Crossing greater borders : a study of intergroup contact in Cyprus' Buffer Zone

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A study of intergroup contact in Cyprus’ Buffer Zone

Caro Aalderink (11786795)

MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Supervisor: dr. M. Dekker

Second reader: dr. P. Pallister-Wilkins

June 29

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_{, 2018}

Word count: 25.114

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Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, dr. Martijn Dekker, for guiding me through the process of writing this Master’s thesis. Thank you, Martijn, for your valuable insights, contagious enthusiasm, and calming humor whenever I needed it most. I would also like to thank dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins for taking the time to evaluate this thesis as a second reader. Rosa, thank you for your advice and enthusiasm: your support has motivated me to aim higher than I originally thought possible.

To my family and friends, and especially to Boyd, for your loving care and support (and for supplying me with food when I lost track of time while writing). Thank you for always looking out for me and for being a source of strength and encouragement in whatever I do, wherever on this planet I may be.

To Athena, for showing me the warmest hospitality I have ever encountered and for making Cyprus feel like home. I will forever remember those warm nights in your beautiful garden, your happy personality, and our fantastic conversations. And lastly, to everyone in Cyprus that I had the honor to meet and talk to on my journey – your courage, optimism, and ambition touched me deeply and really inspired me, not just in writing this thesis. Words cannot express how proud I am of having met you: I hope I have done justice to your stories.

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Abstract

Due to years of interethnic conflict, the two largest communities on the island of Cyprus are strongly divided. Physically, this division manifests itself as the Green Line (or Buffer Zone). Situated in the physical area of division, this study focuses on the Green Line’s psychological manifestations in the lives of Cypriots who do engage in intercommunal contact. In doing so, this study sets out to provide a micro-level account of narratives, exploring Cypriots’ personal experiences and perceptions regarding the Cyprus Problem, intercommunal contact, and everyday coping strategies. By means of participant observation and semi-structured interviews, twenty-two Greek and Turkish Cypriots share their stories which together constitute an addition to the more classic international relations approach to intercommunal conflict. By looking through this particular lens, this study is able to assess the potential for conflict resolution as experienced by Cypriots themselves. The study concludes that the ‘psychological Green Line’ is not strongly present among Cypriots who frequently engage in contact with ‘the other’ community, and that both organized and organic contact settings show a reduction of ingroup favoritism. Ingroup-outgroup boundaries have shifted away from traditional towards smaller and more arbitrary distinctions. Furthermore, Cypriots who engage in frequent contact with ‘the other’ display three coping strategies: avoidance of sensitive topics, identity shifting, and nuancing terms. Whether contact is organized or organic influences the degree to which these strategies are employed.

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1. Introduction

The practice of peace and reconciliation is one of the most vital and artistic of human actions.

Thích Nhất Hạnh (2005)

The island of Cyprus is home to several communities, the largest ones being the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Since 1974, these two ethnic groups have been physically divided by a UN-administered border, commonly referred to as the Buffer Zone or Green Line. This establishment followed years of unrest and interethnic violence and resulted in population displacements of most Greek Cypriots to the south and Turkish Cypriots to the north (Papadakis, 2008).

Although the Buffer Zone is still clearly visible, Cypriots have been able to cross the checkpoints since 2003. Still, levels of interaction between the communities remain low. A study from 2010 found that only one per cent of Greek Cypriots and eight per cent of Turkish Cypriots regularly crossed the Green Line (Husnu & Crisp, 2010). In both the Turkish-Cypriot north and Greek-Turkish-Cypriot south, nationalism is strongly encouraged, for instance through history education (Papadakis, 2008) or mandatory military service (Stavrinides & Georgiou, 2011). This leads to perpetuated ethno-nationalist sentiments and a strengthened feeling of “us versus them”, where one ethnic group is commonly presented to the other as the enemy (Stavrinides & Georgiou, 2011).

Within this divided context, areas where both communities mix or are in contact with one another attract specific attention. The Buffer Zone in Nicosia is an interesting case: it divides the capital into a Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot half, but in providing ground for bi-communal activities and bringing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people together, it has also become a place of unity (Home for Cooperation, 2015).

Only in one village, which happened to fall within the Buffer Zone in 1974, do Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots still live side by side. This village, named Pyla, has been portrayed very differently by both sides. Greek Cypriot discourse has often used Pyla as a symbol for cooperation, arguing that Cyprus used to be characterized by peaceful coexistence and that it is still possible for the two groups to attain this (Papadakis, 2018). On the contrary,

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2 Turkish Cypriot officials have referred to Pyla as another example of oppression of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots, just like in the past; therefore, reunification would be a dangerous route to take (Papadakis, 2018). Naturally, then, Pyla has been subject to various conflicts. By and to other Cypriots, locals were often portrayed as traitors or smugglers, but also as heroes, paving the way for future reconciliation.

The apparent ambiguity of the Buffer Zone, being a place of cooperation to some and a place of betrayal to others, presents an interesting case to study. The current research explores and analyzes interaction patterns in two different places, and also how Cypriots themselves experience the historical divide in their daily lives. How salient is the Green Line in their minds? Do they perceive the other ethnic group as much of an “other”? How do Cypriots from the two communities deal with their backgrounds and histories, and how do they deal with being in the “spotlight” to the rest of the country (and beyond)? And perhaps most importantly, how does one group engage in extending their conception of ‘us’ towards the inclusion of ‘them’? These questions are explored under one overarching research question:

How does the ‘psychological Green Line’ manifest itself in Cypriots’ daily lives in Cyprus’ Buffer Zone?

The academic relevance of this research lies in its contribution to the literature on intergroup contact in societies divided by conflict, focusing on how this is experienced psychologically and on an everyday level. In doing so, this research takes an individual-based approach, in contrast to the more classic international relations-approach that is more commonly used to study the Cyprus conflict. Its societal relevance is that by looking through this particular lens, this study is able to assess the potential for conflict resolution as experienced by Cypriots themselves. The research also sheds light on the pioneering role of those who dare to break through established borders – sometimes physically, but more so psychologically. By engaging in contact with ‘the other’, these people are crossing ‘greater’ borders than merely physical ones. As they are taking the first steps towards a different future, a micro-level study that personally follows their experience and challenges can produce useful insights into pioneering reconciliation efforts.

This thesis starts by ‘setting the stage’ of the current study, providing a historical overview of the Cyprus conflict and the Green Line. Chapter 3 offers the theoretical framework for this thesis. The framework is based on a literature review of relevant theories on (physical

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3 and psychological) borders, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality, intergroup contact, and everyday experiences. Chapter 4 discusses the design of this research, including an elaboration on case studies, research and sampling methods, the current research sample, limitations, and ethical considerations. Then, Chapter 5 and 6 present the findings of the current study, in Nicosia and Pyla respectively. In Chapter 7, findings of both research sites will be compared, analyzed, and situated in the theoretical framework. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions drawn from the current research, followed by an elaboration on this study’s implications and limitations.

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2. Setting the Stage

To account for and to better illustrate the theoretical framework of this thesis (see Chapter 3), this chapter aims to ‘set the stage’ and elaborate on the context in which the current research is situated. The first section provides a concise historical overview of the conflict in Cyprus, followed by an elaboration on the physical area in and around which this research was conducted: the Green Line, or Buffer Zone. Finally, a third section discusses the current situation in Cyprus in terms of division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

2.1 The Cyprus Problem

The conflict in Cyprus is often referred to as ‘one of the longer frozen conflicts in Europe’ (Psaltis, 2016, p. 229). The island has been home to Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots for centuries. Due to its strategic location, several nations have fought to establish power on the island. Cyprus had been a British colony since 1925, yet Cypriots had soon started to challenge the British reign. This resistance resulted in violence in 1931, when Greek Cypriots loudly voiced their desire for amalgamation with the Greek mainland. This desire was not new; the Enosis movement, striving for a unification of all Greek speaking populations, had already been established under previous Ottoman rule (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The Enosis movement reached its peak during the 1950s and 1960s, as anticolonial uprisings started to occur with increasing frequency. In 1955, the Greek Cypriot EOKA [Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston / National Organization of Cypriot Combatants] commenced a guerilla war against the British colonial domination. EOKA’s aim for Enosis was strongly supported by Greek Cypriots, at the time consisting of 78 per cent of the Cypriot population (Ker-Lindsay, 2011) – in an unofficial referendum in 1950, 96 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population favored unification with Greece (“Zypern, 22. Januar 1950”, n.d.). Eight hundred Turkish Cypriots also voted in favor of Enosis: therefore, one cannot argue that the division of Cyprus began solely with the Greek Cypriot desire to unite with Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Meanwhile, most of the Turkish Cypriot minority aspired for Taksim: a partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey (Galvanek, 2013). In response to the movements for Enosis, Turkish Cypriots established a counter organization in 1957: TMT [Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı / Turkish

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5 Resistance Organization]. The nationalistic organization was backed by Turkey as well as British colonial authorities, who sought to undermine the Greek Enosis movement and aimed to stress polarization as an implementation of their divide and rule policy (Souter, 1984).

In 1960, Cyprus was declared an independent state by Greece, Turkey, and the UK in the Zürich-London Agreements. According to these agreements, the new Republic of Cyprus was to become a bicommunal state with a ‘balanced’ power structure: The Greek Cypriots would elect a Greek Cypriot president, whereas a Turkish Cypriot vice-president would be elected by the Turkish Cypriots (“Cyprus Constitution”, n.d.). However, disputes between the leaders and their communities started to arise within the first three years of the new constitution, eventually leading up to political lockdowns and an eruption of violence between the communities on the ground (“A Country Study: Cyprus”, n.d.). On ‘Bloody Christmas’ in 1963, intercommunal violence and killings took place in Nicosia and quickly spread across the island of Cyprus (Gasparini, 2016). The power-sharing government collapsed almost simultaneously. Turkish Cypriot members of government maintain that they were forced out, whereas Greek Cypriots believe that they withdrew with the purpose of forming their own administration (Gasparini, 2016). In order to de-escalate tensions and prevent further escalations of the conflict, Britain, Greece, and Turkey sent in a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, which was later replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, in March of 1964 (Ker-Lindsay, 2014). With a green pencil, the commander of British forces in Cyprus, Peter Young, drew an imaginary line through Nicosia in order to separate the predominantly Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot areas, as to prevent further clashes (Lee, 2017).

Despite UN presence, separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots continued to increase. By this time, the majority of Greek Cypriots had come to realize that Enosis was no longer a feasible goal, yet many hung on to the ideal. Still in support of unification with Greece, EOKA-B [Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston B] was established. In a coup d’état on July 15, 1974, the Greek military junta (which controlled EOKA-B and the Cypriot army), took control over Cyprus (“Government: Cyprus”, n.d.). Prompted by this coup attempt, Turkey intervened by ordering a military invasion of the island on July 20, 1974 (Papadakis, 2018). Severe armed conflict followed, yet Turkish troops were able to occupy the northern half of Cyprus: approximately 37 per cent of the island is still under Turkish control today (Papadakis, 2018). The line that Peter Young had once drawn through Nicosia was extended across the

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6 island, effectively cutting it in half (Lee, 2017): the ‘Green Line’ was now fully established. On November 15, 1983, the occupied northern side of the Line declared its independence, officially proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). To this day, the TRNC is recognized only by the Republic of Turkey itself; the international community commonly refers to the area as ‘occupied territory’ (Papadakis, 2018).

Peace talks and negotiations continued throughout the years following 1974, but changed in the late 1990s when the European Union began accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus (Theodoulou, 2016). Cyprus would become a member state in 2004. Eager to see the island reunite first, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a resolution to settle the Cyprus Problem. In his Annan Plan, he suggested to restructure the island into a federation of two states: the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish Cypriot state, joint under a federal government (Theodoulou, 2016). Greece and Turkey supported the proposal – the latter aiming for EU membership, which would be impossible while there was Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. Most Turkish Cypriots hoped that the plan would result in a settlement where they, too, would join the European Union, ending the isolation of the largely unrecognized TRNC. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were less strongly in favor of the plan: their EU membership had already been guaranteed, and their president urged them to reject the plan, arguing that it would be a danger to Greek Cypriot rights and to an actual unification of Cyprus. In the Annan Plan referendum in 2004, 75.8 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted against, whereas 64.9 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor (Theodoulou, 2016).

Although the international community has played an active role in the peacemaking process regarding the Cyprus Problem, the conflicting parties have not been able to reach a settlement. Greek Cypriots refuse to accept any proposal that does not address the issue of Turkish settlers, who came to Cyprus after 1974, as they would like to see them leave the island. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots demand that authority on Cyprus cannot be formed as a central federal government. Fearing oppression by Greek Cypriots – a significantly larger population – the Turkish Cypriots prefer the island to be governed as two sovereign states. The opposing official views are illustrated by Peristianis and Mavris (2011) in Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots (see Figure 2.1), showing a pronounced difference in the conflicting parties’ interests. Ideal solutions for the majority of Greek Cypriots are pictured on the left side of the figure, those for the majority of Turkish Cypriots are pictured on the right.

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7 Although precise numbers and percentages of Cypriots in favor of the different outcomes were not found, research by Kaymak, Lordos, and Tucci (2008) did assess both Greek and Turkish Cypriot opinions on several outcome scenarios. For instance, whereas 42 per cent of Turkish Cypriots found recognition of the TRNC prior to any negotiated solution highly desirable, this option was unacceptable for 64 per cent of Greek Cypriots. A confederation of two sovereign states was found unacceptable by 50 per cent of Greek Cypriots and acceptable or desirable by 20 per cent of Greek Cypriots, compared to 21 per cent of Turkish Cypriots strongly against and 44 per cent of Turkish Cypriots in favor of the idea. A unitary state was found acceptable to highly desirable by 87 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 67 per cent of Turkish Cypriots (Kaymak, Lordos & Tucci, 2008), suggesting that some nuance exists in the segregation between positions that Turkish and Greek Cypriots may hold.

Figure 2.1: “Ideal and Compromise Positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots” (Peristianis & Mavris, 2011).

2.2 Green Line, Buffer Zone: the Physical Border

The line demarcating the north and south of Cyprus has been defined as “the line between the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control” (Council Regulation, 2004). This line is commonly referred to as the Green Line. Generally, the term ‘Green Line’ is defined as “a line of demarcation between two hostile communities” (‘Green Line’, 2018). The Dictionary of Human Geography specifies that “[t]he most common use of the term denotes the Armistice line separating Israel and the Palestinian territories and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The term is occasionally used elsewhere, as

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8 in the de facto partition lines in Beirut (Lebanon) and Nicosia (Cyprus)” (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts & Whatmore, 2009). David Newman, one of the few scholars to have addressed the concept of the Green Line extensively, notes in one of his works: “[w]hile the Green Line constitutes the default border, the specific course of the Green Line is not sacrosanct, nor is its international legal status clear” (Newman, 2010). As the international community does not recognize them as official borders between sovereign nations, the status of Green Lines remains controversial.

The Green Line has been perceived differently by Cypriots on each side. Greek Cypriots generally regard the Green Line as an illegitimate border, perceive its nature as aggressive, and argue that it should be abolished so that the island can be reunited (Papadakis, 2018). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots more often refer to the Green Line as protective in nature, and as a permanent, legitimate state border to their Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state only recognized by Turkey (Papadakis, 2018).

Figure 2.2: The Green Line in Cyprus (Wathen Stather Hunt, Bowman & Goult, 2018).

The armistice Green Line was established with the aim to prevent violence between the conflicting groups from reoccurring, and has been guarded by a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP. From 1974 until 2003, citizens were unable to cross the Green Line without special permission. In April of 2003 border restrictions were eased, allowing citizens to cross through a number of specified checkpoints. At present, seven active checkpoints allow citizens and visitors to cross as often as they like (“Cyprus Border Crossings”, n.d.) Running across

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9 Cyprus, the line is approximately 180km long and varies in width, from a few meters to a few kilometers wide (“About the Buffer Zone”, 2018). Consequently the Green Line is not really a ‘line’, and is often also referred to as the Buffer Zone. In the current research, the two terms may be used interchangeably, although ‘Green Line’ is used predominantly to indicate its separating character, whereas ‘Buffer Zone’ is used mainly to describe what happens inside the area.

2.3 Division Between the Communities: the Psychological Border

Although Cypriots have been able to cross the Green Line since 2003, levels of interaction between the communities remain low. Husnu & Crisp (2010) found that only one per cent of Greek Cypriots and eight percent of Turkish Cypriots regularly crossed the Green Line. The feeling of ‘us versus them’ among Greek and Turkish Cypriots remains salient. Papadakis (2008) notes how history education in Cyprus embodies a strong sense of nationalism, both in the north and the south. Stavrinides and Georgiou (2011) mention how both northern and southern Cyprus have a mandatory period of military service, perpetuating ethno-nationalist sentiments by constantly portraying the other ethnic community as the enemy.

Some scholars argue that ingroup-outgroup divisions in Cyprus are both inevitable and natural, precisely because Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have different cultures (Joseph, 1985). However, a study on intergroup perceptions in Cyprus found that coexistence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is not obstructed by cultural differences alone: negative attitudes toward the other group were in fact also predicted by perceived differences in social identity and victimization experiences (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006). In addition, Smeekes, McKeown and Psaltis (2017) identified perceived threat as a major factor. They argue that when groups are or feel threatened, they are likely to cling to historical group narratives in order to secure a certain continuity in their group identity.

A 2015 report on Cypriots’ hopes and fears regarding the Cyprus Problem repeatedly highlights a theme of mistrust between the communities (Cyprus2015, 2011). For instance, Turkish Cypriots worry that public authorities will ethnically discriminate them in their decisions; there is a common mistrust towards potential settlements of the conflict; and both communities commonly believe that the other community is less open to coexistence (compared to their own community). Still, a survey included in the same report shows that

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10 there is also division within communities, at least in members’ views of the past and present of the Cyprus Problem (see Figure 2.3; 2.4; 2.5).

Figure 2.3: “I recognize that both communities in Cyprus have made mistakes in the past.” (Cyprus2015)

Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots

2% Strongly disagree 14% Strongly disagree

4% Somewhat disagree 12% Somewhat disagree

7% Neither agree nor disagree 22% Neither agree nor disagree

38% Somewhat agree 23% Somewhat agree

49% Strongly agree 30% Strongly agree

Figure 2.4: “I try to look at the Cyprus problem from the point of view of the ‘other’.” (Cyprus2015)

Figure 2.5: “I do not waste my time listening to the arguments of the ‘other’.” (Cyprus2015)

The figures above reflect an evident division within communities themselves, which nuances the view that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots hold completely segregated opinions. This nuance also reflects the importance of the current research: seemingly, there is ground for manifestation of intergroup contact effects, on which this thesis elaborates.

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3. Theoretical Framework

This study contributes to research on intergroup contact in divided societies. Before turning to the current study, the following chapter situates the research question (how does the psychological Green Line manifest itself in Cypriots’ daily lives in the Buffer Zone?) in a theoretical framework, consisting of borders’ physical and psychological aspects, Social Identity Theory, Intergroup Contact Theory, and the notion of Everyday Peace. These theories are integrated in an analysis of the current study’s results in Chapter 7.

3.1 Borders: the Physical, the Psychological

The current research takes place almost entirely in the physical Buffer Zone/Green Line area, yet in doing so, it addresses the border area’s psychological manifestations. In forms of barbed wire, sandbags, and walls, physical displays of the Green Line are clearly present in Cyprus – yet, the ‘border’ also exists in individual minds. Playing a central role throughout this thesis, the concept of the Green Line is essential to define. The notion of the Green Line being a border is highly controversial, and although the Green Line is not officially a border, research on borders may still be of particular use.

There seems to be no single, clear-cut definition of what a border is, as a border is largely constituted by discourse. Border scholar Henk van Houtum underlines this notion in saying that “[t]he reality of a border is created by the meaning that is attached to it. A line is geometry, a border is interpretation” (2010, p. 412). In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia “established the concept of equality among states based on the principle of mutually exclusive sovereignty over territories delineated by borders” (Popescu, 2011, p. 34). The creation of borders in the Treaty ensured that outside interference was no longer a concern. A political definition of territorial lines was born, although it was not before the early twentieth century that “the idea of the nation-state and a world geography defined by national boundaries had evolved to a position of conceptual dominance, as had principles of international relations built upon them” (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 944). Borders across the planet were shaped particularly during and after the two World Wars, decolonization period, and the Cold War, and nation

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12 states “became naturalized as the ultimate political expression of the will of a people and the uncontested modern political form of the organization of territory” (Popescu, 2011, p. 36).

Since the early twenty-first century, marked by events such as the 9/11 attacks on the New York Twin Towers, increasing attention was paid to security and the protective aspect of national borders. This shift underlined the inherent contradiction of borders: while borders’ openness had become crucial for international trade, fear of terrorism and the ‘other’ had caused borders to become more protected, sometimes even impassable (Van Houtum, 2012). Because of the heterogeneous makeup of most European states, a sense of national belonging and a common identity did usually not arise naturally, but were often created instead. After all, without shared identities and nationalism the survival of nation states according to the Westphalian system would not be guaranteed (Popescu, 2011). Borders themselves played an essential role in the creation of a common identity, as they did “produce and enforce a clear division between the ‘superiority’ of a nation’s domestic ‘us’ and the ‘inferiority’ of the foreign ‘them’”: a process defined as othering (Popescu, 2011, p. 36). Related to this idea is the notion that nations are in fact ‘imagined political communities’, on which Benedict Anderson (1983, p. 49) elaborated that nations are “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.

This is where the physical and psychological aspects of borders meet. According to Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen (2002, p. 126), borders are not fixed in space and time; rather, they should be understood as “an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or products”. A border’s spatial component continuously plays a separating role, leading to the creation of a separate in- and outside in terms of identity (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). According to Van Houtum and Strüver (2002, p. 142), borders “differ crucially in their meanings, forms and contents of representations and interpretation from context to context”. Thus, a border’s psychological manifestation is largely composed of different perceptions that individuals have of it. The first element of this study focuses on respondents’ perceptions of the Green Line. West and Turner (2011) define perception as “a process of using our senses to respond to stimuli” (p. 47). The authors introduce a four-stage process of perception: attending and selecting, organizing, interpreting, and retrieving. Through attending and selecting, individuals choose to attend to some stimuli and ignore others. Through organizing, individuals categorize stimuli that they

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13 attend to, in order to make sense of these stimuli. Interpreting involves assigning meaning to stimuli, and in the final stage of retrieving, individuals recall information they have stored in their memories.

Previous research has shown a connection between individual identities and individual perceptions, creating divergent opinions, relationships, and experiences with the same border. Hetherington and Munro (1997, p. 184) describe this notion, arguing that borders are more than mere lines on a map:

“Turning a space into a place, giving it meaning, it has been assumed, is the act of human intervention […] Place is a contingent effect of the process of placing, ordering and naming that emerge from the actions of heterogeneous materials within a given network and the system of differences that are generated to stability to such a mobile process.”

According to Hetherington and Munro (1997), individual and collective perceptions are crucial in the psychological as well as physical construction of borders. Border perceptions are largely influenced by perceptions of the self in relation to the ‘other’; individuals attend and select, organize, interpret, and retrieve information about the ‘other’ and define differences between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’, which can eventually establish a nation’s identity. Depending on the perception process, perceptions of borders can differ – borders can be seen as protective objects, as gateways that allow contact with the other, or as tools of exclusion, for instance (Angus, 1997). Van Houtum and Strüver (2002) argue that it does not matter whether borders and ‘the other’ are not physically but merely ‘mentally’ there: an imagined border also constructs a reality and is ”not less real in its effects and consequences” (p. 142). Individuals are able to (re)produce what a border embodies or represents, an argument that Newman (2011, p. 33) stressed when he wrote: “[b]orders may signify the point or line of separation between distinct entities, separating one category from another, in some cases institutionalizing existing differences, while in other cases creating the difference where none existed previously.”

3.2 ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’: Social Identity Theory

Although the current research was conducted in and near the physical border area, its main focus actually entails the border’s psychological character. The feeling of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ has been present among Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus since long before 1974 (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006). According to Social Identity Theory (SIT),

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14 originally developed in the 1970s in the study of intergroup relations, individuals relate to favored ingroups (‘us’) and disfavored outgroups (‘them’) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In SIT, it is proposed that people’s identities are largely derived from the social categories or groups to which people belong (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Social categories, for instance, can be based on ethnicity, religion, sex, or class. In other words, people base their self-perception on what defines the ‘us’ associated with any internalized group membership.

A number of studies have found category salience to shape identity. For instance, ethnic minority children in classrooms (where their ethnicity is more salient because they form a minority group) were significantly more likely to describe themselves on the basis of their ethnicity; along the same lines, children were significantly more likely to describe themselves in terms of their gender when they were in families with more members of the opposite gender (McGuire, McGuire, Child & Fujioka, 1978). Mullen, Brown and Smith (1992) conducted a meta-analysis on the subject, which showed that in a large number of studies, group salience was found to promote the development of ingroup bias (favoritism of the ingroup). In fact, the mere categorization of oneself as a member of a certain group was found to already induce ingroup favoritism (Turner & Tajfel, 1986).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) propose three mental processes involved in social identity formation. First, by a process of self-categorization individuals decide to which social groups they and others belong: the ‘us’ (ingroup) or ‘them’ (outgroup). Self-categorization includes an accentuation effect; perceived similarities between oneself and other ingroup members, and perceived differences between oneself and outgroup members, are strengthened. Second,

social identification refers to adopting the identity of the group(s) that an individual

categorized themselves as belonging to, and acting upon that identity. Third, social comparison refers to comparing one’s group to other (out)groups, which results in the selective application of the accentuation effect mainly to those characteristics that result in self-enhancing outcomes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Individuals differ in the extent to which they have a positive social identity (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Those who are high in collective self-esteem are more likely to protect their social identity in the face of group threat. Through processes like these, some scholars theorize that social differences result in the emergence of ethnocentrism (Kalin & Berry, 1996; Kidder & Steward, 1975). The differentiation of individuals into in- and outgroups could, in extreme forms, lead to intergroup violence through ingroup favoritism (Rabbie, 1989). Tajfel and

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15 Turner (1979) proposes three variables that influence the degree of ingroup favoritism: a) the degree to which individuals identify with an ingroup and include this group membership in their self-perception; b) the degree to which contextual factors offer ground for comparison between in- and outgroups; c) the degree of perceived relevance of the group with which one’s ingroup is compared.

3.3 Intergroup Contact Theory

Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner and Christ (2011) suggest that separation has historically failed in reducing intergroup conflict, and that intergroup contact is ‘essential for lasting remedies’: an interesting proposition to explore in the case of Cyprus, where the Green Line originally meant to keep violence between the two conflicting parties at bay. Indeed, one of the core elements of this research is the moment when members of the two communities interact. As such, one of the main theoretical concepts of this thesis is that of the use of direct contact between the two groups, as a way of reducing prejudice between them. Gordon Allport (1954) was the first scholar to elaborate on this paradigm. According to his Intergroup Contact Theory, intergroup contact could lead to positive effects under four conditions: equal group status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and authority support (Allport, 1954).

In this context, equal status refers to the precondition that all participants within the contact setting are equal. Although the equality of status is often difficult to measure or define, various scholars have accepted the idea that participants must perceive each other as equal in the contact setting, in order for intergroup contact to have positive effects (Cohen, 1982; Riordan & Ruggiero, 1980; Robinson & Preston, 1976). Studies have shown that this perception of equal status is important prior to (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) as well as during (Cohen & Lotan, 1995) the contact situation.

Secondly, in order to effectively change attitudes through intergroup contact, it is important for participants to have a common goal (Allport, 1954). In order to achieve that goal, participants also need to rely on each other, making intergroup cooperation Allport’s (1954) third prerequisite. Lastly, Allport (1954) argued that a certain form of authority support is needed for intergroup contact to have positive effects. Having such an authority figure establishes norms on what is and is not acceptable in the contact situation, and may therefore provide participants with a structure in which positive intergroup contact effects can develop.

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16 Since its introduction, Intergroup Contact Theory has been tested in a large number of studies, which show that intergroup contact is particularly effective in reducing prejudice and increasing trust and forgiveness of past transgressions, and that Allport’s conditions are facilitating but not necessary (Pettigrew et al, 2011). In a meta-analysis, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that prejudice can be reduced even through unstructured contact.

Importantly, intergroup contact was found to reduce prejudice not just in self-report measures, but in a number of other measures as well. Explicit measures (e.g. ‘How much do you like Turkish Cypriots?’) are limited by the possibility of self-report bias. Implicit measures, however, tend to show the same effect. For instance, digital response time tasks have been able to measure reduced implicit associations between the participant’s ingroup and the concept ‘good’, and between the participant’s outgroup and the concept ‘bad’ (Aberson & Haag, 2007). Furthermore, physiological threat responses to outgroup members decrease as an effect of positive contact with the outgroup (Blascovich et al, 2001) and contact helps reduce differences in how the human brain processes faces, which suggests that intergroup contact increases perceptions of similarity (Walker et al, 2008). The amount of studies finding both explicit and implicit effects of contact makes Intergroup Contact Theory particularly powerful.

In explaining how contact may reduce prejudice, Pettigrew (1998) proposed ‘four processes of change’: learning about the outgroup, changing behavior, generating affective ties, and ingroup reappraisal. Intergroup contact thus establishes its effects through cognitive, behavioral, and affective means. Several studies suggest that the most important mediating factor is affective in nature: prejudice is reduced by contact through reduced negative affect, such as anxiety or threat and increased positive affect, such as empathy (Tausch & Hewstone, 2010; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).

Still, while contact may increase affect towards the particular outgroup member in the contact situation, the effects of contact would be strongly limited if they would not extend to the outgroup in general. Addressing the question of how positive effects can be generalized, Pettigrew (1998) proposed a three-stage model of optimizing contact effects. The first stage involves decategorization: participants’ individual (rather than group) identities become salient, which creates more space for interpersonal positive affect. Secondly, participants’ group salience is heightened to enable generalization of positive affect from the individual outgroup member to the outgroup as a whole. The third stages involves recategorization: participants’

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17 group identities are broadened to a superordinate group, extending the idea of ‘us’ and ‘them’ towards a more inclusive ‘we’ (Gaertner et al, 1993).

Recently, research on intergroup contact has expanded to include a new concept: the imagined contact hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that actual experiences may not be necessary to improve intergroup attitudes; mere mental simulations of positive contact experiences with the outgroup can reduce negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Crisp & Turner, 2012). In places where actual contact is unlikely, such as Cyprus, Husnu and Crisp (2010) argue that imagined contact could present could provide a feasible alternative. The authors tested the effects of imagined contact in Cyprus and found that when Turkish Cypriots repeatedly imagined positive contact with Greek Cypriots, they expressed greater intentions to engage in actual contact with Greek Cypriots in the future (Husnu & Crisp, 2010). A meta-analysis of over 70 studies on imagined intergroup contact concludes that imagined contact significantly reduces intergroup bias across four variables: attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behavior (Miles & Crisp, 2014).

3.4 Everyday Peace

In studying the aforementioned theoretical principles in Cyprus, emphasis was placed on how Cypriots personally experience such concepts in their everyday lives. The notion of ‘Everyday Peace’ provides a useful framework within which to define this aspect of the research. ‘Everyday Peace’ is a concept introduced by Robert Mac Ginty, defined as “the routinized practices used by individuals and collectives as they navigate their way through life in a deeply divided society that may suffer from ethnic or religious cleavages and be prone to episodic direct violence in addition to chronic or structural violence” (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 549). Mac Ginty defines a deeply divided society as ‘a society in which there is a significant cleavage that goes beyond the political institutions and party politics’ (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 549). Everyday Peace involves individuals’ coping mechanisms, such as avoiding sensitive subjects or concealing (parts of) one’s identity in certain situations.

The case of Cyprus fits Mac Ginty’s description as its divide manifests itself most obviously in residential segregation, different languages and cultures, separate media, and differing access to public goods (Mac Ginty, 2014). In the current research, specific attention was paid to the different coping mechanisms that Cypriots reflect in the context of intergroup contact in the Buffer Zone.

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18 The notion of ‘the everyday’ is particularly useful in this context because it provokes thought on how local voices may be recognized, and how the space of the everyday can be acknowledged as a site of political engagement. In recent years, a number of scholars have discussed this notion, moving from liberal peace towards a more meaningful understanding of how peace is lived by members of a society. Berents (2018, p. 30) states how “recognising the potential of the everyday allows people to move from ‘subjects’ of political orders to ‘active citizens’”. Richmond (2010, p. 670) defines ‘the everyday’ as follows:

“a space in which local individuals and communities live and develop political strategies in their local environment, towards the state and towards international models of order. It is not civil society, often a Western-induced artifice, but it is representative of the deeper local-local. It is often transversal and transnational, engaging with needs, rights, custom, individual, community, agency and mobilisation in political terms. Yet, these are often hidden or deemed marginal by mainstream approaches.”

Richmond further describes the everyday as a ‘juxtaposition to the conservative politics that preserve existing power relations […] or liberal politics which focuses on institutional structures of governance that preserve state frameworks’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 676). Along these lines, the everyday can be seen as challenge to ‘institutionalism and elitism’ when their citizens feel these have ‘lost touch with a social contract’ (Richmond, 2010, p. 676). This way of conceptualizing the ‘everyday’ supports the notion that the everyday potentially hears a larger variety of voices than do liberal peace frameworks, and can possibly account for aspects of protracted conflict, as it exists in Cyprus.

Roger Mac Ginty (2013) proposes the use of micro-level, bottom-up indicators for the measure and evaluation of everyday peace. He notes how precisely their bottom-up nature causes indicators to differ across localities, but introduces a number of examples, including ‘the resumption of cultural practices that declined during conflict’ (p. 56) and ‘fewer military checkpoints’ (p. 60). Mac Ginty suggests a six-stage process for the operationalization of everyday peace indicators. First is identifying the locality in which an everyday peace indicators project could be set up, in which Mac Ginty suggests that the indicators would work best on small levels, such as villages or neighborhoods (2013). In the second stage, the indicators would be identified in a bottom-up manner, by project participants themselves. The third stage involves data collection, the fourth includes data analysis, and the fifth includes the reporting of findings. Finally, stage six involves participants reviewing the process (Mac Ginty, 2013).

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19 Although theories of everyday peace are relatively young and undeveloped, the idea poses the interesting potential of capturing what macro-indicators of peace cannot capture, thereby adding to existing theoretical frameworks. In addition, the notion empowers local community members to personally identify the meaning of peace, and possible ways of enhancing or restoring it. Following this notion, this study pays attention to respondents’ identification of possible ‘everyday peace indicators’ and their personal perceptions of peace in Cyprus.

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4. The Research Design

This study addresses the following research question: How does the ‘psychological Green Line’ manifest itself in Cypriots’ daily lives in the Buffer Zone? The goal of this study is to gain insight into the concepts mentioned in the theoretical framework and how they manifest themselves in the daily lives of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The following section presents how the aforementioned theoretical framework is operationalized.

4.1 The Case Study

As Yin (2008) suggests, explanatory “how” and “why”-questions likely lead to the researcher using case studies, experiments, and histories. This research studies events that are contemporary by means of direct observation and interviews with individuals involved, and without manipulating any of the studied behavior. Therefore, it is best to not make use of histories or experiments (Yin, 2008). Rather, this research makes use of a case study, which has been defined as

“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 2008, p. 23).

Technically, this thesis encloses two case studies. One is Nicosia, Cyprus’ capital, and specifically organized interaction in the local Buffer Zone. The other is the mixed village of Pyla, where interaction is expected to have more of an everyday nature. Close attention is paid to any differences between these two cases, in order to produce valid and comparable insights. The main goal for studying these two cases, however, is to be able to produce broad insights on the same research topic. As such, the site of Nicosia provides an element to this research that is comparable to an experimental condition: intergroup contact being initiated consciously. Along these lines, it can be argued that the site of Pyla provides a control condition for this study.

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21 Although the time frame for fieldwork is only one month, this way of high-intensity field study in two spaces resembles the nature of a multi-sited ethnography, which is defined as “a method of data collection that follows a topic or social problem through different field sites geography and/or socially” (‘Multi-Sited Ethnography’, 2018). George Marcus notes how “in multi-sited ethnography, comparison emerges from putting questions to an emergent object of study whose contours, sites, and relationships are not known beforehand, but are themselves a contribution of making an account that has different, complexly connected real-world sites of investigation” (Marcus, 1995).

4.2 Research Methods

The methodology in this thesis is twofold. Data was collected using a combination of participant observation and semi-structured interviews. In addition, literature research was used in order to frame and understand the context in which the research has taken place. The benefit of using different methods in one study is the possibility for triangulation of research findings. For instance, data gathered from participant observation could be evaluated through semi-structured interviews, and data gathered from the interviews could be checked through informal conversations in the field.

Qualitative interviews are defined as “a site of social interaction in which resulting accounts will have constructed elements even where individual, biographical accounts are sought (Miller, 2016, p. 1). I conducted qualitative interviews with Cypriots who a) are involved in bi-communal activities in Nicosia; b) live in Pyla. By conducting semi-structured interviews, I was able to ask specific questions and thus collect comparable answers from different respondents, but also allow each respondent the space to share whatever they deem important – meaning that to some extent, my respondents’ stories may have been able to influence the direction of my research. My aim was to understand their view on present bi-communal Cyprus, as well as to get examples from their daily lives regarding how they deal with intercommunal contact and how they perceive the other ethnic group.

In terms of content, the interviews I conducted consisted of two different parts. In the relatively unstructured part, I allowed each respondent to share personal anecdotes to the extent that they were willing. In the more structured part, added with the aim of comparing data from different respondents, I conceptualized the theory discussed before and transformed those concepts into a list of topics and questions. No identical questions were used in each

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22 interview, due to different contexts in which respondents’ stories were placed. Still, I used a list of fixed topics and tried to keep questions as similar to the other interviews as possible. As discussed in the theoretical framework, what is strongly embedded in this research is the idea of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and ingroup-outgroup dynamics. Processes of self-categorization, social identification and social comparison were integrated into the interviews when discussing the topic of ingroups and outgroups, in order to assess these dynamics among respondents. For instance, to what extent does someone identify as a Greek or Turkish Cypriot, and what similarities between the individual and the group does that person identify? And in what ways does a Greek Cypriot feel different from a Turkish Cypriot? When discussing the topic of intergroup contact, specific attention was paid to Allport’s four preconditions, for example by asking respondents about the extent to which they felt like they have cooperated with the ‘other’ in the past and how they felt that cooperation played out. Additionally, the notion of Everyday Peace was integrated with a focus on how respondents cope with both specific intergroup contact situations and, more generally, the response they may get from fellow Turkish or Greek Cypriots. Do they feel like others see them as pioneers, or perhaps more as traitors? What difficulties do they encounter from their social circle, do they have personal doubts, and what opportunities do they use?

Secondly, I used the method of participant observation: an ethnographic method which enabled me to immerse myself in my research context. This method allowed me to participate in the lives of those I am studying, as well as carefully observe and record data. In a way, this method is already applicable since I stayed with locals living near Nicosia’s Buffer Zone. I also regularly visited the Home for Cooperation, a community center located right in the Buffer Zone that hosts several bi-communal NGOs and frequently organizes bi-communal activities (Home for Cooperation, 2015). I participated and volunteered in their activities while I was there. They also have a café where I worked on my thesis almost daily, and where I was able to observe how visitors from different backgrounds interacted.

4.3 Sampling Methods

The sample of respondents for this study was selected using the qualitative method of snowball sampling. This method involves asking well-situated people or respondents to suggest (other) information-rich respondents(Patton, 1990, p. 176). I started employing this method by contacting several organizations, experts, and researchers connected to the Cyprus

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23 conflict, and asking them whether they had contacts that qualified as potential respondents in my research. I continued using this method by asking my initial respondents to direct me to further potential respondents once I had arrived in Cyprus. Potential respondents were either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot civilians who a) live in Pyla, or b) engage in intercommunal contact in or near Nicosia’s Buffer Zone. In selecting my respondents, I aimed at keeping my sample diverse in terms of age, gender, and background (Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot). Data for the current research was collected from a total of twenty-two respondents. Nine females (40.9%) and thirteen males (59.1%) participated in this study (mean age 40.35 years, age range 19 – 78). Overall, ten respondents (45.5%) came from a Greek Cypriot background and twelve respondents (54.5%) came from a Turkish Cypriot background. Twelve respondents (54.5%) were interviewed for the case of Nicosia (mean age 30.6 years, range 19 – 51 years). In Nicosia, six respondents (50%) came from a Greek Cypriot background; the other six (50%) came from a Turkish Cypriot background. Ten respondents (45.5%) were interviewed for the case of Pyla (mean age 50.10 years, age range 23 – 78). In Pyla, four respondents (40%) came from a Greek Cypriot background, whereas six respondents (60%) came from a Turkish Cypriot background. Figure 4.1 displays a chronological list of respondents for the current research, including respondents’ first name (altered when requested), age, gender, location of the interview, date of the interview, and whether or not the interview was recorded.

Although respondents’ names can give away their roots, the attentive reader will notice that Figure 4.1 does not specify whether a respondent is Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot. As shown in the above paragraph, a conscious effort was made to recruit a symmetrical sample in terms of background amongst other factors. Nevertheless, when referring to particular respondents (in the table as well as the discussion of findings), a conscious decision was made not to highlight their background. The motivation for this choice is twofold. First, a number of respondents indicated that they disliked the Greek or Turkish label, or rather identified as Cypriot. Second, highlighting respondents’ backgrounds would falsely imply that them being Turkish or Greek Cypriot matters when considering their data. This thesis supports respondents in their efforts to find common ground and replace division with unification. For these reasons, attending to their differences no more than is necessary feels like the most appropriate and respectful style of reporting on their stories.

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24 Figure 4.1: List of respondents (in chronological order)

Name Age Gender Location Date Recorded

Demi 19 Female Larnaca 9 April 2018 Yes

George 23 Male Oroklini 10 April 2018 Yes

Mustafa 50 Male Pyla 11 April 2018 No

Murat 27 Male Pyla 11 April 2018 Yes

Baris 25 Male Pyla 11 April 2018 Yes

Cankut 23 Male Pyla 11 April 2018 Yes

Nikki 51 Female Pyla 12 April 2018 Yes

Thasos 70 Male Pyla 12 April 2018 No

Stavros 48 Male Pyla 12 April 2018 Yes

Nejdet 74 Male Pyla 13 April 2018 No

Simon 55 Male Pyla 13 April 2018 No

Ahmed 78 Male Pyla 13 April 2018 No

Hayal 30 Female Nicosia 17 April 2018 Yes

Mehmet * Male Nicosia 17 April 2018 Yes

Umut 41 Female Nicosia 17 April 2018 Yes

Gregorios 51 Male Nicosia 18 April 2018 Yes

Nur * Female Nicosia 20 April 2018 Yes

Theognosia 28 Female Nicosia 23 April 2018 Yes

Jale 35 Female Nicosia 25 April 2018 Yes

Stephanie 28 Female Nicosia 25 April 2018 Yes

Ekaterini 23 Female Nicosia 26 April 2018 Yes

Oz 28 Male Famagusta 28 May 2018 Yes

4.4 Limitations

The main limitation of this study is the fact that I only interviewed a select number of Cypriots in the Buffer Zone. In Nicosia, these people were selected on the basis of that they relatively frequently engage in intercommunal contact. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is that individuals in Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, who do not engage in intercommunal contact (or less so), may not be represented by the findings of this study. In addition, differences

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25 between the two sites of my fieldwork require careful consideration. In Pyla, intercommunal contact was expected to be much more of an everyday and coincidental nature. In Nicosia, people engaging in intercommunal contact often do so through the activities of bi-communal NGOs: therefore, intercommunal contact in Nicosia was expected to be of a more planned and perhaps even conscious nature.

Another limitation relates to language. Cypriots’ level of English was high enough to be able to conduct functional interviews. However, participant observation presented more challenges; especially when trying to observe contact among Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots in their native languages (which I do not speak). Therefore, my comprehension of participant observation was restricted to body language.

4.5 Ethical Considerations

With regard to ethics, I first of all made sure to obtain respondents’ informed consents and clarified that participation in my research was voluntary (Fuji, 2012). In order to obtain full consent, I provided each respondent with a brief explanation of my research and its aim. The issue of informed consent becomes a bit more complex when considering the method of participant observation. Within this context, I was not always able to inform people about the study I was conducting. This does not immediately lead to ethical issues, however; in many cases, I was merely a witness of what people did and said in public. On some occasions I found myself gathering data in private spaces, however, in which cases I would make sure to inform those around me about my research, its purpose, and anonymity. In interviews, it is crucial that the anonymity of the respondents is presented as an option, and guaranteed, in case they request it. The issue of anonymity was expected to be quite important to respondents, considering the degree of sensitivity with which the conflict is still treated today and the existing conception of Cypriots who engage with “the other” as traitors. However, only one respondent requested to remain anonymous.

Secondly, Fuji (2012, p. 717) notes that “social scientists can bring real harm to study participants” on a social, psychological, or physical level. She therefore poses that researchers should firstly approach local contacts for insights into what risks may be caused to respondents. Since the tensions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are interlinked with the island’s history of conflict, I also aimed to do so; I believed that becoming

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26 as familiar as I could with Cyprus and its contemporary history would ultimately result in better and more appropriate research.

In addition, I took into account that respondents may have experienced personal trauma with regard to the Cyprus conflict, even if they grew up after the island’s state of war. Not only did this mean that I had to handle certain concepts and terms with specific care; it also meant that such experiences may have informed respondents’ current views, and thus may come up during interviews. In those cases, I followed the respondent to whatever extent of sharing they were comfortable with.

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5. Case One: Nicosia

5.1 Introduction

For the first time since my arrival in Cyprus, I grab my passport out of my bag and show it to the officer in the booth. I can see his eyes peeking over the edge of his sunglasses, studying me carefully, before taking a long look at my passport’s identification page. He then places the page on a scanner, looks once more, and hands the document back to me. “Thank you,” I mumble somewhat nervously as he already checks the next person in line. I walk forward, into the Buffer Zone. An empty street leads me from southern Lefkosia into northern Lefkoşa.1

Potted plants form a line separating the left and right half of the street, as to facilitate pedestrian traffic. A large sign warns me that I must apply for immigration control upon entering the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; failure to do so will result in prosecution. Some walls have graffiti on them. I see a peace sign. A tin barrel displays the text ‘THE WAR IS OVER’. Next to it, a permanently closed door says ‘ONE CYPRUS’ – followed by an added Cypriot text, saying ‘no kidding’.

Picture 5.1: The Buffer Zone near the Ledra Street checkpoint (Author’s photo, 2018).

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28 At the end of the street, another passport check awaits me. A Turkish Cypriot repeats the actions of his Greek Cypriot colleague down the road. After another brief look and a scan, he hands me back my passport and I am free to go.

Unbiased as I aim to be, I still cannot help but feel as if I just walked into a different world. In Lefkoşa, streets seem narrower and more lively. Salesmen selling fake brand clothing rush to approach me, trying to draw me into their stores. In Lefkosia, I recognized many big brands that I also see at home (McDonald’s, KFC, Pull&Bear, Bershka, Starbucks); in Lefkoşa, I see none. Churches make way for mosques. The surrounding sounds of Greek change into Turkish. Nonetheless, the buildings and people behind the buzz look the same – and there are just as many tourists.

Centrally located on the island, Nicosia is the capital of Cyprus. Old Venetian walls surround the old town, the ‘walled city’: a tiny space in comparison to Nicosia’s current size. In contrast to the outer parts of the city, Nicosia’s old town appeals for its authentic looks: traditional Cypriot houses with high verandas, people drinking coffee and playing board games on the sidewalk, cats begging for leftovers on a terrace or sleeping in the scarce shade. The city counts about 55,000 Greek Cypriot and 61,000 Turkish Cypriot inhabitants (“World Population Review”, 2018) and functions as the financial, legislative, and administrative center of the island.

Division reached Nicosia before it did other places. In December of 1963 the Green

Line Agreement was signed, dividing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities into the

southern and northern half of the city, respectively (“Nicosia 1963”, n.d.). Fifteen years after the first checkpoints opened, the communities remain largely segregated. Interestingly, though, the very space that divides them simultaneously offers ground for unification. In recent years, several bi-communal NGOs and activities have settled in the Buffer Zone, allowing Cypriots from both sides to meet on relatively neutral soil. I set out to find those people who participate in such meetings: those who use the Buffer Zone to come together rather than to break apart. I want to study how they experience intergroup contact, to what extent they perceive the other group as ‘the other group’ to begin with. How salient is the psychological Green Line in their minds? To what extent have their perceptions of each other changed through contact, and how do they navigate through their daily lives, seeking unification in a divided city?

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29 Picture 5.2: Ledra Street (southern Nicosia, above) and Arasta Street (northern Nicosia, below); two different looks, 150 meters apart. Whereas McDonald’s, Starbucks, and H&M dominate the wide southern

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5.2 Nicosia and the Cyprus Problem

To assess respondents’ personal experiences in the context of division, a first step is to assess their views of the current division and how it emerged in the past. Respondents mark very different beginnings of the Cyprus Problem, ranging from the 1930s to 1974. One respondent marks the 1930s as the conflict’s starting point, noting the early beginning of segregation between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. One respondent mentions 1974, noting the Turkish invasion. Three respondents mark the 1950s, describing how Greek Cypriot fanatics in EOKA started fighting British colonization. Most respondents mark the 1960s, however, mentioning interethnic violence, especially in 1963. There are no significant differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in terms of how they mark the starting point of the conflict. Still, people are aware that the way they were taught about the conflict does not necessarily reflect reality. Gregorios, a 58-year-old man, tells me:

“What I’m telling you is just one of the stories. Because people have different stories to tell you, about the same story, you know? I believe that my story is more close to the truth, because many Greek Cypriots prefer to say the negative things of the others and the good things of us. Some Turkish Cypriots do the opposite. But I’m one of those people – not the majority – who wants to tell the truth. The bad things of Greeks

and Turks, the good things of Greeks and Turks.” 2

When discussing the roots of the conflict, all but a few respondents place emphasis on British influence. “They put us into two different teams, they divided us,” says Demi, a 19-year-old student. “Then the conflict started.”3_{The influence Great Britain has had on Cyprus is}

described in a number of ways. Oz, for instance, describes it as a “British mission to eliminate Cypriotism”4_{. George refers to it as an ‘experiment’: “At the time, everybody was kind of}

Cypriot. So they found differences and took people and said: You are Turkish, and you’re Greek. You’re Muslim, you’re Christian. You have a mosque, you have a church. You speak Greek, you speak Turkish. And so you’re Turkish Cypriot, and you’re Greek Cypriot.”5_Nur

explains her view on the creation of the Cyprus Problem:

“I can definitely tell you that the divide and rule policy also worked here. Especially when the 1960 constitution was drawn. […] The 1960 constitution model is based on

2_{Gregorios, interview, Nicosia, 18 April 2018.} 3_{Demi, interview, Larnaca, 9 April 2018.} 4_{Oz, correspondence, Nicosia, 28 May 2018.} 5_{George, interview, Oroklini, 10 April 2018.}