REPUTATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES?
A Case Study Analysis of EASO and FRONTEX
MSc Thesis Public Administration: IEG. Leiden University
By: Floran van Amelsfort (s2090511)
Supervisor: Dr. D. Rimkute
Second reader: Dr. J. Christensen
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I. Foreword
Before you lies my thesis in which the relationship between media coverage and the reputation management strategy of European agencies is analysed. This thesis is the end product of my MSc degree Public Administration: International and European Governance. I found it an interesting topic to research, since today, due to various trends such as social media and the internet, maintaining a good reputation seems to become more and more important. Not only companies, but also public organizations seem to realize this as this thesis show.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Madalina Busuioc and Dovile Rimkute for their guidance and support. Also, I would like to thank my ‘library companions’ for brightening up the thesis writing process. Moreover, I thank my family for supporting me. And lastly, I would like to thank my girlfriend Modiehi for her patience, help and support.
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II. Table of Contents
I. Foreword ...2
II. Table of Contents ...3
III. Figures and Tables ...5
IV. List of Abbreviations ...6
1. Introduction ...7
2. Literature Review ... 10
2.1 Bureaucratic reputation theory ... 10
2.2 Multiple audiences ... 10
2.3 Reputational threats ... 11
2.4 Dimensions of organizational reputation ... 12
2.5 Literature on reputation management ... 12
2.6 The research gap ... 15
3. Theoretical framework ... 16
3.1 The multidimensional nature of reputation ... 17
3.1.1 The performative dimension of reputation ... 17
3.1.2 The moral dimension of reputation ... 17
3.1.3 The technical dimension of reputation ... 18
3.1.4 The legal-procedural dimension of reputation ... 18
3.2 Political salience and media salience ... 18
3.3 Managing the reputational threat of intense negative media coverage ... 21
4. Research Design ... 26
4.1. FRONTEX and EASO ... 27
4.1.1 FRONTEX ... 27
4.1.2 EASO ... 28
4.2 Most similar case study: EASO and FRONTEX ... 29
4.2.1 MSS I... 29
4.2.2 Similarities between FRONTEX and EASO ... 30
4.2.3 Differences between EASO and FRONTEX ... 30
4.3 Operationalizing the independent variable: media salience ... 32
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4.3.2 Measuring visibility and valence ... 34
4.4 Operationalizing the dependent variable, and the reputational character of the negative media coverage ... 48
5. Results and empirical analysis ... 52
5.1 Independent variable: media salience ... 53
5.1.1 Visibility ... 53
5.1.2 Valence ... 54
5.1.3 The reputational dimensions conveyed by the negative EP questions ... 59
5.1.4 Empirical analysis of the results and expectations for the outcome(s) ... 62
5.2 Dependent variable: reputation management strategy ... 65
5.2.1 Empirical analysis of the results of EASO ... 66
5.2.2 Empirical analysis of the results of FRONTEX ... 68
6. Analysis and discussion ... 71
7. Conclusion ... 73
8. Appendices ... 76
Appendix I ... 76
Appendix II ... 77
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III. Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 1: Visibility of EASO in the media and the EP ……….34
Figure 2: Visibility of FRONTEX in the media and in the EP ………35
Figure 3: Codebook Framework………..45
Figure 4: Visibility of EASO in the EP………..54
Figure 5: Classified negative EP questions for FRONTEX and EASO………..55
Figure 6: Negatively labelled EP questions as percentage of the total EP questions………56
Figure 7: Aggregated SO value per agency per year………...57
Figure 8: Average SO value per EP question for EASO and FRONTEX………..58
Figure 9: Reputational character of the negative EP questions of FRONTEX……….60
Figure 10: Reputational character of the negative EP questions of FRONTEX expressed in percentages…..60
Figure 11: Intensity of Content and the Reputational Dimensions of EP questions……… 61
Figure 12: Reputational character of the negative EP questions of EASO expressed in percentages………..62
Figure 13: Reputation management strategy annual reports EASO………67
Figure 14: Reputation management strategy annual reports FRONTEX………..68
Figure 15: Reputation management strategy annual activity reports FRONTEX 2015-2016………69
Tables Table 1: WordStat Keywords of Busuioc & Rimkute (2018)………51
Table 2: Added Keywords……….52
Table 3: Overview negatively labelled EP questions FRONTEX……….76
Table 4: Overview negatively labelled EP questions EASO………..76
Table 5: SO values of negatively labelled questions FRONTEX……….77
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IV. List of Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
CEAS Common European Asylum System
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard
EBF External Borders Fund
EC European Commission
ECA European Court of Auditors
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EUAA European Union Agency for Asylum
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System
FCO Frontex Coordinator Officer
FDA Food and Drug Administration’s
FRONTEX Before 2016, September 14: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
Since 2016, September 14: European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GUE/NGL European United Left/Nordic Green Left
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
JO Joint Operation
LIBE The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
MEP Member of the European Parliament
RABIT Rapid Border Intervention Team
SO Semantic Orientation
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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s more and more regulatory agencies have been established on the European level (Dehousse 2008, p. 789; Wonka & Rittberger 2010, p. 730). Only because of this mere fact it would already be of interest to study these agencies. They have become an important component in the European Union’s (EU) architectural set-up (Busuioc 2012, p. 719). At present there are 45 of these agencies dealing with various diverse policy areas – such as, safety, energy, financial supervision, and migration - (EU Agencies Network, 2016). The increasing number of agencies within the EU stands in a tradition of agentification that has taken place all over the western world during recent decades (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006). According to Keleman (2002) the establishment of EU decentralized agencies can be seen as a compromise between the European Commission and the member states: the Commission wishes to gain more power, while member sates want to control their policies better. Member states are therefore more prone to delegating these policies to newly created agencies instead of to the Commission.
Since the proliferation of agencies on the EU level since the 1990s (Keleman 2002, p. 93), academic interest could not stay behind. Since 1997 the literature on EU agencies has proliferated rapidly too, when the first collection on EU agencies was published by the Journal of European Public Policy (Rittberger & Wonka 2011, p. 780). The literature regarding EU agencies can be divided into three major strands. The first body of literature looks into the why and how the agencies have been created, how they have been designed, and in what alternatives are to EU agencies. The second, concerns itself with the exploration of the consequences and trajectories of governance. The third and last strand of literature looks into questions regarding the legitimacy and accountability of EU agencies, as these are independent and non-majoritarian institutions (Rittberger & Wonka 2011, p. 780). This thesis contributes to this third strand of academic literature.
This is an important area of research since we do not only see a proliferation of EU agencies, but also various agencies receiving more powers. While first their powers were mostly limited to information providing and executive in nature, several agencies have become more powerful possessing, decision-making, operational, and even quasi-regulatory powers (Busuioc 2012, p. 719). Both the proliferation of agencies, and their increasing powers, amounted to (already existing) concerns regarding the democratic character of the EU (Busuioc 2009, p. 600-601). Agencies have been granted formal independence from the control of representative European institutions, and therefore lack democratic legitimacy (Busuioc 2009, p. 615). Not being accountable to representative institutions does not mean that agencies are not accountable to anyone or anything. According to the bureaucratic reputation theory, which I will use in
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this thesis, agencies are held to account by its various audiences to various degrees, as they want to maintain or even enhance their reputation among (some) of their audiences. Not doing this sufficiently might lead to them losing their legitimacy and possibly their autonomy, which is something agencies try to prevent.
I am especially interested in how agencies would try to maintain or enhance their reputation taking into account their various degrees of exposure in the media. Maggetti (2012, p. 402) found that media can namely function as an ‘accountability forum’ for independent regulatory agencies. Media coverage can thus be considered as one of the most important channels through which agencies, being not accountable to representative institutions, can nonetheless be held to account. Consequently, it would for agencies seem very important that they are aware of the media coverage they receive considering their commitment to upkeeping a good reputation. Furthermore, it would seem essential too that they know how to react to the media coverage they receive. If they do not react well to this ‘accountability forum’ it could pose a serious risk to their established reputation.
The previously described relationship – between media coverage and the reputation management of agencies – has not been adequately researched yet. We know that agencies will react in certain specific ways to certain media coverage (Gilad et al. 2013; Maor et al. 2012; Maor & Sulitzeanun-Kenan 2013; Maor & Sulizeanu-Sulitzeanun-Kenan 2016; Maor 2016) but we do not have an idea on how they would react to media coverage over longer periods of time. Would agencies take into account the media coverage they receive, and consequently adjust their reputation management strategy? Moreover, would media salience lead them to emphasize certain aspects of their reputation, and/or de-emphasize other aspects? Hence, this thesis will provide an answer on the following research question:
“To what extent does media salience influence the reputation management strategy of EU regulatory agencies?”
It is essential to get a better understanding of the relationship between media coverage and the reputation management of agencies, because it contributes to our knowledge of the media as an ‘accountability forum’ for agencies. To what extent does the media actually function as an ‘accountability forum’ for agencies in the European context? And if the media proves indeed to be an ‘accountability forum’ for agencies, how does it precisely work? These questions are even more crucial considering the lack of democratic legitimacy of EU agencies (Busuioc 2009, p. 615). If EU agencies do not hold themselves
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sufficiently accountable to their audiences via the media by reacting inadequately to their audiences, this could have harmful effects for both the agencies’ reputation well as their legitimacy. Thus, this research might not only for academics be useful but also for the EU agencies themselves.
Moreover, this thesis contributes to developing the bureaucratic reputation theory literature. Firstly, and as mentioned previously, there has been no research within the bureaucratic reputation theory literature which has examined in a comprehensive manner the relation between reputation management and media coverage over a longer period of time. Due to the importance of the media, as described before, this seems to be a serious gap in the literature that needs to be addressed. Secondly, the research contributes specifically to the literature within the bureaucratic reputation theory focusing on Carpenter’s (2010) developed reputational dimensions. These reputational dimensions have been receiving unjustly hardly any attention in the literature. By using Busuioc’s and Rimkute’s (2018) method for operationalizing these reputational dimensions, but especially by extending this method in order to accommodate media coverage, this thesis contributes to the theory and encourages utilization and application of these reputational dimensions in future research. Lastly, this thesis contributes specifically to the bureaucratic reputation theory literature about European agencies, which is a relatively new and developing area of research within the broader bureaucratic reputation theory literature.
In order to provide an answer to the research question this thesis will continue as outlined below. In the literature overview a comprehensive overview will be provided of the bureaucratic reputation theory with a focus on the literature addressing the issue of reputation management. Moreover, in this section the research gap will be identified. The theoretical part will focus on how media salience, once intense and negative, can be considered to be a reputational threat according to the bureaucratic reputation theory, and how agencies could consequently manage this threat. Based on the bureaucratic reputation theory, three hypotheses will be presented which show how and why media salience will lead to agencies changing their reputation management strategy. In the research design, will be explained how the hypotheses will be tested. In order to test the hypothesis a most-similar case study analysis will be undertaken of two European agencies: EASO and FRONTEX. Moreover, in this section there will be explained how both the independent variable (intense negative media coverage), and the dependent variable (agencies’ reputation management strategies) will be operationalized. Consequently, in the fifth section the results will be presented as well as an empirical analysis thereof. Here the hypotheses will be either confirmed or disconfirmed. In the sixth section the results will be discussed, looking more
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particularly at what the results would possibly mean for the role of the media and the reputation management of agencies. Finally, in the conclusion an answer will be given on the research question.
2. Literature Review
This literature review will give a general overview of the bureaucratic reputation theory. First of all, it will address several important components of the theory: ‘audiences’, ‘reputational threats’, and ‘reputational dimensions’. Secondly, it will elaborate on the body of literature concerning reputation management and will finally identify the gaps within the literature.
2.1 Bureaucratic reputation theory
The bureaucratic reputation theory of Carpenter holds that organizational reputation is of vital importance for the challenges public administrators’ face. These include: maintaining broad-based support for an agency and its activities, steering the agency amid enemies and/or potentially disaffected supporters, and projecting a judicious combination of consistency and flexibility (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 26). In this paper, organizational reputation is defined as a set of beliefs about an organization’s history, capacities, intentions, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences (Carpenter, 2010, p. 33). Not only is organizational reputation of vital importance for challenges public administrators face, but even more importantly it shapes the administration’s discretion and its bureaucratic autonomy, while also shaping its administrative choice (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 30). Most agencies have to struggle for the resources needed to shape its administrative choice and autonomy and are driven by the protection of their “turf” (Wilson 1990, p. 195). Hence, the reputation is not something the agency cannot influence, but is something that the agency can actively shape itself (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 120). Agencies can manage their reputations.
2.2 Multiple audiences
The presence of a network of multiple audiences is an important aspect by which the theory distinguishes itself from other theories of bureaucracy (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 27-28). Rather than facing one principal (as in the principal-agent theory), public administrators face diverse audiences. According to
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Carpenter “an audience is any individual or collective that observes a regulatory organization and can judge it” (Carpenter 2010, p. 33). Hence, an audience can be the media, elected officials, clientele groups, policy experts, and ordinary citizens (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 26). Audiences affect agencies in two ways. Firstly, they can empower or weaken the agency (Carpenter 2010, p. 33). Second, audiences can affect agencies, because agencies are likely to adapt to their audiences in terms of behaviour and rhetoric, both consciously and unconsciously (Carpenter 2010, p. 33). However, if administrators are consciously aware of the presence of an audience and the fact this audience monitors them, it does not automatically mean that these administrators will direct similar amounts of attention to this audience relative to another audience (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 27). Directing attention to one audience and satisfying this particular audience, often means that less attention could be directed to another audience. There exists a possibility of perturbing this other audience (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 27). Hence, it is likely that the public administration will choose to focus on the audiences which are perceived to have the greatest effect on the organizational reputation of the administration.
2.3 Reputational threats
Since organizational reputation shapes the administration’s discretion and autonomy of the administration, the main focus of administrations is to maintain its reputation and where possible enhance it. A failure to do so might lead to a decrease in its discretion and autonomy, with the ultimate consequence of being dissolved. Whether or not the administration is able to maintain or enhance its reputation is dependent on how it manages the reputational threats it faces. But what are reputational threats? Reputational threats are challenges that pose a threat to the agency’s established reputation (Gilad et al., 2013, p. 452). They consist of external opinions and allegations from (a) particular audience(s) (Gilad et al., 2013, p. 452). Moreover, reputational threats can be classified as either being a performative, moral, procedural or technical threat for the organizational reputation. The dimension of the reputational threat, and the audience(s) which voice(s) the threat, will determine how the administration will respond and manage the threat. Thus, reputational threats shape administrative choice. Hence, as Carpenter states about bureaucratic reputation theory: “The lesson of this scholarship is that, when trying to account for a regulator's behaviour, look at the audience, and look at the threats” (Carpenter, 2010, p. 832). This ‘lesson’ will be followed in this thesis.
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2.4 Dimensions of organizational reputation
In a nutshell, Carpenter (2010, p. 45) argues that organizational reputation consists of four dimensions that shape audience’s reactions and the behaviour of public administrators. These four dimensions of reputation are: the performative dimension, the moral dimension, the procedural dimension, and the technical dimension of agencies’ organizational reputation. The performative dimension is about whether the agency is competent and perhaps efficient to do its job. The moral dimension is about whether the agency is compassionate, flexible, and honest, and whether it protects the interests of its client’s constituents and members. The procedural dimension is about whether the agency follows normally accepted rules and norms, independent of the quality of its decisions. Lastly, the technical dimension is about whether the agency has the capacity and skill required for dealing in complex environments, separate from its actual performance (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 27). However, public administrators could never render a full optimization of all various dimensions due to the infeasibility in practical terms (Carpenter & Krause, 2012, p. 27). Hence, similar to how public administrations choose to focus on certain audiences, public administrations will also choose to focus on (the) reputational dimension(s) which they perceive makes the greatest contribution on the overall organizational reputation of the administration.
2.5 Literature on reputation management
The theory holds that agencies can actively shape their reputation themselves. Moreover, they do this well thought-out, since the theory takes the departure approach that “regulatory agencies are rational, as well as politically conscious political conscious organizations interested in protecting their unique reputations” (Maor 2015, p. 29). Reputation management-related activities consist of two components: an “attacking,” and a “defensive”. On the one hand the defensive component entails that agencies will try to shuffle any blame side-, up-, or downwards in order to protect their administrative discretion and bureaucratic autonomy, (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 120-121). On the other hand, the attacking component entails that these reputation management-related activities could also be seen as attempts to influence the content of the public policy (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 121). Agencies could try to enhance their administrative discretion and bureaucratic autonomy by using the attacking component of reputation management. Wæraas and Byrkjeflot (2012, p. 187) argue that a strong reputation could be a valuable political-administrative asset.
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Though, public organizations that try to manage their reputation face several challenges that non-public organizations do not face. Wæraas and Byrkjeflot (2012) have identified five problem common problems for public organizations managing their reputation. First of all, public organizations are, in one way or another, instruments of superordinate political bodies and can therefore not determine their own course of action (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot 2012, p. 193-194). They have been assigned with a mission by superordinate political bodies and are not able to change themselves this mission. Moreover, there is a tendency for politicians to interfere with the public organization. Secondly, public organization face a consistency problem since most of them carry responsibilities that require the application of inconsistent sets of values and are themselves characterized by multiple identities (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot 2012 p. 195-196). Thirdly, public organizations lack charisma due to the fact that they cannot choose their own followers and environments, due to a general negative perception of bureaucracies caused by the proliferation of New Public Management (NPM), and due to the fact that they deal with problems that are unlikely to go away (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot 2012, p. 196-197). Fourthly, public organizations face a problem of uniqueness due to the fact that public organizations have to conform to the larger category. Therefore, trying to stand out becomes more difficult (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot 2012, p. 197-198). Lastly, organizations are assumed to be searching for an excellent reputation. However, for public organizations this is difficult since pursuing an excellent reputation would imply seeking to be perceived as superior to others involved in the same mission, and it would also be hard for public organizations that achieve excellence to maintain it since they often have to take unpopular decisions (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot 2012, p. 199-200).
Hence, for public organizations managing their reputations is not a clear-cut process. Agencies need to take into account the problems of managing their reputations as public organizations, but they also need to make decisions on when to emphasize what dimension of their reputation and when to prioritise what audience. This is based on the threat an agency faces, and on the particular audience who expresses the threat (Carpenter 2010, p. 832) Sometimes they need to balance their dimensions of reputation, but at other times they need to prioritize of certain dimension(s) of reputation over others (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 121). The same principle applies to the different audiences the agency has to appeal to: sometimes the agency needs to balance the different interests of their audiences, but at other times needs to prioritize certain audiences over others (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 121). This will lead
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agencies to appeal on the one hand to diverse audiences, when at the same time, on the other hand, seek to provide distinct and targeted messages for particular audiences (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 121).
So how exactly do agencies manage threats to their reputations? A wide body of literature has evolved over this topic. One strand of literature has shown how the management of threats is embedded in agencies’ decision-making processes (Carpenter, 2002, 2004; Gilad, 2009; Gilad & Yogev, 2012; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Roberts, 2005). Of these articles Carpenter (2002), Gilad (2009) and Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2013) looked at the particular effect of salience on the decision-making process. Gilad (2009) found that firms’ and regulators’ choices between cooperative and adversarial strategies would be determined by the perceived variance in the external circumstances. Carpenter (2002) found that the agency’s decision-making process speeds up if ‘salience signals’ are transmitted by groups and the media. Maor and Sulizeanu-Kenan (2013) built further upon Carpenter’s finding and found that more critical media coverage would lead to a quicker decision-making of the agency, opposed to positive media coverage which would lead to a slower decision-making process.
Another strand of literature has shown that reputational threats can also be embedded in the endogenous structure of jurisdiction of administrations (Gilad 2008; Maor, 2010). Gilad (2008) shows that an agency’s internal interpretation and external articulation of its mandate is shaped by their need for external and internal support of their legitimacy. Hence, the reputational threats the agency faces can help form the structure of the agency’s jurisdiction. Maor (2010) found that agencies will claim jurisdiction and expand it when their unique reputation is under threat. Looking specifically at the situation of regulatory agencies in case of the emergence of novel technologies, he found that this may occur when new information about the seriousness of the anticipated harm of the novel technology becomes available, or when a rival regulator attempts to formalize its regulatory authority or fails to do so although officially required to. Hence, reputational threats may lead agencies to expand their jurisdictions of, and as such basically restructure them.
A third strand of research has put emphasis on how reputational threats are embedded in the outputs of administrations (Krause & Douglas, 2005; Maor, 2011; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2016). Maor (2011) found that the different reputation an agency has, will incentivize different reputational threats, and in turn these threats will determine the nature of the outputs the agency will provide. Moar and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2016) found that the agency’s reaction to reputational threats can also lead to varying number of units and services (outputs) the agency provides: negative media coverage in the one year can
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lead to a change in the number of and also the nature of outputs of the agency in the following year dependent on their current level of outputs.
The last strand of literature has put emphasis on how reputational threats are embedded in the communication of administrations (Maor et al., 2012; Gilad et al., 2013). In their article Maor, et al. (2012) focused on when agencies are likely to react or keep strategically silent with regards to reputational threats they face. They found that agencies tend to keep silent on issues in which it has a strong reputation, or on issues that lie outside its jurisdiction. Agencies would respond to opinions close to its core functional in which they enjoy a weaker reputation or in areas in which its reputation is still evolving. In a later article they focused on when agencies are likely to react to allegations of under- or overregulation. They found that this depends on the relative threat to an agency’s distinct reputation (Gilad et al., 2013).
2.6 The research gap
In this paper I will build further upon the previously described literature that assesses how agencies manage threats to their reputation. Previous literature has found that reputational threats will lead to agencies managing their reputation in certain ways. Reputational threats may speed up decision-making (Carpenter 2002; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013), it may lead to agencies choosing between cooperative and adversarial strategies (Gilad, 2009), it may shape the agency’s jurisdiction, it may lead to a certain type of outputs an agency provides (Gilad 2008; Maor 2011) and to the quantity of outputs the agency provides (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2016), and it could lastly also determine if and how agencies will communicate (Maor et al., 2012; Gilad et al., 2013).
I think that there are three ways in which this paper could contribute to this body of literature. First of all, all the literature thus far has described quite specific reactions to reputational threats the agencies were facing. For instance, Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2013) have described the effect of reputational threats on the speediness of the decision-making process of the agency, and Maor et al. (2012) have described when agencies are likely to respond or keep silent to reputational threats. The literature thus far has looked at specific situations in which agencies’ management of reputation has been apparent, but has not yet looked at the strategy of the agency concerning its reputational management that forms the basis of the different agency’s reactions. As the theory departs from the assumption that government agencies
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are rational and political conscious organizations, it would be likely that the agency’s reactions are grounded in some broader encompassing reputation management strategy.
Secondly, since the literature has not put much emphasis on the reputation management strategy of agencies, it has never really considered what reactions of agencies to reputational threats would adhere to what dimensions of the agency’s reputation. What dimension of the agency’s reputation would agencies want to defend or improve on by reacting to various reputational threats? For example, Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2016) found that in some cases agencies are likely to take decisions faster due to reputational concerns, but they did not specify what dimension of its reputation the agency would want to defend or improve by taking decisions faster. The same goes for Maor et al. (2012): they found that agencies facing certain reputational challengers are likely to keep silent, but they did not specify what dimension of its reputation the agency would want to defend or improve by keeping silent.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the literature has shown that negative media coverage will lead agencies to react in certain ways by for instance taking decision more quickly, keeping silent, shifting blame, or increasing their level of outputs. The literature has shown how media coverage could lead the agency to act in certain ways and manage its reputation thereby. However, it did not show whether negative media coverage will affect the reputation management strategy of the agency over longer periods of time: is the agency likely to change its reputation management strategy in times of negative media coverage? I intend to fill these gaps in the literature. Next chapter will provide the theoretical framework which will be used to provide an answer on the research question.
3. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework consists of thee parts. The first part will describe in more detail the four dimensions of reputation, which toghether compose the mulitdimensional nature of reputaion. This is necessary because the hypotheses presented in the third part will make claims related to these dimensions. The second part will elaborate on political salience, media salience, and how intense negative media coverage can be considered to be a reputational threat. In the final part I will show how agencies will try to strategically manage the reputational threat of intense negative media coverage. In this part three hypotheses are brought forward.
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3.1 The multidimensional nature of reputation
3.1.1 The performative dimension of reputation
As mentioned before, audiences assign a high performative dimension of reputation to an agency if they perceive it to be competent and perhaps efficient to perform its tasks. Because of this agencies might prioritize deliverables that are in line with certain policy objectives (Krause & Douglas, 2015). As a result, the audience that underscribes the importance of meeting these policy objectives can be satisfied. Though for other audiences subject to the agency’s power the objectives the agency sets itself could harm them (Carpenter 2010, p. 46). This shows that performing according to its task description and policy objectives might also lead to discontent audiences. When considering regulatory agencies in particular, the degree of their performative dimension of reputation depends on whether they can display ‘sufficient vigor and aggressiveness’ to invite compliance of the audiences which are discontent (Carpenter 2010, p. 46). Hence, a key theme within the performative dimension is that it raises problems in terms of measurability and contestation of different performative standards, as audiences are likely to hold the agency to different performative standars (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 122).
3.1.2 The moral dimension of reputation
As mentioned before, audiences assign a high moral dimension of reputation to an agency if they perceive it to be flexible, honest, compassionate, and if it protects the interests of its clients, constituents, and members. Some audiences may ask the question whether the organization has morally and ethically defensible means and ends (Carpenter 2010, p. 46). One could observe here a difficulty for agencies as there might be a potential conflict between audiences who stress the moral dimension of reputation and audiences who stress the performative dimension of reputation: even in the case the agency is competent and efficient to perform its policy objectives, this still might lead to unsatisfied audiences who from a moral point of view do not agree with the policy objectives themselves. Therefore, highly effective organizations might still have a problematic moral reputation (Carpenter 2010, p. 46). Hence, the moral dimension points to the wicked issue of particular policy challenges, and points to the possibility that moral acceptance will never be granted by all audiences (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 122). If nonetheless, agencies want to emphasize their moral dimension they need to send signals emphasizing
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their commitment to social values, their organisational openness, inclusiveness, flexibility, and integrity, and their commitment to the public interest.
3.1.3 The technical dimension of reputation
Audiences assign high technical dimension of reputation to an agency if they perceive it to have the capacity and skill required for dealing in complex environments, separate from its actual performance. Audiences may ask the question whether the organization is “qualified” for the authority granted to it (Carpenter 2010, p. 46). Hence, the technical dimension points to disagreements about what constitutes professional expertise (Christensen & Lodge, 2018). The technical dimension of reputation is not the same as the performative dimension of reputation, and as such an organization does not automatically has to have a strong performative reputation if it has a strong technical reputation, and vice-versa. Though, I think these sometimes relate to one another as being ‘competent’ (performative) is often dependent on being ‘qualified’ (technical). Hence, similar to the performative dimension, the technical dimension can also stand in contrast with the moral dimension of reputation.
3.1.4 The legal-procedural dimension of reputation
Audiences assign a high procedural dimension of reputation to an agency if it follows normally the accepted rules and norms. It differs from moral reputation because even though an organization may have ethically appropriate strategies, it may not have followed the right norms of procedure, deliberation or decision-making (Carpenter 2010, p. 47). According to De Fine Licht et al. (2012, p. 126) who use the procedural fairness theory, a considerable contribution to an organisation’s legitimacy and reputation is the procedure in which it is generated. Are the right organisational procedures and formal requirements being followed, that guarantee procedurally adequate courses of action? The procedural dimension highlights the tension between compliance, and flexibility and responsiveness, and it also highlights the often-questionable links between procedures and intended outputs and outcomes (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 122)
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In this thesis political salience is described as ‘’the degree of importance which is attributed to political matters” (Koop, 2011, p. 210). If an issue is highly politically salient it means that politicians and/or the public ascribe a high degree of importance to this issue. In other words: they care about the issue. As such, political salience is a known to be a good predictor of political intervention (Eisner et al. 1996; Gormley 1986; Ringquist 1995; Ringquist et al., 2003). Politicians are namely more likely to put effort and resources in issues about which the public and they themselves care (Koop, 2011, p. 210). Ringquist et al. (2003, p. 160) found that salience led to more legislative activity. However, salience led to significantly more legislative activity in noncomplex policy areas as opposed to complex areas.
In this thesis I will focus on the political salience in terms of the organisation itself in the public and political discourse. Wood (2017, p. 6) namely argues that political salience can be either viewed in terms of the broad salience of an issue area, or more specifically of the organisation itself in the public and political discourse. Since my primary focus in this paper will be on agencies and not on an issue area, I will similarly to Wood focus on the former.
Media attention (media salience) is the main determinant of political salience of an organisation in the public and political discourse. When an agency is first encountered by an audience, the audience starts by categorizing the agency based on its salient features of characteristics and behaviours (Maor 2016, p. 84). It is the media attention that can serve to bias perceptions of both audiences and agencies and can moderate the accuracy with which agency behaviour is recognized by its audiences (Maor 2016, p. 84). Consequently, media attention can make audiences either more or less aware of the agency’s behaviour (Maor 2016, p. 84). If media attention makes audiences’ more aware of the agency’s behaviour this could lead to more audiences participating in the public or political discourse, and audiences participating more. In turn this could spur again more media attention and more political salience of the agency in public and political discourse.
Even though parliamentary attention is also a determinant of political salience of an organisation in the public and political discourse, it is not a main determinant. Font and Durán (2016, p. 1359) found that members of European Parliament (MEPs) are more likely to ask written questions when agencies generate higher degrees of media attention. An agency receiving media attention is for parliamentarians namely a sign that the agency or the issue the agency is addressing is something the public cares about. Consequently, parliamentarians are more likely to invest their time in this agency (Koop 2011, p. 210), by for instance asking written questions. Hence, even though parliamentary attention contributes to the overall level of political salience, it is often a consequence of media attention.
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In this thesis I will approach salience as a multidimensional construct. According to Kiousis (2004) media salience is a multidimensional construct consisting of three core elements: attention, prominence, and valence. The salience of an object (e.g. agencies or issues) is simultaneously determined by these three core elements (Kiousis 2004, p. 76). Attention and prominence deal with the external evidence of the salience of an object (Kiousis, p. 70). It shows how well an object stands out from other objects and is concerned with the visibility of the object. Hence, media affect the salience of objects (Kiousis, 2004, p. 76). Media can make agencies for example more visible increasing its salience, or it can make agencies less visible decreasing its salience.
Valence is the last core element of salience and is about the tone of coverage or attention by the media (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013, p. 32). Media do not only affect the salience of objects but can also affect the salience of the attributes (properties and qualities) that describe those objects (Kiousis 2004, p. 76). This can be done by using either a positive or a negative tone (Kiousis 2004, p. 76). This negative or positive tone can indicate higher salience of the attributes of the object dependent on the case. In some cases, more positive stories indicate higher salience, whereas in other cases more negative stories indicate higher salience (Kousis, 2004, p. 76). Eventually, media coverage of the attributes of the agency can also enhance or reduce the overall salience of the agency (Kiousis 2004, p. 76). Negative or positive stories about the agency’s attributes have the potential of making audiences more aware of the agency’s behaviour, thereby leading to overall higher levels of salience of the agency.
In this thesis I approach media salience as a multidimensional construct because I think that agencies will only be affected by their salience if they are both visible in the media and if the media coverage about them is valenced rather than neutral. Only if both dimensions (visibility and valence) are fulfilled, agencies are likely to care about their salience. Agencies are not likely to care about their valence if they are not visible, and similarly they are not likely to care about their visibility if media coverage is not valenced. Hence, I think that agencies only care about their salience if their possible increased or decreased visibility in the media is accompanied by valenced (positive or negative) media coverage. Hence, contrary to Wood (2017, p. 6) I do think that a positive or negative tone of media coverage about an EU agency affects this agency. Although I underwrite his claim that EU agencies are usually less directly affected by day-to-day national press coverage (2017, p. 6), I do not think that EU agencies would stay immune to increasing or decreasing valenced media coverage.
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Even though media coverage might be positive or negative, I expect similar to Gilad et al. (2013, p. 459) that more public and political attention will be paid to the negative information. This is conditional upon media coverage being intense (Gilad et al. 2013, p. 459), meaning that the visibility of the agency in the media is high. Since more public and political attention will be paid to negative information about an agency, I also expect the agency itself to pay more attention to its own negative media coverage as opposed to its positive media coverage. An agency is likely to care about its intense negative media coverage and is likely to try to do something about it. They will try to do something about it, because negative stories have the potential of making audiences even more aware of the agency, leading in turn to even a higher level of negative salience of the agency. It is logical that the agency would like to stop this negative intense media coverage about the agency itself.
Moreover, the agency is likely to try to stop intense negative media coverage because it could pose a threat to the agency’s established reputation. Negative external opinions and allegations from (a) audience(s) transmitted through the media could damage the agency’s reputation. This is because negative external opinions and allegations could negatively affect audiences’ perception of the agency (Maor, 2016, p. 84). A risk exists that both perceptions of the audience(s) that voice the negative opinions and allegations, and the perceptions of other audience(s), could get negatively affected. As such, negative intense media coverage can be considered to be a reputational threat.
3.3 Managing the reputational threat of intense negative media coverage
This thesis has established that intense negative media coverage can be a reputational threat for an agency. An agency would likely try to halt this reputational threat because it could negatively affect audiences’ perception about the agency, and because it could lead to an even higher level of negative salience about the agency. But how will an agency try to halt the reputational threat of negative intense media coverage? I expect through managing the agency’s reputation. I expect that how the agency exactly manages its reputation is dependent on the content of the intense negative media coverage.
According to Maor (2016, p. 84) if an agency faces negative media coverage, an agency will tend to manipulate the audiences’ emotions. Through the manipulation of the audiences’ emotions, the agency could potentially reverse audiences’ negative perception of the agency leading potentially to an overall decrease of the negative media coverage about the agency. Hence, by manipulating emotions the agency could protect its reputation. According to Maor (2016, p. 184) the agency will try to manipulate emotions
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by selectively attending to some types of information regarding the agency while ignoring others. This is a conscious effort of managing the agency’s reputation. However, manipulating the audiences’ emotions does not always have to mean that the agency acts actively. This depends on the intensity of the negative media coverage. Agencies with a strong reputation which receive ad hoc criticism might choose to stay silent, since such criticism does not pose much treat to its reputation (Maor et al. 2012, p. 586). This implies that these agencies can afford to stay closed (Maor et al. 2012, p. 587). However, even when an agency with a strong reputation faces intense continuous criticism instead of ad hoc criticism, the agency is likely to respond and to act actively (Maor et al. 2012, p. 587).
During intense negative media coverage when an agency tries to manipulate the audiences’ emotions by selectively attending to some types of information of the organization while ignoring others, the agency is basically highlighting some dimension(s) of its reputation over others. For example, if an agency faces criticism concerning its quality the agency could either selectively attend to information that disconfirms that the agency’s quality is insufficient, or it could selectively attend to information that stresses the good outputs the agency delivers, and it could thereby ignore the concerns related to the agency’s quality. Due to the fact that during intense negative media coverage an agency will selectively attend to some dimension(s) of its reputation over others, I expect that this will change the agency’s its overall reputation management. For instance, whereas first the agency would emphasize dimension ‘A’ it would now due to intensive negative media coverage emphasize dimension ‘A’ even more or would emphasize dimension ‘B’ instead of dimension ‘A’. Hence, the agency will manage its reputation differently during (and possibly after) intense negative media attention, then it did before the intense negative media coverage. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Intense negative media attention will lead to (a) change(s) in the agency’s reputation management strategy.
The current literature has mainly described how agencies have reacted to allegations of underregulation, and allegations relating to the negative externalities of regulation. Allegations of underregulation imply the agency’s failure to accomplish its distinct core mandate for protecting a specific value (Gilad et al. 2013), and appeal therefore to the performative dimension of the agency’s reputation as these claims are about the doubt of ‘accomplishing’ or ‘not accomplishing’. Allegations relating to the negative externalities of regulation imply audiences’ dissatisfaction with the objectives of the agency and/or the
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execution of the agency’s policies independent from whether the agency accomplishes its core mandate. As such, these allegations make an appeal to the moral dimension of the agency’s reputation.
In this thesis I will only focus on the threats that relate to the performative and moral dimension of the agency’s reputation because of two reasons. The first reason is of a practical nature: there has been no body of literature that has researched specific agencies’ reactions to reputational threats of intense negative media coverage that appeal to the procedural or technical dimension of the agency’s reputation. Hence, it would be difficult to research the agency’s reputation management strategy, if we do not know any specific agencies’ reactions to intense negative media coverage that appeals to these two dimensions. It might be the case that the reputational threats of intense negative media coverage that appeal to the agency’s procedural and technical dimensions do not exist. Though, I think that these reputational threats do exist but are rather later by-products of allegations appealing to the agency’s performative and moral dimension. Audiences can always make allegations that appeal to the agency’s lack of quality (technical), or to the insufficient it has for formal requirements and procedures (procedural). However, these allegations only can gain traction (lead to intense media coverage), if these are preceded by allegations of underregulation or negative externalities. This is because first audiences’ must perceive that something ‘goes wrong’ before allegations related to the agency’s quality, transparency, inclusiveness, or justness are likely to become part of intensive media coverage. Either audiences must perceive that the agency is underperforming, or that its performance is having negative effects, before allegations relating to the agency’s technical or procedural dimension are going to be widely perceived as an important issue and thereby lead to intense media coverage. If the agency is perceived to be performing well, and if its performance is not perceived to create negative side-effects, the possibility that allegations about the quality or procedural correctness of an agency will be widely covered by the media is very low. Hence, the second reason why I only focus on allegations of underregulation and negative externalities, is because only these types of allegations can lead to the reputational threat of intensive negative media coverage
How have agencies reacted to allegations of underregulation? Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2013) found that when there is much negative media coverage about the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) consumer protection responsibilities, it led to the FDA taking quicker enforcement decisions by sending quicker issuing warning letters. Hence, the FDA’s decision duration would become shorter (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013, p. 54). They (2013, p. 31) also found also the opposite to be true: more positive media coverage would lead the FDA to wait longer with issuing warning letters. Hence, its decision duration would be longer. This finding adheres to do the broader finding of Gormley (1986, p. 618) who
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found that regulatory agencies are capable of acting quickly when there is intense external pressure. By shortening its decision duration in times of more intense negative media coverage expressing claims of underregulation, the FDA tried to tackle these claims and manage its reputation.
Furthermore, Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2016, p. 32) found that negative media coverage about agency’s performance will lead agencies which have a below average level of outputs to focus on increasing their average level of outputs in the following year. Outputs refer to the number of units of goods and services produced by the agency (Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2016, p. 31). As these types of agencies will put emphasis on increasing their performance, it is likely that they will also focus on their general performative dimension of reputation. Agencies which have a below average level of outputs want to show that they ‘can get the job done’, and that they can be efficient.
I argue that shortening the decision duration and increasing the average level of outputs are both expressions of agencies wanting to focus on their performative dimension to counter the reputational threats coming from intensive negative media coverage expressing allegations of underregulation (performance). Thus, I expect that agencies will counter allegations concerning their performative dimension of reputation by focusing more attention to their performative dimension. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: When there is more negative media coverage related to the agency’s performative dimension of organizational reputation of the agency, the agency will consequently focus more on its performative dimension.
But how would agencies react to allegations in the media which do not necessarily relate to the agency’s performative dimension of its reputation? Gilad et al. (2013, p. 453) found that if the agency is facing public allegations regarding incidents with visible severe outcomes the agency would admit to the problem, but at the same time try to shift blame to others insofar as possible. These public allegations do not necessarily need to be allegations of underregulation but could also be allegations relating to the negative externalities of regulation. As explained above, these are allegations that appeal to the agency’s moral dimension of its reputation.
The admittance to the problem and the blame shifting could be facilitated by agencies emphasizing their procedural dimension of reputation. Hood (2011) found that during a crisis in which there is much negative media coverage agencies would accompany their blame shifting with putting
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emphasis on their appropriate procedural approaches used. Agencies will present themselves using claims of procedural correctness or inevitability (Hood 2011, p. 153). They will claim that the outcome would have been unavoidable and that the issue had to be dealt with in the way it was (Hood 2011, p. 153). One way in which agencies could admit to the problem but shift blame is by referring to their limited legal manoeuvring space as stated in their mandate. They will refer to the appropriate procedure followed that would not have allowed them to act differently. Hence, they would emphasize the procedural dimension of their reputation. Another manner in which agencies could admit to the problem but to shift blame is by referring to the consultation with various partners in the organizational or formal processes. In this way they could absolve themselves of some blame by making the involved actors jointly responsible for the outcomes, (albeit to a lower degree). Hence, agencies could use the procedural dimension of their reputation in order to absolve themselves from blame (Christensen & Lodge 2018, p. 128). By emphasizing their procedural appropriateness agencies could hedge themselves from potential reputational threats. As such, this would greatly incentivize agencies to focus on this dimension of their reputation in times of negative media coverage.
Moreover, agencies might not only emphasize their procedural appropriateness in order to admit and shift blame for allegations relating to the negative externalities of the regulation, but they are also likely to initiate more activities related to the procedural dimension of their reputation. Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2016, p. 31) found that when negative media coverage is joined by a general above level of outputs, the agency will not try to increase the number of units of service delivered but will try to channel it into activities such as public relations, community engagement and stakeholder consultation. Hence the agency will not focus on the output of units or service related to their policy objectives (the performative dimension), but will focus on types of activities that relate and/or try to improve the organizational processes within the organization. Thus, I expect that agencies will counter allegations related to the negative externalities of their policy objectives by focusing more on their procedural dimension. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: When there is more negative media coverage related to the agency’s moral dimension of organizational reputation of the agency, the agency will consequently focus more on its procedural dimension.
What should be emphasized here is that I carefully chose the words “focus more on” in H2 and H3, and not “focus most on”. I namely expect that there will be a significant change of the performative and
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procedural dimension in the agency’s reputation management strategy when there is more negative media coverage, but not necessarily that the agency will mostly emphasize these two dimensions. I namely expect for both agencies that they will in general strongly emphasize their technical and performative dimension of their organizational reputation, independently from whether or not they receive intense negative media coverage. This is because expertise (technical dimension), and thereby delivering good outcomes (performative dimension), is in the end agencies’ raison d’ d'être. Majone namely already argued in 1998 that the EU regulatory state, (of which decentralised agencies are an important component), is predominantly focused on output legitimation strategies (Majone, 1998), which incorporate mostly technical and performative aspects. This is the case because regulation depends to such a high extent on knowledge, that “expertise has always been an important source of legitimisation of regulatory agencies” (1997, p. 157).
4. Research Design
In order to test the hypotheses, I will undertake a most-similar case study analysis of two European agencies: the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), known before 14 September 2016 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX 2017). I will compare these two agencies from 1 January 2012 up until the 31December 2016, so 5 years in total. I decided to start the analysis from the year 2012 because it was the first full year EASO was operational. I decided to run the analysis up until the year 2016 because in June 2017 the last annual reports of both agencies were published. Due to time constraints I could not include the year 2017.
I selected these two agencies because they are highly similar with regards to the policy area in which they operate: migration. Consequently, they face many similar challenges. However, the agencies differ with regards to one particular variable: salience. I expect that FRONTEX is much more visible and therefore receives also much more valenced media coverage than EASO does. My expectation in turn is that in the years negative media coverage is high, we will observe significant changes in FRONTEX’s reputation management strategy compared to the year before. Since EASO is less salient and receives less valenced media coverage, I expect that we will not observe significant changes in the reputation management strategy as we do with FRONTEX.
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This chapter will continue by providing first a short overview of both agencies. Consequently, in the second paragraph I will explain more elaborately than I did above, why I have decided to select these two cases. In the third paragraph I will show how I will measure intense negative media coverage (the independent variable). Here, I also justify why I will use European Parliament (EP) written questions as a ‘proxy’ for media coverage. In the final paragraph I will explain the method I use to identify both the reputation management strategy of the agencies, as well as the reputational character – performative, moral, legal-procedural, or technical – of the negative media coverage.
4.1. FRONTEX and EASO
4.1.1 FRONTEX
FRONTEX was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 (FRONTEX, 20172),
and became fully operational on 1 May 2005 (EUR-Lex, 2016). It is based in Warsaw in Poland. FRONTEX was established in order to strengthen a common EU border management system by coordinating and assisting Member States’ actions in the control and surveillance of the external borders of the EU (Carrera et al. 2013, p. 339). As such it tackles the Schengen dimension of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Servent 2018, p. 90). Hence, FRONTEX directs its activities towards irregular immigrants (Carrera 2013, p. 341). For the wider public FRONTEX has become mainly visible by its coordination of Joint Operations (JOs) (Carrera 2013, p. 339-340), such as operation Triton (2014-currently) and operation Poseidon (2006-2015).
FRONTEX has gained more instruments and powers to coordinate and assist Member States over the years due to the fact that the issue of irregular migration has become more apparent. In 2007 FRONTEX was mandated to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) to assist Member States deal with excessive flows of irregular migrants (Carrera 2013, p. 340). In 2011 FRONTEX’s operational powers increased by granting the Agency more powers with regards to the coordination of JOs and the deployment of European border guard teams under the supervision of a Frontex Coordination Officer (FCO) (Carrera 2013, p. 340). This person is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Operational Plan and the Code of Conduct and has the obligation to report incidents which occur during the operations (Carrera 2013, p. 340). Moreover, in 2013 the European Border Surveillance System
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(EUROSUR) was established in order to improve the information exchange between Member States and FRONTEX (FRONTEX 2017).
Eventually, the 2015 migration crisis led to a mandate change, transforming FRONTEX from the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) on 6 October 2016 (Slominski 2018, p. 107). FRONTEX’s role and powers were further enhanced. It is now able to organize and (co-)finance JOs, and can propose both voluntary and forced returns on its own initiative (Slominski 2018, p. 107). Moreover, it may engage in vulnerability assessments of Member States to identify whether they are properly equipped (Gotev, 2016, October 14). And finally, it can deploy new RABITs in order to help Member States on issues such as identification and consular co-operation (Slominski 2018, p. 107). These new competences were accompanied by a significant increase in the agency’s budget: from €143 million in 2015 to €238 million in 2016 (Slominski 2018, p. 107), and to €302 million in 2017 (Frontex, 20173).
FRONTEX is the most visible representative of the militarization of European borders and has therefore drawn a fair amount of criticism (Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 3). Already before its establishment members of the EP (MEPs) of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group regarded FRONTEX as ‘the nucleus of a European border police force which will add to the suffering of refugees and migrants at the EU’s external borders and within the EU’ (European Parliament, 2004). And since its operational start in 2005 this criticism has not decreased. Since then FRONTEX has received a considerable amount of attention from prohuman rights groups and the media (Leonard 2009, p. 372). The critique centres around IF and how FRONTEX respects core fundamental rights during its activities, and in particular in its joint operations in the Mediterranean (Leonard 2009, p. 372; Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 3). According to the critics it is questionable whether the right to life, the respect of human dignity, the right to an effective remedy and the right not to be sent back to torture, persecution and inhumane treatment, are always safeguarded.
4.1.2 EASO
EASO was established by Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and the European Council in the first quarter of 2010 (EASO, 2014; EASO, 2018). EASO regulation came into force on 19 June 2010, and it became operational as an EU agency on 1 February 2011 (EASO, 2018). The agency is located in Valletta, Malta. It was established with the aim of enhancing practical cooperation on asylum matters
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of the EU Member States, so that individual asylum cases are dealt with in a coherent way (EASO, 2014; EASO, 20182). It promotes policy harmonization and practical co-operation by providing practical and
technical support to Member States, operational support to Member States with specific needs, and evidence-based input for EU policy-making (EASO, 2014). Whereas FRONTEX deals with the Schengen dimension of CEAS, EASO deals with the unfair distribution of applications by asylum-seekers caused by the Dublin regulation of the CEAS (Servent 2018, p. 90). Similar to FRONTEX’s RABITs, EASO can deploy asylum support teams out of there are the ‘asylum intervention pool’ on the request of member states which face particular pressures (Servent 2018, p. 90).
In 2016 the EC proposed to transform EASO from a collection of experts of Member States into a fully-fledged Union agency, named the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) (Servent 2018, p. 91). This was needed to better co-ordinate Member States’ actions in the CEAS (Servent 2018, p. 92). This proposal followed after the 2015 migration crisis in which EASO’s had to undertake many more activities. Therefore, its budget rose from €15.9 million in 2015, to €65.4 million in 2016, and €87 million in 2017 (EASO, 2016; EASO, 2017; EASO, 20183). The agency’s budget is expected to further rise to €114.1 million
in 2020 (EASO, 20183). Under the new mandate the EU will transform EASO in a more operational agency,
which will be able to rely more on its own resources and be less dependent on its Member States (Schembri, 2017, April 24). In late June 2017 the Council and the EP reached a political agreement about EUAA, but at the time of writing it still needs to be endorsed by the EP plenary and Committee of Permanent Representatives (Council of the European Union, 2017, June 29).
4.2 Most similar case study: EASO and FRONTEX
4.2.1 MSS I
In order to answer the research question I will use a most similar systems design I, as labelled by Toshkov (2016, p. 262). This design allows the researcher to focus on a major hypothesized causal relationship, while making sure that the values of all other possibly relevant variables remain constant across the selected case (Toshkov 2016, p 262-263). It allows for deductive theory testing with a focus on a small number of hypotheses (Toshkov 2016, p. 264), as is the case in this thesis. The hypothesized causal relationship in this thesis is the relationship between media salience and agency’s reputational management strategy: I expect that the degree and content of intensive negative media coverage (main
