All Under Heaven
Narratives on international relations in the discourses of Xi Jinping
MA International Relations Thesis January 10, 2021 Jan Waaksma S2726327 j.waaksma@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Supervisor: Dr Andrew Gawthorpe
Abstract
The ever-growing Chinese economy and military have been viewed with suspicion by Western academics. One of the main questions that rises from China’s increasing power is how and if it will change the world order. When Xi Jinping became president of the People’s Republic in 2013, a new era began. Xi incorporates many historical narratives in his speeches to explain his views on the international system. This paper inquires the fifteen speeches of Xi Jinping, held between 2012 and 2020. The theoretical framework for this research is Zhao Tingyang’s
neo-tianxa. The methodology that has been used is the macro critical political discourse analysis.
The systematic application on Xi Jinping’s speeches revealed that the Chinese concept of
neo-tianxia gives interesting insights in how Xi Jinping sees the world. Furthermore, this thesis goes
Table of contents
Introduction……….………3
Literature review……….………6
Methodology………...15
China Dream………...………..19
Community of common destiny………..………..25
Silk Road narrative behind the BRI………..31
Conclusion…………...……….37
“All people under heaven are of one family, all the people are my brothers and I share the life of all creatures and all people should live in harmony”1
This is a quote from the president of the People’s Republic of China (China) Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting in Beijing on 1 December 2017. He referred to the ‘cultural genes’ in the blood of the Chinese people and their firm belief that the world should be a harmonious place connecting all people under the same roof for over 5,000 years. He further stated that “countries may have differences and even encounter problems with each other (…) [b]ut we should not forget that we all live under the same sky, share one and the same home planet and belong to one and the same family”.2 This is just one of the many examples of Xi’s references to ancient
times in his speeches. According to the Commentary Department of the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily, Xi tells stories to explain the Chinese way of international relations and diplomacy. The characteristics of Xi’s speeches are the down-to-earth and warm tone. The speeches are succinct and profound. Furthermore, Xi’s style of speech is fresh and charming.3
In the administration of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao, the focus was primarily on the economic performance of China. When Xi came into power in 2013, the CPC’s party discipline had almost collapsed by corruption and larceny of state wealth. Under Xi, ideology and politics became more significant. Xi did not change the economic goals, but his perspective to achieve those goals shifted to ideology and politics. Due to this change, the discourse used by Xi Jinping and his administration changed.4 In this discourse of the Xi administration references to the past
and narratives play a major role. Until recent years, the vocabulary of academic field of international relations was primarily based on concepts originating from the Western historical experience ranging from ancient Athens to, for instance, the British Empire. With the increasing power of China, new terms are introduced to the field that better apply to China’s past and future.5 With China increasingly claiming its position as a superpower on the world stage, it is interesting to examine the views of its leader on international relations.
1 Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Build a Better World” (speech, General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, December 1, 2017),
http://www.idcpc.gov.cn/english/events/201801/t20180130_95196.html.
2 Xi, “Working Together”.
3 People’s Daily Department of Commentary, Narrating China’s Governance: Stories in Xi Jinping’s Speeches
(Singapore: Springer, 2020), viii.
4 Kerry Brown and Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, “Ideology in the Era of Xi Jinping,” Journal of Chinese
Political Science 23, (2018): 328.
5 Salvatore Babones, “Zhongguo and tianxia: the central state and the Chinese world,”
www.salvatorebabones.com, February 25, 2018, https://salvatorebabones.com/zhongguo-and-tianxia-the-central-state-and-the-chinese-world/
The research question for this paper is: How does Xi Jinping use Chinese concepts to
explain his views on international relations in his speeches? Using critical political discourse
analysis (CPDA), I will inquire the extent to which the concept of tianxia is reflected in three common ideas in Xi’s discourse: the China Dream, the community of common destiny, and the Silk Road narrative behind the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The methodology for the analysis is the critical political discourse analysis on the macro-level. The analysis will begin with a literature review, followed by the introduction of the methodology. Thereafter, the relation between neo-tianxia and the three common ideas in Xi’s thoughts will be analyzed in a separate chapter according to speeches given by Xi Jinping between 2012 and 2020.
2. Literature Review
There is a substantial amount of literature on the use of narratives by Xi Jinping. Jing Luo expressed discourse of Xi Jinping as follows: “…[w]ith genuine creativity, Xi Jinping engages his audience in a sort of conversation, where moods and sentiments are mirrored in the narratee with elements of refreshing surprises.”6 Acharya stated that “…Xi Jinping ha[s] made frequent references not only to Confucianism but also to the earlier tradition of tianxia.”7 As Brown and
Bērziņa-Čerenkova put it, “Chinese leaders like to talk. They are fond of making speeches, which are then covered in detail in official newspapers, on state-run television, and which often become core planks the Party’s propaganda campaigns.”8 Xi’s narratives address the daily life
issues of the people (for instance, employment, health care, and housing) and link them to orthodox socialist principles. Furthermore, he uses historical narratives linking his ideology to Confucian ideas from centuries ago.9 Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova explained the use of language in the ideologies of Chinese leaders as to “create a consensus, marrying current leaders to those of the past, and thus having utility.”10 Also, Taesuh makes an important comment on
the narratives of tianxia by stating that it is used as a “creative misreading[s] of the national past”, and that is part of an international myth-making process.11 This thesis will show that the
Silk Road narrative behind the BRI is one example of this myth-making process. Hereby, Xi implies a steady development of thousands of years and he brings the politics close to and recognizable for the ordinary people. This chapter highlights the main themes in the academic literature regarding the narrative of Xi Jinping. First, the three main ideas in Xi’s thought will be briefly introduced. Second, theory of neo-tianxia will be explored and finally an overview of the academic debate on the narratives of Xi Jinping and neo-tianxia will be explained.
The gap in the literature is twofold. On the one hand, the literature on the discourses of Xi Jinping is mainly focused on dichotomy between the Western and the Chinese world view and Western interpretations of sovereignty and hegemony are used to describe the Chinese concepts in Xi Jinping’s thoughts. This thesis uses three core concepts – China Dream,
6 People’s Daily, Narrating China’s Governance, xi.
7 Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of the “Civilization State”: Rising Powers and the Cultural Challenge to the
World Order,” Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 2 (2020): 145.
8 Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, “Ideology in the era of Xi Jinping,” 331.
9 Lutgard Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives in Chinese Official Discourse under Xi Jinping,” Journal of
Chinese Political Science 23, no. 3 (September 2018): 405.
10 Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, “Ideology in the era of Xi Jinping”, 325.
11 Taesuh Cha, “Competing visions of a postmodern world order: the Philadelphian system versus the Tianxia
community of common destiny, and the Silk Road narrative behind the BRI – of Xi Jinping that are typical Chinese and uses a Chinese theory to get a better understanding of his ideas and avoids the dominant west-east thinking. On the other hand, the novelty in this paper is the systematic application of Zhao’s neo-tianxia to Xi Jinping’s thought. Finally, a remark has to made that this thesis focuses on the narratives on international relations, rather than the application of Xi’s ideas. For example, when Xi talks about the peaceful coexistence of civilizations, it is very questionable if he applies the same ideas to cultural minorities within the borders of China.
This thesis focusses on the three common ideas in Xi’s thought. The first chapter is about the China Dream. The dream is closely linked to the ‘rejuvenation of China’ and relates mostly to domestic policies and can be summarized as “a promise of national restoration that gives the people a more important role in the rise of China”.12 However, the China Dream has
an international aspect as well. Xi believes that China has the ability to “become wealthy and strong and the center of global cultural influence”.13 The rejuvenation of China gives a central
place to the people. Xi believes that the “rejuvenation of China as a powerful, prosperous and cultured nation in ensuring that China and its people will lead the world to a more just and peaceful world order” is achievable in the near future.14 The Asia-Pacific Dream has similarities
with the Chinese Dream, but has a more regional focus. Peter Ferdinand calls the concept of “issues of relations with states around China’s borders” “worthy of note”.15 The ‘dream’
proposes Asian unity and centers around mutual benefits, development and peace.16
The second chapter analyzes the community of common destiny. The community of common destiny, sometimes rephrased to the community with shared future for mankind, is a concept that illustrates the close relationship between China and other countries. More specifically, the relationship between the people living in these countries. Xi often uses three ‘goods’ to exemplify his thoughts on these relationships, these are “good brothers who trust each other, good partners who pursue common development, and good friends who shoulder responsibilities together.”17
12 Stig Stenslie and Chen Chang, “Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy: From Vision to Implementation,” in China in the
Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges, eds. Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 122.
13 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Routledge, 2019), 169. 14 Yahuda, The International Politics, 168.
15 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward ho – The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under
Xi Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 949.
16 Anke Berndzen, “The ‘Asia-Pacific Dream’: Is China Using Economic Integration Initiatives as Ideological
Weapons?,” Journal of China and International Relations 5, no. 1 (2017): 8-9.
The third chapter analyzes the Silk Road narrative behind the BRI. The BRI is closely related to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were introduced at the Bandung Conference in 1955. In 2013, Xi Jinping named the BRI, formerly known as One Belt One Road, one of China’s most prestigious projects.18 The BRI is a key element in the Chinese road
to a future of world leadership. The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ consists of a connection between China, Central Asia and Europe through railways, oil pipelines, and power grids. The Maritime Silk Road is a network of ports and other coastal infrastructural projects.19 China aims to create a platform of economic and trade cooperation. Wang, Jiao, and Ma distinguish five cooperation priorities: “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, trade facilitation, financial cooperation, and people-to-people bonds.”20 The direct railway connection between Germany and China is an example of such a connection over land.
Tianxia and neo-tianxia
This thesis will be based on Zhao Tingyang’s renewed interpretation of tianxia. To understand his interpretation, a concise clarification of the ancient concept is needed. The philosophy of
tianxia emerged some 3,000 years ago and is misinterpreted in Western literature. Tianxia is a
combination of the Chinese characters tian (天) and xia (下). Xia is easily translatable to ‘beneath’, ‘under’, or ‘below’. The variety of the explanations of tian is wider. In relation to
tianxia, the character is understood as ‘heaven’. This leads to the translation of tianxia as ‘all
under heaven’.21 In 1899, the Chinese philosopher and politician Liang Qichao identified the
realm of emperor Yu (±2,100-2,000 BC) as tianxia. He stated that, in those days, it simply referred to the perceptions of the whole world of the ordinary people. Zhitian Liou distinguished a broad and a narrow definition. The broad definition simply meant ‘the world’ or ‘China’, and the narrow one ‘what is in the mind’ or ‘what is seen and heard’.22 This implies a physical and
a psychological aspect of the concept.
18 Xi Jinping, “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future” (speech,
Astana, Kazakhstan, September 8, 2013),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml.
19 Astrid A. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, “Will Trump Make China Great Again? The belt and road initiative
and international order,” International Affairs 94, no. 2 (2018): 231.
20 Wang Jiaoe, Jiao Jingjuan, and Ma Li, “An organizational model and border port hinterlands for the
China-Europe Railway Express,” Journal of Geographical Sciences 28, no. 9 (2018): 1275-1276.
21 Wang Mingming, “All under heaven (tianxia): Cosmological perspectives and political ontologies in
pre-modern China,” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Studies 2, no. 1 (2012): 337.
22 Zhitian Luo, “From ‘tianxia’: (all under heaven) to ‘the world’: changes in late Qing intellectuals’ conceptions
Zhao further unraveled tianxia. He explained his ideas for the first time in 2005,23 further elaborated his view in 200924 and 2019.25 According to Zhao, tianxia had three meanings: “1) the earth, or all lands under the sky, 2) a common choice made by all people of the world, or a universal agreement in the ‘hearts’ of all peoples, and 3) a political system for the world with a global institution to ensure universal order.”26 Thus, tianxia brings together
the geographical world, the psychological world, and an institutional world. The concept of ‘all under heaven’ is a combination of this trinity and the aspects cannot be understood separately. Moreover, nothing can be understood without its context within ‘the three worlds’ and therefore it is impossible to understand a phenomenon in its individual essence.27 Since tianxia implies an interconnectedness between several spheres, it considers the ‘world’ in a holistic manner.28
The geographical tianxia simply refers to the physical world: the land, the mountains, the sea, flora, fauna, and so on. In the psychological sense, tianxia refers to “a world that everyone acknowledges and joins”,29 that it is a world defined by “all people’s hearts”.30 It is
more important to ‘have’ people than to possess land, according to the ancient interpretation of
tianxia. To acquire tianxia, uniting all lands under the sky without winning the support of the
people who live on it, makes it impossible to use the land.31 In the institutional sense, tianxia refers to political world defined by one world system. Since heaven is a harmonious and complete system, the world should have a complete and harmonious system as well. In the words of Zhao “only a world system can give the world a complete political existence”.32 Zhao
considers the institutional aspect of tianxia as the consummate form of the world, the “final actualization of the trinity world with natural, psychological, and political worlds completely overlapping with one another.”33
However, these ancient concepts are not directly applicable to the world of today. Therefore, Zhao adapted the tianxia theory to the present time. This thesis will focus on this modern interpretation. The novelty of the renewed interpretation of tianxia, hereafter
neo-23 Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for a World
Institution (Nanjing, 2005).
24 Zhao Tingyang, “A Political World Philosophy in terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia),” Diogenes 56, no. 1
(February 2009): 4-25.
25 Zhao Tingyang, Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance, (New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2019). 26 Zhao, “A Political World”, 9.
27 Zhao, “A Political World”, 10.
28 Edward Wang, “History, Space and Ethnicity: The Chinese Worldview,” Journal of World History 10, no. 2
(1999): 291.
29 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 12. 30 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 12. 31 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 12. 32 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 12. 33 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 12-13.
tianxia, is 1) its decentralized and non-hierarchical nature and 2) a new sense of universality.
There is no central power, but there are only independent states respecting each other. Power in the sense of either enslavement and domination or protection and submission does not exist, but there is a peaceful and egalitarian coexistence in a harmonious world.34 Nevertheless, some scholars see this as a utopian and believe that China will try to shift from status-quo power to a country with ambition to disrupt the international system.35 In his discourses, Xi often refers to the harmonious and peaceful intentions of China’s rise and therefore the theory of neo-tianxia is relevant to understand his thoughts.
To make tianxia relevant for the future world, changes in economy, politics, culture, and technology are inevitable. For that reason, Zhao defined key concepts to transform tianxia to this present time elaborating on the decentralized and non-hierarchal nature and new sense of universality as mentioned above. According to him, four key concepts are crucial: 1) Internalization of the world, 2) Relational rationality, 3) Confucian Improvement, and 4) Compatible universalism.36 Since tianxia can only be understood in a holistic manner, all four
concepts are included in this thesis.
The internalization of the world is fundamental for a neo-tianxia system. This is based on non-exclusiveness of the old tianxia system. In order to eradicate hostile competitions and wars, negative exclusiveness must be eliminated. Tianxia functions as a supervisory system so that a universal world with collective peace and shared interests for every nation can be maintained. The system is fundamentally anti-imperialist, because tianxia belongs not to only one country, but to the entire world. As Zhao puts it simply: “only by achieving internalization of the world can a non-exclusive and safe world be created”.37
The second key concept is relational rationality. Zhao regarded relational rationality as the opposite of individual rationality which is omnipresent in the Western world today. Even though reason in individuals can lead to collective reasonable behavior, individual rationality is an insufficient application of reason since it is based on self-interest and therefore provokes confrontation and conflicts. Individual rationality can be balanced through the relational equivalent which has two essential aspects. The first is coexistence prior to existence. It is the ontological foundation and means that “coexistence is the necessary condition for ensuring the
34 Xu Jilin, “The New ‘Tianxia’: Rebuilding China’s Internal and External Order”, ed David Ownby, Rethinking
China’s Rise: A Liberal Critique, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 133.
35 Kerry Brown, Hu Jintao: China’s Silent Ruler, (Singapore 2012), 140. 36 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 58-61.
security and interests of an existence.”38 The second is minimization of mutual hostility, which
means that individuals should always take precedence to the minimization of hostility over maximization of self-interest.39
The third concept – Confucian Improvement – is “far better” than Pareto’s Improvement. The latter means that a change of economic allocation helps at least one person and harms no one. The Confucian Improvement goes a step further and is political-economic in essence. A change in circumstances in society should not only benefit one or some individuals, but it must lead to improvement for the population as a whole. This is the idealistic goal for the neo-tianxia system.40 The fourth concept is compatible universalism as contrary to mono-theological ideology. Cultures in the world “used to coexist peacefully side by side, taking pride in their own beauty, until mono-theological ideology brought about conflict among civilizations”.41
William A. Callahan considers tianxia interesting, since it helps to understand the governance of Chinese empire of over two millennia and because the discussion gains renewed attention in the twenty-first century.42 This thesis builds on Callahan’s idea of continuity of the
Chinese culture. The theory of Zhao has been widely criticized by both Chinese and Western academics. Not surprisingly, most alternative views regard the tianxia system as a counterpart of the existing world order. However, the focus of the criticisms differs. Xu Bijun divided the criticisms in several categories. The first category blames Zhao for fallacies in his philosophical argumentation and is predominantly carried out by Chinese scholars. According to them, Zhao applies double standards when he compares the Chinese with the Western worldview. When describing tianxia, he makes clear distinctions between logic and history, and theory and practice. In the case of Western cultures, he uses practices and history to deny logic and theory. Furthermore, he proves the failure of the Western system by its current problematic results. Yet, he proves the success of his theory by applying standards of transitivity and consistency without explaining its application in practice.43 What is problematic in this part of the debate, is the absence of clear definition of tianxia and therefore a clear distinction between tianxia and
neo-tianxia. Nonetheless, these criticisms focus on specific aspects of Zhao’s theory, even though
Zhao explained that the different aspects of tianxia cannot be understood separately. This thesis
38 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 58-59. 39 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 59. 40 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 60. 41 Zhao, Redefining A Philosophy, 60.
42 William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?,” International
Studies Review 10, no. 4 (November 2008): 749-750.
aims to analyze all key concepts of Zhao’s holistic theory in a systematic way instead of some loose aspects.
Another line of criticism is that Zhao on the one hand claims that tianxia is inclusive and all-encompassing, on the other hand he sets the Chinese and Western culture as opposite to each other.44 The Chinese perception of the world is – according to Zhao – opposite to the Western idea. In the European political culture, the idea of a nation-state with fixed territorial boundaries is the norm. In contrast, China sees – and has seen itself for centuries – itself as the center of a unified, peaceful, and harmonious world. As Liang Qichao said: “the Chinese people have never taken the state as the highest entity; they believed there must be an entity higher than the state and exercising control over all states. That was tianxia.”45 From this Chinese point-of-view, the West is only aware of the institutional, geographical world. The international system based on nation-states is in ongoing status of instability and since the only ways to create stability are 1) the hegemony of one dominant great power (which on the long run will never be accepted by all other countries), or 2) the “balance of power” between various great powers and their alliances (leading to disastrous wars in the twentieth century). Therefore, the Western system is always on the verge of collapse.46 Xi is very conscious of the vulnerability of this aspect of the Western system. As this thesis will show, minimization of mutual hostility and enduring peace are relevant in Xi’s discourses.
Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith argue that the theory of Zhao is rather utopian than explanatory. Since Zhao expects that people will change in a voluntary way after they simply see “how good the tianxia elites are”,47 they aspire to become like them. In the tianxian
world order, there is in the end no place for heterogeneity. Nordin and Smith even go further by stating that “Zhao’s account […] actively calls for the eradication of those who do not fit into the elite’s preferred order of turning other into self.”48 Callahan compared the tianxia
system directly to modern racism and sees it as an explanation of how modern China behaves against its ethnic minorities49, for instance the Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Falun Gong. Zhao would argue that his concept of compatible universalism means the exact opposite.50 This thesis will
44 Xu Bijun, “Is Zhao’s Tianxia,” 101.
45 Daniel A. Bell, “Realizing Tianxia: Traditional Values and China’s Foreign Policy,” in The Chinese Visions of
World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics, ed. Ban Wang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 130.
46 Matti Puranen, “All Under Heaven as One Family,” Journal of China and International Relations 7, no. 1
(November 2019): 51-52.
47 Astrid H.M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith, “Relating self and other in Chinese and Western thought,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no. 5 (2019): 644.
48 Nordin and Smith, “Relating self and other,” 644. 49 Callahan, “Chinese Visions,” 755.
elaborate on the tensions between Zhao’s idea of compatible universalism and Xi’s thoughts on cultural diversity.
Later, Zhao would argue that Callahan’s misunderstandings were based on misinterpretation from the European theoretical framework. In the West, tianxia is easily associated with empire. According to Zhao, “tianxia is fundamentally different in nature, because it is a system that has nothing to do with the conquest, hegemony and hostility characteristics of an empire.”51 This shows that Western vocabulary not always can explain
non-western concepts. On the one hand, this thesis builds on this assumption, since it uses a Chinese concept to analyze the Chinese reality. On the other hand, for example in the case of the Silk Road, this thesis adds to the discussion that some concepts that seem Chinese at first may prove to be Western after all.
Despite all criticisms, the theory of tianxia is relevant. According to Zhan Feng, tianxia could be one of the three main sources for a successful and well-developed Chinese IR school in international relations.52 This thesis builds on that. Roland Paris stated that Xi chose a
different path then his predecessors. Presidents Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao overcame decades of imperialism and colonialism by a postcolonial approach. Chinese academics called for new strategies for a new Chinese foreign policy that better suits the new role of China as a major power. One line of thoughts was to “invoke the old imperial idea of tianxia, a system of hierarchical harmony enforced by the preponderance of power and virtue anchored in China.”53
Xi never explicitly mentioned tianxia, but he often makes references to aspects of the concept. However, he uses Confucian concepts of governance as “intellectual resources providing solutions to the dilemma of how to think and legitimize a new role for China in the twenty-first century.”54 He characterized neighboring countries as peripheral and said that the national identity of China was “rooted in memories of golden eras characterized by Confucian values and a Sino-centric order”.55 Xi Jinping combines Westphalian ideas with tianxia, saying “two irreconcilable perspectives live today in China’s self-conception, in the way it engages with the world, and specifically in its territorial disputes with the Philippines and with other littoral states over ownership of the South China Sea”.56 This shows that Xi is not pursuing a
51 Zhoa, Redefining a Philosophy, 65.
52 Zhang Feng, “Debating the “Chinese Theory of International Relations,” in Contemporary Chinese Political
Thought: Debates and Perspectives, eds. Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyang (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2012), 77.
53 Roland Paris, “The Right to Dominate: How Old Ideas About Sovereignty Pose New Challenges for World
Order,” International Organization 74, no. 3 (Summer 2020): 470.
54 Paris, “The Right to Dominate,” 471. 55 Paris, “The Right to Dominate,” 471. 56 Paris, “The Right to Dominate,” 471.
pure form of tianxia and that he is not rejecting the Westphalian world order and that even though the tianxia system is a highly disputed theory, it is still relevant to examine its role in the discourses of Xi Jinping. By doing so, this thesis transcends the classic East – West divide in the literature and brings nuance to this apparent dichotomy.
Conclusion
Thus, the three core ideas in Xi Jinping’s thought are China Dream, community of common destiny, and the Silk Road narrative behind the BRI. The analysis will be focused on these three concepts. Subsequently, the historical background of the neo-tianxia concept has been clarified to understand the holistic assumption of the theory and to understand to what Xi refers if he talks about events that happened thousands of years ago. Then, Zhao’s four key concepts – internalization of the world, relational rationality, Confucian improvement, and compatible universalism – have been explained because these concepts are the framework of the analysis. Finally, the literature review gave an overview of the academic debate on Zhao’s theory and its position in the broader IR field.
3. Methodology
In international relations, the utility of theoretical approaches lays in the fact that it provides distinctive lenses that can enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the world order. Laetitia Olivier and Francois Very explained it as the question how theoretical approaches in IR can contribute to a better understanding of the role and functions on world affairs.57 The methodology to conduct the research is the macro critical political discourse analysis (CPDA). CPDA is a constructivist theoretical approach. The constructivist approach “supports the notion that significant aspects of international relations are determined by historical events and social issues rather than by inevitable outcomes of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics and power”.58
Norman Fairclough explained discourse as “ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world of thoughts, feelings, beliefs”.59 In the words of Terry Locke, the analysis of discourses is “concerned with
language in use and the way in which patterns of meaning as socially constructed versions of reality – discourses – are embedded and disseminated in texts”.60 An important aspect of discourse analysis is that it studies conversations and authentic texts in the social context. Since discourse analysis is based on both micro and macro levels, both linguistic and social aspects are important.61 According to Rahimi, critical discourse analysis “investigates how social power is misused and how text and talk represent, procreate, and resist dominance and inequality in the social and political context”.62 Bingjun Yang and Wen Li put it in other words by saying
that “discourse is shaped by sociopolitical reality and at the same time possesses the ability to shape reality and affect change”.63 Since this thesis analyzes the speeches of Xi Jinping in the
context of China’s position on the world stage, a critical discourse analysis is appropriate. According to Teun A. van Dijk, critical-political discourse analysis deals with “the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse,
57 Laetitia Olivier, Theo Neethling, and Francois Vreÿ, “Theoretical Approaches in International Relations: The
South African Military as a Foreign Policy Instrument,” Scientia Militaria – South African Journal of Military
Studies 43, (2015): 42.
58 Olivier Neethling, and Vreÿ, “Theoretical Approaches,” 50.
59 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Anaysis for Social Research (London/New York:
Routledge, 2003), 124.
60 Terry Locke, Critical Discourse Analysis (London/New York: Continuum, 2004), 54.
61 Elaheh Rahimi, “Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Speeches: A Case Study of Obama’s and Rouhani’s
Speeches at UN,” Theory and Practice in Language Studies 5, no. 2 (2015): 343.
62 Rahimi, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 343.
63 Bingjun Yang and Wen Li, Corpus-based Approaches to Grammar, Media and Health Discourses: Systemic
including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance”.64 Nadira Talib and Richard Fitzgerald distinguished a micro, meso, and macro
level of discourse analysis. For this analysis, the macro level will be applied since the macro level examines several texts across several years.65 Since ‘political discourse’ leaves room for several interpretations, the narrow definition of Van Dijk will be used. He defined ‘political discourse’ as “the text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions”.66 Thus, for
this macro critical political discourse analysis the discourses of president Xi Jinping on international relations in his speeches will be analyzed with a focus on counter-power.
Tools of macro CPDA
Highlight main themes of discourse
In this analysis, the main themes that can be found in the discourse of Xi Jinping regarding international relations will be examined. Thereafter, these themes will be contrasted and compared to the four key concepts on Zhao’s new interpretations of tianxia. This will show if and how Xi Jinping is using these concepts in his discourses on the China Dream, the community of common destiny, and the Silk Road narrative behind the BRI.
Analysis of discourse within the historical and international contexts
The concepts of the China Dream, community of common destiny, and the Silk Road narrative behind the BRI cannot exist by themselves. Xi Jinping elaborates on the fundaments of his predecessors and the history of China in general. Therefore, an analysis of the social and historical context is required. For instance, the China Dream began to take root in the second half of the term of his direct predecessor Hu Jintao.67 The community of common destiny was already mentioned by Hu Jintao in 2007, but referred in those times to the relationship between China and Taiwan specifically.68 The BRI was initiated by Xi Jinping. However, the call for reviving the ancient Silk Road was heard long before Xi came into power. Since Xi adapts his concepts to the changing world order, changes on the international level prior to and during his era must be taken in consideration as well.
64 Teun A. van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” Political Linguistics 11 (1997), 11.
65 Nadira Talib and Richard Fitzgerald, “Micro-meso-macro movements; a multilevel critical discourse analysis
framework to examine metaphors and the values of truth in policy texts,” Critical Discourse Studies 13, no. 5 (October 2016): 535.
66 Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 12.
67 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward ho – the China dream and One Belt, One Road: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi
Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 942.
68 Jin Kai, “Can China Build a Community of Common Destiny?,” The Diplomat, November 28, 2018,
Analysis of how discourse is (re)producing or challenging the dominant threads of the neo-tianxia concept
This tool will be used to apply the community of common destiny, China Dream, and One Belt One Road to Zhao’s concepts of internalization of the world, relational rationality, Confucian Improvement, and compatible universalism. This tool of the analysis will uncover whether or not the concepts that Xi uses fit in Zhao’s concept of neo-tianxia. The concepts of Zhao will be the guidelines for the analysis and the concepts of Xi will be checked with Zhao’s theory successively in three separate chapters.
Analysis of how discursive strategies legitimate and resist control
This last tool of CPDA will highlight how Xi uses the three concepts to legitimize China’s peaceful rise strategy and simultaneously to counter accusations of aiming to become an aggressive and dominant world power. It helps to connect the concepts in Xi’s thought and
neo-tianxia to the main question of this thesis and will be used to conclude every chapter. He uses
the narratives to stress the friendly intentions for the bilateral relations between China and other countries and shows at the same time that China has a long history of these harmonious relationships.
Data collection
The corpus of this study consists of fifteen speeches from Xi Jinping and were collected between May and December 2020. Since this thesis analyzes Xi’s ideas in the international context, the focus is on speeches to international organizations, for instance the United Nations, the Paris Climate Conference and the Belt and Road Forum. The speeches have been given between 2012 and 2020. For this thesis, English translations of Xi’s speeches have been analyzed. Most of these translations were provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Hence, it is noteworthy that there could be intended inaccuracies in these translations, due to the fact that the translations may address a different audience: the rest of the world. However, since the analysis focusses on how tianxia is used in Xi Jinping’s to project his worldview to the rest of the world, these possible inaccuracies are not problematic for this research.
4. China Dream
The China Dream is one of the core concepts in the narratives of Xi Jinping. This chapter will show that the ambivalence of the definition of the dream makes it hard to analyze it from an international level. Two core ideas within the China Dream are the community of common destiny and the Belt and Road Initiative. These two concepts will be covered in detail in the next chapters. Therefore, this chapter primarily focusses on the grand narratives behind the China Dream. The central idea behind the China Dream is the aspiration of China to become a moderately prosperous society with the alleviation of poverty in the rural areas of the country as its main goal on the short term.69 However, in the domestic setting a fair political system without corruption and a safe, orderly, and secure society have been mentioned by Xi as important aspects of the China Dream as well. On the longer run and on the global level, it encompasses China’s aspiration to earn its rightful place on the world stage as the richest country in the world, even to surpass the United States in power and wealth.70 To understand why China claims its ‘rightful place’, the Century of Humiliation needs to be considered. These dark times resulted in the will of ‘rejuvenation of China’ or the ‘Chinese Renaissance’, an important concept to understand the China Dream.
Historical context
The first tool of CPDA allows us to explore the historical context of the China Dream. The humiliations began in 1839, when China tumbled into the First Opium War (1840-1842) with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The war was lost and this caused a dramatic fall in the international power and status of China. As the ‘Middle Kingdom of Old’, China was accepted as a regional hegemon for centuries with a ritualized tributary system based on tianxia. However, it were the treaties after the war that really humiliated the Chinese. The Treaty of Nanking ended the First Opium War and ceded Hong Kong to the British. One century later in 1943, Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek would call it “the first of China’s unequal treaties with a foreign power (…) that implanted among us disunity, economic backwardness, and social chaos, (…) they encouraged a mood of weak surrender, nothing but capitulation and
69 Martin K. Whyte, “China’s Economic Development History and Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’: an overview
with personal reflections,” Chinese Sociological Review (November 2020): 2.
70 Anna Hayes, “Interwoven ‘Destinies’: The Significance of Xinjiang to the China Dream, the Belt and Road
humiliation”.71 The decades following the First Opium War were characterized by several other
wars with Japan, the Russian Empire, the French and – again – the British, with devastating results for the Chinese side. The victory over Japan as part of the allied forces in the World Anti-Fascist War in 1945 marked the beginning of the rejuvenation of China.72
In his first speech as party chief of the CPC in 2012, Xi referred to the Century of Humiliation as “in the modern era, our country has experienced constant hardships and difficulties. The Chinese nation reached the most dangerous period.” In reference to his role in the great rejuvenation of China he said, “countless people with lofty ideals to realise the great revival of the Chinese nation rose to resist and fight but failed one time after another.”73 One
year later, he connected the dream to the great rejuvenation, “to fulfill the China Dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must achieve a rich, powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the people’s happiness”.74 Xi predicted a stronger international position of
China, his era “sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contribution to mankind”.75
The theme of the 19th National Congress of the CPC on October 18, 2017 was Remain
true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the China Dream of national rejuvenation.76 In the three hours opening speech, Xi explained his own view on the China
Dream. The next tool of CPDA allows us to analyze whether Xi’s discourses are (re)producing or challenging the four dominant threads of the neo-tianxia concept.
Internalization of the World
China’s aversion against hegemony and imperialism finds its roots in the Century of Humiliation and this is in line with the fundamental anti-imperialist assumption of the
71 David Scott, China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century
of Humiliation (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008), 13-27.
72 Scott, China and the International System, 252-258.
73 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Politburo Standing Committee Members,” (speech, Beijing, November 15, 2012),
BBC, bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586.
74 William A. Callahan, “Dreaming as a critical discourse of national belonging: China Dream, American Dream,
and World Dream,” Nations and Nationalism 23, no. 2 (2017): 253.
75 Xi, “Working Together to Build a Better World”.
76 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and
Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” (speech, Beijing, October 18, 2017),
internalization of the world by Zhao. However, the call for universalism and all-inclusiveness is less clear. When Xi talks about the ‘dream’ in international sense, he uses it to stress the bond between the Chinese people and of other specific countries. About the people in Indonesia, he said that they are “vigorously implementing their overall economic development plan for the rise of the Indonesian nation.”77 And to the people in China and Indonesia, “to realize our
respective dreams, it is all the more necessary for both sides to understand, support and cooperate with each other.”78
Peace is essential to fulfill the China Dream. Xi said, “the Chinese dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order.”79 He
further stated that both the international and national imperatives must be kept in mind to “stay on the path of peaceful development, and continue to pursue a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up”.80 Paradoxically, in the same speech Xi claimed that a powerful People’s
Liberation Army is important for realizing the China Dream. However, he emphasized the defensive character of the army for the “protection of maritime rights”, referring to the tensions in the South China Sea. Moreover, the core tasks of the army on the international field should be “countering terrorism, maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, international peacekeeping, escort services in the Gulf of Aden, and humanitarian assistance.”81 Therefore,
the strong army fits in the idea of enduring peace because “China will continue its efforts to safeguard world peace, contribute to global development, and uphold international order”.82
Relational Rationality
Xi urged that China is not the only country that is pursuing dreams, “[w]e should not give op on our dreams, because the reality around us is too complicated; we should not stop pursuing our ideals because they seem out of reach.”83 Countries cannot fulfill their dreams in isolation
and therefore every country should be aware of coexistence prior to existence. He said, “[n]o country can address alone the many challenges facing mankind; no country can retreat into self-isolation”.84 Minimization of mutual hostility should, according to Xi, always be the pillar of
international relations. Both coexistence prior to existence and minimization of mutual hostility
77 “Speech by President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament,” ASEAN-China Center, October 3, 2013,
http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm.
78 ASEAN-China Center, “Speech by President Xi Jinping.” 79 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”.
80 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 81 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 82 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 83 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 84 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”.
are key concepts within the relational rationality aspect of Zhao’s theory. Zhao’s theory includes a strong familiar relationship between countries. Xi acknowledges the strong bond between nations, but rather talks about friendship than about family relations.
Confucian Improvement
Benefits for everyone and every country play a role in the China Dream. Xi said, “we will pursue open, innovative, and inclusive development that benefits everyone.”85 By keeping in mind the internal and international imperatives, China should pursue a “mutually beneficial strategy of opening up.” However, despite all peaceful intentions in Xi’s discourses, it is hardly imaginable that China can become the one and only superpower and simultaneously safeguard the benefits for every country.
Compatible Universalism
On how to overcome the humiliations and achieve the rejuvenation of China, Xi said: “it was critical to topple the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism that were oppressing the Chinese people, and realize China’s independence, the people’s liberation, national reunification, and social stability”.86 Thus, domestic stability is regarded essential to
fulfill the China Dream. However, Xi was not spending much time on discussing cultural diversity on the international level. He mentioned it once and urged to boost “cross-cultural exchanges characterized by harmony and diversity, inclusiveness and mutual learning”.87 An
explanation for this reluctance could be that within the borders of China there is very little room for diversity and therefore, the relation between China Dream and compatible universalism is ambivalent. According to Xi, the China Dream can come true when there are universal values in the Chinese society, “the Chinese people of all ethnic groups (…) work together and work hard to create a better life for themselves and ultimately achieve common prosperity for everyone.”88 He continued, “[t]his will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the
Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”89 This is problematic for compatible universalism, because a key feature of this
concept is to avoid a paradox in values. Despite Xi’s call for unity, reports of for instance mass
85 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 86 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 87 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 88 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”. 89 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory”.
detention of Muslim Uyghurs have been published in Western media.90 In this, what Xi calls re-education camps, Muslims are made to swear loyalty to the CPC and the spread of “religious fanatism by having abnormal beards or unusual names”91 is rejected. This is a clear example
that cultures cannot live peacefully side-by-side in China.
The China Dream and China’s position on the world stage
The next tool of CPDA helps us to analyze how Xi uses the China Dream to explain the power status of China on the world stage. Since one of the core aspects of the China Dream is eventually surpass the United States as the superpower in the world, power relations are relevant to analyze. In the historical context, it is quite clear that Xi resists imperialism and the traumatizing experiences of the Century of Humiliation play an important role. Xi’s aversion against imperialism comes out clearly in the case of the internalization of the world. However, in his discourses Xi is reserved in showing China’s ambition to become the superpower. The threat of the ever-growing army is classified by Xi as purely defensive and he emphasizes the international humanitarian and protective aims in other regions. The aspect of “protection of maritime” rights may seem aggressive. However, Xi regards the disputed parts of the South China Sea as parts of China and therefore he sees it as protection of its territorial integrity and thereby legitimizing military control in the disputed areas.
Regarding relational rationality, the coexistence prior to existence and the minimization of mutual hostility fit in Xi’s story of the China Dream. Zhao’s interpretation of relational rationality turns out to be fruitful to counter the Western interpretations of China’s rise as a threat. Since the China Dream is very China centered, the role of Confucian improvement is hardly being used in Xi’s discourses to emphasize China’s peaceful intentions. Compatible Universalism even makes Xi vulnerable for criticisms from abroad on the situation of minorities within the borders of China.
Conclusion
It is evident that the China Dream plays an important role in Xi’s thought. With the concept China Dream, he creates a vision of a glorious future for the Chinese people. More specifically, for the Chinese people who believe in the dream and fit into the mold of the ‘sons and daughters 90 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass
Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.
91 “China Uighurs: Xinjiang legalises 're-education' camps,” BBC News, October 10, 2018,
of China’. With the alleviation of poverty and the rejuvenation of China after the dark times of humiliation Xi’s domestic position and the position of the CPC will be enhanced. However, the China Dream does not fit very well in Zhao’s theory of neo-tianxia. For the analysis the lack of a clear definition of the concept is problematic. Especially the differing interpretations on the national and the international level make it hard to fully fathom the concept of the China Dream. It is not surprising that the aim to surpass the United States as the superpower will be interpreted by the international community as a threat and this can explain the ambivalence in the definition. Since peace and stability are required to make the China Dream come true, it makes sense that Xi is not very clear on this aspiration in his speeches. This suggests that Xi wants to prevent himself from falling into the trap of power politics that led to wars and disunity and eventually in the international order we know today.
5. Community of common destiny
The CPDA starts with a concise exploration of the historical background of the concept. A community of common destiny literally means “a group of people/nations bonded together by common interest and fate”.92 The term ‘community’ has many different interpretations, but in
the discourse of Xi Jinping the meaning of ‘a society of states’ as defined by Hedley Bull comes really close. According to Bull, the international community is a group of states that conceives itself as “bound by a sense of common interests, rules, values and institutions.”93 Another name
for community of common destiny used by Xi is ‘a community with shared future for mankind’. The lack of precision in the definition, gave room for the Chinese government to adopt multiple interpretations. The term was first used in 2007 by the Chinese Communist Party. At the time, it referred specifically to relationship between mainland China and Taiwan.94 Xi used community of common destiny for the first time in 2013 to explain his views on the relations between China and its neighboring countries. He expressed the need for positive multilateral and bilateral relations based on “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness”.95 Since
then, either community of common destiny or ‘a community with shared future for mankind’ has been used in almost all of his speeches when discussing international relations.
The immediate trigger for the community of common destiny narrative was the increasing territorial disputes between China and ASEAN countries. Specifically, when tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines – both ASEAN members – on the South China Sea escalated. The community of common destiny discourse was used as a counter-narrative to the alleged Chinese dominant attitude and quest for hegemony in the region.96 In 2015, the theme of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference was Towards a Community of Common Destiny
and A New Future for Asia. In the opening speech, Xi gave four recommendations to build a
community of common destiny. First, countries need to respect one another and treat each other like equals. Second, win-win cooperation and common development must be achieved. Third, common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security should be pursued. Fourth, inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations needs to be ensured. Although the theme
92 Denghua Zhang, “The Concept of ‘Community of Common Destiny’ in China’s Diplomacy: Meaning,
Motives and Implications,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2018): 197.
93 Denghua, “The Concept,” 198.
94 Richard Rigby and Brandan Taylor, “Whose Shared Destiny?”, in Shared Destiny, eds. Geremie R. Barmé,
Linda Jaivin, and Jeremy Goldkorn (Canberra 2015), 59.
95 Geremie R. Barmé, “Under One Heaven”, eds. Geremie R. Barmé, Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn, Shared
Destiny (Canberra: ANU Press, 2015), xii.
of the conference could suggest otherwise, Xi stressed that the community of common destiny is for “Asia and beyond, and Asia and the world”.97 The next tool of CPDA helps us to analyze
in how far Xi’s community of common destiny is challenging the four dominant threads of Zhao’s neo-tianxia concept.
Internalization of the World
In 2013, during his state visit to Indonesia, Xi called the relation between China and the members of the ASEAN a community of common destiny “as to bring more benefits to both China and ASEAN and the people in the region.”98 He concluded the speech with a call for
“work for a bright future for the China-ASEAN community of shared destiny”.99 The first
aspect of Zhao’s theory is first and foremost based on non-exclusiveness. In other words, internalization of the world can only happen if all countries are part of it. In his speech at the General Secretary of the CPC in December 2017, he made his vision on community of common destiny and its inclusiveness quite clear: “as the term suggests, a community with shared future for mankind means that the destiny and the future of each and every nation and country are interlocked.”100 In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2020, Xi remarked
that the corona crisis “reminds us that we are living in an interconnected global village with a common stake”. Every country should cooperate in battling the crisis and the stronger countries should assist those in need, “[t]his is why we should embrace the vision of a community with a shared future in which everyone is bound together”. In this speech, the Westphalian system was directly criticized. Attempts to build blocs should be rejected and, Xi said, the zero-sum approach must be opposed.101 The aspect of shared interests is quite obvious in the community of common destiny, in the APEC Dialogues speech in November 2020, he said “the pandemic once again shows that the interests of all countries are closely interwoven and that humankind shares a common stake”.102
97 Xi Jinping, “Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia,” (speech, Boao Forum
for Asia Annual Conference, Bo’ao, March 28, 2015), http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zt/ydyl/t1250169.htm.
98 ASEAN-China Center, “Speech by President Xi Jinping.” 99 ASEAN-China Center, “Speech by President Xi Jinping.” 100 Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Build a Better World.”
101 “Xi Jinping's speech at the General Debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly,”
CGTN, September 23, 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-23/Full-text-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-at-General-Debate-of-UNGA-U07X2dn8Ag/index.html.
102 Xi Jinping, “Fostering a New Development Paradigm and Pursuing Mutual Benefit and Win-win
cooperation,” (speech, APEC CEO Dialogues, Beijing, November 19, 2020), http://is.china-embassy.org/eng/zgwj/t1833641.htm.
Another aspect of the internalization of the world is about universal security and enduring peace. In his speech at the BRICS Business Forum in September 2017, Xi exemplified the importance for world peace. He praised the efforts of all countries for “global peace that has reigned for half a century”, but acknowledged that terrorism and regional conflicts “cast a dark shadow over the world”.103 In his New Year’s Speech 2015, Xi connected the community of
common destiny to universal security and enduring peace. He expressed his hope that the “international community will work together to promote peace and cooperation, turn confrontation into cooperation and turn swords into ploughshares (…) [l]et all of us endeavor to build a community of common future for mankind shared by the people of all countries.”.104
Two years later, Xi made the same call saying that he believed “that mankind shares the same fate as a community, and build our planet into a more peaceful and prosperous place to live in”.105
There is some ambiguity on his call for a global supervisory system, which Zhao would call tianxia. On the one hand, Xi expressed his full support for the United Nations and Zhao argued that the United Nations is certainly not a global system in the neo-tianxia sense. To the United Nations General Assembly Xi said in 2020, that countries “should stay true to multilateralism and safeguard the international system with the UN at its core”.106 On the other
hand, Xi repeatedly urged for a reform of the global system. For example, in Davos in 2017 he said “[t]here is a growing call from the international community for reforming the global economic government system”107 and in the speech to the United Nations in 2020 he said,
directly after he expressed his full support, that “the global system should adapt itself to evolving global and political and economic dynamics”. Fundamental rejection of imperialism can be found in the call for cooperation between the stronger and weaker countries.
Relational Rationality
Relational rationality puts coexistence prior to existence and makes “eradicating wars and hostility a basic requirement and limits competitions permitted by the minimization of mutual
103 Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Usher in the Second “Golden Decade” of BRICS Cooperation,” (speech,
BRICS Business Forum, Xiamen, September 3, 2017), https://www.ecns.cn/2017/09-03/271916.shtml.
104 Xi Jinping, “New Years Speech 2015”, speech, Beijing, December 31, 2014. 105 “President Xi Jinping’s New Year Speech,” The 48 Group Club, January 17, 2017,
https://www.the48groupclub.com/2017/01/17/president-xi-jinping%E2%80%8Bs-new-year-speech-full-text-video-and-analysis/.
106 “Xi Jinping’s speech at the General Debate UN.”
107 Xi Jinping, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth,” (speech, Davos,
hostility.”108 In his speech The Paris Conference on Climate Change in 2015, Xi connected the
importance of coexistence to climate change. The narrow-minded mentality of zero-sum game should be rejected. Instead, he called for all countries, and developed countries in particular, to assume more shared responsibilities with win-win outcomes”. Because, an on individual rationality based, “take-more-give-less approach based on expediency is in nobody’s interest”. He concluded with “[t]ackling climate change is a shared mission for mankind”.109 In his speech
to the UN General Assembly in 2015, he urged to “abandon the Cold War mentality in all its manifestations, a foster a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security.”110
Confucian Improvement
Xi repeatedly stressed that the improvement of the situation of one country should never be at the expense of others, his rejections of zero-sum games are examples of that. In his speech to the World Economic Forum meeting in 2017, he made this very clear, “[t]oday, mankind has become a close-knit community of shared future. Countries have extensive converging interests and are mutually dependent. All countries enjoy the rights to development. At the same time, they should view their own interests in a broader context and refrain from pursuing them at the expense of others”.111 However, Confucian Improvement means that every country benefits from changes in the international system. In his CPC Dialogue in 2017 he said “we should work to deliver benefits to all and promote win-win economic globalization (…) thus creating enabling conditions for common development for all mankind”. And that “doing so will enable us to pursue common prosperity for all countries (…) make sure that all of our children are taking care of” which will enable “all countries to benefit from development and all people live decent lives.”112
Compatible Universalism
108 Zhao, Redefining a Philosophy, 59.
109 Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build a Win-Win, Equitable and Balanced Governance Mechanism on
Climate Change,” (speech, The Paris Conference of Climate Change, Paris, November 30, 2015), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_china.pdf.
110 Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a
Community of Shared Future For Mankind,” (speech, United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 28, 2015), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml.
111 Xi Jinping, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times,” (speech, Davos, January 17, 2017),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/18/c_135991184.htm
In his speech to the UN General Assembly in 2015, Xi said that the diversity of cultures is vital to the community of common destiny. He called for the promotion of harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences, because “[t]he world is simply more colorful as a result of its cultural diversity. Diversity breeds exchanges, exchanges create integration, and integration makes progress possible”.113 In the CPC Dialogue speech, Xi said that the “call of history” was
that “different civilizations should blossom and coexist harmoniously, draw on each other’s strength to inspire and nourish human development.” Later he said that countries “should work together to bring down cultural barriers on the ground (…) and eliminate cultural bias that prevents people from engaging with one another”.114 It was in the speech to the UN General
Assembly in 2020, where the universal assumption of the internalization of the world is directly connected to compatible universalism, “we should see each other as the members of the same big family, pursue win-win cooperation, and rise above the ideological disputes and do not fall into the trap of the ‘clash of civilizations’”.115
The community of common destiny and China’s position on the world stage
The next tool of CPDA helps to explain China’s power status on the world stage. Xi envisions a community of all nations based on mutual respect and equivalence. He believes that every country must play its part in order to create a stable and peaceful international order. This does not indicate that China has the aspiration to become the only world power and he uses the community of common destiny concept successful to oppose the Western narrative that sees China as a threat. Concerning relation rationality, the community of common destiny narrative rejects the zero-sum games the West seems to play and as a consequence the community of common destiny should lead to Confucian improvement. Thus, a world order with benefits for every country. According to the concept, cultures should live peacefully side-by-side. This implies that the concept of neo-tianxia fits very well in Xi Jinping’s ideas on the community of common destiny.
Conclusion
Since Xi uses the community of common destiny in almost all of his speeches, it is an important concept in the narratives of Xi Jinping. The concept fits almost every part of the neo-tianxia theory of Zhao. In contrast with the China Dream, the community of common destiny refers to
113 “Working together to Forge a New Partnership.” 114 “Xi Jinping’s speech at the General Debate UN.” 115 “Xi Jinping’s speech at the General Debate UN.”
the international system rather than the domestic situation of China. Even though the community of common destiny is a part of the China Dream, the narrative is very different. Whereas the grand narrative of the China Dream is about pride and becoming the central power in the international system, the community of common destiny has similarities with the ancient interpretations of tianxia. An egalitarian word system should be created with China as ‘just’ one of the countries in a harmonious world.
