Changing the meaning
of a norm
International Nongovernmental Organizations and the development of R2P
Nikki Laurijsse
S1481185
10-6-2019
MSc Political Science (International Politics)
Supervisor: Prof.dr. A.C. Verdun
Second reader: Dr. N.J.G. Van Willigen
Wordcount: 9,995
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Abstract
The norm ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was officially accepted by the United Nations in
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Although research on norms has predominantly
focused on their creation and implementation, authors such as Zwingel (2012) have investigated
their meaning and the development thereof. An international norm is not just created by a
norm-maker and then diffused: norm-takers interpret a norm and send this re-interpretation back to
the global, changing norm-meaning (Zwingel, 2012). In the case of R2P, international
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have a special position: they are part of the
norm-making international level and simultaneously act as norm-takers. This paper considers the
strategies four INGOs employ to influence the meaning of R2P and studies whether their use
of strategies and interpretation of the norm changes after its creation. The INGOs appear to use
strategies such as agenda-setting and framing events in connection to R2P. These strategies are
interrelated and are similar for each case. The INGOs’ interpretation of R2P, however, is
dynamic, changing from responsibility into response into prevention. This changing
interpretation of R2P coincides with the development of its meaning in the broader international
community.
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Table of contents
List of abbreviations ... 3
1. Introduction ... 4
2. Responsibility to Protect ... 6
2.1. R2P and (I)NGOs ... 9
3. INGO influence on norms ... 10
4. Research design ... 13
4.1. Secondary evidence ... 14
4.2. Discourse analysis ... 14
5. Influencing the norm ... 17
5.1. World Summit ... 18
5.1.1. Norm-meaning ...18 5.1.2. Strategies ...185.2. Libya ... 20
5.2.1. Norm-meaning ...21 5.2.2. Strategies ...225.3. Yemen ... 23
5.3.1. Norm-meaning ...24 5.3.2. Strategies ...255.4. Analyzing development ... 27
6. Conclusion ... 29
References ... 32
Appendix ... 36
Appendix 1 – Notes World Summit per category ... 36
Appendix 2 – Notes Libya per category ... 41
Appendix 3 – Notes Yemen per category ... 49
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List of abbreviations
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU
African Union
HRW
Human Rights Watch
ICISS
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRtoP
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
IGO
Intergovernmental Organization
INGO
International Nongovernmental Organization
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
PoC
Protection of Civilians
R2P
Responsibility to Protect
RwP
Responsibility while Protecting
UN
United Nations
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
USA
United States of America
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Changing the meaning of a norm
International Nongovernmental Organizations and the development of R2P
1. Introduction
About a million of people were killed in the Rwandan genocide, while the international
community failed to react (Hintjens, 1999). Atrocities such as this genocide forced the world to
think about the disadvantages of sovereignty, out of which the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)
was born in 2001 (Widmaier & Glanville, 2015). Sovereignty was transformed from right into
responsibility, and the international community was given the obligation to hold states
accountable (Aloyo, 2013). The principle was accepted by the member states of the United
Nations (UN) at the 2005 UN World Summit and civil society joined the movement in the
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) in 2009 (World Federalist
Movement, n.d.).
Norms can change: they are processes, not ‘things’ (Krook & True, 2010). Zwingel
(2012) points out a constant renegotiation between the local and global level, suggesting the
meaning of norms may change over time. A shift in the interpretation of a norm would likely
affect its implementation. Awareness of a norm’s meaning is therefore crucial to understanding
its real-life implications. However, not much has been written on the development of R2P after
its institutionalization, which is why this paper zooms in on it.
In the norm renegotiation process, both local and global actors play a role (Zwingel,
2012). Norm diffusion research rarely portrays international nongovernmental organizations
(INGOs) as separate actors from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), even though their
objectives usually diverge (Kim, 2013, p.506). In the case of R2P, INGOs are part of the
norm-making international level, but simultaneously are norm-takers: they must fit the norm into their
own structure. The connection between INGOs and the meaning of R2P has not been
extensively studied, but it is not difficult to see the potential significance of R2P’s meaning for
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humanitarian INGOs. The norm could be used to increase the legitimacy of INGOs who seek
to protect civilians and to mobilize the international community for this cause. At the same time,
INGOs striving for peace may object to the military aspect of R2P. It seems likely that these
actors would attempt to shift R2P’s meaning to their preferred interpretation. This paper draws
INGOs back into the debate by asking the question: what strategies have INGOs used to
influence the meaning of the R2P norm, and how did their strategies and interpretation of R2P
change over time?
This paper finds that four Human Rights INGOs – the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), Oxfam International, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
(HRW) – predominantly use agenda-setting and strategically framing events to influence the
R2P norm. These influencing strategies are interrelated with one another and with naming and
shaming and influencing public opinion. The organizations highlight specific sides of the norm
while covering others. The focus of their strategic framing shifts from the responsibility of the
sovereign state and the international community to (non-military) response to prevention,
perhaps influenced by R2P’s negative connotations after the failure of the Libya intervention.
The INGOs also connect R2P language to other issues and norms, shifting the norm’s meaning.
Their use of specific influencing techniques, however, is consistent over time.
This paper starts by outlining the literature surrounding R2P and norm development.
Then a theoretical framework is built based on existing theories about (I)NGO influence on
norms, after which the research design is explained. This is followed by the analysis, in which
three cases are analyzed through a method of process tracing, supplemented by a qualitative
discourse analysis: the 2005 UN World Summit (henceforth referred to as ‘World Summit’),
the Libya intervention and the Yemen crisis. For each timeframe, the dominant meaning of R2P
is discussed and INGO publications are interpreted to analyze influencing strategies and frames.
These findings are then combined to discuss the development of INGO strategies and framing
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of R2P, and the way this connects to the broader norm-meaning. Finally, a conclusion is
formulated, including implications and limitations.
2. Responsibility to Protect
The failure of the international community to prevent the atrocities committed in the 1990s
generated debate about humanitarian intervention. How to prevent these atrocities, while also
respecting sovereignty? In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) – set up by the Canadian government – coined the term ‘Responsibility to
Protect’, transforming the concept of sovereignty from right into responsibility (United Nations
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). A state had the
obligation to protect its citizens, and it was the responsibility of the international community to
step in if a state failed (Aloyo, 2013). R2P was accepted by the UN member states in the World
Summit Outcome document (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2005). In 2009, the
UN Secretary General published his first annual report on R2P, further explaining its
implementation (Hofmann & Suthanthiraraj, 2019).
R2P contains three pillars. The first pillar deals with responsibility: sovereignty means
an obligation to protect citizens (Hofmann, 2015). The second pillar talks about the
commitment of the international community to support other states in this obligation (Hofmann,
2015). The final pillar comprises the promise to react if another state fails to fulfil its
responsibility to protect (Hofmann, 2015).
This third pillar was contested, because it allowed the use of force if peaceful means did
not suffice: some member states feared justified Western interventionism, while others were
uncomfortable with being ‘obliged’ to react (Widmaier & Glanville, 2015). In background
reports, criteria for the use of force had been developed, but these were absent from the
Outcome document (Breau, 2006). Next to this, the final R2P concept was limited to acts of
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genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes (UNGA, 2005). By
limiting the instances in which it could be applied, requiring a decision by the UN Security
Council (UNSC) and predominantly leaving the responsibility to protect in the hands of states,
a consensus was reached (Hofmann, 2015). The term R2P was often used in the years that
followed, and the 2011 Libya intervention has been pointed to as the first clear example of its
application (Hofmann, 2015; Hobson, 2016; Widmaier & Glanville, 2015).
Scholars have written extensively on the topic of R2P. The practical impact of the norm
is often discussed (e.g. Breau, 2006; De Waal, 2007; Hobson, 2016). This debate generally
focuses on R2P’s military aspect (Rotmann, Kurtz & Brockmeier, 2014). Rotmann, Kurtz and
Brockmeier (2014, p.361) mention that nation states are frequently portrayed as divided into
Western states, eager to intervene in other countries; and non-Western states, guarding their
sovereignty (e.g. Hofmann, 2015, p. II). Until the intervention in Libya, cases such as the Darfur
conflict were used to evaluate the implementation of R2P, often pointing to the absence of
military intervention (e.g. De Waal, 2007). According to De Waal (2007), the concept of R2P
had inflated expectations as to what the international community could do, that way raising the
stakes of making a decision. After the intervention in Libya, authors such as Hobson (2016)
took this conflict to explain the possibilities for future military intervention.
Not all scholars focus on implementation: some look at the concept of R2P itself (e.g.
Crossley, 2018; Hehir, 2010). Again, contestation is a significant topic. R2P is sometimes called
a Western product, imposing Western values on the world (Crossley, 2018). Crossley (2018,
p.6) categorizes this argument as the pluralist critique. Connected is the critique of
interventionism, problematizing the use of force embedded in R2P (Crossley, 2018). For
example, Hehir (2010, p.224-225) poses that R2P fails to live up to its promise to deal with the
dilemma of humanitarian intervention into a sovereign state, since it does not discuss conditions
concerning intervention or authority.
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Authors such as Welsh (2013) and Hofmann (2015) write about contestation as well,
but do not challenge the norm. They explain how disagreement has kept the norm relevant, both
in the scholarly community and the broader community as a whole (Welsh, 2013; Hofmann,
2015). The debate on certain aspects of R2P normalizes other elements, such as the idea of
sovereignty as responsibility (Hofmann, 2015). The norm is defended as well. Acharya (2013)
argues that R2P is not solely Western-based, looking at the influence of actors such as the
African Union (AU) on its creation, and others point toward the topic of prevention instead of
the use of force (e.g. Hofmann, 2015; Bellamy, 2009). Finally, some scholars accept criticism,
but suggest ways to improve the norm: Royer (2018) for example pleads for a re-interpretation
of R2P, in order to re-politicize it and acknowledge political interests.
R2P is now almost 15 years old: did the norm remain the same? This question has not
been discussed in depth. Authors such as Acharya (2013) and Breau (2006) examine the
development of the concept in the process of its creation. Acharya (2013) looks at the influence
of contestation on the content of R2P and explains that actors such as the AU significantly
influenced its final form. Acharya (2004) also examines the norm diffusion process and the
modification of the global norm in local settings. Other authors study resistance against the
norm and its development after events such as the Libya intervention (Bloomfield, 2015;
Hobson, 2016). This latter focus investigates the impact on the behavior of states, rather than
on the norm itself and how it is used or portrayed. On the development of the meaning of R2P
after its creation, not much is written (exceptions are Hehir, 2010; Crossley, 2018). However,
in a recent article, Hofmann and Suthanthiraraj (2019) argue contestation of R2P and the
complexity of the norm caused a shift in framing by R2P proponents toward prevention.
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2.1. R2P and (I)NGOs
Aside from the meaning of R2P, its applicability and its development, actors have also been
studied. A norm entrepreneur is an actor aiming to “convince a critical mass of states (norm
leaders) to embrace [a] norm” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.895). Obvious norm
entrepreneurs in the R2P debate are states, usually Western (Reinold, 2010; Capie, 2012).
Taking the state-perspective a step further, IGOs can be norm entrepreneurs as well. In the case
of R2P, the UN fits this role perfectly
(Hobson, 2016, p.437; Hofmann, 2015). Other IGOs are
mentioned as well, particularly regional organizations such as the AU and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
(Acharya, 2004; 2013).
Non-state actors also play a role in R2P norm entrepreneurship. Hofmann (2015)
mentions the ICRtoP and singles out Oxfam International to explain the initial influence of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the creation and early development of R2P. He
mentions that “close cooperation among civil society, committed individuals, government
officials and the UN Secretariat have made possible the comparatively rapid development of
R2P from an idea to a set of norms” (Hofmann, 2015, p.13). Capie (2012) and Acharya (2004)
also briefly look at NGOs and R2P, and find that a limited capacity of NGOs in Southeast Asia
makes the diffusion process more difficult. The scholarly community is mentioned as well, and
Crossley suggests a “dynamic relationship” (2018, p.3) between all non-state actors.
The nature of the actor is not always specified. Often, words such as ‘advocates’ or
‘proponents’ are used to point to all advocacy actors (e.g. Crossley, 2018). A proponent,
however, is not necessarily a norm entrepreneur. Particularly on the topic of non-state actors,
specifically (I)NGOs, not much has been written. (I)NGOs are portrayed as important in the
creation process, and as increasingly skeptical (Hofmann, 2015). Whether they have influenced
the later development of the norm, however, is unclear from the literature.
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3. INGO influence on norms
In order to analyze the interaction of INGOs with the R2P norm, the ways in which (I)NGOs
can influence both norms and other actors need to be discussed. According to the UN, an NGO
“is any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or
international level.” (United Nations Department of Public Information, n.d.). This paper is
interested in those NGOs operating at the international, global or transnational level, but takes
into account theory on all types of NGOs, since work on INGOs is limited.
When looking at the relationship between INGOs and norm development, the term
‘norm’ has to be defined. In doing so, norm diffusion models become important. The first type
of models looks at socialization: a norm is created and then carried to localities by norm
entrepreneurs (e.g. Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 1999). The content of the norm remains
the same: norms are portrayed as relatively unchanging. In these models, the socialization
process can be obstructed, but norms are eventually internalized or rejected (e.g. Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998). The norm entrepreneur is thus all-important, while the norm-taker has a more
passive role.
Other norm diffusion models focus more on the local actor, such as Acharya’s (2004)
localization model. These models explain how norms are taken by local actors and molded to
fit the existing structure (Acharya, 2004). The norm thus substantially changes in the diffusion
process. The final type of norm diffusion models focuses on both actors, portraying norms as a
constant negotiation between the global and the local (e.g. Zwingel, 2012; Acharya, 2013). This
approach explains that norms are created globally and are then contested or changed by local
actors, who send back their new interpretation and that way change the norm’s meaning on the
global level (Zwingel, 2012).
This paper uses this latter constant renegotiation process as a framework. A norm is “a
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998,
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p.891). This definition does not require translation into practice. Norms are processes: they are
not set in stone. INGOs can be regarded as both norm entrepreneurs and norm-takers. They can
have influence on norm-meaning through discursive powers, but simultaneously are actors who
are handed the norm of R2P and have to interpret this norm to fit their own structure.
(I)NGOs have no formal coercive powers and therefore must find other ways of
influencing. In the literature, authors have pointed toward strategic use of material resources
and access to information (Tallberg, Dellmuth, Agné & Duit, 2015). Tallberg et al. (2015) find
that material resources are not systematic influencers, but NGOs can trade information for
access to the decision-making process.
Additionally, an important asset of (I)NGOs is their use of discourse. The term discourse
has different meanings, but is defined in this paper as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts
and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995,
p.44). Through language and symbols, reality is constructed. Kim (2013) finds that INGOs
mediate the dominant discourse on a topic and can influence actors by ‘naming and shaming’.
NGOs can also change public opinion by calling attention to certain problems and have
agenda-setting power (Davis, Murdie & Steinmetz, 2012; Aloyo, 2013, p.117; Joachim, 2003). This
dominant discourse can be mediated through the practice of framing (e.g. Joachim, 2003).
Framing impacts norm-meaning, for example when linking the norm to other issues and norms
or focusing on certain aspects (Hofmann & Suthanthiraraj, 2019).
How would (I)NGOs be able to influence norm-meaning through discourse? First,
(I)NGOs can influence public opinion, by framing issues a certain way and giving specific
information, drawing on their impartial legitimacy (Davis, Murdie & Steinmetz, 2012). Davis,
Murdie and Steinmetz (2012) find that public opinion pressurizes domestic governments to
improve their Human Rights practices. This pressure may also work for norms. If the general
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perception of an international norm changes in the local, the norm is ‘reshaped’. When looking
at Zwingel’s (2012) renegotiation model, this local interpretation could change the norm’s
meaning on the international level as well. To a certain extent, governments have to consider
public opinion in their international endeavors, which means a change in norm perception on
the local level will most likely lead to a change in its meaning on the international level (Gordon
& Pardo, 2015).
The possible influence of agenda-setting on the meaning of a norm is more
straightforward. Because of their access to international and domestic platforms due to their
perceived legitimacy and expertise, (I)NGOs have the ability to influence what the international
community discusses (Aloyo, 2013). This impact can “shape outcomes that involve deciding
on what is discussed or ignored” (Aloyo, 2013, p.116). This process can affect the meaning of
norms: is a norm used to call attention to specific issues, and what aspects of this norm are
discussed?
Naming and shaming can also influence norm-meaning. By shaming a country, INGOs
increase the risk of both domestic and international backlash (Kim, 2013). This risk can change
certain government practices, but may also be able to change norm-meaning (Kim, 2013). By
shaming actors while calling on (certain aspects of) a specific norm, the norm is activated
(Wunderlich, 2013). The way shaming is connected to the norm has the power of constructing
reality and thus affects norm-meaning: what behavior is seen as ‘wrong’ through the lens of the
norm?
Finally, (I)NGOs can discuss events through a specific frame and link them to a norm
(Joachim, 2003). This process of framing and linking mediates the discourse and constructs
social reality (Hajer, 1995). By connecting certain issues to an existing norm, or by clearly
dissociating them, the content of this norm may change. The norm’s meaning may be stretched
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to apply to different issues, become focused on one particular aspect, or be narrowed.
Considering Joachim’s work (2003, p.268), framing events is likely related to agenda-setting.
This paper combines theories on (I)NGO influence with theories on norm renegotiation.
It is to be expected that if INGOs changed their perspective on the norm, they would have used
their discursive powers to influence the international community through these framing
strategies.
4. Research Design
In order to assess INGO influencing strategies and the development of the meaning of R2P, this
paper uses a combined method of process tracing and qualitative discourse analysis. A
cross-case study of three cross-cases is carried out, through which the process of the norm is studied. The
cases are instances of events in which R2P was relevant. A chronological order is required to
make claims about the norm’s progress over time. The first ‘case’ is the development of and
reaction to the World Summit Outcome document: the starting point of the analysis. This
research intends to discuss the development of the meaning after its international acceptance,
thus not considering its creation process.
The other two cases are ‘most-similar cases’: the atrocity conditions of R2P apply to
both cases, and both deal with foreign intervention (Gerring, 2008). The 2011 Libya
intervention is discussed, particularly the reactions in the run-up to and directly after the
intervention. This case is often considered the first time R2P was used to justify military
intervention (e.g. Thakur, 2013; Stuenkel, 2014). It is therefore likely that many actors –
including INGOs – have reacted on the issue.
The third case is the Yemen crisis, which started with the 2014 Houthi-takeover and the
military reaction of a Saudi-led coalition (Orkaby, 2017). In this conflict, warring parties are
accused of committing war crimes, therefore making it a possible target for R2P (United
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Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). This case was specifically chosen for
the severity of Yemen’s ongoing humanitarian crisis (Bachman, 2019; Al Jazeera News, 2019).
To examine the development of the R2P norm and the role of INGOs in this process,
the paper uses a simplified form of process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The R2P norm
and INGO influencing strategies are chronologically traced in the three different timeframes,
for which secondary evidence is supplemented by a discourse analysis.
4.1. Secondary evidence
To shed light on the broader international meaning of R2P in the specific timeframes to examine
its development, secondary sources are examined. This secondary evidence mainly consists of
scholarly resources about the specific cases and the meaning of the norm in these cases. Next
to this, UN publications are considered as well. After examining the general norm change,
INGO influencing strategies are analyzed to find whether and if so, how their strategies may be
linked to a possible change in the meaning of R2P.
4.2. Discourse analysis
Not much is written on INGO influence on the R2P norm after its creation (although notable
exceptions are Hofmann, 2015; Shawki, 2011; Crossley, 2018). Therefore, the research
question cannot be answered by combining existing work. Instead, a qualitative discourse
analysis is performed. Publications of four influential Human Rights INGOs – the ICRC,
Oxfam International, Amnesty International and HRW – are interpreted to evaluate how they
attempt to influence the debate on R2P. These organizations were active when R2P was
institutionalized and thus cover the norm’s full lifespan. Human Rights INGOs were chosen
because they work on humanitarian issues to which R2P may apply. They may therefore have
an interest in the interpretation of the norm. In order to avoid a potential bias of only considering
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obvious proponents, two ICRtoP-members (HRW and Oxfam International) and two
non-members (Amnesty International and the ICRC) were selected.
Publications by these INGOs on their websites and in their journals, such as research
papers and press releases, are interpreted. The year around the World Summit, 2005, is
considered for the first case. For Libya, the timeframe spans from November 2010 until
December 2011, taking into account the months before, during and after the intervention.
Because of its longevity, it is not possible to analyze all reactions to the Yemen conflict. The
timeframe therefore spans from February 2017, when the UNSC extended the Yemen sanctions
mechanism, until March 2019 (UNSC, 2017).
In order to determine if a specific influencing strategy is apparent in a publication, a
framework is developed to categorize the discourse (Table 1). The framework is based on the
four strategies of (I)NGO influencing discussed in the theoretical framework: changing public
opinion (Davis, Murdie & Steinmetz, 2012); agenda-setting (Aloyo, 2013, p.116); naming and
shaming (Davis, Murdie & Steinmetz, 2012; Kim, 2013); and framing events (Joachim, 2003).
If an INGO tries to influence the meaning of R2P through public opinion, the
organization needs to target its audience – the general public – by rallying it around or away
from R2P. Expected discourse would be strong wording appealing to emotion (e.g. ‘terrible
crisis’, ‘Western imperialism’), and numbers and information about specific cases of R2P.
For a strategy of agenda-setting, policy suggestions connected to R2P and the cases
would feature in the discourse. There would also be a high quantity of texts. It is possible that
INGOs attempt to get specific aspects of R2P on the agenda: these aspects would be
emphasized. Naming and shaming helps organizations call out actors on the use or non-use of
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R2P. It is expected that INGOs would use specific agency markers (e.g. names of states) and
would connect R2P or other concepts to failures.
Finally, INGOs can strategically frame events. This strategy would presumably connect
specific cases to R2P, or avoid doing so. In the discourse, this strategy would translate into
the
explicit use – or non-use – of R2P in publications surrounding the events. Using different terms
to talk about events that could be connected to R2P, such as ‘humanitarianism’, or linking
certain aspects of R2P to events, are markers as well.
For discovering (a change in) the INGO’s interpretation of R2P, another framework is
required to categorize the direction of the prevalent strategy. This paper assumes social reality
is created through discourse, making it useful to discuss the meaning of R2P. Within
publications, the focus of the discourse and strategies is examined. Does a publication focus on
Pillar I (responsibility of the sovereign state), Pillar II (responsibility of the international
Table 1. Strategic framework
Strategy
Markers Public Opinion Agenda-Setting
Naming &
Shaming Framing events
Observable markers Strong wording/ emotional appeals Policy suggestions connected to R2P/ associated terms
Specific agency Connect to R2P
Numbers & information connected to R2P High quantity R2P in combination with failure Connect to different concept Focus on specific aspects of R2P Link to specific aspects of R2P Goal Influencing public opinion
Urging actors to: - Put events on the agenda justified by R2P - Put R2P on agenda - Focus on certain aspects of R2P
Calling out actors on (non-)use of (aspects of) R2P
Connecting R2P with events (or not)
Author’s compilation based on Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz (2012), Aloyo (2013, p.116), Kim
(2013) and Joachim (2003).
17
community to assist the sovereign state), or Pillar III (responsibility of the international
community to react)? It might also focus on a combination of pillars, or completely disregard
R2P. In the literature, authors also mention more specific focus-points: its military or
non-military aspect (e.g. Rotmann, Kurtz & Brockmeier, 2014, p.361), and prevention or reaction
(e.g. Hehir, 2010, p.221). These possible frames are combined in the framework presented in
Table 2.
To find relevant publications, search words such as ‘Responsibility to Protect’; ‘war
crimes’; and ‘international community’ are used in combination with the specific cases and
timeframes (see Appendix 4 for all search words). Within the publications that appear from
these searches, those concerned with R2P-connected issues are considered. Not all articles
containing words such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘intervention’ are applicable to R2P: interpretation
of the topic is necessary. The content of the publications is interpreted and fragments fitting the
categories are singled out. This textual evidence can be found in the Appendix. The evidence
is used to determine which strategy and frame fit the cases best. With the interpretations from
the discourse analysis combined with secondary evidence, this paper attempts to link INGO
influencing techniques to the meaning of R2P.
5. Influencing the norm
Before examining the development of strategies and meaning, each case is analyzed separately.
For each case, a short explanation of the general meaning of R2P in the timeframe is given,
followed by an analysis of INGO influencing strategies.
Table 2. Meaning-based framework
Focus Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III No R2P
Specific focus
Prevention Military Different name for
same concept
Reaction Non-military No mention of
concept
Author’s compilation based on works of Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmeier (2014, p.361) and
Hehir (2010, p.221).
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5.1. World Summit
5.1.1. Norm-meaning
R2P was institutionalized in the World Summit. At that moment, it was still emerging and states’
conceptions of the norm diverged (World Federalist Movement, 2005). By institutionalizing a
certain form of R2P, the UNGA created the first general meaning of the norm. In this
institutionalized concept, the responsibility of states to protect their citizens from specific
crimes is articulated (UNGA, 2005, art.138). The international community has a responsibility
to help states fulfil this goal, and if peaceful support fails, the use of force might be allowed
(UNGA, 2005, art.138-139).
Three aspects of the institutionalized articulation of the R2P norm stand out. First,
although the aspects of Pillar I have been ingrained in international law and a decision by the
UNSC has legal consequences, the concept of R2P itself is not a legal concept (Gattini, 2015,
p.222-224). Although morally responsible, the international community is not obliged to act
(Hofmann, 2015). This lack of obligation is visible in the careful language of article 139 of the
Outcome Document: “we are prepared to take collective action” (UNGA, 2005, art.139). The
word responsibility is absent. Secondly, R2P is primarily a sovereign responsibility,
emphasizing the individual state (Brunée & Toope, 2005). Finally, R2P is restricted to four
specific crimes already embedded in international law, strengthening international law but
simultaneously safeguarding sovereignty on domestic affairs (Brunée & Toope, 2005).
5.1.2. Strategies
In the World Summit timeframe, ICRtoP-members and members can be divided. The
non-members – Amnesty International and the ICRC – ignore ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Amnesty
International mentions the international character of the specific crimes that are connected to
R2P, recognizing the responsibility of the international community, but solely before its
19
institutionalization (Amnesty International, 2005). Close to and after the Summit, the
organizations do not interact with it. Even in evaluations of the Summit, the concept is absent
(Appendix 1D1; 1D2). The organizations frame the World Summit by not linking it to the
concept of R2P.
This strategy of framing events is apparent again when considering the responsibility of
a state to protect its people. Especially the Darfur crisis is linked to this aspect (Appendix 1D).
Although the organizations do not refer to R2P, they frame the situation in Sudan according to
the norm of sovereignty as responsibility. In these publications, this responsibility is not limited
to specific crimes: states must protect their citizens from all types of violence (Appendix 1C;
1D).
Other strategies are apparent as well. Amnesty International uses agenda-setting
discussing the Darfur crisis (Appendix 1B1). In another instance, the ICRC uses the strategy of
framing events along with a strategy of naming and shaming, by mentioning that many states
did not “take this responsibility seriously” (Kellenberger, 2004). These strategies, however, are
not often used.
The members of the ICRtoP – Oxfam International and HRW – engage more with the
concept. After the Summit, the organizations use emotional wording with regards to R2P: The
Outcome Document was a “historic step” (HRW, 2005a) and “governments acted boldly”
(Oxfam International, 2005). They appeal to public opinion. While the non-members take the
attention away from R2P when talking about the World Summit, the ICRtoP members frame
the World Summit as successful precisely because of R2P (Appendix 1D3; 1D4).
Whereas Oxfam International seems to focus on the concept itself, HRW uses the
strategy of framing events for discussing specific cases such as Darfur and Zimbabwe
(Kasambala & Neistat, 2005; Clough, 2005) (Appendix 1D4). In these instances, however,
framing events is not the dominant strategy. HRW names and shames governments for their
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failure to protect their own or another state’s citizens (Appendix 1C4). This strategy of naming
and shaming is always followed by a strategy of setting the agenda for the international
community to act (Appendix 1B4). This combination of strategies is also apparent in a joint
address of Oxfam International and HRW on the World Summit: they urge specific countries
threatening to block R2P to stop (HRW, 2005b). Both organizations also set the agenda for
R2P to be implemented in practice, hoping to make R2P more than an empty promise
(Appendix 1B3; 1B4).
In this timeframe, the strategy framing events is dominant, although pulled in two
different directions. Next to this, the ICRtoP members use a combination of naming and
shaming and agenda-setting. They also appeal to public opinion, but only in reaction to the
Summit, and this strategy coincides with framing events. For the ICRtoP non-members, the
publications either ignore the concept, or focus on Pillar I: the responsibility of a state toward
its citizens. The ICRtoP members, on the other hand, consider the concept as a whole, both
focusing on the responsibility of the sovereign state and the international community. The use
of force is not discussed.
5.2. Libya
Early 2011, the unrest of the Arab Spring spread to Libya (Hobson, 2016). After the Libyan
leader Gaddafi violently repressed the peaceful demonstrations, they turned into an armed
uprising (Hofmann, 2015). Gaddafi reacted violently, threatening to “clear Libya “house by
house” of rebellious “rats” and “cockroaches”” (Hofmann, 2015, p.15). On 26 February the
UNSC adopted Resolution 1970, referring the situation to the International Criminal Court and
imposing an arms embargo and specific sanctions (Hofmann, 2015; UNSC, 2011a). When
nothing changed, Resolution 1973 passed on 17 March. This Resolution authorized states “to
21
take all necessary measures [..] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” (UNSC, 2011b,
art.4).
Although no consensus existed on the appropriate response, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America (USA) decided on forceful international
intervention, later continued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hofmann,
2015). This intervention started as a way of protecting citizens from being attacked, but the goal
quickly turned to regime change (Hobson, 2016). The NATO intervention ended with the
killing of Gaddafi (Thakur, 2013). Although the change in regime brought hope to Libya, the
country “descended into chaos” (Hobson, 2016, p.442) soon after the intervention.
5.2.1. Norm-meaning
Resolution 1970 and 1973 both reference to R2P, whereas the UNSC had used the concept
merely four times from the World Summit until Resolution 1970 (Gifkins, 2016, p.152). In both
Resolutions, the explicit discourse predominantly refers to Pillar I: the responsibility of a
sovereign state to protect its citizens against atrocities (UNSC, 2011a; 2011b; Gifkins, 2016).
The fact that the international community calls out Libya based on Pillar I automatically means
Pillar II is instigated as well: the obligation to help a sovereign state with its responsibility. In
the Resolutions, the focus of the discourse is on reaction, not prevention.
Even though explicit discourse does not call for military action, Resolution 1973 could be
interpreted as such. The Resolution authorizes states to “take all necessary measures”, only
excluding occupational forces (UNSC, 2011b). This statement was used to legitimize NATO’s
military operation. Resolution 1973 had been passed without objection – only some abstained
–, but the negative reactions to the military execution of the Resolution reveal that R2P’s
norm-meaning was not universal (Tocci, 2016). Before the Libya intervention, its norm-meaning was
focused on Pillar I (and II), but the intervention shifted the attention to Pillar III. Although the
norm’s meaning was still contentious, the legitimacy of Pillar I seems to have been accepted.
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5.2.2. Strategies
For the Libya timeframe, the division between ICRtoP members and non-members is less clear
and the spectrum has widened. The ICRC is most negative. The organization does not actively
ignore R2P anymore, but highlights its dangers. Through military action and politicization of
protecting civilians, the impartiality of humanitarian aid is endangered: boundaries are blurred
(Appendix 2B2; 2C2; 2D2). HRW is on the other end of the spectrum, actively using the
concept in its publications and regarding it “morally self-evident” (Bolopion, 2011) (Appendix
2A4; 2B4). Amnesty International and Oxfam International are in the middle. Both focus on
the humanitarian aspects of the conflict, while trying to stay away from R2P. Oxfam
International for example agrees with the ICRC on the blurring of boundaries, but
simultaneously asks the UNSC to act (Appendix 2B3; 2E3).
All four strategies can be identified in the publications. Agenda-setting is used most by
all organizations and thus stands out. Especially before the acceptance of Resolution 1973 and
the NATO intervention, organizations urge actors such as the UNSC to take action (Appendix
2B). In this early agenda-setting, the division between ICRtoP members and non-members is
visible: the ICRC and Amnesty International barely use this frame, while Oxfam International
and HRW heavily draw on it (Appendix 2B).
During the intervention, the organizations focus on the protection of Libyan civilians
(Appendix 2B). It can be debated whether this discourse is related to R2P or another norm:
Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict (Breakey, 2012). The language of this latter
norm is similar to R2P, but focuses on the protection of civilians in conflict in a more general
sense, not merely from specific crimes. In this case, PoC is related to a mission legitimized by
R2P, connecting the two concepts. By using agenda-setting while focusing on the PoC norm in
the context of an R2P mission, the organizations blur the already unclear boundaries between
the two concepts and pull R2P toward a more generalized meaning.
23
The other strategies are visible as well. Naming and shaming is used to shame the
international community for its inaction, NATO for the nature of its intervention and Gaddafi
for not protecting his citizens
(Appendix 2C). Naming and shaming, however, usually precedes
agenda-setting. Gaddafi’s atrocities also feature in many publications drawing on public
opinion, but these do not draw on the international aspect and are not used for this analysis.
Although heavily employed by HRW, using public opinion to influence R2P is not a dominant
strategy either, since it accompanies
agenda-setting as well (Appendix 2A4).
Finally, all publications could be categorized as framing events, since they all relate to
the Libya intervention. However, some specifically connect it to (aspects of) R2P. Pommier
(2011) for example frames the military intervention as beyond the scope of R2P in the ICRC
journal. R2P in the case of Libya is framed as causing boundaries to blur between political and
humanitarian missions (Appendix 2D2). Finally, Libya is framed as an outlier by HRW and
Oxfam International: only in Libya did the UNSC act so quick and unified (Appendix 2D3;
2D4).
Although all four strategies are applicable to the timeframe, agenda-setting is dominant.
Other strategies are often used to explain why the subject should be on the agenda. The focus
is on Pillar III: the publications are predominantly reactions to the intervention. Within this
pillar, only HRW seems positive on the subject of force. The other organizations try to steer the
norm away from the military aspect, while keeping their focus on the responsibility to protect
civilians.
5.3. Yemen
In 2014, Houthis took over the Yemeni capital, and detained the government in 2015 (Bachman,
2019). The president escaped and established a Saudi-led Gulf State coalition to take back the
24
country (Orkaby, 2017). The operation included airstrikes and a naval blockade, justified by
UNSC Resolution 2216 (Bachman, 2019; Orkaby, 2017; UNSC, 2015b).
The conflict has killed many civilians and contributed to a humanitarian crisis (Al
Jazeera News, 2019; Orkaby, 2017). Both sides have likely committed war crimes (United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). In December 2018, the parties signed
the Stockholm Agreement, of which especially the ceasefire at the Hodeida port was significant
(Al Jazeera News, 2019). However, this agreement did not end the conflict (Al Jazeera News,
2019). Complicating the issue, countries such as the United Kingdom and the USA are
delivering weapons to Saudi Arabia (Bachman, 2019). Although the UN expressed its concern
about the role of the Saudi-led coalition in the crisis, sanctions against Yemen were extended
in 2017 and 2018 (UN News, 2018; UNSC, 2017; UNSC, 2018).
5.3.1. Norm-meaning
The Libya intervention and particularly its ‘failure’ resurfaced contestation of the R2P norm
(Hofmann & Suthanthiraraj, 2019). Critique mainly focused on the third pillar and the military
force it included (Hofmann & Suthanthiraraj, 2019). When looking at the timeframe of the
Yemen crisis, a shift away from this aspect can be identified (Hofmann & Suthanthiraraj, 2019).
In their reports on R2P, UN Secretary Generals Ki-moon and Guterres heavily emphasize the
importance of prevention (Ki-Moon, 2016; Guterres, 2017). The responsibility of the sovereign
state is accentuated again, but protection is also called a “collective enterprise” (Ki-moon, 2016)
(Guterres, 2017). The focus is no longer on response, but on Pillar I and II and the sovereign
and collective responsibility to prevent.
In the UNGA Plenary Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect, most countries
reaffirmed their support for R2P, focusing on prevention (Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect, 2018). Within this focus, international law played a significant role and
‘accountability’ was linked to the concept of R2P (Guterres, 2017). When zooming in on
25
Yemen, R2P does not feature in the UNSC discourse (UNSC, 2015b). However, the Saudi-led
coalition used R2P language as justification for its intervention (Statement issued on 26 March
2015 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the
State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait quoted in United Nations Security Council, (UNSC,
2015a)).
5.3.2. Strategies
For Yemen, the categorization of organizations in ICRtoP members and non-members is no
longer applicable. Again, the ICRC avoids language clearly connected to R2P. However,
Oxfam International could be placed in the middle, while R2P discourse can be found most in
publications of HRW and Amnesty International.
All strategies can be identified in the organization’s publications. Agenda-setting is very
important again: a large portion of the publications is meant to call actors into action. Within
this agenda-setting, the focus is on respect for international law and accountability for
perpetrators (Appendix 3B). Although this focus is similar for all organizations, a difference
exists in featured actors. The ICRC mostly limits its calls for action to warring parties and states
providing those with arms (Appendix 3B2). The other organizations go further and shift this
responsibility to the international community (Appendix 3B; 3B3; 3B4).
Strategies of naming and shaming and influencing public opinion are visible as well.
All organizations, particularly Amnesty International, the ICRC and Oxfam International, use
emotional wording and numbers to evoke sympathy, such as names of victims, particularly
children (Appendix 3A). This appeal to public opinion often coincides with naming and
shaming, except in ICRC publications. These emotional appeals supplement the naming and
shaming of warring parties, states selling weapons to these parties, or the indifferent
international community (Appendix 3A; 3C). HRW, Oxfam International and Amnesty
26
International blame the international community for falling short (Appendix 3C1; 3C3; 3C4).
Both these strategies often coincide with agenda-setting as well.
Framing events is an important strategy in the case of Yemen. Again, all publications
are automatically part of this strategy, since they are chosen for their focus on Yemen and R2P
discourse. However, the Yemen case is framed a specific way. Instead of looking at moral
responsibility, most publications focus on international law and states’ legal responsibilities
(Appendix 3D). Accountability features heavily in all organizations’ publications (Appendix
3D). However, the organizations diverge in frames as well. When looking at more specific R2P
discourse, it appears that the ICRC is doing its best to steer its response to Yemen away from
R2P. It does not focus on the international community, nor on war crimes and atrocities.
(Appendix 3D2). On the contrary, Amnesty International and HRW often mention atrocities
and connect this R2P discourse to international law (Appendix 3D1; 3D4). Finally, Oxfam
International explicitly opposes a military solution to the conflict
(Appendix 3D3).
In the Yemen case, the strategies framing events and agenda-setting are dominant.
These strategies seem connected and often coincide. Naming and shaming and the use of public
opinion are important as well, especially for Oxfam International, Amnesty International and
HRW, but are used less often and usually precede agenda-setting. The meaning of R2P is drawn
to Pillar II and prevention. Accountability and halting the sale of weapons are supposed to
prevent further atrocities. Next to this, Pillar III remains important for Oxfam International,
Amnesty International and HRW: discourse on “timely and decisive UNSC action” (Amnesty
International, 2017, p.2) for example appears in a joint statement of Amnesty International and
HRW. Within this pillar, the focus is on non-military action.
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5.4. Analyzing development
Combining all cases, the strategies agenda-setting and framing events are dominant in all
timeframes, although not always of equal strength. These strategies often interact with one
another, which matches Joachim’s findings (2003). This interaction is an interesting theme. The
other two strategies, public opinion and naming and shaming, are also used by INGOs.
However, they often seem intended to strengthen a strategy of agenda-setting. These findings
suggest the strategies are more interrelated than the literature indicated.
While the use of strategies is rather stable over time, its framing is not. In the beginning,
publications focus on the non-military Pillar I, although ICRtoP members also emphasize the
importance of the international community. For Libya, the NATO intervention draws the
attention toward military response. As a reaction, most publications seem to steer the norm
away from this military aspect, while remaining focused on response. In the Yemen timeframe,
this turn away from military response remains visible, now for all organizations. However,
instead of concentrating on Pillar I and III and response, the publications now shift to
prevention. Even when calling for a reaction, the goal is preventing further hurt.
Next to this general shift in interpretation, the organizations’ positions change as well.
HRW remains most politically outspoken and positive toward the norm, while the ICRC ignores
R2P or regards it negatively. However, after the Libya intervention, Oxfam International seems
to become less politically outspoken, while Amnesty International moves toward HRW’s
perspective, specifically focusing on the international community. Another interesting
development is the way in which R2P is connected to other concepts. Linking the norm to
different existing frameworks pushes the norm in a certain direction; thereby changing is
meaning (Hofmann & Suthanraraj, 2019). For Libya, the connection to the PoC-norm
generalizes the meaning of R2P. The discourse is not on specific atrocities, but on the
responsibility to protect civilians from all forms of violence. In the Yemen timeframe, the
non-28
legal R2P norm is heavily related to humanitarian law and accountability, seemingly turning
‘responsibility’ into ‘obligation’. The connection of a non-legal norm to humanitarian law
seems an attempt to strengthen and formalize R2P.
How can INGO influencing strategies and framing be connected to the development of
R2P in the broader international environment? In the World Summit timeframe, the dominant
meaning of R2P is the institutionalized concept, sometimes with a preference for focusing on
Pillar I. INGO framing follows the dispute on this meaning, with half of the organizations
focusing on Pillar I and the other half on the whole concept. The Libya timeframe shifts the
spotlight from sovereignty as responsibility to response for both INGOs and the broader
international community. INGOs connect R2P to PoC, which is later picked up by states such
as Brazil in the construction of the ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ norm (RwP) (Widmaier &
Glanville, 2015). RwP could be a reaction to a deliberate connection of R2P with PoC and its
focus on protection in armed conflict. In the Libya timeframe, the INGOs try to steer the norm
away from military intervention. The general meaning of the R2P norm has made a similar
move in the Yemen timeframe, focusing more on prevention by discussing accountability and
legal obligations.
The connection of law to R2P is not just visible in INGO publications, but also in those
of the UN Secretary General (Guterres, 2017). While neither UNSC Resolutions nor the address
by Guterres (2017) connect the Yemen conflict to R2P discourse, the INGOs (except for the
ICRC) do. Important to note, however, is that the combination of the words ‘responsibility to
protect’ appears in few publications for this timeframe. While R2P discourse is present, the
term itself is avoided. It is possible that the contention of R2P after the Libya intervention or
the use of R2P discourse by the Saudi-led coalition to justify the attacks puts negative
connotations on the term, making its use undesirable. Instead, the term is supplemented by
connections to international law, or substituted by words such as ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’.
29
Overall, the frames in INGO publications fit the dominant meaning of R2P in the
broader international arena. They sometimes diverge slightly: for Libya, INGOs steer away
from military intervention, and for Yemen, they connect the conflict to R2P discourse. Whether
the general meaning is indeed influenced by INGOs is difficult to say; they could be adopting
existing frames to convey their messages. However, their way of connecting R2P to PoC and
their steering away from military intervention seem to precede similar framing by the broader
community. The connection might be more than just a correlation.
5.5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed what strategies four INGOs use to attempt to influence the meaning of
the R2P norm, while considering three different timeframes to evaluate how their strategies and
interpretation of R2P change over time. From the analysis, it appears that framing events and
agenda-setting are dominant strategies, remaining relatively stable throughout the cases. The
other strategies, influencing public opinion and naming and shaming, are present as well. These
latter strategies usually intend to strengthen the other two. Next to this, framing events and
agenda-setting are interrelated as well. This interaction of strategies can be observed in all
cases.
The interpretation of R2P does not remain stable. The organizations highlight specific
aspects of the norm while covering others. Their judgment of R2P diverges, with the ICRC on
the negative side of the spectrum and HRW on the other. The ICRC often avoids R2P-related
discourse altogether, while HRW does not. Although their normative interpretations differ, the
INGOs connect the norm to similar issues and focus on similar aspects in the cases. The INGOs’
framing of R2P shifts from the responsibility of a sovereign state to protect and the international
community to assist, to response from the international community to atrocities but away from
military action, to prevention. Within their influencing strategies, the INGOs link R2P to other
30
issue areas as well, generalizing the norm by connecting it to PoC or formalizing it by focusing
on humanitarian law and accountability. Next to this, although R2P-related discourse continues
to feature in the Yemen case, the use of the term itself decreases. In the specific cases, a
correlation exists between the INGOs’ developing framing and the broader development of the
meaning of R2P, which does not remain stable either. Some frames brought forward by the
INGOs indeed precede frames on the broader level.
This paper’s methodology has certain limitations. Despite the connection between the
dominant interpretation in the organizations’ publications and the broader meaning of R2P,
causation cannot be claimed. The INGOs might have used the existing meaning of the norm to
convey their message strategically, instead of actively influencing the broader meaning of the
norm. Further research should look into the effects of the finding that INGOs use influencing
strategies and change their framing over time, to investigate whether a causal relationship exists
between their discourse and R2P’s meaning. One possibility would be to zoom in on one
specific case to compare the two in detail.
More limitations arise from the research design. Only four INGOs were considered, all
Western-based. The results may therefore not be generalizable. Next to this, the argument draws
heavily on interpreted publications. It is possible that publications furthering different frames
or strategies were missed, because of the choice in search words. The interpretation might be
biased as well. Although a theoretical framework was used to minimize this risk, interpreting
is never fully objective. It is therefore important that others look into this subject as well,
employing various methods.
The relation between the development of norms and INGOs has not been studied
extensively. The results of this research imply that INGOs should be pulled into the analysis,
since they may attempt to influence norm-meaning. Next to this, influencing strategies seem to
be interrelated. The way these strategies interact should be further investigated.
31
The development of R2P’s meaning suggests that norms do not stop developing after
they are created and diffused. Authors need to consider norm development when studying
norms or their implementation: it is not sufficient to take the ‘official’ interpretation of a norm
as its meaning. This norm development might be connected to the current situation in Yemen.
The focus of R2P on prevention and away from military response might prevent the
international community from intervening. The way a norm is interpreted has consequences for
its implementation. Understanding their development is therefore crucial for understanding
implementation.
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