The coordination of international disaster relief: A case study evaluation of the Dutch contribution between 2005-2015

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Master thesis Crisis and Security Management

The coordination of international

disaster relief: A case study evaluation

of the Dutch contribution between

2005-2015

Author:

Brian Hamelink (s1588504)

Supervisor:

Dr. J. (Jaap) Reijling

Second reader:

Dr. W.J. (Wim) van Noort

Institute:

Leiden University, Netherlands

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Crisis and Security Management

Word Count:

29.915 (excluding references)

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Abstract

The coordination of international disaster relief: A case study evaluation of the Dutch contribution between 2005-2015

A vital aspect within humanitarian and disaster relief is the coordination of (international) relief institutions or organisations and the allocated resources. However, currently, this aspect does not seem to be taken into account by the Dutch government in its decision to participate in foreign disaster relief activities. Therefore, the main focus of this research is on the development of knowledge on coordinating bodies and their capacities related to international disaster relief activities. In order to develop a body of knowledge on coordination, this thesis will elaborate that, in the course of the last 10 years, there was a growing agreement within a coordinating body that could stimulate proper coordination. For this research, the earthquakes in Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and Nepal (2015) were analysed regarding the matter of coordination on directive, commanding, and executive levels. Interviews were also conducted with members of relevant authorities or organisations concerning the Dutch participation in international disaster relief. The main conclusion of this research is that the body of knowledge matured in the past 10 years concerning the deployment of the Dutch USAR team. But the coordination on-site remains problematic and has not matured over time. For improving the on-site coordination, this thesis recommends a lead organisation model by Provan and Kenis (2007) with command and control mechanisms (Donini, 1996) for the coordinating bodies. In order to deploy resources and personnel for disasters with a longer lead time like epidemics, or the deployment of specific expertise like hospitals, it is recommended that a specific framework be used to ensure a well-structured use of resources.

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Acknowledgements

This master thesis owes its existence to the help, support, and inspiration of several yet to be appointed people.

Firstly, I would like to express my genuine appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Jaap Reijling for his guidance during the final phase of the master in Crisis and Security Management, and during my research. His inspiring suggestions, feedback, and support contributed to the development of this thesis.

Secondly, I would like to thank the respondents of this research. Their relevant insights on the field of international disaster relief and the coordination of it were helpful. Each of you inspired and motivated me to continue with this thesis.

Thirdly, I would like to thank the second reader (Dr. Wim van Noort) and the complete staff of the master in crisis and security management. It felt like a short but tremendous journey through the abstract theories of crisis and security management. Therefore, I strongly recommend this master to the readers of this final thesis.

My greatest gratitude goes to my fellow classmates, particularly: Jessica, Kay, Lars and Roan, who helped me during the process of writing this thesis and supported me in my decision-making. In addition, they gave their professional opinions about my research method. It was enjoyable working with you during the past year. I will never forget the moments we shared during this program. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family. During the thesis process I spent extended periods of time in The Hague and spent very little time with them. I would like to thank them for their unconditional support and interest during this research.

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List of abbreviations

FCSS Field Coordination Support Section HSA Humanitarian Staging Area

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

LOT National Operational Team (Netherlands) MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MNMCC Multi-National Military Coordination Centre (Nepalese Army) MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs (Nepalese Government)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCC National Crisis Centre (Netherlands)

NEOC National Emergency Operation Center (Nepalese Ministry of Home Affairs) NGDO Non-Governmental Development Organisations

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NRCS Nepal Red Cross Society

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OSOCC On-Site Operations Coordination Centre

SHO Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties ‘Collaborating Aid Organisations’ (Netherlands)

UN United Nations

UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination (team) UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAR Urban Search and Rescue (team)

VOSOCC Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre WHO World Health Organization

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1. Introduction

At any point in time, a disaster can strike anywhere. A disaster can be defined as a serious threat to the sustainable development of a community or even a whole nation (UNHCR, 2007). On October 8, 2005 such a disaster struck the border of India and Pakistan, the Kashmir earthquake. On October 10th the Pakistani government applied for humanitarian aid by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Dutch government agreed to support the Pakistani request for international humanitarian relief by deploying the Dutch Urban Search and Rescue Team on October 10. The NATO’s response was twofold; the first was on October 11, which was about having an organising role for NATO in the transport of aid from NATO member states to Pakistan. The second answer, on October 18th, was about setting up a relief operation that would be led by NATO (Ministry of Defence, 2006). In response to this, the Dutch government deployed a temporary field hospital from October 23, 2005 until the first of February 2006. This field hospital opened on November 9th to provide medical assistance and care to the victims of the earthquake (Ministry of Defence, 2006).

The Dutch contribution to these disaster relief operations was justified and based upon an assessment framework, which was developed by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 28, 19951. The first evaluation of this particular assessment framework was after the assessment of the Dutch contribution to the conflict in Kosovo in 2000. Since then, the assessment framework has been improved to meet contemporary foreign operations (Ministry of Defence, 2009). This includes the change of the constitution in 2000 on the matter of an Article 100 procedure. This procedure regulates that the Dutch parliament has the right to have information about the deployment of civil and military personnel prior to a deployment to determine the level of support and to ensure parliamentary control.

The framework focuses on ten aspects that justify the deployment of civilians or military personnel (Ministry of Defence, 2009). The first five aspects of the framework are of a political nature and the other aspects have a more professional perspective. These aspects are:

1. The reasons to participate; 2. Political aspects;

3. Mandate of the operation; 4. Participating countries;

5. Degree of influence on the decision-making; 6. Feasibility of the operation;

7. Risks;

8. Suitability and availability;

9. Duration of the participation and repayment agreements; 10. Financial aspects.

During the Pakistani Earthquake (2005), coordination issues arose from the response of the international community, which was led by the UN and NATO (Nabi, 2014; Inspectie Openbare Orde en Veiligheid, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2006). Facilitating the most effective help through

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coordination was seen as problematic, therefore it seemed relevant to include this aspect in the assessment framework for future events in order to ensure an efficient Dutch contribution to any humanitarian relief operation. Additionally, the question remained as to whether NATO would be the most appropriate institution for coordinating humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

According to Nolte, Martin, and Boenigk (2012), the role of coordination in this type of operation is controversial as each involved organization— either ministries, international non-profit

organizations, for example the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, host country governments, and the host country non-profit organization—use a different type of coordination within their organization. Still, they state:

“a well-coordinated network of aid organizations can improve the overall performance of organisations within the disaster response by helping organisations operate more efficiently, avoid overlap and duplication of service and maximize specialization where possible (Nolte, Martin & Boenigk, 2012: 709).”

In addition, according to Nabi (2014), organisations like the United Nations (UN) only coordinate these major responses when a disasters strikes. This will bring less authority during humanitarian and disaster relief activities, it also creates unclear defined roles (Nabi, 2014).

In order to address the aforementioned issue this thesis will review the following question: ‘did the

body of knowledge on coordination related to disaster relief operations matured during the last 10 years and would this warrant improvement of the present framework for participation of the Dutch government in humanitarian aid and disaster relief?’

This thesis will elaborate and review the difficulties surrounding a proper coordination of disaster relief by analysing three major disasters in the past 10 years. More specifically, the earthquakes of Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010), and Nepal (2015). The assumption is that 10 years of experience would be enough to develop a suitable body of knowledge on the coordination of international disaster relief, which can be used to augment the current assessment framework.

It is relevant to see if a more specific framework for disaster relief missions can be developed, particularly due to the response time of the military, civilian expertise or resources, and the issue of coordination prior to and during these kinds of deployments. Additionally, this research only focuses on the domestic and international issues of coordination during international humanitarian and disaster relief activities. Therefore, it will not elaborate the larger political and social considerations which contribute to the development of international aid.

Over the years (1995, 20002 and 20093), there has been little focus on researching an alternative framework specifically for disaster relief. Therefore, this thesis hopes to help deploy expertise and resources more quickly, more efficiently, and in a better coordinated manner. This thesis should also be of interest to other states that use one particular framework (or even no framework) to justify the deployment of military personnel or civilians for international disaster relief purposes. In addition,

2_{Tweede Kamer 26 454, nr. 14 en nr. 15}

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the thesis could also be used by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that frequently deploy employees or volunteers to major disasters.

In order to answer the main research question, a theoretical framework will be elucidated in Chapter two. The framework focuses on theories of good disaster management and how to optimally coordinate a disaster relief mission on three different levels—on a directive, commanding and executive level. Afterwards, the methodology of this thesis will be explained in Chapter three. Due to the importance of primary data for this thesis, interviews were conducted with (military) personnel of the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs who contributed to the missions or who work with the current assessment framework. A further interview was also conducted with the deputy national commander of the Dutch Urban Search and Rescue team; this team witnessed the relief activities in Pakistan, Haiti, and Nepal. The result of the interviews and research will be examined and analysed in Chapter four. Thereafter, Chapter five will elaborate on concluding remarks. Finally, Chapter six will reflect on the limitations of this thesis, opportunities for further research, and practical implications and policy recommendations.

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2. Theoretical framework

This chapter will elaborate on recent theoretical insights in order to answer the previously mentioned research question. The focus is on the operationalisation of coordination during international and national disaster or humanitarian relief activities. Within this chapter, several social scientists will be mentioned; many of the scientists are linked to the ‘Disaster Research Center’ at Delaware (USA). Professor Emeritus Quarantelli (1997), the founder of this institute, published more than 114 articles, 29 books, and more than 150 publications on disaster relief (The Disaster Research Center, 2016). Thus, Professor Quarantelli shall be considered an expert in this field. From a theoretical perspective, he developed several principles for good disaster management. For analytical purposes, these principles can be distinguished on three levels of coordination: a directive, commanding, and executive level. Hereafter, we will expand on these criteria and combine them with other theories that could be useful in explaining certain outcomes in this respect. Based on this theoretical body of knowledge, this chapter will conclude with an analytical framework.

2.1 Coordination on a directive level

The first level will focus upon the directive level. The directive level is similar to the strategic level within businesses or organisations. On this level, the vision of how to solve international disasters is established (RiskOpe, 2014). It set goals and prepares the deployments of the resources that are appointed to the operation. On the matter of coordination, this level is mainly about setting broad outlines for on-site deployments and the domestic arrangements. Mainly, three questions are relevant on this level: ‘What do we do?’, ‘For whom do we do it?’, and ‘How do we excel?’ (RiskOpe, 2014). This level can also be interpreted as the level of oversight, and understanding the consequences and opportunities of the actual deployments on the matter of international disaster relief. Quarantelli (1997) defined the following criteria for the directive level: a proper task delegation and division of labour by a—in principle international—lead organisation or authority and personnel and resources need to be mobilised in an effective manner. Consultation amongst parties will involve, in this respect, agreement on the organisational structure and the assembly of the right skillsets and overall capacity that is required.

Involve a proper task delegation and division of labour within organisational boundaries

Task delegation and the division of labour can be quite straightforward for incidents or minor crises; for example, ambulance services transport victims and fire departments deal with fires. But during a disaster, a number of organisations from outside the community, or even the country, are involved (Quarantelli, 1997). They come together at the site of the disaster and start with what they think they can do best. Examples of this are foreign specialists in the field of search and rescue, like the well-known Urban Search and Rescue teams (USAR). Organisations might also initiate activities which are not their core business or responsibility, despite the fact that their activities will be visible to the outside world.

To coordinate proper task delegation and division of labour on a directive level during disaster relief or humanitarian deployments, the parties that are involved in these activities should be mutually reinforcing and complementary. A well-coordinated deployment of resources and personnel will prevent overlap and duplication of expertise, service, and manpower (Nolte, Martin, & Boenigk, 2012). Also, Akl, et al. (2015) confirmed through their research on the effectiveness of disaster relief

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that improved coordination can enhance not only the effectiveness of a deployment, but also accountability, the flow of resources, and the impact of relief efforts (Akl, et al., 2015: 2).

The different parties involved in humanitarian or disaster relief deployments each have their own preference when it comes to the coordination of the response by the international community. According to Nolte, Martin, and Boenigk (2012), one can define four critical parties within disaster or humanitarian relief: (1) public international organisations; (2) international (non-)profit organisation; (3) host country government and (4) the host country (non-)profit organisations. Donini (1996) basically defined three coordination mechanisms: coordination by authority, by consensus, or by default. Coordination by command implies a coordination mechanism formed by a combination of authority and strong leadership. In the consensus model, the leadership is essentially a function of the overall capacity to orchestrate a coherent response. It also attempts to mobilise the key actors and form common objectives and priorities. By using this form, there is hardly any direct assertion of authority by the coordinator, and consensus is normally achieved. Coordination by default implies an absence of a formal coordinating body. Such coordination only involves the exchange of information and division of labour among the different organisations and institutions.

Quarantelli (1998 and 1997) states that typical ‘command and control’ models are not the best solution for overall coordination (Quarantelli, 1998a). He therefore rejects coordination by authority. In his view, it is a poor model for disaster planning (Quarantelli, 1998a); though, there is a tendency in many countries to tackle a disaster using a military style of command and control. Yet, Quarantelli (1998) emphasises that it is highly uncommon for solely military institutions to participate in disaster relief activities. Further, during armed conflicts there is a possibility that NGOs, such as ‘Doctors Without Borders’, are active in the area. These non-military organisations will not change their organisation model or behaviour during disaster relief activities. Quarantelli claims that every organisation—military or humanitarian—will fall back on their own capabilities operational mechanisms. However, each of these institutions and organisations need to fit in the overall form of coordination or structure. Therefore it is important that during good disaster management the focus remains on the coordination of all participating organisations and not on centralising authority (Quarantelli, 1998a). His conclusion points toward the use of networks as the preferred organisational structure since networks can, according to Ebers (1997) and others, tackle complex problems because they can balance the reliability of hierarchies with the flexibility of markets. By combining markets and hierarchies, organisations will be able to acquire resources and manage risks more efficiently (Ebers, 1997).

According to Kenis and Provan (2009) we can distinguish three main-type network organisations. These are:

a. shared governance networks, all members of the network have an equal share in decision-making (= all-channel);

b. lead organisation networks, one actor coordinates the decisions and activities of actors in the network (which makes this type in fact a hybrid of a pure network and an organisation or hierarchy = hub-channel) and

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c. network administrative organisation (NAO), in which all actors remain equal, but delegate administrative responsibilities to a separate administrative unit.

According to Kenis and Provan (2007), brokered forms of network governance, for example, lead organisation and NAO, are more likely to become effective than shared governance networks. However, task delegation can create conflicts between the members of the network. According to Kenis and Provan (2007), these conflicts derive from: (1) differences in vision, opinion and approach; (2) personal and human factors; (3) diverging goals and interests or (4) a struggle for power and status. On a directive level, these conflicts need to be avoided to ensure an efficient and well-structured disaster response. According to Whelan (2015), the goal-directed mechanism in networks consists of two basic properties: ‘structural’ and ‘relational’. Structural properties concern the organisational aspects. For example, the size or design and the goal consensus. The other property, relational, refers to the more personal aspects of the network-- the relationship between the people of the involved organisations or authorities. A vital aspect of a healthy relationship between organisations and its members is trust. According to Provan and Kenis (2007), trust shapes the ideal form of a goal-directed network because a high degree of trust will require less formal control. To contribute to the proper mobilisation of resources, the UN, and in particular, the UN- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN-OCHA) developed a system in December 1991 as part of the General Assembly resolution 46/182. Based on this resolution, the UN-OCHA should have a leadership role and coordination responsibilities in a disaster affected country (Nolte, Martin, & Boenigk, 2012). This is similar to the lead organisation model which is one of the network forms by Provan and Kenis (2007).

Personnel and resources need to be mobilised in an effective manner

During a severe disaster, the international community is eager to assist the affected region, which means that mobilising people and resources for relief activities is relatively easy. The challenge, therefore, is to arrive with a proper skill-set and overall capacity to tackle the crisis. This especially relates to acquiring scarce special equipment or resources that need to arrive from foreign countries or locations outside the region or country which is struck by the disaster. Also, self-mobilisation, individual volunteers with or without specific knowledge, can present as a problem to disaster management (Quarantelli, 1997). These well-intentioned organisations and their members, or individuals, need to be supervised and coordinated. So, mobilising the necessary personnel and resources is not the problem during a disaster, but a coordinated and effective mobilisation of these organisations will make the distinction between good and bad disaster management.

The previously mentioned UN General Assembly resolution 46/182, which created a role for UN-OCHA, went through a reform in 2005 which involved new elements that improve the capacity, predictability, accountability, leadership and partnership of the UN with other aid organisations (UN-OCHA, 2016). This led to the creation of the so-called cluster model. This model became the example for centralising coordinating activities between members of the international community, and keeping track of activities of other members (Nolte, Martin, & Boenigk, 2012). The main idea behind the cluster system was to separate on-site responders into eleven different response clusters with a lead organisation responsible for the coordination activities. The response clusters and their

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corresponding lead organisations can be divided in the following manner (Nolte, Martin, & Boenigk, 2012; UN-OCHA, 2016).

1. Camp Coordination and Management by the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 2. Education by the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF;

3. Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items by the IOM; 4. Food by the World Food Programme (WFP);

5. Logistics by the WFP;

6. Protection by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); 7. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene by UNICEF;

8. Agriculture by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);

9. Early Recovery by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); 10. Emergency Telecommunications by the WFP;

11. Health by the World Health Organization (WHO).

These clusters should create partnerships between actors who provide humanitarian assistance such as international humanitarian organisations, national and local authorities, and the civil society (Akl, et al., 2015). The UN currently works with these clusters in case of any disaster. It should be mentioned, however, that the UN is only in a position to coordinate in the case of an actual crisis, and upon request of the specific country involved. Between disasters, there is hardly any coordination among the participating organisations (Akl, et al., 2015). This results in a challenging position for the UN during an actual response. Ad hoc coordination mechanisms established in the first hours and days after the disaster strikes the site have to blend in with the emergent coordination structure of the UN in order to establish an overall well-coordinated deployment.

2.2 Coordination on a commanding level

The second level of coordination which will be analysed is the commanding level. This level is similar to the tactical level in other organisations. The coordination on this level is about improving and translating the goals and outlines from the directive level to the executive level (RiskOpe, 2014). The focus is on the oversight and understanding of the consequences of the variety of responsibilities within international disaster relief. It translates the outlines and goals to the diversity of areas of expertise or in disaster relief terms, the clusters. So, on this level, it is important that emergent aspects are well incorporated with the established ones before these parties can work together to properly execute their foreseen tasks. Therefore, procedures and working methods should complement the different organisations to prevent overlap. It also focuses on managing resources, personnel, and equipment prior to and during disaster relief deployments (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010). To create this kind of focus, there needs to be a command centre on-site. This fits the criteria by Quarantelli (1997), on establishing a well-functioning Emergency Operations Centre during relief activities, and on proper exercise of decision-making.

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Having a well-functioning Emergency Operations Centre

Having a centre where every local, national, and foreign organisation or institution is represented by a liaison will clearly add to the information and expertise-sharing between them. An Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is, therefore, fundamentally a social system. If specific and generic functions are carried out, its location and the physical facilities are relatively unimportant. If there is proper representation where all parties are represented, the EOC can collect and distribute the latest information necessary to operational organisations and strategic institutions (Quarantelli, 1997). This will also contribute to the solution to an overall coordination of the response activities. Having several emergency centres during a disaster will not increase the efficiency and coordination of relief activities. A well-functioning EOC is usually an indication of good disaster management.

The formation of an EOC is related to the agreement amongst parties on a network structure. Here, the defining aspects of the effectiveness of the network organisation come to fruition. These aspects are: trust, size, goal consensus, and the nature of the task (in terms of complexity). According to Kenis and Provan (2007), shared governance will require a high density of trust between participants (although only in cases of a limitation of participants), a high goal consensus, and little need for network level competencies. A lead organisation form only requires a low density of trust (highly centralised), a moderate number of participants, a moderate-to-low goal consensus, and a moderate need for network level competencies. Finally, Kenis et al. (2007) state that network administrative organisation has a moderate density of trust (it is monitored by members), moderate to high number of participants, a moderately high goal consensus, and a high need for network level competencies. When these predictors are translated to international disaster relief activities, it might seem that a network administrative network is most suitable due to the high number participants and the high goal consensus. However, this also means that there is a moderate density of trust between the different organisations and authorities. Within the network administrative organisation form, there is hardly any hierarchy; the structure is more horizontal than vertical. According to Kenis and Provan (2007), the absence of hierarchy will create a high level of collaboration between participants, which will eventually lead to more commitment to the network. Also hierarchies can be cumbersome and bureaucratic (Provan & Kenis, 2007). One of the reasons for this is, per Whelan (2015), the nature of governance forms consisting mainly of hierarchical structures containing a combination of vertical (levels of authority) and horizontal (division between units) principles. Additionally, these governance forms are controlled through administrative or bureaucratic means.

Kapucu and Van Wart (2006) researched the response of emergency services in extreme events and found that organisations can work quickly and efficiently through networks to acquire specific goals that require the resources or expertise of other organisations. With hierarchies alone, this could barely be accomplished at all—let alone with the requisite speed (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006). This is a particularly crucial point as certain expertise may not be housed within one organisation, especially within the realm of international disaster relief activities. For example, USAR teams perform search and rescue activities, but do not care for the (wounded) rescued people. This role is the responsibility of another organisation.

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Permit the proper exercise of decision-making.

According to Quarantelli (1997), decision-making mechanisms should be well-structured within disaster management. However, if one or more of the following matters occurs, it will affect the overall coordination mechanism. The loss of higher echelon personnel due to overwork; conflict over responsibility regarding new disaster tasks; clashes over organisational domains between established and emergent groups; and surfacing of organisational jurisdictional differences (Quarantelli, 1997 p. 11). These situations and the associated consequences should be avoided in order to achieve optimal disaster management.

According to Nolte and Boenigk (2013), the mutuality of the organisations concerned with relief activities plays a vital role. A high mutuality will enable good performance of organisations; this can be achieved by developing common goals and structuring the decision-making process with the involved organisations. Every organisation that conducts or participates in joint activities in disaster relief should equally participate in the decision-making process (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013).

According to empirical research by Nolte, Martin, and Boenigk (2012) structures with organisations which had the same powers and have an equal share in the decision-making process reported a better coordination within the network. An equal share in decision-making corresponds with the earlier mentioned network forms by Kenis and Provan (2007) a shared governance network where all members of the network have an equal share in decision-making or a NAO where all actors remain equal. An NAO is also according to Kenis and Provan (2007) more suitable when there are many participants in the network especially in contrast to shared governance forms. However, if the amount of participants and the variety of organisations becomes too large this will hinder the decision-making process (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). This will result in each organisation falling back on their expertise and continuing to pursue their own goals. This will then hinder the decision-making on common goals. A network or lead organisation needs to make decision on complex issues under strict time constraints, with a limited amount of information. This asks also for a flexible decision-making and certain attitude, including a degree of trust by the participating organisations.

2.3 Coordination on an executive level

The third level is the executive level. This level is similar to the operational level in other organisations and is mainly about the actual occurrences, and executing the procedures which are set by the directive level and translated through the commanding level. Thus, the executive level is about linking strategic goals and objectives to tactical goals and objectives (RiskOpe, 2014). To link these goals, Quarantelli emphasises the need for a focus on the development of overall coordination. Part of this effort relates to blending emergent aspects with established ones. These activities should be complementary, well-structured, and not overlapping. Here, also, flexibility is crucial.

Focus on the development of overall coordination

According to Quarantelli (1997), all participants should bear in mind that control is not equal to coordination and that coordination focuses on ‘emphasising cooperation rather than control or insisting that someone should be in charge’ (Quarantelli 1997, 48). The main issue which arises during a disaster is integrating the organisational goals and community relief operations. Good

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disaster management will prevent clashes between organisations and between the community and organisations; it will be judged on the efforts on coordination.

To develop overall coordinated activities, it is vital to take the following principles into account (Auf der Heide, 1989):

a. Resolution of political, personal, and jurisdictional disputes; b. Knowledge on how other organisations function;

c. Knowledge about pre-planned disaster functions and d. Joint planning and training.

If these principles are taken into account simultaneously, the trust between the involved organisations will increase. According to Auf der Heide (1989), the cooperation of members who do not often work with each other can be affected by pre-existing disputes. Within an international context, the majority of these disputes are of a political nature. As is mentioned earlier in this thesis, inter-organisational teamwork requires sharing the right amount of information within a certain time frame. Efficient cooperation between organisations can be formed by utilising knowledge of one another’s internal operations. When another organisation is familiarised with the procedures of other organisations within the network, the exchange of information is improved due to a higher level of reliability. Within a network, the standardisation of procedures will also influence the coordination of the involved organisations. If a network agrees on the same procedures, terminology, and criteria, the sharing of information and collaboration during activities is enhanced. If this standardization is practised and trained prior to a disaster, it will increase cooperation between, for example the international USAR teams which practices periodically with other teams.

When a network of international and national aid organisations is created, it is vital that every participating organisation or authority is involved. However, the research by Nabi (2014) shows that national, in particular, local NGOs, are seldom engaged in the overall coordination processes. According to Nolte, Martin, and Boenigk (2012), this is due to a shift in equality of the participating network members. Nolte et al. refer to the embeddedness, similarity, and reciprocity between organisations. However, equality is not the answer for an efficient overall coordination. Organisations might not wish to associate themselves with the overall relief effort during the crisis. Consequently, this can affect the existing organisational principles and, in this way, affect the overall coordination (Nabi, 2014).

According to Auf der Heide (1989), one of the keys to developing and sustaining an overall coordination is to develop procedures within the network of organisations regarding the delegation of tasks and interaction amongst participants.

Blend emergent aspects with established ones

Disasters in the past and in the future are marked by the presence of emergent phenomena. During a disaster, there are always groups, organisations, or individuals which become important or prominently present. To ensure a coordinated response, these emergent parties need to have a well-structured interconnection with the existing parties. According to Quarantelli (1997), the disaster

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managers should take emergent groups for granted and focus on the interconnection by incorporating it into their thinking and acting. He also mentioned that it is important not to think that these emergent parties are dysfunctional, bad for the coordination structure, or inappropriate to the disaster (Quarantelli, 1997). However, new behaviour of the interconnecting groups may represent the most effective way for solving coordination issues. This is not to say that emergence is always the best solution, but it rarely results in harm (Quarantelli, 1997).

2.5 Analytical framework

An analytical framework is required in order to make a proper comparison of the coordination during each disaster relief operation. This framework can be derived from the above mentioned academic perspectives, and will consist of the following statements:

 Determine the level of coordination on a directive, commanding and execution level during disaster relief operations in the past 10 years;

 Determine possible causes for discrepancies in relation to Quarantelli (1997) insights;  Determine the reasoning for not including the aspect of coordination in the current

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3. Research method

In this chapter, the empirical design of this research is discussed. First, the researcher will elaborate on the overall research design. Thereafter, the different methods for collecting data are explained. Thirdly, the method to analyse the collected data by the aforementioned design will be clarified. This chapter will end with a paragraph concerning the improvement of the reliability and validity of this thesis.

3.1 Research Design

To research the development of best practices on coordination during disaster relief operations, this study will use a longitudinal study specifically focusing on three operations as comparative cases during the last 10 years. When using a longitudinal structure, there does not have to be a certain time interval between the relief operations since the chosen disasters are defined by their properties and relevance (Bryman, 2012). This structure also implies that different deployments or case studies will be assessed, which facilitates a multiple comparative case study. This will enhance the questions of ‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘what happened’. A longitudinal structure provides the phases of certain events during the different relief activities.

It is not be feasible to analyse all earthquakes between 2005 and 2015. Therefore, the most shattering earthquakes that the Netherlands participated in as disaster relief actors will be analysed. The most deadly earthquakes of the last 10 years were: Haiti (2010) ca. 200.000 deaths; Pakistan (2005) ca. 100.000 deaths and China (2008) ca. 70.000 deaths (Becker, 2015). The Dutch USAR team did not participate in search and rescue activities during the Chinese earthquake, but performed activities during the Nepalese earthquake in 2015. Thus, the disaster relief operations of the Pakistani earthquake at India/ Pakistan (2005), the Haiti earthquake (2010), and the Nepal Earthquake (2015) are included in the comparative case study and are explained further in chapter four of this thesis.

It is a coincidence that there is a time period of five years between each of them. However, this will provide the opportunity to address the (more) recent natural disasters where the Dutch Government was involved. Additionally, the leading organisation or cooperation structure is different in each operation, for example some operations were led by NATO, or a combination of the UN and national governmental institutions. This will enhance the ability to analyse a suitable coordination structure and whether this needs to be addressed in the current assessment framework.

3.2 Data collection

Given the character of this research, a qualitative design is used. Sources for collecting data will therefore consist of semi-structured interviews and a desk study of relevant documentation.

3.2.1 Desk study

For analysing the deployments of civilians and military personnel, or resources for international disaster relief operations, official evaluations—which are developed by the ministries, the government, or NGOs—will be used. Primary data for this research was collected by analysing official evaluation reports, governmental letters for the parliament, and (published) eye-witness testimonies of people who were involved in the different case studies. However, the majority of official

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evaluation reports that have been published by the aforementioned organisations or authorities consisted only of

“achievement indicators as the output of the interventions (i.e. how many of something was accomplished or performed, for example: how many vaccinations were administered, how many field hospital beds were provided, how many patients were treated)” (Nabarro, 2014: 15).

It is therefore difficult to solely analyse evaluation reports. As a result, annual reports written by NGOs or NGDOs that have been active contributors to disaster relief missions were added. This includes evaluation reports, interim evaluations by the ‘Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties’ (SHO), and the individual NGOs which participated in the disaster relief deployments. The reports by the SHO are written by the government and consist of information that is received by the associated NGOs. To validate this information, the reports, which are mainly annual reports of the individual NGOs, are also used in this thesis. However, the earthquake in Nepal was in April 2015. This means that the majority of the NGOs have not yet produced an annual report as this research started in December 2015. The evaluation reports written by the government, mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are based on information received by the different governmental institutions. To verify the research results of these evaluations, the government also conducted interviews with people who were involved. Other sources of literature are also used, for example, newspapers articles that mention or cite activities concerning coordination prior to or during the Dutch deployments were used. For each case study, approximately fifteen evaluation reports, academic articles, and grey literature was used.

3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews and respondents.

Next to the aforementioned document analysis for collecting data, this research also includes semi-structured retrospective interviews. In a later phase—after conducting the document analysis of this research—these interviews were conducted to probe beneath the surface and ask deeper questions about what was really happening and what were the underlying thoughts during the humanitarian efforts. The respondents for these interviews are governmental and operational employees of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Dutch USAR team. These three organisations were chosen because they are involved in coordination both prior to a deployment, and during a deployment, of Dutch resources. Additionally, these parties operate on a strategic, tactical, and operational level of disaster relief. The Dutch USAR team is involved because they performed search and rescue activities during the three earthquakes which will be analysed in this thesis. The Ministry of Defence was involved by offering an aircraft from the Dutch Royal Air Force for all the past deployments of USAR. During the earthquake in Haiti and Pakistan, the Ministry of Defence was also involved due to the deployment of a marine vessel (HNLMS Pelikaan) and the marine corps in Haiti, and deploying a temporarily field hospital in Pakistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is involved because they fund the costs of the deployment of USAR and the deployment of Defence material and resources for disaster relief activities.

The researcher chose to interview two operational officers from the Dutch Army. The first officer is a lieutenant-Colonel who was involved with and present during relief activities in Pakistan (2005) and Haiti (2010); he is also a staff-commander at the Dutch USAR team. The second operational officer was a Colonel of the Dutch Army who was partly involved during the relief activities in Pakistan

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(2005) and Nepal (2015). The third respondent was the deputy national commander of the Dutch USAR team. He was partly involved during the deployments of the Dutch USAR team to Pakistan (2005) and Haiti (2010), but he was responsible for the Dutch USAR for the deployment to Nepal (2015). The fourth respondent to research the coordination on all the three previously mentioned phases is a Lieutenant-colonel who is responsible for the deployment of Dutch military resources and manpower during national and international disaster relief activities. The last two respondents in this research (five and six) are both working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fifth respondent was with a Senior Policy Advisor for international disaster relief activities. The sixth respondent was a senior policy advisor/ expert in the field of disaster relief activities.

The interviews were conducted at the ministries or other work places of the respondents and lasted for about an hour each. These interviews were recorded and later converted into a written question and answer sheet. In Appendix two, the citations by each respondent which are used for this particular research are presented.

3.3 Data analysis

The data for the case studies in chapter four will be analysed on each of the three following earlier mentioned phases: the directive, commanding, and executive phase. For each of the three phases, the focus is on the principles for good disaster management by Quarantelli (1997). However, other theories from other earlier mentioned academics supporting the criteria by Quarantelli (1997) will also be used to analyse the data.

Despite the difficulty of analysing evaluation reports and other official documents, the official documents will be analysed according to six principles per Quarantelli (1997). According to E. L. Quarantelli (1997), these principles are criteria for good disaster management. For this thesis, only those which are influenced by or affect a well-coordinated disaster or humanitarian relief deployment are taken into account. If these criteria are all positively tested in the analysis of the cases, then the Dutch contribution was well-coordinated domestically and on-site. To test the criteria of Quarantelli (1997), the criteria are adjusted into statements. In addition, these statements are put together and were set under a specific level of coordination. The following statements are derived from the criteria by Quarantelli (1997); starting with the criteria, followed by the statements which are used in the comparative case study:

1. Involve a proper task delegation and division of labour.

a. There was a proper task delegation and division of labour 2. Mobilising personnel and resources in an effective manner

a. Personnel and resources were mobilised in an effective manner 3. Have a well-functioning Emergency Operations Centre

a. There was a well-functioning Emergency Operations Centre 4. Permit the proper exercise of decision-making.

a. A proper exercise of decision-making was permitted 5. Focus on the development of overall coordination

a. The focus was on the development of overall coordination 6. Blend emergent aspects with established ones

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For analysing each of the three earthquakes on the aspects of coordination and efficiency, the above mentioned six criteria are set under each of the three levels of coordination. These levels are: directive, commanding, and executive. To ensure a satisfactorily-coordinated disaster relief deployment, the coordination needs to be well-structured on each of the three levels, both domestic and on-site. The first two criteria are on a directive level, criteria three and four are on the level of 'commanding', and criteria five and six are on the level of execution. This is visible in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Coordination on three levels including the criteria for good disaster management by Quarantelli (1997)

The specific framework for the analysis is shown in Appendix 1. The official documents and interviews are examined for phenomena that elaborate or explain activities, or are of interest and could be settled under one of the above mentioned three levels of coordination. This led to the most relevant quotations and citations of the respondents and from the documents, which were used for this research. The researcher tends to not just manifest obvious content through this method, but to expose more latent content as well. By using a Likert scale, the aforementioned six criteria of good disaster management within the three levels of coordination will be analysed for three different earthquakes: Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and Nepal (2015).

The Likert scale is essentially a multiple indicator of a set of attitudes in a particular research area (Bryman, 2012). The goal of this scale is to measure the intensity of each of the six criteria within each case, by using the aforementioned statements. After measuring the intensity of the statements, by conducting document analysis and interviews, the researcher could justify if a statement is taken into account, considered, or even neglected. The format for indicating the presence or outcome of the statements is a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The middle position of the Likert scale will represent that there was not sufficient information in order to achieve a clear opinion: a so-called neutral position. This is shown in Figure 2.

Directive

•Creating a vision, goals and outlines.

Commanding

•Improving and translating goals and outlines into clusters.

Executive

•Executing the improved outlines and achieve the predetermined goals.

Criteria:

(1) There was a proper task delegation and division of labour

(2) Personnel and resources were mobilised in an effective manner.

Criteria:

(1) There was a highly functioning Emergency Operations Centre

(2) A proper exercise of decision-making was permitted

Criteria:

(1) The focus was on the development of overall coordination

(2) Emergent aspects were blended with established ones

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Case study (for example Pakistan)

Good disaster management on a directive level Strongly

disagree

Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly agree Domestic

On-Site

Good disaster management on a commanding level Strongly

disagree

On-Site

Good disaster management on an execution level Strongly

disagree

On-Site

Figure 2: Example scheme with the Likert scale for each case study

Each statement is about one of the three levels of coordination, thereby the domestic coordination and the coordination abroad are analysed. After conducting the analysis for each case study, this scheme will be shown with a marked box. Using another method or no Likert scale will be too time-consuming for the researcher and the respondents. Despite that a five point Likert scale has a reduced level of detail it is quickly made and still appropriate for this research. The researcher tries to elaborate details concerning the coordination of the deployment during the explanation of the cases.

To analyse the coordination mechanism used for international disaster relief during each of the three levels, data that supports the development of a specific body of knowledge on the coordination of international disaster relief is sought and analysed. This body of knowledge would aim for a well-structured coordination to take place during the prior defined levels.

To analyse the data concerning the implementation of learned lessons of prior disaster relief activities and whether these lessons were implemented in the more recent relief efforts, the disaster relief activities are compared with the previous deployments. This analysis has been done by acquiring the major lessons learned from Pakistan and Haiti from the desktop research and determining whether these were applied in the deployments of Haiti and Nepal. This has been done by analysing the evaluation reports of the next deployments and by asking about the changes in approach during the interviews with practitioners and policy advisors who experienced the deployments at first hand.

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3.4 Reliability and validity

In order to improve reliability and validity of this research, triangulation was used (Bryman, 2012). This means that the researcher used a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. To gain knowledge about the specific earthquakes and coordination mechanisms in the case studies, published evaluation reports, academic papers, and other sources of literature were analysed. In addition, the researcher interviewed six respondents who are currently working within the field of disaster relief. The analysis of the literature and interviews is conducted by a specific evaluation method elaborated in the previous paragraphs. This method will ensure that each earthquake is analysed in the same way. By analysing three cases within 10 years in the same way, these cases could be compared with each other. This also means that a longitudinal study is used; this kind of study is freed from the constraints which are imposed by different time frames (Nabarro, 2014). The official policy documents which were written or published by the various ministries ensure a high level of validity because the literature in these documents is based upon interviews with eyewitnesses. The use of these publicly accessible documents will also ensure that the research is transparent and is easily replicable. However, an analysis of documents can only be as good the documents on which the researcher works. Documents which are written by NGOs or other organisation–grey literature—are only used in support of the aforementioned official documents. This is because the authenticity of the document could be in order, but the credibility–whether the content is questionable and or distorted in some way—is mainly at stake (Bryman, 2012). In order to additionally support the official and non-official documents, academic papers or research material is used. By using multiple sources for documents and in-depth interviews, the researcher decreases the possibility that the written documents are just recognised as reports with a distinctive purpose in mind (Bryman, 2012).

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4. Comparative case study of three earthquakes

This chapter will elaborate and discuss the analysis of the coordination and control arrangements during the earthquakes in Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and Nepal (2015). The analysis is conducted along the previous mentioned criteria by Quarantelli (1997). Each of the following paragraphs in this chapter will represent one of the three levels: directive, commanding and executive. For each earthquake these three levels of coordination are used to measure, by using a Likert scale, if the criteria by Quarantelli and other academics are taken sufficiently into account. Each case will first introduce the earthquake and ends with a sub-conclusion.

4.1 The Pakistani earthquake, 2005

On the morning of October 8, 2005, Pakistan suffered a massive earthquake with a magnitude of 7.6 that left an unprecedented humanitarian need (Figure 3) (United States Geological Survey, 2016). The earthquake killed at least 73,338, including 18,000 schoolchildren. Over 128,000 people were injured and 3.3 million displaced as the earthquake devastated the basic infrastructure of a region the size of Belgium (Wilder, 2008 & MacLeod, 2007). The earthquake epicentre was located 100km north-northeast of Islamabad along a fault associated with the Indian subcontinent (Phister, et al., 2009).

When the Pakistani government approached the international community for help, approximately 40 countries contributed through funding or b deploying manpower or resources (United States Geological Survey, 2016). Six of the countries only contributed with funding, whereas the overwhelming majority sent resources and/or expertise. In addition to the 40 countries, four multi-national organisations were involved; two of these organisations contributed with funding (European Union and World Bank Group). The other two, the UN and World Health Organisation, contributed with manpower and resources. There were also approximately thirteen international non-governmental organisations involved. The Netherlands contributed by deploying the Dutch USAR team and transferring a temporary field hospital from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Due to the fact that the Dutch contribution to this earthquake consisted of an USAR team and the temporary field hospital, these activities will be judged separately in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1 Coordination on a directive level

The first level analysed in the Pakistani case is the directive level. To analyse the coordination on this level, the following two criteria by Quarantelli (1997) are used: if there was a proper task delegation and division of labour, and there was an efficient mobilisation of personnel and resources. The focus is on which organisation was the coordinating authority or body and how well did they coordinated the relief activities according to the evaluations and the conducted interviews.

Figure 3: Epicentre Pakistan earthquake (United States Geological Survey, 2016)

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Task delegation and division of labour

In the field of coordination, there were two major organisations involved during the relief activities in Pakistan. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) was involved because the Pakistani government asked the international community for assistance. So, the UN was obligated to coordinate the international search and rescue activities and the incoming disaster relief supplies. Next to the UN, NATO was involved for coordinating an airlift for transporting the military disaster relief assets which were provided by member states. On October 10th the Pakistani government filed a request for humanitarian aid at NATO. On October 11th the North-Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to have a coordinating role concerning the logistics of disaster relief materials from Europe (Ministry of Defence, 2006). For coordinating this logistic operation, NATO used the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (EADRCC); it was mainly for NATO member states, the EU, Pakistani authorities and the UN-OCHA. However, other states and organisations could, if they filed a request, also made use of the airlift.

The impact of the earthquake on the Pakistani government was staggering. Most government officials were unavailable, some were dead, some left their posts to travel to their deceased and injured relatives, and some were in shock and confused (Phister, et al., 2009). Therefore, there was a total dependency on the military to organise relief efforts and to create a response structure. In addition, the Pakistan Army also had a role in coordinating national relief activities. They had received their assignment by the Government of Pakistan due in part to the absence of a proper disaster response organisation, and also because the army was the best organised apparatus of the government (Wilder, 2008).

The overall coordination mechanism by NATO was divided into an on-site component and an overall/ domestic component (NATO, 2010). NATO coordinated the military assets, resources, and donations by member states through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) in Brussels. The NATO on-site component was coordinated or lead by the Spanish forces from Arja (Pakistan).

The Pakistani army was, during the entire disaster relief deployment, responsible for the protection of the USAR teams and other relief agencies. If it was necessary, the Pakistani government could agree on the deployment of force protection which would be delivered by the participating countries (Ministry of Defence, 2006). Next to the security of foreign and domestic relief personnel and resources the Pakistani army was the leading authority during the disaster relief phase. On the day after the earthquake President Musharraf appointed Major General Farooq Ahmad, to establish and lead a Federal Relief Commission (FRC) (Wilder, 2008). The FRC was intended to be a ‘one-window operation’ to coordinate and integrate all relief efforts including the work of both civilian and military actors (Wilder, 2008).

According to several NGOs, in particular Oxfam Novib, it was not quite clear during certain relief activities which duties the Pakistani army had. Especially during the period that the army enforced a monopoly position on the field of logistics, for example the distribution of tents to certain areas (Oxfam Novib, 2006). But perhaps the army had more intelligence or information about certain areas which were in greater need, this question remains unanswered. However, UNICEF complemented the government, army and the civil society during the first stages of the disaster relief; it was swift

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and exemplary (UNICEF, 2007). The government, in particular the Pakistan Army, began establishing a Federal Relief Commission (FRC) within a few days of the earthquake; this was based in the Prime Minister’s Office and it coordinated rescue and relief plans (UNICEF, 2007).

The official evaluation report of the Dutch USAR team contribution to the Pakistani earthquake was conducted by the Dutch Institute for Security and Crisis Management (COT) and published by the Dutch Ministry of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations. According to this evaluation report there were some critical comments on the coordination abilities of the UN. The Dutch USAR team stated that the Reception Centre for international USAR teams was hard to find and was not functioning well (COT, 2006: 60). This reception centre should have been accommodated by the first USAR team on-site and the UN, according to the INSARAG guidelines. Also the area where the Dutch USAR team should perform their search and rescue activities changed four times during the first 90 minutes after their check-in at the reception centre. Eventually it was decided to go to Bagh, but the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) by UN-OCHA provided only limited information about the deployment location (COT, 2006: 123). Eventually one commercial truck driver, after loading the truck, refused to drive to Bagh for the Dutch USAR team (COT, 2006: 31). However, the Dutch USAR team was very positive overall about the cooperation and how different parties like UNDAC, the Local Emergency Casualty Centre, and the embassy carried out their tasks (COT, 2006: 60).

Despite the fact that UNICEF stated that the relief was swift and exemplary, the Dutch participants to the disaster relief concluded otherwise. The personnel of the field hospital needed to coordinate all medical relief on their own in the early stages of the earthquake. The commander of the Dutch armed forces was the operational commander during the operation concerning the Dutch hospital. The commander of NATO was in operational control at the time that the resources arrived in Pakistan. The personnel took responsibility because the NATO command structure was not yet operational and the NATO Disaster Relief Team was not yet equipped to coordinate units on a tactical level (Ministry of Defence, 2006). According to the Dutch politician Van Winsen (CDA), the humanitarian aid was too late due to the Pakistan’s bureaucratic answer to aid. First, with the decision-making within NATO, and after that the formation of an alliance to overcome the logistic problems, he pled at that time for a permanent gathering of resources for humanitarian aid and relief missions4. The deployment of USAR was not part of the NATO’s answer, the Dutch USAR team was already performing search and rescue activities during these issues.

Mobilisation of personnel and resources

The first contribution by the Netherlands consisted of the deployment of the Dutch USAR team for search and rescue activities. In the early morning of October 9th the Pakistani government requested the international community officially for disaster relief and humanitarian aid (Ministry of Defence, 2006). After receiving this request the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the commander of the Dutch USAR team had a consultation and answered the request by deploying the Dutch USAR team. However, each respondent agreed on the fact that the deployment of the Dutch USAR team took a while or was relatively late in comparison to other deployments. According to the official evaluation report of the USAR deployment in Pakistan the international request for help came from the Pakistani government on the night of Saturday (October 8th) on Sunday (October 9th). This

The coordination of international disaster relief: A case study evaluation of the Dutch contribution between 2005-2015

Master thesis Crisis and Security Management