The common security and defence policy : still supranational intergovernmentalist?

The Common Security and Defence Policy

Still Supranational Intergovernmentalist?

Name: Matthew Roberts

Student Number: 11127856

Study Programme: European Union in a Global Order

Reearch Project: New Forms of Governance: From the EU to the World?

Supervisor: Dr. J. H. Zeitlin

TABLE OF CONTENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... II ABBREVIATIONS ... III SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ... 1 CHAPTER 1 PROBLEM SETTING ... 1 1.2 Research Questions ... 2 CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ... 3 2.1 CSDP Crisis Management: A Mixed Bag of Supposedly Limited Success and Irrelevancy ... 3 2.2 Realism: Sovereignty Above All Else ... 5 2.3 Liberalism: Pleasing the Domestic Audience ... 7 2.4 Constructivism: Diverging National Strategies ... 8 2.5 Supranational Intergovernmentalism ... 10 2.6 Epistemic Communities in the CSDP? ... 13 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ... 15 3.1 Argumentation ... 15 3.2 Case Selection ... 16 3.3 Data Collection ... 17 3.4 Methods of Analysis ... 17 SECTION 2 CSDP DECISION MAKING APPARATUS ... 19 CHAPTER 4 MAIN CSDP BODIES ... 19 4.1 The Political Security Committee ... 19 4.2 The European Union Military Committee ... 19 4.3 The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management ... 20 SECTION 3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 1 ... 21 CHAPTER 5 SUPRANATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM PRE-2011 ... 21 5.1 EUFOR RD Congo ... 21 5.2 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA ... 22 CHAPTER 6 A SHIFT IN THE CSDP ... 25 SECTION 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS PART 2 ... 30 CHAPTER 7 CSDP ENGAGEMENT IN LIBYA ... 30 7.1 EU Response to 2011 Crisis ... 30 7.2 No Compromise ... 31 7.3 What Vested Interests? ... 33 7.4 EUBAM Libya ... 34 CHAPTER 8 CSDP ENGAGEMENT IN MALI ... 37 8.1 EU Response to 2012 Crisis ... 37 8.2 Fulfilling Military Potential? ... 38 8.3 EUTM Mali - Military Solutions to Political Problems? ... 40 SECTION 5 CONCLUSION ... 42 SECTION 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 45

Acknowledgements

This thesis marks the culmination of my academic career, a journey that began four years ago and has now reached its conclusion with the completion of the European Union in a Global Order Master’s study programme at the University of Amsterdam.

My sincere thanks go to my supervisor, Dr Jonathan Zeitlin for his inspiration, insight and feedback, without whom this thesis would not have got off the ground. Further recognition must also go to Dr Otto Holman, whose course at the start of the Master programme perked my interest in European foreign and defence policy, giving me the initial idea to write my thesis on this subject.

I would also like to extend my thanks to the individuals that took time out of their schedule so that I could interview them which helped to furnish this thesis with expert topical knowledge. Finally I wish to thank my family and friends, whose never-ending and unconditional support was so important during this long and arduous process.

Abbreviations

Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) Central African Republic (CAR)

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Crisis Management Concept (CMC)

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) European External Action Service (EEAS) European Parliament (EP)

European Security Strategy (ESS) European Union (EU)

European Union Battle Group (EU BG)

European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)

European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) European Union Force (EUFOR)

European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST-LEX) European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

European Union Military Staff (EUMS) European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)

European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) European Union Police Mission (EUPOL)

European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG)

High Representative (HR) International Relations (IR)

Military Representative (MILREP)

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) No-Fly Zone (NFZ)

Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Political Security Committee (PSC) United Nations (UN)

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Section 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Problem Setting

For as long as it has existed, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded in confounding international relations theorists. Why would states voluntarily come together to pool their sovereignty in this, the most sensitive of policy areas? Established international relations theoretical frameworks from realist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought are all seemingly perplexed by the creation and continued existence of the CSDP, no matter how successful or unsuccessful one perceives it to be. This is where the chosen theory of this thesis comes into play; supranational intergovernmentalism is, as seems apparent from the name, an attempt at explaining the mechanics of the CSDP without reverting to strictly intergovernmental or supranational theoretical frameworks. It emerged at the turn of the century when scholars were beginning to notice a blurring of the lines in the CSDP between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Whereby actors are representing their respective member state but adopt a consensus seeking attitude instead of rigidly defending red lines (Howorth, 2014, p. 204). However, this is not a mere analysis of whether we can actually apply supranational intergovernmentalism to the operations of the CSDP or its functions. Rather this thesis takes it as a given that we can observe the CSDP through a supranational intergovernmentalist lens. The reason for this is that the CSDP has changed dramatically from its beginnings at St Malo in 1998, when it was envisaged that the EU could take on responsibility for its own security, to its present state as a limited low-key crisis management tool. Moreover, it is not only the conceptions of the CSDP that have changed over the years, but the situations that it is faced with.

For much of the 2000s, the EU was able to flex its military (and civilian) muscles with relatively small scale, and some would say irrelevant (Zimmermann and Duer, 2012, p. 227), missions mostly in Africa and Europe. These crises were far away in most cases and presented little actual threat to the security of the EU. Agreement on initiating these missions was usually not fraught with too much difficulty as these were situations that the EU could afford to intervene in at its convenience, and did not have to commit much in regards to men, material and finance. This scenario changed in the present decade for a multitude of reasons. There has been a shift in the kinds of crises that the EU is faced with. Moreover, the world as a whole had become more volatile, complex and uncertain (HR Report, 2013).

One must also stress the limitations of this thesis at the outset. This is not an analysis of the effectiveness of individual missions, nor of the perceived failure or success of the CSDP as a whole. There is a veritable goldmine of literature that has been written on the CSDP for well over a decade, and it is not in the remit of this thesis to do what entire books have done and evaluate whether or not the CSDP has been a success or not. It would both be unproductive and unoriginal to merely delve into a topic that has already had extensive coverage.

1.2 Research Questions

Research Question 1: Can we still identify the CSDP as functioning through supranational

intergovernmentalism?

Research Question 2: Do the EU’s experiences in Libya and Mali illustrate the limits of

supranational intergovernmentalism in shaping policy during major crises?

Research Question 3: Do member states and their representatives have strong vested interests

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

As this thesis revolves around an international relations theory, one finds it difficult to strictly separate a discussion of the theory and what has been written about it and its application to the CSDP. Therefore, in this chapter, the review of existing literature on the subject and a discussion of supranational intergovernmentalism is combined as it makes little sense to separate such intertwined topics simply for the sake of adding chapters. Here we discuss the state of literature currently regarding the CSDP in general, and the theoretical framework associated with this thesis. Before delving into the concept of supranational intergovernmentalism, one must first grasp why the theory exists and why it is necessary. We see in this section how neither strictly intergovernmental or supranational theoretical frameworks can sufficiently explain the emergence of European defence and foreign policy integration. After discussing this range of theoretical outlooks, we arrive at the main theoretical anchor for this thesis, supranational intergovernmentalism.

2.1 CSDP Crisis Management: A Mixed Bag of Supposedly Limited Success and Irrelevancy

In recent years there has been a veritable explosion in literature on the CSDP. Much has been written on the EU’s engagement in Africa, unsurprising as the vast majority of the CSDP’s missions, both military and civilian, have taken place in the continent. Only very few missions have taken place in the rest of the world, mostly limited to Europe as shown in maps one and two, with only three exceptions being firstly, the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia. A rare foray further afield, and to date only the EU’s second CSDP mission in Asia, giving the EU an opportunity to show off its global reach. Secondly, EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq), the EU’s rule of law mission in Iraq that began in 2005 with the aim being to strengthen the “Rule of Law in its complexity, with a full array of necessary expertise and assistance ranging from police to justice, penitentiary, human rights and gender” (EUJUST LEX-Iraq Factsheet, 2014). The mission ran until 2013, however, despite much effort, little in terms of substance was achieved. During the tenure of the mission and since its conclusion, the endorsements have hardly been ringing. Alina Christova (2012) asks if EUJUST LEX-Iraq was “doomed from the very outset” due to the sheer monumental scale of the task at hand (p. 425). Howorth (2014) evaluates the success of EUJUST LEX-Iraq by stating rather dryly that “it is not clear how much worse the situation could have been had the EU mission never existed” (p. 178).

Thirdly, in 2007 the EU launched European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan, designed to support the Afghan government in establishing a functioning civilian police force that operates within recognised boundaries of international law and with respect to fundamental human rights (EUPOL Afghanistan, 2016). EUPOL is still on-going, though originally slated to end in 2014 coinciding with the withdrawal of the bulk of allied forces from the country, the mandate for EUPOL has been extended to December 2016, indicating that the EU still has faith in the missions achievements and capabilities (European Council Decision, 2016). Scholarly opinion is not quite as positive as would be hoped by the extension of the mission. EUPOL is generally regarded as having never filled its potential and of being little more than an irrelevance in the overall grand scheme of the international effort in Afghanistan (Larive ́, 2012, p. 185; Howorth, 2014, p. 173).

In Africa, the EU has much more experience in crisis management, and unlike in Asia where all missions were civilian based, has had the opportunity to flex its military muscles at it were by engaging in limited and mostly small scale ventures since the turn of the century. Scholarly opinion on African missions is similar in regard to the EU’s Asian endeavours, namely that they are of debatable use and lie behind pragmatic and self-centred motivations. The EU’s first intervention in Africa highlights this argument especially well. In 2003, the EU launched Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), aimed “at contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the

Maps 1 and 2 show completed (left) and on-going (right) CSDP missions. Source: CSDP on-going missions, EEAS.

humanitarian situation in Bunia” (EEAS). By its stated aims, Artemis was considered a “big humanitarian, military and political success” (IRIN News, 2003). However, Artemis was heavily criticised for failing to do more in alleviating the unstable humanitarian situation in the DRC by numerous NGOs and other actors. Admittedly the aims of the mission were not ground-breaking or particularly ambitious in their scale, however, Artemis is generally regarded as being a positive first step in for the then fledgling CSDP. Indeed, Engberg (2014) states that it clearly achieved success in terms of what it had set out to and served as a “test case for future ESDP missions” (p. 61). Whether or not the original objectives had been ambitious enough is beside the point in this case.

2.2 Realism: Sovereignty Above All Else

Traditionally, the realm of European security and defence policy has been dominated by intergovernmental theories, with little thought given to concepts of a more supranational nature. However, the CSDP presents somewhat of a conundrum for IR theorists (Andreatta, 2011). Why would states voluntarily pool sovereignty in the most sensitive of policy areas? Realists have seemingly had difficulty in providing effective answers to this question and to why the CSDP is in existence at all which is led to a marginalization of the theory in the debate (Rynning, 2011, p. 24). To realists, only state actors can partake in matters related to security and defence, through unilateral means or bilaterally through alliances such as NATO. This rigid Westphalian understanding of sovereignty has severely constrained realist explanations for the emergence and existence of the CSDP (Howorth, 2014, p. 193).

Realists have seemingly scrambled around looking for reasons why EU member states would engage in closer defence cooperation, now that the existential threat in the Soviet Union had disappeared, in an attempt to validate their theory. To take one such example, Seth Jones (2007) asks the question why post-Cold War security cooperation came about when other attempts had failed beforehand. The answer, to him, is clear. It can be pinned down to fears of resurgence in German military power post-unification (p. 86). However, one must question the validity of such a thesis. By the time of St Malo in 1998 when European defence cooperation really started to kick on, Germany had already been unified for the better part of a decade. Jones cites sources to provide some credence to his theory, however these consist only of a series of quotes from Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterand expressing their concern over German unification in the late 1980s (p 87). Perhaps at this point there may have been legitimate concerns of a unified Germany becoming a “hegemon with a revisionist past”

(p. 87). However, no evidence of this attitude is offered. Indeed, by 1998 Germany hardly possessed the same aggressive military posture that Britain and France had been fearful of in the earlier half of the 20th century. Germany was, at this point, firmly entrenched in its unique ‘culture of restraint’ that it had adopted post-1945 that had immense influence on public and political attitudes towards taking military action in any circumstance (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001, pp. 62-63). In this regard then, the assertion of European defence and security cooperation being done in response to a hypothetical German hegemonic resurgence is without any sort of concrete basis.

On the other hand, realism does some present useful insights into the mechanics of the CSDP. Though the original realist notion of the CSDP never coming into existence was proven wrong, realists have instead turned their attention to diverging national defence and foreign policies present in the EU. It is argued that due to the propensity for states to cling to their sovereignty in an area of such high politics, the major European powers will resist any attempt to erode national control over defence and foreign policies. As a result of this, Hyde-Price (2006) concludes that the CSDP can only be thought of as strictly intergovernmental and will remain as such for the foreseeable future (p. 231).

Moreover, the different strands of realism each have their own preconceptions regarding the CSDP. Defensive realists for instance, do not believe the world to automatically dangerous; rather the CSDP is seen as a means by which the EU can check American power (Rynning, 2011, p. 539). Posen (2006) asserts that the EU does not trust the United States to always act as the ultimate vanguard of European security and defence. For this reason the EU recognises that it must possess the ability to wield military power should a scenario arise where it becomes necessary (p. 151). Offensive realists, on the other hand, view the world as much more dangerous. For this group, the CSDP can act as a tool of German containment within a strict EU setting (Howorth, 2014, p. 194). What see then is that realism offers a mixed bag of attempts to explain the emergence and continued existence of the CSDP. The EU defied pessimistic predictions that defence integration could ever be a reality. However, one could find credence in realist notions of the failure of the EU to form coherent institutions by which to administer the CSDP. Here states have been most unwilling to entrust matters of such sensitivity to supranational institutions. The perception that al facets of the CSDP are purely intergovernmental is at odds with supranational intergovernmentalism, thus it should prove intriguing to see if the mechanics of the CSDP are so symbolic and doomed to fail as realism

suggests or rather if they are more fluid and lie somewhere in between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

2.3 Liberalism: Pleasing the Domestic Audience

Similar to rational choice realist theories of European defence and security cooperation, liberalism is also divided on how to approach the CSDP. Liberal intergovernmentalists are not highly optimistic for the chances of the CSDP to succeed. In fact the father of the theory, Andrew Moravscik is highly dismissive of any chance of success for the CSDP or any kind common European military component at all, citing a lack of defined use for such a force, opposition from European publics for greater defence spending, and the achievement of only modest gains, as reasons why the CSDP is doomed to failure (Moravscik, 2003, p. 83).

Other strands of liberal theory have seemingly had difficulty in explaining the existence of the CSDP. The core tenet of neo-functionalism – spillover – whereby integration in one policy area creates pressure for integration in another is considered not to apply to foreign and security policy (Rosamond, 2000, p. 52). According to neo-functionalists, only areas of low politics are affected by spillover, whereas spheres of high politics are closely protected by national governments that are unwilling to integrate in the most sovereign of policies (Howorth, 2014, p. 201).

Despite deficiencies in explaining certain facets of European defence cooperation, there have been positive contributions from liberal theories in the CSDP debate. In particular, Benjamin Pohl (2013) has outlined what he believes to be a convincing explanation for the motivations behind the CSDP. Pohl bases his thesis around the constant need from a government’s perspective for domestic approval (p. 316). Indeed, a state’s foreign and defence policy is determined more by domestic than by external factors. This is nothing new in terms of liberal notions of policy and preference formation, stemming from Moravcsik 20 years earlier (Moravcsik, 2993, p. 481). Pohl (2013) gives a twofold explanation for why this is the case. Firstly, member state governments, by participating in CSDP missions, hope to give the impression that they are “capable of influencing international events in line with domestic values and priorities” (p. 317). Secondly, governments are keen to show their domestic audience that they are mindful of “paying too high a price in treasure or casualties for foreign policy projects which turn out to be ill-conceived” (p. 317). However, there is reason to cast doubt on this thesis. It is perhaps thinking too much of the CSDP to say that it has influenced

international events with its collection of short and little publicised mission. CSDP missions have typically been small scale and low key, presenting little sign of even existing to the casual observer.

2.4 Constructivism: Diverging National Strategies

Though not normally thought at home in theorising the CSDP or CFSP, constructivism has made a not insignificant contribution to the debate. This is the theoretical framework that is most relatable to supranational intergovernmentalism. Both general emphasise ideals, norms and values. Moreover, both focus on the way that the preferences of actors can change through socialisation In particular constructivist theory can be of use when analysing the small scale and apparent lack of ambition in CSDP missions. Constructivists claim that each member state has differing norms regarding military action, and that as a result, there can often be a lack of consensus when planning missions (Haesebrouck, 2015, p. 11). One would assume then that due to these diverging strategic cultures within the EU, member states would find it easier to agree on relatively low-key missions such as EUTM Mali, EUPOL Afghanistan or EUBAM Libya for instance. However, if one were to follow this notion, it could be expected that the differing strategic cultures present within the EU prevent agreement and consensus on much greater challenges, namely taking action in Libya in 2011 or taking an expanded role in Mali in 2013.

This raft of national strategic cultures is well explained by de France and Witney (2013) who divide EU member states into different groups based on their defence and foreign policies as well as strategic vision: ‘grand strategists’ such as Britain and France who are both able to project meaningful force outside their national borders and have are aware of how to do so. The Czech Republic, Sweden and Finland also have detailed security strategies but that do not have global force projection aspirations (p. 4). ‘Globalists’ who focus on issues throughout the world but have relatively undeveloped strategies and limited military means to back them up, Spain and the Netherlands fall into this category (p. 5). At the other end of the geostrategic spectrum are ‘localists’, such as the Baltic states, who focus on threats in their immediate neighbourhood (p. 6). These states have historically been dismissive of autonomous EU defence capabilities in the face of Russian aggression. Instead they place their faith in NATO that according to the Latvians is “more cost-efficient and available” (Latvian State Defence Concept, 2012, p. 14). Other states, such as Austria, Ireland and Malta are labelled as ‘abstentionists’ due to having little in the way of strategic vision at all.

Finally, there are ‘drifters’ who may have defence strategies but are in sore need of revision, such as Greece and Italy (de France and Witney, 2013, p. 8).

Turning to the divergences in policy regarding the civilian realm of the CSDP, Korski and Gowan (2009), offer a similar breakdown of national strategies. Member states that have developed detailed planning processes for civilian crises, and recruit only highly skilled individuals while ensuring that performances are thoroughly evaluated. These states are the ‘professionals’ and comprise Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain. Lower down the civilian totem pole are the ‘strivers’, these countries are very enthusiastic to develop their own civilian capabilities but do not put in the effort to achieve the same capacities as the professionals. There are, however, varying degrees of effort in these states with some making a modicum of effort to enhance recruitment and planning procedures. Falling into this bracket are Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Romania (p. 13). Thirdly, there are the ‘agnostics’ made up of Spain and mostly countries that have only relatively recently joined the EU such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. These member states have little in the way of capability or interest in developing civilian capabilities. Lastly, there are the ‘indifferents’, though this grouping seems rather similar to the previous group. This group, of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta have very weak planning capabilities and do not appear to take the task of improvement seriously (p. 14).

Turning to the supranational realm of theory, one finds a distinct similarity with intergovernmentalist counterparts. Supranationalists also have difficulty explaining the establishment of the CSDP or of any EU involvement in foreign and security policy. Indeed, the remit of supranationalism has commonly excluded these areas of policy from its approach to European integration, highlighting as we saw in liberal intergovernmentalism, “Minimal social demand for integration in that policy domain” (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p. 309).

What we can see therefore from this myriad of theoretical approaches is that each have their own unique strengths and weaknesses. Realists feel that they can offer plausible explanations for why member states have, thus far, been unwilling to attribute greater control to the EU in terms of defence, at least, more so than in other areas of policy. The centrality of norms and identity to constructivists provides an intriguing perspective on why there is such a gulf in

both capabilities and attitudes towards the CSDP among member states. Liberalism meanwhile has difficulty, like realism, in explaining the creation of the CSDP and similarly provides answers of little substance to the question of what motivates governments to engage in CSDP missions. Clearly then, different theories have equally different explanations for theorising the CSDP. None of them are capable of fully explaining why the CSDP, or any sort of intensive cooperation in terms of security and foreign policy would take place in the EU. The inability of these theories to provide us with answers leads to the main theoretical approach of this thesis.

2.5 Supranational Intergovernmentalism

As we have seen that established IR theories cannot fully grasp every facet of foreign and defence policy cooperation, it is helpful to offer one that is not a member of any of the established frameworks. Here we review the contributions on supranational intergovernmentalism thus far, but first a brief outline of the theories key tenets. Firstly, it is no longer applicable to simply assume that foreign and defence policy in the EU is conducted from purely intergovernmental standpoints. Rather officials have become socialised to such a degree that strict boundaries laid down by respective governments can be pushed back due to an atmosphere of consensus (Howorth, 2014, p. 204). Secondly, it is assumed that because these national boundaries are in reality quite flexible, it is officials in committees, not elected politicians at governmental level that make the majority of important decisions are taken at this lower level in the hierarchy (Howorth, 2011). We would then expect to observe, in the selected case studies, examples of how officials at committee level are able to influence decision-making, and how national positions are changed due to strict red lines being gradually pushed back so that the committee can find agreement.

Supranational intergovernmentalism was originally proposed as a theory to explain the paradox that presents itself in conceptualising the CSDP, namely, that foreign and defence policies are considered to be among the most important areas of policy for national sovereignty. Yet the reality has apparently become ever more convoluted, with scholars “puzzled over […] a growing sense of de facto supra-nationalism” (Howorth, 2012, p. 434). At the turn of the century, Howorth (2000) coined the term in question in response to the then increasing “profusion of Brussels-based organs of intergovernmentalism” (p. 36). This overlap of the intergovernmental and the supranational has intensified in recent years, illustrating how strict divisions between the two concepts have gradually melted away,

leaving the space in between increasingly blurred. Moreover, Howorth (2012) claims that in light of this breakdown in distinction between intergovernmental and supranational, the whole process of CSDP decision-making is in need of reconsideration (p. 434). This provides justification for a new theory to enter the conceptual debate regarding the CSDP.

Supranational Intergovernmentalism places a strong emphasis on commonalities between actors, for example an “increasingly common approach to armaments procurement and even to defence spending” (Maulny and Liberti, 2008, p. 14) has been observed, along with a parallel common approach to crisis management, since the early 2000s. There is increased recognition by those working in the CSDP that member states can be more than the sum of their parts by pooling capabilities at the European level. In addition, there is a high level of “expert technical advice” (Howorth, 2012. P. 435) present in the CSDP decision-making process, with most of this expertise emanating from the EUMC.

It is at this committee level that policy is thrashed out between members, with elected politicians merely making decisions official, and rarely getting into the business of negotiating of policy (ibid). There is little ambiguity in supranational intergovernmentalism regarding the influence of the PSC for example. It is acknowledged, as one would expect that the PSC is entrenched in a hierarchical system of control with each representative acting beneath their respective ministry of foreign affairs. However, this apparently does not stop the PSC acting as the “script writer for the CSDP narrative” (Howorth, 2014, p. 46). What we would expect then from our case studies would be for CSDP committees to heavily influence thinking in national ministries. This tenet is crucial to the core of this thesis, indeed it had even been stated that elected politicians in the Council of Ministers or European Council merely “rubber stamp” policies that have already been worked out at a lower level. This assumes that members of these more senior bodies have little if any involvement in the decision making process other than giving green or red lights to proposals. Could it not be that this is a slight oversimplification of the process, and furthermore that it presumes too much power and influence on bodies such as the PSC and EUMC?

As the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) began to demand greater time and energy in the early 2000s, the existing infrastructure proved insufficient to deal with the issues that the EU started to involve itself in (Howorth, 2014, p. 41). The PSC’s main

function, as laid out originally in the Council Decision that established it in 2001, is the following:

Keep track of the international situation in the areas falling within the common foreign and security policy, help define policies by drawing up ‘opinions’ for the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own initiative, and monitor implementation of agreed policies (Howorth, 2014, p. 41).

The PSC poses an interesting example of the supranational intergovernmentalist behaviour that has steadily emerged in the functioning of the CSDP. The Ambassadors to the PSC adopt a problem solving approach in their various dealings with their foreign counterparts, and less reliance is placed on red lines handed down from national ministries. Ambassadors then have to sell their case to others and convince them of the value of the argument put forward. This results in a consensus-building atmosphere (Duke, 2005, p. 30; Howorth, 2014, p. 46). Furthermore, in addition to the previous point, the PSC places a strong emphasis upon the expertise offered by its actors. Despite the fact that Ambassadors are firmly placed under the control of their national ministries, they have substantial “capacity to influence thinking and opinion both at home and in Brussels” (Cross, 2011, p. 137). Indeed, this influence has now grown to such a degree that the PSC is “arguably the key institution in CSDP decision-making” (Howorth, 2014, p. 47).

A further body that comes into play in this thesis is the EUMC, the highest military body in the EU and “responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU” (Cross, 2010, p. 11). Its representatives are Chiefs of Defence (CHOD), which meet twice a year. In the meantime their interests are represented by military representatives (MILREPS), who in more cases than not combine their roles with being their respective state’s representative to NATO (Howorth, 2014, p. 47). Cross (2010) denotes three key tasks that MILREPS are responsible for: firstly, they fulfil the role generally expected from senior military officers. This ranges from discussing on-going EU military operations, receiving reports from commanders in theatre, and shaping future necessary actions. Secondly, they consider amongst themselves matters that must be resolved in a rapid manner, including the planning of CSDP operations and determining the contributions that each Member State provide. The third and final point is less formal. The

MILREPS engage in informal discussion regarding can be decided before formal talks begin, meaning that a lot of the issue has already been decided upon (p. 12).

The EUMC, similar to the PSC, features a certain prominence of expertise from MILREPS, necessary to ensure the smooth working of the committee. Indeed, the MILREPS are highly influential on the positions of their superiors, the CHOD who rely on the knowledge gained from their underlings to successfully navigate the “niceties and potentialities of EU cooperation” (Howorth, 2012, p. 438). Cross (2011) demonstrates the increasingly supranational nature of the EUMC by highlighting the “natural allegiance” that exists even before each of the MILREPS arrive in Brussels (p. 171). This is because of a common military background and culture that seems unique to the military community. Thanks to this shared culture and background, the committee members are able to find solutions to problems that are deadlocked at national political level, and understand the necessity for collaboration in times of shrinking defence budgets and increasing procurement costs (Howorth, 2014, pp. 47-48). Despite then that Member States are the main drives behind the CSDP (Cross, 2010, p. 8), this intergovernmental structure “in no way impedes its capacity to deliberate in objectively supranational ways” (Howorth, 2014, p. 48).

2.6 Epistemic Communities in the CSDP?

So intertwined are the members of the EUMC that Cross (2010) asserts that it can be seen as an ‘epistemic community’ (p. 37). This concept was first established by Haas (1992) who defined an epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (p. 3). In addition, four main traits of epistemic communities are claimed as being visible. Firstly, members of the community share a collective set of normative ideals that form the anchor for decisions that can be taken. Secondly, there is a core set of beliefs of the community originate from a shared analysis of situations. Thirdly, the community maintains a perception of validity that allows members to define the criteria by which they can use their particular expertise. Fourthly, according to each scenario, the community preserves a set of common practices that can be utilised for each individual situation. These practices are predicated upon the assertion that they will lead to a positive result for human welfare (p. 3). If one were to apply these mechanics to the CSDP, we can certainly see concrete connections to how supranational intergovernmentalism prescribes the operationalisation and functions of decision-making. By the end of this thesis,

we will have a clearer idea of how closely, or not, the bodies of the CSDP resemble epistemic communities.

Chapter 3 Methodology 3.1 Argumentation

Research Question 1: The CSDP certainly exhibits elements of supranational

intergovernmentalism, especially so pre-2011. Post-2011 however, it is expected that the magnitude of the crises facing the EU, proximity to the Union, and the EU’s reactionary rather than pro-active attitude in confronting the situation, the politics of the CSDP will be more intergovernmental. Here the PSC, EUMC, and CIVCOM though playing important roles will have less influence to shape national policy concerning member states’ responses to crises facing the EU.

Research Question 2: Committees such as the PSC, EUMC, and CIVCOM have played and

continue to play an important role in shaping CSDP policy, however, this role is dependent scale of the crisis facing the EU. Here the distinction between pre-2011 and post-2011 is expected to be important. In the case of Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2012, the EU was unable to each agreement over how to approach each crisis. Instead, individual member states went ahead and formed their own policies. This left the EU to pick up the pieces and implement much smaller and less ambitious missions. We can then say that though it works well in situations where less is at stake and national interests converge easier, but in circumstances of high intensity and diverging national preferences, the consensus finding nature of these influential committees is unable to bridge the gulf between senior decision makers in the Council of Ministers and the European Council.

Research Question 3: Member states still have strong interests in making the CSDP work;

however, they lack the motivation to act on these interests if the situation is of large scale and presents a potential danger to the armed forces of the member states armed forces. States such as France and Britain are far more predisposed to act through unilateral or multilateral frameworks when approaching major crisis management matters. Neither country has rediscovered the enthusiasm of a decade ago for CSDP. Without these two heavyweights, the CSDP lacks leadership and struggles to find purpose. Both case studies are expected to demonstrate this argument. The EU’s paralysis over Libya can be found in the lack of consensus over how it should have been approached. Meanwhile Britain and France chose to act themselves. Mali on the other hand is heavily dependent on French finance, material and personnel. It is therefore highly unlikely that the mission could have ever got off the ground if

France was not behind it. Member state representatives on the other hand, though conscious of their unique position in structures that are not quite intergovernmental nor supranational, are more hopeful than most about the future of the CSDP, and are more positive regarding missions undertaken thus far.

3.2 Case Selection

The main focus of the research conducted throughout this thesis primarily rests upon two case studies, both countries that the EU has engaged in through the framework of the CSDP, Libya and Mali respectively. These two case studies were chosen for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the lion’s share of literature concerning supranational intergovernmentalism and the CSDP concentrates, not so much on specific missions per se, but rather overall and more general observations of the CSDP itself. Much is made of how supranational intergovernmentalism operates in CSDP bodies such as the PSC, EUMC and CIVCOM it is worthwhile and intriguing therefore to look more in depth at how the mechanics of supranational intergovernmentalism work.

Secondly, the cases of Libya and Mali both come after the shift in the nature of the CSDP that is claimed in this thesis. During its formative years in the 2000s, the EU was able, to a greater degree than now, to pick and choose with relative ease those crises that it wanted to respond to. The countries in which missions were launched were mostly far from the borders of the EU, with the exception of EUFOR Althea, the military deployment to the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, without wishing to appear dismissive, it did not matter as much to the EU’s security itself if a mission were launched or not in cases like Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan or South Sudan for instance. Rather, the EU could choose to embark upon overseas interventions if it were in the political interests of various member states.

However, in the current decade, this is no longer the case. The EU faces threats that are a lot closer to its borders, require much more immediate and stronger action, and present a much greater threat to the security of the union. Libya and Mali are two perfect examples of this. A third reason lies in the nature of the missions launched in the two countries. In Libya, the EU’s engagement has been purely civilian, whilst in Mali, a military training mission has been launched. We shall see if any noticeable differences can be observed as a result of this civilian-military dynamic.

3.3 Data Collection

Throughout the course of researching this thesis and to gain adequate answers to the research questions presented, a range of source material has been utilised. This can be divided into three groups. Firstly, the research made use of extensive primary documentation, mostly from the EU, such as mission reports, mission factsheets, European Council summits, and statements and personal reports from relevant persons such as MEPs. To this end, the online repository of EU law, EUR-lex was able to furnish this thesis with a wealth of primary literature that proved invaluable. In addition to EU documentation, source material from national governments was also proven to be useful. Availability of documents naturally varies from member state to member state, however, this thesis has been able to gain insight into the functioning of the CSDP from multiple government websites, most particularly: Britain and the Netherlands.

A further foundation of information gained has emanated from secondary literature gathered from a variety of sources. There has been a huge upsurge in literature concerning the CSDP, particularly since the late 2000s. This literature has come from largely from think tanks and academic journal publications, both are used here. Lastly, further information was gained through the use of interviews with individuals all with relevant experience of defence and security affairs. These were certainly experts in their respective fields, and all offered different perspectives on the overall subject of this thesis. This was exceptionally valuable as it showed how an individual’s role and personal experience can alter their outlook on a certain subject. Moreover, though pivotal when researching this thesis, the use of interviews to gain information on national perspectives should not be overstated. The interviews proved most useful but each member state is different and representatives have similarly diverging ways of operating, as do their respective governments in giving them freedom to manoeuvre.

3.4 Methods of Analysis

In chapter 5 Supranational Intergovernmentalism pre-2011, there is a concentration on the tenets of supranational intergovernmentalism prior the shift in the CSDP. To examine this, two case studies are chosen: EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. While discussing these cases, particular attention is paid to the early phases of the missions themselves, and the build up to their launch.

In the first analytical chapter of this thesis, chapter 6, Shift in the CSDP, the change in nature of the CSDP from the 2000s to the 2010s is examined. This is necessary in order to give context to why a shift in the supranational intergovernmentalism debate is necessary. To examine this shift, we must look at the circumstances surrounding missions launched prior and post-2011. To this end, with the help of both primary and secondary documents, four distinct factors behind the shift in the CSDP are discussed at length: firstly, the scale of the mission anticipated. Secondly, the level of threat posed to the EU. Thirdly, the relative ease by which member states came to an agreement on collective action. Fourthly, the necessity of intervention by the EU. By the end of this chapter, it will have been shown that the circumstance under which the EU launches CSDP missions has radically altered in recent years.

In chapter 7, CSDP Engagement in Libya, we analyse not just a static point in time, or the case as a whole. Rather the case goes from the EU’s initial response to the crisis in early 2011 right through to the launch of EUBAM Libya and to then to the present day. By adopting this approach, we can gain a far broader but also more specific insight into the EU and its member states reacted and have conducted themselves in Libya since 2011. The same format is used in chapter 8, CSDP Engagement in Mali; we follow the EU’s initial response to the rebellion and coup d’état in 2012, and trace the actions taken since then. From this we can observe any differences or changes in the CSDP and indeed member states’ attitudes towards the cases in question.

A primary goal of the research in this thesis is to put supranational intergovernmentalism to the test in distinct and real-world case studies. The methodology of case based research is particularly appropriate in this circumstance. By using theory evaluating case study orientated research (Della Porta, 2008, p. 230), we can observe more than mere observations of single events, rather we can closely investigate detailed processes in CSDP decision making in Libya and Mali at varying points in time. In Libya, for example, the period between the crisis in 2011 and the present state of EU engagement in the country is examined, whereas in Mali the period of investigation stretches from the French intervention in 2012 to the present day. In this sense, due to the extended period of examination and the focus on real-life conditions, case based research is the most potent method of both theory building and theory testing (Della Porta, 2008, p. 211). Moreover, within the cases of Libya and Mali themselves, we must also delve deeper to examine the stages of the EU’s response to these crises.

Section 2 CSDP Decision Making Apparatus Chapter 4 Main CSDP Bodies

4.1 The Political Security Committee

The most senior of the institutions discussed at length in this thesis, the PSC’s prime function is to “monitor international crises and exercise political control and strategic direction of EU military operations (Council Decision, 2001). Due to the increasing importance of the CFSP and CSDP to the EU in the late 1990s, the PSC was an effective solution that would provide the EU with a permanent body to oversee the functions of the foreign and security policies of the EU. There is a reciprocal stream of information from the PSC to the EUMC and CIVCOM below it, the PSC provides these committees with guidelines and general parameters for potential actions that the EU can take. Meanwhile in the other direction, the EUMC and CIVCOM provide the PSC with advice and recommendations, most of which has already been largely agreed upon, which is then passed to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and later to the Council of Ministers and the European Council (Jones, 2007, p. 202).

4.2 The European Union Military Committee

Established at Nice along with the PSC and CIVCOM, the EUMC lies below the PSC in the EU political-military structure and is the most senior military body in the EU. The intention when creating the EUMC was to provide the EU with the institutional capability it was sorely lacking in order to “assume its responsibilities for crisis management” (Jones, 2007, p. 201). When a crisis arises, the EU deploys its institutional infrastructure in order to assess appropriate responses. The EUMC in this regard is composed of 28 military representatives who get together to thrash out a unanimous plan to present to the PSC. It can be thought of as a forum for governments that may have radically different ideas and priorities relating to the issue at hand. Moreover, the EUMC maintains a strong link between the EU and NATO as the military representatives from each state perform the same duty to NATO (Jones, 2007, p. 202). By the time the issue is discussed by the European Council, the vast majority of the detail has already been worked out. If it is decided to launch a military mission, the EUMC is responsible for overseeing the carrying out of objectives and strategies (EEAS). Since 2003, the EU has launched more than its fair share of military missions, though less than the number of civilian missions. These missions have not been grand in scale or ambition and for that

reason they have received relatively little media attention. However, the scope of these missions has been diverse, training missions, peacekeeping and naval patrols have all been added to the EU’s military repertoire since 2003.

4.3 The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

As its name suggests, the role of CIVCOM lies in managing and planning the EU”s civilian crisis management capabilities and strategies. It reports directly to the PSC with recommendations and advice for matters relating to civilian crisis management (European Council). CIVCOM was established in 2000 as a result of the EU’s drive to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP (Council Deicison, 2000). The importance and, indeed the scope of CIVCOM has expanded since its creation in 2000. The EU has launched 21 civilian CSDP missions during its brief lifetime; indeed the vast majority of overseas missions are civilian rather than military based. These missions have taken on a variety of different forms. Firstly, police missions have been launched to maintain law and order and to supplement and support local or regional security forces. Secondly, border assistance often in countries where there exists a dispute over the border, or in which there is little effective border controls. Thirdly, rule of law missions that have taken on substantial tasks to problems such as corruption, and criminal justice systems. Usually these have not taken place in isolation, but in cooperation with other rule of law missions by other organisations or states. Fourthly, monitoring and assistance missions that have been deployed to oversee fair and peaceful elections, or to oversee the implementation of agreements. We can see then that the EU has developed a diverse and extensive portfolio of crisis management experience. Whether or not all of these missions have been successful or not is beyond the purview of this thesis and must require further research.

Section 3 Empirical Analysis Part 1

Chapter 5 Supranational Intergovernmentalism Pre-2011 5.1 EUFOR RD Congo

Though the main focus of this thesis lies with the application of supranational intergovernmentalism post-2011, it is valuable nevertheless to shortly examine its function before the shift in CSDP. In this chapter, we discuss two CSDP missions carried out prior to 2011, and examine how supranational intergovernmentalism can be applied in each case. If we observe the EU’s second mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), EUFOR RD Congo, we see how the EUMC in particular was effective in finding consensus among diverging national policies and opinions. The mission was launched in order to support an existing United Nations (UN) mission to stablise the situation in the DRC ahead of the upcoming election (EU Observer, 2006). Finding enough troops for the mission proved difficult from the outset, despite enthusiasm from EU member states for the mission itself. Britain pointed to its major commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan as to why it would not be partaking; France had at the time commitments in the Ivory Coast and had already been the chief contributor to the EU’s previous mission in the DRC, Artemis. (Euractiv, 2006). Germany, meanwhile, was unenthusiastic about participating in the mission much less acting in a leading role as it was being pressured to do, seeing little in the way of interest in sending troops to the DRC where it historically had no links whatsoever (Major, 2008, p. 23). After the (Hresentative Javier Solana’s efforts at persuading the German defence committee were met with lukewarm signals, an informal meeting of the EUMC was held. After this meeting it was agreed that Germany would contribute 400-450 troops for the mission (Engberg, 2014, p. 100). This would later rise to over 700 making Germany the second largest contributor to the operation behind France. Though it would be somewhat of an overestimation to say that the EUMC was the sole reason for the sudden consensus between Germany and other member states, it aligns with what we know of activity in EUMC meetings. A MILREP stated in an interview that although representatives must act within the confines of their respective government’s policy, they are in an excellent position to give expert military advice back to the capital, offering military solutions to political problems (Interview 1). Moreover, the friendly and effective relationships that military representatives maintain with each other, as asserted strongly by advocates of supranational intergovernmentalism (Cross, 2010), is also most valuable when trying to find convergence between diverging national positions

(Interview 1). The EUMC presented a paper overview of the EU operation in the DRC to the PSC in March 2006, offering expert military advice on how to proceed, and then set about planning for EUFOR RD Congo on the basis of the advice it had offered (Engberg, 2014, p. 100).

Throughout this affair, the value of the EUMC cannot be overstated, it was key in allowing member states to agree on the composition of the mission and in securing German leadership. Moreover, once this was taken care of, the EUMC carried out its role in planning and costing the mission and ran the operation once on the ground. In this sense, EUFOR RD Congo presents an intriguing glimpse into how supranational intergovernmentalism can be applied to the CSDP. Representatives in the EUMC are not acting completely as supranational actors acting wholly on behalf of the EU. However, national positions are seen to change and mould into a single coherent EU policy that can be implemented through the CSDP.

5.2 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

A further case useful for our purposes lies in the EU’s military engagement in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2008, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. The EU was under no pressing obligation to intervene in the CAR and Chad, however, the opportunity presented itself to solve numerous problems that had been nagging at the EU for a frustrating amount of time. Firstly, France had national concerns at stake in the region as a whole thanks to its old colonial links. The French knew that instability affecting the region was undesirable and a very real possibility if nothing was done. Secondly, the EU through the PSC had been discussing possible action in Darfur for a long time at this point but had very little concrete progress to show for its efforts. The EU then felt that if something could not be done in Darfur, perhaps something could be done in a regional context to at least show that the EU was capable of acting. Thirdly, following the conclusion of the EU’s previous military foray into Africa, there was much anticipation to show off the Union’s military capacity one again (Mattelaer, 2008, p. 15). Clearly then, since agreement on intervention in the Sudan was proving difficult, the EU was able to pick and choose a different and more suitable crisis in which to involve itself, one that would prove more amenable to the range of views present.

This mission’s general aim was to improve security in the east of Chad and north east of the CAR, areas that had become increasingly unstable during the refugee crisis in neighbouring Darfur. Specifically the EU would protect refugees and aid workers while facilitating the safe

travel of humanitarian aid, and assist in the protection of UN staff and locations (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Factsheet). Following the establishment of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) September 2007, the EUMC became involved in developing military plans for the mission (Seibert, 2010, p. 11). It is here where we see how the EUMC’s informal decision-making and meeting practices can be so important. Rather than wait for the CMC to be officially announced and knowing that some sort of military mission was to be desired, the EUMC had been discussing military options for a while in a purely informal setting (Mattelaer, 2008, p. 16). Through this more relaxed and unofficial setting, we can see how representatives in the EUMC figured out “what is possible before any formal proposals are put forward” (Cross, 2010, p. 12). In an effort to avoid the lack of consensus that had plagued the planning of operations in the Sudan the previous year, the EUMC arranged for a multitude of military options be brought to the table by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). These options were broadly similar in their purpose, but different in scale. Option one included the supporting of Chadian forces providing security. Option two focused on the protection of UN forces. Option three involved the support of UN forces and protection of civilians. Option four was largely a combination of number two and three (Mattelaer, 2008, p. 16). Indicating the success of early informal planning and the providing of multiple options to be considered by the EUMC, we can see how much of the planning for the mission was taken care of almost exclusively by the EUMC and EUMS. There were still difficulties to be worked out such as troop contributions from member states and logistical challenges due to operating in such troublesome conditions (Keller, 2008). However, in terms of military planning, the importance of the EUMC cannot be overstated.

In this brief examination of CSDP operations prior to 2011, we notice numerous consistencies. Firstly, the value of the EUMC is significant in both cases. In the DRC and Chad/CAR, there were important obstacles to both missions, and it is clear that the EUMC was instrumental through its informal networking in breaking down the barriers between member states over what action to take. As a MILREP stated in an interview, the EUMC is particularly useful when it is given extremely broad and open-ended objectives from national governments. Moreover, the EUMC can be seen to be “starting the conversation” in preparation for instructions from the PSC and Council of Ministers (Interview 1). Secondly, in these cases, the positions of individual member states were altered through dialogue in bodies such as the EUMC and PSC. This is seen most evidently in the agreement between France and Germany over German leadership of EUFOR RD Congo. Thirdly, the vast

majority of the fine details and actual operationalisation of both missions was carried out by the EUMC and EUMS, by the time matters were dealt with by COREPER and the Council of Ministers, decisions had already been made. These bodies had significant licence to roam, as, though we know that each representative is acting on behalf of the interests laid down by their respective government, the representatives are able to really mould these objectives through discussion with their counterparts. EUFOR TCHAD/RCA illustrates this when one discusses the EUMC’s proactive nature by tasking the EUMS to develop comprehensive military options for the intervention.

Chapter 6 A Shift in the CSDP

The security environment that the EU currently finds itself in in 2016 is radically different from the turn of the century. At that time and when the first, and to date only, European Security Strategy (ESS) was published in 2003, the words which appear at the very start of the ESS reflected the overall positive mood of the EU and its optimistic outlook on the future. “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (p. 1) does not seem to ring as true now as it did in December 2003. The Eurozone crisis that exploded in 2008 and still grips the continent, terrorist attacks on a semi-regular basis, and shrinking defence budgets have all led to an atmosphere in the EU that is far from the positive. Though the threats of terrorism and people trafficking identified in the ESS remain, and have indeed intensified in recent years, parts of the ESS are obsolete. The main threat to European security identified in the ESS is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (p. 3). At the time, the Middle East was a hotbed of nuclear activity with Iran pursuing the possibility of acquiring such technology, and the pretext of the invasion of Iraq that year being the possibility of that country gaining WMDs (UK Government, 2003). With the non-proliferation agreement with Iran, this fear has diminished considerably. The ESS demonstrates how different the security landscape now is in 2016 compared to 2003 for the EU.

The rhetoric from officials regarding the EU’s potential role in the global security has also changed drastically in little more than a decade. In the early 2000s, there was a great deal of anticipation and optimism surrounding the future of the EU’s military capabilities. Indeed, the EU was seriously considered as an alternative to NATO, indicating that it would be prepared to engage in high intensity warfare, rather than civilian and humanitarian mission, at some point in the then future (Spinant, 2002). Now though there are few suggestions that the EU should become some sort of concrete alternative to NATO, with the tools necessary to launch large-scale military endeavours. Rather the EU finds itself in a state whereby its main priorities are recognised as being more modest than first envisaged a decade ago. The EU has substantial capabilities in areas that NATO does not, “such as security sector reform, border management and monitoring, and police missions” (Boonstra, 2012). This section discusses and analyses the key reasons for why the EU this change in circumstances has happened and why the CSDP has shifted accordingly.

Since the EU first embarked upon external CSDP missions, the forces available have typically been rather minimalist. This is despite the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) outlining how

member states would, by 2003, be able to cooperatively deploy 50,000-60,000 within short notice if required (EEAS, 1999). The 1999 objective is hardly unique in objectives overestimating the EU’s military capabilities. However, the missions that the EU launched in this period hardly require the massive scale of manpower that the HHG had aimed for. A fitting example of this small and limited scope of CSDP missions can be seen if we look once more at the EU’s operation in the DRC, EUFOR RD Congo. After much negotiation a force of 1000 was deployed in the DRC itself, a number described as “demonstrating how far the EU is from effectively fulfilling its international responsibilities” (Haine and Giegerich, 2006). In the DRC then, the EU could afford to deploy relatively few troops with a limited mandate both in terms of its remit and its timescale. Though there had been calls from the UN for the EU to offer assistance, the EU was content to offer what amounted to a “token force” (Howorth, 2014, p. 159).

The circumstances in present day are, however, very different from 2006. During the early stages of the Libyan crisis in 2011, there were calls for the EU take a leading role in the international response, from both inside and outside the EU. The High Representative Catherine Ashton stated in March of that year that no measures were off the table, concerning the action that the EU could take, specifically including a no-fly zone (NFZ) (EEAS, 2011). However, the European Council could not agree on the creation of an NFZ, nor on an arms embargo, leaving the Union seemingly without a key role to play despite much talk of action from senior figures in the EU, a turn of events that greatly surprised other actors around the world (Engberg, 2014, p. 153; Rettmann, 2011). We see then that unlike situations in the 2000s where the EU could afford to adopt small, limited missions in response to international events, here the Union was expected to do much more to contribute to the resolution of a crisis.

A second factor in the shift of the CSDP is the level of threat crises have posed to the security of the EU. The EU’s exploits in the 2000s are littered with missions launched far from the EU’s borders that mattered little to the safety and security of the Union itself. This changed abruptly with the Libyan crisis in 2011 and the trend of crises closer to home as continued with the launching of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, the EU’s attempt to get a grip on the migrant crisis. Missions such as those initiated in the Palestinian Territories, EUBAM-Rafah and EUPOL COPPS Palestine highlight the EU’s willingness to engage in matters that did not present any sort of threat to the Union, but rather to project European values and

practices elsewhere. EUBAM-Rafah was launched following a call for a third party to monitor the implementation of the ‘Agreement on Movement and Access’ between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 2005. The EU trained Palestinian border officials and acted as an intermediary between Israeli, Egyptian and Palestinian authorities (EUBAM-Rafah Factsheet). Meanwhile EUPOL COPPS is mandated to assist the Palestinians in areas of policing, rule of law and criminal justice (EUPOL COPPS Factsheet).

In the present decade, however, the EU has been forced to deal with situations that directly affect its own security. Confronted with unprecedented numbers of migrants arriving on the shores of Europe, the EU took action by initiating EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia in 2015. The mission “is to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers” (European Council, 2015). This mission along with the its now heavy emphasis on the Mediterranean and North Africa show how the EU has shifted its focus from sub-Saharan Africa, where most CSDP missions took place in the 2000s, to much further north, closer to the Union’s own borders.

The third factor in the shift in CSDP lies in the ease with which agreement is reached between member states. To use the case of EUFOR RD-Congo once more, despite the unwillingness of particularly Germany and Britain to participate in the mission, member states collectively recognised the opportunity to show that the EU could act as a coherent and autonomous military unit (Engberg, 2014, p. 99). What is clear is that even member states that had no intention of participating in the mission gave their tacit consent to its launch. Though there were clearly difficulties in this case, agreement was reached relatively quickly.

The same could not be said in certain cases in the next decade. What we see post-2011 is the EU having far more difficulty agreeing on taking action during international crises. In Libya, this led to the EU remaining out of the picture almost entirely, resembling, as Howorth quips, a “cow grazing in a field watching a passing train go by” (Howorth, 2014, p. 10). Indeed, this passivity was not helped by member states taking a variety of different positions on Libya, many of them irreconcilable. While High Representative Catherine Ashton expressed the EU’s concern at unfolding events, Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary were of the view that the Gaddafi regime was capable of implementing democratic reforms and that it would be counterproductive for the EU to get involved. Meanwhile, on the other side of the table, Britain and France, Germany and Luxembourg roundly condemned the violence propagated