From Ukraine to Armenia A Critical Geopolitics Approach to EU Foreign Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood

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From Ukraine to Armenia

A Critical Geopolitics Approach to EU Foreign Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School of Humanities

University of Amsterdam

Name: Adriaan de Jongste Student Number: 12891281

Main Supervisor: Dr. Artemy Kalinovsky Second Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Luiza Bialasiewicz

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Abstract

This thesis explores the commitment of the EU towards the Eastern Partnership and to prevent further tension with Russia by analysing EU foreign policy discourse towards the Eastern Neighbourhood between the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution in 204 and the Velvet revolution in Armenia in 2018. Through a critical geopolitics perspective, this research is able to show how those involved in the construction of foreign policy construct certain ideas about places and relations and how these ideas reinforce and influence political behaviour of the various bodies involved. Engaging with discourse analysis of interviews, statements, speeches and declarations is able to reveal who have a more impact on the construction of ideas, and how this is reflected in foreign policy discourse. By combining the framework of critical geopolitics and the method of discourse analysis this thesis aims to establish the EU internal power structure, as well as the power structure of the Eastern Neighbourhood. Furthermore, it also reveals the incentives of the various bodies involved in policy making, and the changes the EU endured towards its engagement and commitment towards the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia after the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution in 2014.

Key Words: Critical Geopolitics, Discourse, EU, Neighbourhood Policy, Identity, Contested Neighbourhood, Russia, Armenia.

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In April 2018, Armenia experienced a short ‘revolution’ that led to the abdication of President Serzh Sargsyan. The demonstrations occurred towards the end of Sargsyan’s second term of presidency. A 2015 referendum decided that Sargsyan could remain in power as prime minister, and additionally change the constitution to give more power to the prime minister. As a response prior to the inauguration of Sargsyan as prime minister, protestors, led by opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan, went onto the street to demonstrate against the extension of power and anti-democratic practices (Demytrie, 2018; Feldman & Alibašić, 2019; Lanskoy & Suthers, 2019). Demonstrations against Sargsyan were not uncommon in the ten years of his presidency: In 2015, before and during the referendum demonstrations occurred but were intercepted or restricted by the president. Even earlier, at the start of Sargsyan presidency in April 2008 demonstration took place to express discontent with Sargsyan presidency. These demonstrations were violently put down which, as a consequence, lead to the death of ten protestors. It is perhaps this event, alongside continued demonstrations, that ten years later the Armenian Velvet revolution occurred without violence (Ishkanian, 2012; Abrahamian & Shagoyan, 2018).

The Velvet revolution showed similarities to other revolutions in the former Soviet space due to the pro-democracy element that dominated revolution in Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia. To better comprehend the democratic revolution in Armenia it must first be put into perspective against the other revolution in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Other revolutions in the Eastern Neighbourhood include the 2003 Rose revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine and the 2014 Euromaidan in Ukraine. The Rose and Orange revolutions can be characterized as a top-down revolution that were guided by elites (Ohanyan, 2018). In the case of Georgia this was led by Michael Saakashvilli, and in Ukraine by the Force of the People bloc under the leadership of Viktor Yushchenko and Joelia Tymoshenko. In both cases, protestors took to the streets when they believed that the official results of an election were illegitimate because the elections had been run in a corrupt manner. On both occasions the number of people on the streets were unexpected and were led by democratic values (Tudoioru, 2007). Civil society organisations in particular played a vital and influential role in both of the revolutions. In both revolutions non-governmental groups acted as the mobiliser of people as well as assisting in political training. The dynamics of these organisations differ across the two revolutions though. In Georgia, the organisations sought support and training from Western expertise. The civil society organisations in Georgia spread Western norms and values,

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received funding by organisations supporting democracy, created jobs, generated income, and later trained top-level politicians resisting the government (Companjen, 2010). In Ukraine, civil society organisations grew prior to the 2004 revolution due to domestic events and circumstances rather than through Western support. Furthermore, civil society groups were in particular stimulated by the Kuchmagate in 2000 published tapes in which president Kuchma ordered the kidnapping of a journalist. Younger Ukrainians were of particular importance for these groups as they were seen as not afraid to challenge the regime because they grew up in the 1990s and had not experienced political oppression by the Soviet Union (Copsey, 2010).

The Euromaidan revolution in 2013 and 2014 offers a different perception into the post-soviet colour revolutions. The Euromaidan revolution is characterized by its non-elite movement nature. Young movement groups, similar to the Orange revolution, mobilised in large numbers and became a political movement that demanded change and prioritised European integration or the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych (Diuk, 2014). The nature of the start of the revolution, however, lies with the domestic and international exertion of influence over the region. Compared to Georgia and the 2004 revolution in Ukraine, the foreign policy of both countries played a much larger role in the coming and dynamics of the revolution in which society was pulled into one direction or the other (Noutcheva, 2018).

The Armenian revolution differs in certain aspects, while it also shows similarities with components of the different revolutions. The Velvet revolution is characterized by its domestic focus (Ohanyan, 2018; Giragosian, 2019; Terzyan, 2020). In comparison to the previously mentioned revolutions, the Armenian revolution was not influenced by a shift in foreign policy or strategic orientation. Rather the revolution was part of a longer process in which people were advocating for more engagement with human rights, women rights, environmentalism, and labour and employments concerns and therefore, little to non-political causes (Ohanyan, 2018). Civil society played an essential role in the revolution, however, rather than in organised form as established in other revolutions, civil society was mobilised through social media by opposition leader Pashinyan (Lanskoy & Suther, 2019). As such, civil society is used as a united front against the government without the mobilisation of a variety of organisations. An important aspect in which Armenia differs to the Georgian and both Ukrainian revolution(s) is that Armenia had no ambition “to change its geopolitical orientation” (Lanskoy & Suther, 2019, p.85). Both, Sargsyan and Pashinyan had no intension to break its obligations towards Russia as well as the European Union (EU). Lastly, during the demonstration no symbols symbolising Europe or Russia were shown. The Armenian revolution therefore stands out from the other

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previously discussed revolution. This peculiarity may indicate a continuity in Armenia’s everyday context, while it may also show signs of changing geopolitical imagination from the EU and Russia, as both powers maintained close relations to Armenia.

This thesis focuses on EU foreign policy geopolitical framing towards the former Soviet space. By identifying and understanding EU actorness in the region, interaction with states in the region as well as states acting in the region, and lastly the social context within which policies and discourse have been constructed. The illustration of the various revolutions in the Eastern Neighbourhood have shown growing tensions between the EU and Russia. Both parties seek interest in the region and want to extend its influence over the region. However, confrontation between the EU and Russia, as observed in Ukraine, is far from the ideal scenario for the EU. Since the early 1990s the EU has repeated attempts towards “constructive engagement” (Haukkala, 2015) in which the EU binds Russia into Europe and the key institutions. The clash between the two powers in the region, and the way in which they view each other and the region plays an important role in how the two powers interact with one another. Therefore, this thesis attempts to answer the following research question:

How has the European Union reconciled its efforts to avoid further tensions with Russia with its commitment to the Eastern Neighbourhood between the Ukrainian Crisis and

Armenian Velvet Revolution?

The research question understands EU interaction in the Eastern Neighbourhood to follow two premises. Firstly, as illustrated above it tries to avoid further, and intensifying tensions with Russia. Secondly, the EU maintains its commitment to the Eastern Neighbourhood through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The analysis will further engage with these two influences and also explore what efforts have been made to follow these two premises. And how this is reflected in official foreign policy discourse concerning the Eastern Neighbourhood. Chapter two further explains the research question and research objectives.

Interaction between Armenia and the EU is mainly done through the European Neighbourhood Policy which was established in 2004 and was revised in 2014. In 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was created as part of the ENP to strengthen relations between participating states and the EU. The EaP consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EaP is guided by a framework based on relevant bilateral agreements, such as the Association Agreements, Partnerships, and agreed principles in summits. These bilateral agreements are based on four priority areas: 1)stronger economy, 2)stronger governance,

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3)stronger connectivity and 4)stronger society (“Eastern Partnership”, 2016). The EaP is observed to be of transformative, and also of geopolitical nature (Borzel & Risse, 2009; Makarychev & Devyatkov, 2014). The region has shown to be favourable for the exertion of influence of the EU while it has also shown to be vulnerable. The various revolutions and confrontation with Russia have led to the creation of a contested neighbourhood between the EU and Russia.

The literature review presented in this study introduces the various interpretations of EU’s normative identity. The reviewed studies first define what normative power entails and highlight the weaknesses of this self-entitled identity. The identity of the EU plays an important role in understanding the EU as an international actor in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Second, the works reviewed examine the role of the EU within the Eastern Neighbourhood and the way the EU interacts with states in the Neighbourhood and therefore, touch upon the idea of a contested Neighbourhood. Since the creation of the EaP, the region has endured several attempts to revolution, successful and unsuccessful, as well as confrontation on different levels between the EU and Russia. Although research has suggested the change in approaches within EU foreign policy, critical studies on how these changes are reflected within foreign policy are lacking. Therefore, this study seeks to understand the geopolitical framing of the region by the EU between Euromaidan and the Velvet revolution. In order to understand how the region fits int the EU’s geopolitical imagination, this research engages with a critical geopolitical approach. Critical geopolitics examines how reality is portrayed in several mediums. To analyse the act of foreign policy the social context is essential, but perhaps even more important, foreign policy discourse determines how reality is created. The investigation of discourse will determine how elites spatialize the world through power structures, space and social context (Ó Tuathail, 1996).

This thesis begins by further outlining the research question and research objectives. It then goes on to the review of the literature that introduces important concepts and studies to further the understanding of the context and space this thesis engages with. Furthermore, the theory this thesis follows is outlined in Chapter 4. The theoretical framework introduces the field of critical geopolitics. The history of the concept of geopolitics and the rise of critical geopolitics within the field is described. Moreover, critical geopolitics as a study is presented. Chapter 5 will introduce the method of analysis: discourse analysis. It also outlines the type and selection of data for the analysis. Next, the analysis is structured in three parts: Firstly, an analysis of foreign policy discourse focussed on the time period around the Euromaidan revolution and

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the aftermath. The second part centres around the period between January 2015 and September 2017, with focus on the Riga summit. Finally, the third aspect examines the Brussels summit and the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia. To conclude, the last Chapter of this research will consist of its findings and introduce limitations of this research and propose ideas for further research.

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2. Research Question and Research Objectives

This study proposes to identify and understand how the EU has framed its foreign policy towards the former Soviet space, the contested Eastern Neighbourhood in relation to its interest in the region, and the social context within which these policies have been constructed. Investigating the kind of discourse and narrative the EU is engaged with in the region and how this discourse has developed since the events in Ukraine during the 2014 Euromaidan revolution towards Russia. This research will engage with a discursive analysis in which the interest of the EU will be studied in relation to specific social context, which will outline the evolution of the EU foreign policy discourse. Furthermore, this thesis will explore how the EU has shaped its foreign policy in relation to its own identity in the region and how this is reflected in the interaction with Russia over the contested region between 2013 and 2018. As such, the EU’s geopolitical imagination of the Eastern Neighbourhood will be examined. Moreover, this study solely discusses the EU point of view regarding the geopolitical imagination and does not take into account Russian perspectives or actions that did not spark a reaction by the EU. This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions:

This research question aims to clarify the role of the EU in the region. An important aspect of this is the engagement with other parties that seek influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood as well. Therefore, discourse on foreign policy affairs related to the Eastern Neighbourhood becomes the main source of analysis to determine changes and the type of discourse that can be related to the process of reconciliation towards Russia. The focus lies on the geopolitical implications that are analysed in this research. Therefore, a critical geopolitical approach is chosen to analyse the process of geopolitical imagination within foreign policy. An essential part of critical geopolitics is the analysis of geopolitical discourse. Foreign policy discourse by elites is regarded as one of the few sources of geopolitical imagination from top level politicians. By analysing such discourse this thesis can identity the key components of critical geopolitics: power structures, historical-spatial inheritances and contemporary challenges, games of power and games of rhetorical performance (Ó Tuathail, 2014). In order to engage with a critical geopolitical approach towards the foreign policy, the following subsequent question is examined:

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How has the European Union, through its foreign policy discourse, framed and changed its geopolitical imagination in relation to Russia and the Eastern Neighbourhood between 2013 and 2018?

This question is answered by engaging with the discourses of actors directly involved in foreign policy making and representatives of these bodies towards geopolitical imagination in relation to Russia in the context of the EaP. These actors are further identified in Chapter 5. To analyse this the Eastern Neighbourhood is chosen as a space since it is one of only a few areas in which the EU and Russia are directly and indirectly engaged with each other. Revolutions in the region have shown that the EU and Russia are two powers that have invested and are interested in exerting their influences in the Eastern Neighbourhood countries. Furthermore, discourse analysis will identify key actors, spaces, and possible power structures in the eyes of the EU that help to understand how foreign policy discourse illustrates a perceived reality.

In order to answer this subsequent question, as well as the research question, a variety of foreign policy instruments are analysed. With the purpose to determine a change or continuity in foreign policy discourse from the EU from pre-Euromaidan to Velvet revolution towards Russia and illustrate EU’s geopolitical thinking in the region the analysis is divided into three parts. Firstly, the time period around the Euromaidan is examined with the Vilnius summit in November 2013 as a starting point. The analysis includes the signing of the Association Agreement in June 2014. The second part focusses on the foreign policy discourse between January 2015 and September 2017. In this period only, the EU held one EaP summit, the Riga summit, whereas Russia initiated an economic union that incorporates Armenia and Belarus. Finally, the third focusses on the period between November 2017 up to the end of Velvet revolution in May 2018. Within this time frame, the fourth EaP summit in Brussels, during this event Armenia signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement at the same event. The analysis ends in accordance with the end of the Velvet revolution.

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3. Literature Review

The literature review examines the existing debate on the role of the EU as an actor in the post-Soviet space by looking at the normative nature of the EU’s self-identity. The role of the EU in the post-Soviet space is based on two factors: the EU identity and the way the EU acts in the Neighbourhood. Firstly, the EU holds a normative self-identity which determines its actorness in the region. Secondly, the role of the EU within the Eastern Neighbourhood is compared to the other main actor in the region: Russia. Therefore, geopolitics play an important role in how the EU acts in the region, but is also asked to act by states in the Eastern Neighbourhood and interacts with the states present in the region. The increasing sphere of influence of the EU and Russia in the region and friction with Russia has illustrated the contest for the Eastern Neighbourhood.

3.1. Is the EU a Normative Power?

The EU’s identity is a wide explored theme, this review aims to shed light on how this identity is constructed through norms and values and how this is expressed in EU’s external affairs. This show that putting the EU under one distinctive identity is difficult but achievable according to scholars such as e.g. Nitoiu (2012) and Zutter (2010). More importantly, it highlights the conflicting opinions towards EU’s identity in accordance with how the EU acts in its periphery.

According to Tonra (2010), who previously explored the roots and framework of the EU identity formation, constructing an identity for the EU and Europe based on culture, history or geography is difficult. This is due to the EU and Europe’s diverse geographic identifications, history, culture and experiences in conflicts that may bind the whole together. For this reason, Tonra (2010) suggests grounding the EU’s identity on its shared norms and values that build the foundation of the EU and include democracy, justice, freedoms, and human rights. These norms and values are the foundation of the EU (“the EU Value”, n.d.). The EU holds these as universal values and therefore, sees it as a goal to extend these norms and values across its borders (Tonra, 2010). This goal, to extend norms and values across its borders, may be observed as part of the EU’s normative ambitions. Tonra (2010) identifies the EU as a normative power to be a more dominant analysis of EU’s identity among scholars. Manners (2002; 2009) is a prominent contemporary scholar that investigates the normative identity of the EU. Manners (2002) suggests that the EU is constructed in a normative way that, therefore,

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guide the EU’s action on a global level. Manners (2009) states that if the EU chooses to act as a normative power rather than a realist power it encompasses the use of normative justifications which require a three-way understanding. Firstly, normative justifications should contain legitimate principle that need to be “convincing, coherent and consistent” (Manners, 2009, p.2). Secondly, the actions must be persuasive or attractive and involve multi and pluri-lateral dialogue between involved actors. Thirdly, the promotion of principles should be observed as “being part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding” (Manners, 2009, p.3).

Following Manners (2002; 2009) understanding of the EU’s identity, some scholars believe that there are external factors that have a negative effect on ability to act as a normative actor in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Van der Wal (2008) and Cardwell (2016) identify the EU as a normative power, however, not as distinct as Manner (2002; 2009). Van der Wal (2008) believes that non ideal factors play a negative effect on the normative identity that EU attempts to follow. Such factors include power relations, conflict of interest, and historically established differences. Although such factors make the EU act differently, the normative basis is still dominantly present in its actions. Cardwell (2016) and Haukkale (2008) add that the EU foreign policy is clearly normative as it lacks determinism to act upon the set principles and therefore, may be observed to be ineffective. The EU foreign policy should therefore be understood as a collective commitment to promoting and defending its values on a global level, in which not all tools or instrument work successfully.

Furthermore, there are several scholars who propose a critical perspective towards the notion of normative identity. Nitoiu (2012) investigates the two dominant narratives in international relations, realist and interpretive, on the construction of EU foreign policy. The realist perspective focusses on maximizing interests of both the EU and individual member states interests and involves a power-based narrative. The interpretive narrative supports the argument of Manners (2002; 2009), identifying the EU as a normative power (Nitoiu, 2012, p.68). The two narratives, as argued by Nitoiu (2012) and Zutter (2010) are present within the foreign policy, however, contradict each other in the process of identifying as one or the other. The normative discourse the EU holds on its external policies, contradict the EU’s realist nature of action. Zutter (2010) therefore warns for blindness among scholars for neglecting “the actual phenomenon of aspiring norm-diffusers that rely on pressure or even physical force” (p.1123).

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Furthermore, Pace (2007) and Skolimowska (2015) critically assess the EU’s identity as a normative power by looking at its ability to act upon its democratic peace doctrine abroad. Pace (2007) looks at the inability of the EU to challenge other states towards the identified norms and values. By analysing the EU’s role in the Middle East in the dispute between Israel and Palestine, Pace (2007) concludes that the normative nature is based on the assumption that conflict resolution is done through socialization. However, in the case of the dispute between Israel and Palestine this has no effect and shows the inability of the EU to maintain their normative identity (Pace, 2007, p.1059). Skolimowska (2015) demonstrates the EU’s inability to act as a stabilizing actor, and inability to exert its normative influence in conflicts, by looking at the role of the EU in various crises: Kosovo in 2008, Ukraine and the Crimea between 2013 and 2014, and Transnistria from 2004 to 2015. The unsuccessful attempts of the EU to act as a normative power on a global scale have led to the gap between the EU nature to act as a normative power and how it is perceived from outside the Union. Therefore, Skolimowska(2015) concludes that this gives “a presumption that the concept of a normative power in reality constitutes a certain type of a meta-narrative, utopia” (p.128).

3.2. EU in the Contested Eastern Neighbourhood

The Eastern Neighbourhood has been a contested region for some decades. After World War II both Europe and Russia sought to extend its influences in a large part of this region. The Eastern Neighbourhood consists of Eastern Europe, as well as the South Caucasus which is defined in the ENP under the EaP. The way the EU acts in the Neighbourhood is closely linked to the geopolitical importance the EU holds towards the region and challenges the EU has experienced and may experience in the future. The geopolitical elements in this are linked to the question of identity discussed in the previous section ‘3.1 Is the EU a Normative Power?’. The way the EU identifies itself is reflected in the way the EU acts towards and within the Eastern Neighbourhood. As a result, the relationship between the EU and Russia has also changed in this process. Various crises have occurred that highlighted the vulnerability of the relationship between the EU and Russia, and between the EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood. Compared to other crisis in the past two decades, the Armenian Velvet revolution has not resulted in confrontation between the two powers, however, did illustrate the scramble for influence of both powers in Armenia.

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Various scholars have engaged with the functioning of the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The overarching findings include the normative nature of the EU self-identity and assess the function of the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Nitoiu (2016) states that the EU was engaged in the Eastern Neighbourhood to foster stability on its borders. However, the foreign policy in the region rather involved a more inward-looking understanding of the “regional geopolitical structure” (Nitoiu, 2016, p.23). Before the Ukraine crisis, understood as the political unrest that followed the start of the revolution in 2013 up to the signing of the Association Agreement, the EU viewed the Eastern Neighbourhood as a ring of friends with opportunities to extend its normative power to create stability but perhaps more importantly play a major role in world politics (Nitoiu, 2016). Regarding the role of the EU in the region, Dias (2013) supports the findings of Nitoiu (2014; 2016) and notes that the safeguarding of the internal security and prosperity upon the stability factor along its borders explain the role of the EU in the region. Furthermore, the economic and political integration with the Eastern countries is dominant in the agenda of the EU and highlighted within the EaP. While, further integration was offered towards the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, Nitoiu (2016) argues that the EU offered Russia the prospect of a “more or less equal strategic partnership” (p.23). Nitoiu (2014) highlights that between the Georgian crisis in 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 the EU and Russia operated in “peaceful coexistence” (p.248) and points out that the EU’s successful functioning in the region is highly influenced by Russia due to their overlapping ambitions.

In order to understand the geopolitical aspect of the region Ó Tuathail (2017) designs a geopolitical field that illustrate the dynamics of power and competition among different powers within the region (p.38). The two main powers involved are the EU, represented as the external normative power, and Russia illustrated as the metropolitan state. The metropolitan state is defined as a state that is striving to define itself as “a stable post-imperial spatial” (Ó Tuathail, 2017, p.36) power in the region. Other important components depicted is the nationalizing state that represents former Soviet states that seek to break free from “legacies of dependence and interdependence” (Ó Tuathail, 2017, p.36) of the Soviet Union and as a reaction may favour integration with alternative structures. All countries part of the EaP can be identified as nationalizing states, where some have succeeded to have moved away from the Soviet Union legacies, and others are in the process or have not shown attempts to do so.

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Within these states Ó Tuathail (2017) describes the so called successionist region exist, which are regions that may have held special status in the past or seek to move away from the state. Although not all EaP countries hold such a region, the review below does illustrate that the various crises in the region, for example Georgia and Ukraine show signs of such successionist regions for instance South Ossetia in Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Donbas region in Ukraine. This description of the region helps understand dynamics of the EU foreign policy which is further examined throughout this research.

The way in which the EU and Russia interact in the Neighbourhood is discussed in multiple writings. Delcour (2018) discusses the change in the EU–Russia interaction after the creation of the EaP in 2009. Although the EU had maintained an inclusive narrative towards Russia, in practice the attempts failed and lead to a further exclusion of Russia in the ENP. Delcour (2018) argues that the EU policies in the Neighbourhood are shaped by “internal experiences and consideration, irrespective of the consequences” (p.26) these policies may have in the region. These exact policies were interpreted by Russia in 2013 as an attempt to compete in their sphere of influence. Cadier (2014) further argues that due to the EU’s lack of external coordination and considerations it is vulnerable to the pressure of Russia in the region.

The ability to use soft power by the EU and Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood is conditioned by the “societal norms of appropriate political governance” (Noutcheva, 2018, p.325) rather than each other. However, states that opposing external soft power can result in a clash due to the division in society in its political identity. Such a clash was observed in 2013 at the start of the Ukrainian crisis. Cadier (2018) develops further on the interaction of the EU and Russia around the Ukrainian crisis by focusing on their respective discourses. Furthermore, Cadier (2018) believes that the Ukrainian crisis has led to a rise of a geopolitical narrative within EU foreign policy by emphasizing the “feature of a threat” (p.19). However, Cadier (2018) does not believe that this has led to the clash between the EU and Russia over Ukraine, but rather has sent wrong signals to local elites in Eastern Neighbourhoods that may have led to domestic unrests in Ukraine. The geopolitical narrative includes the image of the EU to prevail over Russia, and to lower the conditionality criteria. This image was proven wrong after the crisis escalated in the East and Crimea. The Ukrainian crisis has further shown the weakness of security components in the EaP and therefore highlighted the economic nature of the foreign policy (Tsybulenko & Pakhomenko, 2016). Nitoiu and Sus (2019) identified the change in actorness in the region as a switch to “survival mode” (p.13) and focus on the normative nature of the EU’s actorness in the region. As a result, the conditionality factor in EU foreign policy

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with countries part of the EaP will become less important. It becomes easier for countries to be eligible for bilateral and multilateral relations and cooperation within the EU system, even those countries that previously did not comply to the norms and values parts of these system.

To further investigate the role of the EU in the Neighbourhood, and to relate to the topic of this thesis, a closer look at the developments in the relationship between the EU and Armenia is given. Through this review, not only will it offer a further understanding but also highlight the shortcomings and strengths of the EU acting in the Neighbourhood. Furthermore, it also illustrates the challenges the EU encounters in the region in relation to another major actor: Russia. Delcour and Wolczuk (2015) illustrate Armenia as an ideal partner for the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood as it highlights the possibilities of the EaP and extension of normative power in the region as potentially successful for the EU. Although Armenia has sided with Russia on economic and security terms, Armenia favours to interact with political and democratic aspects of the EU. As such Delcour (2018) and Wolczuk (2015) believe that the EU has the potential to further democratic developments in Armenia that follow the set of norms and values while at the same time minimizing friction with Russia due to the nature of Armenia’s geographic location and security concerns. Ademmer and Delcour (2016) develop this argument further by emphasizing the different means of influence the EU and Russia seek in Armenia. Economic integration within the Eurasian Economic Union was developed under Russian pressure and as a reaction to past crises in the region in the past. Most important in this aspect is that further integration with the EU does not withhold economic integration with other states and therefore, does not harm its relations with the EU as such. Furthermore, due to the EU’s normative nature, the EU would not likely provide similar security support to Armenia as Russia currently provides. Ademmer and Delcour (2016), and Vieira and Vasilyan (2018) have highlighted the ability of Armenia to position itself favourably in between the two states by sticking to the soft norms of the EU as this stimulates Russia’s ambitions to maintain their hegemonic position. On the other hand, the EU has become less strict on the conditionality criteria and has accepted the multipolar nature of the region and may therefore fill the gaps created by Russia’s focus on security and economic partner (Nitoiu, 2016).

The literature review has shown the diversity and complexity of EU affairs towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. EU’s normative self-identity plays a vital role in understanding EU actorness in the Neighbourhood. However, the review has illustrated that even though the self-identity remains an important presence in foreign policy towards the region, there are signs of shifts that are created through the further engagement of the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood, due

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to the various crisis that have occurred in the past decades. The hints of a shift in EU actorness may illustrate the inability of the EU to come to one concise strategy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. An important aspect within this narrative is the geopolitical peculiarities of the region. The geopolitics of the region that is described by Ó Tuathail (2017) describe the contest between two main powers in the region. Besides the EU, Russia maintains a strong position in the Neighbourhood. The efforts made by the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood demonstrate the inability to act in the normative way the EU describes to act upon. This led countries that received support by the EU, to make wrong assumptions and changes, that in the end were not supported by the EU and have further contributed to instability and crisis in the receiving country.

Furthermore, the contest over the Eastern Neighbourhood is also reflected in the relationship between Russia and the EU, which has deteriorated since the creation of the EaP in 2009. This can also be observed in the different approaches the EU and Russia use in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The similar self-images the two powers entail, show superiority over the other. Yet, neither power is able to act upon this idea, both powers fall short in certain aspects. The EU falls short in being able to offer support concerning defence issues. The EU is able to extend its democratic doctrine in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and show the ability to adjust its foreign policy towards this idea. This is clearly shown in attempts to further integration with Armenia, but this relationship is highly affected by the involvement of Russia.

For this thesis this review of literature offers several important aspects: First, the geopolitics of the Eastern Neighbourhood have started to form a more important role in EU actorness and foreign policy in the region. The implications of EU actions not only have an impact on relations between the EU and the country seeking further integration, but also on the relationship between the EU and Russia, and domestic implications of the country seeking further integration. Specific implications have been studied, and briefly discussed in the review, however, the awareness of these factors by the EU within foreign policy discourse remains unstudied. Second, the review has shown the inconsistency of the way the EU interacts with states in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Some studies have revealed that the approach the EU has used uses a variety of influences, including normative, realist and EU centrist. More recent studies on the relationship between the EU and Armenia highlight a more consistent normative approach, which take into account geopolitical challenges. Although the relationship between the EU and Russia have been studied or at least touched upon by many studies, they are mostly studied through a perspective that looks at bilateral agreements. It is interesting to look at the

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relation from the perspective of the EU in analysing foreign policy discourse which should give more insight on the way the EU has changed its perception of the Eastern Neighbourhood as a whole, but also towards Russia.

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4. Theoretical Framework 4.1.Classical Geopolitics

The origin of the term ‘classical geopolitics’ is found in fin de siècle Europe as a response to changes that were developing in Europe (Heffernan, 2000). The revolutions in communication, transportation and weaponry as well as the various technological breakthrough led scholar to observe the world and politics differently than before. Furthermore, due to the age of discovery and imperial competition that distinguished the worlds frontier, the political systems changed towards a closed political system (Owens, 2015). The new study of geopolitics would therefore study the world as “an integrate global whole” (Heffernan, 2000, p.31). Geopolitics as a study was found in different schools under a different interpretation of which the most significant schools are presented in the following paragraphs. The French geopolitics school is closely related to traditional political geography and will therefore not be discussed. Anglo-American geopolitics hold some of the most prominent figures in geopolitics: Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. And lastly, the German school of geopolitics, Geopolitik, that lead to the fall of classical geopolitics.

Each of these theorists had their own thoughts on how to achieve world domination. Before the term geopolitics was introduced in 1899, Mahan (2014) pointed out the importance of the navy to gain world dominance. Mahan based his theories on the British Empire, which controlled the seas for a long time. Rather than identifying the navy as a pure war component Mahan (2014) recognizes sea power as more than naval supremacy but also economic supremacy describing the sea as “a great highway” and “wide common” with “well-worn trade routes” (p.25). Mahan (2014) found three requirements for a successful sea power. These were: 1) production, 2) shipping which would lead to 3) colonies.

Unlike the other two main characters in geopolitics, Mahan initially only focused on the use of sea power to exert power, and instead of advocating how one nation should act upon the possibilities of sea power it is rather a reaction to how particular nations usage of sea power. The ideas of balance of power, although less significant in Mahan’s writing, were just as important as to becoming a sea power. Mahan discusses the concept of balance of power in relation to Great Britain but only reviews the concept of balance of power in Europe and Asia in later work. Sumida (1999) points out that besides sea battles, Mahan believed that major armed conflicts were imminent with the developments on the great European-Asian continent. These conflicts could surface out of three events: Firstly, competition among great European

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powers in establishing colonies. Secondly, the capability and ability to gain support for the government to prevent revolts. And thirdly, the emergence of an “Asian industrial weaponized” (Sumida, 1999, p.55) nation that could challenge Western powers. In regard to the last point Mahan feared that Japan, Russia, and the German Empire, due to the expansionist militarist monarchical leadership, had the potential to spark armed conflict (Robertson, 1996). Sumida (2000) interpreted Mahan’s findings on containment and balance of power by creating a “transnational consortium” (p.108) between the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan in order to contain Russia. The idea of the threat of Russia posed by Mahan remained a returning topic within classical geopolitics. The main concerns that arise in Mahan’s ideas still remain a central topic in geopolitics today: 1) the possibility of conflict between Western and Asian civilizations and 2) the rise of a global free-trade economy based on sea transport.

Mackinder (2014) countered the theory developed by Mahan of world domination through sea power by arguing that world domination was to be achieved through land power and thus, the conquest of land. Therefore, Mackinder’s main idea can be seen as a further developed argument of Mahan’s concerns. Mackinder (2014) had a new look towards political geography and emphasized the end of the exploration age and the start of a new era, called the “post-Columbian age” (p.422). The so-called post-“post-Columbian age would be marked as a world in which everything is interconnected. A global world in which events in one part of the world would have a great influence and have consequences in other parts of the world (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Mackinder 2014). Furthermore, the developments in technology would also play a vital role in Mackinder’s heartland theory. Mackinder argued that due to the new development in traveling over land via railway, previously excluded nation would have the possibility to become a strong and dominant world power (Jones, Jones & Woods, 2004; Ó Tuathail, 1996, Knutsen, 2014). Most importantly, Mackinder developed the heartland theory as an aid to statecraft (Knutsen 2014).

Mackinder’s heartland theory was developed by reorganising the world map politically into three regions. Firstly, the Americas, Africa and the oceans were labelled as outer crescent (Jones, Jones & Woods, 2004). As a British geographer Mackinder wanted to influence British foreign policy and therefore, put less emphasis on the role of the outer crescent. However, his ideas on the outer crescent have played an important role for nations in this region. Secondly, the inner crest was identified as consisting of Europe and South Asia. Lastly, and most important to the heartland theory, the Heartland or so-called the Pivot. The Pivot consisted of the Eurasian land between Eastern Siberia and Eastern Europe (Jones et al., 2004; Mayell,

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2004; Mackinder, 2014). In later work Mackinder further expresses what he believed to be most important in regard to this theory: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-islands: Who rules the world island controls the world” (Mackinder, 1919, p.194). The direct implication of his theory was aimed towards the British government to prevent Germany to become allies with Russia, as this would disrupt the balance of power of the European continent (Hughes & Heley, 2015).

In reaction to Mackinder’s heartland theory Spykman (1942) developed a similar theory in order to relate it to the foreign policy of the United States. A combination of Mahan’s sea power and Mackinder’s inner crest determines his theory (Murphy, 2015). The rimland, which can be understood as the inner crest, contains the “primary engine of international power” (Gray, 2015, p.887). Opposing Mackinder, Spykman (1942) believed that in future conflicts sea power and land power had to be linked as they were previously in the 19th and 20th century (Fettweis, 2015). Secondly, Spykman (1942) believed that the European continent should not be controlled by one entity, but rather by two entities including states or allies (Gray, 2015, p.888). Spykman’s rimland theory would play an important role in the next 60 years, during the Cold War. It could be argued that the United States followed the rimland theory throughout the years of the Cold War by involving themselves in European affairs post World War II(Ó Tuathail, 1996; Gray, 2015).

4.2.The End of Classical Geopolitics

Besides the Anglo-American geopolitics, which generated greatest interest, Geopolitik has also played a vital role in the developments of geopolitics as a whole. The most prominent figure in Geopolitik is Karl Haushofer. According to Haushofer, geopolitics consists of the study of the state as an “organism” and the competition among different state organism for living space: Lebensraum (Herwig, 1999). The main goal of creating a German school of geopolitics, including the creation of a geopolitical journal, was to educate the German youth after the World War I in recognizing the potential of the space surrounding them. Haushofer believed that Germany’s main problems after World War I, were related to the “lack of broadness of thought” (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.37). In this Haushofer was influenced by Mackinder’s writings on a Russian-German alliance to gain power over the heartland and in addition, gain economic sufficiency, and counter the dominant sea power Britain, as well as the growing maritime power of the United States by allying with Japan (Herwig, 1999). Similar to the writings of

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Mahan and Mackinder, Geopolitik was focused on the German perspective and therefore, involved the unity of the German people (Herwig, 1999). The five main concepts that can be observed from Haushofer his works are: Lebensraum, autarky, pan-regions, lands power versus sea power and, frontiers.

Nonetheless, the role Haushofer played in the rise of the Nazi party in Germany in the 1930s made Geopolitik associated with Hitler’s ideals. Haushofer was affiliated to the Nazi party through his social contacts, of which Rudolf Hess would play a vital but also an evil link between himself and Hitler. As early as 1919, Hess became a student of Haushofer and followed him closely in his writings. Haushofer met Hitler for the first time at the wedding of Hess (Herwig, 1999). Following this first meeting, Haushofer visited Hess and Hitler at the Landsberg prison and shared key writings that played a vital role in the developments of Geopolitik such as writings of Clausewitz and Ratzel and facilitated discussions about geopolitics (Knutsen, 2015). The five main concepts of Haushofer mentioned in the previous paragraph are echoed in Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Besides personal links with Hitler, the German Academy of which Haushofer was president between 1933 and 1937, also had a negative role in the perception towards classical geopolitics. the German Academy became known as the most prominent body to influence the Nazi party as well as achieving goals set by the party (Herwig, 2016).

Although Haushofer’s ideas were prominent in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Haushofer has wrongly been accused to be the brain behind German geopolitics in World War II (Murphy, 2014). Haushofer criticized Hitler for invading Russia and breaking the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which brought an end to his career as an advisor to the Academy, yet Haushofer kept publishing ideas and finding on geopolitical matters (Knutsen, 2015; Ó Tuathail, 1996). The developments of geopolitics and its association with Nazism made geographers in Europe and the United States avoid the discipline for the next decades (Dodds, Kuus & Sharp, 2013).

4.3.The Rise of Critical Geopolitics

After World War II geopolitics was removed from the academic world, however, several attempts in the first decades after the war were made to re-engage with the discipline. Although less academics identified themselves as geopoliticians or political geographer, the study of political geography was shifted to a somewhat new approach to examine new geopolitical circumstances. Within this new approach the individual state was examined through the study

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of “spatial morphology, internal organization, locational characteristics and boundaries of the state” (Murphy, 2015, p.375). American geographer Richard Hartshorne played an important role in this development by promoting the “functional approach” (Jones et al., 2004, p.7). Popularity for the discipline remained low which can be traced back to the history of the study but also the shortcomings of the approach. Firstly, political geography, unlike other disciplines in the geography, did not develop along with the quantitative revolution in the late 1960s. Secondly, political geography, in the 1960s, was only taught at a small number of universities and colleges due to the lack of interest (Jones, et al., 2004). Political geography seemed to have disappeared from the academic spectrum, however, Muir (1976) concluded that political geography, among the geographer was “an underdeveloped branch of geography that should increase in importance” (p.196), which marked the start of new development in the discipline.

The beginning of a shift in geopolitics can be observed by the rise in a more theoretical approach which challenged the classical geopolitical order as well its functional approach (Jones et al., 2004; Storey, 2009). Furthermore, the period of decolonialization in the 1960s and 1970s played a significant role in theoretical development for the later created critical geopolitics. Radical scholars in France and the United States in particular lead to an important re-adjustment in theorizing geopolitics. Yves Lacoste’s La Géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre (Geography is first and foremost about making war) examined the functioning of “geography as a discipline that supported both an imperial order overseas and a capitalist order at home” (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.44). Most important, Lacoste, among others, assisted in the politicization of geographical knowledge and the study of space as socially produced marking the start of a critical post-structuralist approach in geography (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Murphy, 2015).

The new critical approach followed the works of post structuralists Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha (Woodward et al., 2009). Foucault (1980) in particular played a vital role in developing critical geopolitics (Agnew, 2013; Kuus, 2017). Two elements within the work of Foucault (1980) are important according to several critical geopoliticians: Firstly, the redefinition of the term discourse. According to Foucault (1980), discourse is the collection of social practices that define the world, but which are dynamic as well as contested. As such discourse is used to set out the way we perceive things. The social practices include ideas, beliefs as well as understandings on the way we act (Jones et al., 2004). Secondly, it is argued that Foucault’s relationship between power and knowledge serves an even more important element in the development of critical

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geopolitics. According to Foucault (1980), power and knowledge cannot be separated from each other (Sharp, 2009; Kuus, 2017). Foucault (1980) states that “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (p.52). Following this line of thought, then knowledge is created by a power play between different actor and therefore, discourse is a representation of ideas and beliefs that give meaning to something and thus, sets out a framework of how reality is perceived (Moisio, 2015; Kuus, 2017). In this approach power represses but also produces. It produces new “actions, events, agents and outcomes” (Berg, 2009, p.216).

Geopolitics was widely influenced by Foucault’s ideas as well as other social sciences which lead to the creation of a new subsequent discipline: critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics focusses on how the world is created through discourse by those who produce knowledge and therefore, not necessary create truth but a representation of reality (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992).

4.4.Critical Geopolitics

The new (sub)discipline of political geography was recognized in the late 1980s through several publication which focused on geopolitics itself in combination with post structuralist analysis. The name critical geopolitics was given to the (sub)discipline in the early 1990s under the influence of a paper written by Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992) titled Geopolitics and Discourse. Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992) believed that Geography is a “social and historical discourse” (p.192) which links it directly with questions of politics and ideology. Therefore, discourse becomes a form of power knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992). From these assumptions Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992) define geopolitics as “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (p.192). As part of their new approach to geopolitics they propose four theses concerning reasoning and the intellectuals of statecraft. Firstly, statecraft can be defined as a set of social practices (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992). Therefore, geopolitical reasoning is observed as a process of representation by the “intellectuals of statecraft” (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992, p.194) that fill the world with events and issues. Secondly, geopolitical reasoning is of a practical form, which can be defined as the reasoning of those peoples involved in statecraft such as statespersons, politicians, and military leaders. Thirdly, in order to understand the geopolitical reasoning, one needs to engage in a thorough study on how geopolitical knowledge is produced

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through a variety of mediums and how this in turn is reflected in the geopolitical reasoning of intellectuals of statecraft. Lastly, to understand the geopolitical reasoning it must be understood in the context of the modern world political system. Therefore, one state may be highly influenced by a hegemonic state and those who work within the world power may define what world politics is about (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992; Ó Tuathail & Dalby, 1998; Dodds, 2007).

Critical geopolitics treats the production of geopolitical discourse as a significant part of politics rather than an objective reality (Dodds & Sidaway, 1994). Discourse becomes part of everyday politics by constructing a certain significance to particular geographical areas which may be linked to various interests. The link between critical geopolitics and geopolitical economy is easily made as both share a number of characteristics. Firstly, not only states hold a strong position in international politics, but also multinational companies and non-governmental organisations play an important role in the modern political system. The interest of states may therefore be perceived to be in relation to the world economic system. Secondly, national interest may be influenced by minority interest within the state, such interests are often affected by political reasons. Thirdly, international relations are often regarded as a diplomatic and political arena, however, critical geopolitics and geopolitical economy may determine that international relations are affected by the economic interaction between the states (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Dodds, 2007; Kuus, 2017). The wide spectrum in which critical geopolitics can operate is further emphasized in its functionalities inside but also outside the state. It not only functions within the territorial ground of state crafters but also in non-territorial ground as has been shown by the similarities with geopolitical economy. Critical geopolitics does not focus on the “‘real’ sources, meaning or limits of state sovereignty” (Dodds, Kuus & Sharp, 2013, p.8) but rather focusing on the variety of actors involved.

Furthermore, critical geopolitics in its early years of establishment was greatly influenced by Said’s Orientalism (1978). The imaginative geographies and the way the West portrayed themselves against the Orient is of particular interest for critical geopolitics. Said (1978) highlighted the element of the other, which suggest that the West is better than the East. Moreover, the geopolitical images of the other were framed within the colonial discourse and therefore giving a reality made by intellectuals of statecraft (Sharp, 2009). Said’s Orientalism (1978) played a vital role for an important element within critical geopolitics developed by Simon Dalby: spatial exclusion. Spatial exclusion may be interpreted as otherness, which Dalby argues is inherently in the analysis of discourse (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Dalby (1990) claims that “specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and crucially a political act; it

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constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (p.7). Dalby (1990) thereby describes that the self and the difference is part of the production of geopolitical discourse.

Critical geopolitics is divided in three strands: popular, practical and formal geopolitics. Each category corresponds to the geopolitical reasoning. Formal and practical geopolitics were first described by Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992). Formal geopolitics is formed by the strategic community across a state or a group of states. The strategic community are academia including classical geopolitical thinkers and the actors that publish ideas and theories to the public that are often inclined to follow practical geopolitics. Practical geopolitics is understood as the direct actors to statecraft. These actors include politicians, military personnel, and states people who are involved in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Lastly, popular geopolitics is found within popular culture. Popular culture in this form is defined as all sorts of media including mass market magazines, novels and movies that try to define local, national, regional, and wide world events (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail & Dalby, 1998; Dittmer & Dodds, 2008; Agnew, 2013). All three forms are intertwined as one effects the other. Furthermore, it illustrates the wide spectrum in which critical geopolitics can be applied to and how discourse can be analysed within each form of geopolitics.

4.5.Critique to Critical Geopolitics

Critical geopolitics is seen as a large field of analysis and consequently, critics have argued critical geopolitics lacks detail (Kelly, 2006; Sharp, 2009; Dalby, 2010). Thrift (2000) argues that critical geopolitics wants to achieve a range of things but not engage in the further analysis and therefore leave out the little things. Discourse, according to Thrift (2000), remains an important aspect of geopolitics, however, the “arena of words” (p.383) should play a more important role. The geopolitical implication that small words as “us”, “we”, “the” and “them” (Thrift, 2000, p.384–385) may have a larger impact on geopolitical powers and discourses. Secondly, Thrift (2000) calls for objects and the human body to play a more important role within critical geopolitics but also the function of those who have the greatest effect on the intellectuals of statecraft within their respective departments. Feminist political geographers support these arguments and therefore, call for a further “embodiment of the people” (Sharp, 2009, p.362) who are part of the discourse. Therefore, discourse analysis should be taken

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further by analysing how the “concepts and ways of being are taken up and used by people” (Sharp, 2009, p.362) who define these in the different context they operate in.

Secondly, the element of discourse is criticized by various scholars. Müller (2010) identifies the lack of discourse analysis of foreign policy within the critical geopolitical field. Ó Tuathail (2002) acknowledges these critiques and argues that due its lack of proper methodological path discourse analysis is lacking within the field, however, does encourage others to join him in finding a methodology for discourse analysis within the critical geopolitical field. Simultaneously, the focus on foreign policy is widely criticized for its limited area of analysis. By analysing discourse, it lacks the further political practice outside of discourse (Dalby, 1996; Kelly, 2006; Sharp, 2009; Dalby, 2010). Furthermore, Müller (2008) and Power and Campbell (2010) contend that discourse is more than only textual representation which is analysed in critical geopolitics. As discourse is undertheorized in critical geopolitics, they argue that critical geopolitics should be analysed not only through textual representation but also the practice of creating such texts as part of geopolitical activity.

Critical geopolitics will provide a better insight on how the EU views the Eastern Neighbourhood. Scholars have provided research on this matter already, however mainly by looking at the way the EU has put words to actions, the various ways the EU has provided support for the Eastern Neighbourhood, and a thorough analysis of the EaP. Research using critical geopolitics are lacking, in particular by analysing practical geopolitics. This research will engage with practical critical geopolitics. By looking at foreign policy discourse, this research will show how the EU and participating actors want to act, and view relations in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Rather than looking at the challenges this encompasses in the Neighbourhood, this research will focus on the reasoning behind certain decision in the process of further integration with the Eastern Neighbourhood and avoid further tensions with Russia and the impact on EU relations of these decisions.

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5. Methodology

As discussed in the previous chapter, an important element of critical geopolitics is discourse. However, the call for further engagement with a methodological discourse analysis within foreign policy and general geopolitics has remained unanswered (Ó Tuathail, 2002; Ó Tuathail, 2004; Müller, 2008). Although critical geopolitics concerns itself with discourse, a thorough methodology on how to engage with discourse analysis or any other analysis that incorporates discourse has not been set out. Discourse, as a concept, remains the core of the study, and in the last two decades more scholars have justified the importance of discourse within the study (Murphy, Bassin, Newman, Reuber & Agnew, 2004; Ó Tuathail, 2004). In reaction to the critique critical geopolitics have received in the recent decade Müller (2008, 2010) has developed an interaction between discourse as language and practice. This approach therefore advocates for the analysis of discourse according to Foucault (1980) but also correspond to the call of Dodds (2001) to be attentive to social practices of such discourse. This chapter first outlines the interpretation of discourse within critical geopolitics. Followed by the explanation of the chosen methodology of critical discourse analysis and the operationalization of this method for this thesis is explained.

Discourse within critical geopolitics is defined in the early works of Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992), Ó Tuathail (1996), and Dalby (1990; 1991). Agnew and Ó Tuathail (1992) define discourse as “sets of capabilities people have, as sets of social cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities” (p.192). Furthermore, “they are a set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful whole” (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992, p.193). Geopolitical discourses are then used and interpreted by officials and leaders or the so-called intellectuals of statecraft to represent world politics and affairs (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 2002). Space within this representation is essential and therefore, the use of space is the use of discourse. Those who are at the centre of power and authority reimagine and rewrite Space (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Critical geopolitics therefore “deconstructs, unravel and expose discourses” (Dodds & Sidaway, 1993, p.518) to expose the power structure as well as determine how and why such representation is created (Müller, 2008). Within this definition several points are important to note: Firstly, the role of the individuals is important. They shape discourses, use them and then position them strategically to pursue given interests. Discourse is defined as a socio cognitive phenomenon and looks at people and how things are communicated and processed (van Dijk,

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2010). Thirdly, the definition focusses on the construction of meaning which indicates a “actors and action-oriented concept” (Müller, 2008, p.325). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, discourses set out the rules and resources that determine human action and as such “rather than sovereign subjects having discourse, discourses constrain and enable subject positioning” (Ó Tuathail, 2002, p.606).

In accordance with the above-described definition of discourse, and by the call of critics to further engage with foreign policy within critical geopolitics this thesis will follow a discourse analysis that suits this definition best. Discourse analysis within critical geopolitics is seen as a medium for the construction and reproduction of meaning in international relations (Aalto, 2013). By acknowledging that geopolitical narratives are “complex and non-hierarchical” (Omelicheva, 2016, p.712) this study focusses on the practical side of geopolitics. Practical geopolitics focusses on the production and operation of foreign policy which may give further information of the reasoning of the foreign policy makers to engage with specific discourse (Agnew & Ó Tuathail, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 2002). Dittmer (2010) argues that discourse analysis involves two processes: The ways in which claims of a discourse are made must be examined and the power and positionality of the constructer(s) of the discourse must be analysed in order to be contextualized. An important aspect within this approach is the intertextuality. Intertextuality examines the interconnection between ideas, actions and speech indicating that every text or speech is connected to other factors and therefore, the context in which the discourse is constructed becomes an important element within discourse analysis.

Since discourse sets out a framework on how reality is perceived, it is important to closely examine the claims that create reality (Kuus, 2017). To study these claims Bryman (2012) suggest paying attention to rhetorical detail. Bryman (2012) argues that this entails a “sensitivity” (p.538) to the way in which arguments are constructed. The emphasis here lays on linguistic devices such as metaphors, analogies, and irony, play in the formulation of arguments. Simultaneously, it looks at the way in which arguments are placed in speeches or written texts. By following Fairclough’s (1993) understanding of text, any written or spoken product, this thesis looks at both written texts in the form of foreign policy documents, as well as speeches, interviews, and other pieces of texts that are related to political or governmental statements that are representative for this study. Lastly, within this discourse analysis the notion of deconstruction plays a vital role. Deconstruction, aims to analyse how claim are made with

the assumption that texts are different in the way they signify and thus, describe reality (Barnett, 2009). Deconstruction can therefore be used to outline three important components in the

From Ukraine to Armenia A Critical Geopolitics Approach to EU Foreign Policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood

From Ukraine to Armenia

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