Framing (Islamic) Terrorism: An Analysis of Terrorism Discourse in Dutch News Media

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Framing [Islamic] Terrorism

An Analysis of Terrorism Discourse in Dutch News Media

MA Thesis – Television and Cross Media-Culture (UvA) Author: Nynke Haarsma

Supervisor: dhr. dr. J.A.Teurlings Second Reader: mw. dr. J.C. Hermes

Date of Completion: 26-06-2017 Word count: 18.433

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Abstract

This study investigates the framing of Islamic terrorism in the Dutch news coverage of three terrorist attacks that happened between 2016 and 2017. By conducting a theoretical and textual analysis, this thesis argues that terrorism is not a neutral term, but rather a politically charged concept that has obtained its meaning by the specific approach to and representation of the concept by academic, political and media institutions. In the first chapter, it is argued that defining terrorism is problematic and that the conceptualization of the term derives (mostly) from a political perspective. The research continues with arguing that in the discourses of terrorism multiple Orientalist themes can be identifie d. The third and last chapter of the thesis constitutes a theoretical framework on the framing of news. Next to that, a textual analysis of Dutch news coverage of three distinctive attacks conducted by the authoritarian news broadcaster NOS is provided. This thesis makes clear that the framing of Islamic terrorism is embedded in the Orientalist discourse which is consequently reaffirmed and reinforced by the particular representation of terrorist attacks by the NOS.

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Introduction

June 3, 2017 – A white van hits pedestrians on the Tower Bridge in London. June 10, 2017 – A black car drives into a crowd of people at the Central Station of Amsterdam. June 19, 2017 – A car drives into a group of Muslims who just came out of the Finsbury Mosque after their evening prayers. At first sight, these events seem the same: a car hits a crowd of people. However, the characteristics of all three events are particularly different. The attack on the Tower Bridge was part of a large-scale attack by Muslim extremists who pledged allegiance with terrorist group ISIS. The incident on the Central Station of Amsterdam was caused by a man who became unwell and was not aware of his actions. The attack on the Mosque was perpetrated by a white male from the U.K. who had extreme-right sentiments.

Within a month, three accounts of the same kind of event took place in the U.K. and the Netherlands. However, the three events are all characterized in a completely different way: one being Islamic terrorism on randomly chosen citizens, one being an accident and one being a direct attack on Muslims. Although the attacks are all equally severe in essence, the difference in the characterization of the events is made clear in the response from the media and the public. The Islamic terrorist attack fits within the profound Orientalist discourses that are at work in society which makes the

characterization of the event simple: it is just another attack of extreme Muslims on Western values. The accident on the Central Station of Amsterdam directly aroused questions like “Is this the terrorist attack the Netherlands have been waiting for?” When it eventually appeared that it was ‘just’ an accident, there was in instant reaction of ‘relief’ (as argued by Patrick Meershoek in Het Parool) and the seriousness of the event seemed to decrease. The attack on the Mosque in London however, was more difficult to characterize. Since the attack was not perpetrated by a Muslim-extremist, the question aroused how this attack needed to be classified since there was not a clear framework of knowledge to which the media and the public could relate this event to.

After the attack on the Mosque in London, the debate on the representation of terrorism by the media sharpened. Patrick van IJzendoorn (Volkskrant) quotes the question of a young Muslim who just survived the attack: “How do we call a white terrorist, a Christian-terrorist? An atheist terrorist?” (transl. from Dutch). By asking this question, the young Muslim points to the fact that ‘a terrorist’ is not a neutral term. If one uses the term ‘Islamic terrorist’, then should there also be a Christian-terrorist? With the stream of attacks conducted by adherents of ISIS (amongst many others: Paris 2015, Brussels 2016, Manchester 2017), it almost seems that Muslim extremist have a sole right on conducting terrorist attacks. However, as IJzendoorn points out, there are solely in the U.K. already 18 accounts of reported “islamophobian” attacks since 2005. Although IJzendoorn wants to stress here that not only Muslims conduct attacks, he uses a particularly different word to conceptualize the attacks on Muslims, namely ‘Islamophobia’. Hereby he not only fails to acknowledge that this is also a form of terrorism, but he also stresses that it comes from a ‘fear’, rather than a rational reason.

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7 The debate on how to conceptualize terrorism not only takes place in the media but also in the

academic field. Multiple scholars have argued that defining terrorism is problematic (a.o. Cooper and Merali), and others claimed that terrorism has gained an undeniable connotation with Islam (a.o. Hoffman and Kemerli). While the Western world (Europe and America) has experienced an extensive amount of ‘terrorist’ attacks in recent years, the attention for the subject emerged. How does one need to conceptualize terrorism? What counts as a ‘terrorist’ attack?

Since there is no consensus on the conceptualization of the term, it can be argued that terrorism is an all but neutral term. It would be an impossible goal to compose an all-encompassing definition. It is rather in the construction of the term by multiple actors (politicians, academics, and media contributors), that the underlying structures of power that cause the dominant discourses on terrorism can be identified. This thesis intents to expose the particular construction of the terrorism discourse.

Although there has been wide attention for the representation of terrorism, there has not yet been a research focussed on the Dutch context. Kim Powell for example conducted a research on the representation of terrorist attacks in the U.S. after 9/11. Her findings were remarkably interesting, in that she argued that the representation of the Islamist terrorist is particularly different than the

representation of any other perpetrator. This thesis continues with this line of research by focussing on a different research object, namely the Netherlands. In the three chapters this thesis contains, I argue that terrorism is not a neutral term, but rather a politically-charged concept that has obtained its meaning by the specific approach to and representation of the concept by academic, political and media actors. The three chapters of this thesis all contain a different aspect and I will now briefly discuss what each chapter entails.

In order to get a sense of what terrorism is, the first chapter starts with an elaboration on the conceptualization of the term. As will be made clear in the beginning of the chapter, defining terrorism is never a neutral endeavour since it is influenced by the perspective of the one who is constructing the definition (most of the time state institutions). Furthermore, I elaborate on the connection of terrorism with Islam. By discussing multiple researches conducted by other scholars, I argue that one should always be aware of the perspective of the institution that constructed the definition. Moreover, I argue that orientalist themes can be identified in the conceptualization of terrorism.

The second chapter continues with this notion of Orientalism and elaborates on the theory-writing on Orientalism. In the first paragraph, a basic understanding of Orientalism is established. In the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss the relation between Orientalism and Islam and Islamic terrorism. It becomes clear that Orientalist discourses have prevailed over centuries and that the ‘We’ vs. ‘Them’ distinction can be identified in the conceptualization of terrorism and especially Islamic terrorism.

The particular representation of terrorism is further analysed, by pointing to the influence of media on the construction and reinforcement of terrorism discourses. I start with an elaboration on the

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8 role of the media in the construction of dominant ideas by focussing on the theories of news framing. In order to expose this representation, I provide a textual analysis of Dutch news coverage of three distinctive attacks conducted by the authoritarian news broadcaster NOS. All three attacks could count for a terrorist attack. However, as will be underlined in the third chapter, the particular difference in the representation of the attacks is noteworthy.

Although the scale of this thesis is too limited to make any all-encompassing statements about the construction of terrorism, this thesis intends to be a starting point for further research. As will be made clear in the following chapters, it is highly relevant to look at the way in which terrorism is conceptualized since this is not a natural thing but rather a socially constructed endeavour. In the current age in which more and more violent attacks are executed, the fear of terrorism emerges and the debate on terrorism sharpens, it is necessary to take a step back and analyse how discourses of terrorism are constructed. This thesis attempts to do exactly that.

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Chapter 1: The problem with defining terrorism

If one would ask a group of people what their idea of terrorism is, it would likely contain similar aspects. However, in all probability these conceptualizations would not be exactly the same. Of course, a definition can be variable and change over time. Yet, in the case of terrorism the different

definitions come from a wide-range of perspectives and interests, namely academic, political or social-cultural, which explains the ongoing public debate on the conceptualization of the term.

Although terrorism has gained renewed attention in the media and political debate in the current decennium, the concept has an extended and rich history. In the academic field, there are plenty of scholars who dedicated their work on the conceptualization of terrorism. According to multiple authors, one should take lessons from the history of terrorism for conceptualizing the term and creating counter strategies. Chaliand and Blin argue in their extensive book The History of

Terrorism that “[…] terrorism, the principal aim of which is to terrorize, is a historically far broader

phenomenon than suggested by the term’s current usage, which essentially boils it down to the description or analysis of the illegitimate use of violence in terrorist-type activities” (xxxvi). What is noteworthy in Chaliand and Blin’s observation is that the prevailing notion of terrorism is circular. Obviously, terrorism is violence in “terrorist-type” activities, but what does this mean? Moreover, it is not clear when and why the use of violence is deemed ‘illegitimate’. This is directly linked with the legislation of a state or other political institution (like the UN). Chaliand and Blin inexplicitly argue here that definitions of terrorism depend on the specific perspective of the one writing the definition. Although an elaboration on the history of terrorism potentially provides a great insight in the conceptualization of the term, the task is simply too extensive and does not contribute to the purpose of this thesis. What is of more value, is an analysis of the process of defining terrorism by political and academic institutions. Especially the interests of the government in the conceptualization of the term are noteworthy and important to conceive. In the second paragraph of this chapter, I elaborate on terrorism’s relation to religion and in particular its relation to Islam. In recent years, terrorism seems to be irrefutably connected with Islam following the attacks of 9/11 in the public’s mind. Although ‘terrorist’ attacks are not only executed by Muslim extremists (also right-extremist or nationalists), the media seems to focus on attacks that have a radical Islamic background.

However, I start with a more detailed discussion on the different processes of defining

terrorism by various political institutions, as discussed by scholars. It is important to designate what’s in the interest of the government while defining terrorism because it takes part in constructing

dominant discourses that are active in media and subsequently society.

1.1 Political accounts of terrorism

What one means with a ‘terrorist’ can consequently mean a range of things. As Cooper has rightly claimed: “One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” (883). However, whatever one

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10 of the time affect members of society, it has a strong emotional connotation which complicates

defining the term according to Merali: “Usually, people use the term as a disapproving label for a whole range of phenomena that they do not like, without bothering to define precisely what

constitutes terroristic behaviour” (12-3). Terrorism can for example point to state violence against its citizens, state violence against other states or freedom fighter’s usage of violence against a state (13).

However, not only an emotionally engaged point of view on terrorism causes disparate understandings of terrorism. It seems that also political institutions fail to come up with a unanimous definition. According to Chaliand and Blin “the issue tends to be confused by ideological

interpretations, along with the temptation, especially on the part of governments, to resort to

diabolical imagery whenever the term is trotted out” (2). Hence, both social and political actors agree upon the negative connotation of the term. Yet, this is just one part of the conceptualization of terrorism. Since there is a wide range of what people consider to be ‘bad’ and accordingly define as ‘terrorism’, a quite various set of violent accounts may be defined as terrorism.

It seems an impossible goal to create a clear definition of terrorism. The purpose of this thesis is therefore not to come up with an accurate definition, but rather to get a sense of what terrorism possibly entails. Especially the perspective of the one who developed the definition is in the interest of this thesis. Therefore, I discuss several academic works on the process of defining terrorism in order to designate the influence these interests have on the definition.

In an attempt to construct a definition of terrorism, quite a few scholars have generated a set of categories to facilitate a proper definition. Merali draws upon a research of Schmid and Jongman who analysed 109 academic and state definitions of terrorism. He concludes that there are three main points that are outlined in these definitions: “(1) the use of violence, (2) political objectives and (3) the intention of sowing fear in a target population” (14). However, a critical note must be made about these qualifications. Although these points characterize the definitions oF terrorism, it may not be true for non-Western definitions since the research only concerned definitions from Western officials and academics. Thereby, it fails to make a clear distinction between terrorist violence and other forms of violence (15). After all, the use of violence by the Nazi’s in the Second World War could also be qualified as terrorism according to this set of characteristics.

Merali chooses to classify the current definition of the U.S. Department of State as the most applicable definition. He explains: “According to this definition, terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (16). What is emphasized in this definition, is that terrorists attempt to influence people. Terrorists are different from guerrilla warriors for example because of the importance of the psychological influence. Although the psychological aspect is also of great importance for guerrilla warriors (e.g. propaganda, recruiting), this will remain a secondary objective (32). Murali argues that “psychological impact is the most essential element in terrorism as a strategy. […] Terrorist groups are small. […] Under such circumstances, the insurgents cannot

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11 expect to win the struggle in any physical way.” Hence, terrorism is characterized by a strategy that aims for a psychological effect.

However, what Murali fails to acknowledge here is that the definition which he suggests to follow, is created by the US – a state. According to Wagner, this has severe complications for the usage of the definition. In her article on ‘New Terrorism’, Wagner draws a line between the Thugs and Assassins of the eighteenth century and terrorist groups in the twenty-first century. History and present times came together when George W. Bush referred to terrorists on several occasions as ‘thugs and assassins’. Wagner argues that although the president might not have known about the historical reference, Bush’ speechwriters most likely did. “Apart from their colloquial connotations (i.e., ‘hoodlums’ and ‘murderers’), both terms derive from, and thus implicitly denote, historical practices vaguely associated with the ‘Orient’” (1). In the following chapter I will elaborate more on the connection with Orientalism, but what is important to point out here is that Bush used terminology that is linked to stereotypes of dark-skinned, turban wearing villains. Wagner argues: “The

terminology thus invokes some of the most pervasive tropes of Orientalism, namely, that of religious fanaticism and irrationality – or, to put it differently, cultural incommensurability with Western ‘enlightened’ modernity” (2). The connection Bush made with a historic group of alleged terrorists points not only to the way in which the history of terrorism is visible today, but also to the way in which the ‘terrorist’ is constructed and characterized by the state. The terrorist is the ‘irrational’ other who does not live up to and tries to destroy western values. Wagner is therefore critical about the definitions that have been created by the state:

There are obviously valid comparisons to be drawn between the past and the present: yet the apparent similarity between chronologically disparate violent practices is mostly due to the manner in which they have been constructed, rather than any inherent affinity. The most obvious historical parallel is accordingly not between the “Thugs” of the nineteenth century and the modern-day “religious terrorists”, but between the type of knowledge produced by colonial officials then and antiterrorism experts now. (12)

What Wagner importantly argues here is that it is mainly the particular construction of the terrorist which leads to a prevailing notion and discourse about a terrorist. Wagner goes on to say that

terrorism experts heavily depend on their account of having a great deal of knowledge about who the ‘enemy’ is, so to legitimize counter-terrorism actions. “This is accordingly a form of knowledge that is defined entirely by its entanglement with politics and thus intrinsically instrumental” (ibid.). Hence, Wagner finds that political institutions (e.g. state governments, international organizations (UN)) use a particular definition to legitimize their actions upon it.

Next to the need for a legitimization of counter-terrorist actions, other objectives of political institutions need to be accentuated. According to Symeonidou-Kastandiou, political institutions like the EU, which she discusses in her article, formulate certain actions as terrorism as a form of symbolism. She argues that states aim at creating “an illusion of safety” for members of society for

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12 whom it is very difficult to cope with the threats. Thereby, states try to obtain “an enhancement of their authority” by executing specific legislative actions (17).

What is interesting about the conceptualization of terrorism by the United Nations, is that the qualification of ‘terrorist acts’ is oftentimes adjusted. In his article “The Islamist Terrorist as the New Universal Enemy”, Pinar Kemerli argues that the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 have had their impact on the debate on terrorism. In analysing UN records and definitions of terrorism, he designates the changed perspectives on terrorism and strategies on how to prevent it from increasing. Chaliand and Blin argue about this:

In the West and elsewhere, however, there is the tendency to label an action “terrorist” when it is deemed to be illegal. This always dangerous confusion between the moral interpretation of a political act and the act itself clouds our understanding of the terrorist phenomenon. An act is deemed “terrorist” when it smacks of fanaticism or when the aims of its perpetrators seem neither legitimate nor coherent”. (7)

In the article of Kemerli, it is clearly argued that the UN had difficulties with defining political violence. In following well-known terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman, he argues that after World War II, terrorism retrieved its historic connotations (3). The label ‘terrorism’ was mostly used for

insurgencies against the colonial ruler. As Hoffman notices, “the distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters came into fashion in this period (60s/70s, not in original) as a result of the political legitimacy the international community accorded to struggles for national liberation” (ibid.). In 1960, The United Nations General Assembly (GA) signed a decolonization declaration in which was stated that all people had a right of self-determination. In 1970, the GA passed another resolution that extended until 1994 in which the UN assured “the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination recognized as being entitled to the right of self-determination to restore to themselves that right by any means at their disposal” (4). Hence, using violence for reasons of political suppression was not deemed to be illegal and therefore no prosecution would follow.

However, in the 1990s the legitimacy granted to the use of violence for self-determination reasons became problematic. With the end of the Cold War, Third Worldism (the independence of a many countries in the ‘third world’) and a capitalist dynamic which caused an objective for many to prevent conflicts, the UN added an article to the resolution in 1994:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. (4)

The political landscape thus influences the legislation and legitimization of (political) violence significantly. The UN transformed the legislation even further in 2001 after the attacks of 9/11. The following resolutions included more legislation on the acts of terrorism which forced the members of the UN to collaborate in the global fight against terrorism. In that way, the political institutions

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13 legitimized their acts against terrorism. Kemerli argues: “In the name of fighting terrorism, a majority of nation-states have thus mandated new laws that infringe on civil liberties, and in some cases, human rights with regards to the treatment of terror suspects and detainees” (5). In practice, this means that governments can for example overhear calls of their citizens to be able to track terroristic ideas.

Although it might seem rightful to sharpen the legislation on terrorism, it must be emphasized that this has at least a two-sided objective. On the one hand, it points to a counter-terrorism strategy. However, on the other hand it is also a way of political institutions to legitimize the actions and means they develop and use which in some instances violates human liberties and rights. Next to that, it is noteworthy to say that political strategies (i.e. spreading preferred discourses, establishing and maintaining particular international relations and propaganda) might also have their influence on decisions that are made. Legislation of in this case terrorism, is therefore never a neutral endeavour and should for that reason not be analysed and conceptualized as such.

The first EU definition of terrorism is stated in the ‘Council Framework Decision’ of 2002. In this decision, as it is called, the EU states agreed upon several matters to include in their legislation. Symeonidou-Kastandiou critically engages with the Council Framework Decision and analyses the EU definition and its interests and consequences. With the establishment of the EU, the union set itself the goal to protect their citizens for any harmful threat with minimal jurisdiction against criminal activities which included terrorism (15). After the attacks of 9/11, the jurisdictional process on

terrorism accelerated within the framework of criminal law. Without borders between the EU member states and due to the increasing use of technology and the internationalization of terrorist groups, the EU needed to work together and construct a clear definition so to be able to constrain it coherently (16). Symeonidou-Kastandiou is critically about the construction of a definition of terrorism for political institutions. She argues that it is questionable whether a definition can be made due to the various forms it can entail. Furthermore, she states:

These doubts are underpinned by the fact that the characterization of an act as ‘terrorist’, one usually involves a politically-based evaluation: the same conduct may or may not be regarded as terrorism depending on the political goals it purports to serve and the political stance of the evaluator. (20)

Hence, it is within the objectives of the definer what causes the classification of an act as terrorism. Symeonidou-Kastandiou goes even further in saying that one should keep in mind that there is a “one-sided interest” for states in fighting terrorism: to protect their own values and citizens (21). The political interests are clearly apparent in that the safeguarding of democratic values is the main objective. Although dictatorial states are granted protection against terrorism, a political act of violence is not defined as terrorism when its objective is to re-establish democracy (23). The EU member states set their own values as the standard and ‘normal’, which is obviously a political and

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14 not neutral endeavour.

According to the Counsil Framework Decision, an act is terrorism when it is a serious threat against the safety of the nation state. It is however, as convincingly argued by

Symeonidou-Kastandiou, difficult to determine what this ‘serious threat’ contains (26). Indeed, the state has many interests (its position in international politics, its authority to rule and judge according to the law, etc.).

Given the ‘multi-faceted nature’ of the object of the attack, it is not clear which one of the legal rights of the State or an international organization must be threatened every time in order to conclude that a serious offence – an attack, for example, against the life or the physical integrity of a person – can be classified as a terrorist offence. (ibid)

What this makes clear is that the process of defining is a political endeavour. Political institutions create a definition that is somewhat open for interpretation. In that way, one can decide per violent act or threat whether it can be defined as terrorism and therefore adheres to a specific part of the law.

In discussing several perspectives on definition, one could argue that it is impossible to create a definition of terrorism that fits everyone’s understanding. Indeed, as Cooper argued, “the central problem in the process is that no two human beings ever see the same thing, however simple, in exactly the same light or from the same standpoint” (882). Therefore, we might need to accept that an overarching definition is not conceivable. According to Cooper, the problem of defining terrorism will always remain and he suggests that the focus needs to be on what is done rather than on the

conceptualization of the phenomenon (ibid.). As Cooper puts it: “We know terrorism well enough when we see it” (892). The author concludes to say that terrorism is an example of a word that cannot be translated in words: “They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Cooper quoting Wittgenstein, ibid.).

Although Cooper might be right about the manifestation of the word ‘terrorism’, it is exactly this manifestation that is not neutral. Obviously, the manifestation of the phenomenon is not only apparent in the actual act, but also in the representation of the act. Exactly this representation can have a great influence on the conceptualization of the term by politicians, academics, media contributors and consequently members of society.

1.2 Terrorism and Islam

As has been argued before, terrorism is according to most academic and political institutions characterized as having a political goal. Thereby, terrorism has another connotation, namely that it relates to religion. However, religious terrorism may have a ‘holy’ objective but in essence religious terrorism also has a political goal. Chaliand and Blin argue in their introduction that “terror in the name of religion, holy terror, is a recurring historical phenomenon” (2). Religion is used to justify and legitimize the means the terrorist group perpetrate. Bruce Hoffman, who is a well-known terrorist scholar, elaborated on the concept of “holy terror” in 1996. He also argues that the link between

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15 terrorism and religion is not new. For example, the ‘Zealots’, ‘Thugs’ and ‘Assassins’ were early accounts of terrorism with a religious motivation (79). Although terrorist groups with ethnic and ideological motives were more dominant for a few decades in the twentieth century, religious terrorism has emerged since that time. Hoffman explains what characterizes holy terror:

What is particularly striking about ‘holy terror, compared with purely ‘secular terror’, is the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world-view that the ‘holy terrorist’ embraces and consequently uses to justify heightened levels of lethality. For the religious terrorist, violence is first and

foremost a sacramental act of divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Religion, therefore, functions as a legitimising force, sanctioning, if not encouraging, wide-scale violence against an almost open-ended category of opponents. (79)

Religion is thus a means of justification for holy warriors. The actions they take are legitimized because it is the duty of god to do so. However, Kim A. Wagner argues that Hoffman characterized holy terrorism as having “no consideration for political efficacy”, but rather a divine duty (3).

However, this conceptualization fails to acknowledge the political objectives of holy warriors. Indeed, holy warriors want to spread their doctrine but in my view, this always contains political implications. In fact, religious terrorists want to impose their ideology and believe to others with using fear and violence as means. This is not only a ‘divine duty’, but has most certainly political implications as well.

Although there are multiple accounts of religious terrorist (Zealots, Assassins, Thugs, Galleanists), the most renowned link between a terrorist and religion is that of the Islamic terrorist. Obviously, this is a consequence of the terrorist groups that are active today, since it is the most recent account of terrorism in contemporary time. However, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the link of terrorism with especially Islam has its roots in colonial history.

The attacks on 9/11 on the Twin Towers have been pointed out as change of perspective on terrorism by multiple scholars. Kemerli argues that the debate on terrorism changed in a moralistic way. The suicide tactic was deemed inhuman by UN officials and they argued that it did not stroke with liberal and democratic values in that it did not match their idea of individual rights (14). This ‘sacrificial violence’ has been constructed as the signature of the Islamic terrorist. Kemerli concludes to say that “these include the idea that Islamist terrorists are particularly disdainful of liberal

democratic values such as liberty, tolerance, and individualism, and are exceptionally prone to morally inferior and inhumane forms of enmity and violence” (14).

This became also apparent in the conceptualization of the violence that was used by

Palestinian groups. Kemerli argues that these groups used suicide attacks already in the 1980 and 90s. However, they were not characterized as being religious. However, after the attacks of 9/11, this characterization changed dramatically. Kemerli states: “

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16 Less than three months after September 11, the Ambassador of Norway linked Palestinian suicide missions to the growing threat of Islamist international terrorism. Drawing parallels between the ‘tragic and appealing events of 11 September’, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Ambassador urged the international community to contain the conflict before it entirely gets ‘out of hand’. (12)

This is an example of the changing political perspective on terrorist groups. First, Palestinian acts of political violence were deemed as being political but after the attacks, it obtained its connotation with religion.

In her article “Framing Islam”, Kimberly A. Powell argues that due to the attacks of 9/11, the counter-terrorist strategy of the U.S. changed into the ‘War on Terror’. The connection between 9/11 and Iraq has repeatedly been stressed by President Bush and the media which created a political climate that supported the invasion in Iraq (90). She argues: “This was the contemporary beginning of an Us versus Them, or the United States versus Islam that created animosity between East and West (Powell and Abadi, 2003) and sustained a climate of fear of terrorism that is linked repeatedly to Muslims” (ibid.). The U.S. government in that way constructed the Islamist terrorist as the threatening enemy.

This has also been acknowledged by Dahlia Schweitzer who designated 9/11 and the following war in Afghanistan as the point from which the ‘Arab’ is treated as the ‘other’ (118). This notion has oftentimes been used as an interesting narrative in the cultural industries. Schweitzer argues that the significant power of networks (think of social media networks and globalization) has created the possibility for terrorism or – to put it differently ‘fear’ – to spread around the world. This makes it particularly hard to avert.

Schweitzer makes an interesting point in the last part of her article: “Without traditional signifiers, like meaningful geographic boundaries or race, gender, language, or cultural differences, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine who deserves suspicion” (123). What is particularly interesting about this, is that this may have led to the creation of a universal enemy in the form of the ‘Arab/Islamist terrorist’. In that way people are able to decide for themselves when they might be in a threatening situation.

In the changed conception of terrorism after 9/11, it becomes obvious that terrorists with religious motives are conceived as political terrorists as well. The objectives of Islamic terrorists and their ideological believes do not fit with Western values. Next to that, the strategy to control terrorist attacks are also political. In creating an Islamist enemy that is uniquely dangerous, political

institutions like the U.S. government can point a finger to the ones they need to fight in order to get support from the members of society. Especially the framing of a particular idea of this terrorist, akes clearly designates the political objectives of the one who is framing. Kim A. Wagner argues about this that: “[…] the contemporary use of manifestly colonial imagery is no longer coincidental nor mere harmless fun. It is, instead, indicative of a distinct political style that elevates cultural stereotypes to

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17 analytical insights and constructs an image of the enemy for political purposes – all on the basis of empirically dubious modes of interpretation” (2). Framing terrorism is therefore never a neutral endeavour since the frameworks of knowledge are controlled by the ones in power – the political institutions of the state, and the media.

As has been argued before, the framing of the terrorist as Islamic is not only due to the fact that the current dominant terrorists have an Islamic ideology. The starting point of this particular framing of the ‘threatening’ Muslim has its roots in the colonial history, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

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Chapter 2: The Orientalist Discourse

As has been outlined in the previous chapter, defining terrorism is complicated. This is mainly due to the fact that there can be no such thing as an objective definition, especially when the concept has implications for multiple fields (e.g. politics, media and society). In the case of terrorism, there is no consensus about what constitutes a terrorist attack and consequently who can be defined as a terrorist. After all, every definition is constructed from a certain perspective and it is especially this difference in perspective what makes defining terrorism an impossible goal. Therefore, the objective of any research should not be to construct an all-encompassing definition of the concept but rather to analyse the particular construction of these various definitions. It needs to be pointed out here that there is not one dominant definition. It is therefore more relevant to look at the discourses of terrorism that are at work in the public sphere to be able to analyse how the different conceptualizations of terrorism and its construction influence the frameworks of knowledge in society.

Whilst defining terrorism is an impossible goal, it can be argued that terrorism has obtained an undeniable connotation with Islam (especially in recent years). As has been touched upon in the previous chapter, this construction of the relation between terrorism and Islam has its roots in colonial history. In order to underline this statement, this chapter elaborates on the theory of Orientalism. I argue that if we look at contemporary discourses on terrorism, many Orientalist and neo-Orientalist themes can be identified. This statement is supported by the three following paragraphs. In the first paragraph, I discuss the academic work on Orientalism to establish a basic understanding of the theory. In order to make the theory relevant for this thesis, I continue with an elaboration on the specific connection (neo)-Orientalism has with Islam in the second paragraph. The chapter ends with an explanation of the influence of Orientalist discourses on the framing of terrorism as Islamic and classifies Orientalist themes that will be analysed in further detail in the third chapter.

2.1 Orientalism

One of the fundamental writers on Orientalism is Edward Said. In the introduction of an interview with Edward Said, professor Sut Jhally argues that the work of Said was very controversial at the time of its publication in 1978 and has since that time proven remarkably influential (Edward Said - On

Orientalism). Orientalism encompasses according to Jhally the way in which people (especially from

Western societies) have a “preconceived notion” about people who live and come from the East (ibid.). Furthermore, Orientalism concerns the power relations between the West and East. Said conceptualized the term as: “A style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (2). In this

characterization, the Orient points to Middle-Eastern and Far-Eastern societies and the Occident as the Western societies (America and Europe). This distinction, according to Said, has been used by a wide range of writers (politicians, poets, philosophers etc.) as a starting point for their writings (2).

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19 Said starts the introduction of his classic book Orientalism by saying that the construction of the Orient was a way for European colonists to define the ‘unknown’ societies. Said argues that: “(Orientalism) had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experience” (1). Next to colonists, also Western missionaries travelled to the East to get to know the Eastern societies, their culture and habits (Newberg, 196). In a way, it was their task to build a bridge between Western and Eastern culture. As Newberg discusses multiple accounts of reports of missionaries, he argues that most perspectives on foreign, unknown societies were negative. He cites one of the missionaries: “After arriving in Jerusalem in 1924, Laura Radford wrote, “All about us are ‘souls in the dark, undone’—the orthodox Jew, the bigoted Moslem, the educated Syrian, the proud Arabian and Egyptian, the wandering, homeless, all alike deeply religious, but how few with a ‘living hope’” (197). What is interesting to point out here, is that the missionary conceptualizes the Eastern societies as quite helpless and ignorant.

In discussing the accounts of the missionaries, Newberg proposes to follow the five concepts of Orientalism identified by Herb Swanso: “Dualism, the other, intimate estrangement, discourses of power and textual attitudes” (196). This collection of theoretical concepts is valuable for

understanding Orientalism. The concept of dualism obviously points to the distinction made between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’. Newberg continues to say that, according to Said, the West created an image of the East that was completely different from their own image: “This image contrasts the “static” qualities of the East (strange, uncivilized, cruel, and exotic) with the “progressive” qualities of the West (dynamic, progressive, enlightened, and humanitarian)” (ibid.). In that way, the West

constructed the East as ‘an other’, totally different society. Furthermore, an ‘intimate estrangement’ can be identified between the West and the East. Although the colonist (or missionaries) had direct contact with the ‘Orient’, they had the preconceived notion that the West was superior (caused by the negative image of the Orient that was constructed). This eventually induced the “dark side of

Orientalism” as Said would call it. As a discourse that misrepresented the true nature of the Eastern societies, Orientalism functioned as a justification for the domination of Western countries over the East since the East was not capable of taking care of its own. This misrepresentation can be identified in texts that are produced about the Orient, such as the reports of the missionaries.

Matthew Scott critically assessed with Orientalism and provided a solid understanding of the theory writing of Said. Scott explains that Said identified two types of writing about the Orient, in which Orientalist themes can be identified, namely academic and literary writing (68-9). Academic writing concerned the gaining of knowledge about the Orient as possible colonial object. However, because the academic writers are not ‘the same’ as their research-object, it complicates them to identify themselves with their objects. Therefore, their notions of the Orient became ‘exotic’ and ‘romanticized’. Literary writers subsequently take over this view of the academics: “Said insists that the literary writers of the nineteenth century repeated the assumption of academic Orientalism and so contributed to a relatively consistent and homogenous discourse about the Orient” (75).

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20 What is important to emphasize here, is that Scott points out that Orientalism must be conceived as a way of Western thinking: “It gradually becomes apparent that Orientalism, as Said uses it, really names a type of thinking about the vague space of the East that is revealed in a large number of texts about it, rather than some inescapable ideology that must necessarily condition all writing about colonial subjects” (67). Hence, it is not so much that Orientalist themes are deliberately put forward by any institution (political or academic), but rather the collection of multiple accounts of the East which all together construct the East as the subordinated ‘other’.

Said emphasized this in the introduction of Orientalism. He argues that Orientalism is not a natural phenomenon, but a man-made thing (5). Therefore, Orientalism must be seen as a discourse that is dominating Western thought:

My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (3)

What Said makes clear here is that Orientalism has a profound influence on the way in which we conceptualize the East as the ‘other’ through the prevailing discourses that are at work. Furthermore, this “managing” of the Orient, points to the fact that Europe was able to politically intervene in the Middle-East by using the ‘backwardness’ of the Orient as a justification for their presence in the East. What is noteworthy to say about this is that according to Said the Orient (area or person) does not exist, but is merely a construction of western thought (3).

Said refers to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to explain the durability of Orientalism. Hegemony points to the fact that: “[…] certain cultural forms predominate over others” (7). This means that when a discourse is constantly embedded in texts and reinforced, the discourse becomes in some way dominant and seems ‘natural’. Moreover, the Orientalist discourse is not particularly about the true characteristics of the Orient, but more about the Western power over the Orient and its effects. Said argues: “The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such real thing as ‘the Orient’ (21). Hence, it is not so much the truthfulness of any representation of the Orient that is important, but rather the way in which the Orient is

represented. This is particularly interesting for the analysis of the representation of terrorist attacks in the Dutch news, which will follow later on in this thesis.

If we take the representation of the Orient as the means to analyse the function of Orientalism, we need to take in account how the Orient is represented. Said claims that: “[…]

One of the important developments in nineteenth-century Orientalism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient – its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant

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21 mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness – into a separate and unchallenged

coherence; thus, for a writer to use the word Oriental was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. (205)

Furthermore, Said argues that discourses of Orientalism construct the Orient as not capable of

representing itself (21). This lack of representation from within the Orient causes the fact that Western writers (academics, journalists etc.) have the power to construct the Orient in a preferred way while not possessing (enough) knowledge of their subject.

The construction of ‘the other’ has been discussed by one of the main theorists in Cultural Studies: Stuart Hall. In “The Spectacle of the ‘Other’”, Hall emphasizes that it is essential to look at stereotyping when analysing the representation of a minority in society. Hall defines this as following: “Stereotypes reduce people to a few simple, essential characteristics, which are represented as fixed by nature” (257). A division is made between on the one hand the ‘normal’ and on the other hand the ‘abnormal’, or ‘Other’ (258). When ‘the other’ is represented, inclusion and exclusion are significant. However, there derives a danger from this, namely that the representation is naturalized: “It

naturalizes the representation to the point where you cannot see that anybody ever produced it” (Hall, Representation & Media 21).

In short, Orientalism functions as an ideology in which the East (mainly the Middle-East) is constructed as a subordinated other which justifies the occupation of the East by the West. It needs to be pointed out here that Orientalism is not a natural endeavour, but rather a combination of various discourses that construct the Orient as ‘other’. These discourses are not only constituted by political actors or institutions, but also in academic and artistic texts such as art, literary and media.

2.2 Neo-Orientalism and Islam

As has been pointed out in the previous paragraph, Orientalism concerns the dealing of the West with the East. However, Said mainly focussed his theory writing on Europe’s interference with the Middle East or Arab world. He mentions in the introduction of Orientalism that his main focus is on the power relations between the West and the Near-East, meaning the Arab World (17). He argues that this can be discussed apart from Orientalism that deals with the Far-East (India, China etc.) because the experience of the Occident was different. As an American-Palestinian writer, he is particularly interested in the demonization of Islam. In the preface of the 2003 edition he argues:

That these supreme fictions (of the Orient) lend themselves easily to manipulation and the organization of collective passion has never been more evident in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent self-pride and arrogance – much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, ‘we’ Westerners on the other – are very large-scale enterprises. (xiii)

Said emphasizes here that Orientalist discourses are profoundly interwoven in Western frameworks of knowledge. If we look at contemporary discourses on the Arab world, Orientalist themes are

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22 identifiable. After the publication of Covering Islam (by Said) in which he discussed the framing of Islam from an Orientalist perspective, there has been much debate on the representation of Muslims and Islam in the media. Manan argues that Muslims are mostly represented in a negative way. She speaks of dominant metaphors about Muslims that contain: “images of primitivity, images of violence and conflict and metaphor of evil and animal metaphors (126). These metaphors emphasize the dominant stereotyping of Muslims. The association with Islam as primitive, evil and violent are naturalized in this way (127).

Tariq Amin-Khan also elaborates on the role of Western media in relation to Orientalist discourses. He states that the Pentagon has renamed the ‘War on Terror’ (which started as a war against wrong-doing into a permanent war), ‘The Long War’. He continues to say that: “Thus, this Long War for Western hegemony has produced a phenomenal rise in anti-Muslim racism in Western societies, which has been considerably aided by the Western media’s coverage of Muslims and the demonization of Islam along Orientalist lines across Europe, North America and Australia” (1595-6). This is according to Amin-Khan due to the “process of securitisation” which is embedded in Western societies (1596). The securitisation functions as a kind of justification for the targeting of Muslims and construction of Muslim males as terrorists. This is also mentioned by Said in the interview with Sut Jhally in saying that: “You have to have threat” (Edward Said – On Orientalism). What he meant by this is that the U.S. is justifying her military force in saying that there is a continuous threat for which the society has to be protected. Therefore, the U.S. continues with constructing an enemy and in this case the Islamic enemy. What is interesting about this, is that the West is still using the

construction of the ‘other’ as justification for their interference. In the colonial time, it functioned as a justification for Western occupation of the East because Eastern societies needed Western values. Now, in the twenty-first century, the construction of the ‘other’ is still used as a justification for interference in the East but more because the Middle-East has become a threat for these Western values.

Amin-Khan proceeds with a discussion on New Orientalism. Although the specific power relations between the West and the Orient are still apparent in New Orientalism, the latter has been changed and is related to the ‘Clash of Civilzations’ narrative which derives from the work of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington in 1996 (1598). Although Lewis first came up with the term,

Huntington continued with the conceptualization of the clash. It originated as a political project in which Huntington argued that there would be a class between Muslims and ‘Confucians’ on the one side and the West on the other. However, this clash has been narrowed down to a clash between the West and Muslims: “Thus, in classical Orientalist style, Huntington considered the trigger for the clash to be the ‘anti-modern’ culture of Muslims (and Chinese) – implying a monolith ‘Muslim culture’ and a singular conception of modernity. This view of Muslims as anti-modern has become ingrained in popular Western attitudes about them and Islam” (1598).

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23 the conceptual framework of New Orientalism, he states:

New Orientalism employs many of the same problematic formulations as Orientalism, but differs most significantly in that it relies on native or semi-native narrators (such as Nafisi) to relate the same kind of problematic generalizations about a region as classical Orientalism had done. While the Old Orientalism over two centuries represented the Orient as the negative opposite of the West morally as well as materially, the New Orientalism confirms/reaffirms this morally deficient representation of the Orient, thereby serving to make that representation authentic and much less likely to be questioned. (245)

What is particularly interesting about this notion of New Orientalism, is that the representation of the ‘other’ is made authentic which might lead to a more truthful reception of this representation for the viewers and readers of texts that contain (new) Orientalist discourses. In that way, Orientalist discourses can remain dominant, without admitting its true nature, namely subordinating ‘the other’.

2.3 Terrorism and the Orientalism discourse

The frameworks of knowledge that derive from New Orientalism logically lead to the connection terrorism has with Islam in contemporary societies. Stephen Morton makes an interesting point about the relation between colonialism (or as Said would say Orientalism) and terrorism: “If Orientalism provides the sovereign power of the colonial state with a discourse of otherness to justify the suspension of the rule of civil law in times of crisis […], the contemporary discourse of terrorism would seem to serve a similar function.” Morton elucidates on this statement by saying that terrorism is oftentimes aroused because of the occupation of a society in for example Afghanistan and Iraq (36). Morton argues in line with Said and Aman-Khan that the framing of the Islamic terrorist is used as a justification for the violence used in wars against Islamic terrorism and the positioning of Muslims.

It is interesting to mention here that this framing of terrorism in relation to Islam becomes even more apparent when there is an example of non-Islamic terrorism (defined as political violence). Kumar mentions the attack of Anders Behring Breivik on a Norwegian island. Although his

objections and attacks fitted the definition of terrorism, he was not ‘quite’ a terrorist as Kumar observes. He therefore justly argues that: “If the westerner kills his fellow civilians, he is a crazy-loner; if an Oriental kills his fellow civilians, he is the good old terrorist; and if the same Oriental kills western civilians, he is the “new” terrorist (234).”

In the preface of the 2003 edition of his book Orientalism, Said interestingly assessed the relation between Orientalism and terrorism. What is particularly interesting about his statement, is that he connects the influence of Orientalism in the construction of Islamic terrorism. He argues:

In the demonization of an unknown enemy, for whom the label “terrorist” serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-9/11 period has

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24 produced. Speaking both as an American and as an Arab I must ask my reader not to

underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for US policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a view in which terror, pre-emptive war, and unilateral regime change – backed up by the most bloated military budget in history - are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishing by a media that assigns itself the role of producing so-called “experts” who validate the government’s general line. (xx)

There are a couple of interesting things that can be taken from this quote of Said. First of all, the Orientalist discourses in the conceptualization of the world can still be recognized. By constructing the enemy with a simple set of characteristics (e.g. ‘backward’, ‘uncivilized’), political institutions are using this preconceived notion as the Arab ‘other’ as a justification for their interference in the area. While in the colonial time the East was conceived as ‘subordinated’, the East has now in the twenty-first century received the label of ‘threat’. In both ways, the West is in a superior position.

Furthermore, Said argues that the media is reinforcing the dominant discourses on (Islamic) terrorism and thereby supports the actions of Western governments. However, what is maybe the most

interesting about the connection between terrorism and Orientalism is that Orientalist discourses make the conceptualization of terrorism accessible for the public. As has been pointed out in the

introduction of this thesis, there is confusion about the characterization of an attack that has not been conducted by a Muslim terrorist. Suddenly, the terrorist is one of ‘us’. It is always more easy to point a finger to someone else which in the case of terrorism is Islam. However, when a terrible attack is perpetrated by a Westerner, it seems to be more difficult to conceptualize since it does not fit with the dominant frameworks of knowledge in Western society.

Said made clear that the media has a profound influence on the construction of Islamic terrorism and its support for policy making. This chapter has made clear that Orientalist discourses simplify the other to a set of characteristics. As Newberg argued, the East is “strange, uncivilized, cruel and exotic” and the West is “dynamic, progressive, enlightened and humanitarian” (196). In the next chapter, I continue with an analysis of these Orientalist themes in the representation of three attacks by the Dutch news broadcaster NOS.

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Chapter 3: Terrorism and news media

By discussing the problem of defining terrorism and the embeddedness of that problem in the

Orientalist structures of power, it has been argued so far that these discourses still have their influence on contemporary society. Although it would be interesting to ask why these discourses that originated in the colonial time have an impact on frameworks of knowledge today, it is perhaps even more relevant to ask how these discourses are constructed and empowered. The focus of the problem with defining terrorism was mainly on the political aspect. However, not only politics have the power to support a preferred ideology. Media and especially news media form a “cornerstone institution in our democracies”, as de Vreese puts it (2005) (51). With a daily, even hourly update on what is going on in the world, the media counts as a primary source for knowledge in society. This role has even risen due to the technological improvements which has caused a 24-hour news cycle.

This chapter therefore focusses on the role of the media in the manifestation of terrorism and especially the construction of the link with Islam. There has been extensive attention for this subject in the academic field. Kimberly A. Powell for example analysed the news media coverage in the U.S. of eleven terrorist attacks on American soil after 9/11. This third and last chapter aims to do the same, but focusses on the Dutch context which will be briefly characterized later in this chapter.

The last part of this chapter entails an analysis of the Dutch media coverage of three violent attacks, namely the attack on a mosque in Quebec (Canada), the shooting in a gay-club in Florida (U.S.) and the bombing of Brussels airport Zaventem and metro station Maelbeek (Belgium). The different characteristics of these attacks are fairly interesting and will be emphasized before the analysis. The analysis consists of the media coverage of these events by the televised main news medium in the Netherlands: the NOS.

But before I turn to an elaboration on the corpus and subsequently the analysis, it is highly relevant to expand on the relation between terrorism and (news) media. Although terrorism groups oftentimes use media, this thesis will not elaborate on the media strategy of terrorists since it does not support the purpose of this thesis. The focus is instead on the way in which news media approach terrorism which multiple scholars (including Powell) have given attention. Therefore, this chapter starts with a discussion of academic work encompassing the role of news media on the framing, reporting and construction of terrorism.

3.1 Framing terrorism

Multiple academic disciplines make use of the ‘frame-analysis’. The method stems from a

sociological tradition and was generated by Erving Goffman in 1974. Goffman characterized a frame as “an arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity” (10). To put it differently, a frame delimits what can be observed and subsequently, known. Robert Entman continued with the theorization of framing for media research by arguing that it can influence the dominant thinking of people in society (51) and explains: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and

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26 make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (52). A frame in that way highlights a specific, maybe even preferred, part of the story. A frame can consequently ‘define problems’ in articulating the up- and downsides of a problem, related to the dominant cultural values. Furthermore, it ‘diagnoses causes’ which specifies the powers or persons that are accountable for the problem. Then, a frame can ‘make moral judgements’ by designating the actions of different agents in the problem and ‘suggests remedies’ that could solve the fore-hand problem (ibid).

Claes Vreese used frame-analysis in his attempt to elaborate on media framing in Europe. He characterizes Goffman’s method as following: “[…] (it) discusses the organization and classification of life experiences in general” and argues that although the method was not specifically intended for media research, it can be of great value for exposing the construction of events by the media (2003) (22). Other scholars have for example argued that small differences in the representation of ‘reality’ can have major implications for the understanding of events for members of society (ibid.). Vreese later on continues with an elaboration on the specific ‘locations’ where the framing process is active that was explicated by Entman (1993). These four locations are respectively the communicator, the text, the receiver and culture (Entman, 52). The communicator has the ability to, whether knowingly or not, influence the framing based on his or her own background and perspective. The text consists of specific chosen words, which may include or exclude certain parts. The receivers, on their part, can be influenced by this specific framing. However, the perspective of the receiver can also alternate what is taken from the text. Lastly, the culture wherein the other three locations are embedded, “is the stock of commonly invoked frames” which are inhabited in the frameworks of knowledge in society (ibid.). It is in this ‘stock’ of knowledge, that Orientalism is embedded. Although the purpose of this thesis is not to analyse what receivers get from a specific text, it is relevant to point out here that framing takes place in several distinctive but related processes. If a communicator is expressing his or her judgment, the text will consequently be constructed in a different way. Furthermore, if a particular construction remains dominant, it will influence the culture and might accordingly change the structures of knowledge for members of society.

In another article on framing, Vreese emphasizes the framing process of news media. He argues that the specific approach of a media institution can influence the public opinion on a subject, especially with news media (2005) (51). According to Vreese “communication is not static, but rather a dynamic process that involves frame-building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience)” (ibid). Media are therefore active in the process of creating a specific frame but also in how this frame interacts with the knowledge members of society already have. However, Entman emphasizes that frames not per se influence the way of thinking of members of society (53). It is rather more a possibility than an absolute result. Yet this possible effect is enough to make research on the framing by news media relevant.

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27 the public in their book Framing Terrorism. In the introduction of the book, the authors also designate the power of news media in the creation of public opinion and thinking on a subject (3). Especially in the case with subjects that encompass a great controversy like terrorism, it is questionable whe ther journalists are able to live up to the standards such as objectivity and balance (ibid). The authors argue that the debate around the news coverage of terrorism can be narrowed down to two questions:

Does media coverage err on the side of group terrorists, lending them legitimacy and credibility, as well as unintentionally encouraging further incidents through a ‘contagion’ effect? Alternatively, do journalistic conventions err instead on the side of governments, due to an overreliance upon the framework of interpretation offered by public officials, security experts, and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they implement? (ibid.)

This tension between on the one hand empowering terrorist by giving them a stage but on the other hand supporting political institutions by creating a certain public opinion, brings journalism and news media in a difficult situation. After all, journalism has a considerable role in democracy, as Vreese and others argued. The task encompasses informing the public, questioning political acts and be critical at all times.

Norris et al. argue that after 9/11 the perceptions on terrorism in the media drastically changed. They noticed that although the actual threat for terrorism in the U.S. has decreased since 9/11, the fear of another attack has increased to a high level (4). This is also acknowledged by Nellis and Savage who did a research on the implications of media coverage of terrorism for the feeling of fear amongst U.S. citizens. The authors found that there is a positive effect between the hours of watching news on terrorism and the level of fear that is experienced. It is therefore important to critically engage with the frameworks of power that generated this increased fear since this has implications for a.o. racial (in)equality in society and foreign policy (Norris et al, ibid.). The book provides an analysis of the way in which news media frame terrorism. According to the authors “out of the myriad ways of describing events in the world, journalists rely upon the familiar news frames and upon the

interpretation of events offered by credible sources to convey dominant meanings, make sense of the facts, focus the headlines, and structure the story line” (ibid.). Despite the different characteristics of every terrorist attack (perpetrator(s), its objectives, location, scale), the representation of these events will most likely follow the construction of previous events that are comparable. However, this is not only the case with journalists. According to Norris et al., politicians use familiar cultural frames to be able to make sense of the event in a simplistic way that is consequently understandable for members

of society (11).

Whilst researching the news coverage of terrorism attacks in the U.S. after 9/11, Kimberly A. Powell also uses a frame-analysis. She argues that the perspective of the creator of the news message composes the frame: “When journalist attempt to present information in the form of news stories, the way in which they locate, perceive and thus present the information is affected by their perceptions and biases” (93-4). As an example, she explains that in the case of the U.S., the journalist mostly has a

Framing (Islamic) Terrorism: An Analysis of Terrorism Discourse in Dutch News Media