COVER PAGE CLARIFICATIONS
Within the frame:
Right—Nikolaos Michaloliakos: Leader of Golden Dawn
Left—Ilias Kasidiaris: Deputy and spokesperson of Golden Dawn
Out of the frame:
Alexis Tsipras
Leader of the leftist party SYRIZA and former Prime Minister (2015-2019)
Submission Date: 20 May 2020
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the role of framing in the discourse of the extreme right party, Golden Dawn. In order to ‘cure’ the syndrome of hateful rhetoric that currently ‘shakes’ Europe’s democratic foundations, is important to dismantle the discourse and identify who are the ‘Us’ and ‘Them.’ Conducting frame analysis in the speeches of Golden Dawn, the study unveils the framing strategies by which the speakers legitimize themselves, while demarcate the line that excludes the Others. Lastly, the research concludes with an overview of the frames, the actors, and the emotions in Golden Dawn’s discourse. By derogating political opponents and highlighting the immigrants’ menace towards the Greeks’ social benefits and jobs, as well as their distinct differences from the Greek culture, the party achieves resonance with widely shared beliefs of the audience. The repetition of historical metaphors and the usage of archaic expressions amplifies emotions, pursuing the ultimate identification of the people with the national identity and, thus, with Golden Dawn.
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“First, they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”
Martin Niemöller, 1946
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis owes its completion to some inspirational people who facilitated its conduction, and I wish to esteem.
First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, who believed in this project from the very first time and encouraged my efforts even when things got tough. His professionalism, continuous support, and valuable feedback inspired me to realize this study at the optimum. Additionally, I wish to pay my special regards to Dr. Jelle van Buuren for his precious words when I started this Master, and I was struggling to cope with academic writing. I could not forget how my keen interest in researching extremism and radicalization was kindled. For this reason, I thank Dr. Tahir Abbas as during the course “Dealing with Terrorism” he offered insights that made me wonder why people go extreme.
I thank my friend Kerem for taking the time to read my thesis and provided me thoughtful remarks. I wish to thank my friend Zoi, with whom I shared concerns, thoughts, and plans during this academic year. I would like to thank my friend Vasilis for the hard work to design this incredible cover. My thanks to all the people that motivated me with a smile and sent me positive vibes because sometimes less is more.
A great thanks to my brother, Emiljano, who is a motivated graduate of Political Science, thus we had insightful discussions about my topic. Unrelatedly, thank you for being always there! My little sisters, Adriana and Vanesa, are my source of inspiration that steers me wanting to make the world peaceful and righteous. Τhe words are not enough to express my deep gratitude to my parents, Anastas and Lumturie, for their unconditional love, the self-sacrifices, and loyal support in every step of my life.
Last but not least, I wish to wholeheartedly thank my partner in life Vangelis, for his love, for supporting me in every possible way, and for his patience to discuss unfamiliar to him matters. Finally, this thesis has been conducted during the challenging times of Covid-19 pandemic, which prompts me to send two messages. First, coronavirus resembles racism as lurks unseen and infects societies, countries, the world. The only difference between the two is that the Covid-19 will pass, but once racism roots deep, its contagion may prove lethal. Second, the accomplishment of this project during these critical times sends a message of hope: that humanity will always evolve.
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3
1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.1. OBJECTIVEANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS 7
1.2. RESEARCHVALUE 9
1.2.1 ACADEMICRELEVANCE 9
1.2.2 SOCIETALRELEVANCE 11
1.3. THESISOVERVIEW 11
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 13
2.1. THERE-EMERGENCEOFTHEEXTREMERIGHT 13
2.2. CONCEPTSANDTERMS 16
2.2.1. EXTREMEORRADICAL? 16
2.2.2. BEYONDEXTREME 17
2.3. FRAMESANDFRAMING 19
2.3.1. FRAMINGSTRATEGIES 20
2.3.2. FRAMERESONANCE 22
2.3.3. FRAMINGIDENTITY 23
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 25
3.1. CASESELECTION 26
3.1.1. THEPHENOMENONGOLDENDAWN 27
3.2. METHODOLOGY 39
3.2.1. DATACOLLECTION 42
3.3. LIMITATIONSANDDIFFICULTIES 44
4. FINDINGS/DISCUSSION 46
4.1 THEFRAMINGSTRATEGIESOFGOLDENDAWN 46
4.1.1. DIAGNOSTICFRAMES 47
4.1.2. PROGNOSTICGRAMES 54
4.1.3. MOTIVATIONALFRAMES 57
4.1.4. DISCUSSION 58
4.2. THEPROTAGONISTSINTHEDIRCOURSE 60
4.2.1. ENEMIESATTHEGATES 60
4.2.2. ANINEXTRICABLETRINITY 65
4.3. THEPOWEROFWORDS 66
4.4. AVENUESFORFUTURERESEARCH 69
5. CONCLUSION 70
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY 73
5 TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1 MAGAZINE OF GOLDEN DAWN ISSUE MAY 1987 : "HITLER FOR 1000 YEARS" 29
FIGURE 2 DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE NAME MACEDONIA IN 1992 AND 2018 32
FIGURE 3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF GOLDEN DAWN 36
FIGURE 4 MICHALOLIAKOS NAZI SALUTE-SWASTIKA 37
FIGURE 5 THE SYMBOL OF GOLDEN DAWN 37
FIGURE 6 THE FRAMES IN GOLDEN DAWN'S DISCOURSE 47
FIGURE 7 KASIDIARIS ACCUSES MUSLIM MP 53
TABLE 1 ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF GOLDEN DAWN FROM 1994 UNTIL 2019 32
TABLE 2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF FRAMING STRATEGIES 40
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1. INTRODUCTION
The post-war era signaled the promised of the extinction of fascist ideas and inaugurated the path towards democracy and freedom. Today, however, we are all witnesses of the reemergence of extreme right ideals in their most vicious version, the rhetoric. Donald Trump’s entrance in the White House with the use of inflammatory and divisive rhetoric constitutes the crowning glory of a dichotomous worldview between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and seals the international legitimation of the politics of hate (Lopez 2018). Following the paradigm of the most powerful country in the world, instances of extreme right parties that unleash toxic rhetoric, multiply rapidly in Europe, from Sweden Democrats and the Austrian Freedom Party to the Italian Lega Nord and Hungary’s Fidesz, all share common ideological roots manifested through different societal instances (Thomas 2019). Typically, these parties employ othering, namely a discursively constructed process by which real or imagined differences of an outgroup are transformed into negations of identity, and thus, into motives for discrimination. In the extreme right realm, common Others are subaltern hostiles, religious or ethnic minorities (Kopytowska & Baider 2017, 133). By describing Others in derogatory terms, and framing political issues as national threats, extreme right actors embolden ideologies that turn into real life violence (Beirich 2019), posing a pertinent threat to individual liberties and challenging the foundations of the European democracies.
In this setting of rising right-wing extremism across Europe, a relevant case of overt extreme rhetoric emerged in Greece. In the shadow of the economic deprivation and of an unprecedented migratory influx, that transformed into a major societal crisis of values, a new day of extremism dawned to test Greece’s ‘democratic reflexes’ (Vaitsopoulou 2019). The admission of the extreme right party Golden Dawn in the Greek Parliament in 2012 with 6.97% of the vote, was a phenomenon that attracted multiple headlines internationally, but the scholarship in the case remained overdue (Angouri & Wodak 2014, Ellinas 2013). Golden Dawn has been defined as a pure neo-Nazi party that resembles fascism (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 6), and its rhetoric of hatred towards Others reinforces this characterization.
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On these grounds, academia has been persistent in addressing the societal circumstances that appropriated the broadness of the extreme right electorate (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2018) and racist violence as the outcome of this development (Bjørgo & Ravndal 2019). There is an academic tendency, thus, to treat extreme right as an accidental development triggered upon structural conditions, rather than as an active effort for political domination (Caiani et al.2012). Other scholars investigate the racist violence per se without appreciating the ideational motives that lie behind the actions (Burnett 2017, Rees et al. 2019). In these lines, Cas Mudde (2010) argues that the extreme right is not a “normal pathology”, that lies around the political fringes and may outbreak under extreme societal conditions, rather stands for the “pathological normalcy” thesis. According to his reasoning, the extreme right is perfectly aligned with mainstream ideas and broadly shared mass attitudes, issues that are circumvented by the traditional politics (Mudde 2010, 1178). These are precisely the issues that provide to the extreme right the potential for realization. Departing upon these concerns, the present thesis proposes that, instead of looking at extreme right actors as aliens within the political life, we should see the world though their eyes, attempting to unveil the roots of their activization. Extreme right actors are active shapers of their political fates: they articulate context dependent messages in the form of frames, aiming to harvest social acceptance, by establishing a schisma between the good Selves and the evil Others (Tilly 2003, 139, Caiani et al. 2012, 15).
1.1. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The core objective of this study is to explore the discursive framing strategies of Golden Dawn and the actors affiliated with them, as to capture its viewpoints and, potentially, draw conclusions on what triggers similar parties’ success. Inspired upon social movements literature, and anchored within the framing perspective, as introduced by Snow & Benford (1988) the study aspires to identify diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames in the speeches of Golden Dawn during the years 2012, 2015, and 2018 individually. Along with the framing strategies which aim to identify problems, propose solutions, and motivate actions, the literature suggests that extreme actors designate perpetrators and victims, and causally link them with the predetermined frames (Caiani et al. 2012, 15). The ultimate purpose of the framing process is to achieve resonance with the life experiences of the customized audience (Snow & Benford 1988, 210). In parallel with the
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extreme right scholarship, empirical evidence indicates that in seeking popular support, the national identity is the coupling point. By the discursive construction of a collective identity, based on common traits such as nationality, culture, religion, and language, extreme right actors set the boundaries of the ‘Us’ belongingness (Caiani et al. 2012, 104).
Delving deeper in the extreme right discourse, Baider & Constantinou (2014, 180) highlight the argumentative power of emotions. Political use of emotions is a social phenomenon, which involves relationships of power between politicians and their audiences, and is mediated in the discourse through metaphors, euphemisms, and historical examples. Frequently, emotions are manifested indexically in the discourse through similes, or phrases that remind sentiments (Baider & Constantinou 2014,184). Driven upon these theoretical grounds, the present study seeks to answer the following research questions, and the supplementary sub-questions:
RQ 1. What framing strategies does Golden Dawn pursue in its official discourse in the years 2012, 2015, and 2018?
RQ 2. Who are the protagonist actors in Golden Dawn’s discourse and how are affiliated with the framing strategies?
➢ To what extent does Golden Dawn use national identity as a means of resonance with the Greek people?
➢ What is the role of emotions in Golden Dawn’s speeches?
For answering these questions, with the compass of Snow and Benford’s (1988) analytical framework, I will conduct a frame analysis in the speeches of Golden Dawn in the Parliament, as derived from the party’s YouTube channel. For the identification of frames and actors in the discourse, I embrace Entman’s (1991) suggestion to be watchful for catchphrases, metaphors, and keywords. Deriving such elements of expression from the party’s discourse, allows for a deeper understanding of its worldview. Ultimately, the study will contribute to the academic debate on demand-supply explanations for the current upheaval of the extreme right support, by highlighting the significance of the supply side, when it comes to political domination (Mudde 2007). The identified speech patterns of Golden Dawn will serve as the cornerstone for comparisons with
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well-established cases of extreme right discourse, such as the French National Rally1, and the Alternative for Germany.
1.2. RESEARCH VALUE
Embarking upon this research, became evident that both Golden Dawn as an unexplored case and the vicious ideology that the party represents, which is prevalent in all and more European countries, web the academic significance of the study with the necessity to address a current societal pathology. How this thesis contributes to society and academia is, explicitly, explained below.
1.2.1 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE
The present study involves high academic relevance. This confidence derives from the fact that right-wing extremism is a rapidly evolving concept in academia generally (Abbas 2019) and particularly in security studies (Le Roux 2019). However, the scholarship in the field is proved short to anticipate the considerable growth of the phenomenon across Europe. Considering that Alternative for Germany became the biggest opposition party in 2017, the extreme anti-immigration party Sweden Democrats won 18% of the vote in 2018, and the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia has doubled its share of the vote since its premiere in 2015, becoming the third largest party (BBC 2019), becomes evident that the scholarship should broaden as to preempt this outbreak.
Additionally, Schuurman (2019) warns that recent research in right-wing extremism is accompanied by “topical preferences” and regional biases, which generate both geographical and thematic gaps in the knowledge (p.466). In line with Schuurman’s (2019) argument, the current scholarship is critiqued for being too event-driven and for underemphasizing the extremism fueled by state actors (p.464). According to the same inquiry, academia focuses on certain topics (e.g. jihadist terrorism), while pays less attention to right-wing extremism (Ibid.), despite being more prevalent in terms of terroristic incidents in the post-2010 period (Miller 2017). Geographically, the development of the extreme right in Western Europe sparkles academic attention, leaving behind the Southern European disseminators of hatred (Mudde 2010, Ellinas 2013, 544). These
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academic inclinations create an unbalanced representation of the extreme right phenomenon around Europe and establish overqualification over certain topics and ignorance on others. As transpires from the above, by researching the Greek case, I will fill a gap both in the literature of the extreme right in Southern Europe, and in the extremist behavior of state actors. The academic relevance of the Golden Dawn is highlighted, further, by the fact that Greece has no extreme right past, compared to the traditional rightist beliefs that dominate many Western European countries (Ellinas 2013, 543). Moreover, the fact that Greece suffered Nazi atrocities during World War II constitutes a paradox in the advancement of a party that resembles Nazism (Alioğlu Çakmak 2013, 1). Such indications trigger the academic interest for the case's investigation, while might partially explain what prompt the Greek people to trust such an extreme political formation.
In terms of methodology, although the framing dynamics have been theoretically well-elaborated, a common methodological terrain is not yet established (Vicari 2010, 508). Illustratively, Kluknavska (2014, 7), who investigated the frames in the discourse of far-right parties in Czech Republic and Slovakia points out that “there is not a shared criterion on how to perform the frame analysis methodologically”. In a similar vein, Caiani et al. (2012, 24) assert that when it comes to frame analysis “the scientific research suffers from insufficient consideration on methodological issues”. Frame analysis has been, traditionally, employed by cognitive psychology (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, Mintz et al. 2014) and media studies (Scheufele 1999, de Souza 2007), while in the social movements’ domain, and especially in extreme right discourse, the methodological axis of conducting frame analysis is still in its infancy. Acknowledging this methodological deficiency, this study makes a step further to solidify the guidelines of conducting frame analysis. Particularly, future research could follow the methodological pathway of the current study (introduced in Chapter 3), as to explore the discoursal frames of other organizations.
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1.2.2 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
At the societal level, the promotion of vile rhetoric publicly, let alone when it comes from politicians, is the corridor that leads to violence. Evidence suggests that the exposure to hate speech causes the so-termed ‘dehumanization effect’, which makes suffering and harm caused to other human beings hardly surprising (Elster 2017:4). Regarding Greece, the Golden Dawn constitutes a phenomenon for contemporary politics. Since World War II, there is no other pro-Nazi party that, not only entered the Parliament of a democratic European country, but continues, uninterruptedly, its violent tactics and still gained 18 parliamentary seats (Vrakopoulos & Halikiopoulou 2019, 194). Factually, since Golden Dawn’s involvement in the political affairs, there is a considerable rise in racist crimes, according to Hellenic Police’s statistics (Strickland 2018).
Dismantling Golden Dawn’s discourse, and identifying who is framed as an enemy, will introduce us to the ideological foundations that motivate their actions. Other than that, knowing the targets of the discourse is a first step for securing them in real life. Based on this study’s findings, the government could raise awareness by establishing policy guidelines to safeguard the fingerprinted in the discourse. Finally, the societal relevance of this study is achieved by addressing an issue that jeopardizes the peace and security of the Greek society, while is not least observable in all and more European countries.
1.3. THESIS OVERVIEW
This section provides the compass upon which this study embarks and proceeds, so as readers and author to follow the same steps. Epigrammatically, Chapter 2 accomplishes two purposes: expounds theoretical insights on the extreme right, as to enter the worldview of Golden Dawn and introduces the analytical model of framing, to be applied in the case under investigation. Finishing this chapter, the theorization of framing insights in combination with the extreme right scholarship, suggests that the national identity is the legitimator of the extreme discoursal prepositions in the eyes of the people. Chapter 3 justifies the case selection, both by explaining why case study design is the most accurate method to reach the research objective and by highlighting the academic significance of the phenomenon Golden Dawn, displaying empirically its trajectory. Secondly, the chapter revisits the methodological steps taken to realize the study and details the data
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characteristics and qualities. Concluding, limitations and difficulties are being acknowledged. In Chapter 4 the findings are presented and discussed in parallel with the literature. Specifically, in reply to the research questions, the frames are visually represented, and denominators of the actors are displayed and discussed. Concluding, avenues for further research are paved. Finally, Chapter 5 offers concise answers to the research questions and to the supporting sub-questions and approaches the present day.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This theoretical review introduces the reader into the broader academic debate of the demand-supply spectrum, by acknowledging previous research on the field and identifying gaps. As an outcome, the scholarship suggests the need for incorporation of the supply-side explanations. Hence, the study appreciates the agency of extreme actors and attempts to unveil their strategies by operationalizing the frames and framing strategies as derived from the social movements’ literature, constructing an analytical tool for investigating the case of Golden Dawn. In detail, having prefaced on insights of the extreme right trend, follows the conceptualization of the term as to position the object under investigation within the broad spectrum of the far-right party family and culminate in a working definition for Golden Dawn. Second, within the framing literature are identified micro-strategies employed by the agents as to achieve resonance with the audience. Lastly, the discussion touches upon the sore point of the extreme right discourse, the identity. National identity is considered the prominent player who marks the boundaries of the “us” versus “them” worldview and is, potentially, a critical factor for public acceptance.
2.1. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT
The end of World War II sealed the marginalization of extreme right formations. The German Nazi Party of Adolf Hitler (1933-1945) left behind gruesome memories of political violence and exaggerated cruelty, while the annihilation of some 10 million people during the Holocaust and the extreme supremacism rhetoric, wrote a black page in the history of humanity. However, as the years passed, the living memories of that tumultuous period faded away and opened the path towards the establishment of the ‘third wave’ of the extreme right (Hainsworth, 2008, p.2). Unimaginably, extremist far-right parties re-emerged dynamically in the European political scenery putting forward issues of nationalism and xenophobia on the agenda by framing them on the pretext of the ‘threat to the nation’ and attracting considerable public support.
A substantial proportion of previous research on the extreme right is oriented around the emergence, development and electoral success of far right parties, while the far right ideology, the organizational structure of these parties, and the classification of the far right party family have received equal scholarly devotion (Golder 2016, Mudde 2010, Georgiadou 2013, Carter 2005, Hainswoth 2008, Muis & Immerzeel 2016). Most of the academic work in the field explores the
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Western European carriers of the phenomenon, which have been historically prone to rightist political beliefs and share similar societal characteristics. For example, the French Front National (FN, now Rassemblement National), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the British National Party (BNP) draw considerable attention both from the international community and academia (Carter 2005, 2) least because of their extreme ideology or their sudden electoral breakthrough and mostly because the extensive scholar scrutiny (Mudde 2007, Hainsworth 2008, Eatwell 2004, Ignazi 2003, Carter 2005). More recently, a growing body of knowledge in concerned with the far-right appeal in Central and Eastern Europe (Kluknavska 2014, Pirrò 2013, Lugosi 2018). However, the evolution of far-right extremism in Southern European countries has been overlooked by the voluminous literature of the field. According to Hainsworth (2008, 66) extreme right parties of significance did not prosper in Spain, Portugal and Greece due to the authoritarian regimes that these countries experienced in the past, in combination with the late development of their welfare state (Casals, 2005, p.142). Even if that was the case at that time, when the Greek extremist neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (in Greek: Χρυσή Αυγή-Chrysi Avgi) entered vigorously the Greek parliament in 2012 with 6.97% of the vote, the academic community was caught by surprise (Ellinas 2013, p.544). Despite the unavoidable observance of such an extreme political formation, explanations for its rise maintained superficial, questioning, persistently, why Golden Dawn succeeded.
Considering the explosion of far-right support in Europe, explanations of the development abound and are orientated within the demand-supply spectra (Mudde 2007, 201). Envisaging the political universe as another marketplace, some scholars argue that societal crises and grievances create the fertile ground for the emergence of extreme right organizations (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 6), while common indicators are societal problems such as immigration and high unemployment rates (Kluknavska 2014, 4). In respect of Greece, explanations vary from blaming the economic crisis, the weakened state institutions, the Euroscepticism that dominates in the public opinion, or the mass immigration that overwhelms the country in recent years (Ellinas, 2013, 2015, Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, Angouri & Wodak, 2014). Yet, these explanations, almost, echo the propaganda of Golden Dawn, which blames immigrants for the economic deprivation (“the illegal immigrants..”, 2012), without appreciating the distinctive parameters that
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distant the Greek case from its Western European counterparts (Vasilopoulou et al. 2015, Georgiadou 2013, Margaronis, 2012).
Furthermore, demand-side approaches embrace a unilateral view, unable to capture socio-political nuances that differentiate cases from each other, thus, display poor comparative value. By way of illustration, Spain and Portugal experienced comparable crisis conditions and hard austerity measures with Greece, but they did not develop extreme right parties of significance (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2018, 27). On this account, Betz (1999) argues that there is no evidence on the exact linkage between right-wing mobilization and socio-structural change (p.301). In this vein, the wider academic literature on terrorism has, recently, identified that economic deprivation is not linked with the participation in terrorist organizations, neither with the political violence at large (Goldman & Noy 2020, 2), betraying that the issue is more complex than a societal symptom.
A growing body of research has, therefore, accentuated the scarce scholarly attention delivered to supply-side explanations (Caiani et al.2012, Mudde 2007, Carter 2005, 3) and indicates the space for incorporation of the parties’ agency per se and their professional propaganda campaigns as the main motivators for support (Mudde 2007, 276). In simple logic, even if people question why they face difficulties, they do not translate it automatically as a threat generated from undetermined hostile groups. The answer comes by extreme right actors, as the connective tissue in the form of a “Nationalist Solution” (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015) inspired upon a strong polarization: Us (=good) and Them (=evil) (Baider & Constantinou 2014, 181). In this direction, I concur with Mudde’s (2007) argument that “a fertile ground is a necessary but not a sufficient condition” for an increase in the far-right support (p.230). In a nutshell, extreme right parties are “…active shapers of their own fates” (Berman 1997, 102) which strategically seize political, cultural, and discursive opportunities embedded in the societal environment (Muis & Immerzeel 2017, 912), and as such are operationalized in this thesis.
16 2.2. CONCEPTS AND TERMS
Hereby departs a terminological journey towards a concrete definition for the Golden Dawn. Defining the extreme right has been a point of contention among scholars, using various labels such as ‘extreme right’, ‘far right’ and ‘populist radical right’ in order to refer to the same organizations (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.910). Such a debate is a result of both the absence of a single definition and of ideological nuances that differentiate right-wing organizations from each other (Mudde, 2007, p.12). Other than that, the term is not only used for scientific purposes, but also for political ones, as politicians use the term to characterize ideologically extremer political opponents, rendering the consensus unattainable (Mudde 1996, 228). Although an exhaustive review of the academic definitional debate is beyond the scope of this study, delving into the core of the far-right ideology is crucial for understanding what Golden Dawn stands for.
2.2.1. EXTREME OR RADICAL?
The term ‘extreme right’ has been largely associated with terrorist attacks, extensive use of violence and hate rhetoric, transforming the ‘rightist’ political convictions into a threat for the security, democratic values, and individual liberties. Extreme right is located within the broad umbrella term ‘far-right’ which incorporates both radical and extreme right formations (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2018, 28). Deriving 26 definitions from the literature, Mudde (1995, 206) identified 58 different features used to describe right-wing extremism, from which only five common denominators were present: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and strong state (Mudde 1996, p.229). Among these, nationalism is the strongest ideological feature that connects extreme right organizations, as delineates strictly the boundaries between the native group and the ‘Others’ (Hainsworth 2008, Smith 1991).
The term ‘radical’ right has been, historically, used interchangeably with the ‘extreme right’ (Mudde 1996, 230) but contemporarily the two diverge towards their relationship with democracy and violence. While radical right parties distant themselves from fascism and denounce violence, referring to the ‘Others’ as ideologically rather than racially different (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2018, p.29), the extreme right opposes both procedural and substansive democracy, relates directly or indirectly with fascism and glorifies violence when it is for the elimination of internal and external enemies (Mudde 1996, 231, Mudde 2010, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou
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2015, 6). Therefore, the term extreme right will be used to refer to political parties and organizations that embrace violence, while the term far-right is used widely to refer to groups that do not affiliate openly with violence and do not counter procedural democracy.
The abovementioned differences are crucial for the ‘life’ of the parties as extreme right parties are under tight scrutiny from the state authorities and can even be banned, whereas radical right parties are not at risk on this aspect (Mudde 1996, 231). A recent example is the British extremist organization National Action which, upon proscription, refused to be labelled as extremist arguing that is ‘radical’ (Allen 2019, 14). In this direction, Caiani et al. (2012, 5) confirm that the demarcation line between extreme and radical is called ‘violence’. Therefore, two pillars are identified within the sphere of the right-wing extremism: ideology (upon which the external reality is built) and activism (i.e. violence, as an instrument to authenticate their discourse).On this account, the present thesis follows Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s (2003, 401) syllogism:
“... two elements are central to the sociological concept of right-wing extremism: ideologies of inequality on the one hand, such as exaggerated nationalism, racist denigration, and totalitarian views of the law, are associated with varying levels of acceptance of violence on the other.”
The two aspects are complementary, as they dehumanize the ‘Others’ ideologies of inequality are more prone to justification of violence (Caiani et al. 2012, 5). In this case, Heitmeyer’s (2003) definition aligns optimally with Golden Dawn, as ideology and political activism are the two main pillars that drive the party by its foundations (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 7, see section 3.1.1).
2.2.2. BEYOND EXTREME
Populism and the extreme right are perceived as inextricably linked concepts, especially when it comes to political discourses that stir up hatred (Caiani & della Porta 2011, 181). In his seminal book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cas Mudde states that “the populist radical right is the only successful party family (in contemporary) Europe” (2007, 1). This new party family can be identified upon common ideological elements: nationalism, xenophobia, exclusionism, the quest for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, revisionism, and traditional ethics (Mudde 2007, 21).
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Populism, instead of a pure ideology, is a political discourse style, a ‘thin’ ideology that views society as segregated between us, the ‘pure people’ versus the untrustworthy, ‘corrupt elite’ and argues that politics should express the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2004, 543, Muis and Immerzeel, 2017, 910, Caiani 2012, 190). In achieving mobilization, populist leaders construct context dependent messages appropriated in different societal pathologies aiming at the activation of people’s resentment toward the existing political structure and the alleged ‘enemies’ (Golder 2016, 477-479).
The Golden Dawn is self-identified as a popular mass movement from below (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 6) and adopts an exclusionary division of the society which is classified upon culture, religion, and ethnicity (Golder 2016, 479-480). The case deserves exploration if we consider that “populism is not merely a moderate form of the extreme right, but rather includes fascism and Nationalist Socialism as well as its various neo-forms” (Mudde 2007, 31). Thus, its ideological proximity with nativism (nationalism/racism) (Caiani et al. 2012, 190) and the fulfillment of Mann’s (2004) criteria for a fascist organization2 conduce to the identification of Golden Dawn as an: extreme, violent, and fascist political party that uses populist rhetoric for electrifying the masses. By the same token, the eminent Professor of political extremism and populism, Cas Mudde affirms that: “Golden Dawn is one of the few truly neo-Nazi parties in Europe and draws inspiration unabashedly by Nazi Germany” (Chapple & Labropoulou 2013, CNN).
This discussion served as the entryway in the worldview of Golden Dawn, while provided insights on the conceptual and definitional debate of the far-right scholarship. In section 3.1.1., the phenomenon Golden Dawn is explicated. Before reaching there, it is important to approach the extreme right discourse theoretically by delving into the framing literature, as to determine a conceptual tool for the case analysis.
2 Mann (2004) captures: Fascism is the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism (p.13) and provides four criteria that are inherent within the fascist ideology: nationalism, statism, paramilitarism, transcendence and cleansing (2004, pp.13-14).
19 2.3. FRAMES AND FRAMING
Frames and framing are well-established and rapidly developing concepts in social sciences today3. References to them have been reproduced in different scientific disciplines such as cognitive psychology (Bateson 1972, Tversky & Kahneman 1981), communication and media studies (Entman 1993, Scheufele 1999), sociology (Snow & Benford 1992) and political science (Triantafyllidou & Fotiou 1998); while recent years framing is central in social movements studies (Benford & Snow 2000, 611, Kluknavska 2014, 4). The concept of frame was primarily captured by Goffman (1974), who defined frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events within the world (p.21). Although this minimum definition perceives the core meaning of frame, does not take account of the interactive and constructionist character of the term, as used in social movements studies.
Therefore, the present study adopts the explanation given by Benford and Snow (2000): frames are not merely aggregations of individual perceptions, rather are “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (p.614). Regarding extreme right literature, this definition involves significant operational value. Firstly, does not treat frames as static patterns, but acknowledges their malleable and stirring nature. Secondly, such definition prescribes that activists do not only attempt to motivate the public for action, but they seek acceptance; thus, the frames serve as means of legitimation of their (potentially extreme) actions. In this sense, this study along with the literature in social movements employs the term frames, summarized as: problem identification→ blame attribution→ solution prescription→ call for action (Benford 2010, 293).
Consequentially, frames are produced through an active process of symbolic meaning construction: framing. More precisely, the term has been conceptualized as “an active processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford & Snow 2000, 614). Matthes (2011, 124) identifies three actors (strategic actors, journalists, and audiences) prominent in the research of the whole flow of the communication (framing) process: top down from elites, to journalists and the public. On this account, Entman et al. (2009, 175)
3 Interestingly, in 1990 were identified seven references to ‘framing’, and in 1995 the term appeared in 500 citations (Benford & Snow 2000, 612). Today, if one types the word ‘framing’ in Google Scholar, will come up with 1.970.000 results. This fact is considered as an indicator of the growing significance of the literature in ‘framing.’
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observe that “framing is a victim of its own success”. Practically, this means that scholars apply an unruly mélange of concepts under the framing rubric to multiple diverse research issues. For this reason, the current study delimits its scope in the investigation of strategic actors only and adopts Entman’s (1993, 52) seminal definition:
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”
Framing is not a rigid and broad concept as ideology, that cannot be distilled methodologically, neither focuses on nuanced grammatical decisions, that would entail doubtfully generalizable results, rather achieves the middle ground of specificity and generality.
2.3.1. FRAMING STRATEGIES
In practice, collective action frames are generated through three distinct stages, defined by Snow & Benford (1988) as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing strategies.
DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING
In the first place, appropriate interpretative frames convert a societal issue into a problem, ideally into the target of collective action (Caiani et al. 2012, 14, Snow & Benford 1988, 200). During the diagnostic stage the organizational actors indicate the ones to blame for the societal pathology and set the boundaries of the “we” (self-naming collective identity) and the “they” (the source of the problem) doctrine (Kluknavska 2014, 5, Caiani et al.2012). In nationalistic discourse this is achieved with a proficient use of rhetorical devices such as repetitions, euphemisms, metaphors, comparisons, and historical examples (Baider & Constantinou 2014, 182). Following this logic, Potvin et al. (2004) identified the following strategy for the categorization of the self and the others in nationalistic discourse:
– Generalization of certain traits or behavior while ignoring the reality faced by the Other. – Inferiorization, demonization and dehumanization of the Other so much that the audience
will call for expulsion.
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– For the Nation: Construction of catastrophic scenarios (as cited in Baider & Constantinou 2014, 182).
Moreover, in this phase it is probable that ‘injustice frames’ will be developed. As suggested by a plethora of studies, social inequalities are highlighted during diagnosis, which are attributed to indicated perpetrators (Weed 1997, White 1999 as cited in Benford & Snow 2000, 615).
PROGNOSTIC FRAMING
Collective framing articulates, thereafter, potential solutions aimed at the restriction of the problem and the elimination of the assigned enemies (Caiani et al. 2012, 15, Snow & Benford 1988, 201). Potentially, at this stage are portrayed the capable actors to cope with the issue, which are no others than “us” (extreme right activists) (Benford & Snow 2000, 617). This way the actors are self-designated as the responsible for action and simultaneously legitimate their purpose in the eyes of the people.
MOTIVATIONAL FRAMING
The last framing step provides the incentives that stipulate mobilization (“call to arms”) (Benford & Snow 2000, 617). For doing so, motivational frames must generalize a problem in such a way that connects to issues relevant to the life experiences of the targeted audience (Caiani et al.2012, 15). Benford (2010, 293) conceptualized this strategy as frame alignment, which entails the amplification of widely shared values (e.g. religion, freedom, employment) by emphasizing on universally believed concepts (e.g. politicians are corrupt) (Benford and Snow 2000, 623). Along with frame alignment, collective action frames are committed to produce new definitions of collective solidarity and construct actors’ identity as to necessitate action (Caiani et al. 2012, 15). Seeking mobilization, the rhetors carefully construct their discourse by using appropriate vocabularies of motive (e.g. severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety) (Benford & Snow 2000, 618). On this account, Young et al. (2019, 85) refer to “aggressive strategic game frames” as language incorporated during electoral campaigns, entailing aggressive verbs such as “attack”, “hit”, “battle”. Importantly, the said research suggests that the use of “aggressive” frames blurs the audience’s ability to critically view the real theme of the discourse (Ibid, p.92). As acknowledged by the literature, the use of war metaphors tends to normalize violence, which in the long term embeds in the political culture (Gavriely-Nuri 2009).
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The congruous terminology erupts emotions that motivate behavior; for example, anger motivates people to rehabilitate injustice (Holmes 2004, 224). Emotions have been studied as means of persuasion in political rhetoric, and charismatic speakers are expected to balance logos with pathos in shaping their discursive ethos4 (Holmes 2004, 210). Previous research on Nazi discourse agree that the aiming emotion is hatred, which is generated through conceptual metaphors of dehumanization (parasites, sub-humans, spread diseases), insults, and animal metaphors (Baider & Constantinou 2014, 186).
Summarizing, the above theorized strategies are not alien into one another trajectory, but shape interactively the framing process. By dissecting Donald Trump’s speech, is provided an illustrative example of the whole framing cycle: diagnosis→ Mexican illegal immigrants benefit from the US’s taxpayers, by crossing the borders and working untaxed in the expense of the society,
prognosis→ we must build a wall, motivation→ Mexico will pay for the wall, either directly or
by remittances and raising import taxes (Miroff & Blanco 2020). Notwithstanding the framing interactivity, this study analyzes diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames individually, for the sake of precision.
2.3.2. FRAME RESONANCE
The effectiveness and mobilization potency of frames depends upon their degree of resonance, the extent to which the targeted audience fathoms frames as sensible (Snow & Benford 1988). Except from the credibility of the articulator and the empirical credibility of the frame itself—the apparent fit between what activists say and observable events in the world, the frame resonance is affected by its salience. Therefore, the more central the espoused beliefs, values, and ideas of a movement are to the life experiences of the audience, the greater the prospect of their mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000, 621). More specifically, as Benford & Snow (2000, 622) stress out, numerous movement framing researchers acquiesce that the compatibility of the frame with society’s cultural heritage5 impacts significantly the public acceptance of the movement (Caiani et al. 2012, 16,
4 Aristotle’s rhetorical triangle refers to the speaker’s ability to persuade. Logos is the logical reasoning/ argumentation based on facts, Pathos appeals to the audience’s emotions and values, and Ethos appeals to the speaker’s character and credibility (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/).
5 The degree upon which a frame is equivalent with the cultural stock of the target of mobilization has been widely cited as “narrative fidelity” (Fisher 1984 as cited in Benford & Snow 2000, 622).
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Snow & Benford 1988, 210). Lastly, collective action agents operate specific speech strategies aiming, ultimately, at resonance. Some of the most widely employed discursive strategies are: articulation—connecting events in such a way that provides a new angle of vision, amplification— highlighting some issues as being more salient than others, and bridging—linking two or more ideologically corresponding but structurally irrelevant frames while addressing a particular issue (Benford & Snow 2000, 623, Caiani et al. 2012, 16).
As previously mentioned, frames are continuously constituted, reproduced, transformed, or eliminated during the social movement activity. Nevertheless, this process does not occur in a vacuum, but is shaped by political, cultural, and discursive opportunities, embedded in the socio-cultural context (Benford & Snow 2000, 628). Hence, although the sociosocio-cultural structure is not utilized in this thesis as an explanatory basis of the extreme right mobilization, acknowledging the society as a source of inspiration for right-wing actors is determining for appreciating their distinct framing choices.
2.3.3. FRAMING IDENTITY
In social movement studies, the notion of collective identity has been considered as particularly relevant, especially when scholars seek answers on the people’s motivation to act and the context within which social movements emerge (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 284). Collective identity has been treated both too narrowly and too broadly by the scholarship, used to define many different dimensions of the social world, yet has achieved semantic contributions regarding the movements’ emergence, trajectories, and outcomes (Ibid.). Although the concept has been definitionally overextended, in line with the purpose of this study I comprehend collective identity as a simultaneous construction and discovery of preexisting bonds, interests, and boundaries, which enables some actions while delegitimates others (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 298).
Within the extreme right microcosm, identity claims are aimed to develop a schisma between the, often superior, Self and the inferior, often dangerous, Other (e.g. immigrants) (Caiani et al. 2012, Benford 2010, 294). Conceptualizing this dichotomy Caiani et al. (2012) distinct between identity and oppositional frames (p.15). Identity-centered framing aims to develop specific identity bounds demarcated as “us” the defenders, and “them” the various hostile outgroups (Benford 2010, 294), and differentiate further between proximate (peer group) and remote identities (the audience as a
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whole). In a similar vein, oppositional frames assume two directions: direct opposition accompanied by symbolic and physical violence (usually towards immigrants, homosexuals, and left-wing activists) and secondly, systemic opposition in the form of juxtaposition of political positions with the ruling political parties (Caiani et al. 2012, 15-16).
Drifting back to the extreme right discourse, Triantafyllidou (2001, 10) underscores that the nation is the most pertinent form of collective identity, which describes the existence and belongingness within the national community. Smith defines nation as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (1991, 14). Despite the recognized semantic value of this definition, the essence of national identity—that is an instinctual psychological bond that binds fellow nationals together—is overlooked (Connor 1993 as cited in Triantafyllidou 2001, 12). The nation is not an autonomous, self-contained unit, rather entails a reciprocal relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup (Triantafyllidou 2001, 11). Thus, the very sense of national identity is externally defined through differentiation from ‘Others’ (2001, 30). In sum, two qualities are inherent in the very notion of national identity: defines who is a member of the nation and simultaneously, perhaps more importantly, indicates who is a foreigner (Ibid.,10). Integral elements of this distinction are the culture, religion, and language, as these traits reinforce the national identity, and portray what is not included in the nations’ characteristic traits (Triantafyllidou 2001, 25).
These theoretical directions propose that the utter identification of the people with the nation provides the breeding ground for a dichotomous world view (Triantafyllidou 2001, 11). It is of interest to explore how extreme right actors utilize this predisposition and answer questions such as: who are the perceived enemies in the extreme right discourse? what frames are assigned to these enemies? how does the national identity evolve in the framing process?
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter is divided in two sections. This section outlines the research design and provides a justifiable rationale for conducting a case study. After that, the case selection is being justified and the Golden Dawn’s trajectory is documentarily represented.
On basic methodological grounds, the study follows an exploratory pathway for the case investigation. In questioning whether this is the suitable method, I follow Yin’s explanation: a good way to understand that case study is the right method for the research purpose is to formulate a ‘how’ question on a contemporary set of events “over which the researcher has little control” (2014, 16). As the potential framing strategies used by Golden Dawn have been, already, hypothesized inspired by the literature, the purpose is, in fact, to deduct ‘how’ does Golden Dawn realize these strategies in its official discourse. Case study is, thus, rendered the perfect technique to derive frames, while allows for an in-depth understanding of their affiliation with the social world, because the conduction of a case study prerequires the collection of a rich spectrum of data (Resodihardjo 2009, 30). The theoretical material utilized for the study, has been triangulated by multiple sources and the most credible6 were employed. Similarly, sources regarding the case were reviewed and, mostly, the ones written in English were preferred, for achieving potential verifiability. The material that was exclusively available in Greek constitutes an exemption to this preference (e.g. elements from the Bylaw of Golden Dawn).
The thesis unfolds qualitatively, a choice that provides “a nuanced, empirically rich, and holistic account of the phenomenon” (Willis,2014). By definition a qualitative research is employed for the meaning making of an empirical phenomenon within its naturally occurring context (Kaarbo & Beasley 1999, 372), while quantifiable measures involve little evidential value on this account. Essentially, qualitative methods in framing (e.g. discourse analysis) entail a realistic and contextualized interpretive view, so that highly symbolic elements and cultural resonance are not being overlooked (Azpiroz 2014, 77). For this reason, the investigation of framing strategies embedded in the socio-political structure demands the researchers’ contextual knowledge of the case and interpretive abilities (Azpiroz 2014, 76). As Flyvbjerg (2006, p.6) argues, the case study 6 Credible sources are considered the ones that are peer-reviewed before publication and the ones whose author is a prominent scholar on the field.
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is not another strict experimental research method, thus the practitioner’s real-life proximity entails high scientific value. A great distance from the object under study will provide, otherwise, untested and detached from the society research outcomes (Ibid).
In this instance, the author’s own experiences from living in Greece until recently and her primary picture of Greece’s political scenery, in combination with her relevant academic background and knowledge of the Greek language, are considered precious for the overall process. Even if we disregard the fact that the data analyzed and essential literature are in Greek, is required a deep cultural understanding to appreciate the distinctive elements of the Greek national identity, which are embedded in Golden Dawn’s speeches, as potential means of penetration to the audience’s mind. Such cultural parameters cannot be overcome by any dictionary, neither by studying distantly the Greek case.
3.1. CASE SELECTION
As previously mentioned, the far-right scholarship has neglected the Greek case. This stems from the fact that neither the electoral breakthrough (Mudde 2000, 7) nor the extreme violence and the unleashing of hate rhetoric are proved to be preconditions for scholarly attention. As an example, the German case has been studied thoroughly due to the legacy of the past which subsequently generated a pool of scholars studying further the German far-right (Backes 1990, 1993, 1994, Caiani & della Porta 2011, 2012, Miller-Idriss 2009, 2018), despite the little far right mobilization that the country presented (Mudde 2000), until recently. Moreover, the language plays a deterrent role while gathering primary data. Examples of overelaborated parties are the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF) despite receiving insignificant electoral support (Mudde 2000, 8). On the other hand, Mudde (1996) observes that the Belgian far-right party Vlaams Blok remained rather understudied despite being one of the most successful and extreme organizations of that era (1979-2004). Similarly, the so-called “grandfather” of right-wing extremism (the Italian MSI7) officially declared a fascist party, but still did not raise any scholar eyebrows (Mudde 1996, 235).
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Precisely, the language barrier is confirmed hereby from the fact that a vast majority of scholars concerned with Golden Dawn are of Greek origin and presumably Greek-speaking (Ellinas 2010,2013, Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 2018 Hasapopoulos 2013, Lazaridis & Tsagkroni 2016, Georgiadou 2013 and others), while the international scholarship has poorly approached the case (Angouri & Wodak 2014, Gallerano 2013). Other than that, the espousal of Nazi dogmas8 by the party members has shocked the international community. Namely, international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have often criticized Greece (Human Rights Watch 2013), while the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) has repeatedly urged the Greek authorities to ban the party (RVRN, 2020). These observations show that Golden Dawn is not a marginal phenomenon, rather jeopardizes not only the Greek, but also the European security9. Academically, the case gains external validity, as the findings contribute on the remediation of a European phenomenon. These indications steered the case selection. Considering the above, I wish to offer a valuable contribution to the literature by investigating an inaccessible but not least significant case study for the security domain.
3.1.1. THE PHENOMENON GOLDEN DAWN
This section offers an overview of the party’s historical foundations and recaptures its electoral timeline, ideology, structure, and political activism. Recognizing the empirical reality through the eyes of Golden Dawn, is crucial for understanding the ideational roots of its discourse. Equipped with this guide, the readers can draw integrated conclusions for what steers their discursive frames. Instead of drily quoting evidence from the party’s trajectory, the section displays a documented tribute accompanied by photographic material. Apart from the scientific utility in line with the purpose of the study, the section addresses a gap in the literature for the overall performance of Golden Dawn, as most studies focus even on the political life or on the electoral breakthrough.
8 “A GD member ‘promised’ in front of a documentary crew to “turn on the ovens” and make lampshades from the
skins of immigrants, a reference to what Nazi Germany did to Jews, Roma and other minorities in the Holocaust”(Trilling 2020, The Guardian).
9 At a press conference in November 2016, Nikos Michaloliakos declared “the Europe of nations is back, and Greece is only the beginning” (official website Golden Dawn http://www.xrisiavgi.com/enimerosi/view/n.-g.-michaloliakos-kai-flamandoi-bouleutes-uper-ths-eurwphs-twn-ethnwn-kai).
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GENESIS
The Golden Dawn is not a descendant of the economic deprivation and the subsequent societal recession that strikes Greece since 2009, neither is a product of the refugee influx of 2015, rather inhabits the fringes of the political scenery long before, over forty years now. The People’s Association Golden Dawn (Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος Χρυσή Αυγή) premiered in December 1980 in the form of a bulletin published by former members of the Neo-fascist ‘Party of the 4th of August’, relic of Metaxas dictatorial regime (1936-1941) (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015, 16). In 1983, the longest serving party leader ever in Greek politics, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, issued the party’s homonymous magazine and relevant ideologically charged books, in an attempt to project a political doctrine that, until then, was unrepresented in the Greek political scene, the National Socialism10 (Psarras 2012, 35, Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 13). Thereafter, the Golden Dawn differentiated the self from other far-right factions of the time (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 16-17).
Since his youth, Michaloliakos has been associated with mass bombings in bookstores selling material related to the Soviet Union, and cinemas holding screenings of ‘left-learning’ movies (Hasapopoulos 2013, 13); in 1976 he was incarcerated for ten months for the possession of weapons and bombs (Psarras 2012, 50, Vrakopoulos & Halikiopoulou 2019, 188).
Even though the group assumed irregular political presence during the 1980s and 1990s, engaging mainly in violent attacks against political opponents11 and immigrants, (Vasilopoulou & Halikipoulou 2015, 17) a strong ideological axis inspired by ethno-socialist ideals, was already composed. As a matter of fact, among hundreds of articles and special issues on Nazism, in 1987
10 Nikolaos Michaloliakos in an interview with the Associate Professor of Political Science in the University of Cyprus, Antonis Ellinas, said verbatim: “We started in a Leninist way: we decided to issue a newspaper, Golden Dawn, and to build a party around it. Back in the 1980s, we flirted with all sorts of ideas of the interwar years, including National Socialism and fascism. But by the 1990s, we had settled the ideological issues and positioned ourselves in favor of popular nationalism.” (Ellinas 2013, 548)
11 A notorious example is the case of ‘Periandros’, formally known as Antonis Androutsopoulos. He is a former leading member of Golden Dawn, accused of the attempted murder of the left-wing student Dimitris Kousouris in 1998 and two more students. The case attracted bold publicity due to the brutality and apathy of the perpetrator (Vasilopoulou & Halikioloulou, 2015, 17). From 1998 until 2005 he was an evader. In 2006 he was condemned to 21 years imprisonment, but he was released in 2010 (Psarras 2012, 84).
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Michaloliakos dedicated the article “Hitler for 1000 years” to the memory of the “charismatic personality of Adolf Hitler12” (Psarras 2012, 42).
In the same period the party’s documents praise Paganism as faith to the heroes and philosophers of the “miraculous Greek Spirit” (Psarras 2012, 39). Moreover, until nowadays Golden Dawn propagates a conspiracy theory, according to which Hellenism is under threat from Zionism and the ‘Jews’ have been, historically, responsible for Greece’s tribulations. Following, the conspiracy regards the recent economic crisis as inextricably linked with the US-induced globalization, which is a well-thought-out plan to demolish the uniqueness of the Greek culture (Bampilis 2017, 63). Noteworthy, these ideas have been very appealing among Greeks who, incidentally, harbor a high percentage of antisemitic views.13
12 The article is written for the death anniversary of Hitler and, illustratively, concludes: “…forty two years later, with our thoughts and soul dedicated to the Memory of our Great Leader, we raise our right hand, we salute the Sun, and with the bravery that implies our Military Honor and National Socialist duty, we yell full of passion and faith to our future and visions: HEIL HITLER! Source: iefimerida.gr (in Greek)
13 According to the Global anti-Semitism Survey 2014, 69% of the Greeks are antisemitic (Antoniou et al. 2019).
Figure 1 Magazine of Golden Dawn Issue May 1987 Article: "Hitler for 1000 years" Author: Nikos Michaloliakos Source: www.iefimerida.gr
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In January 1985, Michaloliakos resigned as youth’s President of the National Political Union14 (Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωση) and founded the People’s National Movement-Golden Dawn. As of then, the group transit from an ideational group to grass-root movement; the 1990s were the decade of its great street mobilization.
From a historical viewpoint, this development was amplified by the occurrence of major socio-political events that shaped the Greek socio-political life. First and foremost, the collapse of the communist regime in the neighboring Albania brought up to 450.000 immigrants in the country, as estimated by the 2001 Census (Baldwin-Edwards 2014, 3). The influx was accompanied by hysterical reactions from the media and the authorities, who portrayed the immigrants as ‘dangerous’, leading to exponential growth of xenophobia15 (Ibid.). Secondly, Golden Dawn participated voluntarily in the Yugoslav War16 on the side of the Serbian Nationalists. Finally, the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 generated the newly independent Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Claims on the name of Macedonia17 stirred up outrage in Greece, as this is the name of its administrative and geographic Northern region. In 1992 Golden Dawn organized rallies, which prompted great popular mobilization, especially in Thessaloniki18 (Ellinas 2013, 550-551). As shown in Figure 2, almost thirty years later, in 2018, the same scene was reproduced. In this spirit, the Golden Dawn managed to establish itself as the movement that fights for the nation and stands by the people; all that remained was to gain electoral presence.
14 The National Political Union was founded in 1984 by the former dictator of the Greek Colonel’s regime who ruled Greece during the period 1967-1974, Georgios Papadopoulos. The relationship of Michaloliakos with the dictator has been highlighted repeatedly, by the academia and the media, to underline his deeply undemocratic vision.
15 The immigration flow continued coming years with immigrants from Easter Europe and the Middle East. In 2001, 762.000 immigrants were residing in Greece, (the 7% of the total population) (Kotzamanis & Karkouli 2016, 1). Contrary to other European countries, Greece has been an entirely homogeneous country until 1990s. Immigration was unprecedented in the Greek reality until then.
16 The Yugoslav War in 1995 entailed the genocide of 8.000 Bosnian Muslims. The struggle has been characterized by the International Criminal Court a crime against humanity and the greater atrocity after World War II. Members of Golden Dawn admit their involvement in the struggle “on the side of the sister state Serbia” Official Website of GD http://www.xrisiavgi.com/kinima
17 The name dispute was settled in June 2018 with the Prespes Agreement and concluded to the official rename of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into North Macedonia.
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ELECTORAL PATHWAY
Politically, the organization remained inactive until 1993, when was officially recognized as a political party (Psarras, 2012). In terms of electoral ambitions, Golden Dawn declared uninterested until 1994, when participated in the national elections, receiving 0.07% of the vote. Characteristically, Michaloliakos before participating in National elections has declared: “we consider politics a dirty affair and ourselves too pure to involve in it” (Psarras 2012, 41).
Between 1996 and 2009 the electoral pave of Golden Dawn was hampered by extreme violent activities perpetrated by the party’s members and their explicit advocation of Nazi beliefs (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 17). The scenery changed in 2010 when Nikos Michaloliakos was elected as local councilor in the Municipality of Athens with 5.29% of the vote. This election heralded the party’s electoral triumph in May 2012, when 440.996 citizens conventionalized an extreme, undemocratic organization into a parliamentary representative. Assessments that the voters would desert Golden Dawn in the elections of June 2012 were refuted, despite an unprecedented violent incident in national television against two female representatives
Figure 2 Demonstrations against the name Macedonia in 1992 and 2018 Sources: www.point4023.gr and www.protothema.gr
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of left-wing parties by one of its MPs (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 18, Ellinas 2013, 544, see video Telegraph.co.uk, 2012). Eventually, Golden Dawn secured 18 parliamentary seats for the following seven years. The main reasons quoted behind this popular verdict were protest, indignation, and punishment (29%), alignment with its policies (14%), and patriotism (13%) (Public Issue 2012). Even if the 2012’s vote derived from anger towards the austerity measures and disappointment from the traditional bipartisanism, whose nepotism stigmatized the Greek politics for thirty years, the Golden Dawn immediately revealed its vigilante nature by intensifying the attacks towards immigrants. Remarkably, in 2013 the party leader and deputies were imprisoned, and while pending indictment ran for elections. Despite prognoses for a significant decline, Golden Dawn widened and strengthened its electoral base, becoming the third biggest party in 2015 (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2015, 19). The entire electoral performance of Golden Dawn is outlined in the following table.
DATE ELECTION PERSENTAGE SEATS
12/06/1994 European 0.11% 0
22/09/1996 National 0.07% 0
13/06/1999 European (alliance with Front Line)
0.75% 0 13/06/2004 European (alliance with Patriotic Alliance 0.17% 0 07/06/2009 European 0.46% 0 04/10/2009 National 0.29% 0 14/11/2010 Athens Municipality Election 5.29% 1 out of 300 06/05/2012 National 6.97% 21 out of 300 17/06/2012 National 6.92% 18 out of 300 25/06/2014 European 9.39% 3 out of 21 25/01/2015 National 6.28% 17 out of 300 20/09/2015 National 6.99% 18 out of 300 07/07/2019 National 2.93% 0
Table 1 Electoral Performance of Golden Dawn from 1994 until 2019 Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior: https://ypes.gr/el/Elections/
