Creating Additional Value in
Negotiations
Influence of Social Motivation and Power on
Expanding the Pie
Timothy N. Habermehl
BSc. in Psychology
In collaboration with Laura Bargeman and Iris Prummel
Master thesis Psychology, specialization Social and Organisational Psychology
Institute of Psychology
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences – Leiden University Date: 16 July 2020
Student number: 1260464
First examiner of the university: Dr. Wolfgang Steinel Second examiner of the university: Dr. Fieke Harinck
1 Abstract
In this research (N = 192) we used a 2 (power vs. no power) x 2 (prosocial vs. proself) design to examine the influence of power and social motive on “expanding the pie”, which, in this research, consists of the creation of additional value through integral usage of optional issues in a mandatory-optional issue paradigm. Power was manipulated by giving half of the dyads different power roles (power-difference), and the other half no power manipulation (equal power). Social motive was manipulated by instructing half of the dyads to reach a high joint outcome (prosocial motive), and the other half a high individual
outcome (proself motive). The dependent measures were the negotiated outcome and usage of optional issues. Results showed that power and social motive had no significant effect on the negotiated outcome value. Social motive had a significant effect on the number of optional issues used. Dyads with a prosocial motive used more optional issues than did dyads with a proself motive.
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Creating Additional Value in Negotiations
During the course of our lives, we often find ourselves in a position where we have to negotiate. Whether it is when discussing with your friends what to do for an evening out, when discussing with your partner who cooks and who cleans up, or when your bargaining about your salary at a new job, it all comes down to allocating resources in a way that is agreeable for all parties involved. However, many negotiations lead to sub-optimal
solutions. In order to reach solutions that are (more) optimal for all parties, it is important to work together on mutual benefits, thereby creating value that was not apparent
immediately at the start of the negotiation. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) name this creation of value “expanding the pie”, as a metaphor for adding value to “one fixed pie that needs to be divided”. A famous example of this is that of two people arguing over an orange. Both need an orange for their planned activities, yet they only have one. They both stand their ground and refuse to accept any outcome that would be considered an unfair division. Eventually, they decide that the only fair solution is to cut the orange in half, so they can both have an equal share of the orange. Then, they start discussing what they are going to do with their share of the orange. The first person explains that he intends to make orange juice. The other explains that he intends to make an orange pie. By discussing their
intentions (i.e. “I want to make juice/pie”) rather than their positions (i.e. “I want the orange”), they come to the realization that they can come to a mutually beneficial solution: one can use the inside of the orange to make the juice, while the other can use the peels to make the pie, thereby making ideal use of the orange and both accomplishing their
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parties that reinforces the creation of value, instead of merely dividing the initial perceived value.
The example of the orange as mentioned above shows the motivation of both parties to express their interests to each other. They are motivated to think about what the other party needs alongside expressing their own needs. This is labelled as having a prosocial motive, as opposed to a proself motive. We can hypothesize from the orange example that having a prosocial motive trumps having a proself motive when trying to expand the pie.
Now imagine that one of the people that wants the orange is the other’s employer. It seems logical that an employer has more power in this situation, and may be able to
demand the entire orange, leaving the employee with nothing. But what does this mean for the status quo of their relationship? Would it be desirable to work for an employer that claims everything without thinking about the personal situation of his employees? There are multiple factors at play here. It seems that a person with more power can more easily claim a larger share of the outcome. But there may still be a desire to reach an agreement that is more beneficial to all parties, in order to keep everybody happy. A famous quote is “with more power comes more responsibility”, and this may just apply to negotiation situations with power differences between the involved parties. The way a person with more power behaves can in part be attributed to his own social motive. It could be
hypothesized that a person with more power and a proself motive claims more of the initial value, without having to think about the other’s interest. Additionally, it could be
hypothesized that a person with more power and a prosocial motive tries to create extra value for all parties, ultimately increasing value for everyone. However, this may mean that this person has to sacrifice some of his own value to enlarge the total value. And what does
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this mean for the input of the party with less power? In the rest of this introduction, we aim to explain how both social motive and power are expected to influence negotiated outcomes and expanding the pie, leading up to our research hypotheses and general research
question.
Negotiation and social motive
Negotiation is defined as a form of social interaction in which the principal goal is resource allocation (Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Thompson, 1990). The amount and
distribution of resources is often perceived as fixed to a certain point. Within this paradigm, people often have the notion that if one party gains, the other party automatically loses. Pruitt and Lewis (1975) were among the first to research the opportunity to add value to a negotiation, enlarging the joint profit of negotiators. They found that negotiators have to be concerned about their own profit as well as that of their counterpart in order to enlarge their outcome. This is labeled having a Problem Solving Orientation. However, this
orientation alone is not enough to ensure a larger joint profit. Additionally, the exchange of information between negotiators is important (Schulz & Pruitt, 1978). In most instances, the needs of the involved parties are not identical. It is therefore important to express what you need and also listen to what your counterpart needs in order to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. Still, negotiators often settle for suboptimal compromise agreements. Thompson and Hastie (1991) argue that this is in part due to misperceptions of the other party’s interests. They found that most negotiators enter negotiation expecting the other party’s interests to be completely opposed to their own, and even after learning that this is not the case, negotiators fail to understand that their interests are compatible with those of the other party. The inability to conceptualize compatibility in different interests is labeled
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a fixed-pie perception (FPP: Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1991). Thompson (1991) further argues that not only the opportunity for information exchange is required, but also the inherent value of this exchanged information. It was found that when negotiators provide and seek information that is accurate, as opposed to being (mutually) deceptive, this enhances negotiation outcomes.
Another way social motives influence negotiation is by social value orientations (Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Olekalns, Smith, & Kibby, 1996). Social value orientations influence outcome preferences, expectations, and strategic choices. Olekalns and Smith (1999), also using dyadic negotiations in their research, found that negotiation strategy is influenced by social motivation of the dyad as a whole: prosocial dyads use restructuring and supportive strategies and focus on progress management. Proself dyads focus on priority information exchange and concessionary behavior while avoiding positional arguing.
As mentioned earlier, it is expected that a prosocial orientation results in more integrative bargaining and expanding the pie.
Negotiation and power
In the aforementioned literature there has been a focus on integrative negotiation with regard to create value for both parties, therefore implying a preference for prosocial orientations. There seems to be consensus that the concepts of trust, information sharing, and a general concern about the other’s needs as well as your own needs, facilitate
integrative bargaining and the opportunity to add value to the joint outcome. However, substantial research has also been conducted on the subject of power and its effect on positioning in a negotiation. Low-power negotiators are influenced more by the emotions of
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their counterpart than high-power negotiators (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2005). They showed that one’s emotional state not only affects one’s own behavior, but also that of their counterpart. They make the distinction between intrapersonal and
interpersonal effects of emotions or general affect. A positive affect facilitates more cooperative behavior from both players, whereas a negative affect facilitates more
competitive behavior. These findings suggest that if an individual is in a position of power and has a proself motivation, a more distributive bargaining style is more likely to occur. On a similar note, Mannix and Neale (1993) found that negotiators with equal power reach a higher joint outcome than in an unbalanced power situation, but here there is no mention of social motivation in their study.
One aspect that may facilitate the amount of power of a negotiator is called the Best
Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA: Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011). As the title
implies, this relates to having other options available besides being solely depended on the outcome of the negotiation. Having a liable alternative increases the likelihood of a person to be more consistent and steady in setting limits. If one’s alternative option is less certain, they will more likely waffle in the setting of limits and rationalize these limits differently, making them more vulnerable for an opposing party to exploit this.
According to Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007), a high-power party is more likely to initiate competitive interaction in a negotiation. This is because the sensation of power activates the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), making a person more prone to risk-taking and dominating behavior, which is also supported by Anderson and Galinsky (2006). The BAS-system opposes the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), which makes a person more prone to caution and relying on certainty. These findings are supported by De
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Dreu and Van Kleef (2004). They argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Parties with less power are more prone to uncertain
tendencies in their behavior, resulting in lower demands and more vulnerability for exploitation.
Following these results, it is difficult to hypothesize if having power differences between parties facilitates or opposes expanding the pie. But it seems clear that the effect of power differences can not be ignored in negotiations.
Expanding the pie
In order to reach mutually beneficial outcomes, people have to be creative in their thinking, which requires more mental resources than distributive bargaining. Basadur, Pringle, Speranzini, and Bacot (2000) offer a method for expanding the pie. They argue that it is important to reconceptualize the problem. The process of using creativity successfully in a negotiation consists of four stages: problem generation, problem conceptualization, solution optimization, and solution implementation. But even if one or both of the negotiators are aware of the presence of fixed-pie perceptions, they are not always motivated or capable enough to engage in the required creative thinking. De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel (2000) found that one has to be sufficiently motivated to let go FPPs. This means the negotiation topic needs to be personally involving, have important implications, or when one is held accountable for his actions. There appears to be a subconscious
appraisal of engagement, resulting in flexibility between fixed-pie thinking and further integrative bargaining. Furthermore, when sharing information, negotiators may choose to strategically misrepresent information to their own benefit. In a situation where trust is low, negotiators may withhold information because of fear of exploitation and greed, and
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even share inaccurate information out of greed (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). But even though one has to watch out for potential hostile motives of their counterpart in order not to be exploited, honesty pays (Van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011). When being honest, rather than striking one good deal by using deception, the formation of valuable coalitions and contributions to better individual outcomes in future negotiations with the same parties may be facilitated.
Brett and Thompson (2016) present a clear model of negotiation behaviors and the effect on subsequent outcomes. They argue that negotiation behavior depends on
negotiation strategy (i.e. distributive versus integrative), cognitive and motivational biases, personality types, social motivation, emotions and moods, trust, reputations and
relationships, gender, and power. Another strategy in negotiation that has been formulated from literature is called logrolling. Logrolling is the process of making concessions at issues of lower priority in exchange for gains on issues that have a higher priority for the party in question (Moran, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2008; Moran & Ritov, 2002). This way, both parties are able to create value by maximizing outcome on higher priority issues. This process requires information sharing between the parties in order to identify where value can be created.
Current research
In this research we aimed to investigate the following research question: Do different power levels and different social motives influence negotiation outcomes? To answer this question, we conducted a negotiation exercise between two fictional employees of a café, where social motive (proself versus prosocial orientation) and power (power-difference versus equal power) were manipulated, using a mandatory-optional issue
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paradigm. Note that in this research we only gave participants a notion of power, by
explicitly telling them that one of them had a power role. In reality they had the exact same opportunity as their counterpart to reach certain outcomes. Participants were able to expand the pie by making use of optional issues. These issues were not mandatory for the completion of the exercise, but could be used to enlarge the value of the negotiated
outcome. The optional issues were formulated in a way that we expected to require integrative bargaining, more so than the mandatory issues. Furthermore, the point distribution system is designed in such a way that using strategies to expand the pie, as mentioned in the section above, allows for a better opportunity to score points. This particular paradigm has never been used before in negotiation research, so it should
provide new insights to this specific theoretical framework. The following hypotheses were formulated:
1. There is a difference between roles in the negotiated outcome. Participants were assigned a role with either more perceived power, less perceived power, or equal power. Additionally, participants had the instruction to score as much points as possible for themselves or for them both together. For analytic purposes it is important to see if there is a difference between roles, before further exploring differences between conditions.
2. There is a difference across social motive conditions in the negotiated outcome. Participants in the prosocial condition were expected to make more use of integrative bargaining styles, thereby scoring a higher negotiated outcome than participants in the proself condition.
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3. There is a difference across the power conditions in the negotiated outcome. Participants in the higher-power role were expected to differ in their negotiated outcome from participants in the lower-power role.
4. There is a difference between roles across power and social motive conditions (interaction effect) in the negotiated outcome. The effect of power may in part depend on the social motive of the dyad, and the other way around.
5. There is a difference across conditions in the use of optional issues. Participants in the prosocial condition were expected to differ in the number of optional issues used from participants in the proself condition, and use more.
Method Participants
Participants consisted of employees of various companies in the Netherlands, aged 17 to 69 (Md = 35). 42.1% was male, 57.9% female. 96 dyads were formed (N = 192). Companies from our personal social networks were approached with the option to join a negotiation- and communication training for their employees. We offered this training free of charge, but asked for usage of the outcomes for research purposes in return, as the training would normally cost a fee.
Design
This research’s design is a 2x2-design. The independent variables were social motive (prosocial versus proself) and power (power-difference versus equal-power).
In the prosocial condition, the dyad members were supposed to gather as many points as possible for them together. In the proself condition, each member of the dyad was supposed to try gain as much points as possible for themselves.
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In the power-difference condition, one member of the dyad was appointed the boss of the other in the game. This information was expressed on multiple occasions during the introduction by the researcher, and was explicitly stated on all the participants’ exercise forms in this condition. However, it was only stated that one of them had a power role. Both dyad members still had equal opportunity to gain points in terms of the task itself. In the
equal-power condition, power roles were not mentioned.
Materials
The materials used for the current research were created for earlier research conducted by the research’s supervisor, Dr. Wolfgang Steinel. The specific paradigm was developed by König (2017), at that time a student under Dr. Steinel’s supervision, with only slight moderations added for applicability to this research.
Negotiation task In dyads, participants negotiated about management of the fictional
café “Sandwich to Heaven”. One dyad member was given the role of “Sam”, the other the role of “Pat”. Note that in the power-difference condition, Sam was always appointed the boss of the dyad. We aimed to use gender-neutral names to make the exercise applicable for both traditional sexes. Participants could negotiate about seven issues, which were work hours, closing days, cleaning schedule, tip distribution, ingredients, redecoration, and party management. The pay-off schedules gave an overview of how much could be gained or lost by negotiating a specific outcome for a given issue. Four negotiation issues had a forced agreement formulation (mandatory) and three had the option to reach no agreement
(optional). Participants were able to win or lose points by reaching certain agreements. The point system was framed so that certain issues were more important than others specific for each role, and there was the possibility to create value by using integrative solutions
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and optional issues. The options for distribution of points among players are described in Table 1.
Table 1
Point distribution in negotiation exercise
Mandatory issues Possible agreements Pat Sam Joint outcome
Work shifts 8 hours + 1 + 1 + 2
6 hours 0 0 0
9.5 hours - 1 - 1 - 2
Day closed Closed on Sunday + 4 0 + 4
Closed on Monday + 2 + 2 + 4
Closed on Saturday 0 + 4 + 4
Cleaning schedule Clean after night shift 0 + 6 + 6
Clean before day shift + 3 + 3 + 6
Hire someone + 6 0 + 6
Dividing the tips Keep all tips for yourself - 2 + 2 0
Share 25%, keep the rest - 1 + 1 0
Share 50%, keep the rest 0 0 0
Share 75%, keep the rest + 1 - 1 0
Share all the tips with everyone + 2 - 2 0 Optional issues Possible agreements Pat Sam Joint outcome
Ingredients Only organic ingredients + 6 - 3 + 3
Only regional ingredients + 4 - 2 + 2
Focus on seasonal ingredients + 2 - 1 + 1
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No agreement 0 0 0
Redecoration café Entire café in vintage style + 4 0 + 4 Only new vintage furniture + 3 + 1 + 4 Only new Scandinavian furniture + 1 + 3 + 4 Entire café in Scandinavian style 0 + 4 + 4
No agreement 0 0 0
Themed parties No themed parties, ever + 1 - 3 - 2
Twice a year - 1 + 2 + 1
Four times a year - 2 + 4 + 2
Six times a year - 3 + 6 + 3
No agreement 0 0 0
Pre-negotiation questionnaire Prior to the negotiation task, participants answered
some basic control items. It contained three items about the understanding of the pay-off schedule, and one item to check comprehension of the power manipulation (i.e. “Who has
more power, Sam or Pat?”).
Post-negotiation questionnaire The post negotiation questionnaire consisted of 43
items. Examples of items are “I fought for a good outcome for myself” and “I was willing to
reach an agreement on specific issues that did not benefit my cause”. Of the post-negotiation
questionnaire, two scales were used to verify whether manipulations were perceived accurately. One scale measured “concern for other”, in order to assess perception of the social motive manipulation. It consisted of three items, “In the negotiation, I found it very
important to take the other’s interest into account”, “It was crucial for me that the other gets a good deal as well”, and “I wanted to achieve an agreement that is satisfying for both of us”.
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The other scale measured “perceived power”, in order to assess perception of the power manipulation. It consisted of three items, “Sam was the boss of the café”, “Sam had more
influence than Pat”, and “Pat and Sam had equal influence in the negotiation”.
Procedure
The negotiation training was given on site at the participating company’s grounds. At the start of the training one of the researches gave a small introduction. At this point,
participants were told that they were always allowed to leave if they wished during the training and that data collection would be performed randomized and anonymously. Those willing to continue then signed the consent form. The consent form is provided as Appendix A.
The participants were then asked to form dyads, in order to conduct a negotiation exercise in a fictional setting. The exercise took about 20 minutes. During the exercise, participants negotiated with each other in order to gain as much of the resources that benefitted their respective cause as possible. The results of this negotiation and the follow-up questionnaire were gathered as data for this research. The participants received a form containing the rules of the negotiation and their respective role description, and a pay-off schedule indicating which negotiable issues were more valuable to their respective cause and which were less. There were seven issues to negotiate about, of which the first four issues were mandatory to be agreed upon, and the remaining three were optional. Per negotiable issue were three to five optional outcomes the participants could choose from. If an agreement on an issue was reached, both participants of a dyad marked the outcome on their own form. The reported outcome was required be identical for each dyad member on every issue, meaning that there could be no different reported outcomes among dyads.
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Participants were told that they were able to share and discuss all (ir-)relevant information they wanted, allowing for the opportunity to use deception or form creative solutions. The only restriction was that they were not allowed to show their personal role description and pay-off schedule to their counterparts. They were however, free to talk about what
information was supposedly written on the instruction sheets and pay-off schedules. An example of an instruction sheet with role information is provided as Appendix B.
All information about the rules of the exercise as described above was walked
through with the participants by the appointed researcher, and participants’ understanding was checked with a number of questions on the back of the instruction forms. This pre-negotiation questionnaire is provided as Appendix C. The pay-off schedules are provided as Appendix D. Any additional questions were answered by the researcher before the start of the negotiation. The amount of experimental conditions that could be applied to a group depended on group size and situational factors (e.g. main room size or the availability of other rooms or offices). If these factors allowed for multiple experimental conditions, the group was split up in order to give an introduction suited to the experimental design. In this case, another researcher would take a subgroup to a different location in order to give the appropriate introduction. After the negotiation exercise, participants counted their own total of points gained during the negotiation, filled in a questionnaire regarding the exercise, and then had the opportunity for a small coffee break. The post-negotiation questionnaire is provided as Appendix E.
Following the break and if all participants had regathered in the main room, an interactive discussion was formed about the occurred experiences and achieved outcomes during the exercise. The researchers formulated their questions and answers on a
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theoretical basis, thus educating the participants along the way. In this way, the debriefing of the experiment was done interactively.
The rest of the training consisted of more theory, interactivity, and other small negotiation exercises, the content of which is of no further interest for this research. The duration of the entire training was about two to three hours. On request of some
participating companies a shortened version of the training was given. This had no implications for the duration of the negotiation exercise, only shortening the subsequent discussion and omitting additional exercises, resulting in a total duration of approximately one and a half hour.
Results Treatment of data
Four dyads provided non-corresponding pay-off schedules or did not reach an agreement for all mandatory issues. This involves the groups 2, 34, 55, and 180. These dyads were therefore omitted from the data, with 92 dyads remaining for analysis. Measurement and manipulation checks
To measure whether participants understood the point distribution of the exercise, the first three items of the pre-negotiation questionnaire were examined. On average, 90.48% of the control items were answered accurately. The lowest accuracy rate was 83.5%. Therefore, it can be assumed that the participants mostly understood the point distribution of the pay-off schedule.
To measure whether participants understood the social motive manipulation, a multivariate a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed, with a 2
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the “concern for others” scale for Pats and for Sams as dependent variables. This scale consisted of the three items, “In the negotiation, I found it very important to take the other’s
interest into account”, “It was crucial for me that the other gets a good deal as well”, and “I wanted to achieve an agreement that is satisfying for both of us”. This scale had a reliability
of α = .517 for Pats and α = .628 for Sams. The composite scores of this scale are M = 4.58,
SD = 1.10 for Pats and M = 4.52, SD = 1.09 for Sams. A strong main effect was shown, F(2,
91) = 15.94, p < .001, η2 = .259. Pats had more concern for others in the prosocial condition (M = 5.01, SD = .90) than in the proself condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.12). Sams too had more concern for others in the prosocial condition (M = 4.88, SD = 1.00) than in the proself condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.05). This indicates that the social motive manipulation was effective.
To measure whether participants understood the power manipulation, two
MANOVAs with a 2 (prosocial versus proself ) x 2 (power-difference versus equal-power) were performed. The first MANOVA had the control question on power (i.e. “Who has more
power, Sam or Pat?”) from the pre-negotiation questionnaire as dependent variable. A
strong main effect was shown, F(2, 80) = 39.75, p < .001, η2 = 4.98. This indicates that the power manipulation was effective. In contrast, 32% of participants in the power-difference condition (N = 33) potentially misreported and filled in that Sam and Pat had the same amount of power.
The second MANOVA had the “perceived power” scale for Pats and for Sams as dependent variables. It consisted of three items, “Sam was the boss of the café”, “Sam had
more influence than Pat”, and “Pat and Sam had equal influence in the negotiation”. This scale
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are M = 3.81, SD = 1.54 for Pats, and M = 4.04, SD = 1.32 for Sams. A strong main effect was shown, F(2, 91) = 31.56, p < .001, η2 = 4.10. Pats reported Sam to have more power in the power-difference condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.14) than in the equal-power condition (M = 2.81, SD = 1.37). Sams reported to have more power than Pat in the power difference condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.04) than in the equal-power condition (M = 3.27, SD = 1.23). This also indicates that the power manipulation was effective.
Main analysis
To measure whether a different power level and different social motives could influence negotiation outcomes, a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures ANOVA) was performed. Between-dyad factors were role (Pat versus Sam), social motive (prosocial versus proself), power (equal-power versus power-difference), and interaction (social motive x power). The within-dyad factor was power difference (more power versus less power) in the power-difference condition. Dependent variables were negotiated outcome for hypotheses 1 through 4, and number of optional issues used for hypothesis 5. Table 2 gives an overview of the mean scores across conditions.
Table 2
Mean scores and standard deviations of negotiated outcomes across conditions
Social Motive condition Prosocial Proself
Power condition Equal Difference Equal Difference
Joint outcome M 18.73 18.79 18.05 17.42 SD 2.81 2.30 3.08 3.01 Individual outcome Pat M 8.73 8.29 8.47 8.75 SD 3.55 4.84 3.26 2.98 Individual outcome Sam M 10.00 10.50 9.58 8.67 SD 3.72 5.01 3.29 2.85
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Hypothesis 1 predicted a difference in negotiated outcome between roles. Sams were expected to differ in their negotiate outcomes from Pats. Results did not reveal the predicted main effect of a difference in negotiated outcome between roles, F(1, 92) = 1.960,
p = .165, η2 = .022. This means that results do not support hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 predicted a difference in negotiated outcome across social motive conditions. Results did not reveal the predicted main effect of a difference in negotiated outcome between social motive conditions, F(1, 92) < 1, p = .370, η2 = .009. This means that results do not support hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicted a difference in negotiated outcome between roles across the power conditions. Sams (role with more power) were expected to differ in their negotiated outcomes from Pats (role with less power), and score higher. Results did not reveal the predicted main effect of a difference in negotiated outcomes between roles across power conditions, F(1, 92) < 1, p = .866, η2 = .000. This means that results do not support
hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 predicted a difference in negotiated outcome between roles across power and social motive conditions (interaction effect). Results did not reveal the predicted interaction effect in negotiated outcome, F(1, 92) < 1, p = .866, η2 = .007. This means that results do not support hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 predicted a difference in number of optional issues used across conditions. Results did not reveal the predicted main effect in number of optional issues used in the case of power, F(1, 92) < 1, p = .833, η2 = .000. This means that results do not support hypothesis 5 for the power condition. The results did reveal a main effect in
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number of optional issues used in the case of social motive, F(1, 92) = 5.287, p = .024, η2 = .054. This means that participants in the prosocial condition made more use of optional issues than did participants in the proself condition. Results did not reveal the predicted interaction effect in number of optional issues used between conditions, F(1, 92) < 1, p = .928, η2 = .000. This means that results do not support hypothesis 5 for the interaction effect.
Discussion Strengths, limitations, and implications
The main research question was: Do different power levels and different social motives influence negotiation outcomes? Hypotheses about the value of outcomes were not supported by the data. A difference was found in the usage of optional issues; participants in the proself condition made less use of optional issues than did participants in the prosocial condition. Multiple factors may have contributed to these findings.
It is possible that the experimental manipulations did not have the intended effect. During multiple training sessions, participants asked questions about the power
manipulation, especially in regard of the control question before commencing the actual exercise (e.g. “In what way do I have more power than my counterpart? Do I get the final say in decisions or something?”). Many of them (accurately) noted that assignment to a “more powerful” role did not have any internal implications for the opportunities of both parties during the negotiation. This also became evident from analysis of the control questions, with 32% of the participants despite being assigned to the power-difference condition still reporting equal power among roles, and questions about this during the discussions afterwards. This is in line with the definition of power by Wolfe and McGinn
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(2005), who define power as the capacity to control one’s own and the other’s resources and outcomes. Especially in case of the power manipulation, I would recommend
manipulating actual power, for example by adding decision power or higher possible outcomes for the boss role in future research. To add to this, the role and understanding of power vary a lot over the extensive literature. An important distinction of power across gender roles is given by Steinel and Harinck (2019). They showed variation between men and women in their usage of power across various power roles. It may be interesting for future research to further examine these differences. An alternative explanation is offered by Wei and Luo (2012), who performed a similar experiment using social motive and power manipulations. They found that participants across social motive and power manipulations did not vary in their joint outcome, and that this could have been because of different problem solving behaviors, which were not examined in the current research.
Additionally, participants noted during the afterwards discussions that they found it difficult to relate to their assigned roles. Participants who were prosocially oriented in real life indicated difficulty in veining a proself motive during negotiation, and vice versa for proself people in prosocial roles. The same held for participants assigned in high-power roles that were not used to this in real life. Some participants reported that they had abandoned their role information entirely, and instead just played the game as they would have normally.
Finally, a number of participants appeared to not understand their role information at all. It was not until the afterwards discussion that they discovered that they were to behave in a prosocial or proself way (same for more/less power). Luckily, only a small number of participants expressed this to such an extent, but there could have been more
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participants that did not fully understand the exercise. This could be an indication that the role information should be more complete, more integrated into the exercise, or perhaps manipulations should be done in another way.
Also, some experimental power could have been lost because of non-random
assignment of dyads. Participants were free to form a dyad with whoever they wanted. This may have resulted in co-workers who were already friendly with each other to pair up, and take the exercise less serious. Perhaps a more random assignment would have allowed for more seriousness during the exercise.
Negotiation trainings were given on company grounds. This may have been a
strength as well as a limitation. Experimental research often requires a laboratory setting in order to get results that can not be attributed to external factors. However, in this real life setting, participants may have felt more certain about themselves and their abilities in negotiation, resulting in a more natural outcome. We have not repeated this experiment in a sterile environment, so the unique effects can not be compared in this way.
Optional issues may not have been used because of time shortage rather than not reaching an agreement because of experimental manipulations. This became evident because a number of dyads had not finished the exercise when they were forced to end. Because of this, the usage of optional issues could be misrepresented in the final results. I would recommend longer time to complete the exercise for future research. However, a difference was found across social motive conditions for this subject, so the effect of this manipulation may have been enough still.
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The paradigm used for this research has never been used before besides for Master theses. First developed in this form by student König (2017), and from that moment on by a handful of other students, it may require more extensively researched methods of
manipulation, as well as an appraisal of the usage of optional issues, in order to assess its fit for the scientific community. My belief is that significant effects can be found using a similar paradigm in the future, especially when keeping in mind the findings of previous research in negotiation with focus on power and social motive, if the previously discussed topics are appropriately resolved.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Wolfgang Steinel for his work as supervisor for this
research. He was very helpful in answering questions about the data and analysis, and the research in general. Especially his flexibility was a pleasure. He went out of his way during and outside of office hours in order to have general meetings and to be present at the training sessions. Additionally, I would like to thank Laura Bargeman and Iris Prummel for their contribution in the theoretical framework, finding participants, conducting the training sessions, data analysis, and general support.
24 References
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 36, 511-536.
Basadur, M., Pringle, P., Speranzini, G., & Bacot, M. (2000). Collaborative problem solving through creativity in problem definition: Expanding the pie. Creativity and
Innovation Management, 9(1), 54-73.
Brett, J., & Thompson, L. (2016). Negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 136, 68-79. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.06.003.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Koole, S. L., & Steinel, W. (2000). Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 79(6), 975-978.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004). The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negatiation. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 40(3), 303-319.
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without giving
in. New York, United States of America: Penguin Books.
König, L. A. (2017). Expanding the pie: The effect of power asymmetry and gender
differences on value creation in negotiations. Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Leiden
University, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1993). Power imbalance and pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation, 2(2), 119-133.
Moran, S., Bereby-Meyer, Y., & Bazerman, M. N. (2008). Stretching the effectiveness of analogical training in negotiations: Teaching diverse principles for creating value.
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1, 99-134. [nog integreren]
Moran, S., & Ritov, I. (2002). Initial perceptions in negotiations: Evaluation and response to ‘logrolling’ offers. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15(2), 101-124.
Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (1999). Social value orientations and strategy choices in
competitive negotiations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(6), 657-668. Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Kibby, R. (1996). Social value orientations and negotiator
25
Steinel, W., & Harinck, F. (2019). Mighty women, weak men or vice versa—who is best at
expanding the pie? A new paradigm to explore the effects of gender and power on integrative negotiation. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
International Association for Conflict Management, July 2019, Dublin, Ireland. Thompson, L. L. (1990). An examination of experienced and naïve negotiators. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 480-492.
Thompson, L. L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47(1), 98-123.
Van Beest, I., Steinel, W., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 47, 738-747.
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2005). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on concession making. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 557-581. Wei, Q., & Luo, X. (2012). The impact of power differential and social motivation on
negotiation behavior and outcome. Public Personnel Management, 41(5), 47-58. Wolf, R., & McGinn, J. (2005). Perceived relative power and its influence on negotiations.
26 Appendices
Appendix A. Consent form
Dit spel is een afstudeerproject van de Universiteit Leiden...
Je gaat een onderhandelspel spelen en daarna een korte vragenlijst invullen. Dit zal ongeveer 15 tot 25 minuten duren. Deelname is vrijwillig, en je kunt te allen tijde stoppen als je wilt.
Je doet anoniem mee. Al jouw antwoorden zullen vertrouwelijk behandeld worden.
Met klachten kun je terecht bij dr. W. Steinel van de Universiteit Leiden: wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl Je kunt een prijs winnen! Hoe beter de overeenstemming is die je bereikt, des te groter je winkans!
...Hartelijk bedankt dat je mee wilt doen!
Teken a.u.b. hieronder om te bevestigen dat je met deelname aan dit onderzoek akkoord gaat.
___________________, juni/juli/augustus/september/oktober/november 2019 Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening: Naam: Handtekening:
27
Appendix B. Example of instruction sheet and role information (Pat, equal-power, prosocial condition)
Café “Sandwich Heaven”
Groepsnumm er
Versie
20190401
HET SPEL
Oefen je onderhandelingsvaardigheden! Dit spel gaat over onderhandelen en het bereiken van een overeenkomst. Jullie spelen Sam en Pat, samen runnen jullie het café Sandwich Heaven. In dit kleine populaire café, serveren jullie koffie, drankjes en broodjes.
Jij bent Pat.
Om ervoor te zorgen dat alles soepel blijft verlopen, hebben jullie vandaag een werkoverleg. Jullie gaan zeven problemen bespreken. Voor elk probleem zijn er verschillende oplossingen mogelijk, jij hebt een voorkeur voor één van deze oplossingen. Met elke oplossing, kan jij punten winnen of verliezen.
Kijk naar het gekleurde blad: Jij geeft de voorkeur aan de oplossingen waarmee jij de meeste punten kan verdienen (dit zijn de hoogste zwartgekleurde getallen). De negatieve getallen in
rood geven een voor jou ongewenste oplossing waarmee je punten verliest.
DOEL VAN HET SPEL
Het doel van het spel is om voor elk probleem een oplossing te vinden waar jullie beide mee instemmen.
Overeenstemming bereiken. Het bereiken van een overeenstemming betekent dat één oplossing geselecteerd wordt die voor beide partijen geldt. Je moet een oplossing vinden voor de eerste vier problemen! Voor de laatste drie problemen is het niet nodig om een
overeenstemming te bereiken – als je het niet eens kan worden over de oplossing, kan je de oplossing “geen overeenstemming” selecteren.
Punten. Jouw doel is om zo veel mogelijk punten te verdienen voor jou en Sam samen. Hoe meer punten jullie samen verdienen, hoe groter de kans is om prijzen te winnen! Hoe kan je punten verdienen? Door met Sam te onderhandelen! Let op: als je geen oplossingen kan vinden voor de eerste vier problemen in de gegeven tijd, dan heb je geen punten verdient en is het spel voorbij.
Belangrijk: Je mag over alles praten, maar je mag jouw punten schema (gekleurde blad) NIET aan Sam laten zien! Als je dit wel doet, is het spel voorbij en win je geen prijs.
Beantwoord alstublieft de vragen aan de achterkant van dit blad om te controleren of de instructies helder waren.
28
29
Appendix D. Pay-off schedules
Probleem Voorkeur van
Sam
Mogelijke oplossingen:Punten voor Sam
Diensten
Diensten van 8 uur zijn het meest praktisch, met oog op de openingstijden. Met diensten van 8 uur kunnen twee mensen werken in het café: één persoon werkt de vroege dienst (vaak doe jij dit), de ander werkt voornamelijk de late dienst.
8 uur 6 uur 9.5 uur + 1 0 ̶ 1 O O O Dag gesloten
Jouw voorkeur gaat ernaar uit om het café op zondag te sluiten omdat deze dag de minste opbrengsten oplevert. Jij wil niet dat het café op zaterdag sluit omdat op deze dag de meeste winst wordt gemaakt.
Gesloten op zondag Gesloten op maandag Gesloten op zaterdag + 4 + 2 0 O O O Schoonmaak rooster
Jij bent van mening dat de medewerkers het café moeten schoonmaken, het liefst na de avonddienst (jij werkt voornamelijk de dagdienst). Het is zonde van het geld om iemand in te huren voor de schoonmaak omdat het café erg klein is en makkelijk om schoon te maken.
Schoonmaken na avonddienst Schoonmaken voor dagdienst Iemand inhuren + 6 + 3 0 O O O Verdeling van fooien
Jij vindt het eerlijker als iedereen zijn eigen fooi mag houden omdat sommige diensten drukker zijn dan anderen. Tijdens drukke diensten worden meer fooien gegeven dan tijdens de rustige diensten. De medewerkers die tijdens de drukke diensten werken verdienen het om meer fooi te krijgen.
Alle fooien voor jezelf Deel 25%, de rest voor jezelf Deel 50%, de rest voor jezelf Deel 75%, de rest voor jezelf Deel alle fooien met iedereen
+ 2 + 1 0 ̶ 1 ̶ 2 O O O O O Ingrediënten
Pat bijft zeuren over organische ingrediënten. Zelf denk je dat gewone ingrediënten prima zijn. Eerder heb je al voorgesteld om de goedkoopste ingrediënten te gebruiken, maar Pat was hier fel op tegen en stond erop dat jullie gecertificeerde ingrediënten gebruiken. Je wil hier niet weer ruzie over maken en jouw voorkeur gaat ernaar uit om het probleem te laten rusten.
Alleen de goedkoopste ingrediënten Focus op seizoensingrediënten Alleen regionale ingrediënten Alleen organische ingrediënten Geen overeenstemming ingrediënten
+ 1 ̶ 1 ̶ 2 ̶ 3 0 O O O O Opnieuw inrichten van het café
Het café heeft een praktisch, maar een beetje versleten interieur en moet opnieuw ingericht worden. Jij geeft de voorkeur aan de strakke uitstraling van Scandinavisch design. Vintage design is volgens jou niet beter dan wat jullie nu al hebben.
Gehele café in Scandinavische stijl Alleen nieuw Scandinavisch meubilair Alleen nieuw vintage meubilair Inrichten gehele café in vintage stijl Geen overeenstemming inrichting
+ 4 + 3 + 1 0 0 O O O O Themafeesten
Je hebt Pat al meerdere malen verteld dat je het belangrijk vindt om themafeesten te geven in het café. Je hebt de stellige overtuiging dat themafeesten leuk zijn en een goede manier om nieuwe klanten te werven. Wat jou betreft: hoe meer feesten, hoe beter.
Zes keer per jaar Vier keer per jaar Twee keer per jaar Geen themafeesten, ooit Geen overeenstemming themafeesten
+ 6 + 4 + 2 ̶ 3 0 O O O O
Developed by Wolfgang Steinel © 201 9 NEGOTIATIONTRAINING.NL
All rights reserved. D o no t re p rod uc e w itho u t w ritte n p e rmis s ion.
www.negotiationtraining.nl info@negotiationtraining.nl Markeer de oplossing die jullie hebben gekozen .
Probleem Voorkeur van
Pat
Mogelijke oplossingen:Punten voor Pat
Diensten
Jouw voorkeur gaat uit naar diensten van 8 uur. 9.5 uur per dag werken is te vermoeiend. Een dienst van 6 uur betekent dat jij een extra dag zal moeten werken om genoeg geld te verdienen, dit doe jij liever niet.
8 uur 6 uur 9.5 uur + 1 0 ̶ 1 O O O Dag gesloten
Jouw voorkeur gaat ernaar uit om het café op zaterdag te sluiten omdat je dan voetbal training hebt en je stelt je team niet graag teleur. Je wil het café liever niet op zondag sluiten omdat het ontspannen is om dan te werken.
Gesloten op zaterdag Gesloten op maandag Gesloten op zondag + 4 + 2 0 O O O Schoonmaak rooster
Jij werkt voornamelijk avonddiensten en je wil daarna niet ook nog schoonmaken. Jij vindt het belangrijk dat het café professioneel wordt schoongemaakt, dus jij wil hiervoor iemand inhuren omdat je niet bereid bent om zelf schoon te maken.
Iemand inhuren Schoonmaken voor dagdienst Schoonmaken na avonddienst + 6 + 3 0 O O O Verdeling van fooien
Iedereen zijn eigen fooi laten houden is niet eerlijk omdat de avonddiensten meer fooi krijgen dan de dagdiensten. Daarbij vind jij dat de mensen die in de keuken werken ook een deel van de fooi verdienen. Daarom wil jij graag dat de fooi met iedereen wordt gedeeld.
Deel alle fooien met iedereen Deel 75%, de rest voor jezelf Deel 50%, de rest voor jezelf Deel 25%, de rest voor jezelf Alle fooien voor jezelf
+ 2 + 1 0 ̶ 1 ̶ 2 O O O O O Ingrediënten
Je hebt Sam al meerdere keren verteld dat je het erg belangrijk vindt om duurzame ingrediënten te gebruiken en niet de goedkoopste opties! Dit is het beste voor het milieu en daarnaast ook nog hip.
Alleen organische ingrediënten Alleen regionale ingrediënten Focus op seizoensingrediënten Alleen de goedkoopste ingrediënten Geen overeenstemming ingrediënten
+ 6 + 4 + 2 ̶ 3 0 O O O O Opnieuw inrichten café
Het café heeft een praktisch, maar versleten interieur en moet opnieuw worden ingericht. Jij geeft de voorkeur aan een gezellige, vintage stijl. Jij denkt niet dat Scandinavisch design het interieur van het café zal verbeteren in vergelijking met hoe het er nu uitziet.
Gehele café in vintage stijl Alleen nieuw vintage meubilair Alleen nieuw Scandinavisch meubilair
Gehele café in Scandinavische stijl Geen overeenstemming inrichting
+ 4 + 3 + 1 0 0 O O O O Themed Parties
Sam blijft zeuren over themafeesten. Jij hebt geen lol van themafeesten en het organizeren ervan kost veel tijd. Je hebt voorgesteld om geen themafeesten te geven, maar Sam was hier fel op tegen en stond erop om regelmatig een themafeest te organizeren. Je wil hier niet weer ruzie over maken en geeft er de voorkeur aan om het probleem te laten rusten.
Geen themafeesten, ooit Twee keer per jaar Vier keer per jaar Zes keer per jaar Geen overeenstemming themafeesten
+ 1 ̶ 1 ̶ 2 ̶ 3 0 O O O O
Developed by Wolfgang Steinel © 2019 NEGOTIATIONTRAINING.NL
All rights reserved. D o no t re p rod uc e w itho u t w ritte n p e rmis s ion.
30
Appendix E. Post-negotiation questionnaire (Pat version, Sam’s is nearly identical with exception of counterpart name)
Pat
Beantwoord de volgende vragenna de onderhandeling.
Groep nummer:
In hoeverre ben je het eens met de volgende stellingen? Helemaal Heel niet erg
Ik vond het leuk hoe we onderhandelden. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
De sfeer was prettig. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Als ik echt in het café werkte, zou ik het leuk vinden om daar te blijven werken. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Als ik in het café werkte, zou ik na deze onderhandeling liefst ontslag nemen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb erover nagedacht de onderhandelingen te stoppen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tijdens de onderhandeling hield ik veel rekening met mijn eigen belangen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tijdens de onderhandeling hield ik veel rekening met de belangen van Sam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Het was cruciaal voor mij dat Sam ook veel punten kreeg. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik wilde een overeenstemming bereiken waarmee we allebei tevreden zouden zijn. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We kregen allebei de kans om onze argumenten uit te leggen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We hadden open communicatie. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb informatie gedeeld over mijn voorkeuren en prioriteiten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb aan Sam verteld wat ik belangrijk vond. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb geluisterd naar de argumenten van Sam voordat ik een beslissing nam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Voordat we daadwerkelijk begonnen met de onderhandeling, hebben we eerst
besproken over welke problemen we wel of niet zouden onderhandelen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We hebben eerst samen een agenda voor de onderhandeling afgesproken, voordat we
over de problemen zijn gaan onderhandelen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik vond het niet nodig om voorafgaand aan de echte onderhandeling eerst te bespreken
over welke problemen we wel of niet zouden onderhandelen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik was van mening dat wij een betere uitkomst zouden krijgen als wij een oplossing
konden vinden voor themafeesten, herinrichting en/of ingrediënten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik wilde geen oplossing accepteren waarbij ik punten zou verliezen (minus punten). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik ging ermee akkoord om punten te verliezen bij sommige problemen zodat dit mij zou
helpen om punten te verdienen bij andere problemen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb mijn eigen punten opgeofferd om Sam te helpen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik was bereid om over problemen te onderhandelen die niet gunstig voor mij waren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31
Sam stond erop om een oplossing te vinden voor het probleem ingrediënten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sam was niet bereid om te praten over welke ingrediënten in het café worden gebruikt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik wilde tot een oplossing komen voor het probleem herinrichting. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sam stond erop om de herinrichting van het café te bespreken. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sam was niet bereid om te praten over de herinrichting van het café. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik wilde een oplossing vinden voor het probleem themafeesten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sam stond erop om het probleem van themafeesten te bespreken. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sam wilde niet praten over het probleem themafeesten. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ga door op de ommezijde a.u.b.
Hoe vaak heb je jezelf bij de onderhandelingen op de volgende manieren gedragen. Helemaal Heel niet vaak
Ik gaf toe aan de wensen van Sam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb mij aangepast aan de doelen en belangen van Sam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik stond erop dat we allebei een beetje toegaven. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik streefde waar mogelijk naar 50-50 compromissen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik drukte mijn eigen standpunt door. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik zocht naar voordeel voor mezelf. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik vocht voor een goede uitkomst voor mezelf. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik stond voor mijn eigen doelen en belangen én die van Sam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik heb alle meningen overwogen om de beste oplossing te kunnen vinden. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik zocht naar een oplossing die mijn eigen belangen én die van Sam diende. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik probeerde meningsverschillen zoveel mogelijk te vermijden. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ik probeerde confrontaties met Sam zoveel mogelijk te vermijden. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Heb je onderhandeld over de problemen themafeesten, herinrichting en/of ingrediënten? ⧠ Ja. ⧠ Nee. Waarom wel, of waarom niet?
Kende je de persoon met wie je deze onderhandeling opdracht hebt gedaan al reeds? □ Ja deze persoon is mijn partner/man/vrouw/vriend/vriendin.
□ Ja, wij zijn vrienden, goede kennissen of collega’s (zonder hiërarchie verschillen). □ Ja, wij zijn collega’s en een van ons is de baas/manager/leidinggevende van de ander. □ Wij kenden elkaar nog niet goed, of hebben elkaar vandaag voor het eerst gesproken.
Ik ben □ een man
□ een vrouw
32
Ik ben ______ jaar oud. Mijn werkveld is (bijvoorbeeld sales,
administratie, human resources, etc…):____________________________ Mijn moedertaal is
□ Nederlands
□ Anders: ____________________ Heb jij nog opmerkingen of commentaar?
Version 20190401 Bedankt voor je deelname aan dit onderzoek!
