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Securitization of Migration in the European Union:
Mind your semantics!?
Gijs Norden Student number: 1013653 Leiden University Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management Supervisor: Prof. Dr. M. Den Boer Second reader: Dr. J. Matthys Word Count:
2 Table of Contents
1 Introduction………Page 3-4 2 Literature Review Page 4-9
2.1 Copenhagen School……….………...Page 4 2.2 Securitization Theory………..………...Page 5 2.3 World Risk Society………..………...Page 5-6 2. 4 Connecting Migration to Security……….………...Page 7-9
3 Theoretical Framework Page 9-17 3.1 Politics of Insecurity………...………...Page 9-10
3.2 Framing Migrants………..………Page 10-12 3.3 Spread of Trust and Fear………...Page 12 3. 4 Administering inclusion and exclusion………...Page 13 3.5 Structuring alienation and predisposition towards violence………..………...Page 13-14 3.6 Importance of Audience………..………...Page 14-16 3.7 Internal and External Security ………...Page 16-17
4 Case Selection Page 17-25
5 Research Method Page 25-31
5.1 Unit of Analysis………..Page 26-28 5.2 Different existential danger frames………...………...Page 28-30 5.3 Semantic Code Scheme for frames………..………Page 31
6 Findings Page 32-45
6.1 Dutch EU Presidency of 1997………...………...Page 33-36 6.2 Dutch EU Presidency of 2004………..………...Page 37-40 6.3 Dutch EU Presidency of 2016………...………...Page 41-45
7 Synthesis Page 45-53
7.1 Dutch EU Presidency of 1997………..…………...Page 46-48 7.2 Dutch EU Presidency of 2004………..………..Page 48-50 7.3 Dutch EU Presidency of 2016……….………...……Page 50-52 7.4 Comparing the Presidencies………..….Page 52-53
8 Final Conclusions and Discussion Page 53-58
8.1 Final Conclusions……...………..………..…Page 52-54 8.2 Discussion ………..………Page 54-57
9 Literature References Page 59-64
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1. Introduction
During the Summer of 2015 there was an increase in the numbers of refugees applying for asylum in the European Union. Most of these refugees come from war torn regions such as Syria and Iraq (BBC 2015). These large numbers of people, asking for shelter and security, are a big challenge for the European Union and its Member States. In many states there are different opinions about how to deal with these refugees. There are also voices, in for example the
Netherlands, that portray these refugees as a threat to national security of Western States (Van Den Dool 2015). These groups of refugees are framed as a security issue because IS, allegedly stated that they would send terrorists and fighters among the refugees to disrupt European societies (Kaplan 2015). This leads to a securitization of refugees and migration in general. One could think that this process securitization of refugees and migrants is a completely new phenomenon, linked to this specific crisis. Others might think that 9/11 was a turning point and the beginning of portraying migrants as a security problem. However, this is not the case. Refugees and migrants have been portrayed as a threat to security far before these events, for example during the Yugoslavian wars during the 1990’s (Barutciski 1994, 32).
This thesis will look into the securitization of migration. It will look into framing by the Council of Europe of migrants and refugees, during three different migration crises. It will analyze whether and how migrants and refugees have been securitized during the European Union
Presidencies of the Netherlands. This will be done by analyzing different (policy) documents which were issued by the Dutch government as well as the Council of the European Union. The main research method is discourse analysis. It will analyze the (securitization) discourse during three successive Presidencies of the Netherlands of the European Union, namely in 1997, 2004 and 2016. Because the Presidency of 2016 of the Netherlands is still ongoing at the time of writing the Council of the European Union documents of the “troikas” of each Dutch Presidency will be taken into account, referring to EU Presidencies prior and after the Netherlands EU Presidency with the fixed duration of six months each.
The topic of this thesis can be situated in a broader context of research in the field of security studies. Although there are many case studies and applications of securitization theory, there are hardly any studies that compare the frames of particular migrant groups over the course of different times. If they do look into securitization frames of migrant groups, the studies do not
4 compare different migrant groups overtime (Nickels 2007, 37). The theoretical background of this thesis will be mainly focused on the approach of Huysmans (2006). Huysmans can be placed in the more critical group of scholars of the Critical Security Studies (CSS). Huysmans’ theoretical
approach will be completed with the works of Bigo (2001), Balzacq (2005) and others, to include some of the framing theory and other aspects. The research question this thesis seeks to answer is: how do the Council of the European Union and the holder of the Presidency, namely the Dutch Government, frame migrants and refugees during the relevant Presidency terms? Moreover, when we compare these Presidencies, can we observe any successive shifts in the way migrants are framed as a security issue?
In the next section of this thesis the relevant literature concerning the securitization of migration theory will be discussed. Then the theoretical framework will be elaborated on. Followed by the research design, including the case selection and research method of this thesis. Finally, the findings, a synthesis and final conclusions and a discussion will be presented.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Copenhagen School
During the cold war security was mostly linked to military and state security. However, during the 1980’s and especially after the Cold War scholars began to identify other realms of security. Scholars like Ullman (1983), Nye (1988), were among the first to argue that security was nog only linked to states and their military and political power (COT 2007, 18-19). But security could also be applied to fields like economic, societal and environmental issues (Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde 1998, vii). The analysis of the broadening or deepening of security to other fields became known as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The Copenhagen School is a strand in International Relations studies, three authors that are seen as the ‘founding fathers’ of the School are Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap De Wilde. Their book Security: A new Framework for Analysis, is seen as one of the primary books of the School. The Copenhagen school can be placed in the broader context of the critical security studies and the social constructivist strand in International Relations (McDonald 2008, 565-566). The school is mostly known for its development of the concept of securitization which will be elaborated on in the next paragraph.
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2.2 Securitization Theory
The securitization of migration is actually an application of securitization theory to the field of migration. Securitization theory has its origins in the work of authors such as Barry Buzan (1991). It is also closely linked to the abovementioned Copenhagen School. For example, Ole Weaver (1995) argued that security issues do not come out of the blue, but are constructed as such by securitizing actors through speech acts. Security (issues) can therefore not be seen as a given fact but it should be seen as an intersubjective discursive process (Tromble 2014, 527). Tromble (2014), adapts the definition of Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, and describes the process of securitization as:
“The process of securitization is begun when an actor (or set of actors): (1) identifies something a referent object, as existentially threatened; (2) suggests that the source of that threat; and (3) calls for extraordinary measures – or departures from the rules of normal politics, such as secrecy additional executive powers and activities that would otherwise be illegal. The process of securitization is then complete or “successful” when the actor’s intended audience accepts all three components as given and itself perpetuates the securitizing discourse (Tromble 2014, 527-528)”.
There have been criticisms to this view because it is regarded as too narrow, by focusing only on speech acts of dominant actors (McDonald 2008, 563; Williams 2003). Others like Bigo (2002) and McDonald (2008) argue that also bureaucratic practices can also be important to take into account when studying securitization. Through the years the securitization theory has been adjusted and applied to many different fields. In the next section the connection between migration and securitization theory will be explained and elaborated on.
2.3 World Risk Society
In 1992 Ulrich Beck introduced the term (world) risk society. Almost a decade later Beck revisited his risk society theory. And added world to his concept of risk society in 1999. After 9/11 he argued that the world risk society was visible in nearly all global problems. Beck argues that
modernization has created a division between quantifiable risks in the world in which we think and act, and the non-quantifiable insecurities that people create. Risk is linked to control and it assumes we can make policies by which we can counter the risks (Beck 2002, 40). However, in a world risk society there are risks that are uncontrollable, and sometimes even incomprehensible to us that are at the same time created by human behavior. It does not mean that the world has
6 become more dangerous, but it means that uncontrollable risks have “de-bounded”. It is
uncontrollable on three different axioms, spatial, temporal and social. Spatial refers to the fact that modern risks do not stop at borders, they are often cross-border problems, such as large numbers of refugees, economic crises and climate change (Beck 2002, 41). In other words, national security is no longer national, it has become international because states have become interdependent and closely related.
In order to deal with for example international migration, it is necessary for (nation) states to cooperate transnationally (Beck 2002, 46-47). The temporal axiom means that the risks are stretched over a long period of time, which makes it hard to make policy for more than just the short term. The social axiom refers to the difficulty of determining who is responsible for causing the risks or problems, it is for example hard to determine the exact person who caused a financial crisis or who started environmental problems. Mainly because these problems are the outcomes of behavior of many different people (Beck 2002, 41).
Beck then argues that there are three different dimensions of conflict in the world risk society, ecological conflicts, global financial crises and global terror networks threats that have empowered governments and nation-states (Beck 2002, 41). Nowadays this terrorist networked threat has spread across the globe and together with wars and other conflicts have caused millions of people to search refuge in other countries. This new large migration problem is an aspect Beck has left out of his revisiting of the world risk society theory. But mobility was already a big issue that was linked to globalization, moreover human tragedies had already taken place, for example the Balkan crisis and for example ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. There are other authors who did
observe this migration issue, David Held and Anthony McGrew observed that migration had been an ongoing since the end of the Cold War (Held and McGrew 1999, 7). However, there are aspects of the terrorist network threat that can also be found in the discourse around migration. For example, active trust is being substituted with active mistrust of the (unknown) other, but also because accidents or unintended incidents are replaced by fear of (bad) intentions (Beck 2002, 45). And environmental issues can cause migration problems too, perhaps even more than wars do. For example, in 2012 extreme weather drove more than 32 million people out of their homes, Held and McGrew argue (Held and McGrew 1999, 7).
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2.4 Connecting Migration to Security
However, migration has been recognized as a security issue. Copenhagen School Member Buzan (1991) was one of the first to connect migration and security to each other. Along with ecological issues, migration was one of the first fields to which the security nexus was broadened (Buzan 1997, 6-7). Before it was studied in relation to security, migration was mostly studied in the fields of sociology, anthropology and history (Huysmans and Squire 2009, 1). One of the first migration issues that was being securitized was even during the Cold War. It was argued that the migration flows of East German refugees contributed to bringing down the Berlin wall and that they
therefore had a big part in the erosion and finally the collapse of the German Democratic Republic. Thus the general argument goes that population flows can pose a threat to the security and
stability of nation-states and moreover the international order (Huysmans 2006 ,16). To prevent this state erosion due to migration and a possible collapse of their state, states like North Korea but also the German Democratic Republic prohibited their citizens to leave the country. These kind of measures are mostly found in totalitarian states. However, there are a lot of accounts that counter the argument that population flows can cause erosion and collapse. For example, these arguments say nothing about the stability of the hosting country, mostly about the country where people flee from. Moreover, population flows can often be absorbed into hosting societies, when they are willing to do so. Think for example about the internally displaced persons during World War 2 in Europe. But also the Belgian refugees in the Netherlands during World War 1 or the Jewish refugees in the 1930’s. Both groups were absorbed into Dutch society, although their absorption depended mostly on their social economic status (Laqua 2012, 480-81; Moore 1984, 75).
Some critics initially rejected the link, because they argued that the security discourse could have negative effects on migrants (Collyer 2006, 255). They argued furthermore that the link
between security and migration is not universal. It is especially made a security problem in Western and mostly wealthier countries. According to Collyer (2006) this is mainly explained by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the London and Madrid bombings, in which allegedly migrants were involved (Collyer 2006, 256). However, this can be contradicted by the fact that already before these attacks occurred, security and migration were already linked to each other by different scholars (Adamson 2006; Bigo 2002; Buzan 1991; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2002; Weiner 1992). Other critics like Christina Boswell (2007) argues that there is actually an absence of securitization in migration control after 9/11. Her main criticism is that securitization theory’s assumptions diminish possible alternative patterns of issue-framing in public discourse
8 and that it takes for granted the uniform rationality in explaining organizational action (Boswell 2007, 593). According to the securitization literature there are two ways in which organizations take part in securitizing, both underpinned by the assumption that they are power-maximizing. The first is that security agencies try to expand to other areas, they can do so by the legitimization by a security discourse in the public domain. The other way is that agencies try to expand their power by avoiding public scrutiny, by for example trying to go beyond national scrutiny by cooperating at the European level (Boswell 2007, 592-593). However, while Boswell acknowledges that securitization is often happening, she does not discard the theory in general. She adds that securitization should not be the starting point of research. She argues that researchers also have to take in mind that there are other possible ways of framing politics and mechanisms at work than just securitization (Boswell 2007, 59). Lavenex on the other hand argues that there is a big
normative aspect in refugee policies which have been developed in the European Union. There are tensions between internal security on the one side and human rights’ issues on the other side. Refugee policies cannot just be justified on the basis of material interests; it is mainly a normative policy. These policies are derived from universal human rights (Lavenex 2001, 852). In her work she focuses on the Europeanization of refugee policies. This entails the European integration agenda and especially the institutionalization of actions of the EU but also the institutionalization of meaning. Which means that ideational factors are becoming of vital importance as well as the procedural and institutional aspects (Lavenex 2001, 853).
Within the securitization of migration literature there have been different views, critiques and approaches. In the early 1990s most attention was given to states and their “original”
inhabitants, later this changed and authors as for example Collyer argue that not only the state and its people matter but also the effects for migrants themselves (Collyer 2006, 260; Goodwin-Gill 1999, 3; Faist 2004, 15). This was in accordance with a more general trend in IR that a state centric approach shifted towards a more agency centric approach in social constructivism (Checkel 1998, 328). Other authors such as Didier Bigo (2006) focus on internal and external factors of security. He basically argues that security is mostly tackled at a transnational level, states can no longer rely on themselves for their security, they need to cooperate with other states at a transnational level. Especially the impact of Europeanization has aided formalizing transnational relations between security actors and the creation of European institutions that are in charge of fundamental rights and data protection (Bigo 2006, 385). Thierry Balzacq (2005) on the other hands takes another
9 approach, he focuses his research on three basic assumptions. He argues that an effective
securitization has to be audience-centered, that it is context dependent and that effective
securitization is power-laden (Balzacq 2005, 171). Jef Huysmans is also a well-known author in the field of securitization of migration. He has published several articles, books chapters and books on the subject, including some on the normative dilemma of writing security1. In the next section on
the theoretical framework, the work of Balzacq (2005), Bigo (2001) and Huysmans (2006) and others will be combined and elaborated on. It will serve as the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the discourse of Dutch EU Presidencies during several refugee crises.
3. Theoretical Framework
As argued above, security threats and insecurities are not just given study material or given problems that need to be solved. They are the product of social and political practices. A theoretical approach that tries to understand how these practices work and what the social and political implications are of this, is securitization theory which is a part of critical security studies (CSS) (Voelkner et al. 2015, 1). This thesis uses the theoretical backgrounds of the critical security studies, and mainly securitization theory. It will build on theoretical contributions of Huysmans (2006), Bigo (2001), Balzacq (2005) and other academic authors to the securitization theory.
3.1 Politics of Insecurity
Huysmans for example makes a convincing case for the politics of insecurity. He argues that it can be a political danger to put something on the political agenda as a threat to security or to not do this. Politics of insecurity are thus not only concerned with policy reactions to an already defined threat or questions the degree and nature of this threat. Politics of insecurity is also concerned with contesting the use of security language in relation to particular subjects (Huysmans 2006, 7). But what is actually meant by insecurity? This question was answered by Béland (2007), he argues that (collective) insecurity is a social and political construction, that is actively promoted by policy makers and politicians. It means that personal and environmental matters are transformed into
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See for the normative dilemma Huysmans (2002). For other works on securitization of migration see Huysmans (2000; 2006; 2009; 2011).
10 social and political issues (Béland 2007, 320-321).
The focus on the use of security language is important because it can have implications for policy options. An issue that is framed as a (national) or (health) security issue may get more drastic governing solutions than when no securitization took place (Curley and Harington 2011, 142). When this is applied to the issue of migration we can see that cross border movement and the presence of aliens in a particular state often brings issues like political loyalties, calculations of the impact on the economy, military and other capacities of states, to mind (Huysmans 2006, 30). However, in order to pass policies on issues like migration it is necessary to get support, political actors can get support by using particular frames. The next paragraph will elaborate on the issue of framing in combination with migration.
3.2 Framing migrants
Framing is a concept that is most often linked to the media. But frames are not only used by the media but are, for example, also being used by politicians and policy makers. Either through the media or through their own forums like personal, and party websites or government websites. Framing is “the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104).
There are two main types of frames, namely frames in thought of the individual and frames in communication. The first refers to set of dimensions that affect the evaluation of an individual towards a particular subject (id. 2007, 105). This thesis however will focus on the frames in
communication. Because these are the frames that are often used in politics and by policy makers. According to Jacoby (2000) politicians try to attract voters for their policies by persuading them to think about their policies along particular lines. They can do so by focusing on specific features of their policies. For example, stressing the likely effects or the relationship of the policies to
important values of the audience (Jacoby 2000, 751). So frames give specific definitions and interpretations of political issues for a specific, or the general audience. In other words, they try to guide the audience with a specific frame to perceive and interpret matters and events in a specific way (Shah et al. 2002, 343).
The framing of migrants as for example, an existential danger, instead of different kinds of uneases that can be dealt with, is mainly an act of political will. The uneases which may be connected with migration, and which may be experienced in daily life, are linked to an existential situation by
11 politicians and policy makers. By doing so it becomes easier for them to promote political
autonomy and unity (Mehan 1997, 253-254; Huysmans 2006, 50).
Refugees and migrants are often framed as a danger to the survival of political units, such as specific communities, states or regions. This danger can occur in different ways. For example, by numbers, when there is a sudden large increase in immigrants. These large numbers of migrants can be framed as that they will disturb the labor markets of states which can cause popular unrest. Governments like to avoid popular unrest and therefore they will make policies to prevent these unrests (Jørgensen and Meret 2012, 293; Huysmans 2006, 47). Politicians often use or refer to strong wordings that are used, such as ‘flood’ and ‘invasion’ of immigrants. These words cause the public to think they are in existential danger, which can be the path towards the legitimation of particular measures and policies. Not only numbers of migrants are used for securitizing arguments. The specification of characteristics, and cultural differences of immigrants and refugees in comparison to the hosting state or society can be used to frame them as an existential danger to this hosting society or community (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, 24-26).
Even though these aspects are important to the securitization process, Huysmans argues that they are mostly uneases but do not necessarily in themselves mean an existential danger to the survival of a political community or a state. It is mostly not the state that needs to be secured, but the ‘autonomy of the community as a political unity, often defined in terms of its independent identity and functional integrity’ (2006, 48). Which means, as said above that linking these uneases to an existential situation is mostly a political choice.
Migration thus tends to be framed by politicians and policy makers as an existential danger to a political unity’s survival. Migration can, on the other hand, be framed in positive ways as well, for example that migrants contribute positively to the labor market and economic growth. And, as argued before, history has proven otherwise as well. Often the uneases can be dealt with by the absorbing capacity of societies. For example, the absorption of Protestant and other religious refugees and migrants by the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands in the 16th century. This
period serves as an example of migration having positive outcomes to Dutch society, especially they contributed to the economic welfare of the Dutch Republic (De Vries 1985, 667-678). By securing an independent identity and functional integrity states are able to take ownership of their territory. Where they can deepen their cultural and national identity and develop their own way of governing. By creating this identity and autonomy it is easier to define a ‘them’ and ‘us’. It makes
12 it easier to define who is an outsider, a migrant or even an illegal migrant (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, 24-25; Mehan 1997, 258-259). This makes it easier for politicians and policy-makers to portray their own state as a complete and harmonious place that is then being threatened and frustrated by for example migration. The only solution then seems to be to get rid of this existential danger of migration which will then supposedly help restoring a peaceful and free political entity (Den Boer 1998, 3; Mehan 1997, 258-259; Huysmans 2006, 49).
Security framing can lead to the creation of an autonomous domain of politics that claims unity, and therefore a division between us and them, this happens by three different strategies, the spread of fear and trust, the conduct of inclusion and exclusion and finally the institution of alienation and a predisposition towards violence (Huysmans 2006, 51). These three different strategies will be elaborated on below.
3.3 Spread of Trust and Fear
Security framing creates domains of political interaction by spreading trust and fear. In the case of migration this can mean that we trust those who are (culturally) close to us, (Western, European) and fear those who are at distance of us (Non-Western, Non-European). Thus it can mean that these people that are at distance of us can disturb cultural identities that are similar, for example, Muslim identity politics versus the liberal states of Europe. Some argue that they are incompatible (Adamson and Triadafilopoulos and Zolberg 2011, 850-851). This is often reflected and integrated in and a part of policies for the assimilation and cultural integration of immigrants. The danger of this is that immigrants that are less able to assimilate, can easily be politicized into outsiders that should be feared. It can then be created indirectly by creating a negative frame of the ‘others’. For example, by systematically referring to Islam as a threat. This implicitly reasserts the Christian West as opposed to Islam. Thus trust can be achieved through identifying or creating sources of fear or distrust. In this way we know who to trust and who to fear. In this way politics of
insecurity simultaneously represents the politics of knowledge (Huysmans 2006, 51-54). This can then make distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, the first then trying to establish their own (political) identity (Adamson et al. 2011, 850-851). This can already be seen in some western societies where the political right advocates exclusionary politics with regard to certain citizens in society, such as Wilders in the Netherlands, the FPÖ in Austria and LePen with Front National in France. In the Netherlands one party in Parliament, Denk, states that they oppose this and want to actively defend the ‘other side’ (Beweging Denk 2016).
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3. 4 Administering inclusion and exclusion
This strategy is about how the instrumental or governing side of security practice layers relations and administers inclusion and exclusion. There are different ways to deal with existential fear. One of them is to reduce the vulnerability or tackling the danger itself. Security policies are mostly directly and explicitly linked to a strategy of distancing from and neutralizing threats. For
example, defining borders and boundaries. But also Having intensified border controls can create distance between a society and the dangerous external surroundings (Buonfino 2004, 41). But also the use of technology and registration, special ID cards for refugees and immigrants can internally distance them from the host population. An even more drastic measure can be the detainment of refugees who are still in the process of getting a refugee status or refugees who do not meet the legal conditions of a host country and who are to be deported (Bigo 2006, 394). By creating both physical and symbolic distances between the host population and the migrants an atmosphere of inclusion and exclusion can easily be developed.
3.5 Structuring alienation and predisposition towards violence
The process of including and excluding is very vulnerable to intensifying constantly. The
securitization only makes the including and integration with outsiders more difficult. Huysmans brings up the example of guest workers who never fully belonged to their new surroundings but were integrated socially and economically. They were never seen as a danger. People were mostly indifferent to them. The process of securitization has portrayed these people a danger to the culture, public order and welfare provisions to which they contributed themselves by years of hard work. It seems to have also lead to ethnic profiling of ethnic minorities and migrants in general (Van der Leun and Van der Woude 2011, 445; Huysmans 2006, 57). By framing or seeing migrants as a danger to society, it makes it easier to enhance negative feelings towards
immigrants. Which can lead to a call for more restrictive migration policies that need to protect the independent identity and functional integrity of a state (Huysmans 2006, 57). These migration policies are then becoming stricter and more sophisticated as migrants become more innovative in avoiding the measures. People can then get an image of refugees and migrants as being not
genuine refugees but just economic immigrants that try to benefit from welfare. Which then reinforces the calls for even stricter migration policies (Huysmans 2006, 57-58).
14 The aspect of violence is also often invoked in relation to migrants. For example, youth from migrant background from more backward neighborhoods are often associated with images or rioting, violent criminality and other forms of violence (Van der Leun and Van der Woude 2011,445). But also migration is often linked to violence and war (Huysmans 2006, 59). However, Huysmans argues that these extreme securitization views and policies compete in political arenas with views supporting the continuing of immigration to cope with declining populations. And that securitization language is part of the political game to evoke or perpetuate crisis situations,
emergencies enemies and dangers for political gain. However often they do also offer reassurance by showing that they do something about it with (restrictive) policies. By perpetuating and evoking crisis situations, politicians and policy makers can also legitimate their policy plans and ideas. However, this of course cannot be undertaken without a perceptive audience. The next subsection elaborates on the importance of audiences for the securitization process.
3.6 Importance of Audience
Balzacq (2005) argues that securitization is better understood as “a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq 2005, 172). Moreover, the author proposes that the audience, political agency and context are crucial for an analysis of securitization and that these should not be overlooked. He disagrees with the view that securitization can be seen as just a speech act. In which a speech act becomes effective from the act being done (Balzacq 2005, 176). He argues that external factors, such as audiences matter as well. But Balzacq does not explain in detail how the audience should be convinced of the message of the policy makers and or politicians, he does not elaborate on the level of persuasiveness. Mehan on the other hand argues that the securitization process can be seen as a speech act. She refers to the fact that “words of a Khomeini, a Stalin, a Hitler have power: they have mesmerized and electrified, reminding us that words can have a diabolic as well as a liberating and activating power (Mehan 1997, 251). Although Balzacq tries to modify the CS security studies’ theory he does not reject it at fully. He argues that he is only trying to strengthen it, by adding variables that have been neglected (Balzacq 2005, 179). However, he does, as argued above, ignore the variable of perception, receptiveness and potentially
responsiveness, particularly related to the if, how and why audiences are being persuaded by political voices. How can the audience be convinced and even persuaded to act according to the words which are expressed by political leaders?
15 To convince an audience of your security message it is necessary to relate the statement to an external reality (Balzacq 2005, 182). The success of securitization depends on a perceptive
environment and or audience. A security actor has to decide what the right (critical) moments are, in which, the susceptible audience will be easily convinced by his message of securitization (De Graaf 2011, 63; Balzacq 2005, 182). This means that the speech act has to be an intentional, rational and discursive act. Austin (1962) with his speech act theory goes into this matter in more detail. Austin argued that words can actually count as actions. He makes a distinction between
performatives and constatives. Constatives are statements that can be seen as being either true or false. Performatives on the other hand cannot be seen as such. Performatives can be defined as words that actually count as performance of an action. These words can either be felicitous or infelicitous (Emike 2013, 241). Another related concept is the perlocutionary act, these acts are “the effects on, or thoughts or feelings of the audience or the speaker produced by the act of saying something”. Austin then makes a distinction between the act of doing something and the act of attempting to do something (Emike 2013, 242). Perlocution is thus central to understanding how a particular issue can become a security problem. By using securitizing words an actor intentionally chooses to convince its target audience in a particular environment or circumstances.
When actors try to securitize an issue they often try to convince as broad an audience as possible because they have to keep a social relationship with the group they are targeting their message at (Balzacq 2005, 185). They try to obtain both moral support from the general public and their institutional body. They need especially the latter party for formal support, to get issues through parliaments or other legislative and decision-making bodies (Balzacq 2005, 185). It thus needs to be noted as well that audiences do not necessarily have to be the general public. The audience can also be the power elite or put simply, other politicians. Audiences have to be able to provide a securitizing actor with whatever he or she seeks to accomplish with the securitization process (Vuori 2008, 72); for this thesis the target audiences are be the ministers that are a Members of the Council of the European Union, Members of Dutch Parliament as well as the general public. Vuori argues that in crisis situations securitization processes can be restricted to inter-elite audiences and struggles, for example politicians in different political arenas such as parliament and EU
ministerial consultations (Vuori 2008, 72).
Balzacq finally argues that there are three components that are of importance to his assumption of audience. The first is the audience’s frame of reference. The second is its preparedness to be
16 convinced by the securitizing actor. This depends on the whether this actor is trustworthy and knowledgeable on the matter. Finally, the audience needs to have an ability to grant or deny the securitizing actor a formal mandate to implement their (possible) measures (Balzacq 2005, 192). As for the context of a security frame it is important that it fits the what Balzacq calls “Zeitgeist”. The audience has to see how the securitization fits in the bigger picture of the Zeitgeist. Finally, the securitizing actor needs to be able to use the proper words and frames that fit the context (Balzacq 2005, 192). But also in some way needs to indoctrinate the masses with the rightness of their story and frame, in order for them to act (Mehan 1997, 251-252). Thus a successful securitization process can only be achieved when the actors and their relative power, their expressions and discourse (speech acts) have a susceptible target audience that get the feeling that they should act and implement policy on the speech acts of the securitizing actor (De Graaf 2011, 63).
3.7 Internal and External Security
Several authors argue that a merging of internal and external security has taken place. Contrary to what is often argued, this merger between internal and external security has not been due to criminalization of war and militarization of crime, which is often argued (Bigo 2001; 2006; Lavenex and Wichmann 2009; Lutterbeck 2005). Bigo states that internal and external security are mixed duo to a 1) transformation of the social world, 2) the ways in which different agencies construct these changes as threats (such as migration), 3) their interests in the competition for budgets and missions and legitimacy and 4) the way in which political, bureaucratic and media games do or do not construct social change as a political or security problem (Bigo 2001, 121).
Furthermore, the discourse on migration is positioned in competition with other issues in the hierarchy of threats. A general trend that could be observed is that migration is not only seen as a problem at the national level of states, it is also seen as a problem internationally, especially for Western states (Bigo 2001, 121; Lutterbeck 2005, 233). In most political spheres the actors agree that migration is a problem for both internal and external security. Often the migrant in general is linked to all kinds of criminal behavior such as, drug trafficking, Islamic radicalism, organized crime, human trafficking and terrorism. The Western world regards transnational flows of people more and more as a danger to their political, economic and social welfare. International
organizations such as the G8 and NATO and the European Union have incorporated the topic of migration as a potential threat to the security of states. Often the public discourse in the larger states such as the USA, Germany and France contribute to the incorporation of migration as a
17 security issue on the international agenda. Even though smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden and Spain have tried to change the hierarchy of issues of the G8 during the 1990s, nowadays these countries also seem to have incorporated migration as a security problem, as reflected in the Schengen agreement (Bigo 2001, 123-124). We can thus see that the balance of power is also reflected in topics such as migration, the more powerful states put topics on the agenda and the less influential states (eventually) will follow this agenda. In the next chapter the methodology of this thesis will be presented, with an elaborate description of the Presidencies and the backgrounds of the coinciding migrant crises.
4 Case Selection
4.1 Case Selection
For this research the Dutch EU Presidencies are being analyzed, because the Council is one of the formal law and policy making bodies of the European Union, and as a Member of the European Union the Netherlands takes on the role of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union once every few years. The Presidencies of the Netherlands were chosen for both practical and theoretical reasons. For example, a linguistic advantage and because the Netherlands is a small EU Member State but also one of the founding fathers of the European Union. Because the
Netherlands was one of the first Member States it has a lot of experience in organizing EU Presidencies. This makes it easier for policy makers because they can build on previous experiences. As for example the Italian bureaucratic institutions benefitted from previous Presidency experiences during the preparations for the Italian 2003 Presidency (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006, 352). However, politicians are not always able to capitalize these experiences. For example, because they were not in office during the last EU Presidency of their country, but also because, after the enlargement of the EU, there are more Member States which makes the intervals between Presidencies wider.
Furthermore, some research suggests that small EU Member States can be relatively influential in the European Union when they are in the position of President of the Council (Elgström 2003,
193-18 194; Van Keulen 2006, 13). Therefore, the Netherlands seems the perfect candidate to take into account, because it is both one of the smaller countries within the European Union and it has been one of the countries that received a good share of refugees in the past and at the present day (Vluchtelingenwerk.nl 2015). For example, a Member State like Belgium is giving shelter to about 29.000 refugees while the Netherlands had received 40.000 refugees by the end of May 2016 and is expected to receive 90.000 over the whole year of 2016 (Fedasil 2016; Volkskrant 2016). In the next paragraph we will elaborate on how the EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union work, what its obligations and procedures are and how the EU Presidency can influence EU policies and law-making.
EU Presidency of the Council of the European Union
Every six months one of the Member States of the European Union takes on the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The responsibilities of the Presidency are established in the Treaty of the European Union. The Presidency's tasks entail for example, that the relevant Member State presides all Council meetings, except those on foreign affairs. The President has to report to the European Parliament. In sequences of 18 months three Member States will be selected, in specific order, to be President of the Council, these three are often called the troika or trio (Council of the European Union 2015, 10-15). The importance of the rotating Council Presidency has increased. The Presidency is now a functional and accountable element of EU policy making (Vandecasteele and Bossuyt 2014, 233). The Member State that takes on the Presidency, of course also has to prepare itself for the Presidency at the national level. It puts a lot of weight on the shoulders of ministries, especially of the smaller states. Ministries sometimes suffer from wanting to do too much in too little time. This then results in a bad allocation of resources and in the agenda being overloaded with issues, which can annoy other Member States (Schout and Bastmeijer 2003, 14). But when a Member State is well-prepared the efficiency of the meetings will increase (Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006, 1060). It will help officials to see what steps should be taken and what to be avoided. This can involve mapping out important issues at an early stage, intensive contact with other Member States, presenting papers on the different topics or structuring the debates (id 2006, 1062-64).
Before the troika mechanism was installed there was a lack of continuity of policies, since every Member State held the Presidency only for six months. In order to cope with this the troika was installed. At first it was more of an informal mechanism, it was then legally laid down in the
19 Lisbon Treaty (Raik 2015, 20). The troika or trio has to establish an 18-month programme for their term beforehand. This programme has to be approved by the Council as a whole. The troika programme entails an introduction with strategic long term policies of the Union, an operational section with the activities of the Council for the period of 18 months (Council of the European Union 2015, 17). In order to have consistency in policies, a good coordination and smooth transitions from one Presidency to the next is necessary.
Every EU Presidency has several obligations. The Presidency has to update the different files during their six-month term, time frames and schedules for procedures of the parliament and other institutions have to be taken into account. There needs to be an evaluation of the importance of each file or issue and their political or technical implications. Consistency in terminology and presentation is important as well (Council of European Union 2015, 19). To guide this consistency from one Presidency to the next the council Secretary has an important role. It supports the President in their duties and do some administrative work (Raik 2015, 33). Besides the formal mechanisms the troika also experiments with new and additional obligations. For example, some Member States invite an incoming President candidate during their Presidency to the meetings with the European Parliament, or inform them about the negotiations, in order to prepare them for their task and to have more consistency. Other ideas are shared training and spreading the
informal ministerial meetings over the 18-month period instead of each Presidency of six months (Raik 2010, 32-33).
The Presidency allows Member States to initiate policies and to translate national interests into common European concerns. However, it needs to be noted that the Council of the European Union shares the right of initiative with the European Commission. The commission can prepare and initiate legislation in all areas except Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and some policies regarding police cooperation. The Council of the European has the right to initiate policies in the area of the CFSP (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 59-63). Therefore, the presidency can give Member States influence by formulating visions and bringing policy ideas to the table (Elgström 2006, 194). For the duration of the Presidency a Member performs as the administrator, agenda manager, broker, leader and representative of the Council of the European Union. It is for smaller Member States thus the opportunity to get their interests heard (Elgström 2006, 171). From a normative perspective, it is deemed essential for any EU-Presidency to maintain its neutrality regarding all EU-matters and not exploit the Presidency-term for (merely) pushing the interests of its own electorate.
20 In the next paragraph this paper will elaborate on the three successive Dutch Presidencies of the European Union and the three refugee crises that coincided with the three Dutch Presidencies of the Netherlands.
Dutch EU Presidencies during three different refugee crises
As Balzacq argued, it is important to see significant events and especially securitization processes in their Zeitgeist. Therefore, in this section some academic evaluations of these Presidencies will be presented and the backgrounds of the refugee crises that were ongoing at the time of each
Presidency will be elaborated on. This in order to give the reader a basic idea of both the Zeitgeist during the crises and the possible causes and events of the crises
EU Presidency of the Netherlands in 1997 during the Balkan Refugee Crisis (1991-1999)
In January 1997 the Netherlands took over the Presidency from Ireland. This was during the final stage of the Intergovernmental Conference, which had the objective, to revise the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. It was important for the Netherlands to make the final summit in Amsterdam on this topic a great success in June 1997 (Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 71). The Netherlands has always been regarded as an active Member that has tried to push for further integration (Elgström 2006 186-187). According to Van Keulen and Rood the Dutch Presidency of ’97 has to be seen in the light of the Presidency of 1991. During the 1991 Presidency a proposal of the Netherlands for a new treaty was rejected, this casted a shadow over the entire Presidency of 1991. And for the 1997 Presidency the Dutch became less ambitious and more modest (Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 72-73). During the 1997 Presidency Migration and Asylum were no top priorities for the Netherlands. But the implementation of the Dayton Agreements was of some importance after the three main priorities, concluding the IGC, preparing the final stage of the EMU process and the EU enlargement. However, the modest agenda received criticisms from both the national and European parliament for being too modest and not having any clear vision at all (Elgström 2006, 187; Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 75).
In sum according to Van Keulen and Rood the Dutch Presidency of 1997 can be evaluated as a modest and pragmatic. But it needs to be noted that an important treaty, namely the Amsterdam Treaty was carried through during this specific Presidency. Which can be considered as a
milestone of the Dutch Presidency as well. Therefore, it is also said that this Presidency was mostly successful for the Netherlands, especially in its main priority, the IGC (Van Keulen and Rood 2003, 79). IGC ‘s are the Intergovernmental Conferences, where Member States discuss and agree EU
21 treaty changes. Before the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, these
conferences were the only way to revise treaties (Consillium.europa.eu 2016). So in 1997 the IGC was an important meeting for the Member States, because it was the only platform where they were able to debate and discuss changes to treaties. And the fact that during the Dutch Presidency, the Amsterdam Treaty was carried through can be seen as a major success.
Backgrounds of the Yugoslavia Wars
During the Presidency of the Netherlands of 1997, which took part between January and June, the height of the Yugoslavia refugee crisis was over. But still large numbers of former Yugoslavian refugees were entering the European Union. Yugoslavia had fallen apart into different other states such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia that wished to be independent from the mother state. The war has been called “the worst bloodletting since World War II” (Stokes et al. 1996, 136). Tensions in Yugoslavia were already rising during the 1980s when Serbian nationalism was upcoming after the death of communist dictator Tito who held the country together under his strict regime. According to Stokes et al. (1996, 138) three problems were at the core of the collapse of the Yugoslavian state, the inability of the Army to include all ethnic groups, the unrealistic wish of the communist party to keep political control and severe economic problems. Hundreds of thousands persons fled and tried to find asylum in other European countries (Suhrke 1998, 397). By 1993 about 600,000 Yugoslavian refugees had entered the European Union despite visa restrictions and other legal hindrances of European states (id. 1998, 407). During the crisis a 'sharing of the burden' was proposed by states that were most affected by the refugee crisis. For example, Germany, Sweden and Austria (id. 1998, 408). The fact that, at that time, this was the biggest refugee crisis in Europe, since World War 2, makes this case a noteworthy and interesting case to take into the analysis. These are two basic requirements for case studies proposed by Vroomen (2010, 256).
EU Presidency in 2004, Afghan refugees fleeing the Afghanistan War (2001-2010)
The 2004 Dutch EU Presidency from July to December 2004 was again mostly guided by the already rolling agenda of the European Union. The Dutch government felt that taking the role of efficient administrator was the most pragmatic and therefore most suitable option (Elgström 2006, 188). It was preceded again by the Irish Presidency from January until June. On the rolling agenda were five different issues, 1. the EU enlargement, 2. sustainable strengthening of the European
22 economy, 3. further development of the areas of freedom, security and justice, 4. Financial
prospects for the coming years and finally 5. working on the EU external relations. Next to these five main priorities there was also much attention for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty on the European Union (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 5). However, this Presidency was not as modest and pragmatic as the 1997 Presidency. It did have national aspects such as water
management, flooding initiative and maritime transport. But also the launch of a normative debate on ‘norms and values’ of European integration (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 5). As freedom, security and justice was one of the main priorities, an ambitious plan were made for burden sharing among Member States for the issue of refugees.
However, the Member States did not reach an agreement on the Plan-Schilly that incorporated burden-sharing (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 16). The concept of burden-sharing entails the sharing of the burden of migration among Member States of the European Union. It is based on solidarity. It is the sharing of money and refugees in order to cope with forced migration. This to prevent single states from having to take on all the refugees while others do not receive any refugees nor contribute to their shelter financially. The idea of Burden-sharing became especially important during the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. Proposals were made for a EU wide burden-sharing system in the policy area of migration. But ever since it has been proposed there has not been much consensus among Member States on this issue. In fact, we can see it reoccurring during every Presidency of the Netherlands since the 1990’s (Thielemann 2003, 259-260). Eventually The Hague Programme was adopted, which laid the basis for the further strategic development of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This document is also included in the analysis of this thesis. This Programme was a multi-annual programme for closer cooperation in the fields of freedom security and justice. But it was not seen as either ambitious or but it was seen as a key achievement of the Dutch Presidency of 2004 (Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 17). In sum the Dutch Presidency of 2004 can be compared to the one of 1997, ambitions were relatively modest and the Presidency objectives were pragmatically defined. However according to scholars there were some minor successes, for example the adoption of the modest The Hague Programme (Elgström 2006, 188-189; Van Keulen and Pijpers 2005, 16).
23
Background of the 2001 Afghanistan War
In 2004 the Netherlands took the EU Presidency from July to December. During that time the United States and the Coalition of the Willing were at war with the Taliban and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. The Taliban gained power after the Cold War. During the Cold War the Soviet Union supported a Communist Regime in Kabul. But after this communist regime fell, the Taliban gained power over the territory during the power vacuum that was caused due to the fall of the
communist regime in Kabul. The Mujahedeen and the Taliban received support during the Cold War from the United States. For example, they were supported with weapons such as Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and financial aid (Cogan 1993, 76; Kuperman 1999, 219).
The Taliban then ruled over Afghanistan and installed a strict Islamic republic based on Sharia law. The regime restricted women in their freedom and violated human rights. The Taliban was able to rule their territory without let or hindrance until the American-led invasion in 2001, which was a part of the Global War on Terrorism which started after the attacks of 9/11. As a consequence of this war many Afghans fled their country. Many went to neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran.
But a lot of people also took the long trip to the West, and especially Europe. The numbers of Afghan refugees differ over the years. At the time of the Dutch Presidency in 2004 about 25,907 refugees came to the Netherlands (UNHCR 2004, 209). Which made it the second biggest receiving country in Europe of Afghan refugees, after Germany which received 38,576 Afghan refugees in 2004 (UNHCR 2004, 209). In sum, the number of refugees makes the case noteworthy and interesting to analyze in the current study. Because it was considered as a humanitarian and refugee crisis. The fact that there were also concerns about the security threat these Afghan refugees could pose to receiving states, makes the case even more interesting (Schmeidl 2002, 7). They were perceived as threats to national security because these refugees came from a war-torn country that was led by the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban. It was argued that terrorists might have been among them (Schmeidl 2002 7-8).
24 EU Presidency of the Netherlands in 2016 during the Syrian refugee crisis (2011-present)
At the time of writing of this thesis, the Dutch EU Presidency 2016 was still ongoing and therefore there was no scientific evaluation literature available yet. However, some scientists and think tanks published some preliminary articles on the Presidency. The Dutch EU Presidency of January until June 2016 had four main priorities: Europe as an innovator and job creator, stable finances and a stable Eurozone, a forward looking energy and climate policy and finally migration and
international security. Half way through this Presidency, Senior Research Fellow Adriaan Schout (2016), of the Clingendael Institute, wrote an article on the Dutch Presidency of 2016 that was both published on the website of the Clingendael and a Dutch newspaper. He argued that the Dutch received general acclaim for their European Presidency. The Dutch are praised for the energy of the different Ministers and especially the Prime Minister. But, there were also some criticism, for example the Dutch have lost their image of the European frontrunner, after the Eurosceptics gained popularity and because the first government of Prime Minister Rutte was supported by the right-wing and Eurosceptic Geert Wilders. Schout argues that the European Union lacks good leadership, which is now essential. Therefore, most EU negotiators and policy makers are very happy with the energy that Rutte is showing. He is being praised by his colleagues and for
example the President of the EP Schulz and Jean Claude Juncker. It seems that the Prime Minister Rutte has a clear vision to solve problems at the European level. However, it remains unclear whether the Presidency will achieve all its goals (Schout 2016).
Background of the Syrian refugee crisis
From January 2016 to June 2016 the Netherlands holds the Presidency of the Commission of the European Union. This Presidency is partly marked by the refugee crisis that has been ongoing since 2011. In that year, during the ‘Arab Spring’, a call for regime change and more democratic values and freedom came to Syria. This lead to riots in Damascus and elsewhere in the country and finally rebel groups took arms against the government (Khashan 2011, 29). As a result, an armed conflict was born in which different groups started fighting against each other. Islamic fundamentalists of ISIL, Al Nusra and other Islamic groups started fighting the regime of Assad and each other while other opposition groups fight against the Assad regime and the Islamic groups too. Which makes the situation very difficult to solve and to understand (Phillips 2013, 28). It became even more difficult when other Middle Eastern states and Western states started to get involved as well on both the rebels side as well as the Assad regime's side (Phillips 2013, 28). This
25 extremely complicated conflict has made many people refugees and or homeless (Fargues and Fandrich 2012, 4). By March 2013 around one million Syrian refugees were registered by the UNHCR, most of them sought refuge in neighboring countries (Syrianrefugees.eu 2013). Only a few months, in September, later this number already doubled to two million refugees
(Syrianrefugees.eu 2013). In July 2014 the total number of refugees went up to over three million, however Europe accepted only 100,000 refugees. Most of the refugees were still staying in the neighboring countries such as Lebanon (Syrianrefugees.eu 2014). However, the number of refugees that came to Europe grew rapidly over the years. In 2015 about 1 million refugees of which over 350,000 were Syrian refugees reached Europe (BBC 2016). This makes it an even bigger refugee crisis than the Balkan refugee crisis of the 1990s. The size and intensity of the crisis makes this case noteworthy and interesting enough to study in depth.
5. Research Method
For this thesis the research method of discourse analysis will be used. Discourse analysis is a research technique in qualitative research. It focuses on the use of language in policy making by looking at how for example questions are framed and asked. Actually almost all qualitative research makes use of discourse analysis in some way (Babb et al. 2012 ,351).
Discourse analysis does not only analyze words or language used in texts but it also looks at the overall strategy and impact of words. It also looks at how they are being used to shape a political understanding of a situation, or how language is used and manipulated in policy making. It thus looks both at how it is written and what is implied or not said. This makes it different from content analysis that mainly focuses on what is written in the text. Discourse analysis can help to examine how concepts are expressed, including the emotive and pejorative contexts. It is therefore an intensive approach that can only focus on a small number of key texts (Babb et al 2012, 351-352). There are many different approaches in discourse analysis. But the two main types are the
functional discourse, which will be explained below and the critical discourse analysis. This latter type of discourse analysis entails the focus on discourse in order to discover power relations that can both oppress and control people. The focus of critical discourse analysis is not neutrality but it actively tries deconstruct and reconstruct structures and patterns. The categories that are used to
26 analyze texts are not necessarily derived from theory, but may be the result of empirical induction, e.g. through participant observation. However, such an ethnographic field method does not suit this specific thesis (Babb et al 2012, 356-357).
Therefore, for this thesis it is most suitable to use the functional discourse analysis. Because this type of discourse analysis tries to find discourse that matches the concepts and categories that are mostly derived from theoretical approaches (Babb et al. 2012, 356). In this case the theoretical backgrounds of Huysmans and others. It also helps to identify the groups or individuals that will be under analysis. It is important to identify and select discursive texts or speech acts which can be considered as representative of the individuals and groups that are being studied (Babb et al 2012, 358-359). In this regard, it is of utmost importance that the researcher maintains his or her
neutrality and explains the criteria on the basis of which the material was collected and selected for further analysis. Even though we acknowledge that discourse is a wide concept which entails speech acts but also non-verbal communication, diction and pronunciation this thesis will narrow the concept of discourse to semantics (Vuori 2008, 74; Emike 2013, 243). This because of practical reasons and limitations, such as non-availability of older speeches of Ministers. It will mainly look into what securitizing words are used in policy documents, regulations and parliamentary
discussions, and will not take into account diction, pronunciation or non-verbal communication.
5.1 Unit of Analysis
For this thesis the Presidencies of the Netherlands for the European Union will be taken as the main focus point. Official (policy) documents will be analyzed for securitization of migration discourse. Especially the Council of the European Union documents during the full term of the troika will be analyzed, this because Member States work together on the Programme of the Presidencies. The documents of the Dutch government that will be analyzed are mainly letters of the Government to parliament, but also State of the European Union documents and Public consultation documents. The documents of the Council of the European Union that will be analyzed are the directives, regulations, decisions and joint actions. All these aforementioned documents, that were produced by the Council of the European Union during the full period of the “troika”, that are related to migration and or refugees, are taken into account.
Document selection
The European Union documents were selected via the EUR-Lex website which gives access to European Union Law, Treaties, Directives etc. The search engine of this website was used to select
27 the documents. For each Presidency the terms: “Migration 1997”, “Migration 2004”, “Migration 2016” and “Refugees 1997”, “Refugees 2004” and “Refugees 2016” were used. Then the results were refined by selecting the years “1996”, “1997”, “2004”, “2005” or “2015”, “2016”, two years were selected that overlap with the troikas of the Presidencies, furthermore the author “Council of the European Union”, and the option legislation was selected. Then the results were filtered for being related to migration, asylum(-seekers) or refugee(s), all other documents were omitted. All the final results were then downloaded into pdf files. The EUR-Lex website has a very convenient and easy to use search engine, so it did not cost a lot of effort and time to find the right documents for the analysis. For the Dutch EU Presidency of 2016 the documents were selected up to 31 May 2016, which leaves only the last month of the Dutch Presidency of this particular year out of the analysis. But in May there were no documents published on migration and refugees, so therefore there are no documents of this month reflected in the findings section.
For the Dutch Governmental documents on the EU Presidencies, the website
www.officielebekendmakingen.nl was searched for the words “Voorzitterschap Europese Unie”,
followed by the different years “1997”, “2004” and “2016”. Then the programmes of the Dutch government for the Presidencies of each year were downloaded in pdf files. Because the initial search for Presidency of the European Union in combination with the terms migration and
refugees did not give many results, the terms “Presidency European Union (in du: voorzitterschap Europese Unie)” were used. As mentioned above this resulted in finding the Presidency Programs of each year. Then the other documents were found by following the links of the main files that corresponded with the Presidency documents. The search engine of the Dutch Parliament is thus not as easy to use as the EU search engine. It took a lot of time and effort to find the main file numbers that corresponded with the successive Dutch Presidencies and then to find all the other documents that were related to the Presidencies and refugees and migration. So besides the Programmes of each presidency, the preparatory letters to parliament, and the state of the European Union documents were downloaded as well. For 1997 the state of the European Union was not directly given as such. Before 2012 it was not always a distinct written document it was actually an integral part of the Budget plans for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was published every year at Dutch Budget day (Europa-nu.nl 2015). Therefore, for the purpose of reconstructing the discursive speech –acts during the 1997 Dutch EU Presidency this document was downloaded. However, for the year 2004 and 2016 the Dutch Government did write a state of the European Union document. Because the total documents that came up in the search of 1997 were the least,
28 namely 4 (one General Consultation document, the Presidency Programme, and two letters to Parliament), it was best to make the same selection for the other Presidencies. So for each
Presidency one General Consultation, the Presidency Programme and two Letters to Parliament were selected. For the years 2004 and 2016 the State of the Union was included as well. So for these two Presidencies a total of 5 documents were selected that are both related to the Presidency and to migration and refugees. In the next paragraph four different frames are presented. These frames will be used as the basis for the analysis of the different documents that were mentioned above.
5.2 Different existential danger frames
As Huysmans (2006) argued migrants and refugees can be framed as an existential danger to the survival of the political entity. This frame entails that words are being used to describe refugees as a direct threat or danger to the state or region. For this master thesis four different frames will be analyzed and applied to the case of Dutch Presidencies of the European Union.
1. Public Security Frame
This frame is used to argue that uncontrolled (im)migration and especially refugees pose a threat to public order and social stability (Balabanova and Balch 2010, 384). Therefore, to deal with this 'threat' it is easier to implement new, and often much stricter, policies in order to prevent social instability. Balabanova and Balch (2010, 394) then argue that this kind of frame often results in policy makers and politicians making exaggerated and or spurious links between crime and refugees or migrants in general. This can then have a negative impact on refugees and migrants, because it becomes easier to pass legislations and measures to counter the threat and therefore they can be more easily put out of society, this then reveals the second frame of the us versus them frame.
2. Us versus Them Frame
In the Us versus Them Frame, the immigrant or refugee is being portrayed as an enemy and as not being a part of the community. There is a clear distinction being made between 'us' and 'them' (Mehan 1997, 258). By using words like 'here' and 'we', a feeling of belonging is created among a community. While 'us' and 'them' is more commonly used to make distinctions between groups of people. It is a sense of when they (the refugees) gain it is our (the receiving community's) loss (id. 1997, 259). It is often made stronger by mentioning the cultural differences between the refugees
