Violent conflict and the position of women in society : a case study comparison of Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal

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Violent conflict and the

position of women in society;

a case study comparison of

Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal

Bram van der Burgt

Supervisor: Dr. Jane Krause

Second reader: Dr. Darshan Vigneswaran

Master Thesis Political Science – International Relations Department of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to express my gratitude to dr. Jana Krause for her guidance and supervision during the entire study and writing process. Her advice and remarks were exceptionally valuable and contributed greatly to the final product. She inspired me during the writing of my Bachelor’s thesis and in the past months again during the writing of my Master’s thesis. My sincerest gratitude to her.

Secondly, I would like to thank dr. Darshan Vigneswaran for taking time out of his busy schedule to evaluate my thesis, which he agreed to do without hesitation. His courses have greatly inspired me during my years studying at the University of Amsterdam.

Additionally, I am grateful to my partner and fellow student, Sara van Ameijden, for her continues support and comments on my thesis.

And finally my parents, who supported me since I was little and have greatly contributed to the person I am today. Without them I would not have been where I am today.

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2 Master thesis

Violence, Resistance and Restraint in War and Genocide Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause

Second reader: Darshan Vigneswaran Bram van der Burgt

10670424 22-06-2018

Word count: 18.943

Abstract

Recent research has emphasized that besides the suffering of women in conflict situations, there are possible positive effects of conflict on the position of women in society which were unconsciously ignored. The relative novelty of this theoretic underpinning also mean it has not been explored much beyond a few cases. The aim of this thesis is thus to further explore the relation between conflict and the political and economic participation of women and their position in society. It will do so by constructing a more solid theory through combining existing literature and critically assessing the claims in them, which is then subsequently tested in three case studies. These cases are then compared in order to get a clear overview of the processes that could empower women and explain their political and economic participation and position in society after the conflict. By doing so, this thesis has created a better understanding of the relation between violent conflict and the participation of women and their position in society.

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Introduction

The research on violent conflicts such as civil wars and their effects on society is nothing new within the field of international relations and conflict studies. The end of the cold war and the following conflicts meant a boost for the field of conflict studies and studying civil war, genocide and other violent conflict. However, the effects that were being studied, were mainly studied on the macro (nationwide) level or the micro (individual) level. And even when the meso (group) level was being studied, the focus was predominantly on ethnicity, culture or tribe. What the impact of violent conflict was on other groups within society, especially marginalized ones, remained a disregarded subject of research. Only recently, alongside the rise of feminist studies, the effects of conflict on women have become the subject of research.

Earlier research pointed out the suffering of women in conflict situations, due to displacement of relatives, traumas, economic insecurity and being the targets of sexual violence. However, this focus on the suffering of women and their trauma’s, possible positive effects were unconsciously ignored (Berry, 2017: 832). It was only recently that these positive effects were researched, which found that, in addition to the conclusion that “women suffer tremendously from armed conflict”, violent conflict could also lead to increased women participation in politics and the economy (Berry, 2017: 831; Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1514).

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5 However, besides being a quite recent finding, this theoretic underpinning that violent conflict leads to the increased political and economic participation of women, has not been explored much beyond a few cases (Rwanda, DR Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina). And even when discussing these cases, the validity and extent of this claim is contested (Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1514).

Based on this claim, the goal of this thesis is to first and foremost construct a more solid theory able to link violent conflict to the political and economic participation of women and their position in society. Doing so, it will further explore the relation between violent conflict and the participation of women, both political, social and economic. It will do so by first constructing this theory through combining existing literature and critically assessing the claims in them, which is then subsequently tested in three case studies. These cases are then compared in order to get a clear overview of the processes that could empower women and explain their political and economic participation and position in society after the conflict.

Furthermore, this thesis will not only try to prove that his relation exist and then construct a more solid theory, but it is also aimed at deepening the causal mechanisms behind it. It aims to uncover the supporting mechanisms that are able to explain the relation between violent conflict and the participation of women. The comparison between the case studies will also demonstrate how and why the participation of women differs between cases, and if this relates to the level of violence in the conflict, the ideology behind the conflict and the role of women during the conflict.

Research question

Following the research puzzle described in the introduction, the central question this research seeks to answer is: What is the relation between violent conflict (civil war) and the political and economic participation of women? This central question can then be split up into the following sub questions: In what ways can violent conflict lead to increased political and economic participation of women? Does more violent conflict lead to more women participating in politics and the economy? And: How does this relation differ between states?

Hypotheses

The first hypothesis is that countries that experience violent conflict will see a rise in the political and economic participation of women, as well as a higher equality of gender. The

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6 reasoning behind this is that violent conflict opens the door for female participation by disrupting civilian lives and existing state and society structures. Women often learn new skills and capabilities amidst the violence of the conflict, by joining a rebel movement or because they are forced to fend for themselves out of necessity. When after the conflict the state and society structures need to be rebuild, women are then able to use their new capabilities to take part in rebuilding and push for the inclusion of gender issues. And by effectively doing so, they can stress for women’s rights in new laws and thus opening doors for participation of women nationwide. The rewriting of constitutions and including women’s rights, or installing women’s quota’s for instance (Berry, 2017: 832; Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1515). Furthermore, after conflict there is often international pressure on the political and economic participation of women as part of conflict resolution or aid (Handrahan, 2004: 433).

The second hypothesis is that the eventual success of political and economic participation of women will differ between states. Multiple states have experienced violent conflict since the end of the cold war, but women’s political and economic participation differs greatly between them (Berry, 2017: 831; Berry & Lake, 2017: 347). Reasons for this difference could be relatively simply such as the existence of social movements and their success, a difference in ideologies and/or outcome of the conflict or because of the difference in international pressure. However, the difference in participation could also be explained through the intensity of the violent conflict (Wood & Thomas, 2017: 32).

This then leads to the third hypothesis: the higher the intensity of the violence in the conflict, the higher the eventual political and economic participation of women will be (Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1529). This is due to multiple processes linked to higher intensity conflict, such as the more profound change of state and society structures, higher amounts of females joining rebel groups and becoming combatants, more women left in charge of the household and the development of more intense traumas (Handrahan, 2004: 430).

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Theory and Methods

Theoretic framework

The theoretic framework constructed in the thesis has as its main goal to describe the relation between violent conflict and the political and economic participation of women. This relation is built around the expected correlation that higher intensity violent conflict leads to increased political and economic participation of women. There are several possible processes that could explain this correlation. The first one is that the higher the intensity of the conflict, the more women are involved (Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1529). This includes women as victims of violence and more female fighters of various ranks, which ultimately can join the top of the commanding forces. This empowers women through the acquiring of new skills and capabilities, which means that when the conflict ends they refuse to become marginalized again. By being part of the fighting or organizing force, they do not only have the power, but also the means to enforce change for women (Wood & Thomas, 2017: 38).

A second process is that higher intensity conflict more profoundly disrupts state and society structures and often destroys existing institutions (Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1515). After the conflict, these need to be rebuild. And the more profound these structures are destroyed, the more rebuilding needs to be done. It is easier to influence the constructing of new structures than to change existing ones. More violent conflict would then lead to more destroyed structures and thus more rebuilding, on which women then would have increased influence. Furthermore, the more existing state structures are destroyed, the more international assistance is required to guide the rebuilding. And this international assistance often comes with pressure on the participation of women (Handrahan, 2004: 433; Hughes & Tripp, 2015: 1516).

A third process can be found in the necessity for women to come into action. Simply because the men who used to provide for the family are dead or displaced and thus forcing women to fend for themselves and their children (Handrahan, 2004: 434). The majority of the deaths in civil wars are among the male population, as they often also make up the majority of the armed forces. And even in cases where the civilian population is an explicit target, as it was the case during the Rwandan genocide, men are often targeted for killing while women experience other atrocities such as sexual violence. Many women find themselves to be the sole breadwinners of the family after the end of the violent conflict, which often is a position

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8 they never have been in before. This forces them to quickly adapt and participate in the economy, simply to survive (Handrahan, 2004: 434).

A fourth process can be found in motivation based on trauma. Traumas originating from the loss of family or home, sexual violence or other events linked to the conflict can become motivation for women to participate (Berry, 2017: 847). These severe traumas can alter the point of view and beliefs of women in radical ways and thus also change their outlook on their position in the society (Handrahan, 2004: 435). Combined with the realisation that other women are in the same position, these traumas can lay the groundwork for the organization of women in social movements. By organizing themselves, women can help each other work through and process their traumas while simultaneously building up a social movement (Tripp, 2015: 38).

The timeframe when testing these processes is an important aspect, as various data suggests that women’s participation often shows no improvements directly at the end of the conflict. There are various explanations offered for this initial effect, such as the need for people to reintegrate into ‘normal’ life first and work through intense trauma’s combined with the mourning over loved ones (Berry, 2017: 844). Furthermore, women are also often initially forced in pre-existing social patterns, especially if the conflict did not cause a profound change in state and society structures. This effect is known as a ‘patriarchal backlash’ and is most frequently observed in societies with cultures that know a strict gender-based division of roles (Berry, 2017: 833-834). It thus often takes a little while for women to transform their empowerment during the conflict into political and economic action.

However, even though the initial force of women participation may often be relatively small, it is crucial in unlocking doors for future generations of women (Tripp, 2015: 36-37). It should be viewed as a ripple in the water, which starts out small but quickly expands over time. The timeframe in which the relation between violent conflict and the participation of women is going to be tested will thus be as large as possible with the available data. The aim is to collect data which will allow a timeframe starting years before the conflict up to the most recent data available.

The correlation and supporting causal mechanisms described in the theoretic framework will be tested in the case study analyses and comparisons. These should show if this thesis has indeed managed to construct a more solid theory describing the relation between violent conflict and the economic and political participation of women and the

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9 processes behind them. Furthermore, it will demonstrate the differences between the cases and what explains this differences, such as the intensity of the violence or the ideology behind the rebel movements (Wood & Thomas, 2017: 32).

Methods

The research will be based on a comparative case study in which the cases will be analysed using mixed methods. Research based on mixed methods works particularly well for this case study comparison as it allows the combination of an extensive literature review with a statistical analysis. Thus offering a more complete case study comparison, both across case as across time. The first part of this thesis will be an extensive literature review and discussion of background of conflict and role of women before, during and after the conflict. The second part will be an analysis of female participation rates over time, which will be compared between the cases, linking back to the literature review.

The literature review will be based on the myriad of available literature and will be used for two goals. The first goal of the literature review is to construct a solid theoretical framework describing the relation between violent conflict and the economic and political participation of women. And even more, to provide additional possible explanations for the difference in participation of women between cases, based on the intensity of violence in that specific case. This is also the second goal of the literature review, to test the described causal mechanisms by the theoretical framework in three cases. By discussing the level of violence and the political and economic participation of women in each case, the literature review of the case studies is the first test of the causal mechanisms.

The quantitative analysis will be aimed at comparing levels of women’s participation before and after the conflicts as well as comparing these between the cases, as a second test of the causal mechanism. This comparison will be based on descriptive statistics and presented in clear graphs to demonstrate the political and economic participation of women over time in each case. This can then be linked to the qualitative analyses of the intensity of violence and role of women in the conflict, and then compare these cases and the uncovered relations in them. This way the relation and supporting causal mechanisms as described in the theoretical framework and connected hypotheses can be tested.

However, as women’s political and economic participation and their position in society are vague concepts to measure, they will require a well substantiated operationalisation to

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10 make the concepts measurable. Thus for this research the same indicators are used that renowned scholars studying these concepts make use of. Women’s political participation is measured through the percentage of women in parliament and the adaptation and strength of women’s quota (Berry, 2017; Berry & Lake, 2017; Hughes & Tripp, 2015). Women’s economic participation is measured through the percentage of women participating in the labour force (Berry & Lake, 2017; Hughes & Tripp, 2015; Wood & Thomas, 2017). And women’s position in society, probably the most difficult to effectively operationalize, is measured through both the percentage of female headed households as the percentage of females in secondary education (Berry, 2017; Berry & Lake, 2017; Hughes & Tripp, 2015; Wood & Thomas, 2017) Finally, female life expectancy is included to provide context in terms of the intensity of the violence, level of development of the country and offer an indication of the equality of gender.

The data required to perform these measurements and analyses will be compiled from various datasets such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Women in National Parliaments dataset (2018), the Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) dataset by Hughes et al. (2017), The World Bank Gender Indicators dataset (2018) and the World Health Organization life expectancy dataset (2018).

Case Selection

The cases that will be analysed and compared in this thesis are Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal are chosen for multiple reasons. First and foremost Rwanda has become somewhat of a standard case when it comes to studying civil war and genocide and their effects on civilians and civil society. This is also the case when it comes to research concerning the economic and political participation of women after conflicts, resulting in most theories considering the relation between conflict and women’s participation to be based on Rwanda. Furthermore, the studies done on Rwanda provide an extensive overview of all kinds of processes revolving around the participation of women and thus offers the perfect baseline. Both for testing the causal mechanisms behind the relation between conflict and the participation of women, as to compare the cases of Sri Lanka and Nepal with.

The second reasons is that all conflicts in these cases are classified as civil wars, with some even resulting in genocide or alleged genocide. And conflict in all cases happened around the same time period; Rwanda (1990-1994 & genocide in 1994), Sri Lanka (1983-2009)

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11 and Nepal (1996-2006). Yet, these cases show difference rates of political and economic participation of women, while also showing different ideologies and levels of intensity of violence in the conflicts. The intensity of the violence differs when looked at what types of violence are used, the goals of this violence and the number of victims compared to the total population. Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal are thus the best fit for testing my hypotheses and thus answering the research questions. A systematic overview of these cases and their properties is displayed below in table 1.

Aspects of the conflict Rwanda Sri Lanka Nepal

Time period 1990-1994 1983-2009 1996-2006

Ideology behind the conflict

Ethnicity driven (with roots in colonialism).

Separatist with socialist elements.

Socialist.

Type of conflict Civil war and genocide Civil war Civil war

Outcome of conflict Rebel victory State victory Peace agreement

between rebels and government

Intensity of violence Very high (1 million deaths on population of roughly 7 million) Moderate (100.000 deaths on population of roughly 18 million) Low (13.000-17.000 deaths on population of roughly 25 million). Women participation before conflict

Low, patriarchal society, role in society defined by male relatives. Very little attend higher education At best around 17% women in parliament

Low, patriarchal society and at most 5% women in parliament. Relatively high rates of females in education.

Very low (feudal and caste system). At most

5% of women in

parliament.

Women participation after conflict

Higher than men, both political as economic. Women hold majority of seats in parliament (64% nowadays) and have

Big improvement on education and health. Stagnating levels of economic participation. Political participation the same before and during

Higher than before war,

especially when

focussing on legal rights. Over 30% women in parliament due to quotas

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higher employment

rates.

conflict. New quotas are being installed.

in new constitution. High economic participation. Role of women in conflict Women as targets of

killing and sexual

violence. Female

participation in RPF. Only some (Hutu) women are complicit.

Little on government side. Higher amounts of

women becoming

fighters for the LTTE.

Large role as fighters in the PLA (almost 30% of total armed rebel force)

Existing research on women participation (+ links to conflict)

Very high. Not much, focus on

women as combatants for the LTTE.

Not much, focus on role of women in the Maoist rebellion.

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The case of Rwanda

Background of the conflict

The Rwanda conflict will serve as the baseline case as described in the general case selection motivation. It is by far the conflict with the highest intensity of violence, as around 1 million people, roughly fifteen percent of the country’s population, were killed in a mere hundred days (Berry, 2017: 831). This in strict contrast with the civil war, which in comparison ‘only’ took the lives of an

estimated 10.000 people and lasted almost four years (IPEP, 2000: 36). The conflict started in 1990 as a civil war, which eventually turned into a genocide in 1994 as a result of the assassination of the Hutu president. Both the genocide and the civil war ended in 1994 with a victory of the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front over the Hutu Rwandan interim government (African Rights, 1995: 13).

The civil war and following genocide in Rwanda were the result of an increasing divide between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities. The origins of this divide can be traced back to pre-colonial societal relations, which were exacerbated during the pre-colonialization through identity politics (Mageza-Barthel, 2015: 46-47; Uvin, 2001: 83). Since pre-colonial Rwanda, the Tutsi’s and the Hutu’s have always belonged to different social classes. The upper class consisted of the cattle herding Tutsi’s, while the lower class was made up of the farming Hutu’s. These class differences were strengthened by the German and later Belgian colonialists who favoured the Tutsi’s over the Hutu’s simply for being taller and for having a slightly lighter skin tone (IPEP, 2000: 12; Uvin, 2001: 82).

After the decolonization and the formal independence of Rwanda in 1962 there was a continuation of this ethnic division in politics and society, but then the other way around (African Rights, 1995: 10). Tutsi’s saw increasing discrimination starting out with quotas for schools and government functions, but later on also active discouraging of “mixing races” and banning Tutsi political parties. This led to increasing ethnic hatred and violence between

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14 Hutu’s and Tutsi’s which eventually became the Rwandan Civil War and ultimately climaxed in the Rwandan Genocide (Uvin, 2001: 86).

The conflict in the Rwandan case can be divided into two main phases: the civil war from October 1990 until August 1993 and the following genocide in April until July 1994. However, some argue that the genocide as a part of the civil war instead of two separate phases, especially since the killing of Tutsi civilians went hand in hand with the outbreak of the civil war. This is partly true, as the civil war started with an invasion of the RPF as a way for Tutsi refugees to get back into Rwanda, which the Hutu government declined them earlier (IPEP, 2000: 34-35). This invasion and the following civil war combined with anti-Tutsi propaganda caused violent reprisals against innocent Tutsi civilians, and in some cases even killing them. This went on until the first round of peace negotiations started in 1992 after two years of civil war. The Hutu extremists opposed any form of peace with the RPF as they only wanted one thing; the extermination of all Tutsi. The extremists thus actively disrupted the peace process through escalating the violence against Tutsi’s, initiating new waves of killings and actively starting to plot and organize the genocide (IPEP, 2000: 32, 50-53).

The real massacres however took place in the months after the assassination of both the Rwandan and Burundi president on 6 april 1994. The Hutu extremists used this incident as proof that the Tutsi’s are attempting to wipe out the Hutu ethnicity and their power in Rwanda. The only defence for Hutu’s would then be to strike first and thus wipe out the Tutsi’s before they had the chance to do the same. This is when the preparations of the Hutu extremists ended and they officially started with the planned and organized mass killing of Tutsi civilians and even moderate Hutu’s (IPEP, 2000: 45).

The events of the genocide unfolded rapidly afterwards, as Hutu extremists took over power and ordered the start of the genocide through a strict top-down chain of command. It then became clear how organized and planned this genocide has been, as Hutu extremists started installing barricades and were patrolling the streets within a few hours (African Rights, 1995: 11). That same night the genocide started with the killing of any political opposition and moderate leaders, whose names were on the death lists prepared in advance. The next day houses were being searched and road blocks started to appear where Hutu militias would search vehicles and check identity cards, killing any Tutsi’s they would find. (IPEP, 2000: 105-106).

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15 Over the next week the genocide spread rapidly across Rwanda, top-down through orders from government officials, but also more directly through radio broadcasts of the RTLM. While the genocide spread across Rwanda, the killings also became more organized and certain patterns of slaughter emerged. During this period the violence also became increasingly cruel and victims suffered unimaginable agony before being killed (IPEP, 2000: 107). Soon after the start of the genocide international critique arose and before the end of April both the US and the UN issued statements condemning the Rwandan government and the FAR and urging the Rwandan leadership to stop the killings. Nevertheless, the slaughter continued, albeit slightly more covert. With international action not forthcoming and the Rwandan government, the FAR and various militias caught up in the killings, the RPF advanced rapidly. On the fourth of July the RPF took control of the capital and two weeks later on July 18, the RPF officially declared victory, ending both the civil war as the genocide (African Rights, 1995: 13; IPEP, 2000: 108).

Soon after the end of the conflict criticism sparked on the failure of the international community to adequately intervene, especially as there already was an active UN assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Furthermore, the focus of the international community in this mission was primarily on evacuating foreign nationals and ending the civil war, and in their attempts of doing so the ongoing genocide was largely ignored. There are many examples were UN troops could have prevented mass slaughters on various occasions, but failed to do so. (Uvin, 2001: 91-92) By focussing on the impartiality of the Blue Helmets and the strict mandate, “the full potential of UNAMIR went unexplored and unused, and, as result, countless more Rwandans died than otherwise might have. If anyone in the international community learned this lesson at the time, it was not evident at the UN” (IPEP, 2000: 64-65).

Women before conflict

Before the civil war and genocide, Rwanda, like many other rural societies, was a patriarchal society where women were subordinate to men. It has been this way during colonial rule and would continue to dominate societal relations after the independence up until the outbreak of the civil war (Burnet, 2011: 319). Women would require men’s permission for the most ordinary things, such as speaking in public or going out with friends. Within Rwandan society personal and family status was very important and men would represent the household.

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16 Women acting on their own without the permission of their husbands or fathers was thus heavily frowned upon (Burnet, 2011: 317; Wallace et al., 2008: 112).

These gender relations were not limited to just societal norms, as since colonial times women were also prohibited by law from undertaking any economic activity without the explicit permission of their husbands. This created a deep gender-based division of labour, where women’s main occupation would be to take care of the household and children (Hogg, 2010: 72). Furthermore, any businesses or income they had was often controlled by the husband or father and could be plundered or even appropriated at any time. Thus in practice many women were largely dependent on their husbands for their livelihoods, or even for access to the means required to provide for themselves. (Burnet, 2011: 311-312; Wallace et al., 2008: 112).

The position of women in pre-conflict Rwandan society is slightly better when looking at education and their political participation. Even though during Belgian colonial rule Rwandan women had no right to vote or stand for election and girls generally did not attend any education apart from primary school (Burnet, 2011: 318). They received the right to vote and stand for election in 1961, when Rwanda became independent from Belgium. This also led to an increasing number of girls attaining primary and even secondary school, though still lacking behind on boys. Additionally, before the outbreak of the civil war in October 1990 and the following genocide in 1994, at most 17,1% of the seats in Rwandan parliament were filled by women and on the local level women’s political participation was virtually non-existent (Hogg, 2010: 74; Powley, 2005: 154).

Women during conflict

The civil war and following genocide not only profoundly change Rwandan state and society structures, but also deeply disrupted the existing gender relations. In just four years the strict patriarchal society and corresponding gender relations were broken down and replaced with a society that works towards achieving equality for men and women (Mageza-Barthel, 2015: 54). However, this might sound overly positive when taking into account the horrors people and especially women had to live through during the genocide and civil war to get to this point.

Both men and women were targets of killing during the genocide, “but women suffered rape as a hate crime in particularly brutal ways that men generally did not” (Herndon & Randell, 2013: 73). As women were seen as the reproducers of the Tutsi race, killing them

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17 seemed not enough for the perpetrators of the genocide. And thus the bodies of Tutsi women in general and ‘unreliable’ Hutu women, like those married to Tutsi men, “became a specific battleground, a space where rapists claimed victory, an expansion of ethnic territory by the male conqueror” (Handrahan, 2004: 437).

This is a remarkable development as most aspects of the genocide had been specifically planned, while the systematic rape of women and girls was not; there were no specific orders by the extremist architects of the genocide that rape should be used as an instrument. The official orders were to “kill, destroy and humiliate the Tutsi, seize their property, slaughter and eat their cows and defile the churches where they sought refuge”, which for the perpetrators became an indirect order to also rape women and girls, turning them into the ‘spoils’ of the genocide (African Rights, 1995: 44).

Despite these atrocities inflected upon so many women there is also the other side of the coin, as a substantial number of women contributed to the genocide in various ways. There are numerous cases where women directly or indirectly participated in the genocide. Reports vary from providing the killers with information and resources to active participation in the slaughter and everything in between, even though the latter was more rare (Hogg, 2010: 79). Younger girls who did not directly participate in the killings organized in groups and joined crowds that were surrounding places of refuge, where “they excelled as ‘cheerleaders’ of the genocide, singing and ululating the killers into action” (African Rights, 1995: 5).

This supporting role of women is in line with the gender-based expectations. As discussed earlier, before and during the genocide women were still considered subordinate to men. When the men set out to kill, women were not only expected to support them in doing so mentally, but also help them physically. Revealing hiding spots and looting the dead and the barely living for valuables were typical activities for women participating in the genocide (African Rights, 1995: 44; Hogg, 2010: 78). Many women who contributed also stated they did so because they genuinely believed anti-Tutsi propaganda claiming they were a threat and thus needed to be killed, but many also participated out of fear or were forced to do so (Hogg, 2010: 83-84).

Despite all the atrocities that the conflict brought forth, it also initiated the first steps towards empowering women. For instance, the umbrella organization Pro-Femme, which coordinates the activities for over 40 women’s NGOs in Rwanda, was established in 1992 in the midst of the ongoing civil war (Powley, 2005: 157-158). The same goes for the RPF that

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18 would become the driving force behind the empowerment and increased participation of women. Women have been playing important roles within the RPF from its early days onward and continued to do so during the civil war and genocide, significantly contributing to the success of the movement (Powley, 2005: 159).

This involvement in the RPF paved the road for women’s participation after the conflict in two ways. First of all within the RPF they would learn valuable skills that broke with the stereotypes about Rwandan women, such as important leading and management capabilities. Secondly, because of these new skills and the fact that 37,5 percent of the RPF leadership was female, the RPF provided women with a political institution which they would use to advocate for gender equality. This translates into the inclusion of women during the transitional phase in the direct aftermath of the civil war and genocide, which resulted in the securing of women’s rights and the equality of gender in the new constitution and throughout government policies. (Herndon & Randell, 2013: 78; Powley, 2005: 159).

Women after conflict

Because many women were left for dead after being raped or even intentionally kept alive as sexual slaves for the genocide perpetrators, many more women than men survived the genocide. This shows as the Rwandan population immediately after the genocide consisted for around two-thirds of women. This demographic imbalance forced women and girls to participate and take on roles which previously were filled by males. Such as heads of household, leaders of their community and higher political functions, thus effectively making them the primary financial providers (Herndon & Randell, 2013: 73; Powley, 2005: 157).

Nevertheless, women did more than simply filling the roles left open by males; they organized themselves. They created community-based organizations which would address the needs of many affected by the genocide, paved the road for further women empowerment and in general contribute to the recovery from the genocide (Berry, 2017: 831). These organizations truly reveal the empowerment of Rwandan women after they survived unimaginable sexual violence. They grew organically from support groups for female genocide survivors, both Tutsi and Hutu, into groups that promoted solidarity and empowerment for all women whose bodies became a battleground for sexual violence or experienced other horrors during the civil war or genocide (Herndon & Randell, 2013: 72). “The genocide forced women

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19 to think of themselves differently and in many cases develop skills they would not otherwise have acquired” (Powley, 2005: 158).

The civil war and genocide have thus disrupted existing gender relations and opened up opportunities to further challenge contemporary notions of womanhood and women’s overall roles and position in society. However, this proved mainly to be the case for women belonging to the middle and upper class, as women in rural areas struggled just to provide for their families (Berry, 2017: 838). Due to the labour intensity paired with agriculture, the absence of the husbands meant heavier workloads with smaller harvests, but also reduced their overall social status. Furthermore, even relatively successful women in the upper classes experience the burden of being the sole bread winner for the family in addition to the psychological and emotional scars left by the civil war and genocide (Burnet, 2011: 312).

When a new constitution was written in 2003, women were able to push for the inclusion of gender-specific rights through the government-backed gender equality initiative (Wallace, et al., 2008: 113). This led, among others, to the adoption of a 30% quota for women in parliament and upper house, based on indirect elections. In the following election the quota was even surpassed with 48,8% elected female parliamentarians and 34,6% of the seats in the upper house were occupied by women (Mageza-Barthel, 2015: 108; Powley, 2005: 34-35). These quotas applied to all levels of the political sphere, but influenced the position of women in society way beyond it. By bringing women into all levels of government, their opportunities to participate in the labour force and their overall social mobility also improved. “Because quotas apply to national, regional, and local levels, their impact has been broad and deep. Additionally, the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) women-friendly policies overturned the colonial and postcolonial patriarchal gender paradigm” (Burnet, 2011: 305).

In 2008 an extension of these gender-specific rights was made through a reform of the quota to a ‘best-loser system’ with 47,7% of seats and candidate positions reserved for women. Furthermore, a gender-based violence bill was accepted, which installed important safeguards for women’s rights such as the criminalization of domestic violence (Burnet, 2011: 314). Other important initiatives for promoting gender equality are the Inheritance Law, the Land Reform Act and the creation of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, which focus on granting women access to the means of production, allowing them to own property, businesses and sign contracts. This is a fundamental change of women’s economic rights

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20 compared to pre-genocide Rwanda, where they were dependent on their husbands for their livelihoods (Wallace et al., 2008: 113).

Nowadays, women still are the majority in Rwanda, hold over 60% of parliament seats and contribute significantly to Rwanda’s economy. There is joint decision making in domestic issues, such as discussing how to spend the household budget and when to have children. Just as importantly, women in general have found respect they did not had before (Burnet, 2011: 319-320). Furthermore, more girls than boys attend both primary and secondary school and there are more female undergraduate students than male. Despite the rising number of female students and the declining of the gender gap, in post-graduate studies and especially at PhD level or higher, men still make up the majority (Herndon & Randell, 2013: 91). In conclusion, Rwanda is a completely different state today compared to the pre-genocide Rwanda when it comes to women’s political and economic participation and their overall position in society.

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21

The case of Sri Lanka

Background of the conflict

The Sri Lankan conflict is the first comparative case, as it can be seen as a ‘typical’ civil war driven by separatist goals. It is also the case with the longest conflict, which lasted for 26 years (1983-2009) and took the lives of around 100.000 people, both military as rebel forces and civilians. It ended with a total victory of the Sri Lankan government and thus defeat for the LTTE, which lead to them dropping their demand for a separate state and to start working towards a federal solution (Wang, 2011: 100).

The origins can be found in a long history of identity politics, which can be traced back to the colonial times. This has led to an increasing ethnic

division in Sri Lankan society, with the main fault lines revolving around race, territory, language and religion (Brun, 2005: 61). During the second half of the twentieth century the Sinhalese government increased the identity politics through a series of reforms that specifically targeted the Tamil ethnic group and systematically disempowered them. This caused the Tamils to organize themselves and eventually conclude that the only way to secure their interests would be through a separate state for all Tamils, Tamil Eelam (Brun, 2005: 62; Wang, 2011: 101).

They originally aimed to do so relatively peaceful, but increasing hate and violence against the Tamils, often supported by the Sinhalese government, fuelled the feeling that the government could and would not protect Sinhalese people and their interests (Brun, 2005: 62; Jayaweera, 2002: 78). The Tamil organized protest thus also become more violent and eventually even led to the creation of a Tamil militant organization; The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers). The LTTE used primarily guerrilla tactics as a response to the violent Sinhalese riots and targeted mainly military, police and government officials. Both sides, the Tamil rebels and the Sinhalese government, increased the violence used in their

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22 actions which eventually led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1983 (Wang, 2011: 101).

The Sri Lankan civil war is more complicated than the conflicts in the other cases, as there are four main phases recognizable in the 26 years of civil war, which are:

The First Eelam war, which lasted for four years (1983-1987) and marked the start of the Sri Lankan civil war. In this first phase the LTTE were no match for the Sri Lankan government and they were almost defeated at the end of this phase. However, it did not come to that, as this phase ended (due to political pressure from the Tamil diaspora in India) with an Indian peace keeping force controlling the north of Sri Lanka.

The Second Eelam War, which lasted for five years (1990-1995), was the result of failing peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The fighting reignited after the LTTE massacred police personnel and started killing and expelling of Muslim civilians living in LTTE controlled areas. This phase also marked the start of using children and female combatants. It ended with another ceasefire in an attempt to restart negotiations (Jayaweera, 2002: 84).

The Third Eelam War, which lasted for seven years (1995-2002), was the result of another round of failed peace negotiations, after which the fighting continued and the violence quickly increased again. The third Eelam War was the most successful phase of the Sri Lankan civil war for the LTTE, as they controlled nearly 30% of the island at the end of this phase. It also ended with a ‘permanent’ ceasefire as the result of negotiations (Jayaweera, 2002: 85).

The Fourth Eelam War, which was the last and final phase of the Sri Lankan civil war, lasted for three years (2006-2009). The fighting reignited after almost four years of ceasefire and relative peace. The cause being the LTTE control of a main water reservoir and them cutting the water supplies to government controlled areas. This affected around 15.000 villages and the possible humanitarian crisis instigated new government attacks in an effort to reopen the water supply. This eventually led to the Sri Lankan government retaking control of the entire eastern province, ending the ceasefire, and aiming to end the LTTE rebellion and civil war for good. The government completed this goal on Sunday, 17 May 2009, when the Sri Lankan government officially declared victory over the LTTE after a 26-year during civil war. Two days later the government forces also managed to kill the leader of the LTTE, and thereby sealing the state’s victory (Wang, 2011: 100).

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23 Women before conflict

Women’s labour force participation before the start of the civil war has had two significant boosts: the first one was after the independence in 1948 and the second one after the liberalization of the Sri Lankan economy in 1977 (Madurawala, 2017: 219). After the independence in 1948 women were increasingly educated, resulting in rising literacy, later marriage and fewer children. At the same time there was an opening up and expansion of what were considered appropriate professions for women, which combined resulted in the first boost for women’s labour force participation (Madurawala, 2017: 218; Sarvananthan, 2015: 13).

The second boost for women’s labour force participation came after the liberalization of the economy in 1977 and onwards. This liberalization went hand in hand with the expansion of existing and the creation of new employment opportunities for women (Madurawala, 2017: 219). However, due to strict gender-based views on the labour market, women’s opportunities to participate in the labour force were confined within only a few sectors. The strict gender roles thus severely limited further growth and caused besides social inequality also economic inequality between men and women. This shows in an early stagnation of the female labour force participation rate at around 30 percent, while the male labour force participation rate is well over 65 percent (Jayaweera, 2002: 176; Madurawala, 2017: 219).

This inequality between men and women was not limited to the economy. Before the outbreak of the civil war, societal relations followed a rugged structure, in which men and women had their own position with matching roles to fulfil. Women would look after the private sphere of home and family, while men took care of the public sphere and thus the political activities (Kearney, 1981: 730). This is in stark contrast with the education and literacy rates for this period and onwards, which are largely equal between men and women except for higher education, where the majority is female (Kearney, 1981: 731).

Nevertheless, the levels of unemployment for uneducated, and even more so for educated women remained low, especially compared to men. The same patterns rise when it comes to political participation, which apart from voting, is and remains dominated by men. Between 1950 and 1980 only between one and four percent of the seats in the Sri Lankan parliament were occupied by women (Kearney, 1981: 733). This conception of a strict division of roles between men and women lies in the core of the ethos of the pre-civil war Sri Lankan

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24 society. Gender instead of capabilities determined the position and role of an individual in society (Kearney, 1981: 730).

Women during conflict

These strict gender-based roles got shaken up during the civil war, especially by Tamil women. Tamil women faced an extra obstacle on the road to participation compared to Sinhalese women; they experienced both ethnic and gender discrimination. Not only is the traditional Tamil culture even more strict when it comes to gender roles, female Tamils are also discriminated by the dominant Sinhalese state because of their ethnicity (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 46). For the Tamil women, the LTTE and similar Tamil militant organizations were a way to challenge these traditional gender roles, while simultaneously fighting ethnic discrimination against the Tamil people and gain a sense of security (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 46; Wang, 2011: 104).

This was however not just a clear cut choice made by women alone, as it also required a change of heart in the Tamil leadership to let in women as fighters. The acceptance of women as fighters was not a part of the original LTTE ideology, as this is based on traditional Tamil culture, which is even more strict on gender roles (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 46). It was a rational choice of the LTTE and other Tamil rebel groups to include women. First of all simply because of the need for more fighters and the competition between Tamil rebel groups over fighters. This simply required to amass as many fighters as possible, including women (Jordan & Denov, 2007: 44).

However, there is also a more strategic reasoning behind incorporating women in the rebellion. Because of the general outlook on women by the dominant Sri Lankan (Sinhalese) culture, women were considered weak and certainly no fighters. They thus could pass checkpoints without the strict body searches their male counterparts had to go through. This made the recruitment of women a tactical advantage for the LTTE, both in circumventing security measures of the government while carrying out (suicide) attacks, as for propaganda purposes (Jordan & Denov, 2007: 44; Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47; Wang, 2011: 103).

As a result, Tamil women were increasingly incorporated in the LTTE rebellion, first primarily as supporting roles, but they also quickly began to take on more active roles as fighters. This even led to the creation of a female combat unit in 1984, the Freedom Birds, just one year after the official start of the civil war (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 45). And eventually,

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25 because of the active recruiting and growing successes, between ten percent to a third of the total LTTE combatants were women (Jordan & Denov, 2007: 43; Wang, 2011: 102).

The female LTTE combatants were trained extensively in all fields of military activity such as combat, explosives, intelligence operations, electronics and mechanics; all sorts of skills that traditionally were seen as not fitting for women (Jordan & Denov, 2007: 46). Furthermore, their successes in the field also led to women increasingly filling more important roles and holding greater responsibilities (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 50). The women who joined the LTTE did thus not only learn valuable skills that they normally would not have, they also unlocked important leading and management capabilities. “To sum up, female emancipation was made possible through women’s access to ground-breaking training, roles and responsibilities, and in return the involvement of women was a great push factor for the Tamil movement” (Wang, 2011: 105).

While the Tamil women are challenging traditional gender roles through active participation in the LTTE rebellion, the majority of Sri Lankan women are not given this chance. The Sinhalese (and muslim) women, in traditional Sri Lankan culture, were still seen as weaker and in need of protection (Sarvananthan et al., 2016: 125; Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47). There was a common understanding of what was an appropriate occupation for a woman, and especially what was not (Jordan & Denov, 2007: 54-55). And even though the Sri Lankan Army officially had a women’s corps, they were an unarmed support unit and only allowed to operate in non-combat environments (SLA, n.d.).

Ordinary Sri Lankan women thus were not able to challenge their imposed roles in society like the Tamil women were able to. Furthermore, the civil war also limited the growth of female labour participation, especially when the violence grew in intensity and the LTTE became more successful. At the same time of the start of the Third Eelam War, the female labour force participation rate has stagnated at around thirty percent (Jayaweera, 2002: 81). The LTTE might thus cause empowerment for Tamil women, the majority of Sri Lanka women is Sinhalese and they don’t share in these processes. For them the situation is largely the same, or worse as the ongoing civil war limits their opportunities.

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26 Women after conflict

Since the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka has one of the highest gender equality ratings of all South Asian countries. Women are even the majority in most fields of higher education and dominate in high-earning foreign employment (Sarvananthan, 2015: 15; Sarvananthan et al., 2016: 123). However, despite these positive developments, Sri Lankan women among all social classes have seen their opportunities for accessing the labour force decline over time. (Madurawala, 2017: 225). What is especially extraordinary is that women’s opportunities for accessing the labour force have declined even more after the end of the civil war and the gender cap is larger nowadays than before 2009 (Solotaroff et al., 2018: 38). However, in the same time the average household incomes have doubled and the Poverty Head Count Ratio (at national poverty lines) went down from over fifteen percent to little over 6 percent (Madurawala, 2017: 225).

The decline in women’s labour force participation does not necessarily mean that the civil war did not empower women as there are other explanations why the women’s participation rate is declining. The growing economy and doubled household incomes, compared with inequality in opportunities and pay, can be seen as the leading cause. Women earn less than men for the same job, while costs for day-care and housekeeping are rising. It is thus often economically more attractive for families to let the men earn the income, while the women take care of the children and the household (Madurawala, 2017: 225; Sarvananthan et al., 2016: 125).

The other important factor is that, as discussed earlier, the dominant Sinhalese culture in Sri Lanka dictates a strict division of roles between men and women. And gender discrimination thus still plays an important role in the selection of job applicants (Kearney, 1981: 730). With the end of the civil war, the Sinhalese culture and its views on gender roles even became more dominant, which also lead to increasing discrimination based on ethnicity after the end of the civil war (Samarasinghe, 2012: 356-357). Thus Tamil women attempting to participate in the labour force faced an extra challenge; they once again experienced both ethnic and gender discrimination (Solotaroff et al., 2018: 32-33).

The empowerment of women during the civil war might thus not have led to a direct increase in women’s participation in the labour force, it did influence their political participation. Even though the rise in women’s seats in parliament is marginal, from an average of 12 seats before the civil war to an average of 13 seats after, other forms of

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27 participation are rising (Sri Lankan Parliament, 2015). For instance, the involvement in contemporary politics and the voting behaviour of Sinhalese women changed drastically during and after the civil war. As the civil war directly affected their own families, with their sons being drafted and their Sinhala Buddhist culture threatened. These women thus decided on their own political ideologies and parties, campaigning and actively voting (more than men), and sometimes even influencing the political ideology and voting behaviour of their male counterparts (Samarasinghe, 2012: 358).

Furthermore, after years of very low rates of women participating in local politics (around two percent), a 25-percent quota for women in local government has been installed in 2016. Even though this might be a step in the right direction, it also received quite the backlash when it first came into action during the local elections of 2018. Women attempting to run for local positions have reported incidents where they received threats, their own parties were working against them or simply not allowing them to run and some political leaders blatantly telling people not to vote on women (Mashal & Bastians, 2018).

However, these problems seem far less severe in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which used to be LTTE territory. When looking at the local government there, the northern and eastern provinces are seeing significant higher rates of female participation, even before the quota has been installed. This does not only include the amount of women running, but also the number of females at higher local governmental positions. Examples of females in such positions are the Mayor of Jaffna and the Mayor of Batticaloa, the Chief Secretary of the Northern Provincial Council and various District Secretaries in the northern and eastern provinces (Sarvananthan, 2015: 16). This difference between the former LTTE territory and the rest of Sri Lanka can be explained through the role of women in the civil war. Because Tamil women actively participated in the LTTE rebellion, they have learned skills and capabilities which empowered them. Thus while the Tamil women are able to participate in local politics, the majority of women in the rest of Sri Lanka are simply not given this chance.

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The case of Nepal

Background of the conflict The Nepalese Civil War is the second comparative case, as it can be seen as a civil war driven by ideological goals. It is also the case with the least violent conflict, which lasted for 10 years (1996-2006) and took the lives of around 15.000 people

(estimates vary between 13.000 and 17.000). Due to the guerrilla attacks carried out by the Maoist insurgency, many of these lives taken were that of civilians (Joshi & Pyakurel, 2015: 602; Pant & Standing, 2011: 410). The conflict started in 1996 when the CPN-M carried out a series of near simultaneous attacks in various districts across Nepal with the main aim of overthrowing the Nepalese monarchy and establishing a People's Republic. It ended in 2006 after months of negotiations with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord between the CPN-M, various political parties and the Nepalese Government (Leve, 200: 128; Lohani-Chase, 2014: 30).

The origins of the conflict in Nepal varies from the other two cases, as Nepalese society was not divided by ethnic differences, nor had it a long history of identity politics. Furthermore, Nepal was never colonized like Rwanda and Sri Lanka were, instead it had been a Hindu kingdom, ruled by the king as a true constitutional autocracy. It would be also be this monarchic autocracy and its refusal to accept democratic initiatives that would ultimately lead to the Nepalese Civil War. The outbreak of the war can be seen as the climax of a half-century long struggle for democracy combined with increasingsocial and economic inequalities, and the failure of the monarchy to accurately respond to the demands of the Nepalese society (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 168-169).

This struggle for democracy began after the end of world war 2, starting with small strikes and protests but eventually turning into the first revolution against the monarchy in 1951 (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010: 328). The revolution ended with the formation of a new coalition government and a reduction of the power of the Rana-dynasty, but in reality little has

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29 changed. It did however instigate the creation of democratic movements and brought forth a sense of political awareness among the population. However, until the 1990’s all efforts to push for further democratization were foiled by the monarchy (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 169).

In 1990, inspired by the wave of democratization following the end of the Soviet Union, the major political parties in Nepal united to form the People’s Movement. Their goal was to end the constitutional monarchy and install a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty system. The government responded by arresting the leaders of the various parties and other officials supporting the movement (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010: 332). This was followed by months of violent protests and eventually led to the proclamation of a new constitution, which the king accepted in order to end the protests. The new constitution officially transferred the power from the monarchy to the parliament and installed a complicated political system existing of both a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty system and a constitutional monarchy (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 169).

However, this new political system was largely a sham as the King could dismiss or replace the parliament at any time, leaving the real power in the hands of the monarchy. Simultaneously, the Nepalese economy was stagnating, causing various economic and social problems, which the powerless parliament was unable to resolve. Due to this ongoing autocracy of the monarchy, dissatisfaction among the population was rising, but the political parties were still unwilling to challenge the king (Leve, 2007: 129). The Maoists thus took matters in their own hands and started to mobilise against the Nepalese state in order to create a true Nepalese Republic. This eventually resulted in the declaration of the ‘People’s War’, as the Nepalese Civil War is called by the Maoists, roughly six years later in 1996 (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 170).

The exact sequence of events during the conflict in Nepal is difficult to track, as both sides heavily made use of propaganda during the conflict. However, the conflict can be roughly divided in two phases, the phase before the palace massacre of 2001 and the phase after. The palace massacre was carried out by a member of the royal family without any kind of interference by the Maoists, but nevertheless marked a turning point in the conflict (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 172).

The first phase started in 1996 with the launch of the rebellion by the CPN-M. It was characterized by insurgencies and guerrilla attacks in rural areas, without any direct combat taking place between the Maoist insurgents and the Nepalese forces. The rebel attacks would

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30 mainly target police stations as they were seen as a representation of the Nepalese monarchy (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010: 333). During this time the Maoist also gained increasing support from the poor Nepalese living in the rural areas, as they ultimately had the same goals. These goals were equal rights for all Nepalese men and women, redistribution of land and an end to the traditional caste system and the exploitation that came with it (Cottle & Keys, 2007: 171; Menon & van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015: 53).

However, the intensity of the conflict changed in the second phase in 2001 onwards when a new king came to power after the previous king had been killed by his eldest son. The new king caused an escalation of the conflict by immediately launching various active military campaigns in an attempt to rapidly end the conflict. The intensity of the violence skyrocketed, as in the following year a third of all casualties in the entire war were made (Joshi & Pyakurel, 2015: 608). The CPN-M responded to the increased military presence in the countryside by creating an armed wing, the PLA (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010: 334-335). The military operations however did not produce the anticipated results, as at the end of the second phase the civil war had reached a stalemate. For both sides it became apparent that the PLA would never be able to seize control over entire Nepal, nor would the monarchy retain authority over rural Nepal (Leve, 2004: 128; Machanda, 2004: 239).

At this point the nation was essentially ruled by two powers, the Maoists in the rural areas and the monarchy/Nepalese state in the cities. This had caused a political crisis in Nepal which reached its critical point when the king dismissed the entire parliament. In response, the dismissed political parties joined forces with the Maoists to end the kings autocratic rule (Lawoti & Pahari, 2010: 338-339). This was followed by months of massive demonstrations throughout Nepal, eventually leading to a ceasefire and the start of negotiations in August 2006. These negotiations were monitored by the UN and led to the official end of the civil war on 21 November 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (Leve, 2007: 167).

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31 Women before conflict

Nepal is a traditional agricultural society, with a strict gender-based division of labour and society. Except for the matriarch of the family, women were subordinate to men and typically would do menial work around the house and take care of the household and children (Atteraya et al., 2016: 322). Additionally, both the Nepalese society as the economy were also strictly stratified through a caste system, further limiting the abilities of women to participate in politics or the economy. Women thus faced a double challenge compared to men; not only did their caste largely determine their position in society, but as a women they also faced discrimination based on gender. And the lower the caste, the higher the gender-based discrimination would be (Atteraya et al., 2016: 323).

Caste, poverty and gender were closely linked which shows as the poverty and illiteracy rates of women in the lowest caste were more than twice as high as those of women in the highest caste. This has much to do with socio-economic divide created by the caste system, as each caste had a set of assigned jobs. For instance, women from the lowest caste could only perform manual labour, while women in the higher castes would be able to work in the service industry or even hold administrative jobs. This greatly affected income and overall living situation (Atteraya et al., 2016: 322). The same goes for participating in politics, as it was seen as a typical men’s affair and the power was in the hands of the upper castes. Thus besides for a few women from the upper castes, for most women participating in politics other than voting was beyond their reach (Kanel, 2014: 54; Manchanda, 2004: 240).

The position of women within the family is almost the other way around in the caste system, as especially women from rural areas have more power than urban women when it comes to decision-making in the family. In rural areas, women decide over important issues such as when to plant the seeds, when to harvest and how to spend the household budget. While in higher castes, women were expected to be more socially, morally, and materially subjectifying. After marriage the women’s autonomy in her own life ended, and it would become her sacred duty to care for her husband and new family (Leve, 2007: 153; Manchanda, 2004: 245).

From the 1950’s onwards the Nepalese government tried to reduce the discrimination based on caste and the impacts it had on the economic and political participation. In 1963 discrimination based on cast and ethnicity became illegal by law and all castes were able to attend an education, but in practice very little changed, especially for ordinary women

Violent conflict and the position of women in society : a case study comparison of Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Nepal