On Thin Ice?
Russian Conduct in the Arctic and Escalating Tensions
in the High North.
Hamish Cruickshank
European Studies – MA Thesis
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 3
Chapter One – The Debate ... 10
Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework ... 19
Chapter Three – Russia and the Arctic so Far ... 24
Chapter Four – Russian Security in the High North ... 39
Chapter Five – Russia and the United States in the
Arctic... 52
Chapter Six – Sino-Russian Relations in the High North
... 63
Conclusion ... 70
Introduction
On 2 August, 2007, a pair of Russian MIR submersibles descended roughly 4,300 metres in the Arctic Ocean and planted a titanium Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole1. The expedition was heralded as a great success in Russia, and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that it would help the Russian Federation “to obtain additional scientific proofs”2 for its United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) application to extend its continental shelf well beyond the already established 200-mile zone. However, outside of Russia, the mission riled fellow Arctic states. Many viewed the flag planting as an overtly jingoistic act and Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay declared, "this isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say: 'We're claiming this territory'”3. While debates ignited regarding the legitimacy of the Russian expedition, the Arctic was truly back on the international agenda.
This is significant for until this time the Arctic had more or less faded into an afterthought for the international community. The region had been a hotbed of activity in the twentieth century, particularly during the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union faced off across the North Pole. The close proximity of the two superpowers over the Arctic dictated that the region would become a critical, contested space and both sides consequentially invested heavily in their respective northern military installations. The Soviet Union, for example, deployed significant amounts of nuclear weapons to its northern regions and also developed the ‘Sistema Preduprezhdeniya o Raketnom Napadni’ (SPRN) early warning radar system to provide added security in the North. Furthermore, Moscow invested heavily in a chain of bomber and military bases “stretching from the Kola Peninsula in the west to Chukota in the east”4. The Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula in the far northwest of Russia was also bolstered significantly throughout the Cold War, with the fleet amassing roughly 180
1 Tom Parfitt, ‘Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed’, The Guardian, 2 August, 2007,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic (date accessed:12/01/2019).
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions
by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Following His Participation in the 14th Session of the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security’, 3 August, 2007, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/366392 (date accessed: 03/03/2019).
3 Parfitt, ‘Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed’.
4 Kristian Åtland, ‘Russia’s Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?’, Contemporary Security Policy, 32:2, (2011), p.270.
submarines by 19865. On the other side, the United States also invested heavily in both its own northern security infrastructure and NATO’s offensive and defensive capacity in the High North.
However, as the Cold War came to an end in 1991 and the threat of conflict in the region dissipated, the Arctic’s international significance began to diminish. As tensions eased in the Arctic, global attention began to shift to more pressing matters in the Balkans and in the Middle-East. This is not to say that the region faded into total obscurity, for it was still a site of significant scientific research and exploration. However, relative to the Arctic’s significant role in the Cold War the High North was now a space of secondary importance for the international community. Yet, the mid-2000s saw the Arctic emerge once more as a space of great importance as climatic change in the region became an issue of global concern. Rajmund Przybylak states that the period between 1995-2005 was the “warmest since the seventeenth century” and 2005 in particular was an “exceptionally warm year” with temperatures rising by 2°C in relation to the 1951-90 mean6. This rise in temperature has caused Arctic ice to melt at an alarming rate and Yuri Morozov contends that by 2010 global warming “reduced the area covered by permanent ice in the Arctic by almost half, from over 3 million to 1.6 million square miles”7.
Such drastic environmental change fixed global attention once more on the Arctic. Receding polar ice instigated a rise in global sea-levels and a global effort has followed to combat this development. In particular, however, the five littoral Arctic states (Russia, the United States, Norway, Denmark and Canada) were faced with a host of new problems – and also opportunities. On the one hand, the receding polar ice caps facilitated the discovery of vast reserves of natural resources in the High North. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) stated in 2008 that the Arctic held roughly “30% of the world’s remaining underground natural gas resources … and 13% of the known remaining oil resources”8. With the polar ice melting,
5 Ibid., p.273.
6 Rajmund Przybylak, ‘Rising Air-Temperature Changes in the Arctic’, Annals of Glaciology, 46, (2007), p.316. 7 Yury Morozov, ‘Arctic 2030: What are the Consequences of Climate Change? The Russian Response’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68, (4), (2012), p.22.
8 Jørgen Staun, ‘Russia’s Strategy in the Arctic: Cooperation not Confrontation’, Polar Record, 53, (270), (2017),
these reserves have become more accessible and Arctic states have sought to exploit this economic potential. Russia in particular is believed to hold around 60% of the undiscovered oil in off-shore territory under its jurisdiction9. Furthermore, other economic opportunities have emerged in the Arctic as a result of climate change. Receding polar ice has started to open Arctic shipping lanes above Russia and Canada to the world. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), for example, is a 3,000 nautical mile shipping route stretching along Russia’s northern coastline and provides the shortest possible passage from Europe to Asia. The amount of ships traversing the route is increasing on a yearly basis and it is reported that over 600 ships utilised the NSR in 201810. Moreover, a UCLA study conducted in 2013 estimated that by mid-century such routes will be traversable by ordinary shipping vessels without ice-breaker escort, due to the extent of ice loss in the region11. Such occurrences will lead to a substantial increase in traffic on routes like the NSR and the North-West passage above Canada, providing these Arctic states with the opportunity to profit from a substantial increase in transit along the shipping routes.
While the economic potential in the region is evidently immense, climatic change in the region has also presented both Arctic states and the international community with a range of serious problems. Firstly, there is the issue of rising sea levels as a result of the melting polar ice which threatens Arctic wildlife and ecology, and low-lying states across the world. This threat has generated global concern and has led to an international effort to combat climate change through reducing greenhouse emissions and investing in renewable energy sources. Additionally, there is the problem of security. Climatic change in the Arctic has generated a host of new security concerns for Arctic states regarding access to resources, shipping lanes, and territory. Arctic states have therefore taken a range of measures to address these new security issues and to shore up their Arctic regions. While all members of the Arctic five have invested in enhancing their northern security, Russia, in particular, has devoted significant capital towards enhancing its northern security infrastructure. Valery Konyshev and
9 Ibid.
10 Atle Staalesen, ‘80% Increase on the Northern Sea Route’, The Barents Observer, 28 August, 2018,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2018/08/80-increase-northern-sea-route (date accessed - 20/04/2019).
11 Meg Sullivan, ‘Global Warming Will Open Unexpected New Shipping Routes in the Arctic, UCLA Researchers
Find’, UCLA Newsroom, 4 March, 2013, http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/new-unexpected-shipping-route-243485 (date accessed - 02/05/2019).
Alexander Sergunin contend that under Russia’s rearmament programme, a project involving the investment of roughly R19 trillion in renovating and modernising Russia’s armed forces, large amounts have been invested in Russia’s Northern Fleet and nuclear capabilities12. The extent of this investment will be explored in more detail in the proceeding chapters, however it is important to note that Russia has at this stage has invested more heavily in its northern security infrastructure than any other Arctic state.
But why is this the case? As will also be argued in the coming chapters, Russia has been a constructive and accomodating partner in the Arctic affairs so far. As a result, the chance of outright conflict in the High North seems slim. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, recent developments in the region have presented the Kremlin with new security concerns. Firstly, climatic change has led to the emergence of a variety of softer security concerns that Moscow has had to respond to. Ranging from illegal migration to unauthorised shipping, these new security concerns have forced Moscow to enhance its northern security structures and adapt its current northern capabilities to perform a range of new functions. Secondly, the rhetoric and actions of the United States and China in the Arctic have also threatened Arctic stability. Having previously been described as a “reluctant Arctic power”13, the Trump administration has recently adopted a more hands-on approach to Arctic affairs and has suggested, via the publication of a revised Arctic strategy and through recent public announcements from figures such as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that it will attempt to confront and contain Russia in the region. Given the wider deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington in the context of events in Ukraine and Syria, such a stance could result in significant escalation in tensions in the region.
Regarding China, while relations between Russia and China remain relatively pragmatic and stable14, the increasing thrust of China into Arctic affairs has the potential to also generate friction in the region. In January 2018, China propagated its official state Arctic policy and
12 Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, ‘Russian Military Strategies in the Arctic: Change or Continuity?’,
European Security, 26:2, (2017), p.182.
13 Frederic Lasserre, Jérôme Le Roy, and Richard Garon, ‘Is There an Arms Race in the Arctic?’. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.14, Issues 3 & 4, (2012), p.12.
14 James Dobbins, Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne, ‘A Warming Trend in Russia-China Relations, Rand Corporation, April 18, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html (date accessed 01/05/2019).
signalled that it was ready to integrate itself into Arctic affairs and take advantage of the emergent economic opportunities in the High North. This paper will argue that this development also has the potential to create tensions between Moscow and Beijing as China seeks to tap into the region’s energy resources, sea lanes and fisheries despite not being an official Arctic state or full member of the Arctic Council (an intergovernmental forum comprising of Russia, the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland). The Arctic is one of the few areas where Russia maintains a relative advantage over China. Thus, the growing encroachment of Beijing into the High North threatens to make the strategic partnership between the two states ever more lopsided.
Through using a structural realist theoretical framework, this thesis will seek to analyse Russian conduct in the Arctic and shed light on potential new fissures in international relations in the region. To do so, a range of analytical methods will be utilised. Firstly, a political discourse analysis (PDA) will be employed to examine the statements and declarations of political actors belonging to both the Russian Federation and other nations involved in the Arctic. In particular, statements issued on the official websites of the Kremlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, and from the official website of the Russian Government will be examined. The majority of these statements will be from President Vladimir Putin and other leading figures in the Kremlin such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Such an analysis will shed light on how leading political figures in Russia visualise the Arctic and how they view the changing state of affairs in the region. Examining these statements will also prove useful in the sense that they reveal how the Kremlin seeks to justify its conduct in the region to both the Russian people and also the outside world. Through analysing the institutional framework, structural components, and content of the various statements and declarations it will be possible to identify various themes inherent in the Kremlin’s public Arctic discourse and develop a more comprehensive understanding of Russian conduct in the Arctic.
Furthermore, a policy analysis will also be utilised to analyse various strategies and policies published by the Russian Federation, the United States, and China. Firstly, Russia has published an increasing number of official strategy documents relating to the Arctic,
articulating objectives, motivations and concerns in the High North. Reviewing these official documents will further assist in identifying Russian ambitions and security concerns in the Arctic and help in forecasting possible fissure points in relations with other states in the region. Additionally, the U.S. and China have recently published revised Arctic policies and security strategies. In analysing these texts, it will be possible to see whether they clash with Russia’s ambitions in the region and whether they indicate a more hands-on, confrontational approach to Arctic affairs that may jeopardise the relatively stable current state of affairs in the High North.
Newspaper articles will also be analysed to provide another source base for this thesis. In particular, articles from outlets such as the Moscow Times and TASS will be examined, while articles published in other western outlets such as the New York Times and the Guardian, will also be analysed. Additional pieces from think tanks such as Chatham House will also be considered to help provide much needed context and provide another perspective on Arctic affairs.
Through examining these sources, and through employing the various analytical methods outlined above, this thesis will seek to examine Russian conduct in the Arctic, before analysing how Russia’s security concerns in the Arctic have transformed and how they may transform further in the coming years. It will demonstrate how at present, climatic change in the Arctic has led to the emergence of a variety of new softer security concerns that the Kremlin has had to address. As will be made clear, while the Kremlin still views the U.S. and NATO as a residual threat to the Russian Federation, the slim chances of conflict in the region has meant that softer security concerns have taken precedence as of late. However as will also be argued, the recent developments in China and the U.S.A.’s respective Arctic strategies threaten to potentially escalate tensions in the region and may force Russia to reconsider its security priorities in the High North.
To achieve this, this thesis will first examine the existing scholarly debate on the matter before elaborating on the theoretical framework which will guide this analysis. It will then provide an examination of Russia’s conduct in the Arctic from 2007, focussing firstly on non-military Arctic affairs. It will then analyse Russian security developments in the High North and the
Kremlin’s transforming security concerns in the Arctic, concentrating on traditional anxieties in the region before looking at new threats that have emerged as a result of climate change. The final two chapters will then concentrate on recent developments in U.S. and Chinese Arctic policy respectively, analysing the potential for an escalation in tensions in the region. In the end, a clear picture of Russian conduct in the Arctic will have been produced and the potential for tensions to rise in the High North will also have been examined.
Chapter One – The Debate
Until the mid-2000s, academic writing on post-Cold War Arctic affairs was relatively limited. However with climate change having an increasingly detrimental impact on the Arctic the region has remerged as an area of interest. And in 2007 when Russia planted its flag on the North Pole seabed academics began to study the region in more depth, vying to uncover whether a new Cold War was about to begin in the High North. Other avenues of research emerged shortly after and soon a whole host of new scholarship appeared on the region, focussing on issues such as potential tourism in the Arctic to Arctic populations existing in the transforming Polar environment15. Yet the majority of focus still revolves around the potential for conflict in the region, pinpointing Russia as the state most likely to disrupt the Arctic stability that has persisted since the end of the cold War.
Two primary schools of thought exist on the matter: those who see the Arctic as a space of tension and potential conflict between Russia and the other Arctic states and those who see the region as a space of international cooperation, where Arctic states have collaborated to tap into the region’s economic potential and have refrained from aggressive territorial claims. Chronologically, the former school of thought emerged first following the Russian flag planting of 2007 and the resumption of bomber patrols over Arctic airspace and naval patrols in Arctic waters16. This was followed by the arrival of ‘revisionist’ scholarship in the following years as analysts and academics sought to question the original interpretation of Arctic affairs and challenge the contention that the region was a hotbed of tension. Each school of thought will now be examined, but it is important to acknowledge that the traditional account of Arctic affairs is still prominent to this date. Despite the emergence of the revisionist school, many journalists and analysts, particularly in Western circles, still see Russia as a potential antagonist in the Arctic.
15 Elena Zelenskaya, ‘Geopolitics and Tourism in the Arctic: the Case of the National Park ‘Russian Arctic’, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure, and Events, Vol.10, Issue 1, (2018), Nadir Kinosslan, ‘Sustaining
Russia’s Arctic Cities: Resource Politics, Migration, and Climate Change’, Polar Geography, Vol.42, Issue 1, (2019).
To begin with, the traditionalist take on Arctic affairs will be explored. Since 2007, various scholars and analysts have argued that Russian conduct in the Arctic region resembled that of a revisionist state. It is argued that the build-up of the Russian military in its northern region is aggressive in intent and serves as a means of achieving hegemony in the Arctic region. In the context of events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, the investment in Russia’s northern capabilities is seen as evidence of Russia seeking to revise the status quo in the Arctic. It is argued that Russia has plans to seize the economic potential of the region itself through expansion to claim further reserves of natural resources and govern shipping in Arctic waters. Thus, the Kremlin’s investment in its northern military capabilities is seen as a means to achieve this through becoming the region’s hegemon.
The first articulations of this sentiment came soon after the 2007 flag planting incident. Journalists published articles titled ‘Russia claims North Pole’ describing Russia’s hegemonic bid for “ownership of 460,000 square miles of Arctic territory - and its huge reserves of oil and gas”17, while others spoke of the “former red army” unveiling aggressive new Arctic plans18. It should be noted that the vast majority of these articles and analyses emerged from western circles. Indeed, American think tanks such as The Heritage Foundation, a neo-conservative body founded in 1973, is another such example propagating these sentiments. The flag-planting escapade was described as a “chilling throwback to the attempts during the 1930s to conquer the Arctic during the years when the Soviet Union was seized by fear and hatred”19 and a new Cold War was said to be on the horizon in the High North. In a follow-up article a year later, Ariel Cohen, Jim Dolbow and Lajos F. Szaszdi developed this position further calling on the US to revive its presence in the Arctic through the acquisition of ice breakers, the establishment of an Arctic task force and through developing closer ties with
17 Anne Penketh, ‘Russia Claims North Pole’, Independent, 3 August, 2007,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/russia-claims-north-pole-5334382.html, (date accessed – 08/04/2019).
18 Matthias Schepp and Gerald Traufetter, ‘Russia Unveils Aggressive Arctic Plans’, Spiegel Online, 29 January,,
2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/riches-at-the-north-pole-russia-unveils-aggressive-arctic-plans-a-604338.html, (date accessed – 16/05/2019).
19 Ariel Cohen, ‘Russia’s Race for the Arctic’, The Heritage Foundation, 6 August, 2007,
other Arctic states to counter Russia’s perceived hegemonic ambitions and “sustain America’s leadership role in the High North.”20
Many analysts and scholars soon began to reiterate and substantiate these claims. James Kraska, for example, argued that “(Russia) has embarked on a project to ensure that it is regarded as the first Arctic superpower”21. He stated that Moscow believed Arctic resources would become the “critical point for the world military balance”22 and therefore sought to become the dominant power in the region in a bid to achieve greater recognition and transform the space into a resource basin for economic growth. Other analysts such as Alan Dowd cited the training of troops along Russia’s northern coastline and the increase in operational capacity of the Northern Fleet as symptoms of increasing aggressive intent in the region and called on the U.S. and Canada to enhance their military presence in the region to counter Russian dominance of the North Pole23. Pavel Baev adopted a similar argument in his piece on Putin’s Arctic plan. While he contended that Russia has collaborated with other Arctic states, these efforts were primarily motivated by the necessity to gain its neighbours support for its UNCLOS application to extend its continental shelf. Otherwise, Baev argued that “It is difficult to reconcile this professed commitment to cooperation with the determination to advance a massive rearmament programme, centred on the deployment of a new generation of Borei-class strategic submarines that would constitute
the centrepiece of the Northern Fleet.”24 With Russia being the only state at this stage to comprehensively modernise its military capacity inside the Arctic Circle, Baev stated that Russia’s northern neighbours should be troubled by developments.
Despite the emergence of a revisionist account of Russian conduct in the High North, the argument that Russia harboured aggressive intentions in the Arctic remained. Andrea Charron, Joël Plouffe and Stéphane Roussel, for example, identify Russia ‘the Arctic hegemon’
20 Ariel Cohen, Jim Dolbow and Lajos F. Szaszdi, ‘The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic’, The Heritage Foundation, 30 October, 2008, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-new-cold-war-reviving-the-us-presence-the-arctic, (date accessed – 14/05/2019).
21 James Kraska, ‘International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage’, Vanderbilt Journal of transnational Law, Vol.42, (2010), p.1117.
22 Ibid.
23 Alan Dowd, ‘Meeting Russia’s Arctic Aggression’, Fraser Institute, 11 August, 2010,
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/meeting-russias-arctic-aggression, (date accessed – 16/05/2019).
and contend that Russia is “clearly the Arctic region’s dominant and most visible power.”25 They cited Russia’s large icebreaker fleet and the high volume of Arctic naval and air sorties as the main indicators of its hegemonic intent in the Arctic. This is supported by the fact that the Kremlin has “made command of its Arctic a top domestic and foreign policy goal”26 – unlike the other littoral Arctic states. Further analyses of a similar makeup appeared following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Stephen J. Blank, for example, argued that in the wake of Russian actions in Ukraine the Kremlin’s military build-up stemmed from ‘imperial ambitions’27. The article’s main focus lies away from the High North, however Blank contends that Moscow identified the Arctic as a critical space where its military capabilities would be strengthened significantly. In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Blank warns that this military build-up potentially signals a rise in Russian aggression in the region and calls on the U.S. to counter the “Russian military build-up in a way that will enable them to once again achieve victory.”28 Other scholars such as Anders Fogh Rasmussen concurred citing events in Ukraine as a potential precursor for an elevation in Russian efforts to dominate the High North. Rasmussen argues that “Russia has long made clear its desire to enlarge its territory in the Arctic”29. Along similar lines to Blank, he calls on the U.S. and the other littoral Arctic states to counterbalance Russia’s significant investment in its military capabilities along its northern coastline.
To this date the premise that Russia seeks dominance in the Arctic remains prominent. Various analysts, journalists and scholars still contend that Russia maintains hegemonic ambitions in the High North and view the Kremlin’s investment in its northern security infrastructure as aggressive in intent. In May 2019, National Geographic published an article by Neil Shea analysing the ‘new Cold War’ in the region. Once more “aggressive moves” by Russia, and also this time by China, in the form of large investments in northern oil and gas infrastructure are documented. Russia’s expansion of its Arctic military capabilities are also viewed with trepidation as Shea references events in Ukraine. He argues that at this point,
25 Andrea Charron, Joël Plouffe and Stéphane Roussel, ‘The Russian Arctic Hegemony: Foreign Policy
Implications for Canada’, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 18:1, (2012), p.47.
26 Ibid., p.38.
27 Stephen J. Blank, ‘Imperial Ambitions: Russia’s Military Buildup’, World Affairs, Vol.178, No.1, (2015). 28 Ibid., p.74.
29 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘A Place Apart: A Peaceful Arctic No More?’, Harvard international Review, Vol.36,
Russia is “by most measures, the dominant cold-weather player”30 and contends that the U.S. and Canada have fallen far behind in a military sense. Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy posited a similar article in the Financial Times in April, 2019. In the article Astrasheuskaya and Foy posit that Russia is winning the battle for supremacy over the Arctic Ocean and argue that the Kremlin’s renovation of its icebreaker fleet and general northern military capabilities were symptoms of a “rapid and determined push to assert its control”31.
To this date, therefore, we are seeing the publication of articles and analyses that perpetuate the argument that Moscow is set on dominating the Arctic. Security developments are seen as a means for the Kremlin to achieve its hegemonic ambitions, while investments in Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure in the region are described as further attempts to dominate the regions natural resources. While many note that Russia has cooperated on a variety of issues in the Arctic, imperial ambitions still stand out in these analyses. However, as has been noted, a different stance on Russian conduct in the Arctic has also emerged and this revised approach calls this traditional interpretation into contention. This approach, rather, argues that Russia has avoided confrontation in the Arctic and has instead been a pragmatic partner in Arctic affairs to this date. It is argued that while significant capital has been diverted to upgrading Moscow’s northern military forces, this investment reflects a desire to enhance the state’s northern defences to counter a variety of new security threats in the region rather than an attempt to militarise the Arctic and dominate the region. Russia has therefore not sought hegemony in the High North – it has sought security and stability, and a continuation of the status quo.
Scholars such as Lincoln E. Flake have argued that Russia does not seek to be the hegemonic power in the High North. While he argues that Russian actions in Syria and Ukraine have generated some concern, “Moscow’s Arctic approach stands remarkably separate from the
30 Neil Shea, ‘Scenes from the New Cold War Unfolding at the Top of the World’ National Geographic, May 8,
2019, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/10/new-cold-war-brews-as-arctic-ice-melts/, (date accessed – 13/05/2019).
31 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Henry Foy, ‘Polar powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic ocean’,
Financial Times, 28 April, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/2fa82760-5c4a-11e9-939a-341f5ada9d40 - (date accessed 24/05/2019).
larger tumult of relations with the West.”32 He argues that the Kremlin has cooperated with other Arctic states to resolve a variety of different issues, such as the disputes over potential continental shelf extensions, and has adhered to international law in the region. Indeed, he states that “since the North Pole flag-planting episode, Russia’s approach toward its seabed claims has steadily tended toward co-operation and remains firmly grounded in international legal practices.”33 Furthermore, he contends that military enhancements in the region do not stem from hegemonic ambitions. Rather, he argues that the investment in the Northern Fleet and in Moscow’s northern defences has purely functioned to modernise the decrepit and dilapidated security infrastructure in the region. He contends that after the Cold War, “the Northern Fleet was left to atrophy, and the entire security infrastructure along the Arctic coastline … was practically abandoned.”34 In order to limit the vulnerability of Russia’s northern coastline, substantial investment was required. While Flake does maintain that there are vague prospects for conflict in the Arctic and that Russia has attained a strategic advantage in the region, it is far from an aggressive, hegemonic power.
This argument is maintained by various other scholars. Klaus Dodds, for example, has highlighted Russia’s proclivity to adhere to international law in his article analysing claims to the Arctic continental shelf35. Despite the 2007 flag planting incident, he argues that Russia has followed international law with regards to its attempts to secure the extension of its Arctic jurisdiction via UNCLOS. Jørgen Staun has argued similarly. He argues that despite Moscow’s aggressive course in Ukraine, “Russia has followed the ‘rules of the game’ in the Arctic”36 and consequently resembles a status quo state – not a revisionist power. Russia’s course in the High North is stable and predictable according to Staun and despite military enhancements in the region, the Kremlin is pursuing “a non-assertive foreign policy in regards to that region.”37
32 Lincoln E. Flake, ‘Contextualizing and Disarming Russia’s Arctic Security Posture’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies’, 30:1, (2017), p.17.
33 Lincoln E. Flake, ‘Navigating an Ice Free Arctic: Russia’s Policy on the Northern Sea Route in an Era of Climate
Change’, Rusi Journal, Vol.158, No.3, (2013), p.46.
34 Flake, Contextualizing and Disarming Russia’s Arctic Security Posture, ‘p.20.
35 Klaus Dodds ‘Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, The Arctic and the Political Geographies
of the Outer Continental Shelf’, Political Geography, Vol.29, (2010).
36 Staun, ‘Russia’s Strategy in the Arctic’, p.314. 37 Ibid., p.328.
Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin also promote a similar interpretation of Russian conduct in the High North. They argue that contrary to the “widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, … Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region.”38 While the Kremlin may have high ambitions in the Arctic and has certainly invested in military modernisation in the region, these developments are in fact “quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capacities or provoking a regional arms race”39. In their eyes, Russia is not arming itself to dominate the Arctic, it is rather enhancing its current capabilities to protect the state’s economic interests in the region and its territorial integrity. Likewise, Kristian Åtland asserts that the Kremlin’s military ambitions in the High North should not be exaggerated. In his view, while friction may exist in the region, “Russia appears to have more pressing security challenges elsewhere”40 and its Arctic policy now reflects an attempt to increase cooperation in a bid to exploit the region’s increasing economic potential. Robert English and Andrew Thvedt provide another similar analysis. They contend that “Russia has for twenty years been a constructive partner in Arctic governance.”41 Security developments along its northern coastline have functioned to renovate the neglected and decaying Arctic security infrastructure and combat emergent threats in the region. While Russia is certainly a great Arctic power, they argue that ominous accounts of Russian conduct in the region fall far from the mark.
Michael L. Roi concurs that Russia has behaved in a cooperative manor so far in Arctic affairs and harbours no visible hegemonic intent. However, he presents a different explanation for Moscow’s northern military modernisation programmes. He argues that “the restoration of great power status remains the principal objective behind Moscow’s foreign policy”42 and this has heavily influenced the Kremlin’s spending on its military capabilities in the High North. He contends that Russia is determined “to assert its status as the greatest Arctic power”43 but
38 Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, ‘Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?’, Defense and Security Analysis, 30:4, (2014), p.323.
39 Ibid.
40 Åtland, ‘Russia’s Armed Forces in the Arctic’, p.267.
41 Robert English and Andrew Thvedt, ‘The Arctic’ in Andrei P.P. Tsygankov (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy, (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2018), p.338.
42 Michael L. Roi, ‘Russia: The Greatest Arctic Power?’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 23:4, (2010),
p.558.
does not seek confrontation in the region. Rather, it seeks to cement the current status quo and bolster the Kremlin’s great power aspirations. Mariya Y. Omelicheva provides a similar account and argues that “(Russia’s) great power status has been called into question in the West”44 and this has prompted the Kremlin to enhance its efforts in areas of global politics where it enjoys a comparative advantage. The Arctic is one such area, and Omelicheva contends that Russian manoeuvres in the region reflect an attempt to re-assert its great power status rather than an attempt to claim and subsequently carve up the Arctic for itself.
Thus, we are presented with two overriding analyses of Russian conduct in the Arctic. There are those who see Russia as a revisionist power in the Arctic, seeking to militarise the region and attain hegemony through domination of the High North. And there are those that argue that Russia is a pragmatic and responsible partner in Arctic affairs, and contend that military modernisation programmes reflect a desire to enhance a decrepit security infrastructure in the High North and counter new security threats rather than an attempt to attain military superiority.
In the coming chapters, the validity of these contrasting approaches will be analysed. By holding up each side to the results of independent research it will be possible to discern whether Russia has militarised the Arctic and seeks to dominate the region, or whether it has acted as a responsible Arctic stakeholder. As will become clear, while Russia certainly has enhanced its military capabilities in the High North it does not resemble a revisionist power in the region. Such developments reflect a desire to solidify the northern coastline against a host of new security concerns and maintain the status quo in the region. While Moscow does seek to exploit the region’s economic potential it does not seek to carve up the region’s natural resources for itself and monopolise transportation routes through the Arctic Ocean. To utilise the region’s economic potential in the most efficient way possible, it appears that the Kremlin has decided that cooperation with the other littoral Arctic states is the best means of achieving this. We can only work from publicly issued Kremlin documents and therefore the true inner thinking of Putin and other leading figures in the Russian government
44 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, ‘Critical Geopolitics on Russian Foreign Policy: Uncovering the Imagery of Moscow’s
are not available to us. However, from research into what we can see in the form of official announcements and policy declarations it appears that Russia in the Arctic is anything but an aggressive, revisionist state.
Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework
For the purpose of this thesis a structural realist theoretical framework will be employed to guide the analysis. Realism theorizes that “power is the currency of international politics”45 and states, the central actors in world politics, consequently strive to secure as much power as possible. States, in turn, seek to maximise their power to ensure that no other state has the capacity to alter the global balance of power and jeopardise their national security. Various explanations are put forward to justify this pursuit of power. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthathau contend that human nature dictates that humans are naturally driven to pursue power and states are therefore led by those who seek to dominate their rivals46. On the other hand, however, structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and John J. Mearsheimer believe that it is the nature of the international system that dictates why states pursue power. Kenneth Waltz contends that the international system is in a state of anarchy, whereby there is no central authority to govern the international system. With the global order in a decentralized state, Waltz continues that ‘self-help’ is consequentially “the principle of action in an anarchic order.”47 To ensure security and achieve any potential ambitions, states in an anarchical system “must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.”48
With no central higher authority to regulate the global order, Mearsheimer argues that state’s cannot be certain “that one will not attack another”49. Locked in a ‘self-help’ system, states therefore have to make provisions for themselves to ensure that they are strong enough to rebuff any potential attacks from aggressors and ensure their own preservation. The distribution of capabilities globally, according to Waltz, influences how secure each state feels relative to its neighbours and rivals. If a border state has amassed a significant military or economic capacity, this disrupts the balance of power and forces neighbouring states to act in a manner that will rectify the imbalance. Thus, states act on their own accord and strive to acquire sufficient power.
45 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discpline and Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.72.
46 Ibid.
47 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.111. 48 Ibid.
Here structural realism splits into two competing strands: offensive and defensive realism. For the purpose of this thesis the defensive realist framework will be employed, however, it is worthwhile examining the facets of offensive realist theory first.
Steven Lobell contends that offensive realism theorizes that states “seek power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony”50. For offensive realists, security is paramount yet in short supply. The anarchy of the global system drives states to maximise their power and seek supremacy in the world order. Offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer contend that “power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls.”51 Thus, state’s endeavour to bolster their military and economic capacity in order to pursue hegemony. Mearsheimer makes clear that this pursuit of hegemony is not purely for the sake of world conquest. Rather he deems it the best means of ensuring state survival in an anarchic world order where states can never be certain about the intentions of their neighbours52. States should therefore continually seek to maximise their share of world power in order to achieve hegemony and, consequentially, security.
Countering this theory is defensive realism. Defensive realism similarly maintains that the international system is in a state of anarchy and that achieving security is of the highest priority for states. However, contrary to offensive realism, defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that “the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their position in the system.”53 States therefore strive not for aggressive expansion and the pursuit of power but to preserve the status quo through employing defensive and restrained strategies to enhance their security. Defensive realists do not rule out the prospect of conflict, which they argue is sometimes necessary when an aggressive state threatens the security of another or when interests clash at a significant level. However, they maintain that states are not naturally aggressive and strive to avoid conflict through enhancing their own security to
50 Steven E. Lobell, ‘Structural Realism/ Offensive and Defensive Realism’ in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies,
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304, (date accessed – 24/05/2019), p.1.
51 Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, p.72. 52 Ibid., p.73.
preserve the status quo. Doing so helps states to avoid potential losses and a decline in their position in the global order. When states do seek hegemony, this is a result of domestic pathologies54 and not a result of an innate desire to conquer.
According to Lobell, there are four main dangers of aggression and expansion for defensive realists. First, attempts at gaining hegemony provoke resistance and counterbalancing from other states which potentially leaves the state less secure. Second, conquest is rarely a profitable venture, for the cost involved in facilitating the state’s expansion typically exceeds the benefits reaped from conquering another state. Third, offence-defence balance theory enables one to observe how difficult it would be to conquer a territory. Defensive realists argue that more often than not, the defending state maintains a significant advantage over the aggressor. Geography further complicates the pursuit of hegemony with oceans, mountains, deserts, and difficult terrain typically aiding the defender. Attempts at conquest are consequently viewed as costly endeavours. Fourth, Lobell states that “socialization and lessons from history teach states that expansion and the pursuit of hegemony are often misguided because they provoke counterbalancing rather than bandwagoning behaviour.”55 Conquest often produces counterbalancing and the formation of alliances between other states in the international order and this is not conducive to preserving one’s security. In the end, conquest is rarely profitable. For defensive realists, states are better served enhancing their own security infrastructures rather than committing to a costly pursuit of conquest and risking “overextension and self-encirclement”56. Furthermore, in the anarchic system, defensive realists believe that states can generally signal intentions to one another and cooperate to avoid conflict. States can therefore enhance their security yet simultaneously maintain the status quo.
A problem that can result from this is a ‘security dilemma’. A security dilemma develops when one state enhances its own security and inadvertently threatens neighbouring states by making them less secure. Indeed, Robert Jervis states that “many of the means by which a
54 Lobell, ‘Structural Realism’, p.15. 55 Ibid., p.11.
state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”57 This in turn forces neighbouring states to augment their military capacity to restore the balance of power, starting an unintentional spiral of hostility. While neither state may harbour aggressive intentions, both will seek to respond to the flux in the balance of power. Various means are available to ameliorate the security dilemma however, and this can be achieved through enhancing international cooperation and making clear the relative costs of non-cooperation. Therefore, Charles Glaser argues that in the end states can attain a high level of mutual security through cooperation rather than through conquest and expansion. He argues, “when the risks of competition exceed the risks of cooperation, states should direct their self-help efforts toward achieving cooperation.”58 Defensive realism thus offers a comprehensively distinct explanation for the state of world affairs to that of offensive realism.
As will become clear in the following chapters, Russia in the Arctic has to this date refrained from any overtly aggressive behaviour. Aside from the 2007 flag planting on the North Pole and various incursions into the airspace of countries such as Norway and Canada, Russia has maintained a markedly pragmatic stance in the Arctic. It has certainly invested heavily in its northern security, diverting large sums of capital into the Northern Fleet and northern security forces. But these developments, in the context of Russia’s relative cooperation in Arctic affairs, reflect an attempt to bolster Russia’s northern decrepit northern security infrastructure and counter the development of new security concerns that have arisen in the region as a result of climate change. An examination of the evidence provides little to substantiate the claims that Russia seeks hegemony in the High North.
However, it is evident that a security dilemma is emerging in the High North. While research suggests Russian security developments in the High North are of a defensive character, onlooking states have viewed Russian actions in the region with increasing anxiety. Indeed, as this thesis will argue, this can be seen as one of the primary factors influencing the United States’ reinvigoration of its Arctic Strategy. While Russian security developments in the Arctic may be defensive in nature, the U.S. has seen its relative power in the region decrease. With
57 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, (Jan. 1978), p.169. 58 Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: the Logic of Competition and Cooperation, (New
relations between the two states at a low point in the context of events in Syria and Ukraine, Russian activity in the High North is increasingly being seen as hegemonic in intent.
With regards to China, the potential for conflict seems lower. However, with Beijing increasing its involvement in the region and encroaching on Russia’s Arctic interests, friction has developed between the two states. With China seeking to tap into the Arctic’s economic potential and stake a greater position in Arctic governance, Russia’s Arctic advantage may possibly diminish. Yet, when one observes Chinese Arctic policy so far it gives no indications of any expansionist intent. Therefore, this too falls within the defensive realist paradigm for it appears that neither state is pursuing hegemony in the region. Furthermore, despite signs of friction in the Sino-Russian relationship it appears that collaborative ventures between the states will endure. This further has the potential to heighten tensions with the U.S. since America has also identified China as a strategic challenger in the High North. Continuing cooperation has been seen as evidence of the balance of power shifting in the Arctic and this is something Washington is seeking to counter.
Defensive realism therefore offers an appropriate framework through which to conduct this analysis. As will be demonstrated, defensive realism helps to explain Russia’s conduct in the Arctic to this date and helps one understand the motivations behind its security developments in the High North. Additionally, it provides a lens through which it is possible to understand Russian relations with the U.S. and China in the region and observe potential fissure points in these relations. Russia’s conduct in the Arctic region will now be analysed before being followed by an examination of its security developments in its northern regions. As will become apparent, while some may argue that Russia has sought to dominate the Arctic, research suggests that Russian conduct has been cooperative and pragmatic in character. Russia has not sought to militarise the Arctic. Rather, it has sought to enhance its northern security to counter a variety of new security concerns that have arisen as a result of climatic change in the region.
Chapter Three – Russia and the Arctic so Far
Since the late 2000s the Kremlin has devoted an increasing amount of focus to the Arctic. This is exemplified by a search of the word ‘Arctic’ on the official Kremlin website. A search in the year 2003 provides scarce results. The results show only a scattering of minor stories appearing, documenting events such as Vladimir Putin’s visit to Edinburgh to visit an exhibition on the Second World War Arctic convoys59. However, as time progresses a gradual increase in search results is observed. In 2007 six results are visible focussing on the flag planting expedition in August and the Kremlin’s celebration of this60. From this year onwards a steep rise in search results is visible with the ‘Arctic’ returning eighteen results in 2009, forty-two results in 2013, and fifty-two results in 2017. Such a trend is also visible on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian Government. Clearly since the mid-2000s the Arctic has moved from the periphery to adopt a more central place in Kremlin thinking. Much has transpired over this period and Moscow has involved itself increasingly in Arctic affairs. An analysis of this is therefore prudent in order to gauge Russian conduct in the Arctic. As was made clear in the literary analysis chapter, two real schools of thought exist on Russian behaviour in the Arctic: those that view the Kremlin as a hegemony seeking, revisionist power such as Pavel Baev and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and those that view Russia as a cooperative and stable partner in Arctic affairs such as Robert English and Lincoln E. Flake. An examination of the non-military aspects of Russian conduct in the Arctic so far will enable us to see which argument really holds more weight. This will be followed in the subsequent chapter with an analysis of Russian military developments in the High North and the transforming security situation in the region. And as will become clear, while Moscow certainly has moved to enhance its presence in the region and exploit the Arctic’s economic potential, an examination of the evidence indicates that Russia is far from a revisionist power in the High North. Rather it appears that the Kremlin has sought to work through international law to mitigate potential sources of conflict and cooperate with other Arctic states on a variety of matters. Contrary to the contention that Russia seeks to dominate
59 President of Russia, ‘Vladimir Putin and Spouse Visited the Edinburgh Castle’, 25 June, 2003,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/28905, (date accessed – 17/05/2019).
60 President of Russia, ‘President Vladimir Putin Congratulated the Members of the Russian Scientific Research
Expedition to the North Pole’, 2 August, 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/41543, (date accessed – 17/05/2019).
the region it seems that the Kremlin seeks to foster pragmatic relationships with the littoral Arctic states and to maintain the current status quo in the region.
To demonstrate this, this chapter will first look at official policy documents published by the Russian Government that form the basis of the state’s Arctic policy. It will then explore statements and speeches issued by the President of Russia (Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev), the Russian Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation relating to the Arctic. Through doing so it will be possible to see exactly how Russia has conducted itself in the region and observe if the Kremlin is seeking to control the region or is working through international law and acting as a pragmatic partner in Arctic affairs.
The most sensible place to start is with the official state Arctic doctrine the ‘Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Till 2020’. This document, published under President Medvedev, establishes the fundamentals of Russia’s Arctic policy by determining the state’s national interests and objectives in the region. As we approach 2020 a revised Arctic strategy for the period till 2035 is due to be published by Putin towards the end of the year61 and will provide a new outline of Russian interests and intentions in the High North. Whether this revised strategy will provide a radically different approach to Arctic affairs is doubtful. However, for now the 2008 document still serves as the official state strategy for the Arctic.
From the outset, the 2008 Arctic doctrine ascertains that Russia has clear economic objectives in the High North. Under the national interests section, the document states that Russia seeks to use the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) “as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation”62. It also envisions utilising the Northern Sea Route as a national transport corridor for the Russian Federation and preserving the Arctic wildlife and ecology. Thus, the economic dimension is visible from the start and this is a trend that continues throughout the document. There is an explicit desire to exploit the vast hydrocarbon and raw
61 TASS, ‘Putin says new development strategy for Russia's Arctic will be approved this year’, 9 April, 2019,
https://tass.com/economy/1052838, (date accessed 15/07/2019).
62 ‘Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Till 2020’, Adopted by the President of the Russian Federation, 18 September, 2008,
material resources of the Arctic for significant economic gain and to help meet the state’s sizable resource needs. Ensuring environmental security in the High North is another objective stated, along with conducting extensive scientific research in the region. However, these receive limited attention in comparison to the economic priorities mentioned.
Also apparent is a commitment to maintaining the “Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation”63 – a theme that is visible throughout the document. With regards to the strategic priorities section of the policy, there is a clear commitment to international cooperation in the High North. Section A calls for the “carrying out of an active interaction of the Russian Federation with the sub-Arctic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the basis of norms of international law”64, while section B states that Russia will pursue cooperation with the littoral Arctic states to create a regional search and rescue (SAR) system to mitigate accidents in the region. Another strategic priority stated is strengthening the relationship of Russia with other Arctic states via organisations such as the Arctic Council and to enhance collaboration “in the field of effective natural resources management and environment preservation in the Arctic”65. It is also mentioned that the NSR will be made available for international shipping under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.
Alongside the economic objectives of the policy and the commitment to international cooperation, Russia’s Arctic security is also highlighted as a priority in the region. The defence of Russia’s northern state border is stated as an absolute priority, as is the establishment of a comprehensive security system to protect “the territories, population and objects of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”66. The document calls for the preparation of necessary military forces and units to protect Russian interests in the region and provide military security for various conditions that may arise in the future. However, when one reads further it becomes apparent that these objectives are influenced by more than just traditional security concerns. The document makes clear that border control and technical control of the NSR are top priorities of the Russian government. To realise state policy the document calls
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.
for the enhancement of the coast guard under the Federal Security Service and the enhancement of border and boundary departments to combat “terrorism on the sea, suppression of illicit activity, illegal migration, protection of water biological resources.”67 Security and military forces in the region are also expected to assist with these matters.
Because of the attention to security matters in the document, scholars such as James Kraska and Lee Willett labelled this Arctic strategy “expansionist, aggressive, and an
example of “gunboat diplomacy””68. However, while there is an explicit commitment to enhancing Russian security in the Arctic it is hard to argue that this is aggressive in intent. What is visible is an early acknowledgement of the transforming security dynamics of the High North and the first measures being taken to address these. And given the overt attention to economic priorities in the region and the commitment to enhance cooperation with other Arctic states, it is difficult to view the 2008 Arctic policy as anything close to the strategy of a revisionist state in the region.
Meanwhile, in 2013 another Arctic strategy document was published by the Kremlin. The ‘Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’ was approved by Vladimir Putin on February 20, 2013 and an examination of the text provides a similar picture. The document calls for the “comprehensive socio-economic development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”69 in order to facilitate the utilisation of the Arctic as a resource base for the Russian Federation. The document outlines a strategy that will be implemented to achieve this objective via targeted investment and the initiation of various projects in Russia’s Northern Region. The NSR is also identified as a recipient of significant investment. The document overwhelmingly focusses on means to develop Russia’s Arctic regions and modernise existing infrastructure in the region. But once more, international cooperation in the Arctic is highlighted as a development priority. There is a substantial passage in the
67 Ibid.
68 Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin, and Gleb Yarovoy, ‘Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold
War’, Valdai Discussion Club: Grantees Report, Moscow, (2014),
https://www.uarctic.org/media/857300/arctic_eng.pdf, (date accessed – 13/03/2019). p.4.
69 Website of the Government of the Russian Federation, ‘The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the
Russian Federation’, 20 February, 2013,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3f60/89f396de664ba5a456f975046bb3d1c54fea.pdf?_ga=2.85121497.1559 7077.1565801906-1571379978.1565801906, (date accessed – 08/12/2018), p.3.
document highlighting the necessity of forging “a mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the arctic states on the basis of international treaties and agreements”70. Outlined again are methods to achieve this such as a drive to develop a unified regional search and rescue system and fostering cooperative research in the region. Thus, once more we see a Russian Arctic strategy document with an overwhelming focus on socio-economic development priorities and the enhancement international relations with other Arctic states.
Military and security matters are not neglected in the strategy document, however they receive significantly less attention. The document specifies that measures will be taken to “ensure military security, defence and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation”71 via the enhancement of Russia’s northern security infrastructure. These measures, the strategy states, are necessary to repel internal and external military threats and neutralise any armed conflicts that may arise in the region. While this may give the impression that Russia is forecasting conflict in the region, when one reads further it becomes apparent that other factors influenced this objective. There is a strong focus on border control and regulating transit on the NSR. There is also a focus on dual-usage of military forces indicating that softer security concerns such as regulating illegal migration and trafficking in the region are equally pressing matters. Therefore, it appears that the strategy is merely seeking to combat new security threats that have emerged in the region as a result of climate change. With Arctic ice receding at speed, the NSR is becoming increasingly accessible. In September 2017, the entire route was ice-free72 and it is projected that this may become the permanent state of the route as climate change continues to have a detrimental impact on the polar ice. Accordingly, objectives to enhance Russia’s northern military and security forces appears to be a natural attempt to shore up the newly open northern coastline against modern soft security threats. And given the overwhelming focus of the strategy on socio-economic development and Arctic cooperation it is again difficult to view this as anything close to an expansionist strategy.
70 Ibid., p.7.
71 Ibid., p.8.
72 Atle Staalesen, ‘The Northern Sea Route is Completely Ice-Free and Shipping Thrives’, The Barents Observer,
6 September, 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2017/09/northern-sea-route-completely-ice-free-and-shipping-thrives, (date accessed – 22/02/2019).
The energy strategy of Russia, approved on 13 November 2009, offers some additional insights into the Kremlin’s objectives in the Arctic. The Arctic is mentioned a total of thirty-one times throughout the lengthy document and the majority of focus is directed at “(developing) hydrocarbon potential of the continental shelf of the Arctic seas and northern territories of Russia”73. The strategy highlights extracting and utilising the vast amounts of natural resources in the Arctic regions in a bid to ensure state energy security and satisfy economic demand. It also calls for the development of energy infrastructure in the region and the solidification of the NSR to help facilitate exports of hydrocarbons and raw materials. As one would expect with an energy strategy, the vast majority of content focussing on the Arctic revolves around tapping into the economic potential in the High North. However, there are numerous calls for international cooperation. For example, with regards to utilising the vast hydrocarbon reserves located in the Arctic the strategy calls for “efficient international cooperation in risky and complicated projects”74. It further sets an objective in “developing and supporting international cooperation and energy efficiency, and in research of new energy sources”75 and in developing “new forms of international cooperation in the energy sector”76. Therefore, while most content in the strategy focuses on energy sources and development strategies, once more we see a commitment to cooperating with the other littoral Arctic states.
One final relevant policy document to examine in this chapter is the ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ which was approved on November 30, 2016. The Arctic receives relatively modest attention in this document, appearing shortly before the final few sections. Yet here again we see a commitment to develop relations with other Arctic states. The document states that “Russia pursues a policy aimed at preserving peace, stability and constructive international cooperation in the Arctic.”77 It continues stating that Russia
73 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, ‘Energy Strategy of Russia: For the Period up to 2030’, Moscow
2010, http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf, (date accessed – 25/11/2018), p.60.
74 Ibid., p.132. 75 Ibid., p.32 76 Ibid., p.58.
77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 30
November, 2016,
believes that any regional issues should be resolved using the current legal framework and that cooperation with sub-Arctic states should be increased via the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (a forum for international cooperation in the Barents region comprising of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia). The brief section on the Arctic concludes stating that “Russia will be firm in countering any attempts to introduce elements of political or military confrontation in the Arctic, and, in general politicise international cooperation in the region”78. The Arctic is therefore envisioned as a space free from conflict, and this idea is enhanced when the policy focuses on specific inter-state relations. For example, with Canada the document states that Russia seeks to build relations and enhance cooperation in regions such as the Arctic. While this might be expected in an official foreign policy document, it is interesting to note that the Arctic appears to be one of the few spaces where Russia maintains such an outlook. Section 61 for example specifies the Euro-Atlantic region as a space of high tension between Russia and the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who have been pursuing “geopolitical expansion” at the expense of Russia79. Meanwhile section 70 draws attention to the immediate areas neighbouring Russia as spaces of tension and conflict80.
In sum, while the foreign policy concept document does not give too much away with regards to the Arctic, it does illustrate that the Arctic seems relatively exceptional in its recognition as a space of peace and as a region for healthy cooperation. This gives the impression that the Kremlin really does see the region as a space where all parties can operate free from conflict and sheds increasing doubt on the contention that Russia seeks to dominate its rivals in the region. Moreover, this is the impression that one gets from each of the policy documents scrutinized so far. Obviously further analysis is needed to uncover whether the Kremlin really has pursued a cooperative line in the Arctic. But each document examined has indicated a strong commitment to preserving the High North as a space of peace. Exploiting the economic potential of the region is evidently a pressing priority of the Kremlin and Russia clearly seeks exploit the Arctic’s economic potential. But the commitment to fostering cooperative and stable relationships with other states in the region is clear too. While military and security
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., section 61. 80 Ibid., section 70.
