Ineffective Security Force Assistance in Iraq: a consequence of a lack
of involvement in sensitive military affairs?
Yasmin Marguérite de Fraiture Bachelor thesis
Student number: 1819445
Word count: 8384 (Excluding bibliography) June 14th, 2019
Course: Military Behavior in Anti-Authoritarian Mass Uprisings Supervisor: Dr. K. Koehler
Introduction
Security Force Assistance (SFA) is meant to help train, equip and advise allied or ‘partner’ militaries so that they will be able to defend themselves, without needing many foreign troops to accomplish a positive result (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 90). While SFA has become a perfectly accepted alternative to boots on the ground and even a ‘’major pillar of global US national security policy’’ (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 90), it has not proven successful in many cases (Karlin, 2017; Karlin, 2018; Biddle et al, 2018).
In 2003, the United States (US) decided to invade Iraq. Afterwards, it was committed to rebuilding the country through a SFA program. The effectiveness of this program has been disputed, as at the end of 2011, the US completed its withdrawal from Iraq, while from 2011 until 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was able to rise and capture the populous city of Mosul. When it transpired that it was impossible for the Iraqi military to protect its population and territory against ISIL only three years after the US forces had withdrawn from Iraq, it became clear that the Security Force Assistance provided by the US had failed (BBC, 2019; Guerrero, 2018; IBC, 2019; Knights, 2017).
The SFA the US provided to Iraq did not result in a well-working Iraqi security system that could protect the people against ISIL, and therefore the SFA program was ineffective. For future operations, it is useful to consider what factors might have contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the SFA and how improvements could be made.
The hypothesis examined in this thesis is that great donor involvement in sensitive military matters is necessary to increase the effectiveness of SFA (Karlin, 2018). Thus, more specifically to the Iraqi case, it is hypothesized that the absence of involvement of the US in sensitive Iraqi military matters is the main reason why SFA was ineffective in Iraq between 2003 and 2014. The independent variable is donor involvement in sensitive military matters, with the effectiveness of SFA as the dependent variable.
This thesis is designed as a theory-confirming single case study according to Lijphart’s typology (1971). The case study is the SFA the US provided to Iraq between 2003 and 2014. The research method will consist of a qualitative study of the available literature and data concerning the relevant states. First, SFA, its effectiveness and problems with effectiveness are considered and defined in the theoretical framework. The contributions of Karlin (2018) and Biddle (2018) will be central to this study. Then there will be an overview of the SFA provided to Iraq between 2003 and 2014. This will be followed by an analysis of the
independent variable of US involvement in sensitive military affairs in Iraq, as well as an analysis of the dependent variable of SFA effectiveness. Then it will be assessed to what extent the lack of involvement in sensitive military affairs influenced the effectiveness of Security Force Assistance in Iraq.
Literature review
In this literature review several main questions within the literature on SFA are treated. It will be discussed how SFA came into existence, how SFA can be seen in relation to Security Sector Reform (SSR), what types of SFA exist, what approaches can be used to study SFA, why SFA is often regarded ineffective and what the gaps in the literature are.
How did SFA develop?
The training, equipping and advising of foreign forces is not a new phenomenon. The US has played a significant role in providing West-Germany with a professional army after the Second World War. A few years later, the US helped several Asian states develop militaries that would be capable of dealing with threats in their region. In the 1950s and 1960s, they would provide assistance in parts of Latin-America and other regions in the world.
Eventually, the US would shift their approach to taking on more of an advising and equipping role, while there would be less boots on the ground. This is what we would currently consider Security Force Assistance. In Lebanon, the first Iraqi war, and several other cases, the US continued its security aid, but kept reducing the US troops on the ground and instead focused on bringing in local people. From the 90s onwards, Security Force Assistance efforts become more institutionalized through international codes of conduct, laws and resolutions. (Biddle, 2018; Karlin, 2017; Karlin, 2018; Livingston, 2011).
How does SFA relate to SSR?
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) adopted the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in 1994. In this Code of Conduct, the necessity of good governance for a well-functioning security sector is emphasized (OSCE, 1994). For SSR, the host nation must be open to change. The two objectives of SSR are defined as effectiveness and accountability (Shultz, 2013). SFA can be seen as an element of SSR that requires the support from a donor state in order for the recipient to be able to protect the territory and populace against external violence and extend their monopoly over the use of force (Biddle, 2018; Karlin, 2018).
What are the main models for SFA?
Over time, there appear to be two types of SFA that have developed, the Salvador Model and the FM 3-24 model. The Salvador model is based on the SFA program executed by the US between 1979 and 1992 in El Salvador. This type of SFA is very advice focused, and does not
employ any forces on the ground; the local people deal with the execution of the plans. This appears to be a relatively affordable and effective way of approaching SFA (Biddle et al., 2018).
The FM 324 model means that the partner militaries conduct operations together. This requires many troops on the ground. It starts with a large donor military presence and efforts to build a well-functioning military. The donor’s troops are withdrawn over time and at the and the partner military should be able to function on its own or with a little help (Biddle et al., 2018).
How can the study of SFA be approached?
It is possible to approach the study of SFA using a Principal Agent (PA) lens. According to this approach, it is difficult to reach effective SFA, as it is very rare to find interest alignment between the donor and the recipient and ways need to be found to build conditionality into the program that avoids shirking. This PA approach will be the main model used in this thesis (Biddle et al., 2018).
Biddle et al. (2018) see SFA as a PA problem, as it appears very rare for the interest of both the donor and the recipient to align. If one wants to research possible reasons for SFA ineffectiveness, this approach appears to be a useful starting point. There has been some more literature on counter-insurgency from a PA approach, such as Ladwig (2016) and Byman (2006), that is mainly useable when SFA is considered part of both counterinsurgent and conventional warfare (Biddle, et al., 2018).
Why is SFA often ineffective?
There has been a lot of criticism on the effectiveness of SFA programs, more specifically those conducted by the US. While there is disagreement on what exactly causes the failure or lack of effectiveness of SFA, there is general consensus that it generally does not yield the results that were desired or expected (Biddle, et al., 2018; Karlin, 2012; Karlin, 2018). Explanations for this ineffectiveness range from a lack of involvement in military affairs and a strong involvement of external actors (Karlin, 2018), to the idea that cohesion within the military is a central element to successful SFA or any other military operation (Abbas & Trombly, 2014). In the RAND Report Building Armies, Building Nations (2017) it is stated that national identity and ideology are very important for nation-building and the establishment of legitimacy. Militaries can promote these ideas and ideology is necessary to the cohesion and effectiveness of the military and the effectiveness of SFA. Consequently, a
lack of national identity, cohesion and ideology will decrease the chances of effective SFA (RAND, 2017, pp. xiii-xiv).
The US army in particular has been criticized for focusing mostly on material
capabilities, while a focus on improving civil-military relations appears more useful for long-term change and effective SFA (Talmadge & Narang, 2018).
Where are the gaps in the literature surrounding SFA?
While a lot of money is being spent on SFA programs, there has been relatively little research done concerning those programs. Moreover, most literature is very US focused and therefore other SFA efforts are not researched thoroughly. The SFA efforts of the UN, EU, individual states and the NATO are surprisingly little studied. Additionally, more research could be done on instances where SFA programs were used, whether they were effective and how effective they were, in order to find the best practices for future operations. And finally, while there has been criticism in the existing literature on the military effectiveness of SFA, simultaneously there is a gap in the literature surrounding the study of the effectiveness of SFA programs (Biddle, et al, 2018).
In this thesis the case of Iraq will be central. The general consensus in the literature surrounding the US SFA program in Iraq between 2003 and 2014, is that the program was ineffective (Biddle, et al. 2018; Gaub, 2011; Dodge, 2012). However, this issue has rarely been discussed from a PA approach and by a non-American author. Additionally, most studies on the effectiveness of US SFA had the case of Afghanistan as a focus, not Iraq.
Theoretical framework
In the theoretical framework, first, Security Force Assistance will be defined. Then I discuss what it means to have an effective or an ineffective SFA program. This will be followed by considering ways to make SFA more effective. Finally, this translates into the research question about the extent to which a lack of involvement in sensitive military affairs of the SFA recipient can influence the effectiveness of the SFA program.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines SFA provided by the United States as follows: ‘’Security force assistance (SFA) is the set of Department of Defense (DOD)
activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions.‘’ (United States Department of Defense, 2013).
This definition of SFA does not clearly state what the more specific aims of SFA are. More useful definitions can be found in the literature surrounding SFA. According to Biddle et al. (2018) Security Force Assistance (SFA) is meant to help train, equip and advise allied or ‘partner’ militaries so that they will be able to defend themselves, without needing many foreign troops to accomplish a positive result (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 90). Well-functioning SFA should focus both internal and external threats (Payne & Osburg, 2013). Karlin (2018) considers SFA successful when the recipient is eventually able to extend the monopoly over the use of force within their territory. The national security services should be able to protect their populace (Karlin, 2018).
Unfortunately, it is complicated to achieve effective SFA (Biddle et al., 2018; Karlin, 2018). Effectiveness is the ability to be successful and produce the intended results
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). In the case of SFA, this means that the partner military is well-trained, equipped and advised to be able to deal with any threat to their population or territory (Biddle et al., 2018). Additionally, this means that the partner military eventually is capable of successful internal and external defense (Biddle et al., 2018; Karlin, 2018).
However, there are multiple problems that arise when it comes to SFA effectiveness. Biddle et al. (2018) argue that the main problem of SFA is that there is a systematic
misalignment between the interests of the donors and the recipients of SFA, as part of a classical principal-agent problem. They used a principal-agent approach to look at the effectiveness of SFA programs. In a principal-agent situation, the principal can delegate authority to another party, the agent, to act on behalf of the principal. The interests of the
principal, the SFA provider, and the agent, the SFA recipient, do not align with each other (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 94). For effective SFA, necessary requirements are ‘’atypical interest alignment between the US and its SFA partner, a larger US footprint than many would prefer, with intrusive US policies designed to monitor its ally’s behavior and enable strict
conditionality in aid provision, or ideally all of the above’’(Biddle et al, 2018, p. 94). The political interest alignment is very rare, and Biddle et al. (2018) consider politics central to the effectiveness of SFA. It is expected that a small footprint leads to a small return as well
(Biddle et al, 2018, p.95).
The principals can attempt to solve issues related to interest asymmetry by imposing their will through conditionality. However, in order to enforce their will, they need to establish monitoring to check the agent’s performance. Additionally, there is information asymmetry, which means that the agent knows more about their actions than principals do. Thus, SFA can only be effective if the principal is deemed credible (Biddle et al., 2018, pp. 95-96). Moral hazard and adverse selection are inevitable. With moral hazard, there is nothing that protects the agent from doing something that is counterproductive or non-desirable for the principal, while adverse selection means that there is asymmetric information that can be misused for the agents own gains. Together, these elements constitute an agency loss, which means that there is a ‘’divergence between the outcome the principal seeks and the outcome the principal obtains’’ (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 97). Interest misalignment is the clearest problem that causes this phenomenon, but it is also the hardest to solve, as no two states have exactly the same interests, and the closer the interest alignment is, the less likely the situation is that the US needs to provide SFA (Biddle et al., 2018, pp. 9899).
Those problems with SFA ineffectiveness raise the question whether it is possible to create an effective form of SFA. Karlin (2018) considers how to achieve sustainable and effective SFA programs. She states that there are two factors, the nature of the US
involvement and the external threat environment, that interact with each other to make the monopoly on violence more enforceable and sustainable (Karlin, 2018, p.12). The focus of this thesis will be on the nature of the US involvement in sensitive military affairs, as this is the element in which the SFA donor needs to establish some form of monitoring, otherwise the recipient will be tempted to shirk (Biddle, 2018; Karlin, 2018).
In her work, Karlin (2018) states that sensitive military involvement consists of ‘’selecting the personnel who constitute the institution’s senior leadership, organizing the military around countering an internal threat, and avoiding becoming a co-combatant’’ (Karlin, 2018, p. 13). In the study, she applies this theory to Lebanon, Greece and South Vietnam based on three elements: structure, personnel and limits. Concerning structure, Karlin’s main question to measure US involvement is whether the US is focused on preparing the partner state military to combat internal threats and how its internal defense is established (Karlin, 2018, p. 13). Secondly, Karlin asks if the US actively and effectively tries to
influence the appointments in the recipient’s military for the central positions of leadership. Additionally, Karlin considers how effective and unified the vision and the initiative of the US is, both on the ground and in the US (Karlin, 2018, p. 13). Lastly, Karlin asks whether the US limits itself to training, equipping and advising or whether the US essentially has become a co-combatant beside the partner state military (Karlin, 2018, p. 13).
Biddle et al. (2018) looked at SFA through a principal-agent (PA) lens, focusing on interest misalignment as a central problem in SFA. Karlin (2018) considered that a lack of donor involvement in sensitive military affairs increases the chances that the SFA is
ineffective. It is likely that the SFA donor does not want to get involved deeply, as they rarely have similar interests (Biddle et al., 2018). A SFA donor involved in sensitive military affairs might not be in the interest of the agent either, as some states consider their security sector as the central element of their national sovereignty.
Therefore, if interests align, it should be possible to create a successful form of SFA. However, this is very rarely the case. The interests of states are never exactly the same, so at best, they are similar. Political interests never align, and it is mostly about the interest of the provider of SFA that will determine how much effort they put into it and therefore how effective the SFA will be. It is possible that this strongly influences how much the SFA provider is willing to do for the receiving country. Thus, politics is central to the effectiveness of SFA and effectiveness of SFA is not easily achieved (Biddle et al., 2018; Karlin, 2018). The research question is to what extent a lack of involvement in sensitive military affairs influences the effectiveness of Security Force Assistance. The hypothesis of this thesis is that a lack of US involvement in sensitive military matters leads to ineffective SFA. In the case of Iraq, a lack of involvement in sensitive military matters by the US between 2003 and 2014, led to ineffective SFA.
The US policy is focused on small-footprint SFA. Considering SFA through the PA lens offered by Biddle et al. (2018), it becomes clear that the principals want to invest the least resources possible in order to achieve significant results. In practice, however, the recipient needs to be monitored. Thus, the SFA donor needs to have the capacity to monitor the recipient’s behavior. To do this well, the donor needs access to sensitive information and it needs to be in charge of important positions and personnel appointments. Additionally, the SFA donor should be able to sanction when the recipient is non-compliant. The more
resources are spent on the SFA program, the larger the footprint will be and the higher the costs involved are. This seems necessary in order to set up an effective SFA program (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 96; Karlin, 2018). As Biddle et al. (2018) stated, the SFA of the US needs to become more intrusive, there needs to be a larger amount of boots on the ground, and there needs to be an interest alignment between the SFA provider and the SFA recipient (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 94).
Method and case study
In this paper, the dependent variable is ineffective SFA, the independent variable is the extent of the donor involvement in sensitive military affairs of the recipient. The case study is US SFA in Iraq between 2003 and 2014.
After the 2003 invasion in Iraq, the US decided to dismantle the Iraqi army and rebuilt it from scratch. At that point, the Iraqi army did not enjoy any legitimacy, and the leaders of Iraq were not concerned with nation-building or creating an inclusive national ideology. Simultaneously, the US advisors wanted to get the job done as quickly as possible with the smallest amount of resources possible. They ended up not dealing with military politics while shifting the focus to military capabilities decreased the effectiveness of SFA. This was a crucial mistake as involvement in military politics is central to the effectiveness of SFA (Biddle, 2018; Karlin, 2018).
First, a timeline of events in Iraq will be considered, followed by a short introduction on societal tensions in Iraq and ISIL. This will provide the context for the analysis of the dependent variable, SFA ineffectiveness, and the independent variable, the level of US involvement in sensitive military affairs in Iraq between 2003 and 2014.
The ineffectiveness of the SFA program is considered through the high levels of violent civilian deaths and the capture of Mosul in 2014 by ISIL. If there are lots of violent civilian deaths every year and the Iraqi army cannot withstand ISIL, this means that the Iraqi security services have not been able to enforce their monopoly on violence.
The independent variable consists of an analysis of who was responsible for important appointments within the Iraqi military, as well as the use of advice within the SFA program. If the US has no say in important military appointments, than they have no involvement in sensitive military affairs. Secondly, advisors should be involved to improve the SFA program through reconstructive criticism towards all parties involved and coming up with new ideas to improve the SFA program.
Timeline of events in Iraq
The planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq started after 9/11, meaning that there was a relatively large timeframe to plan out an elaborate strategy. However, moments before the invasion, the post-war planning was still not completely done (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp.174-185).
In the early 2000s, the intention of the Bush administration was to focus on economic sanctions, military containment and inspections by the UN while using only a limited capacity of US personnel (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Secretary of State Colin Powell wanted
diplomatic constraints on the regime of Saddam Hussain and saw the use of force as a last resort (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p.16).
When the US took control over Baghdad in 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was created. The CPA was meant to function as a form of government until a new government was chosen (CIA Factbook, 2019).
Bush claimed that the main reason for invading Iraq was the possibility that Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). According to Bush, Iraq did not conform to United Nations Security Council Resolutions, which would entitle the US to invade Iraq (CIA Factbook, 2019). Right after the invasion, UN inspectors did not find proof that Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) (Gordon & Trainor, 2006; Guerrero, 2018; Hashim, 2009). It was asserted by Iraqi officials that the main goal of the US was actually control of the oil in the ground and that the possibility of Iraq having WMDs was used as an excuse. As most oil in the world comes from the Middle East, the US allegedly wanted to gain control in the region (Hallenberg & Karlsson, 2005).
An important consequence of the US invasion in 2003 was the start of a de-Ba’athification process. From its onset, the Ba’ath party had wanted to create an indivisible Arab nation and Arab unity (Hashim, 2009, p. 25), and the US did not agree with this. Therefore, according to the Bush administration, the Ba’athist elite from Saddam’s regime needed to be banned from any political, military and public functions (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp. 73-74, 184). With this
de-Ba’athification, the Sunnis would lose their powerful position and there would be room for people from other societal groups, such as the Kurdish minority and the Shi’a majority, to assume higher positions (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p.184).
The consequence of this de-Ba’athification process was that the Sunnis were frustrated and more likely to oppose the new regime. They were not wanted in the military any longer, while
they were also the people who possessed the knowledge to keep the military functioning. This had significant influence on the SFA program, as there were now thousands of unhappy Sunni people on the streets, and there was no security system. A new bureaucracy and military needed to be created from scratch (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p. 185). In practice, the Sunni people were needed for the professionalism of the military, thus almost three quarters of the Sunni officers ousted in 2003, were reinstated again in 2004 (Gaub, 2011, p. 4-16).
The years 2004 until 2007 were tumultuous, and violence increased during this period. In 2004, Saddam Hussain was captured and an interim Iraqi government was put in power. Al Qaeda in Iraq was formed in 2004, by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2005, the National Assembly appointed the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as the new President. The Prime Minister was Ibrahim Jaafari, from the Shi’a community. In those years there many bombings and attacks, with large amounts of casualties on all sides (Guerrero, 2018). The year 2006 was a very deadly and violent one, and Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan Al-Maliki was appointed as the new Prime Minister of Iraq (Guerrero, 2018; IBC, 2019). In 2007, the involvement of the US became greater, as Bush deployed extra US forces who were supposed to help the Iraqi military (Guerrero, 2018).
In the following years, the end of Bush’s term came in sight and Obama was elected as the new US president. In 2008, at the end of Bush’s administration, the Iraqi territory under US control was returned to Iraq. The US Congress and the American people grew increasingly critical of the US operation in Iraq. In 2009, Barack Obama started the withdrawal of troops under the Status of Forces Agreement and continued this process until he announced that the United States would officially end the combat missions in Iraq by the end of 2011. Meanwhile in Iraq, Al-Maliki started appointing high-ranking Shi’a military officials based on their loyalty to him, not their competences (Guerrero, 2018).
In the years that followed, the civil unrest was not over and would get even worse. In 2013, societal problems started to increase and the Sunni insurgency got more violent. ISIL was created during this time from a merger of Al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra from Syria. In 2014, in Mosul, as well as in Fallujah, Ramadi, Al-Qaim, Husaybah, and several other cities, ISIL had beaten the Iraqi army (Guerrero, 2018).
After the capture of Mosul by ISIL, the US got involved again in Iraq. Obama started airstrikes against ISIL forces, and the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve was created. Under American influence, Al-Maliki was forced to resign, and Haider Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi took his place as Prime Minister. The years 2015 and 2016 were very deadly,
but eventually Iraq was able to take several cities back from ISIS. In 2017, Mosul was declared back under Iraqi government control (Guerrero, 2018).
As has become clear from the timeline, there were a lot of societal tensions between 2003 and 2014. This was mostly related to the hostility that grew between the different societal groups. Crucially, first, the Sunnis were oppressing the other societal groups in Iraq, while now they seemed to be the ones oppressed by the new elite. Consequently, this resulted in a strengthening of the Sunni insurgency and the eventual existence of ISIL.
Analysis
This section provides evidence on the ineffectiveness of US SFA. Two elements are considered that show why US SFA was ineffective. First, the amount of violent civilian deaths within the timeframe of the SFA program between 2003 and 2014 will be discussed. Secondly, the capture of Mosul in 2014, the second largest city of Iraq, by ISIL will be discussed.
Dependent variable: SFA ineffectiveness
As has been mentioned before, SFA is a political exercise. The US SFA in Iraq came after the US invasion of Iraq, and it can therefore not been seen separately from this conflict
(Hallenberg & Karlsson, 2005, p. 75). From the moment US officials started considering the Iraq invasion, they knew a program to restructure and rebuild Iraq and its military was essential. However, there appeared to be a lack of clear post-war planning just months before the 2003 invasion (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp.170-185).
The amount of violent civilian deaths that has been recorded between 2003 and 2014 is significant. This proves that the SFA the US has been giving has not been sufficient to increase the capabilities of the Iraqi military so that they can protect their people.
Secondly, the fact that the US decided to withdraw, while a few years later the Iraqi military, especially its second division, proved incapable of defending Mosul against ISIL fighters is the main piece of evidence that the US SFA program had been unable to provide the Iraqi military with the capacity to withstand a threat.
Violent civilian deaths
The Iraq Body Count database keeps track of the violent death of civilians that have happened in the aftermath of the US invasion in 2003. Based on cross-checked media articles,
information about the circumstances of each violent death is recorded. It should be taken into account that this database is based on reports on violent deaths in the media, so it is possible that there are many more deaths that are not taken into account (IBC, 2019).
The following graph (figure 1) has been created using the information from the IBC (2019) and combines the amount of violent civilian deaths on the Y-axis with the year on the X-axis. This gives a clear overview of the amount of civilian deaths each year in Iraq between 2003 and 2014.
According to the IBC (2019) data, there is a significant rise in this type of deaths from March 2003 onwards, which coincides with the month in which the US invaded Iraq (Guerrero, 2018). For a few years in a row, there were thousands of civilian deaths. As can be seen in figure 1, the year 2006 was the deadliest since the 2003 invasion. The talks about withdrawal of US troops from Iraq started in 2007. After 2007 the amount of violent civilian deaths slowly reduced. There was a vote in April 2007 in Congress about passing a bill that would allow a final deadline for the war in Iraq. It was vetoed by president Bush, but in 2008, in the Status of Forces Agreement, it was agreed that all US troops would leave Iraq by the deadline of the 31st of December 2011 (BBC, 2019; Dean, 2016; Guerrero, 2018). The numbers of violent deaths remained high until 2008, but between 2008 and 2009 they were roughly halved. Around this time, Bush’s term came to an end and Obama came into office. Then between 2010 and 2012 continued to decrease, but still the violent deaths are in the four thousands for three years in a row. This coincided with the withdrawal period (IBC, 2019). The civilian violent death toll at the end of the withdrawal period was the lowest since 2003, thus the US SFA appeared to have positively influenced the death toll
(IBC, 2019). However, from 2013 onwards, the Sunni insurgency started to intensify (BBC, 2018).
From July 2013, the death toll amongst civilians strongly increased. The year 2014 was the worst since 2006 and 2007: the number of civilians who had died violent deaths had increased to over 20,000 (IBC, 2019). Early 2014, there was lots of violence in Anbar province, and during the second half of the year Mosul is captured (BBC, 2018). As can be seen in figure 1, 2014 was a very deadly year. After 2014, the numbers slowly decreased, but they remained high. During this time, ISIL had captured a large part of the Iraqi territory (Dean, 2016; BBC, 2018; Guerrero, 2018).
Taking into account these numbers of violent civilian deaths, it appears unwise that the US decided to withdraw. It might have been a logical decision at the home front, as Congress was strongly in favor of withdrawal and the new administration was coming, while the SFA program they had started clearly had not been properly finished.
IBC only counts deaths that have been discussed in the media, and it is possible that there are many more. Furthermore, discussions within US Congress about withdrawal started in the US while Iraq was dealing with the greatest amount of violent civilian deaths up until that point. At this point in time, the SFA clearly was not effective as the death toll of civilians was extremely high. When the deadline of withdrawal arrived, hundreds of civilians were dying violent deaths each month.
The thousands of civilian deaths each year show that the Iraqi army was incapable of protecting its people. During the periods where there was significant help from the US, they were able to eventually reduce the amount of civilian deaths. But once the US troops had withdrawn by the end of 2011, there still remained thousands of civilian deaths. Thus, there were many civilian deaths while US SFA should have had a clear plan in order to deal with the post-war situation. If US SFA had been effective, this large amount of civil deaths seems unlikely to have occurred. This means that the SFA the US has given to Iraq has not been as effective as it should have been, considering the time, money and other resources invested in it.
An important note relating to this part of the dependent variable is that only civilian casualties are considered. The amount of injured civilians and other people that died is not taken into account.
The capture of Mosul by ISIL in 2014
The Iraqi security forces were very weak in the years running up to the capture of Mosul. The military and other security forces were mainly rebuilt to fight against a threat that had ceased to exist. The way the country was governed was still unstable, with Al-Maliki trying to attain personal power, among other issues. Moreover, the US had decided to withdraw from the region by the end of 2011, so the Iraqi army had to depend on itself completely. Within the army, there was a lack of cohesion between the different societal groups and the different ranks. The US has been criticized for not doing enough to promote cohesion within the security forces in Iraq (International Crisis Group, 2010).
Right before the collapse of Mosul, the Iraqi army’s 2nd Division that was responsible for the area, mainly operated through a system of checkpoints within the city. With ISIL approaching, lots of, mostly Sunni, soldiers decided that it would be safer for them to desert, as their lives and that of their families would be uncertain under possible ISIL rule. They did not feel safe being associated with the Iraqi military. There was corruption and the local people did not trust the military (Abbas & Trombly, 2014; Dodge, 2012; Gaub, 2011).Food and wages did not always end up with the soldiers who had earned them, while
simultaneously they could still receive part of their paychecks if they decided to desert
because of the administrative issues and corruption. Additionally, in Mosul some soldiers who had returned from leave were assassinated. It began to become more attractive to desert than to stay (Abbas & Trombly, 2014).
Thus, when around 1500 ISIL members attempted to capture Mosul, there was relatively little resistance (Lafta, et al., 2018). The Iraqi military did not have the esprit de corps to resist ISIL, while ISIL was very ideologically motivated and was a more coherent force. Additionally, ISIL was able to attract some frustrated Sunni people who were open to an insurgency as they had lost their jobs en masse after the US invasion and
de-Ba’athification in 2003 (Astore, 2014).
The people who remained in Mosul under ISIL experienced less freedom than they had before the capture of Mosul, and the quality of life declined under ISIL. Children were traumatized and were unable to attend school for years. Marriages were being arranged hastily, resulting in more cases of intermarital violence. Basic amenities were not there. If the Iraqi army had been able to protect the Iraqi people and not left their post in Mosul, then ISIL would not have been able to seize Mosul and assert control for years (Lafta et al., 2018).
Mosul could be captured, because it was more attractive to a significant part of the Iraqi security forces to flee their posts rather than to remain in the army. There was corruption and no cohesion within the military. This resulted in a lack of faith in the capabilities of the Iraqi army and an army that could not function properly (Abbas & Trombly, 2014).
Independent variable: US involvement in sensitive military affairs
Two elements will be considered to determine the influence of the US in sensitive military affairs. First, the personnel appointments within the military. Secondly, the possibility of giving advice.
Appointments within the military
Considering who makes military appointments is relevant to determine the influence of the SFA donor in sensitive military affairs. If the US has no say in important appointments, then it has no involvement in sensitive military affairs. If the political and military elite is
corrupted, then the US would never be able to implement a successful, effective or efficient SFA program, as important decisions will be undermined and civilians cannot trust that their leaders are acting in their best interest. During the invasion of Iraq and the first years of reconstruction after 2003, Saddam Hussain and then Nouri Al-Maliki were dominant in Iraqi politics, and were able to get strongly involved in appointing military personnel and
politicians.
Before Saddam’s fall in 2004, important sources of his military and political power were the clan system and the Ba’ath party. Clans and patriarchal government forms have existed for so long in Iraq that clan members were extremely loyal and the clans and the government were mutually dependent on each other (Hallenberg & Karlsson, 2005, p.66). As loyalty was important, Saddam pragmatically used the Ba’ath ideology to control the military and put his clan members and family in the highest positions. Saddam’s clan controlled the party and through the Ba’ath party, the army was controlled (Gaub, 2011, p. 25; Hallenberg & Karlsson, 2005, pp. 66-67).
Several years after Saddam Hussain, Al-Maliki was appointed Prime Minister in 2006. At that time, Maliki was not considered a threat as he opposed Saddam’s ideas. When Al-Maliki was chosen, he was the second most important man of the Dawa Islamic Party, a Shi’a party that had been outlawed by Saddam Hussain, and was in favor of creating a Shiite state and reducing the power of the Sunnis. Therefore, the repressing societal group had become the oppressed (Guerrero, 2018; Khedery, 2014).
The SFA had failed in the creation of institutions for political oversight, which enabled Al-Maliki to bypass the constitution and create his own institutions to control the Iraqi security forces (Dodge, 2012, pp. 126-128). In 2012, Dodge found that Al-Maliki had increased his power over the national security services of Iraq. Al-Maliki had achieved this through the creation of the Provincial Operation Centres (POCs) and the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCC). He did so unconstitutionally and did not respect democratic rules and norms. Al-Maliki used the OCC to directly control the highest military people on the ground, while he used the POCs to put the local head of police and military under the officers loyal to him personally, in each province in Iraq. Al-Maliki’s Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB) controlled the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and he was able to use his power how he wanted (Dodge, 2012, pp. 122-128).
The US could not contain Al-Maliki. There were several ways in which Al-Maliki was able to sidetrack or play in to the lack of focus of the US to get his way (Khedery, 2014). At the time the US was under the leadership of Obama, Al-Maliki started replacing capable military officers with people loyal to him personally. Khedery (2014) believes that this is related to a leadership vacuum that took place at that time at the US embassy in Iraq. Apparently the US did not have the complete control over sensitive military matters, as Al-Maliki could appoint whomever he preferred and the US was not paying enough attention to what was happening in Iraq at the time because they had other issues they were concerned with, such as economic crisis and lack of support from the US people and Congress (Khedery, 2014). If the US had no or barely any say in important appointments within the army, then it had no involvement in sensitive military affairs and it could not claim to have brought democracy (Biddle, et al., 2018; Karlin, 2018; Record, 2010, p.165).
Additionally, enabling the repression of the Sunni minority eventually led to
ineffective SFA, because it increased civil unrest in the long-term. Sunnis were completely eliminated from public life, and that made some of them open to the ideology of ISIL. This eventually resulted in the 2014 capture of Mosul and several other cities within Iraq. Advice
Experts are able to deal with sensitive military affairs, whereas a focus on bringing in more troops on the ground does not say anything about sensitive matters being dealt with (Karlin, 2018; Payne & Osburg, 2013). It is important to consider whether the US was open to using advice within their SFA program and if advice was actually taken into consideration.
In 2006, a very violent year took place and changes in the US approach were considered. The rise in violence led to the establishment of the Iraq Study Group. Based on their research, in December 2006 they recommended that the amount of combat units from the US would be decreased, while the number of units with the mission to train and advise would be increased. Additionally, the restructuring of the strategic framework was recommended for the region, in which regional actors where recognized and the influence they had over the Shi’a (Dean, 2016; Gordon & Trainor, 2006).
Opposite the Iraq Study Group, there was the Council of Colonels with a completely opposite approach: they noted that there were several problems, both an insurgency and a civil war. According to the Council of Colonels, the number of US combat units needed to be increased and there was a need for time to achieve an inclusive government in Iraq. Bush decided to listen to the latter, and in January 2007 he pledged an increase of 20,000 troops (Dean, 2016, pp. 32-33; Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Even at the most violent stage of the conflict up until that point, there was no serious attempt to advise Iraq on how to proceed. In 2012, Dodge stated that a US Government Assessment Team in Baghdad in early 2008 concluded the following:
‘’ ‘The United States Government’s advisory effort in Iraq is best described as fragmented and incoherent. Coalition efforts have suffered from the lack of a
coherent strategy that outlines priorities and assigns lead responsibility to a specific directorate or agency. The ministerial surge that followed the reinforced security effort of 2007 resulted in more advisors arriving in Baghdad, but not in a focused effort’. The report went on to cite a lack of coordination between civilian and military reconstruction efforts, too few Arabic speakers and the restrictive nature of security arrangements as reasons why efforts at rebuilding the Iraqi state had failed’’ (Dodge, 2012, p. 134).
These problems were detected, but they did not appear to have been taken seriously by the US government, as the Bush administration was coming to an end and in the US support for the operation was declining (Gordon & Trainor, 2006).
Finally, US advisors imagined the OCC as a place for coordination, not for direct demands. However, Al-Maliki was able to extend his power over the OCC, and there was no clear action taken against him. Through the OCC, Al-Maliki also obtained power through the CTB over the Iraq Special Operations Forces, established by the US, and consisting of more
than 4,000 of the best military men in Iraq and used it as his personal guard system (Dodge, 2012, pp. 128-129)
There appears to have been no structural advisory effort during the years of the SFA program in Iraq. However, there were some efforts to give advice surrounding the SFA program. There was the Iraq Study Group, whose advice was not taken into account. To complicate matters, the Council of Colonels came with opposite advice that was eventually followed by the Bush administration. A few years later, problems were detected but not actively addressed. The focus remained on boots on the ground and not on advisory elements.
Finally, Al-Maliki was able to discard advice given by the US and misuse a platform that was meant for advice, without facing any measures that would limit his power. This means that both on the US and Iraqi front, US advice was not taken seriously. Whether this had to do with a lack of quality of the advice or whether there was not enough emphasis on advice, the fact is that there was no real effort to focus on advisory elements of the SFA program and try to improve the situation in Iraq with efficient advice.
Conclusion
The research question was to what extent the lack of involvement in sensitive military affairs influences the effectiveness of Security Force Assistance. The case that was being used to answer this question was SFA in Iraq between 2003 and 2014. For the theoretical framework, Biddle’s principal agent theory (2018) shows how interest misalignment in SFA causes ineffectiveness, while Karlin’s (2018) theory states that involvement in sensitive military affairs by the SFA donor helps the effectiveness of the SFA program. When there is a misalignment of interests, it appears more likely that the donor and recipient have different levels of commitment to the SFA program, which then reduces the chances of an effective SFA program as the necessary level of involvement by the SFA donor might not be reached because it is not in their best interest.
In the case of Iraq, the way the US got involved in government and military affairs was unsuccessful. The focus was on the element of strong involvement in sensitive military matters. The timeline and study of SFA provided by the US to Iraq is crucial to understand why the invasion of Mosul could happen, therefore proving the ineffectiveness of the SFA program. The ineffective SFA also made people more receptive to the ideology of ISIL. Which, in turn, made the terrorist group even bigger and eventually capable of capturing Mosul and other cities in the region.
Iraq had dealt with societal tensions years before the invasion of the US in 2003. The US decided to invade Iraq without having a constructive post-war plan in order. The war and the SFA program took more resources and more time than was expected. In 2008, there was decided to withdraw, meaning that at the end of 2011 there would be no US forces left in Iraq. However, the Iraqi security forces proved incapable of protecting the Iraqi citizens, as Mosul was captured in 2014 by ISIL fighters.
The dependent variable that has been considered in this case study is SFA
effectiveness. This variable has been measured by looking at the amount of violent civilian deaths in the period between 2003 and 2014. It has become visible that the US forces left Iraq while it still dealt with enormous amounts of violent civilian deaths and the Iraqi security forces were unable to protect the population from violence.
The main proof that US SFA was ineffective in the case of Iraq, was the fact that the second biggest city of Iraq could be captured by 1500 ISIL fighters. There was a high level of desertion within the Iraqi army, there was a lack of trust from within the army as well as the
Iraqi people, and there was corruption. There was no cohesion, so there was barely any
resistance to the ideologically motivated ISIL fighters. ISIL grew even stronger because of the Sunni’s that joined as a result of the de-Ba’athification efforts of the US after the 2003
invasion.
The independent variable was US involvement in sensitive military affairs in Iraq. The US seemed to have barely any influence on important appointments within the Iraqi military. First, Saddam provided bad leadership, and later, Al-Maliki would mostly focus on personal gains rather than what would be best for Iraq. There was politicization of the security forces under Al-Maliki, and it was tolerated or going unnoticed by the US. The army was ineffective, and Al-Maliki could manipulate the system.
Additionally, there was a lack of advice from the US. Advisory elements within the SFA program were not prioritized and if there was any advice given, it was not always
listened to or there would be disagreement on what the next steps in the program needed to be. In accordance with Biddle’s (2018) principal agent view on SFA, interests of two different countries never fully align. The US, as the SFA donor, and Iraq, as the SFA recipient, clearly had interests that did not align and the US was not involved enough in sensitive military affairs to tackle the problems surrounding corruption, appointments and mass desertion. Al-Maliki had most of the power, while the US was not in control over the Iraqi security services and could not make the decisions that mattered most. With the US troops gone after 2011, there was no more control over the expansion of corrupt power and there was no trust in the Iraqi army.
The final result, was the capture of Mosul. A significant part of the people who were involved in ISIL, came from the group of people that grew frustrated after the
de-Ba’athification process of 2003. Therefore, it could be argued that the US not only provided ineffective SFA, but actually contributed to issues in Iraq of an even larger scale than the problems under Saddam in 2003.
There are practical implications to advocating for a stronger influence in sensitive military affairs by an SFA donor. It could hurt the recipient’s sovereignty or give off a neocolonial image. It would also mean that small-print SFA can never be effective, and thus greater investments need to be made in the beginning in order to complete the SFA program in a successful matter.
Theoretically, it might be interesting for future research to look into other elements that might influence ineffectiveness of SFA, such as cohesion within the military or the role of external threats.
Lastly, it could be relevant to research how limitations to the funds and support from the US influenced the effectiveness of the SFA program in Iraq. With the Status of Forces Agreement it was decided to withdraw, while before the invasion the US had committed to post-war rebuilding efforts. Putting an expiration date on the program might have negatively influenced the effectiveness of the SFA program, as deadlines were being prioritized.
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