The establishmentof a national environmental Security Task Force (NEST) in Thailand: is it feasible?

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THE ESTABLISHIMENT OF A NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY TASK FORCE

(NEST) IN THAILAND

: Is it feasible?

MASTER THESIS

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs (MSc. Crisis and Security Management)

Written by: Nuntinee Kleadmanee (S1892711) Date: 8th June 2017

Word count: 22,807 words (excluding appendix)

Supervisor: Dr. I.M.A. d’Hooghe Second Reader: Dr. G.M. van Buuren

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Acknowledgements

Herewith, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Ingrid d’Hooghe, for her invaluable guidance, support, and patience. Without her continuous optimism and encouragement, this thesis would hardly have been completed.

I would like to thank Commander, Pol.Maj.Gen. Apichat Suriboonya and all my collegues at the Foreign Affairs Division for giving me the necessary support and opportunity to come and study here in The Hague, The Netherlands.

My appreciation also extends to all the interviewees, who are extremely busy people. I would like to thank them all for giving me their time, response and knowledges which together form the primary data for this research.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends back in Thailand who stood by me through all the process in completing this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

“National Environmental Security Task Forces (NESTs) brings together appropriate representation form agencies identified as necessary to address

environmental crime. The NEST can ensure national level communication, coordination and cooperation between agencies and, through the INTERPOL

National Central Bureaus, act alongside other NESTs at regional and international levels” (INTERPOL, 2017).

Illegal wildlife trafficking is considered to be a serious growing crime of the 21st century. It has posed dangers to both the critical conservation and the global security. The government of Thailand recognizes the importance in preventing such issue from escalating in Southeast Asia region. As a result, Thailand is currently in a process of establishing a National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) as a mechanism to combat wildlife trafficking in the country. Thus, this thesis will look into the feasibility of establishing NEST in Thailand by using the concept of Collaborative Governance as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2007) and will also explore whether the conditions as stated by Collaborative Governance are met. It has been found through all the findings that most of conditions are in line. However, a set of additional constraints and factors, such as the level of trust between the stakeholders and an equity in power, resources, and knowledges must be considered (or solved) in order for NEST to actually be successfully established in Thailand.

Key words: Wildlife trafficking, INTERPOL, Environmental Crime Programme,

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEANAPOL ASEAN National Police

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species DNP Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant

Conservation

ECEC Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee ENS Environmental Security Sub-Directorate

FAD Foreign Affairs Division

INTERPOL International Police Organization

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NCB National Central Bureau

NESS National Environmental Security Seminar

NESSC National Environmental Security Steering Committee NEST National Environmental Security Task Forces

NRECD Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Suppression Division

SOMTC ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime THAI-WEN Thai Wildlife Enforcement Network

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime WEG New Zealand Wildlife Enforcement Group

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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Illegal wildlife trade is considered to be one of the most lucrative illicit markets in the world today. This multi-billion-dollar illegal trade of the protected species has become a serious international crisis as it poses dangers to both the critical conservation and the global security (Warchol, 2004 p.57) (US. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2017). Moreover, illegal wildlife trade has created threats to the environmental security dimension leading to biodiversity loss, species loss, introduction of invasions species, and disease (Baker, et al., 2013 p.928). Billions of plants and animals are traded annually to meet consumer’s demands as form of trophies, decorative items, pets, food, clothing and traditional medicine (Nijman, 2010 p.1102). China is currently one of the biggest consumers of illegal wildlife products in the world due to the increasing affluence of the expanding middle class in the country (Felbab-Brown, 2013). Moreover, the value of illegal wildlife trade, which is controlled by organized international crime syndicates, accounts for more than US$5 billion to US$20 billion annually, making it the second largest black market in the world after drug smuggling (Warchol, 2004 p.57) (Rosen and Smith, 2010). In Southeast Asia, wildlife trafficking generates revenues of more than US$3.5 billion a year (UNODC, 2017).

From the fact that Southeast Asia is considered as one of the world’s largest ‘wildlife hotspots’ as it is home to the greatest biological diversity, this region’s biodiversity and species preservation are innumerably threatened by the current ill-regulated wildlife trade from region’s key suppliers of illegal wildlife market (Felbab-Brown, 2013). Many studies have shown that the volume and diversity of the illegal wildlife species that are traded and consumed have rapidly increased to an unprecedented level. Many plants and animals are being extricated from the region’s tropical forests at least six times faster than its sustainable rate (Felbab-Brown, 2013). Scientists further predict that over 40 percent of both plant and animal species in Southeast Asia could be annihilated within a century if the problem persists. This estimation represents as high as half of the global extinction (ASEAN-WEN, 2015).

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Thailand, a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN), is home to numerous unique and rare species of flora and fauna such as the iconic tiger and Asian elephant (ASEAN-WEN, 2015). It is undeniable that wildlife trafficking has heavily impacted the native species in the country, including those that are under the protection of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). For instance, the approximate numbers of wild elephant and domesticated elephant in Thailand are largely reduced from 300,000 to 3,000 and 100,000 to 3,700 since the turn of the 20th century (Rujivanarom, 2017). Similarly, Southeast Asia region which was once highly populated with over 100,000 wild tigers at the turn of 20th century is now suffering with no more than 4,000 wild tiger inhabitants across the region, up to 250 of them are inhabited in Thailand (Platt, 2016).

Moreover, Thailand as well holds a major concern when it comes to wildlife trafficking because the country serves as a source, transit and destination of this global illegal trade of wildlife products (UNODC, 2017). Due to its geographical location, Thailand is a major hub for the wildlife trafficking of CITES protected species to meet consumer demands in many countries including the United States, China and Europe. Between 2014 to 2017, the authorities from the Royal Thai Customs Department has seized innumerable CITES protected wildlife species including; 7 tons of ivory, 6 tons of pangolin, and over 10,000 turtles and tortoises (figures provided by the Royal Thai Customs, 2017). Many of these larger seizures were shipments destined to Lao PDR.

However, it can be quite challenging for national policy makers in Thailand to develop a fair criminal justice intervention to effectively tackle the transnational issue of wildlife crime. Cooperation and collaboration from all levels of the society are critically required in combating and preventing such illegal activities from occurring (White, 2016 p.93). The international police organization or better known as INTERPOL, whose core mission is to prevent and combat crime through the enhancement of cooperation and innovation on police and security matters, has encouraged its 190 member countries to establish a National Environmental Security Task Forces (NESTs). NEST is a model framework which “provide[s] coordinated, cooperative and centralize law enforcement support for

environmental security by facilitating national multi-agency information sharing, intelligence-led operations and other collaborative compliance and enforcement actions”

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1.2 Research Question and Objectives

Thailand has recognized the urgent need for domestic action and for cooperation with other ASEAN Member States in tackling the potential threats of transnational organized wildlife crime in the region. In 2015, Thailand was appointed to become the Lead Shepherd for Wildlife and Timber Trafficking issue as the crime has become the new priority area of transnational crime under ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime’s (SOMTC) purview (ASEAN, 2017).

Furthermore, as the establishment of a NEST has proven to be an effective mechanism in combating against wildlife trafficking in many Western countries including Belgium and New Zealand, Thailand is in the process of establishing NEST as a mechanism to combat the rampant wildlife trafficking that takes place in the country, or in which the country is somehow involved. The NCB Bangkok and INTERPOL co-hosted the National Environmental Security Seminar (NESS) in the beginning of January 2017. Several organizations have been identified as potential members.

However, setting up a NEST is easier said than done. There still has not yet been many NESTs established in Southeast Asia, and there are many conditions that need to be met in order to successfully establish a NEST as a mechanism in tackling wildlife trafficking in Thailand. With that said, the goal of this research is to explore whether or not Thailand can set up a NEST that would have the potential to successfully combat wildlife trafficking. To be more precise the research question is

“What are the conditions that have to be met for the National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) in Thailand to become successful in combating against wildlife trafficking in the country and are those conditions being met?”

1.3 Academic and Societal Relevance

The theoretical framework that will be used in this research is the ‘Collaborative Governance Model’ as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2007). It is not uncommon to see the theory being applied and studied in many different policy contexts since collaborative governance is considered to be a broader concept of Public Administration. Moreover, many studies have incorporated the use of this approach to understand environmental issues such as the protection of open spaces, natural resources management and the forest management. Although the idea of collaborative governance has been widely used in

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practice when dealing with wildlife trafficking, however, there are still far little academic research testing on whether it can actually be a good procedure in combating wildlife trafficking and what does it take for a collaborative governance to become successful in doing so. Therefore, this research seeks to fill in this gap.

Furthermore, in regard to the societal relevance, as mentioned earlier, wildlife trafficking is a contemporary phenomenon that is occurring not just only in Southeast Asia but also in other wildlife trade hotspots including Central America, Africa and Europe. Consequently, the findings of this research on the conditions that are needed to be met in order to successfully established NEST as a mechanism in combating wildlife in Thailand can therefore be generalized to other countries and regions that are interested in using this similar context. Moreover, this research also aims to produce a meaningful result that may become useful for the involving law enforcement agencies and national policymakers in their working fields and enhancing them to see the importance in achieving a collaborative governance network as a finest effort to tackle against wildlife trafficking in the country.

1.4 Thesis Outline

In order to provide the reader with the essential understanding of NEST, the second chapter details the background information on the establishment of NEST and introducing the relevant stakeholders who will be the main focus of this research. The third chapter eleborates on the theoretical framework, a Collaborative Governance Model by Ansell and Gash (2007) and explore the four critical variables that determine the success or failure of a collaborative governance. Next, chapter four addresses the used methodology, research design as well as discussed the limitations and validity of the research. Subsequently, chapter five describes the findings and analysis found in the single case study. Lastly, chapter six discusses the conclusions to the research question based on the findings and forwards some recommendations for the improvement in establishing NEST in Thailand. Besides that, this chapter also discusses the future outlook of NEST.

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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

TASK FORCE (NEST)

2.1 INTERPOL, National Central Bureau (NCB) & Environmental Security Sub-Directorate (ENS)

INTERPOL’s mission;

“Preventing and fighting crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters” (INTERPOL, 2017)

The International Criminal Police Organization or more commonly known as INTERPOL is currently the world’s largest international police organization with 190 member countries founded in 1923 and has its own General Secretariat based in Lyon, France (INTERPOL, 2017). The intergovernmental organization was developed with the hopes to facilitate cross-border law enforcement cooperation and also to support and assist all organizations, authorities and services that share the same interest in preventing and combating international crime. Moreover, in order to enhance the unity and cooperation among all actors, INTERPOL also offers tools and services which include; facilitating targeted training, expert investigative support, relevant data, and secure communications channels (INTERPOL, 2017).

Although INTERPOL has a General Secretariat which is run by the Secretary General, each of the member countries are assigned to hold its own National Central Bureau (NCB) whose duty is to link their national police with INTERPOL global network (INTERPOL, 2017). The NCB is often situated either as part of the country’s national police or separately-operate as individual investigation service. The NCB serves as a contact point for all INTERPOL-related activities, so it is worth mentioning that the NCBs are heart of all INTERPOL’s activities as they are the main contributors to INTERPOL’s criminal databases and also cooperating on all cross-border investigations, operations and arrests (INTERPOL, 2017).

Furthermore, in the borderless world of the 21st century, transnational crimes have emerged more than they have ever been. INTERPOL sees the importance in preventing and delivering initiatives on such issues including ones regarding to environmental crime.

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In 2009, INTERPOL established its own Environmental Crime Programme as a single unit dedicated for the crimes which involve; wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, fishing, and as well as pollution crime (e.g. trade and disposal of waste and hazardous substances). Later, the programme was restructured and renamed to Environmental Security Sub-Directorate (ENS) with the mission “to assist member countries in effectively enforcing

national and international environmental laws and treaties to ensure the ongoing conservation of the world’s environment, biodiversity and natural resources.”

(INTERPOL, 2012 p.5).

2.2 National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST)

“The National Environmental Security Task Force –Bringing Compliance and Enforcement Agencies Together to Maintain Environmental Security” (INTERPOL,

2012).

Background

To begin with, it is important to recognize the complexity and transnational nature of wildlife trafficking. As a type of environmental crime, wildlife trafficking often has linkages with other type of serious organized crimes including terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling, arm smuggling, corruption, fraud, tax evasion and money laundering (UNEP, 2012 p.2). When compared to these type of crimes, wildlife trafficking has proven to be growing due to the fact that the return is highly profitable and the illicit activity is facilitated by a low risk of detection and scarce conviction rates (INTERPOL, 2012 p.7) (UNICRI, 2013). Moreover, it is quite evident that the complexity and interconnectivity of this illicit transnational activity to other transnationals organized crimes has made it challenging for countries to develop an effective law enforcement response to such issue. As White and Heckenberg (2016) described in their article that the organized criminal modus operandi are characterized as being ‘loose, transnational, motivated by singular purpose and networks formed on ad hoc basis’, whereas the law enforcement modus operandi are often ‘tight, jurisdiction-based, informed by multiple institutional demands, and subject to formalized arrangements and agreements.’ As a result, cooperation and collaboration in all levels of law enforcement is critical and justifiable in combating and preventing such illegal activities of environmental crime (White, 2016 p.93).

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Collaborative Efforts in combating Environmental Crime

Unquestionably, wildlife trafficking as part of an environmental crime has created a challenging work for environmental law enforcement agencies, especially inter-agency collaborations. This is due to the fact that wildlife trafficking not only involves many type of other organized crimes, but it also requires highly-efficient investigative techniques, approaches and knowledge to tackle such problem (White, 2016 p.98). As a result, Pink and Bartel (2015) stated that activities and collaboration efforts by agencies have naturally been developed as a way to response to environmental crime. Moreover, such collaboration efforts are often created within the same geographically-based, discipline-based and commodity-discipline-based (Pink and Bartel, 2015).

In the case of Southeast Asia region, many regional environmental law enforcement networks have been developed in response to environmental crime. Some of the few examples include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations –Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN), the ASEAN Forest Law Enforcement and Governance initiative (ASEAN-FLEG), and the Asian Regional Response to Endangered Species Trafficking (ARREST). As a result, INTERPOL’s National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST), (which will be further elaborated in the next section), currently at the national level, can act as an intersection and focal point of the domestic level, regional and global level as part of the efforts to combat environmental issue in the region (White, 2016 p.98). Therefore, from this aspect, collaboration among all agencies evidently plays an important role when dealing with environmental crime (Pink and White 2016; White, 2016 p.98).

History of NEST

The concept of INTERPOL’s National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) was first proposed and put forward during the Environmental Crime Committee meeting in 1995 and was later presented to the INTERPOL General Assembly in 1996. In the beginning, the National Central Bureaus (NCBs) were asked to set up a national

working party bringing representatives of the related law enforcement agencies and administrative departments which are responsible for the control of waste product.

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statistics on environmental crime, ensuring that crime analysis of data is accomplished, being attentive to problems of waste control, and preparing an annual summary report of their activities to the General Assembly (INTERPOL, 2017). Due to the success in setting up a national working party, in September 2012, NEST was officially launched as an initiative by INTERPOL at the 21st INTERPOL Asian Regional Conference before 150 officials from 40 countries. Since then, many countries have held a National Environmental Security Seminar (NESS) as a first step in establishing a National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) in the country including Thailand (INTERPOL, 2017).

NEST Overview

Figure 1. National Environmental Security Taskforce (INTERPOL, 2012)

As a way to ensure a coordinated multi-agency response in combating environmental crime and further enhancing environmental security, INTERPOL recommends its member countries to establish the National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) in their own country. NEST is a collaboration framework where different representatives from related agencies come together to form a national multi-agency task force to combat environmental crime including wildlife trafficking, forestry issues and pollution controls (White, 2016 p.196) (INTERPOL, 2016 p.22). As shown in Figure 1., potential members of NEST are national agencies that are responsible for national

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environmental law enforcement such as police, customs, prosecutors and environmental agencies. Greater contribution to NEST can as well be accomplished when the expertise and knowledge is enhanced by the collaboration of these law enforcement personnel, inter-governmental and non-inter-governmental organizations (more details about NEST

memberships will be further emphasized later in this chapter) (INTERPOL, 2016 p.7).

INTERPOL (2012) has further emphasized in the NEST Manual that “NEST, as a

multi-agency approach can attack criminal from all angles –from on-the-ground wildlife poaching or waste dumping to investigations into their financial and tax affairs –so that all avenues of escape and evasion are closed.” Having a multi-agency to work within

NEST evidently ensure that NEST can effectively addressed to all kinds of criminal activities within the environmental dimension. (INTERPOL, 2012 p.7).

NEST not only helps ensuring a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative response to environmental crime at a national level, but also serves as a national focal point for environmental enforcement issue, operations and initiatives at both international and regional levels. To affirm that such duties is carried out, the National Central Bureaus (NCB) as an appointed facilitative leader of NEST becomes a gateway to help facilitate coordination with other NESTs from other countries. NCB, at the same time, as well ensures that proper international responses which aim to tackle this type of transnational crime are met (INTERPOL, 2012 p.19).

Moreover, INTERPOL’s Environmental Security Sub-Directorate (ENS) has also emphasized the importance of establishing NEST into various projects among its member countries. Such projects include: Project Leaf (Law Enforcement Assistance for Forests), an initiative consortium against illegal logging; Project Scale, an initiative to suppress and

combat fisheries crime; and Project Eden, an initiative to detect and counter illegal international trade and disposal of waste (White, 2016 p.98). One of INTERPOL’s

well-known initiative in regard to combatting wildlife trafficking is Project Predator. Project

Predator aims to support and enhance law enforcement capacity on the conservation of

Asian big cats. To put forth this project, INTERPOL has emphasized an establishment of NEST to the involved member countries. In this case, NEST serves to improve; the information and intelligence management, investigative skills, capacity building and international initiation (White, 2016, p.98). Therefore; the establishment of NEST not only stands as a tangible proof to a country’s leadership and their awareness of environmental

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security threats, but also serves as a way of portraying its dedication to protect wildlife population from harm and to preserve them for future generations (INTERPOL, 2016 p.7).

NEST Mission & Objectives

“The activities of the NEST should principally focus on proactive and dynamic intelligence-led enforcement based on priority target areas identified by the participating agencies. A NEST could initially focus on one commodity or crime type. However, as resources are secured and the NEST becomes stronger as an institution, the

focus can widen to encompass further environmental crime types and commodities”

(INTERPOL, 2012, p.19).

As INTERPOL has stated in the NEST Manual (2012), the mission of NEST is to provide coordinated, cooperative and centralized law enforcement support for

environmental security by facilitating national multi-agency information sharing, intelligence-led operation, collaborative compliance and enforcement actions (INTERPOL, 2012 p.18). Eight objectives in the establishment of NEST in a country are listed as following:

1.) Exist as a permanent body to centralize information exchange, operational coordination and other actions as required through the NCB;

2.) Investigate high-profile national and international environmental cases;

3.) Communicate and coordinate among participating agencies and entities through a permanent staffed presence and through regular teleconference calls and face-to-face meetings;

4.) Maintain contact with the INTERPOL Environmental Security Sub-Directorate to ensure international coordination and collaboration on information exchange, operations and training programmes;

5.) Gather, collate and analyze intelligence from national sources and disseminate it to appropriate national, regional and international agencies and receive similar information from international sources and disseminate it to the appropriate national and sub-national entities;

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6.) Develop, plan and execute national multi-agency operations against environmental crime with regional and international awareness and coordination;

7.) Develop, plan and execute training programmes to build the capabilities and capacities of national agencies;

8.) Develop strategic plans, communicate with governmental and civil society stakeholders, and identify resources to ensure the sustainability of the NEST and its effectiveness (INTERPOL, 2012 p.18).

Structuring NEST in a country

Figure 2., Establishing a NEST (INTERPOL, 2013) Before structuring a NEST, INTERPOL Environmental Crime Sub-Directorate (ENS) suggests that two steps must be taken. As shown in Figure 2., it is recommended that the National Central Bureau (NCB) must first hold a National Environmental Security Seminar (NESS) as the very first step in establishing NEST. The seminar brings together all relevant experts, stakeholders and decision makers who are responsible for environmental compliance and enforcements; to help identify National-environmental security needs, capacities and priorities, and to develop strategies for combating environmental crime by using INTERPOL tools and services (INTERPOL, 2013 p.9). Once the National Environmental Security Seminar (NESS) has been hosted, it then leads to the formation of a National Environmental Security Steering Committee (NESSC),

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which helps in the guidance of establishing the National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST). The National Environmental Security Steering Committee (NESSC) acts as a foundation for the formation and operation of NEST. NESSC can also help ensuring effective communication with other regional and international partners including INTERPOL. Furthermore, the NEST factsheet (2013), also recommends that NESSC should be composed of mainly the heads or their appropriately delegated representatives of the national agencies who hold responsibility for environmental enforcement and compliance such as the Head of police, custom, environmental agencies and prosecutors (INTERPOL, 2013 p.10).

NEST Memberships

As mentioned earlier, a multi-agency approach of NEST requires participation from ranges of agencies that have different expertise, experience and also abilities to complement one other’s activities to combat environmental crime. Although Figure 1. shows only some of the potential members of NEST such as police, customs, prosecutors and environmental agencies, however in reality, the possibilities of agencies joining NEST can be so much more. Table 1 below shows a varied ranges of agencies, organizations and entities that can be invited and potentially become a part of NEST multi-agency approach. Furthermore, it is important to recognize how different agencies have their own set of unique skills, capabilities, and experiences that can contribute to the establishment of NEST (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10). INTERPOL Environmental Security Sub-Directorate (ENS) emphasizes the importance in keeping NEST to be flexible in its composition. The NCB as the facilitative leader (in some cases) can invite specific participants to join a specific operation while the membership of NEST can still only focuses on maintaining the core group of mostly law-enforcement agencies (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10). Moreover, it is also quite critical to become aware of the potential overlapping responsibilities and also jurisdictions between some agencies. NEST can therefore become a mean in helping with the management and coordination of these overlapping responsibilities since it can ensure efficient operations and also help avoid some duplication of efforts between such agencies (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10).

In the first column of Table 1, it is important to acknowledge that the essence of NEST is to bring all national governmental agencies, organizations and departments which

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share responsibilities for environmental compliance and enforcement to come together and form a collaboration network. With that said, NEST opens the best opportunities for these agencies to work together in order to combat environmental crime effectively (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10). Since environmental crime is often linked to other types of crime such as terrorism and money-laundering, it is necessary to involve other stakeholders whose responsibility is respectively related. Each agency represents different part of the law enforcement chain and holds specific skills to solve such issues. Such agencies may even include judiciary and prosecutors (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10). Moreover; since environmental crime by nature is a transnational crime, NEST must not only pay attention to this concern at national level, but also at regional and global level if necessary. By doing so, NEST can also help highlight and identify future national priorities (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10). Therefore, it is important to bring the global and regional agencies to join the network. Lastly; civil society, research institutions and private sector should also be invited to support NEST since they can bring their own special set of skills, resources, knowledges, fundraising and awareness to NEST (INTERPOL, 2012 p.10).

Government Agencies Global and regional

agencies, organizations and networks

Other experts: Civil Society, research institutions and private sector

• INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB)

• National and/or local police forces

• Customs and/or border control agencies

• Compliance and enforcement agencies for: environment, fisheries, forestry, natural resources (including agriculture), pollution, wildlife and environmental management authors • Management authorities for:

environment, fisheries, forestry, natural resources (including agriculture), pollution and wildlife • Finance and tax agencies • Prosecution agencies

• Existing NEST-like structures

• INTERPOL, its Regional Bureaus, and National Central Bureaus • United Nations agencies such as UNEP, UNODC • International Conventions and Treaties such as CITES and the Basel Convention • World Customs Organization (WCO) • Green Customs Initiative (GCI) • International Consortium on Combating • Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

• Research and academic

institutions, such as universities • Private companies and

enterprises with environmental or social concerns; programmes or areas of business which could be involved in private-public partnerships

• Scientific institutions and facilities such as forensics laboratories (these may also be private)

• Environmental and Security policy institutes or “think tanks”

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Wildlife rime (ICCWC)

Table 1. Table composed by the author on the basis of Potential members of National Environmental Security Task Force (NEST) (INTERPOL, 2012)

2.3 NEST Membership in Thailand

The most recent progress in establishment of NEST in Thailand involved ENS together with the NCB Bangkok co-hosted the National Environmental Security Seminar (NESS) in the beginning of January 2017. Various representatives from many law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders took part in the Seminar. Some of the representatives included; the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP), Royal Forest Department, The Royal Thai Customs Department, Pollution Control Department, the Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Suppression Division (NRECD), Office of the Attorney General, Department of Marine and Coastal Resources and etc. There were four topics that were mainly discussed during the course of the seminar including 1.) the interconnection between participated agencies 2.) communication procedure between agencies at the strategic, operational and tactical level 3.) identifying possible solutions to the obstacles regard to environmental and natural resources and 4.) Forming a National Environmental Security Steering Committee (NESSC) towards the end of 2017 (Foreign Affairs Division, 2017).

Research focus: Thailand NEST stakeholders

In this research, six potential stakeholders of NEST will be focused. Such agencies/entities include; the National Centre Bureau (NCB) Bangkok, the Royal Thai Customs, the Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Suppression Division (NRECD), the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP), and Love Wildlife.

(1) The National Centre Bureau (NCB) Bangkok

The NCB Bangkok situates as part of the Foreign Affairs Division (FAD) of the Royal Thai Police. The FAD Commander acts as the Head of INTERPOL Bangkok. As mentioned earlier in section 2.1, the NCB Bangkok is responsible in working with INTERPOL General Secretariat and international government agencies on criminal

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matters and assisting other INTERPOL member countries in law enforcement-related activities. They are also in charge of cross border and transnational crimes, one of which is wildlife trafficking (INTERPOL, 2017).

(2) The Royal Thai Customs

The Royal Thai Customs plays an important role when discussing wildlife trafficking as it is the first and last line of defense to block the flow of illegal wildlife species and products from entering or leaving Thailand. Currently, the Customs Department has approximately 6,000 staff dispersed within 48 Customs Houses that are operating throughout the country. Mission of the Royal Thai Customs is; to facilitate and promote a national logistics system, protect and secure society based on Customs control centre, and collecting revenue in a fair, transparent and efficient manner (Customs, 2015). (3) The Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP)

The Department of National parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) is an agency under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE). It currently has approximately 300 staffs; 66 of which are government officials, 100 inspectors and 200 temporary workers. Moreover, the agency holds responsible for managing Thailand’s protected areas and its native wildlife species. It is one of the three agencies that make up the Thai CITES Management Authority and it is the main focal point for CITES-listed fauna. The DNP has representative at 53 checkpoints throughout Thailand including Suvarnabhumi International Airport (DNP, 2015).

(4) The Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Suppression Division (NRECD) The Natural Resources and Environmental Crime Suppression Division (NRECD) is a division under the Central Investigation Bureau (CIS) of the Royal Thai Police, which holds responsible for investigating all kinds of environmental crime in Thailand. The NRECD currently has approximately 500 full time staff. More importantly, Thailand sees that involvement of police officials is necessary to the investigation of serious environmental crime. With authorized powers and resources of police agency on this matter, NRECD can call forth the cooperation from the local Royal Thai Police units. Although the NRECD is based in Bangkok, this division has managed the capabilities to deploy teams to different provinces in Thailand to investigate environment crimes effectively. (Nepolice, 2015).

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(5) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is an intergovernmental agency which holds responsible in assisting its member countries to combat illicit drug, terrorism, and other types of crime including wildlife and forest crime. In regard to wildlife trafficking particularly, the UNODC has established The Global Programme for Combating Wildlife and Forest Crime/Sustainable Livelihoods Unit (GP/SLU) as the focal point for the UNODC wildlife and forest crime activities. The programme serves to: provides capacity building support to the source, transit and destination countries of wildlife trafficking; offers specialized training and support to police, customs, prosecutors, investigators, and judiciary capacity building in the intelligence gathering; as well as strengthens cross-border cooperation (UNODC, 2017).

(6) Love Wildlife

Love Wildlife is a non-governmental organization registered in Thailand which is dedicated to the protection of Southeast Asian wildlife through education and outreach. The organization sees itself as a leader of wildlife conservation in Thailand. It also aims to acknowledge the younger generations on the importance of wildlife issues and conservations through education (Lovewildlife, 2017).

2.4 Case Study –New Zealand Wildlife Enforcement Group (WEG), an example of existing environmental task forces

One successful example of NEST establishment which is mentioned in the NEST Manual (2012) is the New Zealand Wildlife Enforcement Group (WEG). Formed in 2008, The New Zealand Wildlife Enforcement Group (WEG) has become an exemplary model in establishing NEST for many countries around the world (INTERPOL, 2012 p.29). The participating agencies in the WEG include Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Department of Conservation and New Zealand Customs Service. These three agencies together have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which explains the roles and responsibilities of the group as a whole and also as in each agency in particular (INTERPOL, 2012 p.30). WEG is governed by senior representatives from the three participating agencies including the leader of the agency which held responsible for the enforcement of legislation deciding on the WEG’s course of action (INTERPOL, 2012 p.30). In addition, INTERPOL (2012) has stated in regards to the WEG’s

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multi-disciplinary nature illustrates on how each agency taking part in WEG has its own separated jurisdiction where the case may fall under. Moreover, the training was specifically carried out to the officers based on the prominent attributes of the unit prior to joining the group. The officers are granted authority to the legislation enforcement while assigned to the WEG. Despite of the primary objective of WEG which focuses at the domestic level, it also operates on the international level (INTERPOL, 2012 p.30.). Therefore, taking WEG as a successful example of NEST in New Zealand, the establishment of NEST in Thailand could potentially become the main mechanism in combating wildlife trafficking; hopefully not only in Thailand, but also Southeast Asia region.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

3.1 Defining Collaborative Governance

‘Collaborative Governance’ is defined as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.544). According to the Ansell and Gash (2007), collaborative governance is a new form of governance which emerges as a response to; the downstream implementation failures, the high cost and politicization of regulation (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.544). Moreover, collaborative governance is believed to be an alternative way of replacing the adversarial of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.544). Within this definition, the authors emphasize six important criteria that must be presented within collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.545):

(1) the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions (2) participants in the forum include non-state actors

(3) participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely ‘‘consulted’’ by public agencies

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(4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively

(5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice)

(6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management

Firstly, to further detail the six criteria as mentioned above, collaborative governance as defined by Ansell and Gash (2007) must specifies a specific role for public agencies. Public agencies also include the public institutions such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and as well other governmental bodies at the local, state and federal level (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.545). According to the authors, the public agencies possibly initiate collaborative forums to fulfill their own objectives and to comply with a mandate, which can include court orders, legislation, or rules governing the allocation of federal funds (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.545).

Secondly, collaborative governance as defined by Ansell and Gash (2007) must require a participation from the non-state stakeholders. For instances, many scholars would interchangeably describe an interagency coordination as collaborative governance, creating a somewhat confusion to the reader. Therefore, an involvement of non-state stakeholders within the definition would help declutter this uncertainty. Moreover, a collaborative process must involve representations from the key interest groups (Smith, 1998 p.61). Reilly (1998) has described collaborative governance efforts as a type of solving puzzle which involves the sharing pursuit of government agencies and citizens’ concerned (Reilly, 1998 p.115).

Thirdly, the definition also implies the involvement of non-state stakeholders in policy outcomes. This means that they hold equal responsibility with the rest of the state stakeholders and thus, all stakeholders must be directly engaged in decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.546). Even though the ultimate authority may lie with the public agencies, all stakeholders must involve and directly participate in the decision-making process – as emphasized in the literature by Ansell and Gash (2007). Therefore, it is important to regonize the advisory committees as one form of collaborative governance if the advices are closely linked with the decision-making outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.546).

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Fourthly, formal collaboration must be presented in collaborative governance as it is a way to distinguish collaborative governance from other casual and conventional forms of agency-interest group interaction (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.546). In many cases, collaborative governance has sometimes been used to describe the informational relationships between agencies and interest groups. Although both stakeholders do engage in a ‘two-way flows of influences’, however, the main difference between the definition of collaborative governance, as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2007), and the conventional interest group influence is that ‘the former implies an explicitly and public strategy of organizing this interest’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.546). For instance, Walter and Petr (2000) described collaborative governance as ‘a formal activity that involves joint activities, joint structures and shared resources’ (Walter and Petr, 2000 p.495) but Padilla and Daigle (1998) describe the development of collaborative governance as a ‘structured arrange’ (Padilla & Daigle, 1998 p.74). Therefore, the formal arrangement implies to the understanding of organization and structure.

Fifthly, decisions within the collaborative forums must also be consensus oriented (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.547). This means that, even though the public agencies have the ultimate authority to make any decision, the goal of collaborative governance is to achieve a certain degree of consensus among all the stakeholders. Furthermore, Ansell and Gash (2007) pointed out that many times, collaborative forums do not often succeed in reaching consensus, however, the premise in meeting together in a ‘deliberative, multilateral, and formal forum’ is to walk towards consensus or at the very least to reach or discover areas of agreement (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.547).

Lastly, it is important that collaborative is focused on public policy issues. By focusing on public policy issues, it helps distinguished collaborative governance from other types of consensus decision making including alternative dispute resolution and transformative mediation (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.547). Even though some public agencies may pursue dispute resolution or mediation to reduce social or political conflict, however these are often used with the concern of private conflicts (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.547). Therefore, collaborative governance as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2007) is only restricted to the governance of public management.

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3.2 Collaborative Governance: Scope and Origins

Theoretically, many scholars believe that the Concept Collaborative Governance has emerged together with the study of intergovernmental cooperation in the 1960s while others believe that the concept actually has its roots since the birth of American federalism where McGuire (2006) described the concept as “the most enduring model of collaborative problem resolution” (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Elazar 1962, 1984) (Emerson et al, 2011 p.3). Moreover, collaborative governance has also been connected to various theories which include ‘Bentley’s (1949) group theory and the subsequent theoretical reaction and evolution, Olsen’s (1965) Logic of Collective Action, to the prisoner’s dilemma and game theory (Axelrod 1984; Dawes 1973), and to the extensive common-pool resource literature (Ostrom 1990)’ (Emerson et al, 2011 p.3).

In regard to its linkage to public administration, collaborative governance is considered as the main of broader concepts of public administration and of democracy. Many public administration scholars view collaborative governance as the new paradigm for governing in democratic systems in today’s society (Frederickson 1991; Jun 2002; Kettl 2002) (Emerson et al, 2011 p.3). Democracy theorists were inspired to create new forms of public involvement and civic engagement (which is known by many as the deliberative democracy movement) due to the decline in American civic institutions, voting behavior and social capital (Fung and Wright 2001; Nabatchi 2010; Sirianni 2009; Torres 2003). Deliberative democracy promises citizens the chances to exercise their voice and also more acknowledgement to the “citizen-centered government by embedding governance systems and institutions with greater levels of transparency, accountability and legitimacy” (Henton, Melville, Amsler, and Kopell 2005, 5; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Nabatchi 2010) (Emerson et al, 2011 p.3).

Additionally, collaborative governance also has its root in the management practices. The concept is often described as having a cross-boundary character (Kettl, 2006). The importance of shared administration could be traced back since the earliest literature on policy implementation. Furthermore, the understanding of network theory and intergovernmental relations has given rise to the studies of horizontal network management and collaborative public management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kamensky and Burlin 2004; Wright 1988) (Emerson et al, 2011 p.4).

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In conclusion, the scope and origins of collaborative governance has evidently been applied and studied in many different policy contexts. Collaborative governance approaches have been applied not only by law enforcement agencies relations, but in the US and India, for example, also by environmental agencies on issues such as the protection of open spaces, natural resources management and the forest management; and by state and local public health agencies such the US Veteran’s Heath Administration and the Department of Homeland Security, child and family service delivery and also to government contracting (Emerson et al, 2011 p.4). Thus, collaborative governance should be suitable in describing the collaborative relationships between potential stakeholders in the establishment of NEST in Thailand as a way to combat wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia.

3.3 Collaborative Governance Model by Ansell & Gash (2007)

Figure 3., A model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007)

In regard to the ‘Collaborative Governance Model’ as shown in figure 3., according to Ansell and Gash (2007), the model is built from central findings of meta-analysis of 137 collaborative governance studies in different policy areas. The main purpose of Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2007)’s research is to identify the different ‘contingent conditions’ (critical variables) that determine the success or failure of this mode of governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.561). This contingency model of collaborative governance also aims to create an analytic framework that help practitioners identify the

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key challenges and limitations in using collaborative strategy (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.562).

There are four main variables within the Collaborative Governance Model: (1) the starting conditions, (2) institutional design, (3) facilitative leadership and (4) collaborative process. In the matter of the relationships between the variables, the ‘collaborative process’ variable is the main focus in this model whereas the other three variables represent influences and contributes to the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.551). Ansell and Gash (2007) stated

starting conditions set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration. Institutional design sets the basic ground rules under which collaboration takes place. And, leadership provides essential mediation and facilitation for the collaborative process. The collaborative process itself is highly iterative and nonlinear, and thus, we represent it (with considerable simplification) as a cycle (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.551).

Thus, the next section will briefly discuss these four variables and its relations in more detail.

Firstly, ‘starting condition’ represents the very first step of collaboration in determining whether it will facilitate or discourage cooperation among the stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.550). According to the model in Figure 3, ‘starting condition’ consists of three variables; the imbalances between power and resources of different stakeholders, incentives for stakeholders to collaborate, and lastly, the history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.551). As many collaborative governance scholars have noted in their studies, power imbalances between the stakeholders is noted as the main problem in collaborative governance. The authors further emphasized that when certain stakeholders do not have the capacity, status, organization and resources to participate or even to participate equally to other state holders, the collaborative governance process will be susceptible to manipulation of stronger actors (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.551). This issue of power imbalances is particularly problematic when 1.) important stakeholders do not have the organizational infrastructure to be represented in collaborative governance process 2.) some stakeholders may not have the skill and expertise to engage in discussion about highly technical problems and 3.) some

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stakeholders do not have the time, energy or liberty to engage in time-intensive collaborative processes (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.551). Next, it is important to understand the incentives for stakeholders to participate and engage in collaborative governance as well as those factors that create such incentives. Many scholars recognized that the issue of power and resource imbalances affects the incentives for stakeholders to participate in the collaborative processes (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.552). As Gray (1989) argued:

power differences among players influence their willingness to come to the table and timing considerations is important: parties that believe that their power is on the rise will be unlikely to want to bind themselves to collaboration.

Moreover, Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (2007) argued that stakeholders’ incentives to participate mostly depend on their expectations whether the collaborative processes will produce meaningful results against the balance of time and energy it requires. Incentives will increase when there is a direct relationship between their participation and concrete, tangible, effectual policy outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.552). In addition, a successful collaborative governance also depends on stakeholders’ incentives to enter a collaboration. The incentive for stakeholders to engage in collaborative governance will increase when 1.) the collaborative process is the exclusive forum for decision making 2.) stakeholders perceive achievement of their goals to be dependent on cooperation with other stakeholder. It is well noted in the literature that if stakeholders are highly dependent on each other, this factor can help move toward a successful process (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.553). However, incentives to participate will be low when stakeholders believe that they can achieve their goals unilaterally or through alternative venues (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.552). Lastly, prehistory of antagonism and cooperation between stakeholder’s will also determine the success of the collaborative process. Ansell and Gash (2007) pointed out that in many of the successful collaborations, stakeholders realized that they cannot achieve their goals without an engagement with other stakeholders whose interests are opposed to theirs. A prehistory of conflict often creates low levels of trust, and thus produce low levels of commitment, strategies of manipulation and dishonest. Thus, it creates what the authors called ‘a vicious circle of suspicion, distrust and stereotyping’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.553). On the other hand, if there has been a history of a positive and successful past cooperation then it creates high levels of trust and social capital which

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creates a virtuous cycle of collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.553).

The second critical variable that determines the success or failure of collaborative governance and influence the ‘collaborative process’ is ‘facilitative leadership.’ Facilitative leadership is an important variable in bringing stakeholders together and getting them to engage with one another, steering them through rough patches during the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.554). The collaborative leader also plays a vital role in setting clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and also exploring mutual gains (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.553). Moreover, Ansell and Alison Gash (2007) uses Lasker and Wiss (2001, p.31) to describe the four important components of an effective collaborative leadership which include 1.) the skill to promote broad and active participation 2.) ensure broad-based influence and control 3.) facilitate productive group dynamics, and 4.) extend the scope of the process. In order to bring about a balance of power among stakeholders’ collaboration, the authors also pointed out that collaborative leadership must empower and represent the weaker stakeholders in a group (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.555).

The third variable of the collaborative governance model is the institutional design, which the authors refer to as ‘the basic protocols and ground rules for collaboration, which are critical for the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.555). One of the most critical conditions of successful collaboration is that the collaboration or the institutional design must have a broad participation where all stakeholders that are affected by or concern about the issue are included in the collaboration. (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.556). Broad-based inclusion not only reflects the open and cooperative characteristic of collaborative governance, but it is the hub of a legitimation process where it provides 1.) the opportunity for stakeholders to deliberate with others about policy outcomes and 2.) the claim that the policy outcome represents a broad-based consensus (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.556). Therefore, it can be concluded that a weak or non-inclusive representation of related stakeholders may undermine the legitimacy of collaborative outcomes. In addition, the authors noted that the importance of the ‘exclusiveness of the collaborative forum’ must represent “the only game in town” (showing the inclusiveness of all stakeholders). Thus, it is a way to motivate stakeholders to participate and to prevent them to seek out to other alternative venues (Ansell & Gash,

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2007 p.556). Furthermore, clear ground rules and process transparency are important features that must be represented in the institutional design. These two features are considered to be part of the procedural legitimacy and trust building as they reassure stakeholders that the process within the collaboration is fair, equitable, and open (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.557). Process transparency is described as the condition when stakeholders can feel confident that the public negotiation is “real” and collaborative process does not involve ‘a cover for backroom private deals’ (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.557). In addition, a clear definition on the roles of each stakeholder must be identified in the collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.557).

Lastly, ‘collaboration process’ is described as the core variable in the collaborative governance model. Although many scholars would describe collaboration as developing in stages, Ansell and Gash (2007) see the collaborative process as a cyclical rather than linear since collaboration is often depending on attaining a ‘virtuous cycle’ between communication, trust, commitment, understanding and outcome. Thus, these variables as mentioned are presented across every stages in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.558). Although, as a virtuous cycle, it is hard to know the starting point of collaborative process, however, communication lies at the heart of collaboration governance and therefore face-to-face dialogue is the starting point of the process.

Firstly, face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders is considered to be the “thick communication” that allowed stakeholders to identify their opportunities for mutual gain in this consensus-oriented process (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.558). As the authors stated, face-to-face dialogue lies at:

the core of the process of breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to communication that prevent exploration of mutual gains in the first place...[and]... a process of building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding, and commitment to the process (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.558).

Secondly, trust building is another important variable in collaborative process. As mentioned earlier, a lack of trust between stakeholders can be a common starting point for collaborative governance. Collaborative process can be difficult to cultivate if there has

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been a prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders since it often affects in the trust building at the very beginning of collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.558). Ansell and Gash (2007) mentioned that it is quite for collaborative leaders to know that it is important to build trust among opponents before stakeholders may risk manipulation. Moreover, trust building is often a time-consuming process that needs a long-term commitment in order to achieve collaborative outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.559). Thirdly, stakeholders’ level of commitment to the process is an important factor in facilitating collaboration. Here, commitment to the process means developing a belief that good faith bargaining for mutual gain is the best way to achieve desirable policy outcomes (Burger et al. 2001) (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.559). Furthermore, commitment to the collaboration requires a psychological shift from those who regard their positions in absolute terms to “mutual recognition” or “joint appreciation” (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.559). Ansell and Gash (2007) stated:

commitment depends on trust that other stakeholders will respect your perspectives ad interests. It is also easy to see how clear, fair, and transparent procedures are critical for commitment. Before committing to a process that could go in unpredictable directions, stakeholders must feel confident that the procedure of deliberation and negotiation has integrity. A sense of commitment and ownership can be enhanced as involvement increases (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.559).

Fourthly, within the collaborative process, a shared understanding of what stakeholders can collectively achieve together must be stated at some point in the process. It is noted that shared understanding can be an agreement on the definition of the problem or an agreement on the relevant knowledges that are need to address such problem (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.560). Lastly, many scholars suggested that collaboration are more likely to occur when the purposes and advantages of the collaboration are relatively concrete and also when “small wins” from collaboration are possible (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.561). Achieving intermediate outcomes can help in building the momentum which leads to the successful collaboration. Moreover, it can also help encourage the virtuous cycle of trust building and commitment (Ansell & Gash, 2007 p.561).

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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Research Methodology

In this research, a qualitative method, particularly an exploratory case study is used. A case study is defined as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009: p.14). This research utilizes an embedded single case design to investigate six potential stakeholders of NEST in Thailand and four critical variables of Collaborative Governance model of Ansell and Gash (2007). So, this embedded single case design can be suitably used to investigate the feasibility of NEST and its relations to Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007) since the potential stakeholders represent multiple unit of analysis while NEST represents a sole focus of single case study. Therefore, it helps in answering the research question of whether the stakeholders have the necessary conditions of a successful collaborative governance met. Moreover; by looking at each stakeholder individually, it is easier to discuss in details whether NEST has the required conditions to be considered as successful establishment in Thailand. Therefore, this research’s approach is to gain an in-depth understanding of NEST, a mechanism to combat wildlife trafficking in Thailand, by using an embedded single case design method.

4.2 Data Collection & Sampling

In this research, data is collected through extensive desktop research, document analysis and in-depth interviews with experts. Firstly, an extensive desktop research is used to explore and gain insights about the current situation of wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia and to see what INTERPOL is currently doing to encounter wildlife trafficking in general. Secondly, document analysis is used as the method to obtain primary data for this research. Analyzes of documents such as INTERPOL publications and other intergovernmental organization publications regarding wildlife trafficking provide this research with deeper insights about the availability of resources INTERPOL is offering to help its member countries lay the foundation in establishing NEST in the country. Lastly, in-depth interview with the experts is also performed to gather primary data. This research mainly used the conducted interviews from law enforcement agencies, an inter-regional

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governmental organization, and NGO (the prospective member of NEST) (see section 2.3).

This research also uses purposive expert sampling method to observe the feasibility of establishing NEST in Thailand. Purposive sampling is commonly used in qualitative research since the technique involves identifying and selecting groups or individuals that are knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Since this research focuses on a practical case in establishing NEST as a mechanism in combating wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia, the research requires specific individuals who are expertised and familiar with the functions of NEST and as well are well-awared of the current situation of wildlife trafficking in Southeast Asia. Moreover, this research aimed to focus on individuals whom have experiences working with one another before. Therefore, the sample of this research are stakeholders mentioned in Section 2.3 as following:

1. Head of INTERPOL NCB Bangkok, Thailand

2. Superintendent of NRECD (Central Investigation Bureau), Royal Thai Police

3. Forestry Technical Officer at DNP & Board member of INTERPOL’s Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee (ECEC) and Working Groups

4. Senior Customs Officers at Suvarnabhumi Airport, Royal Thai Custom 5. Regional Coordinator of the UNODC Global Programme on Combatting

Wildlife and Forest crimes in Southeast Asia 6. Chief Executive at Love Wildlife (NGO)