A mirror and a magnifying glass : Antarctic Governance System and climate change : case study of Chile

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Climate Change

Case Study of Chile

Master’s Thesis

International Development Studies June 24, 2016

Ekaterina Gladkova 11125225 gladkovaka@gmail.com Supervisors: Dr. Enrique Gomez Llata Cazares,

Dr. Gustavo Blanco Wells Second reader: Dr. Yves van Leynseele

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University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc. International Development Studies

This thesis has been developed in Chile and received partial funding provided by CONICYT-Chile through the Program FONDAP, Project N°15150003 (Research Center IDEAL)

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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Enrique Gomez-Llata for being a good mentor and guiding me towards new inspirational horizons during my thesis writing. Thank you for your easy-going attitude and never-fading optimism, it has been invaluable during occasionally stressful writing times. Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to IDEAL Research Center and our RP5 research team. I owe my thanks to Gustavo Blanco, my local supervisor, who has been unprecedentedly supportive and helpful before, during and even after my fieldwork in Chile. It has been a pleasure working with you. Additionally, I am very grateful to all those who crossed my path in the field, thank you for your time, your contributions and assistance, you made this fieldwork a highly rewarding experience. In particular, I want to mention José Retamales and Alejandra Mancilla – I greatly appreciate your help. Furthermore, I want to thank Yves van Leynseele for being my second reader and his brilliant insights throughout our Core Issues module.

Finally, my special thanks goes to all those who shared their support during my writing and fieldwork and managed to bear with my emotional ups and downs – my dear family, lovely friends and our outstanding IDS baking group.

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Despite vast research on sustainable management of the global commons in general and the salience of the Antarctic model of governance in particular, little is known about the effects climate change poses on the governance framework of a common-pool resource. The existing body of knowledge is inclined to perceive climate change in the scientific, rather than the social realm. Yet, the state of the continental ecosystem hinges on interpersonal relationships of Antarctic actors and their interaction with nature. These relationships either boost or deflate the salience of the Antarctic treaty and might be impacted by global warming discourses. Using the case of Chile, this study asks what climate change can do for the Antarctic Treaty System and, simultaneously, what the treaty system can do for climate change. Through qualitative interviews, participant observations and policy document analysis, it analyzes the perspectives of the two most important actors in Chilean Antarctica, the national government and the scientific community.

The study concludes that the Antarctic governance system and climate change can be mutually reinforcing. The idea of climate change grew to become a dividing, rather than a unifying element in Chilean Antarctic governance. However, the current connotation of the idea as a challenge to overcome or a problem to be solved can be transformed into an opportunity while also changing the conventional perception of global warming. This study adds to the growing body of research on the consequences of climate change for the governance and sustainable management of common pool resources.

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7 List of Acronyms

ASOC Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition ATCM The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting ATS The Antarctic Treaty System

CCAMLR The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CEP The Committee for Environmental Protection

CRAMRA The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic mineral Resource Activities DELC The Division of Environmental Law and Conventions

GHG Greenhouse Gases

IAATO International Association Antarctica Tour Operators

IDEAL Centre for the Dynamics of High Latitude Marine Ecosystems INACH Chilean Antarctic Institute

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

SCAR Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research UNEP United Nations Environment Program

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change WCED World Commission on Environment and Development

WCS World Conservation Society

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8 List of tables, figures, photos and maps

Tables

Table 1. Operationalization table 37 Figures

Figure 1. From climate change discourse to sustainable governance in Antarctica 36 Figure 2. The Chilean Scientific Antarctic Program 1964 - 2012, number of projects 45 Figure 3. The vicious cycle of climate change discourse 70 Photos

Photo 1. Workshop on Chile-Korea 57 Maps

Map 1. Chile with its Antarctic claim 11 Map 2. Punta Arenas on the map of Chile 12 Map 3: Antarctic territorial claims and year-round research stations 21

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9 1. Introduction and background to study

On May 23, 2016 Chile hosted the 39th_{Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, amassing those who}

demonstrate “interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial research activity there” (ATS, 2011) and bear the responsibility of governing the continent. Due to its remoteness and unrelenting hostility, the significance of Antarctica for humanity might seem counterintuitive. However, one should not be deluded. It is the world’s largest wildlife sanctuary, one of the few largely pristine areas remaining on earth, a wilderness that must be preserved under a comprehensive environmental regime (Jorgensen-Dahl, et al, 1991). A brief acquaintance with the Antarctic continent is capable of inspiring awe by its breathtaking characteristics. Its landmass makes up 10 percent of the Earth’s surface, while 95 to 98 percent of it is enveloped in an ice sheet with an average thickness of 1.52 miles (Tray, 2008, 215). Suffice to say that it comprises the planet’s biggest mass of ice, containing roughly 70 percent of all the fresh water on Earth (Tray, 2008, 215). Beyond the continent, ice shelves can be found, responsible for the production of fresh water icebergs. Additionally, Antarctic ice caps divert some of the sunrays that reach the planet’s surface back into the atmosphere, thus preventing the troposphere from overheating.

Additionally, it is a scientific laboratory of incalculable value, with freedom of research being a key element of the Antarctic Treaty, the main regulatory framework on the continent. It unlocks planetary evolutionary riddles and is essential to our understanding of future risks. The paradox of the Antarctic is that despite the abundance of resources, the treaty has set a moratorium on their extraction. The only exceptions are fishing – the only large-scale resource exploitation taking place on the continent at the moment – and opportunities for scientific research. The continent provides a fertile ground for materialization of scientific endeavors, and knowledge is one of the most valuable resources the Antarctic commons prides itself on.

Finally, Antarctica is governed by a unique treaty system that “has developed in a pragmatic, flexible and innovative manner” (Jorgensen-Dahl, et al, 1991, 10) and demonstrated precaution in handling controversial problems. However, the transcending beauty of the polar region has been tainted by human economic activities that put inexorable strain on the local ecosystems. Fishing, tourism and long-term scientific intervention inevitably pose a number of dangers to the environment, changing its original state (Burleson et al, 2013, 324). The confluence of these factors crowned Antarctica with the title of a ‘continent on the brink’ (Tray, 2008; Burleson, Huang, 2015). Additionally, fears are mounting that Antarctic ice sheets are susceptible to melting – the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is potentially unstable and human-induced climate change may feed into its gradual disintegration (Oppenheimer, 1998). Marine and coastal ecosystems of the Antarctic have

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10 been characterized as being “among the most vulnerable to climate change and climate variability” (IDEAL, 2015, 34). The unsettling tendencies on the continent explain the concerns raised among some authors, mentioning sporadic outbursts of collective action to “preserve the common heritage of humankind, respect for the integrity of nature independently of its value for humans” (Sachs, 1999, 37).

For this reason the question that has invariably emerged during ATS meetings, including the most recent one in Santiago, concerns the implications of climate change for management of the Antarctic. Despite the vast research on sustainable management of the global commons in general and the salience of the Antarctic model of governance in particular, little is known about the effects climate change poses on the governance framework of a common-pool resource. The existing body of knowledge is inclined to perceive climate change in the scientific, rather than the social realm. The general picture emerging from the literature recognizes climate change as a threat to the Antarctic ecosystem (Burleson et al, 2013). However, the state of the continental ecosystem hinges on the approach to governance and the durability (or, as some might put it, sustainability) of the governance system and climate change is a poignant reminder of the human/non-human interaction within such a system (Hulme, 2010). Additionally, scientific knowledge production, hailed as a pivotal part of Antarctic governance (Jorgensen-Dahl et al, 1991), is also a product of relationships engineered during the governance process. These relationships either boost or deflate the salience of the Antarctic treaty and might be impacted by global warming discourses. Therefore, the dots between climate change and the Antarctic governance model are yet to be connected.

Using the case study of Chile, one of the most dynamic actors in Antarctica, this study asks what climate change can do for the Antarctic Treaty System and, simultaneously, what the treaty system can do for climate change. It covers the perspectives of the two most important types of governance actors in the southern polar region, the national government and the scientific community. The research places a considerable emphasis on the aspect of knowledge production, bearing in mind its interconnection with other Antarctic governance elements. In particular, it seeks to differentiate between knowledge as information, sheltered in theoretical domains, and knowledge as a tool for communication that can foster sustainability-oriented dialogue.

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11 1.1. Research Questions

Based on this, the following research question is derived:

Four sub-questions will facilitate the process of answering the main question:

1) What vision does the Chilean government adopt in relation to Antarctic governance? 2) How does the Chilean government react to climate change in Antarctica?

3) What are the forces shaping the production of scientific knowledge in Antarctica?

4) What is the interaction between the government and the scientific community in response to climate change?

1.2. Research location

1.2.1. Chile

Chile laid its claim for the possession of the oldest sovereignty rights in the Antarctic in 1940. This was substantiated by historic rights, first discovery, effective occupation and secondary scientific theories (Tray, 2008, 227). Chile proclaimed that its Antarctic expeditions were organized over 150 years before James Cook reached the continent. The evidence of Chilean sovereignty was corroborated by a letter dating back to 1833 from a founder of the Chilean State to a British officer, declaring Chilean possession of the Antarctic Peninsula and surrounding

What is the relationship between the Antarctic governance system and climate change?

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12 islands (Tray, 2008, 228). Chile had spread its influence even further, establishing a permanent base on the peninsula in 1947 and instigated the tradition of governmental visits (Tray, 2008, 228). The incorporation of the Antarctic territories into the Chilean governmental agenda (Tray, 2008, 228) reinforced the strategic importance of the region for the Chilean state. Being in the closest proximity of the Antarctic continent (850 km away), Chile is one of the most crucial stakeholders in the Antarctic-related decision-making process and therefore its role in shaping the continental governance cannot be underestimated.

1.2.1. The region of Magallanes

The region constitutes one of the two areas of Chilean Southern Patagonia. It includes the Antarctic territory claimed by Chile and the capital city of Magallanes, Punta Arenas, exhibits the potential for establishing a reputation of a “gateway for worldwide expeditions to the Antarctic” (IDEAL, 2015, 18). Therefore, Magallanes region might become a catalyst for advancing scientific research in Antarctica, which would put Chile on the map as a scientific hub of worldwide importance.

Chilean Southern Patagonian and Antarctic ecosystems are vulnerable to any changes occurring in the region. As asserted by scientists, the constellation of profound and deleterious effects of global warming and anthropogenic impact in the region may lead to ice melting and coastal floods, precipitating the loss of Chile’s largest freshwater reserve in the Patagonian Ice Fields (IDEAL, 2015, 15). Chilean Southern Patagonia is recognized to be one of the largest freshwater reserves worldwide and “a key region for aquaculture and for hydroelectric power production” (IDEAL, 2015, 15). Meanwhile, the Antarctic Peninsula has experienced rapid temperature rises (up to 2.8 degrees) that triggered the decline in the extent of sea

ice (IDEAL, 2015, 15). These occurrences will take its toll not only on the structure of local ecosystems, altering their patterns of functioning, but also create a ripple effect, impacting global climate.

Considering its strategic importance in connection to climate change, the region of Magallanes makes a relevant location for any research that aims to look at governance of the Chilean Antarctic claim and its reaction in the face of global change.

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13 1.3. Thesis Outline

This study is divided into seven chapters; I have begun with a brief insight into the governance of Antarctica and its current challenges, which has then led to an outline of the theoretical debates that guide the empirical analysis. Chapter two goes on to discuss the concepts of sustainability, governance of the commons, and climate change. It also integrates communicative action theory and details the importance of dialogue in relation to the main concepts of this study. Chapter three then presents the research design and the methodology applied for this research and also introduces the conceptual scheme and operationalization to the reader. Chapter four is devoted to the views of Chilean government actors on Antarctic governance processes and climate change. Chapter five deals with the scientific view on research advancement, the main governance instrument in Antarctica, and its connection to climate change. Building upon that, I discuss the interplay between the government and scientific actors. Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of this research and suggests recommendations for future research and reforming the current dynamic.

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14 2. Converging debates on sustainability, governance of the commons and climate

change

Sustainable governance of the Antarctic is one viable solution for reversing the damaging trends outlined in the introduction and preventing them from flourishing. Evidently, two concepts comprise the idea of sustainable governance: sustainability and governance of the commons. I will elucidate each of them in relation to Antarctica in this chapter and attempt to find common ground between the two.

Additionally, as it was demonstrated above, climate change casts its shadow over Antarctica and therefore is capable of impacting the governance architecture. The phenomenon cannot go unnoticed on a continent that has been commonly referred to as a barometer for monitoring climate pattern alterations in an increasingly warming world (Burleson et al, 2013, 317). Thus, the concept of climate change as applied to Antarctica will also be discussed in the course of this chapter.

2.1. Sustainability

The branding of the idea of sustainable development started gaining steam in the 1980s, bolstered by concerns about rapid industrialization undermining the ecological balance. This led to dissemination of the definition of secure, balanced development which still remains relevant today: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, 43). The conceptualization was eternalized in the Brundtland Report and sought to ensure that the desire to eradicate injustice would not be trumped by environmental misgivings. However, such perspectives on sustainable development inevitably drew some criticism for its rhapsodizing of market imperatives and elevating economic growth as a key developmental objective, with some authors rightly regarding market integration and consumption as “part of the problem, not of the solution” (Sachs, 1999, 28).

A number of definitions were more tacit in their insinuations about growth. For instance, the World Bank aptly described sustainable development as development that lasts (World Bank 1992, 34). The breadth of such characterization provides considerable room for interpretation. Some see it as a moral idea, a set of commendable values for the future that focuses our attention on higher ideals for guiding our actions in the direction away from destruction and degradation (Ratner, 2004). Others offered a more tangible take on sustainable development: the report issued by the UK government in 2005 identified four priorities that needed to be addressed (Defra, 2005). They included sustainable consumption and production, climate change, natural resource protection and sustainable communities. Moreover, within the scope of its action to preserve the planet’s natural equilibrium

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15 while advancing social equity, sustainable development is expected to cut across national barriers and manifest itself on a greater spatial scale (Blewitt, 2008). The report is representative of a certain tendency that became emblematic of sustainable development – the final aim is to make our world a better place for everyone inhabiting it.

However, despite having an articulated objective, the nature of the term is kaleidoscopic and contains multiple meanings. Sustainable development pursues a lofty ambition of addressing several dimensions at once: social, such as international justice (Sachs, 1999); ecological, such as ecosystem resilience, resource conservation (Ratner, 2004) and regenerative capacities of nature (Sachs, 1999); and economic, such as growth and material welfare (Ratner, 2004).

Therefore, I have chosen the ecological angle to debate the role of sustainability in the Antarctic governance. The existing model of governance does not have enough force to combat injustice, poverty and inequality, but nevertheless can put environment into the limelight. Antarctica is “a salient symbol of surviving wilderness” (Stokke et al, 1996, 5), rich in resources that can be employed for purposes traditionally associated with development. For the clarity of this research I will elucidate the value of Antarctic resources. Firstly, knowledge is a resource of paramount importance – Antarctica is a gold mine for scientific research for those studying weather patterns and climatic and geological changes. Secondly, the continent is home to the world’s largest coalfield (BBC, 2014) and is rich in mineral and other energy resources. Another two sources of immeasurable value are water and sea life, as well as Antarctic wilderness itself that has attracted copious amount of tourism. Bearing in mind that the vision that Antarctic actors adopt in relation to these resources is a yardstick for analyzing the relationship between natural and human, I intend to dive into the pool of discussion surrounding ecological sustainability before constructing my own definition of “sustainable” in relation to the polar region.

2.1.1. Anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism

Based on some of the definitions of sustainable development provided previously, one might surmise that the concept disproportionally favors the human rush for development over the natural ability to sustain that same development. The bias is rather obvious: the protection of nature’s dignity has been supplanted by “the extension of human-centered utilitarianism to posterity” (Sachs, 1999, 34).

Therefore, it brings up the question of viability of striking a balance between human-centered and nature-centered in sustainable development.

As it has been justly noted, anthropocentric orientation of the term puts the debate about our relationship with nature on hold (Sachs, 1999). Moreover, it disempowers the environmental crisis by

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16 confining it in a stifling cell of development, which “was understood to inflict injuries on people and nature” (Sachs, 1999, 34). As it was noted above, the abundance of resources in Antarctica adds complexity to the ecological sustainability debate and consequently a question arises: how is nature perceived in a region that has continuously been celebrated as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”? (Burleson, 2015, 322) Academics are unanimous in lamenting the trend for devaluation of nature. Based on several case studies discussed in her book, Pettenger ponders over three woefully one-dimensional perceptions of nature. It can be seen as an external force subjected to manipulation and control. It can be seen as a product to be consumed. Alternatively, nature can serve as a tool for domination, managed by economics and power (Pettenger, 2007, 240). These ideas resonate with Sachs: debating about indispensability and the dispensability of nature’s “services” with regards to development, he concludes that nature turns into a critical variable in accommodating and nurturing development (Sachs, 1999, 34). How can this appalling and inherently destructive trend be reformed?

Eco-anarchist thinkers, such as Bookchin, devoted a significant amount of attention to building a partnership with nature and creating guidance for living with and within it rather than exploiting or subjugating it (Blewitt, 2008). A particular emphasis has been laid on the fact that the future of humankind depends on the strength of its bond with nature. Being a silent collaborator in all human activities, it has been represented by scientists, academics and politicians but has never been considered an “equal participant in a range of heterogeneously complex networks constituting the world we have shaped, know and relate to” (Latour, 2004). In a similar vein, the Antarctic ecosystem is a coveted resource for scientists seeking to explain the nature to the rest of the world but is seen as an inferior entity in need of protection. Ecosystem integrity is deemed to be the principal element for the continuation of human activities that drive society and the economy forward. Instead, Ben-Eli invites us to reassemble our set of values by reintroducing a sense of reverence and worship towards nature, reviving its sacredness (Ben-Eli, 2007). To herald the era of sustainability we need self-restraint and a spiritual dimension to foster the balance that has been lost.

2.1.2. Socio-ecological systems

Another way of addressing and studying patterns of human-natural interaction and designing long-lasting solutions is by perceiving them through the lens of a socio-ecological system. Within the academic community, social scientists have selected human interactions as their research domain, while ecologists have focused on natural environments (Liu et al, 2007, 639). Multidisciplinary research that seeks to bridge the gap between the former and the latter, however, is, as yet, a work in progress.

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17 As it was concluded above, the relationship between social and natural systems today is dramatically represented by human-driven environmental change (Anderson et al, 2008, 301). Pervasive interference and the subduing of nature at an accelerating scale that results in severe damage inflicted upon ecosystems have propelled scientists to consider the tenacious and essential link between social and ecological variables. This has led to the emergence of the concept of human-nature systems or socio-ecological systems (Anderson et al, 2008, 301). Some scholars, being in tune with anthropocentric versus ecocentric debates, assert that human leverage within ecosystems holds sway and that our era is marked by human-dominated ecosystems (Brousseau et al, 2012, 81). Tin’s perception of human engagement with the Antarctic environment is a testimony to that. According to her, it can be viewed in terms of human activities that happen within the continent, governance scenarios that regulate those activities, effects the activities produce and values that drive those activities (Tin et al, 2014, 9). Any activity unfolding within the ecosystem is comprehended through a narrow lens of human understanding, and the ecosystem serves as a backdrop and an enabler for human activities to happen.

Therefore, there is a growing need to integrate bio-geo-physical components alongside the related local and regional actors (Bhaduri, 2015). Socio-ecological systems have been defined as “an extensive multitier hierarchy of variables that have proven to be relevant for explaining sustainable outcomes in the management of forestry, fishery, and water resources.” (Binder, 2013, 6)

The systems are complex and dynamic, with their boundaries being in flux due to ever-changing environmental landscapes and fluctuating social determinants (Bhaduri, 2015). Brousseau points to a common misconception grounded in the belief that socio-ecological systems are defined by “linear and gradual rather than discontinuous and abrupt change” (Brousseau et al, 2012, 80). Therefore, socio-ecological systems should aspire for designing long-term, sustainable solutions, harnessing reflexivity and planning for the uncertain. “Reflexive systems are those in which expectations regarding future developments trigger anticipatory responses” (Brousseau et al, 2012, 85) and can contribute to the construction of effective governance mechanisms. At the same time, those institutional arrangements should be adjusted for the turbulent nature of socio-ecological systems, and therefore the need to embrace uncertainty comes into play. Elinor Ostrom breaks down the structure of socio-ecological system to the following components: resource system, resource units, users, and governance systems (Ostrom, 2009, 419) Resource units form a part of the resource system, while the governance system sets the rules for actors. The final result produces a number of interactions, outcomes and feedbacks (Basurto et al, 2013, 2).

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18 Socio-ecological systems can be studied on different levels and be applied to different spheres. Binder aggregates four different approaches in studying socio-ecological systems (Binder, 2013, 1):

1. combining material or energy flows and economic flows;

2. modeling human behavior and drivers that specifically impact on an ecosystem or an ecosystem service;

3. identifying and modeling specific goods that are relevant for the human system as well as for the ecological system;

4. studying the resilience and adaptive management of social-ecological systems

In Antarctic ecological processes, biodiversity and human impact are closely intertwined, but the backdrop of “knowledge and governance deficits” (IDEAL, 2015, 34) feeds into the increasing human domination over the ecosystem, dissolving its integrity. Focusing on the third approach introduced by Binder and taking into consideration debates surrounding human and natural or anthropocentric and ecocentric, I want to ponder over the criteria for a durable, impact-minimizing path for developing Antarctic activities. In the discussions on socio-ecological systems, most authors bring up the concept of sustainability. How can sustainability be conceptualized in the Antarctic context? Firstly, it will be based on the values shaping human relationship with nature. Recognizing the ecosystem as a rightful actor and addressing its needs, especially in a sensitive Antarctic context, will be the first step to sustainability. Secondly, governance mechanisms that will be discussed in the next chapter, should be predicated on achieving a long-term compromise between natural and human, rather than being a set of guidelines delegating responsibilities to Antarctic actors. Therefore, environmental criteria should come to the fore in defining sustainability in Antarctica. However, socio-ecological systems contain another component – social determinants (Bhaduri, 2015), and the governance system clearly belongs to the social domain. The next paragraph dwells on the intricacies of governance strategies for common pool resources.

2.2. Governance of the commons

First I would like to turn to the concept of governance and examine it from a holistic perspective. For a long time the term “governance” was used as generic and descriptive (Lynn, 2012, 1). Various definitions of it lay on the spectrum from “the general exercise of authority” (Michalski et al, 2001, 9) to societal steering that takes place under the auspices of civil society in an attempt to depart from the traditional state-centered model (Lynn, 2012, 3). The governance model premises on the plurality of actors that engage with each other, building a dynamic, complex and diverse framework of organized activities that seek to create a wider range of opportunities to solve certain problems. However, one should not assume that governance is a panacea for a wide range of problems. Its nature is fluid and

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19 by no means coherent, with local governance being defeated by the power of the global, national governance being swayed by clashing ideologies and fragmented systems, and global governance being ruptured by national interests (Gupta, 2014, 3).

Another feature of governance, as opposed to traditional perceptions of government, is its positioning beyond a formal hierarchy (Carlsson, 2008). This trait emanates through the overwhelming majority of governance definitions, including network governance. Having been defined as a “coordination characterized by informal social systems rather than by bureaucratic structures within firms and formal contractual relationships between them” (Jones, 1997, 911), this strand of governance overlaps with natural resource management. A growing body of scholars finds social network governance apt for being incorporated in the field of political science and sustainable management of the global commons (Carlsson, 2008; Bodin, 2006). In this scenario social networks are characterized as social structures comprising of nodes (actors), related through a variety of links (Carlsson, 2008), with self-regulated collective action at its core.

The Antarctic is the embodiment of the notion of the global commons, namely, a resource domain or area that lies outside the political reach of any nation state (UNEP, 2016). It could also be defined as a common pool resource i.e. a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use (Ostrom, 1990). According to Urbinati, governance refers to policies rather than politics, with a population that can be affected by global issues such as the environment, migration or use of natural resources being the recipient of these policies (Urbinati, 2003: 80). The two statements beg a number of questions. Firstly, who and on what terms governs the Southern Polar Region? And secondly, who is the recipient of the policies designed by Antarctic actors, bearing in mind that the continent is uninhabited due to its rather hostile and unwelcoming environment?

Historically an increased interest of nation states in Antarctic resources, bolstered by the development of technology, called for more robust regulation frameworks. The Antarctic governance breakthrough came in 1959, with the adoption of the Atlantic Treaty by the twelve countries1_{. It set}

the tone for the future of the Antarctic global commons, holding peaceful use of its territories (ATS, Article I), freedom of scientific investigation (ATS, Article II), and preservation of the status quo of territorial claims (ATS, Article IV) as the core governance values. Thus, operating on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the treaty’s participants have been managing the Antarctic on behalf of the international community (Dodds, 2010, 108). Like any institutional framework, the Antarctic Treaty System has been subject to many changes. The number of countries that acceded to the treaty has

1Antarctic Treaty original signatories: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US

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20 risen to 53. 17 countries achieved recognition of their activities in Antarctica and are now bearing the title of Consultative Parties (along with the original 12 nation states) while the other 24 Non-Consultative parties are not part of the decision-making process (ATS, 2011). Therefore, the recipients of the policies in the Antarctic are the national state actors themselves, as they steer the governance wheel in the unanimously accepted direction.

Until the mid-1980s the conventional approach to governance of the global commons prevailed: it assumed the inability of resource users to self-organize (Cox, 2010). Instead, the imposition of government or business structures for private ownership was often recommended (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). However, some authors advocated for a hybrid model of cooperative governance, which “is defined as a polycentric form of social coordination in which actions are coordinated voluntarily by individuals and organizations with self-organizing and self-enforcing capabilities” (McGinnis et al, 1996). It implies increasing the diversity of representation within an institutional arrangement and establishing multi-actor structures (Carlsson et al, 2008). In the case of Antarctica this idea might hold if politicians, scientists, NGO representatives, tourism sector actors and stakeholders from the CCAMLR are invited to the negotiating table and participate on an equal footing. However, it is important to take a sober look on the role of the governmental actors who, “due to a unique possession of resources – such as legislation power, budgets, personnel, access to mass media, and democratic legitimacy)” (Carlsson et al, 2008, 48) might have an unfair advantage in the governance process. Despite the ability of governmental stakeholders to foster the creation of new networks of actors (Carlsson, 2008), other participants should be wary of their behavior, especially in Antarctica, with the treaty system having been designed by political actors positioning themselves above everyone else.

Ostrom was a trailblazer who advocated for a hybrid model by formulating eight principles for successful action in common pool resource governance. Ostrom’s theory aims to identify the conditions for sustaining collective action in the face of the uncertainty associated with a common-pool resource in order to prevent its degradation. Ostrom’s design is oriented on “fallible, norm-adopting individuals who pursue contingent strategies in complex and uncertain environments” (Ostrom, 1990, 185), which is the relevant case for Antarctica. Each of the principles will be discussed below, as I attempt to embed them in my research.

Principle 1: well-defined boundaries

The principle focuses on drawing boundaries within the community of users and delineating the resources available for use to induce better management of the commons. Agrawal maintains that clear boundaries can promote sustainable use of resources when actors are stationary (Agrawal,

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21 2003). However, this condition sparked a wave of criticism from those insisting that “rules of access are often politically malleable and spatial boundaries fluid” (Turner, 1999, 649).

However, in the case of Antarctica, the source of benefit is the whole continent and actors have a high degree of mobility in this context. Therefore, the boundaries contain overlapping and jointly managed areas:

Map 3: Antarctic territorial claims and year-round research stations

As one can see, lines on the map of Antarctica have been drawn, with seven countries carving out a territorial claim for themselves. However, occasionally there is no correlation between station

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22 location and territorial claim, which might create fertile ground for contestations between actors and make the process of governing disharmonious. Creation of border barriers is also at odds with the ethos of the Antarctic Treaty that designates the territory for the common good of humanity.

Principle 2: congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions

The rule prescribes the balance between the appropriation and provision of resources and their conformance to local conditions.

Some scholars underlined the importance of local culture and customs in relation to the congruence with local conditions (Young, 2002). However, in Antarctica this principle means conducting human activities in a well-managed, environmentally conscious manner, addressing the fragility of the local environment. Preservation of the pure state of the Antarctic environment and its protection has been the subject of continuous negotiation of the ATS members. Stokke maintains that the result of those negotiations is “a litmus test of whether state leaders are prepared to halt the global spread of environmental decay” (Stokke et al, 1996, 5). To avert the environmental catastrophe, the ATS undertook a number of steps to draft a set of regulations for extra protection2_{. The most}

recent and the most extensive environmental governance framework is represented by the Protocol on Environmental Protection (1998) – it highlighted the importance of ecological management and environmental impact assessment in the region (Rothwell, 1996). The structure of the protocol covers six strategic areas: environmental impact assessment, conservation of the Antarctic fauna and flora, waste disposal and waste management, prevention of marine pollution, area protection and management and liability arising from environmental emergencies. However, one of the contradictions that emerges as a result is a consideration that “a non-extractive resource use is inherently less likely to pose environmental risk” (Liggett, 2013, 83). As a result of this perception, actors deem their actions to be environmentally benign creating a stumbling block for governance structures.

The balance between appropriation and provision has been theorized as congruence between costs to which resource-users are subject and benefits they enjoy from using the resource (Cox, 2010). Clearly, it is in participants’ interests to minimize the costs while yielding maximum benefit. However, in the Antarctic context this might mean incurring harm on the ecosystem and breaking the back of sustainability. Scientific research fuels especially passionate debate, with knowledge being a coveted resource while simultaneously being an instrument to assert authority in the Antarctic (Dodds et al, 2014, 125) and a scheme to maximize financial returns (Walton, 2014, 113). Therefore, dismissing the

2Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, 1964; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 1972; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 1980.

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23 appropriation/provision equilibrium in the context of the absence of an effective (which, in my opinion, implies sustainable) model of governance puts natural resources and the environment into peril “from consumption and deployment of advanced technologies for resource use” (Dietz et al, 2003, 1907).

Principle 3: collective choice arrangements

The third principle allows system users to modify and recalibrate the rules of the system of which they find themselves a part. As noticed by some authors, an unusual system of Antarctic governance is conducive for “collective action and institutionalization of resource use” that exemplifies long-term thinking but is also regarded as elitist and cumbersome (Tin et al, 2014, 309). It begs the question of why certain parties bear the rights to representation of the global community. The complexity of identifying system users in Antarctica – is it every nation state, due to its status of global commons, or only those who signed the treaty? – came to the fore during the heated debates about the ratification of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). The critics of the system voiced their demands in the UN in 1988, arguing for wider participation in the Antarctic mineral moratorium negotiations (Stokke, 1996). Despite the benign outcome of the discussion (extraction of mineral resources was outlawed), the question of elitism of the treaty system and the vagueness of the definition of “Antarctic resource user” term still persists.

Principle 4: monitoring

Monitoring is a crucial instrument in the governance of the commons toolbox, it ensures that those not abiding by the rules are brought into the spotlight and penalized respectively (Cox, 2010). It is inextricably linked to the commitment to follow the rules actors have to undertake and produces joint benefits for the community (Ostrom, 1990). In the case of the Antarctic, environmental monitoring is crucial (Young, 2002) in guaranteeing that knowledge is “extracted” in a sustainable fashion. The Antarctic Treaty System elevates monitoring to an obligation for all signatories in order to minimize impacts from human activities (Hughes, 2010), especially considering the poor environmental management track record in the past (Tin et al, 2009). However, Antarctic stakeholders are skeptical about the efficiency of environmental monitoring, due to inconsistency among national actors in publishing the collected data (Hughes, 2010). The underrepresentation of monitoring results is woeful: with 75 running bases, the information for most stations is not available and only three out of 28 treaty nations supplied the details of the monitoring work for the online information exchange base in 2008-2009 (Hughes, 2010). Therefore, the mismatch between theory and reality of environmental monitoring in Antarctica is evident and no accountability mechanisms have been

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24 developed for addressing it. Additionally, this trend exposes another problem that has plagued Antarctica since the inception of the treaty: most Antarctic nations act autonomously, with little coordination of monitoring activities (Hughes, 2010), thus undermining the ethos of the ATS.

Principle 5: graduated sanctions

The principle keeps violations of mutual agreement between actors in check, by imposing incrementally progressive sanctions on system users and preserving community cohesion (Cox, 2010). Ostrom provides two additional conditions that increase the possibility of actor compliance with the rules: certainty in achieving the collective objective and perceivable compliance from other actors in the system (Ostrom, 1990, 95). The second condition has been particularly hard to fulfill in Antarctica: annex VI of the Madrid Protocol on Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies was adopted in 2005 after 13 years of negotiation but was not ratified by all Antarctic signatories (ATS, 2011). The Antarctic governance system lacks “enforcement mechanisms <…> to penalize contravention of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and its related legal instruments” (Hughes, 2010), as its orientation on peace maintenance has not been conducive for the development of a sanctions framework. With the number of actors proliferating and accountability mechanisms dissolving, signatories fall into trap of inflicting harm on the local environment and not being punished for the sake of being in the line with “no-blame policy” and maintaining good diplomatic relations.

Principle 6: conflict-resolution mechanisms

Cox demonstrates that tension will inevitably arise in the common pool resource context, therefore instruments for conflict resolution need to be present to avoid conflict escalation (Cox, 2010). As I discussed earlier, the treaty sees peace as both the ends and the means to achieving this, therefore the eruption of a conflict is rather unlikely. However, the treaty addresses the potentiality of a conflict in Article XI, advising the parties to resolve the dispute “by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Antarctic Treaty, 1959, 9). In case of failure, parties should consult with the International Court of Justice.

Principle 7: minimum recognition of rights

This principle safeguards the authority of common pool resource actors over the principles they designed for themselves and protects the system from the external intervention (Ostrom, 1990). The UN attempted to involve itself with Antarctic treaty negotiations to no avail and it has been an

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25 autonomous entity ever since. However, the architecture of the governance framework has been subject to change, with its rules being adopted by other external bodies. The ATS, with its “manifestation of growing institutional thickness” (Dodds, 2010, 111) grew to become the spotlight of public attention, with the question “who owns Antarctica?” remains controversial. Starting from the 1980s, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings were given greater exposure, especially by non-governmental organizations. (Dodds, 2010, 111) Greater participation of non-non-governmental bodies and private actors in Antarctic-related issues precipitated the shift in sharing the burden of responsibility. Therefore, national structures are no longer the ones at the helm of governance, which poses an additional challenge for the accountability system and monitoring the compliance with the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental Protocol.

Principle 8: nested enterprises

Ostrom suggests that “appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom, 1990, 101). Rules for the regulation of actors’ activities should be established on many levels rather than descend from the top to the bottom of the governance pyramid. The Antarctic is an embodiment of this scenario, with different entities within the treaty addressing different dimensions of it: the treaty overlooking the management of the continent, the environmental protocol ensuring protection of the environment, marine resources being supervised by the CCAMLR Convention and tourism being regulated by International Association Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO). Such division of responsibilities, in theory, should provide for a more efficient and straightforward governance process. However, the process is accompanied with a number of difficulties and an overlapping legal regime is one of them. With each dimension of the treaty premising its actions on a specific regulatory system, the phenomenon of legal pluralism might arise when two systems inevitably collide. For instance, Dodds draws parallels between the existing Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and other legal regimes governing fishing in the region, such as the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of the Southern Blue Tuna. (Dodds, 2010, 112)

Therefore, all of the principles can be applied to Antarctica but as one can deduce, the state of some of them (monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms) is yet conspicuously imperfect. Moreover, Ostrom’s theory has normally been applied to the examples of community-based global commons notably smaller in scale, which has also been noticed by some scholars (Young, 2002). Judging the above principles from the perspective of socio-ecological ecosystems and sustainability, one might notice that the amount of attention reserved for the ecosystem is insufficient. Therefore, I would like

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26 to dissect Sachs’ conceptualization of environmental diplomacy and attempt to position the case of Antarctica into it.

Sachs captures the Antarctic zeitgeist in defining the purpose of knowledge: it seeks to identify the limits that allow “the maximum use of nature as mine and container, right up to the critical threshold beyond which ecological decline would rapidly accelerate” (Sachs, 1999, 38). The limits are determined on the grounds of scientific knowledge and bickering about its status is an inevitable part of the game (ibid, 38). Rightly so, other authors argue that the importance of the final outlet for knowledge, namely policy and transfer, should not overshadow the process of knowledge production (Blewitt, 2008, 174). The latter process can be considered one of the pillars of Antarctic governance and is therefore of tremendous importance. Moreover, environmental regulations on the continent have been designed as a result of the conflation of scientific and political knowledge that recognizes the scientific contribution and simultaneously “protects certain species, certain types of nature” being guided by political preferences and interests (Blewitt, 2008).

Having identified the limits, the actors embark on the “bargaining process” (Sachs, 1999), with each country aspiring to take hold of a slice of the natural resource pie. The means for achieving the goal are taken from the diplomacy playbook, with power and persuasion being the main weapons countries deploy (ibid). Finally, the deal has to be consummated by developing instruments for compliance with newly established rules via monitoring and enforcement institutions (ibid).

I believe that the process of “rationing what is left of nature” (ibid) resonates with the design of the Antarctic treaty system. Therefore, this research aims to combine Ostrom’s legacy, understandings of sustainability, and peculiarities of the Antarctic context for defining sustainable governance in Antarctica. For this purpose, a common ground between governance of the commons and sustainability needs to be identified and I attempt to show that communication and dialogue can adopt the role of this connecting agent.

2.3. Role of dialogue for sustainable governance

This section will shed some light on the role of healthy communication and constructive dialogue for sustainability and effective governance of the commons. However, a broader view on communication theory needs to be taken before I embark on spelling out its practical purpose in the context of the global commons.

Communicative action theory developed and popularized by Habermas creates a scenario in which actors, engaged in dialogue, seek to reach common understanding and plan their future actions by consensus, sound argument and cooperation as opposed to recalcitrant strategic pursuit of their own goals and objectives (Habermas, 1984). This theory is particularly applicable to the Antarctic

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27 treaty where the consensus system has often been deemed protracted and cumbersome due to interest clash among actors (Vidas, 2012). Communicative action has been defined as individual action aiming to find a common ground and promote cooperation in contrast to strategic action (Habermas, 1984). This idea of reaching mutual understanding on the international arena might seem utopian or unattainable, however Habermas outlines a number of conditions necessary for its materialization. Participants are entitled to an equal chance to speak, participate, argue and problematize without being pressured or coerced by other actors, the state labeled “the ideal speech” (Habermas, 1975). Therefore, potential conflicts and disputes are to be resolved without exerting any force, “except that of the better argument” (Habermas 1975:108).

Habermas mourns the current state of dialogue affairs that has been distorted by the colonization of lifeworld – “transformation of social arenas once coordinated via communicative action into arenas coordinated by administrative and economic subsystem imperatives” (Gunderson, 2014, 636). This pathology is eroding socialization processes and impairs dialogue, which can be the case even for the Antarctic treaty, despite its flexibility and available opportunities for smooth communication. Moreover, the reign of economic and administrative imperatives along with the loss of the dialogue grasp suggests a value shift in the direction of financial and material gain which breeds opportunities for strategic action.

Habermas’ theory implies that the process and the organization of dialogue are more important than the outcome (Gunderson, 2014, 638). However, this particular aspect can shape the decision-making, which is a process in itself, as well as enable the integration of crucial values, which, in the case of Antarctica, are environmental. A number of scholars argued that “ecological rationality” can be achieved via communicative action (Dryzek, 1987) and ecological values should be reflected in decision-making by institutionalizing procedures for their consideration (Brulle, 2002). The communicative action model, with its pressure-free, understanding-oriented spirit, therefore can and should be applied to any discussion related to the environment. Ecological rationality, according to Dryzek, equates to long-term sustainability (Dryzek, 1987).

The importance of constructive dialogue for building strategies for sustainability is hard to dispute. Sustainability, as it was shown above, is a multifaceted, dynamic concept, with an all-encompassing range of meanings and practices. Therefore, dispute, discordance and collision of interests are hard to avoid but “only through discussion, debate, critical reflection, learning and dialogue agreement and action can and will emerge” (Blewitt, 2008, 23).

Additionally, communicative action is an essential building block for the governance of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1994). Throughout history, this statement has been subject to polemic: Hobbes regarded verbal promises as toothless in contrast to the compelling force of coercive

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28 power and punishment (Ostrom, 1994). Ostrom presents similar doubts, juxtaposing “short-term, profit-maximizing strategies and strategies negotiated by a verbal agreement” (Ostrom, 1994, 145). However, she defeats such arguments by claiming that communication allows for a greater amount of cooperative strategies (Ostrom, 1994), which can overpower opportunistic behavior. Communication alone is not sufficient for fostering cooperation, as there are a number of caveats for result-yielding dialogue. One of them is frequency that might rattle the success of communicative action. Ostrom demonstrates that one opportunity for communication serves as a catalyst for the process of adopting a joint strategy between the subjects. Yet, the impossibility of further communication on a regular basis has “limited the durability of their agreements” (Ostrom, 1994, 171). Therefore, communication can be the glue holding the strategy together only under the condition that its regularity is not disturbed.

Having discussed the importance of sustained communication that arises once the concepts of sustainability and governance of the commons coalesce, I will define sustainable governance in Antarctica. The term “sustainable” in this particular case can be substituted by “harmonious” or, even, “conscious” and the given model consists of environmental criteria and social determinants. The former implies the pursuit of an ecological goal based on the value of achieving a common ground between non-human and human communities and reassembling the governance order in favor of the Antarctic ecosystem. The latter implies that the goal will be achieved through the improved communication processes among the key Antarctic actors, both national and international, ensuring their compliance with the existing rules and regulations of the treaty.

2.4. Climate change

At the beginning of this chapter I signaled the problem of climate change and its deleterious effects for the Antarctic and the globe. This section aggregates a number of definitions and debates on the subject of global warming and familiarizes the reader with the understanding of climate change relevant for this research.

As it has been aptly concluded by climate change academic Mike Hulme, the idea of global warming is as widely spread and as potent in modern social discourses as are the ideas of democracy, terrorism or nationalism (Hulme, 2009). It has been advanced in different contexts, examined through various ideological lenses, critiqued by many distinct groups. Moreover, it sparks a pluralistic debate on sustainability and the means of achieving it as “sustainability is now relocated into the wider context of the social response to global warming” (Arias-Aldonado, 2013, 429), which is particularly relevant for this research. It has been frequently emphasized that climate change will be a significant

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29 challenge to Antarctic environmental governance (French and Scott 2009; Joyner 2011; Orheim et al. 2011; Rothwell and Nasu 2008). ATS parties concluded that they “should lead by example in the global effort in addressing climate change” (ATCM 13, 2010, 3). However, despite the ample evidence of the effects of human-induced climate change, there is no consensus on its understanding and further action to address it. Since the issue came to the fore in 1979 (Gupta, 2010, 636), a set of strategies crafted to engage with the problem constructively has been repeatedly modified. I will start with an insight into the evolution of the climate change debate.

Through its history, it has witnessed a rapid transition from an ambiguous technical concern into a cause for international tension and public dismay (Demeritt, 2001). The foundations of climate change discourse were laid during the period from 1985 to 1992. The World Meteorological Organization’s 1985 Villach conference became a stepping stone for publicizing the warnings about the anthropogenic magnification of the greenhouse effect due to soaring amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Demeritt, 2001). It also succeeded in cementing the hegemony of the natural sciences in framing the problem of climate change which led to the foundation of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 (Hulme, 2007). IPCC embarked on sketching the boundaries of the climate change debate with its reports and it certainly influenced the signing of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The latter was subsequently bolstered by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, where politicians “hammered out a package of legally binding targets for reducing the GHG emissions of industrialized countries” (Demeritt, 2001, 307). Since then the Convention, along with IPCC reports remain to be a yardstick for climate policy discourse (Hulme, 2007).

The rich tapestry of definitions of climate and climate change leaves one in awe. IPCC defines it as a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer) that can be attributed to natural internal processes or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). The distinction between natural variability and human-induced change is crucial for shaping climate change discourse. Stehr argues that two rival images of climate – “slow climate and its changes, and the fast weather and climate variability (including naturally occurring rare extremes and multi-year anomalies)” – are not related but can be manipulated and misconstrued (Stehr et al, 1995, 101). This aspect will be discussed later in this chapter.

“Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of them” – this aphorism attributed to Epictetus encapsulates the currently unfolding debates on global warming and climate. Climate has long been perceived as “a statistical abstraction” (Demeritt, 2001, 312), opaque and obscure. Instead, Demeritt insists, it should be viewed as a collection of social practices and principles,

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30 with its universalism brushed aside, making up space for “particulars” (Demeritt, 2001, 312). Hulme subscribes to this idea: climate change is trying to cast off the shackles of a dull scientific term or a description of changing climate patterns around the world (Hulme, 2010). Instead, it is becoming “both a resourceful idea and a versatile explanation, which can be molded and mobilized to fulfill a bewildering array of political, social and psychological functions” (Hulme, 2010, 267). The idea might also enhance our perception of environmental reality and of the factors that contribute to it, such as scientific and political realities (Lahsen, 2010) and shed some light on the protracted nature of human responses to environmental problems. Therefore, climate change is more than a wide array of facts or a catalyst for mounting concern, it is an instrument that can serve as an impetus for change, including the change in governance system, and will be treated as such for the purposes of this research.

To ensure a better understanding of global warming as an idea, I will employ Barry’s approach to normative analysis of climate change (Barry et al, 2013). According to Barry, climate change can be plugged into three distinct areas: philosophical, economic and political (Barry et al, 2013). However, I also supplement them with social and development-related aspects of climate change, which came to the surface during the literature review.

2.4.1. Philosophical aspect of climate change

Barry frames the philosophical aspect of climate change by embedding it in the concept of ‘anthropocene’ and analyzing its bearing on the relationship between humankind and nature (Barry et al, 2013). Indeed, it puts nature into the spotlight, presenting it as a “dynamic historical agent” (Taylor, 2014, 9) rather than an acquiescent entity that relents and capitulates in the face of human force. The perception of nature as a legitimate player endows it with the potential for shaping the future of mankind (Taylor, 2014).

However, as optimistic as it might sound, the human-nature paradigm change is a tortuous process. It is impaired by the fact that climate and society have been separated as domains of nature and culture respectively and have been perceived as external entities (Taylor, 2014), despite the fact that climate change encompasses both natural and cultural. This dichotomy impairs the interpretation of climate change: being firmly ingrained in the natural domain, climate science does not cut across societal barriers with its knowledge and is therefore “detached from its cultural settings” (Hulme, 2007, 9). As a result, humanity remains oblivious about the meaning of climate change idea in different settings, for different communities (Hulme, 2007). Therefore, climate change, rather than being universalized, should be weaved into differing social, political and cultural fabrics to enhance its understanding and provide a fresh, alternative perspective on it.

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31 2.4.2. Development-related aspect of climate change

Taylor evidences that coming to grips with the phenomenon of global warming questions the ideas of development and future progress (Taylor, 2014). Manifestations of climate change vary from region to region, and so do regional perceptions of it. Despite the technical side of the issue being addressed - regional global warming impact assessment models have been introduced and gradually upgraded – the social and moral sides have received insufficient attention and have been riddled with criticism. One camp denounces the idea of climate change as “a powerful agent of anti-development” (Taylor, 2014, 10) that, if left to its own devices, will negate the accomplishments of the modern era. Therefore, adjustment mechanisms are needed to be put in place.

However, a number of detractors categorize the climate change concern as the ‘northern’ one, arguing that its meaning in the global south has been diminished by prioritizing the urgent needs of sanitation, health and hunger (Demeritt, 2001). Additionally, the 2°C cap on global warming is a construction of western minds and is unlikely to incite the whole world to act (Hulme, 2007). Demiritt and Hulme prove that threats to the global environment, including climate change, are therefore constructed as not being universal in nature (Demeritt, 2001), which, therefore, makes claims about the global reach of environmental concerns seem spurious. The divergence of opinions once again proves the malleable and versatile nature of the concept of climate change.

2.4.3. Economic aspect of climate change

As was shown above, the narrative of climate change is artificially constructed and can therefore be framed in many conceivable ways. One such way has been closely associated with great perturbations, danger on a large scale and even the premature death of civilization, as was predicted by the IPCC in 2007 (Swyngedouw, 2010). However, the apocalyptic angle can potentially divert the attention from other problems, such as poverty or disease, and also sideline “other ways of formulating the problem, such as the structural imperatives of the capitalist economy” (Demeritt, 2001, 313), thus calling for a radical change of the global economic order. Moreover, the capitalist economy has perpetuated a certain image of climate change, which it has subsequently exploited for its own benefit. It hinges on the management of fear and the promulgation of epic apocalyptic imaginaries for preserving the status quo (Swyngedouw, 2010).

2.4.4. Political aspect of climate change

Going hand-in-hand with the economic aspect, the political aspect can be viewed as a strategy for re-engineering “the basic concepts and institutions of first, industrial, nation-state modernity” (Beck,