Democratic global governance or a
different agenda: a look into climate
migration
Assessing public attitudes and their coherence with the
international community regarding climate migration: a survey
experiment
Word count: 18444
Elisa Leys
Student number: 01609500
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Thijs Van de Graaf
A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Political Science: International Politics
Academic year: 2019 – 2020
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Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.
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Contents
ABSTRACT ... 5ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... 6
1.
INTRODUCTION ... 7
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW ... 10
2.1. TERMINOLOGY AND TYPOLOGY ... 10 2.2. MULTICAUSALITY ... 12 2.2.1. Minimalists and maximalists ... 13
2.3. ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE MIGRATION ... 14 2.3.1. Economic migrants ... 15
2.4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ... 15 2.5. SECURITY APPROACH ... 17 2.6. MIGRATION IN POLITICS ... 18 2.7. PUBLIC ATTITUDES ... 20 3.
RESEARCH PROBLEM ... 21
4.
HYPOTHESES ... 22
5.
METHODOLOGY ... 23
5.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ... 23 5.1.1. Methodological weaknesses ... 24
5.2. SURVEYS ... 25 5.2.1. The Namibian case ... 25
5.2.2. Conditions ... 27
5.2.3. Survey questions ... 27
5.2.4. Sample ... 28
5.3. ETHICS AND GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ... 29
5.4. DATA COLLECTION ... 29
5.4.1. Randomization check ... 30
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6.ANALYSIS ... 31
6.1. SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL ... 31 6.2. HYPOTHESIS 1 ... 32 6.2.1. Descriptive analysis ... 32
6.2.2. Statistical analysis: Chi-square test of independence ... 36
6.2.3. Statistical analysis: independent T-test ... 37
6.2.4. Conclusion ... 37
6.3. HYPOTHESIS 2 ... 37 6.3.1. Descriptive analysis ... 37
6.3.2. Statistical analysis: Chi-square test of independence ... 41
6.3.3. Statistical analysis: independent T-test ... 42
6.3.4. Conclusion ... 42
6.4. COMPARISON OF TREATMENTS ... 42 7.
CONCLUSION ... 44
8.
REFLECTION ... 46
9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 47
10.
APPENDIX ... 53
APPENDIX I ... 53 APPENDIX II ... 53 APPENDIX III ... 53 APPENDIX IV ... 54 APPENDIX V ... 60 APPENDIX VI ... 60 APPENDIX VII ... 62 APPENDIX VIII ... 77 APPENDIX IX ... 83 APPENDIX X ... 84 APPENDIX XI ... 90
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Abstract
Deze thesis is een aansluitend onderzoek op de onderzoekspaper van mijn bachelor waarbij er aan de hand van een discoursanalyse naar het klimaatmigratie vraagstuk gekeken werd. Het onderzoek wordt echter met een nieuwe blik voortgezet door het toepassen van experimentele methodes en het observeren van de publieke opinie omtrent klimaatmigratie. Door de complexiteit van het fenomeen is er heel wat onenigheid in zowel de wetenschappelijke gemeenschap als de internationale gemeenschap omtrent klimaatmigratie. Hoewel de link tussen klimaatverandering en migratie intussen internationaal werd erkend, blijven adequate oplossingen uit. De aanpak van de internationale gemeenschap waarbij de focus voornamelijk gelegd wordt op lokale strategieën met het oog op het verbeteren van waarschuwingssystemen die aan de hand van ontwikkelingshulp kunnen worden opgekrikt, heeft enkele belangrijke gevolgen. De framing die hierdoor op klimaatmigratie wordt toegepast, weergeeft het fenomeen op een simplistische en economische wijze. Daarenboven worden klimaatmigranten die niet als gevolg van een natuurramp migreren, volledig in de steek gelaten. Om na te gaan of deze framing een effect heeft op de publieke opinie omtrent een onderwerp dat voornamelijk in de wetenschappelijke of politieke context besproken wordt, werd een survey experiment opgezet waarbij studenten online bevraagd werden over een scenario dat ze vooraf moesten lezen. Respondenten kregen door randomisatie één van de drie opgestelde scenario’s voorgelegd waarna ze allemaal dezelfde vragen moesten beantwoorden. Door drie verschillende scenario’s te creëren waarbij er twee geframed werden zoals dat ook door de internationale gemeenschap gebeurd en één waarheidsgetrouw, konden de verschillende antwoorden achteraf vergeleken worden. Uit zowel de descriptieve als statistische analyse bleek dat de waargenomen verschillen niet groot genoeg waren om vast te stellen dat de framing die toegepast wordt door de internationale gemeenschap effect heeft op de publieke opinie. Hoewel de publieke opinie niet helemaal overtuigd blijkt van de huidige aanpak, is de kloof niet groot genoeg om te kunnen zeggen dat de internationale gemeenschap een andere agenda op het oog heeft. Het falen van het huidige beleid, kan voornamelijk te wijten zijn aan de complexiteit die schuilgaat achter het fenomeen.6
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Thijs Van de Graaf, my professor and supervisor, who has given me the freedom to independently do my research on a topic I have felt very passionately about. Moreover, Prof. Van de Graaf has helped me look at climate migration studies from a new angle, providing helpful advice and always encouraging my ideas. I’m also extremely grateful to miss Robin Devroe, who has helped me with setting up the most crucial part of this dissertation. Over the course of several months she has very patiently answered my many questions and extended her assistance. Miss Devroe helped me tremendously with the unfamiliar territory of experimental design, which has been a vital contribution to my analyses. I’m very grateful to my roommates and friends, Eva and Marie, who’s help cannot be underestimated by offering their insights and advice as well as much needed encouragement and patience.I would also like to express my thanks to my dearest friends Kato and Nordin, who, through conversations, exchanging ideas and philosophies, extending advice and support, have made invaluable contributions to this dissertation.
Special thanks to Mathias who has relentlessly supported me throughout this entire process and extended his advice and practical suggestions as well as his profound belief in my abilities. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, who, despite not always understanding exactly what has kept my busy for the past academic years, never wavered in their support and encouragement.
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1. Introduction
Fast-paced globalization has shaped and transformed the world tremendously in the last few decades. Despite the many benefits it has offered to the world, the 21st century has been met with many crises,often exacerbated by globalization. Many local issues, due to their increasing scale, have become cross-border issues, demanding global approaches and solutions. Crises were frequently met head on by the international community, however some issues have left the international community groping in the dark. This dissertation will examine a phenomenon that the international community will have to face as yet. Two global issues that have been heavily debated, nationally as well as internationally, are climate change and migration. Both issues concern many of the world’s nation’s leaders and for this reason became a focal point of discussion within the international community. With annual Conference of the Parties monitoring annual progress of the parties to the UNFCCC, the Global Compact for Migration (hereinafter referred to as GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (hereinafter referred to as GCR), it seems these topics are continuously left on the table for further discussion and scrutinizing. These issues seem to have captured many citizens as well as they have penetrated society. Citizens all over the globe have taken to the streets to voice their concerns over climate governance and migration has been the hot potato deciding local and national election outcomes. Though both issues have been widely discussed separately, the climate-migration nexus and the growing issue of climate migration seems to have gained less traction. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is not entirely unknown within the international community. In fact, climate migration first started drawing attention in the late 70’s and 80’s (Bates, 2002). In 1976 already, Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute1, proposed the use of the term ‘environmental refugee’ (Black, 2001). Later in
1985, UNEP researcher El-Hinnawi defined environmental refugees as
those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/or
1
The Worldwatch Institute is an independent research entity dedicated to global environmental research. (Climate Action Network, n.d.)
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biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life. (El-Hinnawi, 1985, p. 4) As time went on, different definitions were posited and discussed and rough estimates were made. The most widely repeated prediction so far, has been 200 million climate migrants by the year 2050 (IOM, 2008). Unfortunately, despite some strong and urgent signals from the scientific community, decades later, in 2020, the international community remains paralyzed in its position regarding this pressing issue. Moreover, climate migration is often still overlooked in mainstream media. The number of climate migrants is expected to rise significantly in the next decades (Taylor, 2018), thus change is desperately necessary. Because of the vast estimates made, short mentions and acknowledgements will no longer suffice. (Betts & Collier, 2018; Heslin, Deckard, Oakes, & Montero-Colbert, 2019; Taylor, 2018)
Historically, migration has been a consistent survival and adaptation strategy for those facing environmental changes (Graeme, 1996; Klepp, 2017). However, due to the climate crisis, naturally occurring migration processes have been compromised and relatively constant migration streams have become oversaturated (Klepp,2017). Extreme and prolonged periods of drought, rainfall, a constant sea-level rise, and other environmental conditions have caused for the loss of livelihoods in the most economically vulnerable parts of the world (IMF, 2017; IOM, 2008; Klepp, 2017). For those who have the means to migrate (Lübken, 2012), migration mostly occurs within borders (IOM, 2008). Nevertheless, the current climate crisis could be detrimental and cause for additional cross-border migration, which will require a globally integrated approach. When it is no longer feasible for the countries of origin to address the root causes, the issue becomes an even more serious concern for the international community. Resolving and averting such a humanitarian crisis will require much closer cooperation of local, national and international actors (UNHCR, 2018).
Furthermore, research has not fully caught up with reality yet. Most research regarding the climate-migration nexus focuses on jurisprudence or more specific phenomena such as Furthermore, research has not fully caught up with reality yet. Most research regarding the climate-migration due to extreme weather shocks (Burzynski, Deuster, Docquier, & De Melo, 2018). Research on slow onset events and its association to migration is rather scarce. Also, research on the political impact of climate migration has only really taken off in the last decade. As the literature review will illustrate, there is a lot of ambiguity surrounding the phenomenon of climate migration, which could impede meaningful
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and necessary progress. Research will have to advance to help find global political solutions for the currently neglected climate migrants. For this dissertation, I will be building upon earlier research of my bachelor’s dissertation. After having conducted a discourse analysis and applying a social constructivist lens to the climate migration-nexus, it has become clear that much more research needs to be done, to gain a better understanding of this issue and the position of the international community. The bachelor’s dissertation focused on the several discourses in the international community and how these affect the lives of climate migrants. However, with this limited study, it was not feasible to fully comprehend how the international community has come to its current stance regarding the issue. For this reason, the following dissertation will approach the issue from a different angle; this time public attitudes will be assessed and analyzed. Analyzing public attitudes could explain whether the stance of the international community is attributed to democratic global governance or whether there might be another agenda. Going forward the term ‘international community’ will be used a lot; for this dissertation, this refers to the United Nations organization and its associated organizations as this is the only body with substantial authority with regard to international migration frameworks.10
2. Literature review
When reviewing the existing literature on climate migrants, there are certain reoccurring topics such as the judicial aspect to climate migration issues and debates on the existing migrant frameworks, set up by the international community. Though crucial to understanding the complexity of climate migration, there are clear gaps in the literature with certain aspects often neglected. In this literature review, I will bring forth a summary of the relevant existing literature beginning with the phenomenon of climate migration itself and the progress that has been made in the international community. Later, I will go on to digress on the context in which climate migration is discussed and its repercussions. 2.1. Terminology and typologyUnderstanding the climate migrant phenomenon begins with understanding its confusing terminology, which has been heavily debated within the scientific community. In research, different terms are frequently used to refer to the same subject, inter alia, environmentally induced migrant, environmental refugee and climate refugee. The term ‘climate refugee’ causes confusion because officially, according to international law, the term ‘refugee’ only refers to “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” (UN, 2010). This definition, introduced by the United Nations, stems from the Refugee Convention in 1951 and was last adapted in 1967 with the Protocol2. International law concerning refugees is thus ruled by this convention, but the world has changed quite a bit since 1967. This implicates that people fleeing their homes because of devastating environmental changes due to human-induced climate change cannot seek asylum under this universally accepted Convention. Moreover, many scholars and policy makers believe that adapting the Convention to include climate migrants could have negative geo-political implications3 (Adger, et al., 2014). Nonetheless, ‘climate refugee’ or ‘environmental
refugee’ often appear in academic literature as well as in the political debate. Initially these were used to draw attention to the issue (IOM, 2019). In the early 90’s, the contradictory term ‘environmental refugees’ was defined and used by Norman Myers as
2
The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees broadened the 1951 Convention, considering the Convention covered only those who became refugees as a result of events that occurred before January 1951. (UN, 2010)
3
The lack of global instruments to accommodate displaced peoples could have grave implications. (Adger, et al., 2014)
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(…) people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification and other environmental problems. In their desperation, they feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt. Not all of them have fled their countries; many are internally displaced. But all have abandoned their homelands on a semipermanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of a foreseeable return. (Myers, 1993, p. 752)
Myers applied this definition in his research and subsequently estimated the number of environmental refugees worldwide (Black R. , 2001).
However, many scholars have heavily criticized the use of confusing and legally meaningless terminology the likes of Myers’ definition. For these reasons, ‘climate migrant’ is a less problematic; although it has been argued that the word ‘migrant’ implies a degree of volition (Apap, 2019). Whether movement was voluntary and whether climate change was the primary cause for movement is often the focal point of the existing literature (Heslin et al., 2019). The categorization according to terminology and typology, makes this an incredibly complex phenomenon but its complexity should not be a mere matter of semantics. So, for the purposes of this dissertation, the term will be confined to The question of volatility has purposely been left out of this definition, as this is nearly impossible to determine. An important distinction that will shortly be addressed is the one between the climate migrant and the climate internally displaced person (hereinafter referred to as IDP)4. Even though the International Organization for Migration (hereinafter referred to as IOM) does not make a distinction between internal and cross-border migration (IOM, 2019), this distinction is crucial when it comes to the decision-making process in the international community. A climate IDP, similarly to the climate migrant, migrates due to changes in the environment but remains within their own state (Heslin et al., 2019). Climate change and internal displacement commonly go together. In contrast with the
4 Research often cites a third category of people; those who wish to move but do not have the means to do so, referred to as immobile or trapped populations (McLeman, 2018). They will not be discussed any further to keep research more confined. (1) cross-border migration, be it permanently or temporarily, because of (2) environmental changes (3) due to climate change which have affected the livelihood of those migrating.
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climate migrant, there is a clear definition that applies to the IDP and with that comes along plenty of data. In fact, data recovered by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre shows that the global majority of internal displacement is due to natural disasters (IDMC, 2018), and studies have pointed out that most movement due to climate change takes place within borders (Burzynski, 2018; Lonesco, 2019; IDMC, 2017). However, these proportions could change at a certain point when the effects of the current climate crisis aggravate internal climate displacement, but that is impossible to predict at this stage. Internal displacement often takes place in countries that are most vulnerable and least resilient to climate change (IDMC, 2017; IMF, 2017) but when movement remains within borders, the sense of shared global responsibility seems to be lacking. This could possibly explain the lack of incentives to create global policies regarding climate migrants. Even though there are international guidelines and treaties on IDP’s, it boils down to state sovereignty (Morel, 2010) and for this reason the climate IDP will be left out of the equation in this dissertation.
Because of the many different usages of terminology and typologies regarding climate migration, several scholars and research centers have used different estimates. As estimates are rough and unreliable, it is impossible to know how many climate migrants there are globally and how many there are to be expected in next decades. There is, however, a clear consensus that numbers will only increase as climate change continues to take its toll on the planet. The number of migrants is expected to be considerably higher than it was during the migration crisis of 2015, a crisis that stirred up a lot of fear, confusion and division. (Heslin et al., 2019; Karakitapoglu, Larsson, & Reuben, 2017; Weber, 2019) 2.2. Multicausality
The two focal points5 in research mentioned earlier are cause for great debate. Because of the
complexity of climate change, it is often hard to point out causality within climate migration research. Many cases demonstrate multicausality which makes it so that the environmental factor cannot be pointed out as the sole push-factor for movement (Abel, Brottrager, Cuaresma, & Muttarak, 2019). Some scholars believe the aspect of volatility is crucial in the categorization of migrants and refugees. However, because of multicausality, establishing the degree of volition becomes especially intricate. This forced-voluntary dichotomy has significant political and legal implications both on a global and a
5
Whether movement was voluntary and whether climate change was the primary cause for movement.
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local scale, which might explain the dispute regarding this particular distinction (Bivand Erdal & Oeppen, 2018; Klepp, 2017). For this reason, volatility was left out of the definition, mentioned earlier.An often-cited example of the multicausality of the climate-migration nexus is the Syrian conflict. Some scholars argue that this conflict, at its core, is in fact partly driven by climate change. Before the conflict, Syria experienced its worst drought recorded hitherto (Selby et al., 2017). Within this relatively new field of research in climate driven conflicts there is no consensus on whether there is a causal link between climate change and certain conflicts. However, the prevailing opinion has it that the Syrian conflict is, in part, a climate driven conflict. If we follow this logic, it would imply that the Syrian refugees, who formed the largest group in the European refugee crisis (European Commission, 2016), could be regarded as climate migrants as well. Despite the popularity of this theorem, research has not been able to come to a final conclusion, as there are multiple other factors involved (Abel et al., 2019). Scholars specialized in nexus dynamics6 have increasingly warned about the effects of
climate change on instable regions, such as the possibility of resource conflicts (Platform on disaster displacement, 2018). 2.2.1. Minimalists and maximalists The debate on multicausality has led to a division of scholars into two camps, or rather a spectrum, with on the one end the minimalists and on the other the maximalists (Klepp, 2017). The former also known as the skeptics and the latter as the alarmists. Minimalists tend to downplay the importance of the environmental factors and underline the complexity of the migration processes, in which several underlying factors are at play. Thus, the use of the term ‘climate migrant’ is heavily disputed by minimalist scholars. Whereas maximalists often focus on the environmental factors as the primary drivers of movement and assert causality. Fortunately, in recent years, more nuanced viewpoints have been applied to study the climate-migration nexus. This previously polarized debate could have severe implications, when influential over the policy-making process (Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020). However, although the scientific community has moved to the middle of the minimalist-maximalist spectrum, the majority within the international community seems to reside on the minimalist side of the spectrum still. A less nuanced position can lead to inaction or misinformed action, which could further hinder climate migrants in need of aid.
6 The dynamics between climate change, conflict and displacement are called nexus dynamics. (Platform on disaster displacement, 2018)
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2.3. Economics of climate migrationThere are several, crucial economic aspects to the climate migrant issue that should not be overlooked. A study executed by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) has shown that global warming has increased global economic inequality (Diffenbaugh & Burke, 2019). This increase results from the impact of warming on annual economic growth, which over the course of decades has accumulated robust and substantial declines in economic output in hotter, poorer countries—and increases in many cooler, wealthier countries—relative to a world without anthropogenic warming. (Diffenbaugh & Burke, 2019, p. 9808) On top of this, countries most affected or most likely to be affected by climate change are poorer, low-income countries and countries in areas with hot climates (IMF, 2017). These two often overlap, making a big part of the commonly named Global South most vulnerable to climate change. Yet, these are the countries that have contributed least to climate change. At the same time, these countries have less resources to adapt to climate change and often they are the most vulnerable in the global economic system. Therefore, those who have contributed least to global warming, suffer most (Azhar, 2017). This is also the case on a much smaller, local scale. People who have the means to, are the first to relocate, if they cannot adapt to their changing environment (Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020).
With regards to these issues, the climate justice movement has arisen. Amongst other causes, it advocates for bringing justice to climate victims. The climate justice movement also strives for accountability of the biggest net emitters (Bayes, 2018). Therefore, tackling the climate migrant issue is an important cause within the climate justice movement (Trent, 2018). Climate justice focuses on the undeniable social, ethical and economical dimensions regarding climate change. But as with most climate change concerns, it is very hard to assign responsibility, decide on accountability or who’s liable (Brugger, 2015). Nevertheless, some analysts believe that regulated cross-border climate migration could be considered as a necessary solution to the question of global redistributive justice as well as an important adaptive mechanism to climate change (IOM, 2008). For now, there is no structural capacity in the international system to provide adequate aid for climate migrants. Yet, most affected countries and populations do not have the means to adapt to their rapidly changing
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environment and so, migration occurs. For the most part, migration occurs within the borders of the home state or to neighboring countries (IMDC, 2017). Although the economic aspects to climate change and climate migration are critical, it has led many wealthy nations to mainly invest in local problem-solving strategies due to the lack of structural capacity in the international system. These solutions include development aid and investments in early warning systems as a part of risk and disaster reduction strategies. However, these solutions are insufficient and inadequate to resolve the issues surrounding climate migration, certainly with regards to the future. The often-employed economy focused strategies, therefore can have critical implications. (IOM, 2008)
2.3.1. Economic migrants
As environmental degradation is more likely to happen to already marginalized and vulnerable populations (Marino, 2012), climate migration can mistakenly be reduced to an overly simplified, economical issue in which the economical pull-factor outweighs the environmental push-factor. Climate migrants often follow traditional labor and economic routes and thus are regarded as economic migrants, with environmental factors being left out of the equation. These difficulties especially emerge in cases of movement from places where degradation happened due to slow-onset events (Black, 2001). In these cases, multiple causes for movement can be identified. Economic migration is a well-known phenomenon with a clear, concise definition7 and its own solutions.
However, these cannot substitute solutions to climate migration. Moreover, countries tend to be rather reluctant towards economic migrants (Helbling, 2019), thus misidentifying climate migrants as economic migrants, has important ramifications as they might not receive the necessary aid.
2.4. Recent developments
In recent years, the international community has taken incremental, but crucial steps nonetheless, in the process towards providing climate migrants the necessary help and protection. However, the progress that has been made, has primarily been focused on disaster-management. An example is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction that was signed in 2015. Since then, this UN framework has been used as the global blueprint in the aim at reducing the impacts of natural disasters
7
“
A person who leaves their country of origin purely for economic reasons that are not in any way related to the refugee definition, in order to seek material improvements in their livelihood.” (European Commission, n.d.)16
(Guadagno, 2016). Migration was addressed three different times in the final text of the Sendai Framework, which articulated their importance as a specific group of disaster risk reduction stakeholders. Another example of this narrow disaster-management focus, is the United Nations Climate Change Conference (hereinafter referred to as COP24) in Katowice, Poland, that took place between December 2nd and December 15th, 2018 (UNFCCC, 2018b). At the COP24, the Task Force on Displacement8 presented certain recommendations with the aim of helping countries that werecoping with displacement as a result of climate change. These recommendations such as, data collection and analysis for risk assessment and strengthening cooperation between countries were all aimed at protecting those affected within existing laws and framework and without exception, specific to natural disaster-induced migration (Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Executive Committee, 2018). Both these developments affect migrants worldwide and undoubtedly have crucial implications, such as improved climate resiliency, evacuation management and risk data collection. But there is a potential downside to this specific focus on disaster-management. That is, it could undermine the process towards protecting climate migration due to slow onset events. Despite the many issues addressed above, there has been a very recent, positive change in the matter, which could be seen as a possible first step towards an international framework. On December 10th and 11th, 2018, in Marrakesh, the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration took place. This Global Compact (also referred to as the UN migration pact) marked an important step forward in the international community because it is the first ever global agreement on a common approach to international migration. The UN migration pact is also of great significance to the climate migrant. It is the first comprehensive UN document in which the international community makes commitments to address climate change –natural disasters as well as slow onset events– as a driver for displacement. It also outlines ways for countries to cope with the affected communities. With this, though they cannot receive refugee status, the causal link between climate change and migration became irrefutable. (UN News, 2018; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018; Taylor, 2018; UNFCCC, 2018a)
8 The establishment of this taskforce was requested in 2015 at the Paris COP21, by some countries wanting to be prepared for the phenomenon that had remained absent from international conferences until 2010 in Cancún, when human mobility was addressed for the first time in the context of a climate conference. The taskforce was set up to work out recommendations to “avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”. (Nash, 2018; UNFCCC, 2017; UN News, 2018)
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Unfortunately, these accomplishments were partly overshadowed by the negative reactions of many far-right parties and movements worldwide (Cerulus & Schaart, 2019). This made several countries revise their view on a pact that had previously been uncontroversial. A possible explanation is that the Global Compact could give leeway to eventually adapt the UN refugee definition. This in turn, could lead to political opportunism, by including or excluding a much larger group of migrants that countries would have to take responsibility for (W.H., 2018). In reality however, this is very unlikely to happen. Eventually, 152 countries ended up approving the deal, 12 countries abstained and 5 countries voted against. Despite this and despite the migration pact being non-binding, this can be seen as a huge accomplishment. Though no international law or framework is being called for to better protect those affected, these milestones have made sure to move future dialogue further into a new redressing process. With numbers increasing and affected countries reaching their limits, the likelihood of cross-border migration increases. The existing initiatives are insufficient in aiding all climate migrants, with a narrow and local focus on risk and disaster-management. Thus, research will have to further prove the importance of a more comprehensive legal framework for all climate migrants. Binding international legislation would ensure their safety and make sure there is no discrimination9 based on gender, age,religion and so on. Clear international legislation has the potential of putting an end to the exacerbation of inequalities in already vulnerable areas and make sure its communities are protected. (Azhar, 2017; Heslin et al., 2019)
2.5. Security approach
The economic approach and local problem-solving measures are telling on how climate migration is treated within the international community. Very often, the issue, similarly to climate change, is treated as a security threat, rather than a human security issue. The securitization of the issue has an important implication, because climate migration, when discussed as a threat multiplier, is no longer a human-centered issue and therefore, neither will the solutions. (Boas, et al., 2019; Klepp, 2017; Klepp & Fröhlich, 2020)
9 Some countries have gotten very selective in choosing who they grant permission to stay. (Ahzar, 2017)
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A term often used to address the declining humanitarian situation caused by climate change that eventually leads to migration, is secondary impact (Butler & Harley, 2010). A clear example of this secondary impact is the continuously declining health of the population in the most affected countries. This often goes together with economic factors as well as governance factors (Trent, 2018). One could question both the cause and whether movement would be voluntary in this case. Nonetheless, the humanitarian impact of climate change is extensive and indisputable. (Abel et al., 2019; Butler & Harley, 2010; Morel, 2011; Selby, Dahi, Fröhlich, & Hulme, 2017)
When migration occurs, in case of big surges of cross-border migration, refugee camps are often the first solution (Heslin et al., 2019). They are made for asylum seekers awaiting their process to be granted refugee status and are above all supposed to be a temporary solution. Because of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, countries feel pressured to respond to mass displacement and they often do so by setting up camps. Political expediency plays an important role in situations like these. “The refugee camp thus arises out of the juxtaposition of the international pressure to act charitably towards those in need and a state’s inclination to keep “space and distance” from the refugees themselves.” (Heslin et al., 2019, p. 244). The climate migrant cannot claim political asylum, which means unless they can claim asylum on other grounds, they have nowhere else to go. This space and distance that is mentioned, points to the need for a country to create a “safe” environment, not for the migrants but its own citizens first. Though the issue affects many aspects of the migrant’s life, the security threat approach, discards the critically important humanity to the issue. However, this type of thinking is not limited to the international community. Many studies and scholars in the scientific community have taken on this approach within climate migration research (Klepp & Fröhlich, 2020). Approaching climate change and therefore climate migration as a security issue, as mainly done by the Global North (Klepp, 2017), has repercussions for policy-making and many climate migrant’s lives.
2.6. Migration in politics
Though international commitments with regard to migration remain strong (Klaus & Pachocka, 2019), the controversy surrounding the Global Compact, mentioned in section 2.4., sheds light on the current political context in which the broader migration debate is being held. Moreover, examining this political climate, could help to better understand the standstill in the international community regarding climate migration. In recent years, there has been a noticeable shift towards nationalism
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and nativism (Bieber, 2018). This has created a political climate that is rather hostile towards migrants. As radical right populist parties gained popularity, existing migration policies and humanitarian assistance increasingly came under fire. Therefore, migration has been the hot topic that has been deciding election outcomes and has been a polarizing factor in many societies all over the world. From the nativist perspective, immigration threatens the nation state and its identity (Lutz, 2019). This anti-migrant sentiment has gone hand in hand with a heavy securitization of the issue as well, with selectivity of immigrant admissions as a result. Data has shown that European states for example prefer to admit skilled populations as they presumably would assimilate better (Blitz, 2017). Interestingly, these sentiments are not particular to Europe or the United States, countries, inter alia, Russia, Japan, Brazil, Australia and Israel have faced this similar trend (Bar-On, 2018). In short, this hostile climate that has resulted in securitization and selectivity, has dominated the migration debate worldwide and subsequently jeopardized migrant’s rights. There is another peculiar and unexplored discourse regarding migration with a nativist perspective (Harris, 2017). This baseless discourse however, explores the causal relation between migration and environmental degradation, stating that immigrants cause environmental disruption and should therefore be kept outside of borders. This discourse originates from the colonial period in the United States10. Though it has lost its popularity since then, this discourse has reappeared from time to time, voicing concerns over overpopulation on environmentalist grounds (Del Valle, 2018). Though the need to disguise nativist ideas with environmental claims has become less relevant, with the normalization of the anti-migrant sentiment, the link between anti-migrant politics and environmentalism remains eminent. With this recent trend, in an attempt to sway voters, right-wing anti-migrant political groups or parties indulge in their fair share of “green” proposals to make their less inclusive ideas easier to take in. This could explain a possible discrepancy in attitudes towards climate change and attitudes towards climate migrants. The broad migration discussion has caused for controversy in which the notion of nuance is often lost. In this context, climate migration has become part of a greater discussion and in a sense lost its momentum. Nevertheless, the climate migration discussion is one to be had, as climate migrants are continuously exposed and vulnerable in an international system that refuses to recognize the need10 The idea was that America’s natural beauty, the flora, fauna and human race, should stay preserved and protected from outside “infestations”, referring to immigrants. (Del Valle, 2018)
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for a protective framework. The sensitivity of the general migration debate could be an indication of the long process that is ahead for climate migrants. 2.7. Public attitudesThe surge in extreme right-wing nationalism and anti-migrant sentiments as mentioned in the previous section, implies a similar trend in public attitudes, as electoral outcomes are often used as a measure for public attitudes. However, the literature relating to public attitudes and anti-migrant sentiments has suggested the opposite. The Refugee Welcome Index created by Amnesty International for example points to rather hospitable attitudes. This study measured levels of acceptance towards migrants through surveys in 27 countries worldwide, based on 27000 participants and found that 66% of the respondents (globally) believed governments should do more to help refugees (GlobeScan, 2016). Moreover, globally, only 17% of the respondents would refuse refugees entry to their country. This study shows a clear discord in public attitudes towards the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and official policies regarding asylum and humanitarian assistance (Blitz, 2017). However, when taking a quick look at the survey, the social desirability bias could have been quite high, seeing that the questions were very explicitly about hospitability towards refugee; a sensitive topic. Moreover, there were several other limitations to the survey, one of which was the geographical coverage. As Blitz states: “(…) although Amnesty International used a representative sample, the survey may appear biased in favor of contact with refugee and immigrant populations.” (Blitz, 2017, p. 388)
Nonetheless, more reliable research such as assessments based on the European Social Survey as well as the Pew Research Center have come to similar conclusions, also indicating a disjunction between public attitudes and current local immigration policies (Blitz, 2017). Thusfar, the international community has not made enough efforts to halt further discordance, leading to question the democratic character not only of local governments but also that of global governing. This could indicate a similar trend with regard to climate migration.
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3. Research problem
As the literature review has demonstrated there are still many gaps to be filled with regard to climate migrants and the phenomenon of climate migration itself. One of the biggest issue is the shortfall in data, which is a direct result of the lack in consensus on terminology and typology, leading the international community into a downwards spiral towards immobility. Ultimately, the reductive manner in which the issue has been framed has led to solutions inapt to deal with the worsening circumstances. In order to avoid a humanitarian crisis, caused by the current climate crisis, the international community will have to find a way to overcome these difficulties and bring the issue forward through a new approach, which does not focus solely on certain specific aspects. The earlier findings of my bachelor’s dissertation have helped navigate through the discourses in international politics with regard to climate migration. To better understand the current standstill in the international community, taking a new approach to research could not only be helpful but necessary. Therefore, insights into public attitudes towards this often misunderstood phenomenon could be useful to gain new perspectives into its possible solutions and the way in which it has been misrepresented by the international community. Assessing public attitudes, could help to critically analyze and scrutinize the international community’s current stance on the issue. It could do so by indicating whether this stance has broad social support or whether there might be other political or institutional factors at play that impede effective solution-oriented thinking in the international community. Additionally, it could help better understand if and how public attitudes are affected by the different and sometimes misinformed positions that actors within the international community have taken on, as a result of attribute framing.11 The definition that will be applied for this dissertation is the widely accepted definition for attitudes by Eagly and Haiken (1993). The existing literature regarding the climate-migration nexus has proven to be incomplete and lacking new perspectives. The constant focus on jurisprudence, terminology or causality, though important, could lead to unfruitful debate and inaction. For this reason, assessing public attitudes regarding a11
“ (…) the process of highlighting some particular aspect, or attribute, of the target object or issue.” (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010, p. 657)
“ (…) a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1)
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subject that is mostly discussed within either the academic or policy context, could offer new insights. So far, there has been very little research regarding climate migration and public attitudes, thus the following analysis will be of great scientific relevance, filling in one of the many gaps in current research. Furthermore, assessing and analyzing public attitudes concerning an imminent problem with grave global social repercussions, is of social relevance as well. Scrutinizing the democratic governing of the international community as well as the way in which they respond to or rather influence public attitudes is critically relevant. Moreover, this dissertation could help better understand why this issue is not of greater public concern and examine the possible causes.4. Hypotheses
From analyzing public attitudes, the opportunity arises to assess how and if they change when presented with different information or rather a change in framing. As climate migration is mainly discussed in the political or scientific context, public attitudes regarding climate migration are arguably subject to the effects of framing, when assessed. However, research regarding these effects thusfar has not been conclusive (Bütler & Maréchal, 2007; Druckman, 2001), therefore this dissertation will take on an inductive approach. Using the following two hypotheses, this dissertation will attempt at assessing how and if public attitudes are affected.
H1: Reducing the climate migrant issue to an economic issue affects public attitudes towards climate migrants. H2: Oversimplifying the climate migrant issue with a narrow risk and disaster-management based approach affects public attitudes towards climate migrants. As pointed out in the literature review, one of the major issues that arises is the oversimplification of the climate migrant issue, as a result of attribute framing. The issue is reduced to a certain type of climate migration without taking into account the many elements that influence the decision to migrate. The first hypothesis, tests how the economic focus on the issue –both on the climate migrant is regarded and the economical solutions– affects how the issue is perceived. The second hypothesis tests how the oversimplification of the climate migrant issue as a disaster-management issue affects public attitudes towards the issue. The assumption for these hypotheses is that the reductive frames will affect public attitudes in a similar way, expecting coherence in attitudes with regard to the simplistic approaches. The two hypotheses will be tested and discussed alongside the research section of this dissertation.
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5. Methodology
5.1. Experimental design Measuring public attitudes can be done through several types of methods; for this dissertation, it will done by applying experimental designs. Experimental methods in political science have become increasingly popular because they offer many new possibilities compared to older observational methods. Experimental design lends itself perfectly for attitude measuring specifically for sensitive matters and wording or framing. Therefore, experiments are an obvious choice for this analysis that is set out to assess attitudes regarding a rather sensitive topic additionally to the role of framing. (Holbrook, 2011) The main trait of experimental design is purposefully manipulating elements that intervene in the data generating process. Parts of the process are manipulated so that they no longer naturally occur and are set by the experimenter. Through the elaborate set-up of experiments, confounding factors, or factors that may interfere with the manipulations, can be kept under control. Confounding factors can either be observable or unobservable depending on the circumstances of the manipulation and the target population. Confounding factors can be made observable in an experimental context in which the possibility of interference is controlled for. In experimental design, controlling confounding variables is often done by comparing experimental results to outcomes in which manipulations do not occur, but all other observable conditions are identical. This way, through precise methodological control, causal relationships can be identified. (Morton & Williams, 2010)
Both hypotheses are aimed at identifying causal effects. Older observational methods often measure correlation but fail to measure causation. These fallacies in observational design are circumvented in experiments to test hypotheses about attitude change. Aside from the first crucial element of manipulating the independent variable (e.g. the information provided), there is a necessary element for experimental design, namely random assignment. Random assignment of respondents to conditions (e.g. levels of the independent variable) is crucial to this design specifically because it solves two problems. The first is the problem of reverse causality. As explained above, by manipulating the independent variable, the cause and effect can be identified. The only difference across conditions is the independent variable, which provides a level of certainty, as changes in the dependent variable can be traced back to the differences in the independent variable. Moreover, random assignment solves a second problem, that of the omitted variable bias. Most issues, including that of framing, are
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the result of complex social interactions, in which many different variables can play a role. However, it is virtually impossible to include countless variables into the analysis. With experiments, the researcher decides which conditions go into the control group and which go into the treatment groups, therefore other variables cannot influence random assignment and the groups become comparable. The groups are then perfectly similar on all relevant variables. (Bol, 2019; Holbrook, 2011) Another advantage to experimental designs, is that there is a wide variety of experiments, suitable for different analyses. The particular type that is well-suited for this analysis is a post-test-only control group design. In such a design, respondents are randomly assigned to either the control condition or one of the experimental conditions. Subsequently, attitudes of these different groups are measured and compared. The idea of this experiment is that by making participants respond to variations in issue framing, the effects of framing could be identified. In other words, I will be conducting experiments in which I will be presenting the respondents with a certain scenario that implicitly refers to the subject of climate migration. The scenario’s will differ depending on the condition the respondent is randomly assigned to. The reason the issue will not be explicitly explained is that experimental design is a great tool to measure attitudes towards a politically sensitive issue such as migrants. Implicit attitude testing minimizes the social desirability bias. (Holbrook, 2011)
The purpose of applying experimental methods is to connect micro-level findings to macro-level theories or to work inductively (Bol, 2019). As mentioned, the following analysis will focus on the latter by using micro-level findings to critically analyze how these findings in possible attitude change relate to stances in the international community.
5.1.1. Methodological weaknesses
Aside from the many advantages experimental methods offer for studying attitude change and formation, there are a few weaknesses that should be taken into consideration when applying this design. The fundamental weakness to this design relates to external validity. This weakness arises from its distinctive feature of manipulating the data generating process. The artificiality of experiments vastly increases the internal validity, but at the same time this increases the deviation from real-life situations in which the independent variable naturally occurs and is not arbitrarily assigned. Experiments typically deviate from real world attitude formation as it happens in a much shorter time span. As such, attitude change studied in the context of experiments, may not reflect the
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actual processes that would naturally occur, which affects the ecological validity12 of the experiment. In short, experiments may not reflect real-world processes and thus show what can occur instead of what does occur. A second concern that arises when applying experimental methods, is the unobservable confounding factors. Though many confounding factors can be made observable through meticulous design, it can remain unfeasible for some factors to be observed with confidence. An example of such an unobservable confounding factor is the mood of the respondent and its impact on how the respondent receives the information. Lastly, there is the problem of reproducibility. This issue arises with most qualitative analyses and it is no different for experimental designs. (Bol, 2019; Holbrook, 2011; Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010; Morton & Williams, 2010) 5.2. SurveysAside from design, there is another classification for experiments, based on the location of the experiment (Morton & Williams, 2010). Experiments can take on many different forms, depending on the context in which they take place. Laboratory experiments13 are a preferred method as they allow
for more control over confounding factors. Other favored types are survey experiments and field experiments. The post-test-only control group design for this analysis, mentioned earlier, will be applied by conducting survey experiments. Compared to laboratory experiments, online survey experiments allow for less methodological control as they cannot easily measure interference from confounding factors. Nonetheless, online survey experiments can test a larger number of respondents and during a global pandemic this is an optimal and viable solution. 5.2.1. The Namibian case For the survey set-up, three scenarios were created, all based on the same hypothetical case. The scenarios differ, depending on the hypothesis they test. The hypothetical case, the case of a Namibian farmer named Isra, was based on the current environmental state of Namibia as well as the efforts of the international community with regards to this situation. Namibia has been classified as one of the countries most vulnerable to natural hazards and climate change (UNU-EHS, 2016). Namibia faces countless droughts and floods and this situation is
12 Ecological validity is a sub-category of external validity that is related to the representativeness of everyday life. (Holbrook, 2011)
13 Subjects are recruited to a common physical location (a laboratory) and the subjects engage in behavior under a researcher’s direction at that location. (Morton & Williams, 2010)
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continuously aggravated by the impacts of climate change (IOM, 2018). Therefore, the country is exposed to significant threats to the livelihood of its communities and its overall development. Furthermore, the livelihood of Namibia’s rural communities is heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture14 and many face food insecurity. In 2019, the Namibian president declared a state ofemergency due to the extreme drought the country was facing (Harrisberg, 2020). As Namibia is currently the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa, the loss of livelihoods is immense and one of its direct result is migration. (IOM, 2018)
At the national level, legislation, programs and management plans have been set up to help deal with the risks and impacts Namibia faces (Directorate Disaster Risk Management, 2011). The Disaster Risk Management Act of 2012, National Disaster Risk Management Policy and the National Policy on Climate Change of 2011 are all a part of Namibia’s adaption strategy. A 2018 report by the IOM assessed Namibia’s existing policy framework and its ability to address the issues mentioned above. The country’s National Disaster Risk Management Plan was designed with the technical and financial help of several UN agencies, but the entire document does not mention climate migration, nor migration in general for that matter (Directorate Disaster Risk Management, 2011). Namibia also receives help from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (hereinafter referred to as UNDRR)15. The UNDRR acts to implement the Sendai Framework (mentioned in section 2.4.), which
gives an idea of the prioritization of the international community in badly affected and struggling countries. Regarding climate migration and the local policy framework, the biggest issue seems to be the lack of data. Consequently, crucial environmental factors are not captured nor taken into account within the country’s policy framework. As the IOM report states: “the climate change policy is not explicit on environmental migration and the associated impacts thereof.” (IOM, 2018). A recent article that appeared on the Knowledge Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction of the UNDRR describes how the currently existing policy framework has failed many Namibians seeking refuge in the cities: As rural Namibians move to cities to escape the worst drought in nearly a century, many find themselves navigating a no-man's land between over-saturated slums and the parched farmland they hope to one day return to, say activists and aid officials. (Harrisberg, 2020)
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Agriculture with the principal purpose of providing for yourself and your family.
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Unfortunately, the many efforts in mitigating the climate crisis in Namibia failed to take into account climate migrants and thus have proven to be insufficient. 5.2.2. ConditionsDepending on the condition one is randomly assigned to, the respondent receives one of three scenarios that they will have to asses. The questions afterwards are the same for each respondent, regardless of which condition they are assigned to. Each scenario, though based on the same Namibian case, provides distinct information that prioritizes a different message to the reader. The first condition is that of the control group, in which the respondents get the most accurate information available without explicitly mentioning climate migration (see Appendix I). The second condition is that of the first treatment groups and is designed to test the first hypothesis (see Appendix II). The information that is provided communicates a different message to the respondent than reality would. The third and last condition is for the second treatment group and is designed to test the second hypothesis. The information provided goes along the lines of the international community’s stance in which local problem-solving and disaster-management are prioritized (see Appendix III). For both treatments, the information provided was rather selective. Notice how both treatments groups explicitly mention European financial aid. The European Union has been working closely with the UNDRR with the aim of building African countries’ capacity in disaster risk reduction mainstreaming, also in Namibia (UNDRR, 2020). This element is in accord with the inaccurate economic focus that has been discussed in the literature review as well as the focus on local problem-solving. 5.2.3. Survey questions After receiving and reading the case information, the respondents fill in a series of questions (see appendix IV). These survey questions implicitly examine the respondent’s attitude towards the climate migration issue, by asking them to list preferences and make certain choices. Though preferences and choices are both distinct from attitudes, they are heavily influenced by it (Holbrook, 2011). Moreover, the indirect way in which the questions assess attitudes, minimizes the social desirability bias. The first sets of questions are set up to assess certain aspects with regard to climate migration such as responsibility, climate justice, development aid and its remedial potential and climate change as a push factor for migration. These are some of the subjects that are still heavily debated within the scientific community. Some subjects are referred to more than once; asking similar questions can help assess the consistency in the responses of each treatment group. Additionally to these questions,
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there are two questions set up to test whether the respondent has read the case carefully; also referred to as manipulation checks. For the respondents that failed the manipulation checks, a robustness check will determine whether the responses deviated too far from the responses of respondents who did pass the manipulation checks.
At the end, the respondent will also be asked to fill in more personal questions that focus on specific socio-demographic factors that could potentially affect the respondent’s attitude towards the issue. Confounding factors such as ideological orientation, educational background and prior knowledge regarding the issue have been made observable by asking the respondent to answer these explicitly. This way, the possible interference of these confounding factors is controlled. Additionally, these socio-demographic features are highly important to assess whether randomization was well-executed. 5.2.4. Sample The subjects for this experiment are university students, more specifically students enrolled at Ghent University. For this analysis, a sample of Ghent University students, is a more realistic and convenient option. However, using a homogeneous16 convenience sample has some important implications. First,
a homogenous sample doesn’t necessarily reflect the heterogeneity of society that a pool of professional subjects might better reflect. Moreover, students are typically in a phase of late adulthood in which they are specifically susceptible to persuasion; this is a second concern about the use of student pools. Nonetheless, having a large subject pool that is relatively homogeneous means that this subject pool automatically refreshes over time while maintaining this relative homogeneity. Because of its practicality, many researchers have made use of large student samples. This increases the comparability of experiments conducted across researchers, to the extent that university students may be similar at different institutions of higher education. Furthermore, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable in this case should not be met with interference by the age of the sample. (Druckman & Kam, 2011; Holbrook, 2011; Morton & Williams, 2010)
To be able to conduct a meaningful statistical analysis, there should be a minimum number of respondents per treatment. However, for a small-scale study the likes of this one, the minimum
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A college student sample tends to be more homogenous in terms of several factors such as socioeconomic status, education, age, and often race and ethnicity. (Holbrook, 2011)
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number will be lower, at approximatly 50 respondents per treatment. Therefore, the survey requires a minimum of 150 respondents in total. 5.3. Ethics and General Data Protection RegulationBecause of its manipulative nature, ethics are a critical aspect to experiments. Most experiments involve some form of deception (Bol, 2019), as does this experiment in which the respondents are unknowingly deceived by being misinformed. However, some form of deception is necessary as to ensure that subjects cannot guess the hypotheses that are under investigation (McDermott, 2002). As the subjects are presumably Belgian, the case was tailored to better fit their frame of reference. Although the likelihood of a Namibian climate migrant, migrating to Europe is currently still low, this makes the case more relatable to the subjects and allows them to form an opinion more easily. Moreover, existing climate migration patterns are aggravated by the climate crisis which makes this hypothetical case even more likely to come true in the future. Respondents are also made aware that this is a hypothetical case, yet the issue of deception should be acknowledged. For this reason, the level of deception is kept at a minimum during the experiment. Before starting the survey, the respondents received the necessary information including a guaranty for total anonymity. To assure the respondents’ protection, the survey was completely anonymous. The respondents, however, were given the opportunity at the end of the survey to insert their email address to receive the results of the analysis, if they wished. Here, the respondent was given an informed indication as to how this personal data will be processed (see Appendix IV) and therefore adhered to the General Data Protection Regulation17 (hereinafter referred to as GDPR). The GDPR
does not concern the processing of anonymous information (General Data Protection Regulation, 2016) and therefore was not relevant with regard to the other parts of the survey.
