Media logic for elite versus anti-elite parties in Dutch
talkshows during the campaign for the general
elections of 2017
Anique Gijsberts (10353445) Master’s Thesis
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s programme Communication Science University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Marjolein Moorman June 30, 2017
Abstract
An often heard complaint of anti-elite politicians is that they are not treated the same as elite
parties. This research tests whether this is a legitimate accusation or not.That’s why the
following question is central: How is media logic visible for elite vs. anti-elite parties in the
run up to the Dutch general elections of 2017 in the major talkshows? Media logic is divided into ‘control over form’ and ‘control over content’. Control over form includes the variables ‘reaction time’, ‘interrupting comments’ and ‘question type’, and ’control over content’ includes personalisation, horse race and negativity. A quantitative content analysis is
conducted in which comments made by talkshow hosts to politicians are coded (N=615).
From the results, no clear conclusion can be drawn, but some differences in media logic for
anti-elite parties and elite parties are found. This lays a foundation for further research to find
out why media logic is different for anti-elite parties and elite parties.
Keywords
Introduction
In the run up to the Dutch general elections of 2017, the hosts of several talkshows on
television were criticised by a vast number of anti-elite parties. For instance, Jan Roos, leader
of Voor Nederland (VNL), said after his interview with Pauw & Jinek that ‘if you are a right
wing politician, you have a problem in the Netherlands’, Geert Wilders from the Partij voor
de Vrijheid (PVV) never showed up in Nieuwsuur because ‘he didn’t like it’, and Thierry
Baudet of Forum voor Democratie (FvD) and Tunahan Kuzu, leader of DENK, both criticized
the Dutch media multiple times for being biased. In addition to this, an often heard complaint
is that parties which don’t belong to the party elite of old, (often) big, established parties, are
not treated the same as other parties. One has to only think of the recent discussions on the
media and the content of the media as ‘fake’, ‘left wing hate media’1 and being ‘a mouthpiece’ of the ‘elite’2
.
This mistrust is shared by a lot of followers of the anti-elite parties, and goes often
hand in hand with a low trust in the government (Lee, 2010). On Twitter, Facebook and other
public platforms there is a lot of support for this anti-media rhetoric. The discussion further
fuelled by the ongoing flow of anti-media and anti-establishment messages of politicians
through Twitter and in interviews, but can that mistrust be substantiated? We already know
that the media have an influence on what is considered important by the public and the way
different issues are framed (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Is there scientific prove that
legitimizes this distrust in the media by anti-establishment politicians, or does their claim
against the media just turn out to be an easy way for a party to put itself in the underdog
position? One way to see if the trust issues with the media can be substantiated, is to find out
1 From http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/27788708/__Wilders_haalt_uit_naar__haatmedia___.html
2
From http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/len-mccluskey-jeremy-corbyn-media-bias-corporate-mouthpiece-establishment-labour-conference-latest-a7329196.html
if the anti-elite parties have a point; are anti-elite parties actually treated differently by the
media?
A way to test this, would be to look at media logic. This is part of the process of
mediatisation; a process in which politics becomes more dependent on the rules of the media
(Strömbäck, 2008). In the final stage of mediatisation, media logic determines how issues are
portrayed in the media. This can be looked at from the side of the politician, in which he or
she adjusts to the demands of media logic, but also from the side of the media. In this thesis, I
will look at this side of media logic, also called media interventionism. This describes the
ways in which media can intervene, without defining if this happens consciously or
subconsciously. Media interventionism is divided into ‘control over form’ and ‘control over content’ (Voltmer & Brants, 2011). Media logic through control over form happens by
influencing the form of, in this case, an interview in a talkshows. This happens by influencing
reaction time, the type of comment or by interruptions. Media logic through control over
content happens by influencing the content of a conversation, by asking things that fit within
media logic. To see if elite parties are treated differently than anti-elite parties, I will compare
how media logic is applied for both party types.
This is relevant, as television still is an important medium for people for finding
information about politics. Although the media landscape is changing rapidly and online
media make television seem somewhat outdated, television still has a substantial share in the
media landscape and media routines of lots of its citizens. It is the most important source for
news according to Papathanassopoulos et al. (2013), but a development can be seen in which
especially young people are adopting other media in their routine of news gathering.
However, also for young people television is still an important medium to gain knowledge of
Looking back at the declining trust in the media and anti-media rhetoric becoming
more present in the current political discourse and the public sphere, it is important to see if
the accusations of anti-elite parties are legitimate. Although this research does not aim to
assess whether the content that is produced by the media can be trusted, it aims to say
something about the presence or absence of differences in attention for different party types.
To be able to say something about what drives this media logic, one first needs to have
a clear overview of the presence of media logic in the media. The research aims to make a
contribution to this understanding. This is important, as a clear overview of how media logic
works for different party types lays a foundation for further research in understanding what
effects explain media logic and what journalistic choices lie behind it. Therefore, in this
thesis, a division will be made between parties with a strong anti-establishment rhetoric and
parties that belong to the establishment.This has been done for a lot of news programs
(Voltmer & Brants, 2011), but not for political interviews in talkshows.
As parties are especially visible during election time when they are campaigning, this
research focuses on the way politicians are approached by interviewers in talkshow interviews
in the three weeks prior to Dutch general elections of 2017 and whether the presence of media
logic is different for those parties. I will look at interviews with politicians in the commercial,
late night talkshow RTL Late Night and Pauw en Jinek, a talkshow on the Dutch public
broadcasting channel in which two important late night talk show hosts of the public
broadcaster host a show that is specially produced for the elections, a few weeks before the
elections. That’s why the following question is central:
How is media logic visible for elite vs. anti-elite parties in the run up to the Dutch general elections of 2017 in the major talkshows?
Theoretical framework
The aim of this theoretical framework is to give an oversight of what is already known in the
literature about the different factors in the main research question; media logic and
differences between parties. This theoretical framework is structured as follows: first I will
give a common definition of media logic. Then I will elaborate on how media logic can be
studied. Within this framework, I explain the process of media interventionism by dividing it
into two parts; influence on form and influence on content. Finally, I explain how anti-elite
parties are defined. This section ends with two specific research questions.
Media logic
The process in which media and politics interact is a highly studied relationship in which the
logic that the media applies, or the way media present political reality, constantly changes.
Media first acted according to partisan logic, as a mouthpiece for political parties, but this role
changed to a public logic where as a result of depillarisation, professionalisation of the media
gained momentum and public broadcasters dominated the television landscape. The last phase
is a media logic that is characterized by commercial channels, the decline of newspapers and a
poll-driven style of reporting (Brants and Van Praag, 2006). This media logic is also seen as
the last of four phases of mediatisation, a societal process in which politics becomes more
dependent on media and in the end completely adjusts to the logic of the media (Strömbäck,
2008; 2011). Media logic is defined by Strömbäck (2008) as “the news values and the
storytelling techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its
format, and to be competitive in the ongoing struggle to capture people’s attention”
(Strömbäck, 2008; pp. 233). In this context, media logic has been studied in various ways.
First, research looks at the way politicians adapt to media logic, by following the laws of the
logic only. For instance, research to soundbites looks at the way politicians use one-liners that
enhance the chance of being covered in the media (Esser, 2013), by making short statements
that fit in the short and simple style of reporting, or by addressing issues in a way that is
interesting for the media. Although Hallin (1992) concludes that this proves a more
journalist-driven style of reporting, it still looks at the side of media logic in which the politician adjusts
him or herself to the logic of the media. Research on how media coverage of politics is
influenced by media logic without taking into account the intention of a politician is more
scarce. This process is described by Strömbäck (2008) ‘media interventionism’.
In this research, I will look at the media interventionism side of media logic. By
looking at this side of media logic, one can really say something about the influence that
journalists have on the process of information gathering, regardless of how politicians act.
A way to explain media interventionism is to look closer at the journalistic role
conceptions. Plaisance and Skewes (2003) sum up three main role conceptions of journalists:
the disseminator; which describes the role of getting information to a public that is as broad as
possible and as quick as possible. The adversarial role conception stands for the journalist as
an adversarial of public people like business people and politicians. The interpretive function
stands for an analyzing style of reporting in which the journalists gives context and
clarifications for complex problems like new laws and (international) developments. Beam,
Weaver and Brownlee (2009) add the populist mobilizer role to this list, which stands for a
function in which ‘normal people’ get the chance to express an opinion and to be involved in
decision-making processes. Those different role conceptions are not mutually exclusive and
can form an explanation for the presence (or absence) of journalistic voice and input
(Mellado, 2015).
As stated earlier, this research will look at media logic from the perspective of media
control over time and control over content (Voltmer & Brants, 2011). In the next section, the
division between both types of control will be explained further.
Influence on form
Interviewers can apply media logic by influencing the form of an interview with politicians in
various ways. The different intervention techniques that are studied in this research are type
of comment, interrupting comments and the time a politician gets to answer to the comment.
Firstly, journalists can influence the amount of pressure they put on a politician to
explain his or her answers by adjusting his or her comments. For instance, the type of
comment the interviewer uses determines how much room a politician has to answer to a comment. If it is a closed question, a yes or no answer is required which makes it much more
difficult for a politician to prove his or her point and keeps the power of the conversation on
the side of the journalist (Voltmer & Brants, 2011).
Another indicator of influence on form is whether the politician is interrupted or not,
or as Stamper and Brants (2011) call it; turn-taking. They looked at the process of turn-taking,
described as “the main mechanism through which the exchange between interviewer and
interviewee is organized” (pp. 133). This can happen in a natural way (‘natural turn-taking’)
or through interruption. Within interruptions, the division between successful and
unsuccessful interruptions can be made. An interruption is successful when the interviewer
manages to take over control over the interview. When the politician retains control, the
interruption is considered unsuccessful. In this research, only successful interruptions are
counted, as this has the consequence of taking control, in contrast to unsuccessful turn-taking.
The last indicator of influence on the form of an interview is the time a politician gets
to answer to a comment the interviewer made. When a politician is given more time to
her electorate to hear about and can frame an issue in a way that is beneficial for him, her or
the party (Voltmer & Brants, 2011).
Influence on content
Besides controlling the form of an interview, interviewers can also control the content of the
comments made in an interview. According to Strömbäck, for instance, (news) media apply
their logic by using a game frame and/or horse race coverage. Zeh and Hopman (2013) add to
this, next to horse race coverage, with personalisation, visualisation and negative coverage. In
addition to this research, Takens et al. (2013) conclude that the combination of three
indicators, namely negative coverage, personalisation and contest coverage explain one single
media logic (also underlined by Broersma, Den Herder & Schohaus, 2013). In this research,
personalisation, contest coverage and negativity are studied as a part of media logic. Focusing
on (one of) those aspects fit into media logic for different reasons. One of the explanations is
that it corresponds with some of the traditional news values of Galtung and Ruge (1965).
They argue that stories get more attention when they fit into one of the news value categories.
The fact that journalism takes news values into account, says something about the shift from a
descriptive style of journalism to an interpretative style of journalism (Brants & Van Praag,
2006; Voltmer & Brants, 2011), in which there is a place for the interpretations of the
journalist (consciously or subconsciously). By following an interpretative style of journalism,
journalists follow the media logic by focusing on mass audiences. That’s why media logic
often goes hand in hand with a more populist way of reporting in talkshows (Blumler &
Kavanagh, 1999; Blumler, 2001) where the opinions of ‘normal’ men and women are voiced
and people can join the show in the audience.
The usage of personalisation, negative coverage and horse race coverage is a way to
negative effect is found for negative coverage of political news on political trust
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006), and critics of media logic argue that media logic can have a
negative effect on political interest, political knowledge and an informed electorate (Esser,
2013).
Personalisation is seen as part of media logic because it indicates a more entertainment-driven style of reporting. By focussing (partly) on the person behind the
politician, issues that the politician stands for receive less attention. Personalisation is
researched in different ways within the context of media logic. Some focus more on “the
visibility of top-ranked politicians versus other lower ranked politicians” (Zeh & Hopman,
2013, pp. 229) and the “proportion of news stories with prime minister candidates” (Zeh &
Hopman, 2013, pp. 231). This research looks at a more substantive aspect of personalisation
like Van Santen & Van Zoonen (2009; 2010) do. They argue that personalisation is more than
looking at an increased attention for politicians instead of the political parties they represent.
They distinguish different types of personalisation of which three types can be seen in the
political communication field, looking at from the perspective of the media: an increased
focus on professional qualities of the politician (individualisation), an increased focus on
private persona of a politician (privatisation) and an increased focus on personal emotions of a
politician (emotionalisation).
Another indicator of influence on the content of an interview is horse race coverage, a
type of coverage about the contest between two or more leading parties. With horse race
coverage, the focus is more on the game element of elections (who is winning or losing) at the
cost of substantial questions and content. It is part of the game frame (Aalberg, Strömbäck &
De Vreese, 2011), which refers to “news stories that portray politics as a game and are
centered around: who is winning or losing elections, in the battle for public opinion, in
approval or disapproval from interest groups or particular constituencies or publics; or that
speculate about electoral or policy outcomes or potential coalitions” (Aalberg, Strömbäck &
De Vreese, 2011, pp. 172).
Closely related to contest coverage is negative coverage, as contest coverage can be
brought in a positive way or a negative way. Negativity is part of media logic as it is
“eye-catching, adds drama, stimulates interest and is easy to understand even by uninformed audiences” (Lengauer et al., 2012, pp. 182). Takens et al. (2013) define negativity it as the mean of the positive or negative directions of contest coverage. Subsequently, with the rise in
contest coverage in several countries, also the amount of negative coverage has increased. In
the United States and Germany, Farnsworth and Lichter (2006) found a rise in negativism in
election news coverage. This also counts for the Netherlands: from 1990 until 2003
Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2006) found an increase in negative campaign coverage, with an
exception in 2006.
Party types
As mentioned in the research question, the aim of this research is to find out if there is a
difference in the presence of media logic in interviews with politicians of anti-elite parties
compared to politicians of elite parties. In the Netherlands as well as in the international
politics, it is a well-known tactic of anti-elite politicians to blame journalists for treating them
differently than established parties. In this thesis, I test whether this is a legitimate accusation
or not.
Anti-elite politics (or anti-establishment politics) is defined as “a rhetorical appeal
based on opposition to those who wield power within the state” (Barr, 2009, pp. 44). The
emphasis is on the flaws of the current system or established political structure. The clearest
party PVV and socialist populist party SP (Bos & Brants, 2014). Relatively new parties that
were never represented in parliament (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015) and use an anti-establishment
rhetoric, like Forum voor Democratie (FvD) and Artikel13, are also considered anti-elite. In
the method section, an overview of every party in the research population that is considered
anti-elite is provided (see Table 2).
Except for Bos et al. (2010), who conclude that quality television programs pay more
attention to populist elements than to mainstream leaders (Bos et al., 2010), the
interventionism side of media logic in relation to anti-elite parties, as discussed earlier in this
paragraph, did not get that much attention in literature. Taking that into account, research on
the question if media logic is different for elite parties and anti-elite parties is missing. This
will be tested in this thesis. As a result that clear theory that supports the research question is
missing, no clear hypotheses could be formed. Therefore, two research questions are
formulated together that contain all the concepts that are discussed in this theoretical section.
The results of these questions together form a clear answer on the main question of this thesis:
RQ1: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the form of the interview with anti-elite parties versus elite parties?
RQ2: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the content of the interview with anti-elite parties versus elite parties?
Method
For this thesis, a quantitative content analysis was conducted of all comments made by
interviewers to politicians in two of the most frequently watched talkshows in the
3 On June 6, 2017, judges decided that Artikel1 could no longer use it’s name due to trademark problems. However, the party campaigned under the name Artikel1 and therefore this is the name that will be used in this thesis. For more information refer to
Netherlands, ‘Pauw & Jinek’ and ‘RTL Late Night’. With a combination of information and
entertainment, talkshows provide a platform for a broad public that has different interests. Not
only is there more time for questions and debate than, for instance, in the news, the goal of
providing both information as well as entertainment gives an interviewer the chance to ask
questions or make comments about more than only the political beliefs and plans of the
politicians (personal life, predictions about the outcomes of the elections). The interviews that
are studied mainly focussed on the campaigns and elections, so you can really say something
about the media logic within the context of the elections. In talkshows there is a lot of time for
interviewers to ask questions and for interviewees to answer them which, together with the
goal of providing both information as well as entertainment, gives an interviewer the
opportunity to ask questions about more than political beliefs (e.g. personal life, predictions
about the outcome of the elections). Together with the assumption that talkshows use a more
populist rhetoric by including the voice of normal people in the audience as well as at the
table (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Blumler, 2001), this would indicate that talkshows are a
good study object when you want to study signs of media logic for different party types.
Both talkshows were frequently watched: Pauw en Jinek scored above one million
viewers almost every day, while both talkshow hosts in their own talkshows score 690.000
(Pauw) and 745.000 (Jinek) every day. RTL Late Night is a bit under that, but also scores
between 400.000 and 500.000 on average (Stichting Kijkonderzoek, 2017). In table 1, an
overview of the guests at both talkshows and the dates of broadcast is given.
Table 1 – Overview of politicians in RTL Late Night and Pauw & Jinek
Show
Date of
broadcast Politician (party) Anti-elite or elite party Pauw & Jinek 27-02-2017 Emile Roemer (SP)
Halbe Zijlstra (VVD) Henk Krol (50PLUS)
Anti-elite Elite Anti-elite Pauw & Jinek 28-02-2017 Alexander Pechtold (D66)
Jan Roos (VNL)
Elite Anti-elite
Table 1 – Overview of politicians in RTL Late Night and Pauw & Jinek - Continued
Show Date of broadcast
Politician (Party) Anti-elite or elite party
Pauw & Jinek 01-03-2017 Fleur Agema (PVV) Mona Keijzer (CDA)
Anti-elite Elite RTL Late Night 01-03-2017 Marianne Thieme (PvdD) Elite Pauw & Jinek 02-03-2017 Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA)
Sybrand Buma (CDA)
Elite Elite RTL Late Night 02-03-2017 Henk Krol (50PLUS)
Leonie Sazias (50PLUS)
Anti-elite Anti-elite Pauw & Jinek 03-03-2017 Kees van der Staaij (SGP)
Edith Schippers (VVD) Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks)
Elite Elite Elite Pauw & Jinek 06-03-2017 Mark Rutte (VVD)
Jan Marijnissen (SP)
Elite Anti-elite RTL Late Night 06-03-2017 Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks) Elite Pauw & Jinek 07-03-2017 Klaas Dijkhoff (VVD)
Kadija Arib (PvdA)
Elite Elite RTL Late Night 07-03-2017 Emile Roemer (SP) Anti-elite Pauw & Jinek 08-03-2017 Sylvana Simons (Artikel1)
Marianne Thieme (PvdD) Sharon Dijksma (PvdA)
Anti-elite Elite Elite RTL Late Night 08-03-2017 Sybrand Buma (CDA)
Wouter Bos (PvdA)
Elite Elite Pauw & Jinek 09-03-2017 Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks)
Jeanine Hennis (VVD) Emile Roemer (SP)
Elite Elite Anti-elite RTL Late Night 09-03-2017 Alexander Pechtold (D66) Elite Pauw & Jinek 10-03-2017 Ahmed Aboutaleb (PvdA)
Thierry Baudet (FvD) Gert-Jan Segers (CU)
Elite Anti-elite Elite RTL Late Night 10-03-2017 Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks) Elite Pauw & Jinek 13-03-2017 Alexander Pechtold (D66)
Sybrand Buma (CDA)
Elite Elite RTL Late Night 13-03-2017 Mark Rutte (VVD) Elite
Table 1 – Overview of politicians in RTL Late Night and Pauw & Jinek - Continued
Show Date of broadcast
Politician (Party) Anti-elite or elite party
Pauw & Jinek 14-03-2017 (15-03-2017)
Mark Rutte (VVD) Emile Roemer (SP) Alexander Pechtold (D66) Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks) Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA) Gert Jan Segers (CU) Kees van der Staaij (SGP) Jan Roos (VNL)
Sylvana Simons (Artikel1) Marianne Thieme (PvdD) Elite Anti-elite Elite Elite Elite Elite Elite Anti-elite Anti-elite Elite RTL Late Night 14-03-2017 Jan Marijnissen (SP)
Lillian Marijnissen (SP)
Anti-elite Anti-elite
Table 1 - Overview of political guests at RTL Late Night and Pauw & Jinek
Sampling
For this thesis, broadcasts with politicians in it, in the last three weeks prior to the Dutch
general elections of 2017, were included. The research units are comments made by the
interviewer, which include both questions asked by the interviewer as well as remarks made
by the interviewer.
Because the Pauw & Jinek talkshow was specially produced for the general elections
of 2017 in the Netherlands and started broadcasting two weeks before the election, every
broadcast of this show was included which is a total of twelve broadcasts of one hour each.
From RTL Late Night, every broadcast with a political interview in the context of the
elections was included, which is a total of nine broadcasts. As the time frame allowed this
whole population to be coded, no sample was drawn from the data. The data were collected
by using a codebook (see appendix) while watching the broadcasts on the website of the
Dutch public broadcaster4 and the website of the commercial broadcaster RTL5.
4
www.npo.nl
5
In this thesis, the research units are comments made by the interviewer, among which
are both questions asked by an interviewer as well as remarks made by an interviewer to
provoke a reaction of a politician. The research units will be referred to as comments. In total,
615 comments were coded.
Variables
The following variables were included in the codebook. First, descriptive variables like date,
show and political party of the politician were coded. The concept of media logic is measured
with two main categories of coding questions: influence on form and influence on content.
Influence on form consists of reaction time, type of comment and the presence of interrupting
comments. Influence on content consists of personalisation, horse race and negativity. The
coding instructions can be found in the appendix.
Type of comment
Three types of comments are distinguished: closed questions (1), limited choice questions (2),
open questions (3) and remarks (4). A closed question is a question on which a predefined
number of answers is available, like yes or no or ‘do you prefer X or Y’? In a limited choice
question, a few answers within a limited frame are possible. Those are questions like ‘how much?’, ‘why?’, ‘how long?’ (Voltmer & Brants, 2011). Open questions are questions where any answer is possible and the interviewee is not limited to a set range of possible answers,
like ‘what do you think about X?’ (Voltmer & Brants, 2011). The last category was used for
comments that could be identified as remarks. In total, 615 comments were made. Most of the
questions asked were closed questions (42,9%), followed by ‘remarks’ (28,7%), limited
Reaction time
The time that a politician gets to answer a question was coded in seconds, using a stopwatch.
If the politician was interrupted by anyone other than the interviewer (other guest at the table,
someone from the public), and after that continued with his or her reaction, this was counted
as one answer. The average reaction time of politicians was 29,19 seconds (SD = 28,96), with
a range between 0,35 seconds and 321,83 seconds.
Looking further at the division between parties, on average politicians from D66 took
the longest time to react (M = 37,28, SD = 25,77), and PVV got the least (M = 18,06, SD =
18,00). Politicians from both incumbent parties from the past cabinet, PvdA and VVD, were
invited the most: both parties were represented in the population with five politicians. On
average, GroenLinks received the most comments (n=72) and ChristenUnie (CU) the least
(n=14).
Interrupting comments
When the interviewer made a comment which ended the reaction time of the politician in an
unnatural way, by interruption, this variable was coded positive. In total 9,4% of the questions
ended with an interruption.
Personalisation
For this variable, first, a dummy variable is coded that indicates whether or not the question
contains signs of personalisation. If this is the case, three types of personalisation are
distinguished: individualisation (1), privatisation (2) and emotionalisation (3).
Individualisation is a focus on the professional or political qualities of the politicians, like
trustworthiness, integrity and competencies. Privatisation is a focus on the private life of the
politician, like his or her children, religious beliefs, relationships and hobbies.
and feelings (Van Santen and Van Zoonen, 2009; 2010). 16,0% of the questions showed signs
of personalisation in general. Within this number, the largest category was privatisation
(45,4%), followed by individualisation (30,9%) and emotionalisation (23,7%).
Horse race
For this variable, first, a dummy variable is coded that indicates whether or not the question
shows signs of horse race coverage. If this is the case, four types of horse race coverage are
distinguished: who is winning or losing the elections (1), opinion polls (2), approval or
disapproval from interest groups (3), speculations about electoral outcomes or coalitions (4).
In total, 15,3% of the questions showed signs of horse race coverage. Most of those were
speculations about electoral outcomes or coalitions (59,6%), followed by opinion polls
(36,2%) and ‘who is winning or losing the elections’ (4,3%). The category ‘approval or
disapproval from interest groups’ was included in the codebook (see appendix) but did not
appear in the population.
Negativity
A question was considered negative when the horse race or personalisation was present in a
negative way. Of the 615 questions, 181 were questions with signs of horse race and/or
personalisation. Of those, 11,6% was negative.
Elite parties vs. anti-elite parties
In this research, as explained in the theoretical framework, every party with a strong populist
and/or anti-establishment message is considered an anti-elite party. From parties of which
politicians were a guest in the coded talkshows, FvD, PVV, SP, VNL and 50PLUS fit this
description. This resulted in a division of parties that are presented in Table 2 (a more detailed
71,38% were comments made to politicians of elite parties, 28,62% were comments made to
politicians of anti-elite parties.
Table 2 - Division of political parties in elite and anti-elite parties
Elite parties Anti-elite parties
CDA D66 GroenLinks PvdA PvdD SGP VVD Artikel1 FvD VNL PVV SP 50PLUS Reliability
To test the reliability of the codebook, an intercoder reliability test (ICR) was conducted. To
do this, a guest coder coded the dependent variables for a sample (n=100) of the whole
population (N=615). The coded data of both coders are compared by reporting the scores for
percent agreement, Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha. The results can be found in Table 3.
As explained by De Swert (2012) a Krippendorff’s Alpha of > 0.8 is desired. However, as the variables are complex variables with a specific description, a value of > 0.6 is also acceptable (De Swert, 2012, pp. 5). The variables ‘personalisation’ and ‘type of personalisation’ have a Krippendorff’s Alpha between 0.6 and 0.7. A possible explanation is that personalisation is not as clearly noticeable as for instance horse race. The lower score can be low because this variable was only coded when a comment showed signs of personalisation and horse race. Because this variable is related to personalisation and horse race, the possibility of errors is higher than for other variables that are not related.
Table 3 - Intercoder reliability
Variable Description Level of measurement
Percent
agreement Kappa
Krippendorff’s Alpha
Party Party of the politician
Nominal 100% 0,953 0,953
Comment type Type of comment Nominal 84% 0,779 0,779
Personalisation Are there signs of personalisation in the comment? Nominal 85% 0,613 0,614 Type of personalisation Which type of personalisation? Nominal 78% 0,599 0,603
Horse race Are there signs of horse race in the comment?
Nominal 96% 0,811 0,811
Type of horse race
Which type of horse race?
Nominal 87% 0,750 0,755
Negativity Is the comment with signs of horse race or personality negative?
Nominal 93% 0,668 0,688
Analysis6
To analyse the data, some t-tests and chi square tests were conducted to compare the average
on every variable between elite and anti-elite parties. The descriptives of every variable can
be found in table 4 and table 5. In the results section, the most notable results are discussed.
Results
RQ1: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the form of the interview with anti-elite parties vs. elite parties?
6 Because every political interview of both talkshows within three weeks prior to the Dutch general elections of 2017 is coded, no sample is drawn from the population. Therefore, statistical tests are not necessary, as every difference that is found between the data represents the entire population. However, to clarify the results that are found and to give an idea of the strength of the correlations, the statistical tests are still conducted and described in the result section.
The three variables used to code control over form are speaking time, type of comments and
number of interruptions. In Table 4, general descriptives of each variable can be found as well
as the differences between elite and anti-elite parties, including the statistical tests.
On average the answers of politicians of elite parties were longer compared to the answers of
anti-elite parties. However, this difference is not significant. A chi-square test for type of
comment does not indicate any dependency between the variable ‘type of comment’ as a whole and party type, χ2 (3) = 5,58, p = 0,134. Looking at the different comment types, the
differences between number remarks and party type and number of open questions and party
type appeared to be significant. There were more remarks made to anti-elite parties than to
elite parties, but more open questions asked to elite-parties than to anti-elite parties. Although
the percentages differ slightly between the closed questions that elite parties got and the
closed questions that anti-elite parties got, this difference is not very big and appeared to be
not significant. This also was the case for limited choice questions, as can be seen in Table 4.
Generally can be concluded that in this research, elite parties are asked more open questions
but fewer remarks than anti-elite parties.
The last indicator of control over form is the presence of an interrupting comment. On
average, 9,4% of the answers of politicians ended with an interrupting comment from the
interviewer. Although elite parties were interrupted more than anti-elite parties, this
Table 4 - Control over form Party Number of comments Number of politicians Number of comments per politician (M) Reaction time (total seconds) Reaction time (M (SD)) Interrupting comments (% within party) Closed questions (% within party) Limited choice questions (% within party) Open questions (% within party) Remarks (% within party) Artikel1 17 1 17 360,21 21,19 (16,92) 0% 52,9% 17,6% 0% 29,4% CDA 74 2 37 1979,55 26,75 (23,44) 6,8% 46,6% 24,7% 5,5% 23,3% CU 14 1 14 360,58 25,76 (26,89) 7,1% 64,3% 0% 7,1% 28,6% D66 49 1 49 1826,94 37,28 (25,77) 8,2% 42,9% 24,5% 12,2% 20,4% FvD 16 1 16 524,30 32,77 (21,08) 12,5% 56,3% 12,5% 0,0 31,3% GL 72 1 72 1865,73 25,91 (20,27) 6,9% 43,7% 22,5% 9,9% 23,9% PvdA 79 5 15,8 2396,60 30,34 (39,55) 15,2% 32,9% 26,6% 6,3% 34,2% PvdD 24 1 24 603,87 25,16 (17,20) 25,0% 33,3% 16,7% 8,3% 41,7% PVV 23 1 23 415,37 18,06 (18,00) 0% 60,9% 13,0% 0% 26,1% SGP 24 1 24 545,79 22,74 (13,31) 4,2% 62,5% 8,3% 0% 29,2% SP 66 3 22 2117,87 32,09 (28,70) 7,6% 43,9% 22,7% 6,1% 27,3% VNL 21 1 21 464,66 22,13 (14,36) 9,5% 23,8% 38,1% 0% 38,1% VVD 103 5 20,6 3555,34 34,52 (40,67) 8,7% 41,7% 28,2% 3,9% 26,2% 50PLUS 33 2 16,5 932,97 28,27 (19,60) 18,2% 30,3% 24,2% 0% 45,5%
Elite parties 439 17 25,8 13494,61 29,92 (31,00)A(1) 9,8%A(2) 42,8%A(3) 23,3%A(4) 6,6%A(5) 27,2%A(6)
Anti-elite parties 176 9 19,6 4451,37 27,36 (23,12)A 8,5%A 43,2%A 22,2%A 2,3%B 32,4%B Total 615 26 371,9 17946,78 29,19 (28,96) 9,4% 42,9% 23,0% 5,4% 28,7% 1 t (613) = 0,99, p = 0,218, 95% CI = [-2,52, 7,63] 2 t (613) = 0,49, p = 0,327 95% CI = [-0,04, 0,06] 3 t (613) = -0,87, p = 0,873, 95% CI = [-0,09, 0,08] 4 t (613) = 0,29, p = 0,564, 95% CI = [-0,06, 0,08] 5 t (613) = -0,27, p < 0,001, 95% CI = [0,00, 0,08] 6 t (613) = -1,25, p = 0,018, 95% CI = [-0,12, 0,03]
RQ2: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the content of the interview with anti-elite parties vs elite parties?
The variables that were used to code control over content are personalisation, horse race and
negativity. General descriptives of each variable can be found in Table 5. On average, more
comments made to politicians from anti-elite parties contained signs of personalisation
(29,5%) than comments that were made to politicians from elite parties (10,5%). Although the
majority of the comments did not show signs of personalisation, this difference appeared to be
significant. This is also the case for personalisation; more anti-elite parties than elite parties
received personalised comments. Within the personalised comments asked to elite and
anti-elite parties, anti-anti-elite parties only scored higher on privatisation (60,8%) than anti-elite parties
(28,3%). This is a significant difference, which says that politicians from anti-elite parties are
asked more about their private life than politicians from elite parties.On the other types of
personalisation elite parties scored higher; 34,8% of the comments to elite parties contained
signs of individualisation versus 27,5% for the anti-elite parties, but this difference is not
significant. The difference between party type and emotionalisation on the other hand,
appeared to be significant: 37,0% of the comments made to elite parties contained signs of
emotionalisation versus 11,8% for the anti-elite parties, which says that elite parties are asked
more about their emotions and feelings in the talkshows interviews than anti-elite parties.
Elite parties and anti-elite parties did not significantly differ in the number of
questions that showed signs of horse race. When looking at the different types of horse race
coverage, chi-square is not significant, which means there is no clear relationship between
party type and the horse race types, χ2 (2) = 5,58, p = 0,134. On a more detailed level,
comments made to politicians from elite parties more often include speculations about
electoral outcomes or coalitions (63,6%) than is the case for comments made to politicians
more comments about who is winning or losing (4,3%) than anti-elite parties (4,2%), but this
difference was not significant as well. Anti-elite parties scored higher on comments that
referred to expressions of public opinion differed a lot: 31,8% of the horse race questions
asked to elite parties were about opinion polls, compared to 46,4% of the horse race questions
asked to anti-elite parties.
The third indicator for influence on content is negativity, which was coded for the
comments that contained signs of personalisation or horse race coverage, or both. Elite parties
were approached less in a negative way; 9,3% of the comments that were coded as
personalisation or horse race, were negative. For the anti-elite parties, this percentage was
Table 5 - Control over content Party Number of comments Number of politicians Personalisation (% within party) Individualisation (% of personalisation) Privatisation (% of personalisation Emotionalisation (% of personalisation) Horse race (% within party) Who is winning / losing elections (% of horse race) Opinion polls (% of horse race) Speculations about electoral outcomes or coalitions (% of horse race) Negativity (% of sum personalisation and horse race)
Artikel1 17 1 11,8% 50% 0% 50% 23,5% 0% 25% 75% 16,7% CDA 74 2 8,1% 33,3% 33,3% 33,3% 24,3% 5,6% 0% 94,4% 4,2% CU 14 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 14,3% 0% 50% 50% 0% D66 49 1 16,3% 37,5% 50% 12,5% 14,3% 0% 0% 100% 13,3% FvD 16 1 43,8% 42,9% 14,3% 42,9% 25% 0% 50% 50% 25% GL 72 1 14,3% 30% 20% 50% 9,7% 14,3% 42,9% 42,9% 12,5% PvdA 79 5 13,9% 36,4% 0% 63,6% 20,3% 0% 62,5% 37,5% 14,8% PvdD 24 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 8,3% 0% 50% 50% 0% PVV 23 1 43,5% 10% 80% 10% 8,7% 0% 100% 0% 0% SGP 24 1 12,5% 33,3% 66,7% 0 4,2% 0% 0% 100% 0% SP 66 3 18,2% 33,3% 66,7% 0% 16,7% 0% 36,4% 63,6% 0% VNL 21 1 28,6% 16,7% 66,7% 16,7% 14,3% 33,3% 0% 66,7% 42,9% VVD 103 5 7,8% 37,5% 37,5% 25% 12,6% 7,7% 46,2% 46,2% 5,6% 50PLUS 33 2 45,5% 28,6% 71,4% 0% 12,1% 0% 100% 0% 29,4%
Elite parties 439 17 10,5%A(1) 34,8%A(2) 28,3%A(4) 37%A(4) 15,0%A(5) 4,5%A(6) 31,8%A(7) 63,6%A(8) 9,3%A(9)
Anti-elite parties 176 9 29,5% B 27,5%A 60,8%B 11,8%B 15,9%A 3,6%A 46%A 50%A 15,1%B Total 615 26 16,0% 30,9% 45,4% 23,7% 15,3% 4,3% 36,2% 59,6% 11,6% 1 t (613) = -6,00, p < 0,001, 95% CI = [-0,25, -0,13] 2 t (95) = 0,77, p = 0,131, 95% CI = [0,11, 0,26] 3 t (95) = -3,36, p = 0,028, 95% CI = [-0,52, -0,13] 4 t (95) = 3,02, p < 0,001, 95% CI = [0,09, 0,42] 5 t (613) = -0,27, p = 0,588, 95% CI = [-0,07, 0,05] 6 t (92) = 0,21, p = 0,671, 95% CI = [-0,08, 0,10] 7 t (92) = -1,35, p = 0,055, 95% CI = [-0,36, 0,07] 8 t (92) = 1,23, p = 0,141, 95% CI = [-0,08, 0,36] 9 t (179) = -1,20, p = 0,018, 95% CI = [-0,15, 0,04]
Conclusion & Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to find an answer on the following question: How is media logic
visible for elite vs. anti-elite parties in the run up to the Dutch general elections of 2017 in the major talkshows? By conducting a quantitative content analysis on comments made by
interviewers of two popular Dutch talkshows, in political interviews during three weeks prior
to the elections, it was investigated to what extent media logic differed for elite parties and
anti-elite parties. This was done by looking at the indicators reaction time, interrupting
comment and comment type, which are part of control over form, and the indicators
personalisation, horse race and negativity, which are part of control over content. In this
paragraph, the conclusion and implications following from the results are given and some
limitations and suggestions for further research are discussed.
RQ1: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the form of the interview with anti-elite parties vs. elite parties?
From the results, no clear conclusion can be drawn when looking at the ‘influence on form’ as
a construct. Looking closer to individual variables, answers of elite parties were longer than
answers of anti-elite parties. No clear difference was found for interrupting comments.
The clearest difference between anti-elite parties and elite parties can be found in the
type of comments. Although elite parties received more open questions, they received fewer
remarks than anti-elite parties. This is ambiguous: when an interviewer uses remarks or open
questions, the politician gets a chance to choose his or her own line of reasoning instead of the
interviewers, allowing the politician to choose its own frame. On the other hand, closed
questions limit the choice of the politician to choose their own line of reasoning, and so do
limited choice questions (to a lesser extent), which can indicate the presence of a media logic
RQ2: Is there a difference in the way interviewers exercise control over the content of the interview with anti-elite parties vs elite parties?
From the results, also no clear conclusion can be drawn when looking at ‘influence on content’ as a construct. On a more detailed level, especially the difference in personalisation between elite and anti-elite parties appeared to be important. Anti-elite parties scored higher
on privatisation than elite parties. This indicates that those parties are asked more about their
private life than elite parties. Furthermore, elite parties scored significantly higher on
emotionalisation, which indicates that they received more comments about their personal
emotions and feelings. Another finding is that anti-elite parties are approached in a more
negative way than elite parties. For both party types, no clear difference was found in
comments that contained signs of horse race.
Conclusion
Due to the sometimes contradictory and often not clear results, no clear conclusion can be
drawn in terms of a difference in media logic between anti-elite parties and elite parties.
Although elite parties scored higher on variables that indicate the absence of a media logic in
the way interviewers approach politicians (a longer reaction time, more open questions, less
personalisation and horse race), the majority of the results appeared to be not significant. In
the comparison between the two talkshows, it stood out that elite politicians received more
open questions but fewer remarks. From these results can be concluded that there are some
differences in how indicators of media logic are visible for elite versus anti-elite parties in the
run up to the Dutch general elections of 2017 in the major talkshows. However, based on the
results one cannot conclude that control over content or control over form is significantly
Discussion
An important limitation of this research is that it only focused on two talkshows. As explained
earlier, television is still one the most important source for news (Papathanassopoulos et al.,
2013). However, if you want to get a full understanding of the coverage of anti-elite and elite
parties and also want to include the younger generation and the important possibilities for
publicity that the current media landscape offers, it is important to also look at the way
politicians are covered on other popular forms of media on the internet like YouTube, news
websites and Snapchat. To get a broader view of the representation of anti-elite parties in the
Dutch media landscape it would be interesting to conduct this research with a sample that is
more representative for the entire Dutch media landscape. Also, as a suggestion for future
research, a longitudinal study in which the representation of anti-elite parties versus elite
parties in different time periods and different elections is researched, can give more insight
into how media logic is visible in interviews with elite and anti-elite parties. Going back to
the role conceptions of journalists (Plaisance & Skewes, 2003; Weaver & Brownlee, 2009;
Mellado, 2015) and looking at the results, not one role conception stood out. As stated in the
theoretical framework, the role conceptions are not mutually exclusive. The emphasis on the
private life and emotions of politicians fits within the audience approach role conception, but
other results, like the influence on type of comments, says something about power relations,
in which the open questions and remarks give a politician more freedom. This indicates
leaning towards the loyal-facilitator role rather than the watchdog role. However, it does not
explain why the results for elite parties and anti-elite parties were so contradictory in this area.
A big question that remains unanswered is why some indicators of media logic differ
for both party types. It appeared that the politicians of anti-elite parties who blame the media
for treating ‘them’ differently are partly right, but in this thesis also results are found that
research is needed to give a clear answer on this. A good way to start would be to look at the
role conceptions, as discussed in the theory (Plaisance & Skewes, 2003; Weaver & Brownlee,
2009; Mellado, 2015). If the motivations and role conceptions of journalists are more clear, it
can help to explain the difference that is found in how media logic is visible for anti-elite
parties and elite parties and provide more understanding about this subject. This thesis can be
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Appendix - Coding scheme
In this coding scheme, the unit of analysis is a comment that is made by an interviewer to a politician. Comments that are made by other guests at the table should not be included in this research.
A. General information A1. Date
Use the following notation: DD/MM/YY E.g.: 02/02/2017
A2. Show
-
Pauw & Jinek (1)-
Nieuwsuur (2)A3. Party
What is the political party of the politician?
-
Artikel1 (1)-
CDA (2)-
CU (3)-
DENK (4)-
D66 (5)-
FvD (6)-
GeenPeil (7)-
GroenLinks (8)-
NIEUWE WEGEN (9)-
PvdA (10)-
PvdD (11)-
PVV (12)-
SGP (13)-
SP (14)-
VVD (15)-
VNL (16)-
50PLUS (17)-
Other (18)B. Form of Comment
B1. Speaking time of politician vs. journalist
The length of the time a politician gets to answer to the comment, measured in seconds. This is the amount of seconds until the next comment is made by the interviewer, a video begins or an other part of the broadcast begins. The time that interruptions, like comments of others at the table and words spoken by the interviewer takes, should not be counted.
[Seconds]
B2. Type of comment
Closed question: In contrast, closed questions limit the range of possible answers, often to two clearcut alternatives. (…) Another variant of the closed question, ‘Do you prefer X or Y?’, equally limits the range of responses to distinct options” (Voltmer & Brants, 2011, pp. 134).
Limited choice question: “A type of question that provides more freedom, but still exerts limitations on the choices the interviewees can make to construct their own narrative. Examples of these are enquiries about ‘how much?’, ‘how long?’, ‘when?’ or ‘why?’” (Voltmer & Brants, 2011, pp. 134).
Open question: A question where any answer is possible. “Typical examples are ‘What do you think about X?’” (Voltmer & Brants, 2011, pp. 134).
Remark: Anything other than a question.
-
Closed question (1)-
Limited choice question (2)-
Open question (3)B3. Did the reaction end with an interrupting comment?
This is the case when the reaction of the politician does not end in a natural way (when he or she is finished talking), but by an interruption. This is only the case when the politicians gets clearly interrupted and can’t finish a sentence.
- Yes (1) - No (0)
C. Content of comment
C1. Personalisation
Personalisation (Van Santen and Van Zoonen, 2009; 2010):
-
Individualistation: focus on professional/political qualities of a politician, like individual competences, integrity and trustworthiness-
Privatisation: focus on private persona of a politician, like children, relationships, hobby’s etc.-
Emotionalisation: focus on personal emotions of a politician, like personal experiences and feelings-
Yes (1)-
No (0)C1A. If yes, which kind of personalisation?
-
Individualisation (1)-
Privatisation (2)-
Emotionalisation (3)-
Other (4)C2. Horse race
Horse race: When a comment contains an “expressions of public opinion (polls, vox pops); approval or disapproval from interest groups or particular constituencies or publics; or that speculate about electoral or policy outcomes or potential coalitions.”
- “Who is winning or losing elections, in the battle for public opinion, in legislative debates, or in politics in general”
- “Expressions of public opinion (polls, vox pops)”
- “Approval or disapproval from interest groups or particular constituencies or publics” - “Speculations about electoral or policy outcomes or potential coalitions” (Aalberg,
Strömbäck and De Vreese, 2011, pp. 172).
-
Yes (1)-
No (0)C2A: If yes; which type of horse race?
-
Who is winning or losing (1)-
Opinion polls (2)-
Approval or disapproval from interest groups (3)-
Speculations about electoral outcomes or coalitions (4)C3. Negativity
Negativity: When the individualisation or horse race frame is mentioned in a negative context, about losing instead of winning, making mistakes, talking about fights, lies etc.
