UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen
Daan Blom, studentnummer 10524584
THE PERFECT MORAL STORM
A Theoretical Solution to Steven Gardiner’s Climate Change
Tragedy of The Commons
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Gijs van Donselaar for taking me on as his student on such short notice, helping me sort out the chaos that was to become my Master thesis. Not only did our discussions motivate me to continue working hard on this paper, they also clarified many philosophical hurdles that I kept running into. An example of this was the issue of the classic prisoner’s dilemma falling short in explaining the bargaining between nations and the uneven payout structure that would be the case if developed countries were to cooperate with underdeveloped countries. This adapted 3x3 matrix on page 40 was introduced to me by Dr. van Donselaar and has allowed me to clarify this point to myself as well as the reader. It should therefore be noted that this was not an invention of mine, but one that was given to me by my supervisor and which I look forward to seeing published one day. Despite having written this thesis in a relatively short period of time, many hours have gone into it and I have received much help from talks with my father, who has given much of his time throughout my years at university to discuss philosophy with me and read my work. I wish also to thank my mother for always helping me structure my work and checking up on my grammar, sentence structure and use of language, despite having no background in philosophy. I would also like to thank my girlfriend for proof reading this paper on the count that my mother is for the first time unable to do so. Finally I would like to thank Jolande Jansen for recommending me to go see Dr. van Donselaar when I told her I was in need of a new supervisor. Also, I am grateful that they were both willing to adapt to my schedule and have made themselves available to me so that I could hand in and present my defense on such short notice. Thank you all.
Introduction ___________________________________________________________________________________ 3 Climate change as a ‘Perfect Moral Storm’ __________________________________________________________ 4 THE GLOBAL STORM __________________________________________________________________________ 5 The Intergenerational Storm ___________________________________________________________________ 6 Theoretical Storm ____________________________________________________________________________ 7 Moral Corruption ____________________________________________________________________________ 8 The Tragedy of the Commons _____________________________________________________________________ 9 HARDIN’S TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS __________________________________________________________ 9 Gardiner: Climate Change as ultimate tragedy of the commons ______________________________________ 13 Gardiner’s response to population as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: _________________________________________ 14 Intergenerational Issue _______________________________________________________________________ 16 Self-Transcendence as a Response to Gardiner’s Intergenerational and Theoretical Storms __________________ 18 ERNEST PARTRIDGE _________________________________________________________________________ 18 SAMUEL SCHEFFLER _________________________________________________________________________ 20 The Core Precautionary Principle as a response to scientific and moral uncertainty ________________________ 30 Precautionary principle _______________________________________________________________________ 30 Reasonable doubt in the case of climate change __________________________________________________ 33 The Global Storm ______________________________________________________________________________ 35 Henry Shue’s Three Principles of Equity _________________________________________________________ 36 The Paris Climate Agreement Upholding Shue’s Principles of Equity ___________________________________ 38 What are we left with? Institutional inadequacy: Back to the Original Prisoner’s dilemma ___________________ 40 Bargaining between nations in Prisoner’s Dilemma model __________________________________________ 41 Back to the original prisoner’s dilemma _________________________________________________________ 40 Solving the Climate Change Prisoner’s Dilemma ___________________________________________________ 43 Tit for tat __________________________________________________________________________________ 41 Global Community __________________________________________________________________________ 42 THOMAS HOBBES ___________________________________________________________________________ 43 Laws of Nature to secure man’s preservation _____________________________________________________ 45 Stag Hunt: The Super Strategy _________________________________________________________________ 47 Conclusion ___________________________________________________________________________________ 49 Bibliography __________________________________________________________________________________ 53
INTRODUCTION
We are told that the climate change is perhaps the single greatest threat to humanity that exists today, yet, after more than thirty years of climate change’s presence in public debate, society continues to fail in its mitigation. Climate change is a diverse problem in which many disciplines are involved, among which are politics, economics and ethics. It is a global problem not merely in a literal physical sense, but also due to the causes and effects being spread all over the world. Wealthier countries are the primary culprits and the poorer nations the victims, not only due to their historical lack of greenhouse gas emissions but, also, because they have little capacity to anticipate the consequences of climate change. The time lag between causes and effects of greenhouse gases further complicates the issue, and it seems as though no viable political or ethical way of dealing with climate change exists.
The complexity of climate change is often described as a problem of collective action to achieve mitigation and a problem inherent to politics and governments, and their inability or
unwillingness to find suitable ways to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Yet, rather than looking at ways in which we can achieve collective action, we need to look at the cause of this collective action problem before we attempt to find a viable political solution to the warming of the planet. Stephen Gardiner argues in his book, ‘The Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption,’ that the problem we face is one of ethics. Climate change presents a case of incredible ethical complexity which has made it equally complicated for governments to
adequately respond to the problem. This ethical complexity Gardiner describes is due to several factors which I will describe in the following chapter.
Existing theories on climate change are failing. "In essence, the problem is that traditional approaches seem largely “inept,” in the nonpejorative sense of being “unsuited” for, poorly “adapted” to, “inappropriate” for, or lacking the necessary skills and basic competence to complete, the task.’’ (Gardiner 2006, p.394). What Gardiner refers to is the inability of
individuals and nation states to find ways to answer the moral responsibilities wealthy nations have to those who are harmed due to past and present actions, now or in the future.
Traditional theories fall short, or only offer partial solutions. Important issues that arise in the climate change debate are things such as the lack of knowledge individuals and institutions have, or the uncertainty regarding the future warming and its effects. More generally, the problem is that individuals and institutions have a tendency to prioritise personal interest or personal maximisation, thereby directly or indirectly causing harm to the planet and future generations.
significance and renders individuals morally corrupt. Evaluating the combination of global, temporal, and theoretical components related to climate change - rather than in terms of its complex reality - allows the moral integrity of individuals to be compromised, further
complicating the problem. Each dimension Gardiner describes presents itself with its own set of challenges regarding moral responsibility and is analysed individually. Yet, it is the combination of these dimensions that reveal the shortcomings of contemporary theoretical models and illustrate why climate change makes for such a complicated issue that remains unsolved today. What I aim to do in this paper is to offer insight into the complexity of the individual storms Gardiner addresses and how their overlap creates a highly complicated ethical crisis in the form of an intergenerational prisoner’s dilemma. I will attempt to respond to all three storms that Gardiner discusses in order to find out whether a solution can be found, or whether we are indeed facing a ‘tragedy of the commons’.
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A ‘PERFECT MORAL STORM’
The climate change debate tends to be framed in a factual and technical way that results in questions regarding its legitimacy, whether humans are the cause of the rising global temperatures, and whether we are capable of doing something about it.
By focusing on the ethical issues involved in climate change, Gardiner illustrates why it is so difficult to find practical solutions to this global problem. In his book, he argues that the efforts to mitigate climate change do not explicitly take into account the ethical challenges faced in climate change policy formulation. Focusing merely on justice issues fails to take into account the other ethical issues surrounding the problem.
Gardiner’s thesis boils down to the fact that the characteristics of global climate change results in a perfect moral storm, resulting in an opportunity for the current generation to continue engaging in exploitative behaviour, harming future generations, without having to acknowledge that they are doing so (Hattingh 2008, p.7). Gardiner characterises the way we avoid overly selfish behaviour while taking advantage of our present position, without the unpleasantness of acknowledging it to ourselves, as moral corruption. An analysis of the characteristics of climate change from different perspectives illustrates how this moral corruption Gardiner discusses occurs.
The complexity of climate change is further enhanced due to the overlapping properties the aforementioned storms have. The global and intergenerational storm have in common that they both have issues characterising the dispersion of causes and effects, fragmentation of agency and institutional inadequacy.
THE GLOBAL STORM
The global storm corresponds to the dominant understanding of climate change and emerges from a spatial perspective of the three characteristics these two storms share. The dispersion of causes and effects such as the emission of greenhouse gases is geographically located, yet the impacts are felt all over the world.
Climate change is a truly global phenomenon. Emissions of greenhouse gases from any geographical location on the Earthʼs surface travel to the upper atmosphere and then play a role in affecting climate globally. Hence, the impact of any particular emission of greenhouse gases is not realised solely at its source, either individual or geographical; rather impacts are dispersed to other actors and regions of the Earth (Gardiner 2006, p.399). Furthermore, there is the problem of the fragmentation of agency as a result of climate change’s causes being distributed over countless individuals and institutions, making it
impossible to unify through a comprehensive structure of agency (Hattingh 2008, p. 8-9). This forms a gap between individual and collective interests and makes it harder for us to respond. The cumulative, global effects of the emissions of individuals and nations cannot be measured as some linear connection. The current global institutional organisation further contributes to the fragmentation of agency seeing as no global government exists, nor is there a less
centralised system of global governance, making it highly complicated to coordinate an effective response to climate change. The lack of a viable enforcement mechanism makes it impossible to eliminate the option of free-riding that would occur after an agreement has been made regarding greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation. Unfortunately, Gardiner claims, this is not the worst of our problems when considering the global aspect of climate change.
The absence of a viable enforcement mechanism further adds to the obscuring of responsibility towards the problem among individuals and nations, as well as the asymmetry of power
existing between industrialised and developing nations. These developing nations are most likely to be affected by climate change despite having very little responsibility in the matter. As a result, Gardiner argues that action on climate change forms a moral risk for developed nations (Gardiner 2006, p.401). It would open the door to a recognition that international norms of ethics and responsibility exist and that this may encourage our attention to other global moral defects within the global system such as poverty, war, and human rights violations (Gardiner 2006, p.401) The developed nations – Gardiner argues - have a responsibility due to past emissions, yet, continue to act in ways that contribute to their own self-interest and thus to greenhouse gas emission (Gardiner 2006, p.401). ‘’Hence, given that halting climate change will require deep cuts in projected global emissions over time, we can expect that such action will have profound effects on the basic economic organisation of the developed countries and on the aspirations of the developing countries.’’ (Gardiner 2006, p.401). The fact that those in current global and political power are heavily dependent on the continuation of the current
system and the lack of a viable alternative poses a serious problem in gaining the necessary support to make such a global agreement. Add to this the argument of scientific uncertainty as well as the indeterminable price of costs and benefits of working towards climate change mitigation. (Gardiner 2006, p.403).
THE INTERGENERATIONA L STORM
The intergenerational storm arises from a temporal reading of the above mentioned
characteristics. The determination of the dispersion of causes and effects is further complicated by the effects (rising sea levels, ocean acidity, CO2 uptake) of climate change being time lagged, making it an intergenerational problem. Deferral negatively affects the challenges posed, due to the superimposition of the global and temporal aspect climate change creates. This further compounds the problem of plausible deniability that affects people’s sense of global and inter-generational responsibilities. As a result, an apparent incentive for delay due to uncertainty arises. Climate change is therefore a resilient problem and its impacts are severely back-loaded due to our awareness being time-lagged too, resulting in the cost and scope of the problem continuously changing, undermining our motivation to act (Gardiner 2006, p.402). The fragmentation of agency under a temporal perspective illustrates the problem of temporally fragmented agents not being able to unify. Substantial deferral will thus likely undermine the will to act, resulting in the negative effects of current generations to fall on future generations (Gardiner 2006, p.404).
Then there is the issue of institutional inadequacy which fails to regulate the global emissions of greenhouse gases due to its lack of a reliable enforcement mechanisms. Democratic political institutions are structured in a way that complicates the introduction of long term policy as well as maintaining such policies due to their relatively short time horizons. National as well as international agencies are fragmented and ineffective, making a system of global governance highly complicated. The reason for the lack of effective and strict policy from governments has a lot to do with the time-lag of the effects of greenhouse gases. Despite our dawning
consciousness of climate change today, Gardiner claims its hypothetical effects fail to motivate policy makers to make the necessary sacrifices that would result in severe financial
repercussions to businesses and states (Gardiner 2006, p.405).
All of this can be reduced to the notion that individual rationality aims to gain the best possible result for the individual. Present generations typically act in self-interest, leaving future
generations worse off, resulting in the intergenerational problem of climate change. This inevitably leads to a multiplier effect for all future generations and may create situations in which tragic choices must be made.
‘’The presence of backloading and deferral together brings on a new collective action problem that adds to the tragedy of the commons caused by the Global Storm, and thereby makes matters much worse.’’ (Gardiner 2006, p.404). What we have now is a prisoner’s dilemma in which collective action is complicated further due to the negative effects of greenhouse gas emission befalling on future generations, while current generations reap all the benefits from the use of cheap energy. This alters the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma and puts future generations in a position with no reciprocal bargaining power. It would therefore no longer be in the collective interest of current generations to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions according to common rationality, effectively ceasing any motivation to work towards greenhouse gas mitigation.
The intergenerational problem of climate change appears to further complicate the already existing paradoxical preference structure of the classic prisoner’s dilemma, making it harder to solve, and making change in the future even more difficult than now. Gardiner therefore draws the conclusion that the lack of reciprocity between generations would hinder a possible
solution on an infinite basis, making the intergenerational problem of climate change an impossible problem to solve.
THEORETICAL STORM
Gardiner addresses a third storm of theoretical inadequacy which builds upon the previous two. We are extremely ill-equipped to deal with many problems characteristic of the long-term future. Even our best theories face basic and often severe difficulties addressing basic issues such as scientific uncertainty,
intergenerational equity, contingent persons, nonhuman animals and nature. But climate change involves all these mentioned above and more (Gardiner 2006, p.407).
He argues that no moral or political theories are adequately equipped to deal with the issues inherent to long-term global issues such as climate change. It raises questions regarding our capacity to understand the complexity of climate change, and illustrates the danger of moral corruption with regard to that complexity. He argues that,
Coming to terms with this complexity involves not only identifying the individual global and temporal components of climate change, but how aspects common to both, scientific uncertainty for example, introduce a deceptive simplicity that compromises efforts to develop an adequate response based on an honest understanding of the problem (Summerlin 2009).
Despite the overwhelming consensus among scientists that climate change is human-induced, there still remains a small community of scientists who reject the theory and present
alternatives. What further exacerbates this is the philosophical problem of non-identity which argues that acting now to protect future generations will render those future generations non-existent, making them worse off than if we did nothing (Parfit 1976, p.105). In his chapter, ‘On
Doing the Best for Our Children’ Parfit argues that if a specific person is not conceived at a specific moment that he was conceived, it is a fact that he would not have existed. As a result, enforcing an alternative climate policy to achieve mitigation would result in people being conceived at a different moment, resulting in different people existing in the future. Therefore we would in fact no longer be ensuring that the rights of the future people we are considering when implementing these mitigation policies are protected, rather, an alternative group of future people who would exist as a result of these policies (Parfit 1976, p.103). Though such a theory may appear intuitively trivial at first glance, a viable counter argument has yet to be found within standard ethical theory. The reflective disequilibrium this generates could therefore be argued to form a problem when considering future generations.
Another issue stems from our cost-benefit analysis approach to global problems, which has offered radically different paths to take. Gardiner claims current and past political philosophies tend to fall short in addressing the theoretical problems of climate change, arguing that they seem ‘’peculiarly reticent in the face of the threat,’’ (Gardiner 2011, p.16) raising concern as to whether they might worsen the perfect moral storm. Finally, Gardiner argues for a third
theoretical problem stemming from the global problem being framed as purely anthropocentric and instrumental. ‘’To be sure, to a significant extent, the problem posed by the perfect moral storm is that nature becomes a vehicle through which injustice is visited on other people. It facilitates the exploitation of the poor by the rich in the global storm, and of the future by the present in the intergenerational storm.’’(Gardiner 2011, p.16).
MORAL CORRUPTION
These three storms combined create room for self-deception by selectively applying our attention to the aspects of climate change that relieve us of our moral burden (Gardiner 2011, p.17). We assume that rational analysis can help us to comprehend the challenges of climate change and solve our problems, yet we are faced with a seemingly insoluble prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, we assume the state to be capable of responding adequately to the problems caused by climate change and remain the most effective institutions to act rationally, in the interest of its citizens, and the common good. Yet, they, just like us, find themselves in the same bargaining position towards future generations as we do. This allows us to continue deceiving ourselves into not feeling responsible for our own actions, further corrupting our morality. The combination of overlapping global, intergenerational, and theoretical storms result in individuals creating a perfect excuse not to respond to the challenges we face
regarding climate change. Instead, Gardiner says, ‘’By avoiding overtly selfish behaviour, earlier generations can take advantage of the future without the unpleasantness of admitting it – either to others, or, perhaps more importantly, to itself.’’(Gardiner 2006, p.409). In other words,
it allows us to delude ourselves that we are taking action while doing nothing, and without feeling immoral about it.
Gardiner’s thesis of moral corruption is perhaps best summarised in an article by Joshua Kurdys, a philosophy student at Penn State University:
In conclusion, moral corruption constitutes a significant threat because it permits self-deception by selectively applying our attention to components of climate change that ease our moral burden. Practically, moral corruption emerges in beliefs that excuse inaction with claims of scientific uncertainty and exorbitant economic or political costs while ignoring signs that encourage action such as scientific consensus and the mounting inter-generational costs of inaction to be borne by future generations. Theoretically, moral corruption appears in the self-interested choice of strategies we select in responding to climate change by emphasising the self-interested obligations for collective action suggested by the global effects of climate change without evaluating these strategies according to inter-generational standards requiring ethical commitments that go beyond contemporary preferences. In contrast to the practical effects of moral corruption, which play on the division between interests for self and other, the theoretical implication of moral corruption suggests that the way we constitute the distinction between individual and collective interests may render a theoretically adequate balance between personal and political obligations, while effectively abandoning questions of responsibility to innocent generations to come (Kurdys (2009). The general message we can extract from Gardiner’s reasoning is that the crisis we face is not something that can be solved through conventional ethics such as theories of justice, truth, respect for nature or respecting human rights. He argues that conventional ethics appear to be applicable only to simple cause-effect relationships (low population and low-technology
societies), individual agency (harms and their causes are individual, readily identified, located in time and space), and institutional adequacy (Hattingh 2008, p.15).
Despite Gardiner’s pessimism, I wish to respond to each of his moral storms and offer a possible theoretical solution to them. Then I will look at the problems that remain once these individual storms have been dealt with to determine whether his conclusion of moral
corruption is justified. The main argument for his conclusion of moral corruption appears to be that the overlap of these individual problems involved in climate change are the reason people are so vulnerable to such corruption. For this reason, I will attempt to formulate an answer to the above-mentioned problems Gardiner claims are inherent to the problem of climate change. I will begin by addressing the global storm, followed by the intergenerational problem, and finally, I will respond to Gardiner’s claims of theoretical inadequacy regarding climate change. First, however, I believe it necessary to shed some light on the problem of climate change as Gardiner frames it, namely, as a prisoner’s dilemma that inevitably leads to what Garret Hardin called: ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’ By analysing Hardin’s work on ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ and Gardiner’s response to this, I aim to show that there are ways in which a tragedy of the commons can, and has been avoided.
THE TRAGEDY OF THE C OMMONS
HARDIN’S TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
‘The tragedy of the commons’ is a term first used in philosophy by Garret Hardin. He used it to point out a certain problem which did not have a ‘technical solution’. What he meant by this was that no solution was to be found through scientific techniques or other physical changes etc. Problems such as these require a change in morality according to Hardin. Overpopulation, for example, is one of those problems and was Hardin’s primary focus of study. The structure of a tragedy of the commons is based on the classic 2x2 prisoner’s dilemma which goes as follows: Two criminals are arrested for a crime that they both committed. Each criminal has the choice to either, remain silent, or confess. In the case where both criminals confess, they each receive five years in prison. If they both remain silent, they both get one year. If only one of the two confesses, while the other remains silent, the confessor goes free and the one who remains silent gets ten years. Furthermore, both criminals are kept in separate cells so that they don’t know what the other is going to do. In a prisoner’s dilemma the preference structure will look something like this:
Player B Player A Cooperate Defect Cooperate 3 3 4 0 Defect 0 4 1 1
The problem lies in the fact that it is collectively rational to collaborate, yet individually rational not to. In the case that prisoner’s work together (and choose to remain silent) they both receive only one year of prison time. When prisoner A does not cooperate and confesses, this is the best option for him individually, seeing as it would result in his freedom and prisoner B getting ten years. The problem is that Prisoner B is in exactly the same situation and will reason in the same way that prisoner A does, whereby both end up confessing and each receives five years, which is the third best option. When each player of the prisoner’s dilemma thinks individually, there is no possibility for cooperation.
The same drama occurs in Hardin’s analysis of the overuse of the commons. The main subject of his discussion in his article is human overpopulation and how humanity is ill-equipped to deal with it. By producing new strains of food or harvesting more fish from the oceans to keep the world fed, humans approach the problem incorrectly. He analyses the problem analogous to an example of an open pasture:
Imagine an open pasture, available to all. According to Hardin, it is to be expected that each herder will attempt to keep as many cattle as possible on this public ground. Even including factors such as disease, wars or poaching, there will come a time where the land has reached its maximum capacity and, "the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.’’ (Hardin 1968, p. 1248). Hardin then argues that as a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. This argument goes as follows: By adding another animal to the pasture, the herdsman gains a positive component of utility of +1 seeing as he pays nothing for the land being used and he has full ownership of the cow and the profits it generates. However, there is also a negative
component as a result of his addition of the cow of -1 due to the pasture being used to its fullest extent and an extra leading to overgrazing. This -1 component of utility is, however, shared by all the herdsmen, and thus forms only a small fraction compared to the whole +1 he gains from adding the cow (Hardin 1968, p. 1246).
Hardin argues that through this logic the herdsman decides that adding more cows is the only sensible course for him to pursue. Yet this is the same logic that all the herdsman have, and therefore, inevitably leads to the overgrazing of the pasture. ‘’But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.’’ (Hardin 1968, p.1244). According to Hardin, all men are stuck in a system of thinking that compels them to – in this case – maximize their herd without limit – in a world that is limited. This inevitably leads man to ruin, through the pursuit of their own self-interest in a society where the commons are free.
According to Hardin, it is the human condition that occurred through natural selection, ‘’The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers.’’ (Hardin 1968, p.1244). This philosophy of the commons can be seen all over the world in cases such as overfishing, deforestation and overgrazing of farmland, because there is a tendency among individuals to pursue this philosophy of going for personal gain.
He makes a case for pollution being another example of how the freedom within the commons leads to tragedy. Here something is not taken out of the commons, rather, something is put in. Sewage, radioactive materials, poisonous fumes etc. are all dumped into the common grounds
maximisation. The costs of one individual’s share of the waste he discards into the commons is less than what it would cost to purify this waste before releasing them. Naturally this same logic applies to the rest of the people, locking us into a system of ‘’fouling our own nest’’ as long as we are rational, independent individuals within a commons (Hardin 1968, p.1245).
Hardin argues that private property could help to reduce the chances of humans exhausting the planets resources because the balance of positive and negative utility would deter a farmer from overpopulating his own pasture. However, the tragedy continues to occur, this time through pollution, overfishing or deforestation etc. Hardin, therefore, reduces the issue to overpopulation, using an example of a factory polluting a river today and one in the time his grandfather was alive and the difference in the consequences being the justification for its morality. ‘’Analysis of the pollution problem as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognised principle of morality, namely: the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed.’’ (Hardin 1968, p.1246). Essentially, Hardin argues that morality is a system sensitive phenomenon and that context is what determines whether something is immoral or not. In his example of slaughtering a bison 150 years ago only for the consumption of its tongue and discarding the rest, he states the Plainsman is not being in an important sense ‘wasteful’. Whereas, if it were to happen now, due to the limited
population of bison existing today, people would respond quite differently. Though I agree to a certain extent that this might be the case, it does not make it a viable moral principle. The slaughtering of an enormous animal just for its tongue should be considered wasteful and immoral in any case, yet even more so when the population is extremely low, in the second case it is immoral even if the Plainsman ate the entire animal. Morality to Hardin is ‘system-sensitive’ and should take into account particular circumstances. He argued that the view on ethics in his time was stagnant and limited, and ‘’therefore are poorly suited to governing a complex, crowded, changeable world.’’(Hardin 1968, p.1246).
Hardin criticises the validity of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ that states that the choice of how many children a family should or can have rests with the family and no one else. What this results in according to Hardin is that each new individual born, gains access to the commons and so, what follows, is that it is in everyone’s interest to give birth to as many children as possible because they all share the commons equally. ‘’To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.’’ (Hardin 1968, p.1246).
Hardin has received vast amounts of criticism in the past over his theory, over its lack of evidence or logical reasoning behind his conclusions. However, looking at the case of climate change one cannot help but believe there is a certain truth in Hardin’s predictions regarding the way we treat the commons. What’s more is that Hardin published his theory in a time where
the Keynesian socio-economic model was failing and neoliberalism was gaining momentum in the West and becoming the new socio-economic structure of society. What we see after the 1970’s is a major privatization of the commons all over the world, yet what we can conclude is that this has only increased the degree of destruction of the planets resources and ecosystems. According to Hardin, the same rationality inherent to the overuse of the common pastures can be applied to the issue of overpopulation. With the rate of increase being so vast, Hardin feared that eventually the human population would become so large that it would consume and pollute the world until it was no longer inhabitable. More people place extra demands on food, water, and energy supply, which inevitably leads to scarcity and environmental damage.
Gardiner summarizes Hardin’s views, arguing that:
First, Hardin claims that the population problem has a special structure - it is a commons problem- and that this structure ‘remorselessly generates tragedy’. The tragedy is, that left to their own devices, people have large families, causing misery to themselves and their communities and untold damage to the environment. Second, Hardin sees the problem as one primarily caused by, and affecting, those in the developing nations. Third, he argues that the only available solutions are severe. In one article, he argues that we should abandon the United Nation's declaration that freedom to reproduce is a fundamental human right (Gardiner 2001, p.389). The only means of achieving this result, Hardin argues, is through the use of coercive
instruments. Institutions founded by misguided altruism in the form of a welfare state and aid to poorer countries means that the cost of overpopulation no longer falls on the people responsible for it and has resulted in what Hardin calls ‘The Tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968, p.1247-1248). Despite agreeing with certain statements Hardin makes, Gardiner offers a critique on Hardin’s logic regarding the population problem and presents an alternative view regarding overpopulation as a commons problem.
GARDINER: CLIMATE CHANGE AS ULTIMATE TRA GEDY OF THE COM MONS
Gardiner also compares Hardin’s analogy of the Herdsmen to a prisoner’s dilemma.
The prisoner's dilemma structure is interesting for both theoretical and practical reasons. The theoretical reason is that it involves a paradox of rationality. It shows that in some situations, individuals reasoning purely on the basis of self-interest can be led to make decisions that are suboptimal in terms of self-interest. (Strictly-speaking, the problem does not depend on self-interested motivation per se, but might arise for any value system with a similar structure, including some moral views. The practical reason is that there are real world situations that have this structure (Gardiner 2006, p.394).
Even if Hardin were correct in his reasoning, we should explore all other possibilities with which we could solve prisoner’s dilemma without breaking with our conception of morality. Gardiner suggests three possible ways to do this:
The first is to change people's motives, and so alter the preference structure that generates the problem. Hence, one might try to make people value some aspect of the situation in a new way. For example, fairly recently, many people have been made to disparage Styrofoam cups to the extent that they have such a strong preference to drink from a reusable cup, that they are willing to carry one around with them. Or one might try to make people value cooperation itself.
The second solution is to appeal to broad considerations of self-interest. For example, it is well known that the dynamics of a prisoner's dilemma can be changed if the parties will meet again in other bargaining situations in the future. If we know that we must make a bargain again, we are much more likely to give up some gains from noncooperation now in exchange for the expectation of gains to be made from an overall strategy of cooperation. The third solution is to appeal to a sense of fair play, and in particular to the notion of reciprocity. This is present in almost all societies and supports a social attitude of rebuke to those who do not cooperate: they are socially shunned. This too can work to solve some problems without the need for coercive state interference. (Gardiner 2006, p.394).
We will return to these possible solutions later on in this paper because, as we will see, Gardiner argues that they do not apply to the climate change prisoner’s dilemma. GARDINER’S RESPONSE TO POPULATION AS A PRISONER’S DILEMMA:
Population as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, certainly in modern Western society, or even in China or India today seems completely counter-intuitive to Hardin’s argument of rational individual interest. Producing more offspring would result in the individual to have to share that which he already has and could only gain something if he had nothing in the first place. Hardin’s view of the developed countries taking on some form of global welfare state is furthermore completely unjustified and uninformed. In reality, women today are choosing not to have children at all, due to fears of the time it would cost, the physical, mental and economic investment it would require, and the general will to fulfill other personal goals or desires. Hardin reasons that humans function the same as animals lacking consciousness and have no capacity to alter their thinking in any way, shape, or form. Yet, he offers no empirical evidence whatsoever as to why it would be in all human’s interests to have a large family. Nor does he take into consideration that humans act and think upon more than mere instinct. In his argumentation he concerns himself with ‘groups and germ lines’, but nothing about the interests of the individuals
involved, therefore, it doesn’t justify the claim that it is always advantageous to the individual to have a large family (Gardiner 2011, p. 399). Furthermore, Gardiner argues that no evidence exists regarding the correlation between the biological interests of a germline and the self-interest of individuals carrying that germline (Gardiner 2001, p.399).
Arguing against the idea that the human conscience could play a role in the decision of how large a family to have, Hardin responds that,
The argument has been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good-by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race (Hardin 1968, p.1246).
Hardin deduces that reproductive restrain would be eliminated through natural selection, seeing as those who have restraint will have fewer children than those who do not. This reasoning faces issues on several different levels. As Gardiner argues:
This argument faces serious practical, empirical, and theoretical problems. The practical problem is that natural selection works over very long time-scales. Hence, it is unlikely to happen fast enough to prevent the appeal to conscience working for a while. And perhaps a while is all we need worry about, if the benign demographic thesis is correct. The empirical problem is that if Hardin were right, we would expect people already to have the desire for as many children as possible, since we would expect the selection procedure to have been at work for generations. But the empirical evidence suggests the opposite: global fertility rates are falling. The theoretical problem is the assumption that the attitude of restraint is transmitted between generations. There is simply no reason to believe that peoples' consciences will be the same as their parents', nor in particular that they will have the same attitude toward reproduction. Indeed, the empirical evidence stands squarely against it (Gardiner 2001, p. 399).
If we look at the development of Europe and its increase in population we see that it is currently in decline to the extent that our population is actually declining. ‘’Second, the UN reports that global fertility rates have fallen significantly in the recent past (to 2.7 children per family in 1998, from 5 in the early 1950s); and, furthermore, this reflects a decline in fertility in all regions of the world (in the last twenty-five years, 6.6 to 5.1 in Africa, 5.1 to 2.6 in Asia, 5.0 to 2.7 in Latin America and the Caribbean).’’ (Gardiner 2001, p. 396). This data disproves Hardin’s view of the human population growth expanding indefinitely and renders its applicability on a prisoner’s dilemma impossible. Furthermore, the high birth rates in underdeveloped countries can be attributed partially to unwanted pregnancies, lack of birth control facilities, and the cultural position, lack of rights and treatment of women. Also, the simplicity of the ‘Population PD-2’ fails to take into account the cultural complexities of different nations as well as
individual preferences. In India and China, for example, it has become a regular phenomenon for women to abort their female fetuses due to the male gender being preferred. This
phenomenon affects family size greatly and is certainly relevant to population policy (Gardiner 2001, p. 397). Add to this the lack of education most women in developing countries receive as well as the general culture of male domination within those countries, resulting in uninformed, or even absence of choice making.
In light of these arguments, it is safe to conclude that Hardin’s limited view on the issues regarding overpopulation render them impossible to be applied to a prisoner’s dilemma and can therefore be ignored. However, this does not change the fact that the paradox between
individual and collective rationality is still the root of the problem when discussing solutions to climate change.
Gardiner claims that rather than looking at the issue of overpopulation as the root to a tragedy of the commons, we should be looking at the total environmental impact of humanity, more specifically, at the total amount of impact per person. The reason for this being that there is a massive contrast between different parts of the world and their consumption of energy. He concludes that climate change cannot be reduced to a problem of overpopulation, only that it maintains the dilemmatic structure that Hardin describes.
INTERGENERATIONAL ISSUE
This news is bad enough, but there is worse to come. For the problem of an escalating
environmental impact per person seems to have a structure similar to the one that so worries Hardin in his misdiagnosis of the problem of world population (Gardiner 2001, p. 402).
The true tragedy of the commons occurs, according to Gardiner, when considering how the emission of greenhouse gases affect the environment. Firstly, consider the intergenerational issue concerning the environmental impact of emitting greenhouse gases. The time it takes for the waste gases we emit to be taken up into the atmosphere is approximately fifty to a hundred years, raising an important time-lag issue. The full effects of our emissions would therefore not be felt until at least fifty years from now and peak around a hundred years from now. Also, the direct benefits we gain from burning fossil fuels all go to the current generations, meaning the current generations cause all the damage, reap all the rewards, and leave the future
generations with all the costs (Gardiner 2001, p.403). According to individual rationality, it would, therefore, be in our best interest to continue emitting and consuming to serve ourselves to our maximum potential without consideration for future generations.
Gardiner sums the intergenerational issue up as follows:
Intergenerational-l: It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate: (almost) every generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome produced by everyone over polluting (Gardiner 2001, p. 404).
Notice the almost in Gardiner’s argument. This is due to the fact that the current generation does not prefer the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution because they are the only losers in this scenario. Based on the rationality of maximizing individual utility, the current generations would, therefore, have no reason (not even collectively) to choose to cooperate, seeing as future generations have no bargaining power.
Intergenerational-2: It is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each generation has the
power to decide whether or not it will over pollute, each generation (rationally) prefers to over pollute, whatever the others do (Gardiner 2001, p.404).
The reason this case has an even more dilemmatic structure than the classic prisoner’s dilemma Hardin described is that in those cases solutions could be found through rearrangement of the situation so that a certain guarantee could be created to ensure mutual cooperation. Gardiner states that:
In the prisoner's dilemma, PD2 arises because there is, in fact, no way for each prisoner or herdsman to ensure that the behaviour of others is beneficial so long as his is beneficial. But here, Intergenerational-2 arises because the situation is such that it is in principle impossible for one generation to ensure that the behaviour of the others is beneficial so long as theirs is beneficial. The intergenerational problem is that these situations cannot be rearranged because the other player does not exist and can therefore not be interacted with. The future
generations are in no position to benefit nor to engage in reciprocal acts with their forbears (Gardiner 2001, p. 405-406).
Gardiner’s argument is that future generations have no bargaining power, even if someone were to represent their case. They have nothing to offer the current generation in exchange for their cooperation. This argument rests entirely on the fact that Gardiner relates self-interest to rationality and appears to almost entirely skip the notion that people might have a deeper sense of morality that would make them want to cooperate, for this would require sacrifice on their part. ‘’Given this analysis, other things being equal, it is reasonable to expect that the commons will be deeply harmed by the present generation. Furthermore, the same reasoning will apply to each future generation as it comes into being.’’ (Gardiner 2001, p.404)
Gardiner argues that his three alternative approaches to preventing the overuse of the commons fall short when considering future generations. What will be required to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma of climate change is a sacrifice of individual interest by the current generation which, according to Gardiner, cannot be justified by an appeal to reciprocity because there is only one player able to deliberate. His alternative solutions that may have worked for Hardin’s prisoner’s dilemma regarding overpopulation fall short when considering future generations. The solution to this second prisoner’s dilemma must, therefore, be looked for in the development of key values such as universalism, benevolence, respect for nature, and most importantly, the rational desire for self-transcendence.
He concludes that Hardin’s main claims regarding the tragedy of the commons are correct, despite differing in their reasoning for making these claims.
If my analysis of the inter and intra-generational problems surrounding global warming is correct, two of Hardin's main claims are right after all. First, strong coercive regulatory regimes may be needed in order to stop
overpollution, and so to address the pressing problem suggested by population growth. Second, the benign demographic transition hypothesis should be treated with suspicion (Gardiner 2001, p.416).
The issue of climate change is structured in such a way that it hinders us from acting morally. From this perspective, climate change sceptics are merely a symptom rather than the cause of our inability to act. Gardiner, therefore, analyses the climate change issue analogous to the theoretical problem of the tragedy of the commons. Despite arguing that people would agree to collaborate in order to achieve a common good in a classical prisoner’s dilemma, he argues that the condition for this to be possible is that a possibility needs to exist for the people involved to be able to work together. This, according to Gardiner is impossible to realise due to the fact that climate change and its causes affect people of a different generation, hence the intergenerational problem. The climate change issue is therefore only soluble if we have the capacity to imagine these future generations as having a reciprocal capacity if we want to achieve a just distribution of resources to restore the planet’s atmosphere.
Gardiner fails to come up with a solution to his intergenerational prisoner’s dilemma. I believe this has to do with the fact that his focus lies too much on ethics as a solution to the problem. I agree with his views on the complexity of climate change, yet I would argue that the solution to his intergenerational prisoner’s dilemma can be solved by appealing to a rational desire for self-transcendence.
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AS A RESPONSE TO GAR DINER’S INTERGENERATIONAL AND THEORETICAL STORMS
ERNEST PARTRIDGE
Gardiner’s greatest issues that result in moral corruption are the intergenerational aspect of climate change and our lack of a sufficiently broad ethical theory for people to take the rights and lives of future generations seriously. Furthermore, this issue is strengthened by the presence of the non-identity problem to which ethics has yet to offer an adequate response. I would, therefore, argue for a different approach to such issues by appealing to the concept of ‘self-transcendence’. Ernest Partridge wrote an elaborate philosophical and psychological paper regarding our connection to future generations. Despite no link being made to global climate change at the time of writing - seeing as it was not a major issue at the time - Partridge offers a general account on the human property of self-transcendence. He thereby indirectly responds to Gardiner’s claims of the intergenerational problem of climate change and their lacking of reciprocal bargaining power within a prisoner’s dilemma.
For the world to ever achieve the level of collaboration required to mitigate climate change, we, as a people, at an individual and collective level need to step back and ask ourselves what we are doing and who we are doing it for? Why do people write books, create art etc.? Why do
we as a species constantly seek to discover new things? Why do we have children? Would anyone do any of these things if they knew the world was going to end in the next hundred years? I believe not. This suggests that we as a species are innately connected and even dependent on the future of humanity if we are to have any meaning in life. Because it is only because we know there is a future that we do the things we do. We are intertwined with future generations because it is they who give meaning to the things we do today.
I wish to suggest not only that humans commonly display a concern for future others, but also that it is both morally correct to do so and, even more, that such interest is grounded in identifiable and rational features of social, personal and moral life – features that reflect and manifest fundamental aspects of human nature and development. Accordingly, if one feels no concern for the quality of life of his successors, he is not only lacking a moral sense but is also seriously impoverishing his life. He is not only to be blamed, he is also to be pitied (Partridge 1980, p.78).
Partridge calls this relationship with our future others our capacity and rational need for self-transcendence. What this means is that,
as a result of the psychodevelopmental sources of the self and the fundamental dynamics of social experience, well-functioning human beings identify with, and seek to further the well-being, preservation, and endurance of communities, locations, causes, artifacts, institutions, ideals, etc., which are outside themselves and which they hope will flourish beyond their own lifetimes (Partridge 1980, p.78).
We can therefore not view ourselves as beings restricted to our own lifetimes. Evidence of this thesis can be found in a multitude of choices people make, such as working in public service, producing art, or scientific research. What these career choices suggest is a motive ‘’for the self to be part of, to favourably affect, and to value, for itself the well-being and endurance of something that is not oneself.’’ (Partridge 1980, p.79).
Accepting Partridge’s theory that this connection with future generations gives us meaning as individuals sheds new light on Gardiner’s views of future generations not having any bargaining power over the current generations. If we accept that climate change will inevitably lead to the destruction of much of the world as we know it, and eventually the end of the human race, this should become a major motivational factor for the current generations to cooperate in climate change mitigation. For without future generations our lives today would cease to have
meaning. ‘’By fulfilling our just duties to posterity, we may now earn and enjoy, in our self-fulfillment, the favors of posterity.’’ (Partridge 1980, p. 90). Partridge even goes so far as to claim that lacking the need for self-transcendence renders an individual a narcissist. This
irrational self-involved individual has lost touch with rationality. Partridge appears to be arguing against Gardiner in this sense. Where Gardiner argues that people are morally corrupted
through the complexity of climate change, Partridge claims that not caring about future generations is in fact irrational and narcissistic. Gardiner’s notion that no theoretical model
exists to take into account the value and meaning of future generations seems misguided. Partridge refers to several authors who have argued for the case of future people. He refers to authors such as Mead, who argues that the self has its ‘’origin, nurture, and sustenance in social acts.’’ (Partridge 1980, p.80). Self-transcendence therefore becomes not a morally desirable feature of humanity but a basic human condition (Partridge 1980, p.80). Of course this will not include all members of society, yet it certainly would include the majority. To those who are not, Mead and Dewey would argue, ‘’those who claim total psychic and moral autonomy are deceived. Their personality and selfhood have their origin in social acts and contexts, and their denial of this nature is a symptom of personality disorder.’’ (Partridge 1980, p.81). The core argument of Partridge’s text is therefore that it is human to seek self-transcendence. We are transcendent from the moment we become conscious due to our ‘selves’ constantly reaching out to others and identify with others.
Looking at society today, I believe Partridge would conclude that people may indeed have become more narcissistic, pursuing primarily extrinsic goals rather than intrinsic ones. A great part of society has lost touch with its basic need for self-transcendence and has become selfish, focusing more on money, power, or possessions, instead of desiring the well-being of the other than self, such as institutions, artefacts, or art. Nevertheless, in many of our actions, even those who might be labelled ‘narcissists’ we can see an underlying desire to leave something behind, a legacy, something to go on after their death. Even those who act and live selfishly do not simply wish their lives to end in death. Care for future people, whether direct or indirect, exists between all healthy individuals who are sound of mind. Taking into consideration the needs and rights of future generations is something innately human, whether we are conscious of it or not. All of what we do in life seems to be connected, and in direct relation to others, whether it be via direct relationships or through institutions. We transcend ourselves in much of what we do, be it through the formation of wills, creation of art, or finding the cure for diseases. Past actions have indeed resulted in the ordeal we are facing at present with climate change, this does not change the fact that much of how society has been structured has been to secure the prosperity, improvement and survival of the human race. What we need now is a radical change in our behaviour and our way of life, yet this can certainly be achieved when we all realise that much of what we do in life, is in fact, dependent on the people who will live after us, and that our current way of life is destroying their prospects at a good life.
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
Samuel Scheffler further elaborates on this idea of our dependence and need for
self-transcendence in his book: ‘The Afterlife’ and his preceding lecture, ‘Why Worry About Future Generations?’ His lecture, which draws much from the content of his book offers an insight as to why we have reasons to consider future generations. The issue Scheffler raises is that
contemporary approaches towards the consideration of future generations is that they offer a very limited array of motivational factors as to why we should care about the continuation of humanity. When talking about the afterlife, Scheffler does not refer to one’s actual life after death, but that what lives on after another’s death and how this continuation of people affects us in the present without our conscious knowledge. What this concern for future generations reveals is the limits of our temporal parochialism.
Most of us today lack any clear, or well developed conception of the value of human continuity or, of the values that we hope will be realised in the future. Nor do we exhibit any normatively articulate understanding of the importance to us of future generations or, of our own relations to them (Scheffler 2015).
Scheffler argues that the modern human being has become increasingly detached from his or her position in time, focusing primarily on their own with little consideration for those who came before us and those who will come after us (Scheffler 2015). Much of this can be reduced to the ways in which the globalised world has made us geographically more cosmopolitan, aware of the countless interconnections among people all over the world (Scheffler 2015). Social and economic interaction across borders has greatly influenced the way that most people understand their position in the social world, yet, Scheffler claims this has resulted in us
becoming temporally more parochial. What he means by this is that we have become more deeply self-involved, unaware of the connections we have to the people who existed before us and even less so with those who will exist beyond our lifetimes. Despite this, Scheffler argues that the fact that the prospect of humanity’s extinction would have such a devastating impact on us reveals a limitation to our egoism despite what for example philosophers such as Gardiner believe. Some might argue, however, that this could still be considered a form of egoism, in the sense that they care because their existence is a precondition to leading valuable lives themselves. However, the fact that we care is not because we depend on future
generations. We depend on future generations because we care about them. The prospect of their extinction reveals to us that without them we lose the ability to lead value-laden lives. Not that we think humanity’s extinction would be a setback to our interests, rather, that the
survival of humanity matters to us in its own right (Scheffler 2015). The things many of us do today can only maintain its meaning on the precondition that humanity’s existence is continued into the distant future. ‘’Why try to find a cure for cancer or enhance the seismic safety for bridges, or improve the quality of early childhood if there will be no people around to benefit from one’s efforts.’’ (Scheffler 2015). What the doomsday scenario suggests is that much of the tasks we give ourselves throughout our lives rest on this precondition of continuity. It ‘’reveals our willingness to harness the resources of instrumental rationality to pursue goals whose achievement will occur only after we are gone.’’ (Scheffler 2012, Lecture 1 p. 13). The goals people often pursued therefore only make sense on the assumption that future generations will exist, which is why the disappearance of humanity would be so devastating. In short,
Scheffler claims that we have an interest in the survival of future generations because they matter to us, not because we have an interest in their survival (Scheffler 2015). It is not so that people who regard their activities as worthwhile are motivated by the idea that they would be remembered for it, yet faced with humanity’s imminent disappearance would nevertheless cease to find reasons to continue pursuing these activities (Scheffler 2015).
Scheffler argues that beneficence based literature that focuses on determining maximizing the quality, or, the quantity of life in the near future offers a limited scope of motivational factors that could contribute towards the consideration of future generations. The complexity of human attitudes and motivations is our most striking feature which is why every simplifying and reductive theory of human psychology inevitably ends in failure (Scheffler 2015). In his 2012 lecture at Stanford University, he therefore offers four alternative reasons for securing the continuity of humanity.
The first are reasons of interest:
The primary reason why the prospect of humanity’s disappearance would be devastating to those engaged in such activities is not that it would make the activities seem pointless, the activities only make sense in the first place on the assumption that future generations matter to us and, because their survival matters to us. The primary reason for our concern is that humanity’s survival matters to us in its own right whether we recognise it or not, the appeal to our interests presupposes this. In short, we have an interest in their survival because they matter to us, they do not matter to us because we have an interest in their survival (Scheffler 2015)
Scheffler makes a point that that this should not be misinterpreted as an egotistical desire for people to live beyond our lifetimes. He insists that precisely because we are so saddened by the prospect of humanity’s demise, our interest in them is revealed independently from our
dependence on them to give meaning to our own lives. He clarifies this by distinguishing reasons of concern and reasons of interest. Reasons of concern rest on the fact that the fate of future generations matter to us in its own right, and reasons of interest appeal to our own interest in pursuing worthwhile activities throughout our lives (Scheffler 2015). Our concern for future generations does not manifest itself in a desire to impact the lives of people, or to leave a legacy of some sort. Rather, it is a straightforward concern for the extension and continuity of generations into the indefinite future under conditions conducive to human flourishing
(Scheffler 2015). Scheffler gives the example of a person working to find a cure for cancer. A person working in cancer research may never live to see her research actually paying off, yet she continues to spend her time on contributing towards finding the cure. If this person knew the world would end in the near future, she may no longer find it worthwhile to continue pursuing this goal seeing as only a few people would benefit from it and only for a short while. What this example tells us, is that the importance of many projects we undergo throughout our lifetimes is not diminished by our own deaths but would be diminished by the prospect of
example is that the continuation of our species matters more to us than our own continued existence, because it is a condition of other things mattering to us (Scheffler 2012, Lecture 1 p. 12)
What Scheffler finds so interesting about this dormant concern we have for future generations is that it reveals the limits of our temporal parochialism. The fact that we are capable of feeling such sadness and despair at the prospect of humanity’s extinction shows that the survival of humanity matters a great deal to us and reveals another reason why we care about future generations, namely, reasons of love:
When in our imagination we contemplate the imminent disappearance of the human race, and when we react to that prospect with feelings of loss, sadness, and even despair, it becomes clear that the survival of human beings matters deeply to us, despite our tendency to overlook this fact. The point can be put more strongly if we say, following Harry Frankfurt, that love consists in a disinterested concern for the flourishing of what is loved than in experiencing such reactions, what we reveal is our love for humanity (Scheffler 2015).
Yet how can it be said that we feel love for people who do not yet exist? Or may never exist? Should the indeterminacy of their identities and the uncertainty of their existence not be incompatible with emotions such as love? (Scheffler 2016). Scheffler would argue that it is not. He draws a comparison from the book ‘Children of Men’, in which the entire world has become infertile. How this prospect results in a depressing effect on regular human motivations
complies with Scheffler’s argument that we have a deeply embedded love for humanity. This is not the same love that we feel for the people close to us in the present, rather, it is a love that comes closer to one of art, poetry, or music. The love of humanity is buried deep into the range of attitudes and dispositions Scheffler claims most of us possess (Scheffler 2015). Such feelings are not rendered irrational or inappropriate due to the indeterminacy of the identities of future people. By suggesting that many people would react to the disappearance of humanity with sadness and despair, Scheffler argues that a form of concern is revealed that can best be described as a love for humanity (Scheffler 2015).
Scheffler makes a point that indeed when we look into newspapers anywhere in the world the odds are that what we encounter directly contradicts the notion that people inherently possess a love for humanity. Yet, he clarifies that he does not think all people possess such a love, only that most people do. Furthermore, the savagery that occurs in one part of the world does not undermine the reality of kindness in the other. Just as the selfish indulgences an individual may have do not mean that his love for humanity is thereby eliminated. Scheffler merely attempts to illustrate how the love of humanity forms a part of a mix of motivations for the things that we do on a daily basis (Scheffler 2015). Again, one might argue that reasons of love are self-interested ones because we only have such reasons because these people matter to us. However, with reference to John Rawls, Scheffler argues that a distinction between the
interests of a self, and an interest in oneself needs to be made (Scheffler 2015). To claim that our distress as a result of a loved one being harmed is out of self-interest does not render our distress self-interested. ‘’To say that we’re self-interested is to say something about what we take an interest in, namely ourselves. It is not to say that it is we who take an interest.’’
(Scheffler 2015). Whereas reasons of love find their origin in our direct concern for the survival of humanity, reasons of interest are a result of our capacity to lead value-laden lives and our vulnerability to the extinction of humanity (Scheffler 2015).
Following up from these two alternative reasons for considering future generations comes a third reason Scheffler calls reasons of value:
For part of the dismay we feel in contemplating the human race’s imminent extinction is a response neither to the defeat of our own interests, nor to the fate of the humanity we love, but, rather to the destruction of value (Scheffler 2015).
Reasons of value represent an attitudinal phenomenon that have deliberative, emotional, and motivational dimensions (Scheffler 2012, Lecture 1 p. 3). Our distressed responses to the deaths of people that we love, or the destruction of things that we value deeply ‘’highlights a
conservative dimension in our attitudes toward what we value.’’ (Scheffler 2012, Lecture 1 p. 8). It reveals a conceptual connection between something that we value and wanting something to be sustained (Scheffler 2012, Lecture 1 p. 8). What this means is that we have reasons to act in such a way so as to preserve or sustain the things that we value. This does not refer to a specific person or object that we wish to preserve, rather, what we realise that needs to be preserved when considering the end of humanity is the value of valuing itself. Without anyone to listen to the masterpieces composed by Mozart or Bach, the concept of valuing becomes redundant. It is this realisation at the prospect of humanity’s extinction that value ceases to exist which gives us perhaps the greatest motivation of all to consider future generations. The issue is therefore neither our interest nor love for humanity, rather it is our desire for the things that we value, as well as the conscious act of valuing itself, which should continue to exist in the future.
Reasons of value also offer a response to Parfit’s non-identity problem. The prospect of losing value in its entirety outweighs the moral problem of altering the identity of future generations through present actions. The fact that this would occur does not give us sufficient reason not to act. To argue that a change in our actions would harm future generations can therefore not be accepted. It is more important that people can exist in the future indefinitely, than that some people will exist for the next few generations. An appeal to reasons of valuing therefore offers grounds for dismissing Parfit’s claims. It cannot be claimed that the future generations that would exist if we did nothing should be secured at the expense of the entire human race. Furthermore, the same argument would apply to the future generations that would exist if we
