Who is ready to bleed for the United States? : European support for US-led missions after the Cold War

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Master thesis political science: Grand strategy in the 21th century

Who is ready to bleed for the United States ?

- European support for US-led missions after the Cold War -

Willem de Grave 6015867

First reader: Dr. P.A van Hooft Second reader: Dr. S. Rezaeiejan Date: 30-01-2015

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3 Abstract

Under the unipolar moment that emerged after the end of the Cold War the United States has on several occasions embarked on military out-of-area operations to shape the international environment. The difference in the degree of support for these missions provided by its traditional Western European allies is remarkable. While some countries have showed extraordinary willingness to ‘fight and die’ next to the US, other states have stood on the side-line time and again. In the thesis the argument is developed that system level

explanations cannot account for this. First, distinctions based on relative material capabilities, fail to account for differences between states holding the same capabilities. Second,

explanations associated with alliance dependence and balance of threat fail to create

differencing hypothesis because these pressures are to a large degree felt in the same way by the highly similar European states.

To account for difference in contributions, on the domestic level Atlanticism as part of a country’s strategic culture is developed as the mechanism through which elites judge their alliance with the US, the level of threat coming from a region and the preferred method of dealing with this threat. Coupled with the promise of political influence, these moral and utility incentives have led to robust preferences of the elites in these countries in the period under investigation, hereby accounting for consistent differences in contributions. The strength of Atlanticism makes other domestic variables like public opinion and the domestic political structure of the country of subordinate importance.

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1 Introduction

In 1989 the bipolar system, that had marked international politics for decades, crumbled with the demise of the Soviet Union. After a short period of optimism in a peaceful ‘end of

history’ however soon a new variety of threats required international attention. Enjoying unmatched military capabilities, from now on the world looked predominantly to the United States (US) to deal with these challenges. Whether fuelled by international pressures or a domestic drive to spread the ‘American way’ the US actively picked up this task and became actively involved in dozens of hazards over the last two and a half decades. Though the country hereby possessed the military capabilities to tackle these conflicts on its own, it preferred to build broad coalitions of states to provide them with international legitimacy and a share in the risks (Kreps, 2011:7). Consequently, coalition warfare has become one of the central features of warfare after the end of the Cold War (Ashraf, 2011:1).

For its coalitions the United States looked for the support of those states that shared a similar worldview and had high value of their alliance with the country (Poulsen, 2012: VII). Traditionally, these had been the Western European states with which it was united through the NATO alliance since the 1940’s.1 It was explained that this ‘grand bargain’ between the two sides of the Atlantic, in which the US would keep Europe safe and police the world in exchange for legitimacy and a share of the burden provided by its allies, explains the persistence of NATO after the Soviet threat had vanished (Sireci & Colleta, 2009:57). However, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the perceived reluctance of many of the traditional European states to uphold their share of the bargain hit an open nerve in US-EU relations. This led US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to label Western Europe as ‘old’ and reluctant (The Guardian, 2003a). Though this critique applied to states like Belgium, France and Germany other states of the ‘Old Europe’ like the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and the Netherlands had shown remarkable degrees of support for the US in their missions, hereby allowing for an interesting comparison.

This thesis is therefore dedicated to the US-led military out-of-area operations that have emerged after the Cold War. And particularly the issue of over- and under-contribution to these missions by its traditional Western European allies. It seeks to answer the question what has motivated the Europeans to place boots on the ground and will formulate an answer the question why some states on have shown remarkable willingness to ‘fight and die’ next to the

1_{List of Cold War Western European NATO members: Belgium ,Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg,}

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6 US, while other states on different occasion stood watching on the side-line. The question the thesis seeks to answer therefore is:

How can differences between European states in their contributions to US-led out-of-area missions after the end of the Cold War be explained?

The large number of variables connected to burden-sharing behaviour, and the debt of analysis necessary to grasp their essence, make it that current leading works on the topic are highly detailed studies of county’s incentives during one single mission. Consequently, there is ample academic work which seeks to explain differences in mission contributions over multiple missions. The frequency of US-led missions over the last decades hereby widens the opportunity to fill this gap. Since these works allow for comparisons over time and space patterns in contributions during this period become identifiable. This sort of conclusions seem feasible in an era in which coalition burden-sharing between Europe and the United States has become of increasing interest due to changing power relations and growing instability around Europe’s frontiers (German Marshall Fund,2013).

In the thesis a Neoclassical realist argument towards explaining contributions will be developed. It will be shown that explanations coming from the system level of international politics fail to provide an answer to the research question because the great similarity of states under investigation leads to a convergence in incentives from this level. To account for differences Atlanticism as part of a country’s strategic culture is developed as the domestic mechanism through which elites judge their incentives for contributing. It will be shown that the strength of this variable will ultimately determine actual troop contributions, making other domestic variables like public opinion and domestic political configurations largely irrelevant during the period.

In the next section a short overview of the existing literature will be provided, followed by a theory section in which the thesis argument will be developed further. These theoretic claims will in the remainder of the thesis be tested against two pairs of two countries (the UK & France and Denmark & Belgium) which approach similar cases on many important dimensions but differ on their degree of ascribed Atlanticism. The contributions of these states will be compared during three high profile cases: The Persian Gulf war (1991), the Afghanistan war (2001) and the Iraq war (2003). The thesis will end with a conclusion, in which the implications of the research will be discussed.

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2 Literature review

Questions relating to burden-sharing behaviour between allies have been under scholarly attention since the Cold War. As a result of these academic debates, three broad categories of explanations have developed in literature. The first strand of literature is offered by structural realism which seeks to explain burden-sharing by looking at explanations stemming from the international system. The second strand of literature looks for variables at the domestic level and consists of ‘strategic culture’ and what will be called here ‘domestic political setting’ literature. The last strand of literature uses explanations from both the system and domestic level to explain burden-sharing behaviour. The main contributions off all three strands of literature will be discussed below.

2.1 System level explanations

Structural realism or neorealism offers a system level theory of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing (Ashraf, 2011:37). Structural realism has two central premises:

First, since there is no overarching international sovereign, that can make or enforce international laws and punish or reward state behaviour, the international system must be perceived as and anarchy of states.

Second, under this anarchy a state can ultimately only rely on itself to safeguard its existence and interests. Power is therefore perceived as the currency of international politics,

underlying in all state relations. It is however not the absolute quantity of capabilities of a state that determines its behaviour but its relative material capabilities towards other states in the system (Schweller, 1997:927).

For all realists the interactions between states are dependent on the division of relative material capabilities (polarity) of the system (Rose, 1998:144). Within this given system, states are assumed to be undifferentiated, rational units whose aim at a minimum is to survive. But at the same time states will also try to maximize their utility versus other states because the anarchic tenants of the system forces them to act selfish (Zagare, 2004:108). Structural realists expect that the pressures described above can give a full account of state behaviour. Consequently, the theory assumes that similarly placed states in the international system respond in the same fashion to input from their external environment. Structural realism has developed three broad explanations of coalition burden-sharing which will be discussed below.

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8 2.1.2 Collective action

Collective action theorists have indicated that coalition burden-sharing between allies in out-of-area operations should be perceived collective action problems. Assuming that the intensions of US missions are benign, and not imperialistic in nature, the output these missions produce are public goods. Because all states in the system benefit, but also because states who don’t contribute to the collective effort, to for example stabilize a region, cannot be excluded from the gains in terms of safety (Olsen & Zekhauser,1966:266-79). Assumed to be rational and out to maximize utility, states will therefore voluntarily not contribute more than the gain it would receive if the good were supplied to all (Bennet et al, 1994:41). With this as underlying assumption Olsen & Zeckhauser demonstrated that collective actions of alliances will therefore be plagued by free rider problems (Olsen & Zeckhauser, 1966:266). They showed that during these missions larger states will face a strong tendency to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, while less powerful states will only marginally contribute to the provision of public goods (Massie, 2014:3). The logic behind this is that larger members of alliances have higher stakes in the outcome and hereby have the resources to provide a significant amount of the collective good, while smaller members can only hope to make a very modest impact on the collective efforts (Olsen & Zekhauser, 1966: 279).

2.1.3 Alliance dependence

In later work it was questioned whether the output produced by alliances satisfies the definition of a pure public good. It was argued that under certain circumstances countries will have private incentives to contribute to the collective provision of a mission (Massie, 2014:4). One of these private incentives indicated in literature is the concept of alliance dependence (Ashraf, 2001:45). Glenn Snyder indicated that states upholding alliances inherently face two fears:

The first is abandonment: the fear that an ally may leave the alliance or fails to provide support when this is expected.

The second is entrapment: the fear of becoming entangled by an ally in a conflict peripheral to a state’s interest (Snyder, 2007:187-188).

Snyder’s showed that states fearing abandonment will show greater commitment to

upholding an alliance, either voluntarily or because they are sensitive to requests and pressure from bigger allies (Snyder, 2007:187-188). Using Snyder’s model on burden-sharing it was argued that states that are dependent on the United States for the provision of important state functions are more likely to make considerable contributions to its out-of-area operations

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9 (Bennet et al, 1994:44). This alliance dependence can be of military as well as economic nature. With respect to the former scholars like Jens Ringmose indicated that this logic helps explaining why states who are highly dependent on the provision of American security like the Baltic states and Poland disproportionally contributed to US missions after the End of the Cold War (Ringmose, 2010:331). Regarding the latter, Bennet et al showed that for this reason Egypt, which received massive amounts of economic aid from the US during the time, contributed heavily to the US-led intervention in the Gulf in the 1990’s (Bennet et al,

1994:45).

2.1.4 Balance of threat

The second private incentive coming from the international system relates to the level of threat a state perceives coming from a region.

Patricia Weitsman has shown that states facing a strong threat from an external enemy will contribute more toward a coalition than states facing less threat (Weitsman, 1997:156). Because such a state will have a higher stake in a good outcome, the logic of collective action is overcome at this point. Scholars hereafter used this idea to explain differences in

contributions to US-led missions. Bennet et al used the idea to explain contributions of states like Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War (Bennet et al, 1994:43). Davidson recently used threats to a state’s psychical security as a variable determining significant amounts of countries contributions to multinational coalitions (Davidson, 2011:78).

2.1.5 Criticism

Even though structural realism is strong on its assumptions the theory suffers from two major shortcomings. First, because states are assumed to fully rational respond to inputs from the international system, structural realism falls short of explaining a situation when two similarly placed states in the system respond in different ways to similar systemic inputs (Schweller,2004:161). Second, structural realism ignores the domestic level political and cultural constraints, through which systemic incentives and pressures are filtered to shape states’ decisions on burden-sharing (Ashraf, 2011:44).

2.2 Domestic level explanations

In contrast to the system level explanations of Neorealism, proponents of domestic level explanations look for variables within the nation-state. In literature two broad categories can be distinguished. The first category looks at the domestic political setting of a state when

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10 deciding on the use of force abroad. The second category of literature consists of strategic culture explanations.

2.2.1 Domestic political setting

Work in the domestic political setting strand of literature generally includes research on the influence of public opinion and the autonomy of the executive to decide on the use of force abroad.

Public opinion

Scholarly work regarding the use of force generally holds that that executives fear being electorally punished for their policy decisions. This idea was best captured by Thomas Risse-Kappen who in his 1991 work argued that “Policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against an overwhelming public consensus” (Risse-Kappen, 1991:510). Working from this tradition three broad categories of literature can be distinguished regarding public opinion and troop contributions. First, the bottom-up approach which holds that policy positions on troop contributions affect a voters choose, both the executive and opposition will adopt a public strategy that appeals to the position of the mass public (Schultz,1998:831). Consequently, scholars working in the bottom-up tradition expects that an unfavourable public opinion environment will ultimately limit the support a country will provide for US-led missions (Larson & Savych 2005:xvii). Second, the top-down approach suggests that the public takes its opinion on complex issues like foreign intervention from elites (Ashraf, 2011:54). Elites can usually frame interventions using persuasive rhetoric and their access to mass media, hereby getting the public behind their preferred course of action (Kreps,

2010:199). Last in recent analysis of burden-sharing between the US and its European allies during the last decade the elite consensus thesis, which holds that public opinion doesn’t hold either top-down or bottom-up tenets has become of increasing dominance. Sarah Kreps for instance argued that systemic incentives towards international cooperation create consensus between both the executive and parliament about the course of action, hereby sheltering leadership from electoral punishment (Kreps, 2010: 192).

Autonomy of the executive

Public decisions in democracies can at times also be constrained by parliament. Bennet et al argued that, in general, executives will be more willing to support international missions than legislatures because they will feel the pressure put on them by systemic pressures more

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11 directly, while legislatives representing society on the other hand will worry more about short time issues like risks and costs (Bennet et al, 1994:46). When opinions between the executive and legislative differ the autonomy of the executive on questions relating to the use force becomes decisive (Bennet et al, 1994:46). Wagner has shown that as a result of particular historical trajectories and political configurations major differences exist between the

European states on this parameter. Like Bennet et al, Wagner hereby held the assumption that the higher the degree of parliamentary control, the easier it is for parliament to put restrictions on the use of force abroad (Wagner, 2006:53). Strong bulwarks against the use force abroad have been identified as particularly strong in the Post-World War II political systems of Germany and Japan. But of the states under investigation this has also been observed for Denmark (Wagner, 2006:40).

2.2.2 Strategic culture

Strategic culture theorists aim to explain differences in state behaviour by looking at an actor’s domestic identity in security and defence matters (Biehl et al, 2013:9). The concept was first coined by Jack Snyder. In his view historical processes that are particular to a country form a ‘perceptual lens’ through which strategic issues are processed, hereby affecting policy in such a way that similarly placed states can respond differently to inputs from the system (Longhurst 2000:302). Strategic culture literature can be categorized in three broad generations:

The first generation conceptualized strategic culture as the context within which states form their security policies. Starting from the assumption that strategic culture produces tendencies and preferred working methods, while not ultimately determining behaviour (Biehl et al, 2013:10). Working in this tradition, Sedivy & Zaborowsky for instance stated that strategic culture lays out the repertoire of possible policy tools available for dealing with a situation (Sedivy&Zaborowski:2010:193). Kerry Longhurst hereby contended that strategic culture tends to outlast the era of its original inception, hereby influencing state behaviour over longer periods of time (Longhurst, 2004:6).

The second generation of research hereafter focused on the differences between officially declared policy and the ‘real’ aims and motives of a security elite (Biehl et al, 2013:10). Last, the third generation, heavily influenced by social constructivism, conceptualized strategic culture as a variable that independently determined a specific actor’s behaviour. Al Johnston for instance described strategic culture as: “A limited and ranked set of grand strategic preferences that are constant across objects and persistent over time” (Johnston, 1998:38).

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Atlanticism

With respect to strategic culture and Transatlantic burden-sharing the concept of Atlanticism has been indicated as holding particular explanatory value. Atlanticism hereby refers to the preferred international form of security and defence cooperation of a country, and is often put opposite towards Europeanism (Biehl et al, 2012:15).In general, Atlanticists are described as those countries that view the alliance with the United States as the most important

institutional institution for the provision of security and the wellbeing of a state, and Europeanists those countries that want the European Union to have greater autonomy on these matters (Biehl et al,2012:15). In a comprehensive qualitative work on strategic culture Biehl et al (2013) argued that the foreign policy preferences of all European states can be distinguish based on this categorization. Making use of the same academic concepts Becker & Malesky later on quantitatively showed that there is strong correlation between the extent to which a state’s strategic culture is Altanticist or Europeanist, and a state’s allocation of resources towards NATO or the EU (Becker & Malesky, 2012:7). John Ringmose in 2010 hereby found that allies of the US who perceived themselves as particularly strong

Atlanticists contributed disproportionally more to the Afghanistan mission than other NATO states (Ringmose, 2010:331).

2.2.3 Criticism

Recently the ascribed value of domestic level explanations as a counterweight to structural explanations has increased. Used as intervening variables cultural and political variables have proven to be helpful tools in explaining state behaviour. However, used as independent variables the theory suffers from a major shortcoming by ignoring the influence of systemic incentives and constraints on mission contributions (Ashraf, 2011:59). This is the reason why models that use both levels of analysis have become increasingly used as a tool to analyse troop contributions.

2.3 Neoclassical explanations

Neoclassical realism offers a middle ground between structural and domestic level theories. Scholarly work in the Neoclassical tradition holds that systemic pressures and incentives shape the general direction of foreign policy, without being precise enough to determine the exact details of state behaviour, to do this the domestic level need to be analysed (Rose, 1998:146). Neoclassical realist therefore concurs with Neorealism that international systemic

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13 incentives should be the starting point of analysis. However, strategic culture and domestic politics act as intervening variables in determining what specific foreign policy actions a state will pursue (Ashraf, 2011:62).

2.3.4 Criticism

By incorporating both levels of analysis Neoclassical theories seem most promising in terms of outcome, but the field is far from complete. There are two leading theoretical models on coalition burden-sharing that use both systemic and domestic level variables to explain variation: Bennet et al’s account of coalition burden-sharing during the Persian Gulf (1994) and David Auerswald's model of coalition behaviour during NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999. 2 These works, by focusing on the European middle powers, leave the small powers which form the bulk of European states undiscussed. By focussing on a single case they hereby lack the power to generalize findings over multiple missions. As a result current models lack the power to explain the research question.

3 Theory section

In the section above it was indicated that in search of an answer to the question how different countries contribute to out-of-area operations scholars have pointed to explanations coming from the system and domestic level. The lack of an encompassing answer provided by any of these strands of literature has led to integrated models, which include explanations from both levels during a single mission, these models however generally exclude the small powers and lack generalizability by using models fit for a single mission.

The aim of the thesis is therefore to build a framework which can explain the varying contributions of Western European states over multiple missions regardless of its size. The fact that in the last twenty five years several US-led missions in which European countries contributed have been conducted without major shifts in polarity hereby makes such a

broader theory possible.3 In order to do so, in the section below first the independent variable will be described in more detail. Hereafter the feasibility of the variables which could the

2_{Recent work in the Neoclassical tradition also include David Richardson’s American allies and War}

(2011) and Daniel Baltrusaitis account of coalition politics during the Iraq war (2010). For these works the same critique applies, with Davidson not discussing the small powers and Baltrusaitis only discussing the Iraq case.

3_{The model described below operates under the current the current configuration of international}

power: unipolarity. This refers to an international system in which a single state (the US) controls a disproportionate share of the politically relevant resources of the system (Walt, 2009:92). In a future world in which the configuration of power differs, state incentives towards burden-sharing during US-led interventions will likely be different.

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14 independent variable to vary will be discussed, ultimately leading to a set of testable

hypothesis (Gerring, 2012:129-130). The section ends with a methodology section in which first the measurement of variables and later mission contributions is discussed. The section ends with a description of the case and mission selection.

3.1 Dependent variable

The variable under investigation in the thesis is contributions to US – led out-of-area operations:

Contributions refers to the actual provision of military forces on foreign soil by European states.4

Out-of-area operations refers to the fact that the military operations were conducted away from the home soil of the United States and Europe.

US-led refers to the fact that it can reasonably assumed that the United States were the leading power behind the operation.

3.2 Independent variables

In the section below the variables which could cause variations in contributions are discussed. The section will start by discussing system level variables followed by domestic level

variables. If possible a distinction of the states under investigation based on the variable will hereby be provided.

3.2.1 System level variables

In literature relative material capabilities, alliance dependence and balance of threat have been indicated, their feasibility will be discussed below.

Relative material capabilities

It was indicated that, all other variables neglected, states facing an anarchy of states will have strong incentive to pass the buck of the provision of public goods to other states (Massie, 2014:4). However, large states cannot free ride as easy as small states during international missions for two reasons:

First, their contributions make a big difference on the total contribution towards the mission

4_{Financial contributions to US-led missions will be neglected, because this sort of ‘check book diplomacy’}

is too closely associated with free-riding behaviour and unwillingness to share the actual burdens of military operations (Ringmose, 2010:328).

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15 (Massie, 2014:4). This is for the simple fact that the couple of large states in the international system are usually the states which possess the numbers and material to act in force outside their own region. Small states, which hold less capable armies, can hereby usually only hope to perform secondary or niche functions. Consequently, if the big states don’t deliver no-one will.

Second, for the larger states the social recognition of their relative power, its prestige, is of increased importance (Davidson, 2011:18). In a system where power is the ultimate currency underlying state relations, the bigger states will have huge incentive to show just how capable they are on the world stage (Schweller, 1997:71). Weak responses on the other hand, may lead a state’s rivals to believe the country is neither willing nor capable to engage in military action, which will ultimately be translated in its behaviour towards the country (Davidson, 2011:18).

Consequently, it is the assumption that the larger the relative material capabilities of a state the larger the share of the burden in out-of-area missions (Zeckhauser & Olsen, 268). Small states at this point will be tempted to free ride because their efforts cannot be expected to secure much of the public good than will already be supplied by the bigger states

(Baltrusaitis, 2008:126).

Country selection

Predictions associated with the size of a country seem promising in answering the research question since the states under investigation can be divided on this category. The widely accepted distinction between states in great, middle and small powers proves feasible in doing so. Based on indicators like the size of the population, military capabilities, and economic power most scholars would argue that the United Kingdom, Germany and France are the middle powers on the European continent.5 The bulk of other European states can be perceived as small powers due to their small capabilities.

The Correlates of War index, which is a frequently used source to list countries based on their material capabilities shows support for this distinction, as shown in figure 1 (Wohlforth, 1999:103).

5_{Middle powers lack the true power of great powers like the United States but still play a (considerable)}

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Figure 1: Material capabilities Western-European states (1991-2003) Country Score 1991 Score 2003 Aggreg ated Score 6₍₁₀₀₎ United States 0.136 0.142 13,85 Germany 0.0328 0.027 3,0 United Kingdom 0.0264 0.020 2,35 France 0.0234 0.0203 2,19 Italy 0.0212 0.0185 1,98 Spain 0.0123 0.0110 1,17 Netherlands 0.0073 0.0062 0,68 Belgium 0.0062 0.0049 0,63 Norway 0.0019 0.0017 0,18 Portugal 0.0019 0.0016 0,18 Denmark 0.0016 0.0016 0,16 Luxemburg 0.0008 0.0005 0,07 Total World 1 1 100 (Correlates of War, 2013).

In the remainder of the thesis the feasibility of the relative material capacities thesis for answering the research question will be analysed. It will hereby be shown that domestic factors present in European states transform the logic of collective action to such a degree that the theory is unable to account for differences between similar states and in relative contributions.

Alliance dependence

Scholars have shown that in particular circumstances security or economic dependence on the US has led to contributions to its military operations. However, in the section below it will be argued that it is impossible to distinguish the Western European states on this category, making the theory of little relevance for answering the research question.

6_{Controlling for the aggregated scores for the entire period under investigation it is shown that the}

relative material capabilities of states have not fluctuated considerably in the period of investigation. Consequently, the classification in European small and middle powers can be perceived as being constant for the entire period under investigation.

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17 Security dependence

By upholding the security alliance between both sides of the Atlantic, symbolized in the collective defence clause of the NATO treaty, the US protects Europe from external aggression (Pedersen, 2011:1-2). Scholars indicated that the fear of renewed Russian aggression has made the former Soviet democracies in Eastern Europe highly dependent on American security, and this is the reason why these states were willing to contribute heavily to US-led military operations in the last decade (Ringmose, 2010:330).

For the Western European states under investigation in the thesis however, it seems fair to assume that they are less threatened by Russia.7 This makes security dependence against Russia less of a deal for these states than in the Eastern corners of Europe. However, given the anarchic tenants of the current international system, Western European states are likely to still value the American deterrence to some degree:

First, to hedge against any future uncertainness.

Second, because loss of American deterrence could invite renewed Russian aggression. Last, states are aware that the geopolitical battle against Russia is played on a multi-level board in which force is fungible, in the sense that it can be translated in other political domains other than the pure military (Art, 1996:3).

To explain how this can situation can lead to differences in military contributions however, it somehow must be made clear that major differences between European states exist on the points previously stated. In other words, European states must be able to a priori assume that they would be more or less vulnerable for hypothetical renewed Russian assertiveness if the Americans left the continent. This would then translate in different levels of alliance

dependence and corresponding contributions to US-led missions. No work on differences regarding different levels of threat from Russia for Western European states in the post-Cold War period exist. Given the interconnectedness of the European states and the high

unpredictability of war it hereby seems unlikely that any major differences exist that would lead to different incentives for the Western European states on this variable.

Economic dependence

States highly economic dependent on the United States may also be persuaded to contribute more to military missions. Western European states are by no means dependent on US aid however, so pure economic quid pro quo seems unlikely as a motive. It seems reasonable to

7_{One could for instance point to the increased geographical distance between Russia and Western Europe}

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18 assume however, that the European states under investigation are aware of the fact that they benefit from the current American coordinated economic system, and consequently value upholding this system. To make economic alliance dependence an explanatory variable for mission contributions based on this assumption however two conditions must be met: First, it must be assumed that European states are willing to send troops abroad for the pure fact that they fear that otherwise economic functions provided by the United States will in the future disappear.

Second, even then it must be possible to find considerable differences between the way Western European states profit economically from the current US-led economic system. Given the fact that all states under investigation share the same economic tenets, being highly developed market economies, with open economies, it seems unlikely that economic

dependence will lead to such major differences causes variation in incentives to contribute to US-led missions (CIA: 2014).

To sum up, systemic alliance dependence cannot create independent hypothesis regarding burden-sharing behaviour for the states under investigation. Later on it will be argued however that the perception of the functions performed by the US can create variation between European states.

Balance of Threat

The claim that states are more willing to incur the costs in life and material when the target of intervention threatens the country’s national interest seems plausible (Davidson, 2011:16). It is for instance easy to imagine why a country on the verge of being invaded would be more keen to join an international coalition against the aggressor than a country on the other side of the ocean.

The neutralization of systemic threat hereby forms the second systemic condition that can give countries different incentives to contribute to a military operation.

Following earlier work on the topic it is assumed that states attribute different value to the preservation of different types of threats:

- Security against external threats to guarantee the survival of the state is valued highest. - The physical wellbeing of a state’s citizens is valued second.8

- Threats to national prosperity which include economic interest and national resources are

8_{After the Cold War these threats for the Western states especially came from security risks that}

originated elsewhere in the world. Most notably after 9-11, international terrorism and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by ‘rough states’ came to dominate the Transatlantic security discourse (Ashraf, 2011:43).

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19 valued third (Davidson, 2011:9/ Massie, 2014:6).

It is the assumption of the thesis that differences between countries on the indicators

described above may lead to different assessments of threat. This translates in different stakes in the outcome of an intervention and therefore ultimately in differences in contribution. Though it is not possible to a priori assume this, it is however the contention of the thesis that systemic threat holds low explanatory value to answer the research question due to the their high similar nature of the states under investigation. As will be indicated below a state’s assessment of threat as part of its strategic narrative is however part of the explanation.

3.2.2 Domestic variables

In the literature review it was indicated that both the domestic political setting as well as the dominant strategic believes in a country have been indicated as state-level variables

influencing troop contributions to US-led missions. Their feasibility for answering the research question will be discussed below.

Domestic political setting

It was stated that decision makers are influenced by particular domestic pressures when making policy-decisions. However it will be argued below that these limiting variables have held little explanatory during the missions under investigation:

For a domestic structure to limit troop contributions two conditions must be met: First, the preference of the mass public and the executive must not coincide.9 Since if a majority of the public is in favour with the executive line it makes little sense for the opposition to try to politicalize the issue and decision makers will consequently fear no electoral consequences (Davidson, 2011:18). As will be shown in the thesis, this situation occurred in many countries throughout the missions.

Second, if public opinion is against contributing to a mission however, the bottom-up approach would predict that opposition groups, attracted by the promise of electoral profit, would diverge from the government’s policy and would advocate troop reduction or immediate withdrawal (Kreps,2010:192). At this point the degree of autonomy of the

executive from parliament to decide on the use of force becomes decisive. With executives in states confronted with the strongest control mechanisms facing the most severe pressure to

9_{It is hereby assumed that executives will favour the use of force abroad more than mass publics,}

legislatures or constitutions since they feel the pressure of systemic incentives more directly (Bennet et al,1994:46).

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20 limit their contribution (Bennet et al, 1994:47).

The thesis will however hold that the bottom-up approach fails to appreciate the strength of systemic and strategic cultural pressures to support the hegemon in the era under

investigation. Especially in the Altanticist states, decades of Transatlantic cooperation, an extended history of security and economic benefits and a promise of future cooperation, will make it that policy elites will go to great lengths to defend their contributions

(Kreps,2010:192). At this point, neither, public opinion, parliamentary control or constitutional bulwarks will limit the sending of forces abroad. The thesis will hereby

indicate that this commitment is made easier because pressures towards contributions are also on many occasions shared by (mainstream) opposition parties. Consequently, only the most unpopular of interventions will lead these parties to develop an electoral strategy towards contrary to executive preferences.

Country selection

Public opinion differs per country and mission and therefore an a-priori categorization of states on this parameter is not possible. The degree of parliamentary control can be perceived as a parameter constant for the period under investigation. Wagner listed three categories of states, as illustrated in figure 2, the thesis will side with this categorization.10

Figure 2: Level of parliamentary control Western-European states

Low Medium High

Country Belgium, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain Denmark, Germany (Wagner, 2006:5)

In the remainder of the thesis the assumption that domestic political variables hold little value will be tested. Given the fact that the bottom-up tradition would expect states with high levels of parliamentary control will face the most considerable challenges towards contribution this claim will be controlled in most detail.

10_{Wagner listed the degree of parliamentary control as}_'_{high' if the executive must seek prior}

parliamentary approval before it may send troops abroad. 'Medium' if parliament’s power of prior

approval is undermined by significant exceptions, and 'low' if there is no obligatory parliamentary

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21

Strategic culture of Atlanticism

In the thesis strategic culture refers to: the set of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a country’s elite that generate specific patterns of preferences in actions and policy (Biehl et al, 2013:12). Following earlier work in the first generation of strategic culture research it is hereby assumed that:

- The carriers of strategic culture in a country are policy elites.

- There is one dominant strand of elite strategic culture in discourse and practice in a country. - Strategic culture in a country is persistent over time, hereby tending to outlast the era of its original inception (Biehl et al, 2013:12).

With respect to European strategic culture it has been indicated that ever since the 1980’s, but especially after the Cold War, states can be categorized as being Altanticist or Europeanist. Atlanticist hereby refers to the European states that view the alliance with the United States as the primary institutional structure to provide for its security and general wellbeing (Biehl et al, 2012:15).

Europeanist hereby refers to the European states that value a more independent role for the European Union to provide for their security and general wellbeing (Biehl et al, 2012:15). It is the contention of the thesis that Atlanticist states contribute more than Europeanist states to US-led missions because of the following mechanism: In an anarchic world system states try to maximize utility, which simply means that executives in their policy choices try to create as much security and economic wellbeing as possible. Coming out of the bipolar system European states found two institutional pillars to provide this for them: the European and the Atlanticist framework. Both these pillars have their merits in terms of attraction, and are somewhat contradictorily, be it for the fact that the United States on many occasions have used its influence to withhold the strengthening of the European pillar (Nolan, 2011:77).11 Given the great unpredictability of the international environment, it is hereby extremely hard, not to say impossible, for European states to objectively determine which pillar it should support to receive a maximum result in utility in the long run. The choice between Europe and the US is important on a wide range of policy topics. To justify making such choices elites developed a strategic narrative based on their perception of US power and role on the world stage, the possibility of a fully independent European pole, and the role of the specific country wished to play on the international stage. As indicated by strategic culture scholars this narrative became dominant and persistent overtime within elite discourse, hereby

11_{It has been observed that the US is especially reluctant on the development of an independent European}

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22 translating in developed habits of behaviour (Longhurst, 2004:6). This led consecutive elites to commit themselves to either one of the two institutional frameworks or to develop a more mixed strategy.

With respect to contributions to US-led missions, the adherents of the Transatlantic pole hold two important tenets:

First, their perception of alliance dependence. With Atlanticist states tending to share the vision of the importance of a stable, sustainable, US- led international order for their own wellbeing (Becker & Malesky, 2012:7-8).

Second, their perception of levels of threat. With Atlanticist states tending to share the vision of the United States when it comes to the level of threat posed by a region, even when this threat level is ambiguous, and the best way to tackle this threat.

However it is not just the moral obligation to contribute to an US-led public good that lead policy elites in Altanticist countries to contribute more than its Europeanist counterparts, there is also a more realpolitical incentive. The believe in the feasibility of an American dominated system lead these states to believe that being on good terms with the US is extremely important. Consequently, in Atlanticist countries the believe exist that showing a ‘willingness to bleed’ will translate in political leverage with the US, from which the county will ultimately benefit.12

States being less Atlanticist on the other hand hold face less of these moral and realpolitical incentives. Because these states hold the believe that their security and economic wellbeing does not depend on an international framework led by the United States their perception alliance dependence is lower. This gives Europeanist states less incentive to follow the US blindly in their assessment of the threat a region possess, especially if this is ambiguous, or solutions to the problem are multiple.

Policy elites in these states hereby seem less attracted by the promise of leverage with the US, especially if contributing to US-led missions collides with other strategic national preferences or holds the prospect of electoral backlash.

Consequently, the decision to provide troops to US-led missions under unipolarity comes as a trade-off between strategic narratives and the possible prospect for political influence. For Atlanticist states their pro US conception gives moral obligations to provide support an makes the prospect of influence more attractive. For the Europeanist states their strategic

12_{Most notably, increased access to Washington officials to lobby a country’s preferences and}

quid-pro pro logic regarding the appointment of officials for important international functions. (Henriksen & Ringmose,2010:162).

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23 narrative will collide more easily with US actions, hereby limiting contributions even if this means a loss in leverage with the unipole.

Country selection

For the states under investigation recent work in both the qualitative and quantitative tradition points to the same direction when it comes to the degree of Atlanticism of the Western

European states during the period under investigation.

Qualitative strategic culture studies show convergence around the assumption that especially Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom have shown strong versions of Atlanticism in their behaviour while the Netherlands has shown a more moderate version (Biehl et al,2013:1-385 / Stahl et al,2004:417-441 / Mouritzen,2007: 155-167/ Græger & Haugevik, 2009:1-58 /Dunne,2004:893-909). Of the states holding a more mixed policy preference between both institutional pillars both Spain and Germany have been labelled as holding a slightly more Atlanticist policy, followed by Italy. France, Belgium and Luxembourg were seen by all as the most Europeanists of the countries under investigation (Garcia & Pardo, 2014:77/ Croci, 2008:1-2/ Erb, 2004:1). This categorization is largely supported by the quantitative study of Becker and Malesky, their findings are presented in figure 3 (Becker & Malesky, 2013:37).13

Figure 3: Atlanticism Western European states

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24 3.3An integrated model of county contributions under unipolarity

To sum up, executives responsible for the decision whether to join the US in their out of area operation or not face several pressures. At the system level, they are first concerned with their status on the world stage (relative capabilities) and the impact of this for their expected role in the conflict. Second, they consider their systemic dependence on the United States and the level of threat coming from the region. It was however indicated that these variables are unable to influence or divide the highly similar European states. What truly matters in the turbulent and uncertain times leading up to an intervention are executives developed habits of looking at the international system, the role of the US and how best to maximize utility under these circumstances. The moral and realpolitical incentives elites in Atlanticist states hereby face lead them to make big contributions. These incentives are so strong that, even when confronted with negative public opinion or parliamentary opposition, elites will stick to their commitments. The following is illustrated in figure 4. 14

Figure 4: Decision model European Elites towards US-led missions System level

Domestic level

14_{In the figure the green lines correspond with what causes variation in troop contributions between the}

states under investigation.

Elite decision on troop contributions

Strategic culture Degree parliamentary control Relative material capabilities Balance of Threat Alliance dependence perception Threat perception Public opinion Alliance dependence Political influence perception

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25 3.4 Hypothesis

Based on the theoretic assumptions presented above several testable hypotheses can be created:

System level hypothesis:

H1a: Small powers will free ride on the efforts of the bigger powers by contributing less in both absolute and relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions.

H1b: States with similar relative material capabilities will contribute the same towards US-led out-of-area missions.

H2a: States facing a high level of threat will contribute considerably to an US-led out-of-area mission to secure that region.

H2b: States facing a high level of threat from a region will contribute more in relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions than states perceiving a low level of threat.

Domestic level hypothesis:

H3a: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will contribute more in relative terms to US-led out-of-area missions than states with no strategic culture of Atlanticism.

H3b: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will be influenced in their contributions to US-led out-of-area operations by the prospect of political influence with the hegemon.

H3c: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will justify their contributions to US-led out-of-area operations with an appeal on alliance dependence.

H3d: States with a strategic culture of Atlanticism will show convergence in threat

perception and the preferred method of dealing with the threat with the US, even if the level of threat is ambiguous and solutions multiple.

H4a: Public opinion doesn’t influence executive decisions to contribute troops to US-led out-of-area operations.

H4b: Parliament or constitutional bulwarks will not limit the contribution of a state to US-led out-of-area operations.

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26

3.5 Research design

The section below will indicate how the hypotheses will be tested in the remainder of the thesis. The section will start with a discussion of how the variables used in the model will be analysed. Hereafter an assessment of how absolute and relative contributions of states will be measured and weighted will follow. In the last part of the chapter the case and mission selection will be discussed. It will be argued that four countries form the ‘ideal type’ of Western European states and three missions prove particularly feasible in measuring the European ‘willingness to bleed’ for the US.

3.5.1 Measurement variables

In the section below the measurement of the assumptions associated with first system level and hereafter domestic level variables are discussed.

Relative material capabilities

Underlying hypothesis 1a + 1b lay the assumption that states are utility maximizing and fully rational. Within this framework bigger states will contribute more because:

- Bigger states military capabilities holds more valuable for warfighting. - Bigger states value international prestige more.

The feasibility of the first claim will be tested by an assessment of the nature of the conflict. This includes the nature of US requests from its allies and the military means a state needed to participate in the conflict.

The feasibility of the second claim will be tested by looking if prestige could be obtained from participating in the conflict and by assessing if this has influenced executive decisions.

Balance of Threat

As indicated, states can face different levels of threat coming from a region, translating in different incentives to contribute.

Even though the level of threat will be mostly a qualitative assessment, the first two levels of threat a state can face: security against external threat and threats to the wellbeing of its citizens will be assessed using:

- The geographic distance from the conflict: which controls for possible spill over effects a European country might face from instability coming from a region of US-led intervention.

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27 - The intentions of the actor: which controls if an actor against which intervention is aimed threatened the particular European state.

- Offensive capabilities: which controls if the actor at which intervention directed is able to strike at a European state (Bennet et al, 1994: 43).

The third, economic level, will be assessed by looking if instability in a region could in any way disrupt either high levels of trade or an open flow of natural resources (oil) of which a country is dependent.

Domestic political setting

Controlling for the influence of the domestic setting of a country ultimately comes down to answering the question if domestic pressures led to a situation in which executives were no longer able to act in preference with their systemic and strategic incentives. To control for the thesis contention that this situation did not occur two control mechanisms are developed: First, it will be shown that domestic structure on many occasions could not have limited contributions because public opinion was in favour of intervention. This will be assessed by consulting public opinion polls prior to, and during important times in the mission.15 Second, at the point when public opinion becomes unfavourable towards intervention it will be first looked at if this led to parliamentary opposition which made hindered the executive in their preferences. But also if executives were sensitive for this public pressure, and

consequently withdraw or limited their contributions in the short to medium term Strategic culture

The effect of strategic culture on troop contributions will be tested by an assessment of the degree to which morality and the prospect of political leverage influenced a country’s executive to make a contribution. In order to do so historical and academic works,

biographies, and executive statements will be consulted and weighted for each country during the missions.

3.5.2 Measurements of mission contributions

The thesis will use several control mechanisms to test country’s contributions. Most notably quantitative mechanisms will be used, these are however supplemented by a qualitative assessment. Taken together they form an overall assessment of these indicators provides a

15_{Most attention will be given to public opinion during the initial decision to provide support for an}

US-led mission or not. It is the assumption that this executive decision is more severe than maintaining or reducing forces in later instances of the intervention (Davidson,2011: 22).

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28 picture of the actual ‘willingness to bleed’ during a mission, with ultimately exposure to risk weighted highest for reasons discussed below.

3.5.2.1 Quantitative measurements

The quantitative measurements used in the thesis can be divided in absolute and relative contributions, and exposure to risk.

Absolute troop contributions

Absolute troop contributions are measured by either the total number of troops contributed by a country during short missions or by the peak contribution of a country during longer

missions. This indicator consequently allows for comparisons about the commitment states

Relative troop contributions

Given the great difference in material capabilities between the states under investigation, more important in burden-sharing debates is the contribution a country made in relation to its material capabilities (Ringmose, 2010:332).

To account for this, two measurements will be used in the thesis:

- Total number troops contributed / total number of inhabitants (100,000 inhabitants) -Total number troops contributed / total number of military personnel

This indicator consequently allows for comparisons about the commitment states were willing to make in relation to its size.

Exposure to risk: relative number of combatant deaths

Though hinting at the weight of a commitment, absolute and relative contributions don’t provide the full picture of a country’s willingness to bleed for the US. This because they don’t account for the way forces were actually used during missions. To fill this gap the thesis will use the relative number of combatant deaths a country suffered during a mission as the indicator of a country’s willingness to expose its forces to risk (Ringmose, 2010:333). This indicator relates to the actual willingness of a country to ‘bleed’ for the US because: - The number of combatant deaths reflects a countries choice to deploy troops in regions that are dangerous in opposition to regions that are being considered safe.

- The number of combatant deaths is an indicator of the formal restrictions put on the use of military force (caveats) by governments during an out-of-area operation.

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29 The thesis hereby holds the assumption that the US, given its huge military power, has

enough manpower on its own and will consequently favour small operations with high levels of risk more from its allies than huge military contributions with low levels of risk.

To measure the relative number of combatant deaths the thesis will use: - Total number of combatant deaths

- Total number of Combatant deaths / share population

- Total number of combatant deaths / share total national troops deployed

5.3.2.2 Qualitative measurements

To complete the picture the quantitative analysis provides a qualitative assessment of the country’s role during the mission is provided. This will be done by looking at the time when troops began operating in the area, the level of risk countries took during the mission as observed by later commentators, and the date of withdrawal. The level of diplomatic support for the US during the mission will also be discussed since the legitimacy associated with this

3.5.3 Case and mission selection

In the operationalization of the variables above both relative material capabilities and the degree of Atlanticism take the form of variables constant for a country in the period under investigation. It was hereby indicated that these two variables will hold predictive value in the ultimate decision to commit troops to US-led out-of-area operations. Based on these indicators four ideal types of states can be distinguished, as indicated in figure 5.

Figure 5: ideal types of Western European States Type of state

Small power Middle Power

Low A B Atlanticism

High C D

To create as much variation as possible first two pairs of states who approximate each other on their relative material capabilities but differ in their degree of Atlanticism are needed. Second, two pairs of states are needed who approximate each other on their degree of Atlanticism but differ on their relative material capabilities.

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30 Based on the country operationalization’s Belgium (A), France (B), Denmark (C) and the United Kingdom (D) will be used as the Western European ideal type states. With the UK and France presenting two states on the European continent with high material capabilities, but considerable differences in their degree of Atlanticism. Belgium and Denmark

approximate each other on their relative material capabilities, and hereby form the ‘typical’ European small state. Both states however differ considerably on their degree of Atlanticism, with Denmark scoring among the highest and Belgium among the lowest on these

parameters. Because Denmark holds strong parliamentary control mechanisms and the other states weak levels, this also allows verifying for the feasibility of this variable. 1617

Mission selection

The US and its allies have on several occasions fought together in the last two decades. From the cases suitable for investigation the First Gulf War (1991), Operation Enduring Freedom (2001- ) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2007) are being chosen for analysis.

These missions are chosen for two main reasons:

First, during these missions the US asked for the provision of actual boots on the ground of its European allies. The risks associated with this type of missions prove a better indicator of the actual ‘willingness to bleed’ for the US than for instance air campaigns.

Second, the selected missions hereby hold different timespans, levels of threat, and public opposition, hereby allowing for the control of the importance of these effects on

contributions.

16_{The other variables controlled for in the thesis ( balance of threat and public opinion) fluctuate per}

mission and country, therefore counties can not a-priori be categorized on this variable. Consequently, hypothesis regarding this variables will be ‘ad -hoc’ tested during the thesis.

17

The Danish constitution states: “Except for purposes of defence against an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliaments” (Danish Constitution: Section 19, para 2).

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31

US-led missions after the Cold War

The chapters below will seek to explain differences in troop contributions during three high profile US-led missions in the unipolar era. First, the 1991 Gulf War will be discussed,

followed by operation Enduring Freedom (2001- ), and operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2009). The cases will be discussed in similar structure: after a short background of the conflict, a quantitative and qualitative assessment of troop contributions is provided. Hereafter the feasibility of first the structural hypothesis, followed by domestic hypothesis to explain the cases will be discussed. The cases end with a short recapitulation of the arguments presented.

4 The first Gulf War (1991)

Only two years into the unipolar moment the international community looked to the United States for severe military action when Saddam Hussein invaded the rich, but military weak, oil state of Kuwait (USDSOH: 2014). In the aftermath of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 678 that authorized member states to use ‘all means necessary’ to

enforce Iraqi withdrawal, the US assembled the widest, most geopolitically disparate, military coalition in history to restore the ruling family of Kuwait (Bennet et al, 1997: 4). 18

4.1 Background conflict

Coming out of the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Iraq emerged with its state intact, but laden with massive debts. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait to cancel the Iraqi debt they held, arguing that the loans should be considered payments for protecting the Arabian Peninsula against Iranian aggression. After Kuwait rejected this, Saddam threatened to flare up the long standing conflict between the countries about ownership of two small but strategically important islands in the Persian Gulf

(USDSOH: 2014). In July 1991 Saddam accused Kuwait and the UAE of intentionally overproducing oil for export, hereby depriving Iraq of critical oil revenues. And almost a month later, on August 2, 1990, a force of 100.000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and overran the country in a matter of hours.

International condemnation of the Iraqi violation of the territorial integrity of Kuwait was widespread and virtually unanimous. Within days the United Nations (UN) passed several

18_{The international coalition consisted of troops of 41 countries, including several Arab states, and}

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32 resolutions demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal. When Saddam did not respond to the posed deadlines a military coalition led by the United States attacked Iraq by air, soon followed by a massive ground campaign driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait in a matter of days (USDSOH: 2014).

4.2 Troop Contributions

The peak contribution of the countries under investigation in the war and the number of fatalities are shown in figures 6 and 7.

Figure 6: Troop contributions Gulf war

Country Peak contribution Contribution/ 100.000 population Contribution / Tot. military personnel United States 541,400 214,00 0,24 United Kingdom 45,400 79,07 0,14 France 14,600 24,93 0,03 Belgium 400 4,00 0,00 Denmark 100 1,94 0,00

Total contribution = 801,000 (RACGWVI, 2014: appendix A). Figure 7: Fatalities Gulf War

Country Fatalities Fatalities / 100.000 population

Fatalities per troops deployed (x100) United States 146 0,058 0,03 United Kingdom 47 0,086 0,10 France 9 0,015 0,06 Belgium 0 0 0 Denmark 0 0 0

(RACGWVI, 2014: appendix A).

4.2.1 Time, size, mix and diplomatic support

United States: The US contributed more than twice as much soldiers as all the other

countries of the coalition combined (Bennet et al, 1994:48). American troops were first on the ground to protect Saudi Arabia, and when the war started it was the US who launched the first series of air attacks (Encyclopedia Britannica: 2014 When the air stage of the war was won, the country together with French, British and Arab forces conducted the more risky land operation, crushing the Iraqi army at the expanse of 146 fatalities.

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33

United Kingdom: Contributing over 45,000 troops, the UK made a massive contribution to the war efforts in the Gulf (Bennet et al, 1994:53). Beside large in size, the UK was hereby on the forefront of both the air and ground offensive. Because of this commitment it suffered relatively heavy losses compared to its coalition partners.

British support to the US hereby materialized in strong diplomatic support. A week after the invasion of Kuwait, Great Britain was the first country to pledge troops to demonstrate support for Washington’s stand (Washington Post, 1991). Faith in the American cause was hereby shown by the country’s decision to allow its troops to fall under direct US command (Richardson, 2011:52).

France: With a contribution of 15,000 soldiers, involved in both the air and ground campaign, France also made a considerable contribution to the war effort (Bennet et al, 1994:59). The tasks assigned to the French forces, and the risks associated with it, however were lower than that of the UK and US. Providing the left flank of the invasion force France, as expected, quickly overran Iraq's 45th Infantry Division, suffering little casualties. France hereby resisted formal integration of its forces into the coalition, and its response to Iraqi aggression was therefore only partly coordinated with the other allied efforts (Bennet et al, 1994:59). The symbolic value of the French contribution to the US is mixed. One the one hand, it was of great importance for the legitimacy of the mission because France could not be accused of being an American puppet and had enjoyed close links with Iraq in the past (Davidson, 2011:56). On the other hand, France unilateral diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis in the months leading up to the invasion were not welcomed by American decision makers (Richardson, 2011:56). Most notably, the French initiative to offer an active settlement of several of the Middle Eastern problems, in return for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, was not appreciated (New York Times, 1991). 19

Denmark: Denmark’s contribution to the war was limited to the sending of a single mine sweeper supported by 100 sailors to the Persian Gulf. Despite the fact that the ship was not allowed to deploy offensive operations, and consequently had almost zero value to the war effort, the symbolic value of the contribution was high. The decision was in line with American requests, and hereby entailed the first Danish military out-of-area operation ever. Danish presence in the Gulf hereby formed a massive watershed with the country’s foreign policy during the Cold War years (Pedersen, 2012: 455).

Denmark hereby strongly declared its diplomatic support for US action against Saddam. It

19_{Of this offer for settlement of regional problems especially the French proposals to the Arab-Israeli}

Who is ready to bleed for the United States? : European support for US-led missions after the Cold War