When Pigs Fly
Animal Capabilities and Policy Analysis
University of Amsterdam
Master Political Science- International Relations Master Thesis - When Pigs Fly
June 2014
Author - J.A.M. van Ooijen BSc
Supervisor - prof. dr. M.V.B.P.M. van Hees Second reader – dr. L.L. Ferracioli
Humanity’s true moral test, its fundamental test … consists of its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals. And in this respect humankind has suffered a fundamental debacle, a debacle so fundamental that all others stem from it.
Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, 1984.
Table of Contents
Preface ... 6
Part I ... 8
Chapter 1. Operationalizing ideals ... 8
1.1 The treatment of animals ... 8
1.2 Structure of the thesis ... 9
Chapter 2. Humans & Non-Humans: An Introduction to the Field of Animal Ethics ... 11
2.1 Foundations of the animal-human relationship ... 11
2.2 Peter Singer – Animal Liberation ... 12
2.3 Tom Regan – the Case for Animal Rights ... 12
2.4 Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare debate ... 13
Chapter 3. Martha Nussbaum – Justice for Non-Human Animals ... 14
3.1 The animal welfare vs animal rights debate vs Nussbaum’s Capability Approach .... 14
3.2 The foundations of Nussbaum’s Capability Approach for Animals ... 14
3.3 The Capability Approach for Animals ... 16
Part II ... 19
Chapter 4. Methods ... 19
4.1 Criteria of Adequacy ... 19
4.2.1 Adequacy criterion Number 1: In line with Nussbaum’s approach ... 19
4.2.2 Nussbaum’s narrative approach ... 20
4.2.3 Nussbaum’s anthropomorphist approach ... 21
4.3 Adequacy criterion Number 2: A threshold must be feasible ... 23
4.4 Adequacy criterion Number 3: Prevent vague policies ... 24
4.5 Adequacy criterion Number 4: Prevent policies with unintended bad consequences 24 4.6 Four adequacy criteria ... 25 3
Part III ... 26
Chapter 5. The development of framework based on Nussbaum’s capability approach for animals ... 26
5.1 Ten capabilities ... 26
5.2 Capability ‘Life’ ... 27
5.3. ‘Bodily Health’ ... 30
5.4 ‘Bodily Integrity’ ... 33
5.5 Senses, Imagination, and Thought ... 36
5.6 Emotions ... 38
5.7 ‘Practical Reason’ ... 39
5.8 ‘Affiliation’ ... 40
5.9 ‘Other Species’ ... 42
5.10 ‘Play’ ... 45
5.11 ‘Control over one’s environment’ ... 46
5.12 The framework based on the capability approach for animals – conclusion and discussion ... 47
Chapter 6. Policy implications of the CAA ... 50
6.1 Implications for Dutch policies regarding animal welfare... 50
6.2 Capability ‘Life’ and policy implications ... 50
6.3 Capability ‘Bodily Health’ and policy implications ... 51
6.4 Capability ‘Bodily Integrity’ and policy implications ... 53
6.5 Capability ‘Senses, Imagination and Thought’ and policy implications ... 54
6.6 Capability ‘Emotions’ and policy implications ... 54
6.7 Capability ‘Affiliation’ and policy implications ... 55
6.8 Capability ‘Other Species’ and policy implications ... 55
6.9 Policy implications of the CAA – conclusion and discussion ... 56
Chapter 7. Theoretical and practical clarifications ... 57
7.1 Discrepancies in-between theory and practice ... 57
7.2 Conflict solution – consequentialist calculation ... 57
7.3 Flexibility ... 59
7.4 Alterations to the CAA - conclusion ... 60
Part IV ... 61
Chapter 8. Animal capabilities and policy analysis ... 61
8.1 Conclusion ... 61
Appendix 1 Pigs killed painlessly ... 64
References ... 69
Preface
The man in front of our group starts his lecture by asking us: “Who amongst you is a vegan, neither eating, wearing or using animals in your daily life?” When I look around I see almost no hands. Then suddenly the man starts shouting: “Well then, the rest of you are murderers, rapists, kidnappers and thieves!” Some people start to laugh, others start mumbling and some people, like myself, look at the man in utter disbelief. The man continued, accusing us of helping to continue the holocaust on animals by looking the other way so that we can later say: “Wir haben es nicht gewusst” (“We did not know”). Shocked and intrigued by all of this, I sat on the edge of my seat for the rest of his lecture.
This was my first encounter with the Dutch philosopher Floris van den Berg. Mostly renowned in Dutch society for his atheist actions, he is also a devoted animal rights activist. I had the chance to speak to van der Berg after his lecture and asked him if he truly believed that comparing the way we treat our animals with severe crimes against humanity is a justifiable comparison. He replied: “It is not because my arguments are radical that they could not be true”.
Van den Berg’s answer reminded me of a story my former history teacher told me about how people in the 15th century believed that the earth was flat. My teacher told me that the early explorers did not dare to sail too far along the coastline of Southern Africa because all of the people they met during their journey were black. They believed that this blackness could only indicate that the end of the world was close because all the people were burned black by the hellfire. Sailing further would surely mean that the sailors would tip off the world to a certain death. During that era, the thought of the earth being round instead of flat was an idea that was so radical that almost nobody believed it could be true.
The story points out exactly what Van den Berg meant when he replied to my question: although his ideas about the relationship between humans and animals seemed too radical for me, they could still be true. This epiphany proved to be the starting point for this thesis.
The treatment of animals and how we envision their societal position is a point of discussion for many of us. Are humans and animals equal and should they be treated as such? Some scholars envision animals as equals, while others argue that this cannot be the case. Personally, I find myself in-between these positions. I have been a vegetarian for a long time
and these days I am mostly vegan. I believe animals are not equal to humans because humans are more powerful than animals. We have power over animals. I strongly believe that this powerful position entails more responsibility for the creatures we have power over, and I believe that these creatures should receive the same treatment as humans.
The discussion as to whether or not humans and animals are equal is, for Martha Nussbaum, not a discussion. For her, humans and animals (or non-humans as she terms them) are, in essence, equal and should be treated as such. For the sake of argument I will accept Nussbaum’s claims, because this thesis will not be about the discussion whether or not humans and animals are equal and which position in this debate has the best arguments. Not because it is not important, but because this thesis is about Nussbaum’s view towards animals and about her capability approach for animals.
I understand that many readers will have difficulties with Nussbaum’s view of the human- animal relationship. Perhaps this is because they envision a different relationship between animals and humans, or because they do not find the capability approach suitable for extension into the domain of animals. However, I urge every reader to look beyond his or her opinions, beliefs and views no matter how challenging this may be.
As with any scientific theory, Nussbaum’s approach deserves an open mind because it could be that it leads us to ‘blind spots’ in our knowledge. Our knowledge is not fixed or factual, our knowledge can be considered a social construct. Thus, we should treat every theory as if it could be the next theory about a round shaped earth. Envisioning another relationship between animals and humans is difficult, but it may not be impossible: the earth could be round; pigs could actually fly.
Part I
Chapter 1. Operationalizing ideals 1.1 The treatment of animals
The treatment of animals is becoming an important topic for Dutch politicians, government, and civil society. Animal welfare foundation Stichting Wakker Dier (“Animal Alert”) studied the feelings of Dutch consumers towards the conditions farm animals are kept in and concluded that more than 90% of the respondents found one or more situations to be unacceptable (Wakker Dier 2014: 4-5). The respondents were given descriptions of acknowledged and problematic welfare situations of farm animals. For example, one of the situations was the long transportation time most pigs must undergo before they are slaughtered. Stichting Wakker Dier also concluded that one out of five consumers buys meat that originates from organic farms where animal welfare is an important factor (ibid.).
The treatment of animals has also become more important for the academic world. Many scholars have tried to provide us with guidelines for altering our use of animals. Peter Singer proposed a utilitarian approach; Tom Regan suggested a rights-based approach and Martha Nussbaum advocates her capability approach for animals. It is this last approach that will be the subject of this thesis.
Nussbaum baldly states that her theory of animal ethics is superior to the theories of Singer, Regan and other theorists (Nussbaum 2006: 278-279). She developed the Capability Approach for Animals1 out of the Capability Approach2 for humans, which she developed together with Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. The CA became highly influential within the fields of economics, social sciences, developmental studies and political philosophy. Scholars and policymakers do not yet as intensively use Nussbaum’s animal ethics theory. Nonetheless, Nussbaum still claims that the CAA provides better theoretical guidance compared to other animal ethics theories (ibid.).
The main goal in this thesis is to explore how Nussbaum’s theory would hold when taken into the real world. Can the approach function as a guideline? Is it realistic? Can it lead to an actual framework for analysis? What alterations must we make in order for the approach to become of any significance for real-life situations? These questions were the basis for
1
CAA (Capability Approach for Animals)
2 CA (Capability Approach)
8
developing my research and the sub-questions in this thesis. In the next chapters I will formulate an answer to my research question: How can we use the Capability Approach for
Animals to assess the wellbeing of farm pigs in the Netherlands? and secondly, given the answer to the first question, how can we use it to improve the current Dutch policy regarding animal welfare for pigs?
Nussbaum states that animals that are raised for food need our help the most to improve their situations. In many countries, working animals and pets are somewhat protected from cruelty and exploitation. However, the laws and legislation protecting animals used for food are, in most countries, either not enforced, very marginal, or completely absent (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 159-160). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore Nussbaum’s list for the assessment of wellbeing of all farm animals: cows, pigs, goats, sheep and chickens. Therefore, I have selected pigs as my focus as I feel that this farm animal needs our help the most.
In 2013 there were an astonishing 12,212,303 pigs in the Netherlands.3 Whoever has travelled in the Netherlands may have noticed: we see cows, sometimes chickens and occasionally goats in the meadows, but the 12,212,303 pigs are nowhere to be seen. Most Dutch pigs lead invisible lives inside big stalls where we cannot see, hear, or even smell them. Some pig welfare organizations campaign to enhance the visibility of the pig. They are concerned that the ever-increasing invisibility of the pig leads to customers becoming more alienated from the animal their bacon once was, which could in turn lead to even worse living conditions for the pigs.4
1.2 Structure of the thesis
In this thesis I will conduct two analyses. The first analysis is intended to formulate an answer to Sub-questions 1 and 2: “How should the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list be used for assessing the well-being of pigs?” and “How can we make this list more precise?” The answers to these sub-questions will form a framework that is based on Nussbaum’s CAA and that can be used for policy analysis. This analysis and framework are the core subjects of this thesis.
3
Statistics regarding the numbers of farm animals in the Netherlands in 2013:
://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=80780NED&D1=419,442,446,500-517,520,532-534,538,542,550&D2=0&D3=0,5,11-13&HDR=G1,G2&STB=T&VW=T retrieved 28-05-2014
4
For an example of the campaign, see Varkens in Nood (“Pigs in Need”): www.varkensinnood.nl retrieved 28-05-2014
9
The second analysis will be centered on the implications the CAA has for Dutch animal welfare policy regarding pigs. These implications will form the answer to sub-question 3: “What are the policy implications of the Capability Approach for Animals for Dutch animal welfare policy regarding pigs?” The answers to all three sub-questions will form the answers to my main research question. See figure 1. For a schematic overview of all questions.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Part I is the theoretical framework of this thesis. It will provide an introduction to the field of animal ethics and the position of Nussbaum’s approach in it, and an in-depth explanation of Nussbaum’s CAA.
In Part II I will discuss my methods. I will identify four requirements for possible answers to Sub-questions 1 and 2. This I will do in terms of criteria of adequacy. Also in Part II, Sub-questions 1 (“How should the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list be used for assessing the well-being of pigs?”) and 2 (“How can we make this list more precise?”) will be answered to develop a framework we can use for policy analysis based on the CAA.
In Part III the framework developed out of the CAA will be used to conduct a small analysis of Dutch pig welfare policies, to provide an answer to Sub-question 3 (“What are the policy and political implications of the Capability Approach for Animals for Dutch animal welfare policy regarding pigs?”). The last chapter of this part will discuss discrepancies between Nussbaum’s theory and reality and provide solutions to overcome these.
The thesis concludes in part IV where I will formulate an answer to my main research question with an overview of the exploration process and the issues and challenges I encountered.
Research question
How can we use the Capability Approach for Animals to assess the wellbeing of farm pigs in the Netherlands? and secondly, given the answer to the first question, can we use it to improve the current Dutch policy regarding animal welfare for pigs?
Sub-question 1 How should the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list be used for assessing the well-being of pigs?
Sub-question 2 How can we make this list more precise?
Sub- question 3 What are the policy and political implications of the Capability Approach for Animals for Dutch animal welfare policy regarding pigs?
Figure 1. schematic overview research question and sub-questions
Part II
Chapter 2. Humans & Non-Humans: An Introduction to the Field of Animal Ethics 2.1 Foundations of the animal-human relationship
After the Second World War, animal ethics became more important for philosophers, scientists, scholars and civil society (Rollin in Armstrong & Botzler 2008: xvi). Philosopher Bernard Rollin identified reasons for this increased interest, that are grounded in the societal changes that occurred in past decades. In the past fifty years we have seen a transformation from husbandry farming to industrialized farming. Rollin argues that this led to a new ethical code concerning animals. The old anti-cruelty ethic was focused on lonely psychopaths who harmed animals for no reason, but the transformation to industrialized farming led to a significant rise in large-scale animal suffering that was not initiated by individualistic motives of cruelty. This discrepancy between the new situation and an old explanation led to scholars and civil society searching for a new ethical code to explain the new circumstances (ibid.).
Although animal ethics became increasingly popular after the Second World War, the foundation for our current perception of the human-animal relationship formed centuries ago. It was Aristotle who argued around 350 BC that humans are above animals in hierarchy because humans can reason and animals cannot (Armstrong & Botzler 2008: 2). Aristotle’s idea was further spread via Christian religion that imagined God above all and humans above the rest. ‘Humans above the rest’ is still the dominant notion today (ibid.). However, there are many scholars who are opposed to this view. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was one of them and stated that:
“… It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse? ... the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (in Armstrong & Botzler 2008: 46)
Bentham doubted Aristotle’s reasoning. In past decades other scholars have also criticized the ethical foundations of our relations with animals and offered alternative theories. Singer, Regan and Nussbaum all represent different movements of these critics and I shall turn to their theories now.
2.2 Peter Singer – Animal Liberation
Peter Singer proposed in his book Animal Liberation (1976), an animal ethics theory that became highly influential in our thinking about animals. Singer’s theory is based on the utilitarian approach. Utilitarian scholars envision that the best action one can take is the one that maximizes utility. Thus the consequences of an action are important, not the motives that lead to the action (Regan 1983: 140-143).
Singer equates animals and humans, and argues: ‘If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit non-humans?’ (ibid.: 7). According to Singer (ibid.: 1-24), the fact that animals have a lower degree of intelligence compared to humans is not a justification for the exploitation of animals. Singer calls the focus on the differences and prioritizing them, ‘speciesism’ and he strongly objects to this vision. He argues that we must not look at the differences between species, but at the similarities and because, similar to humans, animals have the ability to suffer; their interest in not having to suffer should receive equal consideration (Singer 1976: 8-9, 222).
Singer advocates the basic moral principle of equality. This principle states that the preferences of all humans and animals must be treated as equally important whenever assessing which action would lead to ‘the good’. Consequently, this could lead to circumstances in which the preferences of animals triumph over the interests of humans (ibid.: 8-9). For some scholars Singer’s theory is insufficient. One of them is Tom Regan and I shall turn to his theory of animal ethics now.
2.3 Tom Regan – the Case for Animal Rights
Regan states that it is not the consequences of our actions that make them morally right or wrong, but the actions themselves. A morally right action is one that does not violate the rights of others – humans and non-humans – and does not treat the other as a means to an end. Regan argues that all creatures that are able to experience ‘subjects-of-a-life’ such as pain, hope, happiness and frustration, have inherent value. Humans and animals share this inherent value (ibid.: 243-250). The value cannot be reduced to the animal’s value to others. So, contrary to Singer’s argument that the end justifies the means, for Regan all creatures have an inherent value that is independent of their value for society (ibid.: 214-218, 260- 263).
Whereas Singer’s approach can still defend the use of animals, Regan argues otherwise. He argues that the inherent value of humans gives them the right not to be used by other humans. But animals also have this inherent value, and the principle of not being used 12
therefore also applies to animals. Therefore, Regan argues, every case where humans use animals should stop. Animals must be capable of pursuing their own wishes and interests, they should receive rights similar to human rights (ibid.: 266-331).
2.4 Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare debate
The opposing arguments from philosophers such as Singer and Regan have evolved into the animal rights versus animal welfare debate. The main points of discussion in this debate are benefits, interests, pain and humane treatment (Francione 2007: 1-5). Phillips et al. (2010) examined how the opposite views manifested themselves within the US food supply chain. With regard to cows, animal rights organizations argued that cows are highly intelligent and social animals that are capable of forming complex relationships with each other and therefore should not be exploited to benefit humans (ibid.). On the other hand, animal welfare organizations were not directly opposed to the use of cows, but prioritized the improvement of cow treatment by proposing guidelines to the US government and farmer organizations (ibid: 93-94).
Although the animal rights movement agrees that the conditions for cows have been significantly improved with help of the animal welfare movement, they still argue against this type of policy change. For example, rights-based philosopher Mark Reardon claims that policies of animal welfare are far more a case of illfare reducing than welfare increasing. Animals do not become a subject-of-life in welfare policies, they remain a subject-of-death where being kept alive is more important than having a life (Reardon 2001: 269-283).
Gary Francione likens the differences between the two movements to an insider-outsider position. The rights movement represents the insider-outsider position as it challenges the whole social institutions that facilitate and justify the exploitation of animals. The animal welfarists on the other hand, act as participants trying to influence the system from within. They try to ease the conditions animals are kept in by lobbying and campaigning (Francione 1996: 440-441).
The debate between the two movements is ongoing and has been for decades. It sometimes seems to be stranded in a deadlocked discussion, but this might change. Marcel Wissenburg argues that there is now a third approach that might provide a way out. This approach is the CAA developed by Nussbaum (Wissenburg 2011: 392).
Chapter 3. Martha Nussbaum – Justice for Non-Human Animals
3.1 The animal welfare vs animal rights debate vs Nussbaum’s Capability Approach
Nussbaum advocates an approach in terms of rights and justice towards the treatment of animals, and defines it as a species of the human rights based approach (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 155). Although Nussbaum speaks about rights, she is not a typical animal rights advocate. Following Francione’s distinction of an insider- outsider-position regarding the animal rights vs animal welfare movements, Nussbaum ultimately seeks to change the whole system for the better by changing from within. She argues that in our quest for justice for animals, we must not strive to change the system immediately; we must be realistic rather than utopian (ibid.: 340-341). Nussbaum’s pursuit of altering the system is thus compatible with the animal welfare movement. However, Nussbaum’s approach also differs from the animal welfare movement.
Nussbaum claims that any future with more justice for animals would require a lot of sacrifices by humans. In the utilitarian view, which is related to the animal welfare movement, these sacrifices have to be measured against the benefits animals would win to determine the morally right action. For Nussbaum this reasoning is unwanted, because ‘… we don’t want to be in a position where showing animals deserve minimally decent treatment requires us to show, first, that this would maximize utility.’ (ibid.: 156). For Nussbaum, animals are in essence equal to humans and should be treated as such. Each individual animal is entitled to flourish and should only be used by humans when this benefits the animal’s position to flourish. A dog or horse in training for example (Nussbaum 2006: 320-321).
Nussbaum’s approach is not compatible with the animal rights movement nor the animal welfare movement, and it is for this that Wissenburg argued that she might have provided us with a third approach to animal ethics.
3.2 The foundations of Nussbaum’s Capability Approach for Animals
In her quest for justice for animals, Nussbaum turns to Aristotle’s ethics with regards to ‘flourishing’. (Nussbaum 2006: 295-296). Aristotle argued that we should look in wonder to animals, and acknowledge their dignity. Nussbaum translates this concept of Aristotle in an idea that an animal should have the possibility to lead a flourishing life: live according to its needs and with dignity. Nussbaum then reasons that justice for animals would entail the ability of an animal to live according to its species’ needs (ibid.). This idea forms the underpinning of Nussbaum’s quest for a theory of social justice for animals.
Nussbaum reviewed influential theories to determine if they could be used to formulate the theory of justice she envisioned (McEwan 2010: 8-10). She began with John Rawls’ social contract method. Rawls formulated his theory of social justice around the concept of ‘justice as fairness’. According to Rawls, justice as fairness refers to basic entitlements every person should be able to achieve. This is something Nussbaum agrees with. However, for Rawls animals cannot be incorporated in the concept of justice as fairness (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 155). Social contract theory posits that individuals consent to hand in some of their freedoms to the authorities in exchange for the protection of their remaining freedoms or rights. Animals cannot take part in this exchange and thus cannot be subjects of justice (ibid.). Rawls does acknowledge that humans owe something to animals, and argued that we have direct duties to animals based on compassion and humanity (ibid.). Rawls treats animals as objects of compassion, not as handling subjects (Nussbaum 2006: 299). Nussbaum is opposed to this reasoning. She claims that animals are subjects of justice, that they are creatures that are owed something and who are an end in themselves. She argues that torturing animals is unjust, not only because it is wrong of humans to treat animals cruelly, but because animals have the right not to be treated like that: it is unfair to them (ibid.: 287). Rawls theory of justice is of influence to Nussbaum but because it cannot incorporate animals as subjects of justice, she turns to other theories, and begins with Singer’s utilitarian theory.
Social contract theories are normally a close ally of the CA and the utilitarian approach is much more criticized (ibid.: 287-288). However, this is not the case with regards to the CA for animals. As Nussbaum argued, Rawls’ social contract theory does not provide a sole basis for a theory in which animals can be envisioned as subjects of justice, because animals cannot take part in framing the contract. This is different within the utilitarian discourse, because here animals do not have to be part of the social contract to be incorporated in the calculation of ‘the good’. Utilitarian scholars can imagine humans framing principles of justice for another group of beings based on the principle of equality (ibid.). It is the utilitarian focus on outcome that incorporates animals in the calculation of the good.
Nussbaum approves of the focus on outcome because animals are incorporated in the calculation of what would be ‘good’ (McEwan 2010: 11). Nonetheless, Nussbaum argues that the CA is superior to utilitarianism. For Nussbaum the focus of the utilitarian approach is not broad enough, because it focuses primarily on preferences. Although Nussbaum acknowledges the importance of these preferences, she argues this view is too minimal and non-committal. An animal that has been living all of its life in a cramped cage may not 15
necessarily be in pain but neither is it in the position to live a flourishing life (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 155-156).
In addition to this, Nussbaum argues that a major flaw in the utilitarian approach is that the ‘good’ can be dispersed unequally across the beings involved. It does not differentiate between the needs of individuals: it only differentiates between groups that are involved. Nussbaum finds this to be an undesirable outcome. Nussbaum’s preferred outcome is that all the individual entitlements of animals are protected and achieved and thus focuses on individual flourishing as an outcome (Nussbaum 2006 : 291).
3.3 The Capability Approach for Animals
Influenced by Aristotle’s ethics, Rawls’ theory of justice, and the utilitarian theory of Singer, Nussbaum develops her own approach regarding animal ethics. She proposes to expand the CA (for humans) into the domain of animals. Nussbaum developed the CA together with Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. The approach became highly influential in the field of development studies. Many policymakers and researchers used this approach when defining and measuring poverty and underdevelopment (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 149-150). The core claim of the CA is that the assessment of well-being (or quality of life) should not be focused on resources ‘… but on the opportunities people have to lead the lives they have reason to value.’ Two notions are central to the approach: a person’s functionings and capabilities. The functionings are a person’s achievements: to be healthy for example. The capabilities refer to the freedoms people have to achieve their desired functionings (Robeyns 2006: 351).
Nussbaum’s CA differs from Sen’s approach in many ways. She herself explains these differences as being answers to different questions. Nussbaum is looking for a way to achieve social justice and for this, she provides a list of ten capabilities that each society must seek to achieve (Nussbaum 2003: 40-43). Sen does not make any commitments about the contents of the capabilities, nor does he provide a proposed set of capabilities (ibid.: 35-36). Contrary to Nussbaum, Sen is not looking for social justice, but for a social space to compare the quality of life in different societies (Nussbaum & Faralli 2007: 149).
Nussbaum argues that the CA can be expanded into the domain of the animals in order to achieve justice for animals. She argues that we can use the CA list for animals too because humans and humans and animals are in essence equal: they are both entitled to a flourishing life. A schematic overview of the list of capabilities for humans (and animals) can be found in figure 2.
1 Life Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2 Bodily Health Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3 Bodily Integrity Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choices in matters of reproduction.
4 Senses,
Imagination and Thought
Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think an reason – and to do these things in a “truly” human way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5 Emotions Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6 Practical Reason Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7 Affiliation a) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
b) Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8 Other Species Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals,
plants and the world of nature.
9 Play Being able to laugh, to play and enjoy recreational activities.
10 Control Over One’s
Environment
a) Political – Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
b) Material – Being able to hold property, (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others, having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
Figure 2. Nussbaum’s list of ten capabilities ((Nussbaum 2011:33-34)
In the next chapters I will translate this list into a framework that can be used for policy analysis. Before this, I will first clarify the methods used for conducting the analysis.
Part II
Chapter 4. Methods 4.1 Criteria of Adequacy
In this thesis, Nussbaum’s CAA is examined to consider if it can be used as a framework to assess the wellbeing of pigs in the Netherlands. This approach entails undertaking a double analysis: in the first analysis I will explore Nussbaum’s CAA to build the framework that is needed for the second analysis. The second analysis is the actual analysis of Dutch welfare policy using the theoretical framework created in the first analysis.
The goal of the first analysis is to specify a framework which I can use for policy analysis. I will develop this framework with the help of the answers to sub-question 1 (“How should the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list be used for assessing the well-being of pigs?”) and Sub-question 2 (“How can we make this list more precise?”) in Chapter 5. The answers to these questions will not be random chosen based on intuitions or gut feelings, but they are argued with the help of criteria of adequacy. Scholars use adequacy criteria to define the requirements possible answers to their research questions must meet. For example, Nussbaum’s book, in which she clarifies the CAA, is named Frontiers of Justice (2006). The title implicitly mentions an adequacy criterion: justice. Examining Nussbaum’s theory, it becomes clear that one of her adequacy criteria would have been that her theory must meet the criteria she herself formulated about what it would entail to be just.
The four criteria of adequacy I formulated are based on assumptions of animal policies of Nussbaum and Temple Grandin, an animal scientist. Because my criteria themselves are thus based on assumptions, this indicates that the criteria are open for criticism and can be challenged. This is encouraged, my criteria of adequacy must by no means be considered as fixed, or free of criticism.
4.2.1 Adequacy criterion Number 1: In line with Nussbaum’s approach
This thesis is an exploration of Nussbaum’s approach. Her theory will be my main theoretical framework I use for developing my own frameworks. The first criterion will therefore be that all interpretations and thresholds for the capabilities that are forthcoming out of the answers to Sub-questions 1 and 2 must be in accordance with Nussbaum’s justification of the CAA. This suggests that all thresholds and interpretations forthcoming of the analysis are based on Nussbaum’s ideas. I loosely used an anthropological research method to do this interpretation.
Anthropologists use a very distinct method called ‘participant observation’ or ‘going native’ for the collection of data during their fieldwork. This means that the anthropologist tries to think, act, and talk as ‘the natives’ do in order to understand and explain their subject from their point of view. This method has been the inspiration for conducting my research in this thesis. But in my case Nussbaum was the only native. I tried to think, act and talk as she would, even when her ideas and views were not similar to mine.
There will be situations where Nussbaum’s approach encounters its weaknesses and difficulties. Scholars have identified these weaknesses and argued that some parts of Nussbaum’s approach must be altered.5 Although these scholars express valid critiques, I will not use their critiques in order to develop a framework for the policy analysis. My intention is that the framework will be solely based on Nussbaum’s CAA.
An essential part of Nussbaum’s method is based on her worldview with regards to the equation of animals and humans and a narrative way of approaching situations. This part can be considered as controversial, offensive or provocative by those who do not share this view. However, in line with this criterion of adequacy, Nussbaum’s methods become my methods. The perhaps controversial parts of her approach will implicitly be the foundation of many of the arguments I will make. It is therefore important that these essential parts of her method are discussed and explained. I will do so in the next two sub- paragraphs.
4.2.2 Nussbaum’s narrative approach
Nussbaum explains her method as a philosophical one which uses narratives as vehicles to guide us to understanding (Nussbaum 2013: 663-672). Raymond Anderson argues that philosophers such as Nussbaum ‘… use narratives to motivate moral examination, explanation and justification.’ (Anthony 2009: 263-265). A narrative puts us in a position where we can imagine to be one of the characters and are ‘… living through their predicament.’(ibid.) Nussbaum’s narrative approach could be considered as the basis for her CAA. However, this narrative approach can also be considered as controversial in our current societies.
When researchers measure aspects of animal welfare, the conventional method in our societies is quantitative. Animal behavior scientist David Fraser notices that ‘…scientists strive for objectivity, in the sense of making measurements that represent the object under
5
For criticism on Nussbaum’s CAA see for example the works of Ilea (2008), Kaspenbauer (2013) and Singer (2002).
20
study, not the subject (person) making the measurement.’ Other methods are considered less scientific (Fraser 2003: 439). Nussbaum’s narrative approach could thus be considered as less scientific and less desirable. However, in defense of this part of Nussbaum’s approach, consider the example below of how a narrative approach prevented animal suffering (ibid.).
In 1997 the European Union banned the use of gestation stalls. These cramped stalls are used to house pregnant pigs, and prevent them from walking and turning around during most of their pregnancy and the period thereafter. Based on the literature of the welfare of industry farm pigs, the European Union concluded that the stalls caused serious welfare problems for the pigs and hitherto banned them. Shortly after this, Australian scientists used mostly the same literature to formulate an advice for the Australian government that was the complete opposite. According to the Australian scientists, the gestation stalls were in fact able to meet the requirements for the welfare of the pigs (Fraser 2003: 434).
The European Union argued that the welfare of the pigs could not be met with the use of gestation stalls due to 1) the animal could not behave in its natural way which led to emotions such as frustration and stress, and 2) ‘… that it is better to include such considerations in assessing welfare than to limit welfare assessment to scientifically uncontroversial measures.’ (ibid.: 434). Thus, for the European Union the conventional way of assessing animal welfare was not adequate enough to provide a valid advice for the wellbeing of the pigs. They therefore ‘…included the effects of fear and the behavioral and physiological consequences of lack of control…’ in their assessment without expecting these factors to lead to affect objective variables such as growth, health or injury (ibid.: 436).
The Australian scientists used an approach of assessing animal welfare that emphasized the importance of the biological functioning of the animal. These functionings could be easily measured, and during the time in the gestation stalls the pigs showed no significant differences (ibid.: 436). Thus, the Australian scientists limited their set of indicators to measure the pigs wellbeing in accordance with the conventional animal welfare methods and concluded that all welfare standards were met.
The example showed that a narrative approach can have added-value to our perception of animal well-being, although less scientifically desired. Following criterion 1 ‘in line with Nussbaum’, the narrative approach will be used throughout this thesis.
4.2.3 Nussbaum’s anthropomorphist approach
Nussbaum advocates that her approach is based on our ability of imagining which is a part of the narrative approach. She argues that good imaginative stories about animal suffering have 21
been a key factor in encouraging resistance against it. It is this imagination that can also help us to expand our moral judgment to the domain of animals (Nussbaum 2006: 301-302). To imagine animals in terms of human characteristics, is termed as anthropomorphic. However, this view is also not without controversy.
Anthropomorphism has long been considered an error that we should fear as scientists because of the chance of misinterpreting animals’ behavior by attributing human characteristics to it. Many scientists also do not agree with the concept of attributing human characteristics to animals in the first place. However, in defense of this part of Nussbaum’s method, some scholars do claim that anthropomorphism could lead to beneficial situations for animals. For example, Fredrik Karlsson encountered several situations in which avoiding anthropomorphism led to other morphisms, such as mechanomorphism. This is also something we should not desire because to attribute only mechanical qualities to animals would certainly not help in envisioning them as creatures with sentience. Karlsson furthermore argues, that anthropomorphism is a communicative strategy that, if applied sensibly, could be used to understand the needs of animals better (Karlsson 2012: 707-720).
Unfortunately, using anthropomorphism as a communicative strategy is still difficult, even when applied sensibly. In her article about anthropomorphism and cross-species modeling, Sandra Mitchell points out that, although the logical and quantitative objections may be declining among scientists, there arises a new objection. Mitchell claims that it is too difficult to empirically test if there is a common physiological ground animals have with humans that justifies anthropomorphism (Mitchell in Armstrong & Botzler 2008: 88-96). For example, Bob Bermond argues that animals are not able to experience suffering the same way as humans because animals lack the presence of a well-developed prefrontal cortex. This cortex is the key to have an awareness of past and future. Animals therefore always ‘live in the moment’ with behavior based on instinct and previous learning. Animals can suffer, but do not experience this the way humans do (Bermond in Armstrong & Botzler 2008: 99-110).
Nussbaum claims that the risk of misinterpreting is not a new phenomenon because all of our human knowledge is based on interpretation. Because we cannot look inside someone’s head, we are only able to form an image about the inner motives of the other person by using our imagination. Nussbaum acknowledges that the risk of misinterpretation is present, with humans and animals, but for her the advantages of the approach outweigh this. It is still a huge improvement compared to the self-centered and inadequate thinking of most people regarding animals (Nussbaum 2006: 301-302).
Nussbaum’s anthropomorphist approach will be explicitly and implicitly used throughout this thesis in accordance with criterion 1: in line with Nussbaum’s approach.
4.3 Adequacy criterion Number 2: A threshold must be feasible
A statement by Nussbaum is the basis for the second criterion. She argues that, although she wants all capabilities for animals to be established and not violated, this is not a realistic option in our current society. So, instead of advocating for an immediate change to all policies that are not in accordance with her CAA, she argues that we must ‘…be realistic rather than utopian.’ (Nussbaum 2006: 340-341).
In line with Nussbaum’s statement, we must sometimes lower the threshold for a capability when necessary, in order to have a certain level of workability for real-life situations. This way, structural change regarding the wellbeing of animals will be slow, but still on its way and, ultimately, inevitable according to Nussbaum. (ibid.). Based on this argument, the second adequacy criterion is that my framework must be capable of providing realistic guidelines regarding animal well-being: the threshold must be feasible. To determine if a threshold is so, the current European and Dutch laws and regulations regarding the welfare of pigs are used.
In the Netherlands the welfare of pigs is regulated in the Varkensbesluit (“Pig decree”). This decree stems from 1994 and has been regularly updated since then. Currently, the Varkensbesluit is for pigs the policy that regulates the minimum conditions in which they are kept and treated. There is also an European directive named ‘the protection of pigs’ that is sometimes leading. A more general Dutch animal welfare decree is focused at the responsibilities all Dutch citizens have in relation to the treatment of animals. It is for example forbidden to withhold any animal from medical care. Since 2009, this decree is the Gezondheids- en Welzijnswet voor Dieren (“Health and Welfare Regulations for Animals”). For my analysis, these decrees will be the policies that will be mostly analyzed. If it is possible to implement the threshold within the current system of laws and regulations, then the threshold will be termed ‘strongly realistic’. If a threshold does not fall inside the scope of current laws and regulations and requires significant but feasible changes to the legal system, these thresholds will then be termed as ‘weakly realistic’. Thresholds for capabilities that are labeled as ‘weakly realistic’ will be clarified further in Chapter 6 when the policy implications of Nussbaum’s approach are discussed.
To assess whether a threshold based on Nussbaum’s CAA is feasible, I will not only look at laws and regulations but also consider the broad social basis we could expect (or not) 23
for the threshold. For example, it would be not feasible to require the prohibit of eating meat, not only because laws and regulations are absent, but because we can expect the broad social basis for this prohibition to be absent. A threshold is then also not feasible.
4.4 Adequacy criterion Number 3: Prevent vague policies
From her research regarding the differences in animal welfare policies, Grandin (2010) concluded that numerous policies are vague. Many regulations are open to multiple interpretations. This can result in one inspector being really strict and another one seeming to be unconcerned. Grandin provides an example she witnessed during a USDA food safety department inspection with regard to the Humane Slaughter Act. The Humane Slaughter Act demands that slaughter facilities must avoid ‘agitation and excitement’ in animals. Grandin argues that this regulation is too vague: she observed that one of the inspectors found hitting and scaring pigs acceptable, even when the pigs were loudly squeaking, which could be indicators of both agitation and excitement. Another inspector wanted to shut down the plant because one pig was squeaking (Grandin 2010: 3). Other examples of underspecified policies are: ‘provide adequate space in pen’, or ‘handle cattle properly’. These guidelines are too vague to be consistently enforced. One person may define proper handling of cattle completely differently to another person.
Grandin states that all words that are open to various interpretations, such as ‘properly’ and ‘sufficient’ must be either eliminated or very well defined (ibid.). In line with Grandin’s views, the third adequacy criterion will be that various interpretations of the policy must be limited as much as possible: we must prevent thresholds that can lead to vague policies.
4.5 Adequacy criterion Number 4: Prevent policies with unintended bad consequences
It is possible that some policies aimed at improving the situation, end up making things even worse. Grandin uses the example of animal welfare organization HSUS’s 2006 campaign (Grandin 2010). HSUS campaigned against the increasing number of surplus horses that were slaughtered for human consumption because they found this to be morally wrong. The campaign was so successful that a new national policy banned all horse slaughter. Slaughter plants were forced to shut down. Unfortunately this led to many new welfare problems.
When the policy became active in 2007, the total number of horses exported to Mexico went up by 312%. Thousands of horses were shipped to Mexico under very poor and cruel conditions, to be slaughtered in plants that used horrible slaughter methods. The number of abandoned horses in the U.S., where horses were just left somewhere to die, also rose
significantly. Thus, the overall score for the welfare of horses decreased considerably due to the implementation of this new policy (Grandin 2010: 3-4).
The cruel consequences of the policy were never intended by HSUS, but were unfortunately not foreseen. Therefore, Grandin argues that policies must be based not only on the problem, but also on the causes that underlie the problem. In the case of the horses, it would have been better to investigate why so many horses became surplus, instead of deciding that killing horses for human consumption must be banned. This would have prevented a lot of animal suffering (ibid.).
4.6 Four adequacy criteria
In this chapter I have discussed the adequacy criteria used in this thesis. In summary, the framework that is based on Nussbaum’s list of capabilities must:
1) be in line with Nussbaum’s approach 2) be feasible
3) must prevent vague policies
4) must prevent possible unintended bad consequences
There is a fixed patron all capabilities will be tested against. The criteria’s are of decreasing importance, corresponding with their number on the list. I will first translate Nussbaum’s interpretation of a capability into a threshold with regards to the pig. This is criterion 1: in line with Nussbaum. Next, the formulated threshold will be tested by criterion 2: must be feasible. The developed threshold must be realistic to become part of my framework. If it fails to meet this criterion, the threshold will not be used. The threshold will then be tested against the requirements of criterion 3: prevent vague polices, and 4) prevent unintended consequences. If it is not possible to modify a threshold in such a way that it meets the requirements of criteria 1 and 2, the threshold will not become part of the framework that is used for policy analysis.
Part III
Chapter 5. The development of framework based on Nussbaum’s capability approach for animals
5.1 Ten capabilities
Nussbaum’s CAA consists of ten capabilities that she considers necessary for the possibility of leading a flourishing life. At the core of the approach are the rights and entitlements animals have to these capabilities. The rights and entitlements are founded on the principle of justice (Nussbaum 2006: 332).
Every species has its own spectrum of capabilities based on the species-specific need to flourish. Although there will be many varieties between species, Nussbaum argues that the list of ten capabilities can still be used as a universal framework for all creatures (ibid.: 333).
The ten capabilities are: 1) Life
2) Bodily Health 3) Bodily Integrity
4) Senses, Imagination, Thought 5) Emotions
6) Practical Reason 7) Affiliation 8) Other Species 9) Play
10) Control Over One’s Environment
In this chapter I will discuss how these capabilities can be used for the assessment of the well-being of pigs and will formulate answers to Sub-question 1: “How should the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list be used for assessing the well-being of pigs?” and Sub-question 2: “How can we make this list more precise?” The answers must meet the adequacy criteria formulated in Chapter 4. The goal in this chapter will be to interpret each capability with regards to pigs and establish thresholds that will then function as a framework that can be used for policy analysis.
5.2 Capability ‘Life’
The first capability on Nussbaum’s list is ‘Life’. Nussbaum claims that every animal should be capable of living a life of normal length, not dying prematurely or before one's life is so reduced that it is no longer worth living. It does not matter whether or not the animals have a conscious interest in this. Even animals that do not have a consciousness, such as insects, may not be killed unnecessarily. However, Nussbaum argues that if they form a threat to our crops, or are a source of nutrition when no other nutrition is available, their rights are not violated if we kill them. This is different for animals that do have a certain level of consciousness: for example, animals that can experience pain, suffering and pleasure. None of these animals may be killed for the sake of sports. This includes brutally killing animals for food and for fur (Nussbaum 2006: 76, 333).
What does Nussbaum’s interpretation of the ‘Life’ capability entail for pigs? Foremost, the pig may not be killed for food. This would be a violation of the pig’s capability of living a life of normal length. The normal lifespan of a pig is 6-15 years. The lifespan depends on whether the pig is used for breeding or for its meat. Sows can reach 15 years, porkers from 6-10 years. Porkers are bred to become very large very quickly and because of this more health problems reduce their life expectancy.6 Following Nussbaum then, ideally the threshold for this capability would be that all Dutch pigs must be capable of living a life of normal length which would be between 6-15 years.
The second criterion refers to the real-life applicability of the threshold: it must be feasible. When this criterion is applied to Nussbaum’s interpretation of the ‘Life’ capability we must conclude that this requirement is not (yet) met. It would not be realistic to require that, starting now, all Dutch pigs must be capable of leading a life of normal length. It would be an impossible effort to let 12,212,303 Dutch pigs live a life of 6-15 years, especially considering the fact all these pigs are bred specifically to become food.
For a capability to be realistic, Nussbaum argued that we must sometimes lower its threshold. For the ‘Life’ capability Nussbaum formulated a partial solution for lowering the threshold so that it becomes less idealistic and more realistic. Although Nussbaum is not an advocate of killing animals for food, she argues that there are difficult cases with regard to the violation of an animal’s capabilities that are deeply institutionalized and socially entrenched
6
See for article ‘Animal Care- Pigs’
://www.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Animal-Care-Pigs.pdf retrieved 28-05-2014
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in our societies. To kill and eat an animal for food is an example of such a difficult case (Nussbaum & Faralli: 160). To address these difficult cases Nussbaum reasons that any beginning, however small, is better than no beginning. Therefore, she argues that for now, in our current societies, killing animals for food is defensible if this is done painlessly (Nussbaum 2006: 333). In line with this argument, the threshold for this capability must be lowered from ‘a pig must be capable of living its life of normal length’, to ‘being killed painlessly’.
There are already European laws formulated that provide rules and regulations for the slaughter of Dutch pigs with regard to their welfare.7 Nussbaum’s lowered threshold could thus be defined as strong realistic and useable for the framework.
The third criterion I formulated refers to preventing the vagueness of many animal welfare policies. With regard to the current interpretation of the ‘Life’ capability, some adjustments are needed. Because the threshold has been lowered from being capable of living a life of normal length to being killed painlessly, it is important to define ‘being killed painlessly’. Temple Grandin has researched this subject extensively.
Grandin argues that pain is interrelated with other states of being. She has done a lot of research into how to reduce all forms of negative feelings for animals before and during the slaughter process (2010: 195). She describes the process pigs must go through before they are slaughtered and critically reviews this. Grandin’s research suggests three different stages in the pig slaughter process (2003: 83-90):
1) Transportation 2) Pre-slaughter 3) Slaughter
For each of these stages Grandin identified key factors that must be taken into account when assessing and ensuring the pig’s wellbeing. To ensure that a pig is killed painlessly, transportation and the process of pre-slaughter are equally important. Grandin has shown that killing an animal painlessly entails a lot of precautionary measures. These measures are all focused on reducing suffering and based on the natural behavior of pigs (ibid.). Based on Grandin’s research, very specific measures that need to be taken in order for a pig to be killed
7 See European Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 ‘On the protection of animals at the time of
slaughter or killing’
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painlessly have been formulated. These specific measures prevent a policy based on this threshold from becoming too vague. The measures can be found in Appendix 1.
The altered threshold for the ‘Life’ capability is that if an animal is killed, it must be done so painlessly. Although at first sight this does not seem to have any unintended bad consequences, if we look deeper we could argue that the lowered threshold could lead to unintended bad consequences. Killing a pig painlessly now functions as the threshold for the ‘Life’ capability, but if this threshold is regarded as fixed then it could turn our attention away from the morally wrong action that, according to Nussbaum, killing the pig is in the first place.
We must make sure that a policy based on the lowered threshold of being killed painlessly does not stay that way because, for Nussbaum, the ‘Life’ capability is about animals being capable of living a life of normal length and not about being killed painlessly. Nussbaum argues that for now we can lower the threshold in order for it to be realistic. This indicates that this threshold for the Netherlands is not the ideal situation and we must strive for a future change to reach the original threshold. Following this reasoning then, the threshold for this capability is not strong realistic but weak realistic because there must be adjustments made to the Dutch policies to ensure that the original threshold will be reached in the future. In Chapter 6 I discuss which Dutch policies this applies to.
Pig’s ‘Life’ capability: Interpretation and threshold
According to Nussbaum’s interpretation of the ‘Life’ capability, a pig must be capable of living its life for between 6-15 years. I have argued that this threshold must be lowered in order for it to be realistic and not utopian. Still in line with Nussbaum, I have lowered the threshold for the ‘Life’ capability and reasoned that the new threshold must be that a pig must be killed painlessly.
Due to the risk of multiple interpretations of the word ‘painlessly’, I have provided a thorough checklist of what it entails to kill a pig painlessly to prevent the possibility of vague policy. Not only the action of killing is important but also the stages prior to the killing are of significance to ensure that a pig is killed without pain.
An unintended bad consequence of a policy based on the lowered threshold could be that we are distracted from the original threshold of the capability: that an animal must be capable of living a normal length life. To prevent this distraction I argued in line with
Nussbaum that we should also be focused on preventing the act of killing in the first place. For this, alterations to Dutch policy are needed and these will be discussed in Chapter 6.
5.3. ‘Bodily Health’
The next capability on Nussbaum’s list is ‘Bodily Health’. This capability refers to the possibility of an animal acquiring good health. For this, every creature must be capable of obtaining suitable food and shelter (Nussbaum 2006: 76). Nussbaum becomes more specific about what this capability implies for animals when she describes the capability in relation to animals in human care. Specifically, for animals in the meat industry, she argues that there must be laws against the detention and mistreatment of animals. Furthermore, she considers the juridical differences between animals kept as pet and animals bred for food as an asymmetry that must be eliminated. All animals should receive the same protection as pets do (ibid.: 334).
In accordance with Nussbaum’s interpretation of the ‘Bodily Health’ capability, this interpretation entails for pigs that they should be housed and fed according to their species needs. To enforce this, there must be laws that prevent pigs from detention and mistreatment. The laws that protect pets from cruelty and neglect should also be enforced for pigs in the food industry. Considering the implications associated with this interpretation of the threshold for the ‘Bodily Health’ capability, we must conclude that meeting this threshold is at this moment rather utopian.
It is estimated by Foundation Wakker Dier that approximately 95% of the Dutch pig are part of the intensive livestock industry, and housed in dense pens that are small, rarely admit daylight and only contain straw and some enrichment materials. The pens consist mainly of concrete, fluorescent tubes, steel fences and slatted floors.8 We can certainly not consider these conditions as ensuring that a pig is capable of receiving good housing. But to rehouse approximately 12,000,000 pigs is not realistic. Therefore, the threshold for this capability must be lowered.
It is a difficult task to set a lower threshold, but still aim high enough. If it is set too low the pigs would not be helped to achieve a flourishing life. So then, how can the threshold be lowered but still manage to achieve proper housing arrangements for the pigs in the intensive meat industry? For this, I propose a list based on a study of the University of
8
See website foundation Wakker Dier (“Animal Alert”) http://www.wakkerdier.nl/bio-industrie retrieved 29-05-2014
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Wageningen (WUR). This study, which has the alluring title ’What does the pig want?’ (2009), provides alterations for current pig housing based on the needs of the pig. It is specifically designed to have feasible options for improvements. The list the WUR proposes consists of thirteen points which are important for a pig (ibid.: 6-18):
1) Rest 2) Saturation 3) Excretion 4) Self- care 5) Exploration 6) Social behavior 7) Thermoregulation 8) Safety 9) Health 10) Exercise 11) Sexual behavior 12) Nesting behavior 13) Maternal behavior
The WUR study proposes alterations based on these needs. For example, for 80% of the day pigs like to rest, preferably with others. The WUR study therefore proposes that stables must provide adequate laying space that is clean and quiet and large enough for the pigs to rest together and away from pigs that are not resting (WUR 2009: 6).
To a certain extent, many of the points on the list are already present in the Varkensbesluit (“Pig decree”), but not as explicitly as mentioned in the list.9 Because the legal structure for this list is already present in the current policy for the welfare of pigs, this part of the threshold for the capability could be considered as strong realistic and can thus be used for the framework.
Another point Nussbaum proposed for the interpretation of this capability was to eliminate the asymmetry between the way pets and animals bred for food are treated. I find this to be utopian. Firstly, the implementation of a law preventing these differences seems rather utopian in our society because no structures for this change are currently present in
9 See Varkensbesluit article 2.2-2.11
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Dutch policies. Secondly, the differences in the way we treat our animals are deeply institutionalized in our society and this may not be the result of absent laws but from a civil society that is not supportive of this claim of Nussbaum.
Melanie Joy argues in her book Why we love dogs, eat pigs, and wear cows (2011) that there is a belief system identifiable in most Western societies that conditions us to eat certain animals and love others. She terms this system ‘carnism’ and refers to the ways we numb ourselves and try to disconnect from the empathy we feel for animals we eat and treat so cruelly. Joy argues that a top-down approach, such as implementing laws to force social change, will not eliminate any differences humans ascribe to the social positions of different animals. On the contrary, Joy argues that this will only be met with resistance. She argues that we must create a counter movement that emphasizes the similarities between the animals we eat and love to create social awareness and change ‘from below’ (ibid.).
The approach Joy promotes seems to be more realistic to eliminate the juridical differences between pets and animals used for food. However, this would mean that Dutch policies must be somehow focused on supporting initiatives that could start such a social movement from below. In Chapter 6 I will discuss how the Dutch government could initiate such movements for change.
The threshold for this capability is not very precise yet. Bearing in mind the WUR-list, there is some work to do. All the words in the list must be explained thoroughly. Defining criteria for this capability is beyond the scope of this thesis, and I will leave that task to animal scientists and behaviorists. For an example a list I refer to Appendix 1 where such a clarification is made with regard to the ‘Life’ capability.
If the list that now represents the threshold for the ‘Bodily Health’ capability is enforced as a policy, unintended consequences could develop. In a world that is becoming ever more interconnected, the market in meat is no exception. The list of thirteen measures that must be undertaken for pigs to attain a good bodily health capability, forms stringent rules that will probably make Dutch pig meat more expensive. If consumers or retailers are not willing to pay more for their piece of meat, this could lead to increased importation of pig’s meat. A similar process has already developed within the Dutch-EU egg-industry.
The EU banned battery cages for egg-laying hens but did not increase import tariffs for eggs coming from countries where the ban was either not enforced or absent. In the Netherlands, this led to an increase in the number of imported eggs from egg-laying hens in battery cages from countries outside the EU, thus leading to an overall decrease in animal 32
well-being (Horne 2012: 12-14). This phenomenon could occur for pig meat as well. Imported, cheaper pig meat would probably come from countries where the rules regarding pigs’ housing do not focus on the pigs’ well-being. This then would lead to more animal wellbeing problems for pigs outside of the Netherlands. To prevent this perhaps unintended consequence, Dutch policy must be able to prevent it. Therefore, alterations must be made to the Dutch policies. In Chapter 6 I will discuss this further.
Pig’s ‘Bodily Health’ capability: Interpretation and threshold
To be able to lead a flourishing life, the pig must be capable of acquiring good shelter. In accordance with the CAA, the pig should therefore be free of detention. Also, the juridical differences between pets and animals bred for food must be eliminated. This original threshold has been lowered to make it feasible for our society. The lower threshold is based on the WUR- list of thirteen points that must be followed for a pig to have a minimum of good shelter. These points must be clarified to prevent the policy measures from becoming too vague. This is a task for biologists and animal scientists to take up. To eliminate the juridical differences between pets and animals bred for food, it is important that civil society supports this, the Dutch government should play a role in this.
To prevent unintended bad consequences, the policy regarding this capability must ensure that the amount of imported meat does not increase, as this meat probably comes from countries with a lower threshold, therefore jeopardizing the wellbeing of pigs in those countries. For this, precautionary measures must be taken, I will discuss these in chapter 6.
5.4 ‘Bodily Integrity’
The third capability on Nussbaum’s list is ‘Bodily Integrity’. This capability refers to the rights and entitlements animals have to protection from violations to bodily integrity. Humans should be free to roam between places and be free of violence aimed at the person, sexual violence and domestic violence (Nussbaum 2006: 76). Furthermore, Nussbaum states that all measures taken that violate bodily integrity must be prohibited (ibid.: 334-335).
A threshold for that is based on Nussbaum’s reasoning would mean that no measures may be carried out that violate the pig’s bodily integrity, regardless of whether the measure is painful or not. Currently there are a few methods within the meat industry that violate bodily integrity and which are common practice: castration, docking of the pig’s tail, teeth grinding
