Waltzing in a time of war : understanding the strategic partnership between the Russian

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Master’s Thesis

Waltzing in a Time of War

Understanding the strategic partnership between the Russian

Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic

Author:

Natalie Shatashvili

Student number : 10391630

Supervisor:

Dr. Said Rezaeiejan

June 24, 2016

I would like to expresses my deepest gratitude to my family for their unconditional love and guidance as well as to my friends who supported me during the writing of this thesis.

Michael Shatashvili Ruth Shatashvili Aaron Shatashvili Tamar Shatashvili Merlin Drachenberg Ursula Drachenberg Ruthi Drachenberg Michael Shatashvili Lital Shatashvili Jonathan Shatashvili Tim Coorens Sida Nakrosyte Julia Ertl Bianka Narwanova Laura Kropp Aleksandra Wojcik Lucia Zelenska Koen Schiernecker

and the amazing Ring the Bell group: Alejandrina Mercado, Camille Mayoly, Todor Ristov, Milan Nascimento, Jonas Mertens.

Thank you!

The Syrian civil war has sparked international outrage and increased tension between the United States and the Russian Federation. This thesis examines the partnership between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic between 2011-2012 using neoclas-sical realism as its theoretical framework and foreign policy analysis for its methodology. The variables measured include relative power and human decision making in relation to political, economic and sociocultural factors. The research concludes that the Russian-Syrian alliance is part of a security measure to undermine western and specifically US influence inside the Middle East. The research moreover argues that with increased rel-ative power comes a nations increased behavioural appetite to influence boarders outside of its territory. Further research on a larger time-frame needs to be conducted to obtain more concrete and continuous data.

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis FSA Free Syrian Army GNI Gross National Income HDI Human Development Index IMF International Monetary Fund ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Acknowledgements i

Abstract ii

List of Abbreviations iii

1 Introduction 1

2 Theoretical Framework 4

2.1 Realist perspectives in International Relations . . . 4

2.2 Realist perspectives in International Relations . . . 5

2.3 Neoclassical criticism of classical and neorealism . . . 7

2.4 Neoclassical realism in foreign policy . . . 8

2.5 Neoclassical Realism . . . 10

2.6 Foreign Policy Analysis in international relations . . . 11

2.7 Foreign policy analysis and human decision making . . . 12

2.8 Individual and collective decision making . . . 13

2.9 Multiple factors affecting Foreign Policy . . . 14

2.10 Causes and effects of FPA . . . 15

2.11 Variable selection . . . 15

2.12 Recipe for making an Alliance . . . 16

2.13 Different responses to threats . . . 17

2.14 Different levels of threats . . . 19

2.15 Alliance building through common traits . . . 20

2.16 Policy Instruments: Bribery and Penetration . . . 22

2.17 Holding on or breaking off an Alliance . . . 23

2.18 Reasons for failed alliances . . . 23

2.19 Reasons for successful alliances . . . 25

2.20 Institutionalisation as means of survival . . . 26

2.21 Chapter summary . . . 27

3 Methodology 28

3.1 Hypothesis . . . 28

3.2 Neoclassical realism in domestic politics . . . 29

3.3 Time frame and variable selection . . . 29

3.4 Source selection . . . 30

3.4.1 Political category . . . 30

3.4.2 Economic category . . . 30

3.4.3 Sociocultural category . . . 31

3.5 Chapter summary . . . 31

4 Syria: a rocky past shaping a turbulent future 32 4.1 Syria during the Roman era . . . 32

4.2 The new religion of Islam . . . 33

4.3 Western Intervention . . . 33

4.4 French domination . . . 34

4.5 Hafez al-Assad in power . . . 35

4.6 Syria’s conflict with Israel . . . 36

4.7 Syria under Bashir al-Assad . . . 37

4.8 Syria as a global conflict of interest . . . 38

4.9 Chapter summary . . . 38

5 Results and Analysis 39 5.1 Foreign Policy Analysis 2011 . . . 39

5.2 Foreign Policy Analysis in 2012 . . . 46

5.3 Chapter summary . . . 49

6 Conclusion 51

Introduction

Reading about or hearing of the Syrian Arab Republic sparks thoughts of war, terror and chaos. As of March 15th 2011, the country has been suffering from an ongoing civil war, protesting against President Bashar al-Assad’s government (Allison, 2013). The situation now has become more pressing and intense than before as the governments regional stability is under major threat. The regime responds to overcome such threats with “unconstrained use of force” exposing “entrenched political fault-lines” amongst Middle Eastern governments in their merciless struggle for power (Allison, 2013, p. 795). The Syrian Arab Republic however, would not be able to sustain their current government without external help. From a regional perspective, Iran has been the most dedicated supporter of Assad’s regime and his predominately Alawite state composition together with Shi’a Islam. Nevertheless, from a global perspective, it is the Russian Federation that has been implementing and contributing diplomatic armour and military supplies to the Syrian state (Valenta and Valenta, 2016). This raises the question of why the Russian Federation has decided to position itself as a key player in Syrian affairs. The country has effectively sheltered Damascus in the UN Security Council despite the knowing abuses the Assad regime has committed against its people. “It’s de facto alignment with Damascus reaffirmed at the June 2013 G8 summit, has left Russia increasingly isolated internationally” (Allison, 2013, p. 795). Even China has chosen a more low profile attitude towards this issue which makes one question why Russia maintains close relations with Syria despite contrary action seen by the west and most Arab and Muslim states. Hence, this thesis will conduct an in depth analysis on the research question of How can we understand the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic? The importance of researching this question is to understand the actions of countries mingling in foreign affairs and their true intentions behind them. This not only provides a greater understanding of foreign affairs but also the mechanism behind alliance formation and power politics.

The main hypothesis that this thesis will want to test is that the partnership between

the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic is mainly Russia’s attempt for undermining the United States. The country seems to be having a deep-rooted animosity of fearing western-led military interventions for which Russian President Vladimir Putin has received harsh criticism since the early 2000s (Valenta and Valenta, 2016). Looking back in history, Russia has clashed over diplomatic relations with the west before, to which it had like-minded supporters from the international community for backup. Nonetheless, in the case of Syria, not NATO, the United States or any other significant western country has been anxious or passionate about a partnership with Assad’s regime.

On September 30th, 2015, The Russian Federation began a military intervention into Syria. Why would a country like Russia intervene and invest time in another country miles away while having closer issues with a temporarily postponed proxy war with the Ukraine? Military interventions come as no surprise from the Russian regime with Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and south-eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015 (Valenta and Valenta, 2016). Winston Churchill made a fitting remark by arguing that “The Russians will try all the rooms in the house, enter those that are not locked, and when they come to one that cannot be broken into, they will withdraw and invite you to dine genially that same evening” (Isaacson and Thomas, 1997). But there must be a legitimate reason for Russia’s actions, beneficial factors that might not be as obvious to the general public as they are to the country.

Assad’s regime was fighting for its survival by the summer of 2015 with multiple rebel groups, supporters of the Sunni regimes in Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States, making their approaches. Meanwhile, Assad and his Alawite structured government together with the military were getting defeated and losing ground on a daily basis. This caused the regime to ask for Russia’s direct military intervention in July 2015 (Valenta and Valenta, 2016). Everyone was and still is questioning Russia’s motives, is it in fact fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? “ISIS was metastasizing in northern Afghanistan and could, over the long-run; affect Russia’s Central Asian allies” (Valenta and Valenta, 2016). The key argument to keep in mind over the entire course of this research is that actors helping other actors only do so if gaining from it is greater than the loss. So what does Russia gain from being in a partnership with Syria?

To explain the partnership between the above mentioned countries, neoclassical realism together with foreign policy analysis will be used as the foundational building blocks to measure political, economic an sociocultural variables. By analysing these variables through this theoretical framework, this thesis hopes to paint a clearer picture of what kind of alliance the Russia and Syria are engaging in. The three variables were chosen for very specific reasons. Understanding the political negotiations between the two countries might shed light on the physical actions and interactions of the ongoing civil war. This will be measured by analysing foreign policy documents, state party speeches/interviews

as well as UN resolutions. The economic aspect will be measured by obtaining data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to observe both Russia’s and Syria’s money management. This is vital in interpreting military actions as well as Syria’s survival tactics and Russia’s apparent incentives. Social and cultural variables are being merged together to explain characteristics from both countries and if they possess influence over variables one and two.

This thesis is structured as follows: subsequent to the introduction, the paper will divulge into its second chapter focusing on building the theoretical framework and con-ducting a thorough literature review. Thereafter, Chapter 3 explains the methodology by which the above mentioned variables will be measured followed by Chapter 4 providing a brief historical background on Russia’s and Syria’s origins of cooperation as well as reasons for the outbreak of the current civil war. Chapter 5 will present an analysis of the obtained results with variables. The thesis will conclude with Chapter 6 and its closing remarks together with a complete bibliography.

Theoretical Framework

To understand Russia’s partnership with Syria and Syria’s intentions with Russia from any point of view or angle, one first has to establish the core elements that define an alliance together with its characteristics and aims. This chapter will outline the importance of international relations in explaining these aims by using the most fitting theory namely neoclassical realism. Arguments on why neoclassical realism is being preferred over other branches of realism or other existing theories in international relations will be discussed below. Moreover, the chapter will highlight the groundwork of foreign policy analysis to provide a more coherent presentation of why and how the three variables used to answer the research question (political, economic and sociocultural) will be measured. Outlining the key elements of neoclassical realism in foreign policy analysis will allow for the drafting of a checklist to understand how this level of analysis can be used in measuring and analysing the Russian-Syrian alliance. The theoretical framework based on provided literature will thus enhance the visibility of the existing relationship between the two countries.

2.1

Realist perspectives in International Relations

Theories help us make sense of the environment we live in and the world we hear about from secondary sources. Successful policies need to have solid organizing principles that cannot be flawed. “Everyone uses theories-whether he or she knows it or not-and dis-agreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disdis-agreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes” (Walt, 1998, p. 29). Scholars have expressed their distress of foreign policy analysis ignoring the academic practice of theorists when in fact there is a valid link between “the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy” (Walt, 1998, p. 29).

For this paper the theory of neo-classical realism and foreign policy analysis will be used in forming a more substantial understanding of why Russia and Syria engage with

each other and how these engagements are being preserved. However, before expanding on that theory, it is beneficial to state why neoclassical realism and foreign policy analysis have been chosen as the most fitting measure of investigation to answer the above men-tioned questions. To explain this, explanations on the theory of realism as well as other theories in international relations and why they are not suited for this specific research question are discussed in the sub- sections below.

There have been a number of theories looked at for the suitability of this research question. Among them, realism proved to possess qualities that were not found within other theories in international relations. Liberalism for example, intentional institutions, trade flows or the amount of economic interdependence between states cause a secondary phenomenon. By devaluing the relative distribution of power and placing attention on institutions, liberal democracy and trade to the isolation of power politics, liberal theories have difficulty explain numerous aspects of international politics (Ripsman et al., 2016). The theory ignores the central role of the “foreign policy executive the ministers and officials who are tasked with making foreign and security policy and who stand at the intersection of domestic politics at the international arena” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 5). Constructivism on the other hand assumes that both the international system and the domestic political environment cannot have an individual effect on state behaviour. They believe that actors who are ingrained in culture on a domestic and international level, must place meaning to their external environment, international interactions and the actions of other actors (Ripsman et al., 2016). Basically, the theory suspects that what actors do within the international sphere, the interests they hold and the actors they fulfil in achieving those interests arise from social norms and ideas and not objective material reality. The problem with constructivism is that countries and their leaders are influenced by competing international and domestic norms and cultures. They deal with multiple and often conflicting identities which would make it immensely difficult to hold predictions about their foreign policy choices or indications about their past behaviours “except through ex post factor stipulations” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 14). Realism however does not hold these limitations and addresses the international system and power distribution quite differently to liberalism and constructivism which will be outlined in section 2.2.

2.2

Realist perspectives in International Relations

Classical Realism: The theory of classical realism was established in the post- World War II era and initially tries to understand and explain international politics as a result of human nature. It was regarded as the most dominant theoretical framework throughout the Cold War and reflects on international affairs as a struggle for power among states.

Hence it is fair to say that realism has its key focus set on the lasting propensity of conflict between states. The reason for it having been as dominant as it was is due to the fact that it provided clear cut and simple explanations for war, alliances, imperialism and cooperation. Furthermore, its significance relied on the competition consistent with the main features of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union (Walt, 1998). The theory is very often associated with philosophers such as Niccol`o Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes or political scientists like Hans Morgenthau. In his 1948 published book Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau stated that ”politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau and Nations, 1948). What Morgenthau and Nations (1948) is trying to explain is that all the policies and laws established by a state have their bases within the people that draft them, people that are governed by their ego and emotions. He moreover argues that give the fact that politics is managed through the objectivity of human nature, there is an opportunity for a theory of international relations to be developed by putting oneself in the shoes of the political actors to in turn have a higher likelihood of correctly predicting future political outcomes (Morgenthau and Nations, 1948). Classical realism however decreased in usage when neorealism started to emerge. This is due to the fact that scholars of international relations started favouring a theory focused on rationality more than one targeted at understanding human nature. Neorealism: Contrary to classical realism, neorealism suggests that structural con-straints, not strategy, egoism, or emotions, determine the behaviour in international rela-tions. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz for example has a slightly different way of approaching the international system compared to Morgenthau. Waltz distances himself from human nature and addresses the effects of the international system which according to him is made up of great powers fighting for their survival. The system itself is seen as anarchic meaning that there is no central authority protecting states from each other (Waltz, 1996). Having no central authority means that every sovereign state is equal within the system. Each state has its duty to protect itself on its own. Therefore,Waltz (1996) argues that states will act in a manner of self-help logic which entails every state to seek out their own interests above everyone else’s. Neorealist view states as having similar aims but not having the same potential in achieving them. The structural division of different levels of potential, limits cooperation among states due to the fears of relative gains made by other states. This would then cause the likelihood of becoming dependant on these other states. The notion of each state wanting to maximize their power results in a so called balance of power wish essentially outlines international relations (Rose, 1998).

Neorealism distinguishes between two ways in which states can balance their power. Internal balancing takes place when a state manages to grow its potential for achieving a given aim by expanding in economic growth and/or increase military spending. Ex-ternal balancing occurs if states wish to enter into an alliance in order of obtaining a

better overview of the partners potential of power. Neutralists believe that living in a bipolar system (power distributed amongst two states who have the highest national and international influence over economy, military and culture) is more stable than living in a multipolar system (more than four nation-states exercising nearly equal amount of influ-ence). The reason for it being that within a bipolar system, balancing of power can only occur internally since there are no other states with similar power capabilities to form an alliance with. Hence there would be a lesser likelihood of miscalculations/interpretations which decreases the tendencies of power struggles that could result in war (Rose, 1998).

Scholars of neorealism do not all agree on certain points. There seems to be an exten-sive discussion on whether states primarily aim to just survive or whether their goals lie in increasing their relative power as well. The former statement is supported by Kenneth Waltz and defensive realism while the latter showcases the views of political scientist John Mearsheimer and offensive realism. Defensive realism revolves around the idea of security dilemma which according to Waltz (1996) arises to due mistrust between other states, resulting in the maximization of security within one’s own country. The reason for the lack of trust and increase in security can be explained by the above mentioned argument that states aim for ultimate survival. Offensive realism also states that the international system is anarchical and that states can never fully be sure of the intentions of another state. However, offensive realism takes on a slightly more pessimistic view on how the mechanisms of international politics by arguing that there are dangerous inter-state secu-rity competitions which increase the possibilities of conflict and war. Mearsheimer argues that states “look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 34). Crit-icism concerning offensive realism notes that the theory suffers from restrictive focuses as it fails to take into account domestic factors. According to scholars, Mearsheimer fails to mention a state’s internal political functions such as its economy or society which play a significant role when it comes to the decision-making process on domestic and there-fore there-foreign policy (Hendrickson et al., 2003). Section 2.3 will outline the reasons for not choosing any of the above mentioned theoretical branches of realism and why neoclassical realism instead will be used in conducing foreign policy analysis.

2.3

Neoclassical criticism of classical and neorealism

Compared to classical or neorealism, neoclassical realism looks at both external and in-ternal variables. It is revising and systematizing certain elements and insights that can be found in classical realism as both agree that a state’s foreign policy is motivated primarily by its status within the international system and its relative material power capabilities (Rose, 1998). Neorealism however tries to explain the outcomes of state

in-teractions through the motivations of individual states but without giving much insight to the behaviour of them. Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power forms the foundational parameters of a country’s foreign policy. They look to the example of Thucydides formula (Athenian historian and general who recounted the history of the Peloponnesian War in 411 BC between Sparta and Athens) which states that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Hanson and Strassler, 1998, p. 43). Neoclassical realists further add that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy “is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level” (Rose, 1998, p. 148). In neoclassical realism, there is no dominant factor shaping a nations foreign policy over time. Therefore their relative power in relation to the rest of the international system should be the starting point when wanting to analyse a state’s foreign policy. Defensive realism for example emphasis on a countries response to threats but overlooks the matter that perceptions of threat are to some extend influenced by ones relative material power. “The theory is further flawed be-cause its first-order systemic argument does not account for much actual behaviour, thus forcing its adherents to contract out the bulk of their explanatory work to domestic-level variables introduced on an ad hoc basis” (Rose, 1998, 151).

Offensive realism, neoclassical realists argue, limits foreign policy to only systemic factors which is bound to make any analysis of it inaccurate. Offensive realists argue that in order to comprehend the mechanisms of state interpretation to their external environment, an analysis of how systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables (such as the views of political leaders and domestic state structures) has to be conducted. The issue there is that political leaders can be limited by both national and international politics which makes international anarchy very difficult to depict. Neoclassical realists consider the possibility of an objective reality of relative power that can have dramatic effects on the outcomes of state relations. “They however do not consider that states necessarily apprehend that reality accurately on a day-to-day basis” (Rose, 1998, p. 151). Section 2.4 will further elaborate on the views of neoclassical realism specifically in relation to foreign policy and power politics.

2.4

Neoclassical realism in foreign policy

The core analysis of this thesis is to understand why Russia and Syria have drafted, implemented and engaged in the foreign policy measures that they have. Neoclassical realism stresses the fact that when it comes to foreign policy choices, they are made by actual political leaders and elites. Therefore, when we talk about relative power, it is their perception of it that needs to be taken into account. “This means that over the short to medium term countries’ foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material

power trends closely or continuously” (Rose, 1998, 145). Because political figures of a state do not always possess the unlimited freedom to take and direct national resources, power analysis must focus on the strength and structure of states relative to their societies. This is due to the fact that the strength and structure of a state can affect the scale of national resources that can be used in foreign policy. Rose (1998) explains how this can lead to countries with similar gross capabilities but different state structures to likely demonstrate difference in behaviour. He moreover states that systemic pressures and incentives can shape the broad outlines and general pathway of foreign policy without being too strong or direct to determine the specific details of state behaviour. Therefore, neoclassical realists strongly advocate that in order to be able to understand the links between power and policy, a close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented must take place.

In neoclassical realism, both independent and intervening variables are taken into con-sideration. The theory has a specific methodological preference for theoretically shaped narratives which are preferably in cooperated by thorough counterfactual analysis which observe how different factors combine to shape specific foreign policies (Rose, 1998). As specified in section 2.3, neoclassical realists idealize Thucydides work on the History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides argues that it was Athens growth in power that caused the war with Sparta. He goes on to elaborate how systemic incentives were adapted through unit-level variables into the foreign policies of numerous Greek states. This ex-ample embodies the primary subject of all neoclassical realists which is the influence of relative power on foreign policy (Hanson and Strassler, 1998). Staying on the topic of power, scholars such as Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy and Michael Mandelbaum argued that when a countries status of power changes, so does its foreign policy. This is why Mandelbaum (1988) states how the security policies of very strong countries are signifi-cantly different to weaker countries. Kennedy (2010) further adds that patterns in history clearly suggests that there is a vital link between a powerful countries economic rise and fall and its expansion or decline as an important military power. The reason for it being that states are in constant temptation to increase their influence and control over the environment, meaning that more powerful states will opt for larger security measures and welfare goals compared to a less wealthy or significant state (Gilpin, 1983). Zakaria (1999) agrees with Gilpin (1983) and explains this behaviour by arguing that states have the ten-dency to use their resources and tools to gain control over their environment. States are likely to want more rather than less external influence and will try to pursue such influ-ence as much as their capabilities permit them to do so. The central empirical prediction of neoclassical realism is thus that over the long term the relative amount of material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition- the envelope, as it were- of their foreign policies (Rose, 1998). Hence, as relative power increases, a

state will seek more international influence and less in case its power decreases, which will be visible through its foreign policy. The following section will discuss neoclassical realism in relation to foreign policy analysis and the advantages it contributes towards the understanding of political actors and their decision making process.

2.5

Neoclassical Realism

Out of all the theories available to us, neoclassical realism is the most appropriate one to use for this particular research question. When looking at liberalism for example, intentional institutions, trade flows or the amount of economic interdependence between states cause a secondary phenomenon. By devaluing the relative distribution of power and placing attention on institutions, liberal democracy and trade to the isolation of power politics, liberal theories have difficulty explain numerous aspects of international politics (Ripsman et al., 2016). The theory ignores the central role of the “foreign policy executive the ministers and officials who are tasked with making foreign and security policy and who stand at the intersection of domestic politics at the international arena” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 5). Constructivism on the other hand assumes that both the international system and the domestic political environment cannot have an individual effect on state behaviour. They believe that actors who are ingrained in culture on a domestic and international level, must place meaning to their external environment, international interactions and the actions of other actors (Ripsman et al., 2016). Basically, the theory suspects that what actors do within the international sphere, the interests they hold and the actors they fulfil in achieving those interests arise from social norms and ideas and not objective material reality. The problem with constructivism is that countries and their leaders are influenced by competing international and domestic norms and cultures. They deal with multiple and often conflicting identities which would make it immensely difficult to hold predictions about their foreign policy choices or indications about their past behaviours “except through ex post factor stipulations” (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 14). Neoclassical realism does not face such limitations. It identifies substantial variables at different levels of analysis and indicates how they can form a range of outcomes at the levels of foreign policy, strategic adjustment, international outcomes as well as structural changes. This makes it a far superior explanatory tool than liberalism or constructivism. That is not to say that the theory has not received its fair share of criticism. Political Scientist David Lake argues that neoclassical realism is unhelpful and should be dismissed in favour of problem-driven research agendas. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have noted that in recent years, scholars of international relations have more or less abandoned the study of grand theory while being more in favour of hypothesis testing. Nonetheless, neoclassical realism helps one understand the dynamics of international politics and its

“regularities in a holistic manner” as opposed to just placing attention on mostly disjoint empirical results. Mearsheimer and Walt also suggest that grand theory can aid in em-pirical research by posing important theoretical questions and then developing hypothesis to test them (Ripsman et al., 2016).

Neoclassical realism does not necessarily focus on the outcomes of state interactions but rather the behaviour of each state. Within foreign policy analysis, one tries to explain what states are trying to achieve in the external realm and how they go about wanting to achieve it. Waltz argued that theories must rely on the coherent logic of autonomous realms. Since foreign policy however is influenced by both internal and external subjects, it does not incorporate such an autonomous realm. Hence, according to Waltz, one should not look for a purely theoretical explanation of it. Once should instead focus on analysis or accounts that might prove to be of relevance to a specific case. Neoclassical realism works with both internal and external variables by in-cooperating and systematizing a few arguments from classical realist thought (Rose, 1998). The next section will in-cooperate neoclassical realism into the study of foreign policy analysis which will be further discussed in Chapter 3 when outlining the methodology of the three variables wanting to be measured (Political, Economic and Sociocultural).

2.6

Foreign Policy Analysis in international relations

Theoretical disciplines all consist of a base. These bases conceptualize the fundamental or foundational level at which events in a particular field of study occur (Hudson, 2005). This also applies to the study of International Relations. The relationship between actors and nations are all deeply embedded in human decision making either individually or as part of a group. One could thus argue that the base of IR is the same as the base of most social sciences. “In a sense, the ground of IR is thus the same ground of all the social sciences. Understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them, is central to the inquiry of social scientists, including those in IR” (Hudson, 2005, p. 1). FPA provides vital contributions to IR both in theoretical as well as substantive and methodological ways. This is because FPA places itself at the intersection of all social science and policy fields since they relate to international affairs. Therefore, FPA is of great value to all those who study international relations.

Scholars have argued that FPA can be considered as the best conceptual link to em-pirical ground to which all international relations theory is based. It is characterised by an actor-specific focus meaning that all interactions made between nations and across nations is deeply embedded in human decision makers acting as an individual or as a group (Hudson, 2005). FPA provides vital contributions to IR in theoretical, substantive

and methodological aspects. Moreover, it lies at the intersection of all social science and policy related subjects as they are all linked to international affairs. We want to be able to understand how humans perceive and react to the environment around them as well as how they shape or are being shaped by the world they live in. This is central to all social scientists including those in IR. “FPA is positioned to provide the concrete the-ory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general thethe-ory and its social science foundation” (Hudson, 2005, p. 2). Scholars have moreover stated that the sin-gle most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is the identification of theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behaviour, namely material and ideational factors (Hudson, 2005). The point of intersection in this sense is not the state but the human decision makers. There is no IR or FPA without human beings as that would mean no change, creativity, persuasion or accountability. However, (Hudson, 2013) argues that over the decades, only a few mainstream IR theories have included human beings within the theoretical mix. “Adding human decision makers as the key theoretical intersection confers some advantages generally lacking in IR theory” (Hudson, 2013, p. 7).

2.7

Foreign policy analysis and human decision

mak-ing

The importance of human decision making has largely been emphasized by scholars for decades. “By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus, we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers” (Bruck et al., 1962, p. 85). Rosenau, who was one of the first political scientists to apply Complexity Science (an interdisciplinary system of analysis with origins in the traditional sciences) to political science and international affairs, encourages us to look at FPA from a scientific point of view (Humphreys, 1977). In his 1966 published article Pre-theories, he argues that researchers should emulate the methods of Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics. This might come as a surprise as there is no obvious link between modern genetics and FPA or IR. However, the similarities of data collection within hard and social sciences is more similar than frequently assumed. Mendel was able to distinguish genotype from phenotype in plats by carefully observing and comparing them which is what should be expected from scholars applying FPA to their research (Rosenau, 1966). The theory of how cultural factors and social constructions within a culture affect state behaviour was previously hard to test as it had not been well developed

in IR. However, now that human decision makers are placed at the centre of the theoretical matrix, it opens the doors of allowing theorists to link to the social constructions that can be found inside a culture and explore them with a higher probability of success. “The engine of theoretical integration in IR, then, is the definition of the situation created by the human decision makers” (Hudson, 2013, p. 8). Simon (1985) argued that it is simpler to calculate the rational response to a fully specified situation than to form a conclusion to a reasonable specification of the situation. He moreover adds that without an empirical study, there is no possibility to predict which reasonable specification decision makers will opt for, but that FPA luckily provides that necessary empirical data (Simon, 1985).

2.8

Individual and collective decision making

The study of foreign policy has placed its main aim in maintaining and developing a countries power and security. It deals with questions of how to avoid war when possible, deciding to fight when necessary but most importantly how to keep the integrity of a countries boarders (Hudson, 2013). FPA in a nutshell analysis how state leaders react to other states. This can be extracted by looking at their plans, policy perceptions, actions and attitudes states have towards each other. It is essentially a looking glass into what strategies governments use to lead their interests within the international arena. What is taken into consideration is a countries size, wealth, demographics, populations, natural resources, political culture as well as its history (Bruck et al., 1962). What interests researches about foreign policy is who or what influences the decisions that are being undertaken?

We can tell from history and human behaviour that leaders are quite quick in taking credit if a foreign policy succeeds but the public even quicker in blaming them if it fails. We assume that foreign policy makes follow a rational model, meaning that decision makers set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible outcome and then choose the option with the highest benefits and lowest costs (Hudson, 2013). Nonetheless, it is vital to note that decision makers face a number of obstacles in their decision making process. Sometimes decision have to be made quickly leaving less room for rationality whole other times there is a lack of information that could have altered the initial decision. Individual decisions reflect the values and believes of the decision maker as well as their personality. This tends to put a wider distance between the decision maker and the rational model as it creates misconceptions and selective perceptions (Waarden, 1992). There are two clear limitations found in individual decision making. The first is classified as affective bias in which the person’s rational decision is hindered by emotions being felt at that particular time. The second limitation is known as cognitive bias in which rationality is being interrupted by not being able to comprehend

all possible options (Hudson, 2013). The thought process of a foreign policy maker is far from simple. “It contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions” (Hudson, 2005, p. 22). The decision maker operates within a social context surrounded by numerous factors such as: culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology and demographics. All of these elements present both awareness and restrictions in making the most suitable and rational decision (Waarden, 1992).

However, foreign policy decisions are rarely the product of one person alone. Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but can also introduce new sources of irrationality into the decision making process (Waarden, 1992). The danger with group dynamics is that they tend to be overly optimistic about the chances of success and are therefore more willing to take risks. It should be mentioned though, that groups tend to balance out bias and often force leaders to rethink decision (Waarden, 1992). Foreign policy is not only affected by the internal dynamics of individual and group decision making but also by the states and societies within which decision makers operate. There are multiple interest groups lobbying for their goals by talking with legislators or officials in hopes to influence their decisions on a set of rules (Waarden, 1992).

2.9

Multiple factors affecting Foreign Policy

Knowing that there are more factors affecting the decision making process shows us that in order to undergo FPA properly, various factors that could possibly affect the outcomes need to be investigated separately before thinking about their interaction. According to Breuning (2016) it is more efficient to focus on one explanatory factor at a time. “After analysing various factors separately, we can then asses their relative contributions to foreign policy behaviour, taking into account also the possible interactions among these different explanatory factors” (Breuning, 2016, p. 9). The strategy for this research paper is to analysis different factors that influence foreign policy decisions in isolation and then subsequently attempting to integrate these factors into a comprehensive explanation. The aim is to take foreign policy beyond intuitive into explicit knowledge as it will help in re-examining ones questions and assumptions. “Studying foreign policy analysis has to potential to yield knowledge that is far more helpful than merely knowing historical facts, understanding the peculiarities of the personalities of specific leaders can facilitate more useful and productive diplomacy” (Breuning, 2016, p. 17). FPA is not satisfied by merely describing decisions, behaviours and outcomes but is determined to understand why these particular decisions were made. What options were considered and why not others? What could have caused a higher likelihood of better results? In order to answer these questions

one has to think in terms of causes and effects.

2.10

Causes and effects of FPA

Causes are factors that add to different policy options being considered and portray certain decisions in a better light than others. It compels decision makers to opt for a specific direction, as in their view, it is best suited in achieving their desired outcome. The causes are essentially what will determine the reasons for certain decisions and explains with what behaviour these decisions were being made (Breuning, 2016). Therefore, the causes are classified as the independent variable. The effect on the other hand is seen as the dependent variable as it in-cooperates the set of options considered, the decisions, and the outcome of these decisions. In order to put this more into perspective (Breuning, 2016) takes previous examples from history. “Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Chamberlains appeasement of Hitler and Khrushchev’s decision to build missile sites in Cuba were all dependent variables” (Breuning, 2016, p. 18). He argues that each of these decision was followed by behaviours/actions that led to the final decision. The decision was made from a set of possible options that were considered, out of which one ultimate choice was made. These examples mirror the significance of FPA on explaining option selection, decisions and behaviours or on the individual and state level analysis (Breuning, 2016). Section 2.9 will proceed to explain the variables extracted from foreign policy analysis in relation to neoclassical realism. These will be further elaborated on in the methodology section in Chapter 3.

2.11

Variable selection

The first intervening variable is the decision-makers perception through which systemic pressures will have to be filtered. One cannot stress enough how international distri-butions of power can influence a countries behaviour only through the influence of the person/people making the decisions. “Analysts of foreign policy thus have no alternative but to explore in detail how each country’s policymakers actually understand their situa-tion” (Rose, 1998, p. 158). The second intervening variable which is strongly emphasized by neoclassical realists such as Zakaria (1999) and Christensen (1996) is the strength of a country’s state apparatus and its relation to the encompassing society. Gross assessments of the international distribution of power in their view is inaccurate as political leaders do not always have access to their country’s total material power resources. Therefore, when it comes to FPA, one must take into account the possibility of governments extract-ing and directextract-ing the resources of their own societies. “It simply involves incorporatextract-ing into international relations theory variables that are routine in other subfields of political

science” (Rose, 1998, p. 161). In order to continue defining the exact sources and steps in measuring what kind of alliance Russia and Syria hold, it is vital to understand the basic elements of what an alliance is, why countries choose to engage in them, how they are formed, contained as well as destroyed.

2.12

Recipe for making an Alliance

According to Political Scientist Stephen Walt, alliances are most frequently viewed as a re-sponse to threats. They can either be a formal or informal pledge for security cooperation between two or more states (Walt, 1985). A formal alliance would have the agreements outlined in a written treaty while an informal alliance could be understood in the form of ad hoc agreements of tactical understandings, verbal agreements or joint military exercise. While the nature of an alliance varies amongst participants, it most frequently engages in mutual military support against an external actor depending on the circumstances. When investigating partnerships amongst states, scholars have taken the liberty to take both formal and informal alliances into consideration as numerous states provide support for each other despite the absence of formal treaty due to the fact that formal agreements often times state little about the true degree of commitment (Walt, 1985). One of the most vital thoughts to keep in mind when studying partnerships between states is than an alliance does not equal friendship. Its primary goal is to combine the participant’s capabilities in such a way that it increases their respective interests. The extent of collab-oration differs widely among states but distinct features have been observed when wanting to categorise or label certain alliances. They can either be offensive or defensive meaning that they are either intended to provide resources for an attack against a third party or intended as a mutual agreement in the event that an outside factor attacks one of the alliance members. The partnership can also vary in symmetry as it can either be sym-metrical or asymsym-metrical depending on the equal capabilities and identical commitments the members possess. An alliance can exist for purely practical reasons between states who don’t share similar regimes or political values just like in World War II between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, alliances can bring states with comparable strategic interests and ideological principles together as with NATO today (Walt, 1985).

In the case of Russia and Syria, Assad’s regime has been facing great threats to keep their government in place to which Russia has become an avid supporter. But what does Assad’s regime threat have to do with Russia? According to Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui the ongoing civil war in Syria has rekindled the cold war rivalries between Russia and the United States with Russia main aim being to isolate the United States from their Middle Eastern affairs (Siddiqui, 2016). Nevertheless, Mearsheimer argues that the United

States has no strategical interest in Syria nor would there be a “compelling moral case” in intervening in Syria (AnalistReview, 31/08/2013). He further adds, that the United States should advocate diplomatic solutions in ending the civil war in Syria but not result to military force. It is clear that Russia and the United States strive for different goals when it comes to Syria which strengthens the believe that the Russian-Syrian alliance is merely a symbolic one, used to threaten the United States.

2.13

Different responses to threats

As mentioned earlier, alliances are seen as a response to threats. However, it is difficult to predict what exactly the response will be. Scholars have divided state responses into two hypotheses: balance or bandwagoning. If a state chooses to respond to the threat in a balanced manner, it allies in opposition to the principal source of danger (Walt, 1985). If it decides to respond by bandwagoning the state allies’ together with the state that poses the threat. Understanding which response a state has chosen to follow is very particular as the policies that get established as a result of it are quite distinct. The literature suggests that if balancing is a more common response than bandwagoning, then states are considered to be more secure due to their aggressors facing combined opposition. “Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defence policies” (Walt, 1985, p. 4). Nevertheless, if bandwagoning seems to be the dominating hypothesis then the entire concept of security decreases because the act of aggression is rewarded.

In traditional balancing theory, states choose to join alliances to protect themselves from a higher power (other states or coalitions) whose resources could pose a threat to their current potion or survival. Walt argues that states will choose to balance to two reasons. “First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong” (Walt, 1985, p. 5). The safer option thus is to join forces with states that cannot dominate their allies which avoids being dominated by those who can (Gulick, 1955). Winston Churchill provided his explanation for choosing the alliances Britain did throughout their history. “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent [...] it would have been easy [...] and tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, [...] and thus defeated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was” (Walt, 1985, p. 6-7). Henry Kissinger also was more in favour of approaching China rather than the Soviet Union because in his mind it was more profitable to align with the weaker side when facing a triangular relationship (Walt 1985). The second reason why balancing theory is implemented according to Walt is that joining weaker states increases

the new member’s influence as the weaker states will have the need for assistance (Wilson, 2013). This would not be possible in a bandwagoning scenario because the new member’s influence would decrease as it brings less to the table than the dominating power, leaving it vulnerable. While the choice to respond to threats using the balancing theory has clear advantages, it has been argued that states prefer to ally themselves with the stronger power and thus bandwagon (Walt, 1985).

In contrast to balancing theory, bandwagoning theory suggests that the dominating power is selecting the weaker states standing on the side lines just like a bandwagon. It has been linked to German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s risk theory which implied building a huge battle fleet so that the Germans could force the English into neutrality or into an alliance by first posing a threat to their supremacy (Langer, 1969). Looking at the bandwagoning theory across the ocean, it has frequently been embraced by American officials when justifying their foreign policy. The theme that arises from states adopting such a theory is that they are attracted to strength and power. Hence, the more powerful a state seems to be the greater the likelihood of other states wanting to ally with it. It can be argued that bandwagoning is being implemented as a form of appeasement. If a state chooses to align with the state posing the threat, the bandwagoner may succeed in shifting the attack elsewhere and avoid being the target himself. However, it has also been suggested that states align with the dominating force in time of war to share the “spoils of victory” (Walt, 1985, p. 8). Examples of such bandwagoning behaviour can be found in Mussolini’s declaration of war on France and Russia’s entry into the war against Japan in 1945 or Italy’s and Romania’s alliances during the First World War. By opting to join the stronger state, each member hoped to achieve territorial gains at the end of war as can be seen with Stalin’s decision to establish a partnership with Hitler in 1939. Bandwagoning theory stands in strong contrast to balancing theory which is why alliance choices will vary greatly depending on which theory a state chooses to response with (Walt, 1985).

Schweller (1998) argues that the act of balancing or bandwagoning can occur do to misperceptions of the distribution of power between states. This can have vital conse-quences on the foreign policy of a country as he explains with the example of the Soviet union in 1939. The argument states that the Soviet Union should have balanced against and not bandwagoned with German at the beginning of World War II. By doing so, Stalin would have presented Hitler with a two-front war, undermining the German dicta-tors strategy and perhaps even causing its abandonment. Due to the fact that the Soviet Union mistakenly viewed Europe as a tripolar and not a bipolar system, they expected a war of attrition in the West. Therefore, the downfall of France quickly ended Stalin’s strategic manoeuvre of conquest in a post-war era, a time when the rest of Europe would be drained (Schweller, 1998).

2.14

Different levels of threats

It would be a mistake to state that power alone decides what partnership a state will choose to engage in. States do not ally in response to power alone but more precisely states will ally with or against the most threatening power. States may choose to respond with balancing theory, allying with other strong states if the weaker state poses a threat in a different form. Since we have established that an alliance is a response to threat it is important to analyse the different levels of threats that states may encounter.

• Aggregate Power: The higher a state’s power the higher the probability that it may come off as a potential threat to other states. However, since power comes with many different abilities, it can either punish or reward others (Walt, 1985). Hence, ones aggregate power can be seen as a reason for other states to either balance or bandwagon with it.

• Proximate Power: It is suggested that the further away a state is the less influence it contains over others. Thus states that are closer pose a greater threat to their neighbours than states that are in less proximity to one another. Just like with aggregate power, proximate power can produce both a balancing and bandwagoning response. In the event of a balancing response, “alliance networks that resemble checkerboards are the likely result” (Walt, 1985, p. 10). In the event of the response being bandwagoning, a sphere of influence is likely to be created. This would mean that less influential states bordering more powerful states could choose to not ally with them if their neighbour has previously shown to express obedience.

• Offensive Power: States who have larger offensive capabilities possess a higher likelihood of provoking an alliance compared to states that are militarily weaker or only capable of defending themselves. In this case bandwagoning would be the more applicable choice as balancing could prove to be less efficient if assistance to states cannot be provided fast enough (Walt, 1985).

• Offensive intentions: Outside appearances play a vital role in alliance building. Hence, if a state appears to be aggressive it is more likely to provoke others to balance against them. Nazi Germany for example provoked a huge coalition against itself as it put together substantial power with offensive ambitions. If we turn to Libya under Gaddafi, his aggressive provocations led Egypt, Israel, France, the United States, Chad and Sudan to political and military responses to defend against Libyan activities (Wright, 1981).

None of the above mentioned threats can be excluded when analysing alliances as one or more can influence any political or military action. The difficulty lies in establishing

which threat is more important or plays a more significant role compared to the other threats. It is however safe to say that each threat possesses value. Depending on how states choose to respond to different levels of threats will influence their policy prescrip-tions. The question however remains, which response is more realistically reflected in history? Within international politics, there has been a steadier pattern of balancing theory than there has been on bandwagoning (Walt, 1985). States facing external threats seem to prefer to balance against a threat rather than bandwagoning into it. The reason for it is quite rational, intentions and perceptions are unreliable and prone to change. Thus it is safer to balance against threats rather than wondering about if the dominating power will remain neutral towards the bandwagoner. However, it would be a mistake to assume that bandwagoning rarely occurs. There are two key factors that increase the likelihood for that theory to be placed into action. Weak states have a higher frequency of bandwagoning due to pressure and little added incentive (they won’t have much influence on outcomes and thus choose to ally with a state that does). A rather simple reason for weaker states to bandwagon is that in some instances there will be a lack of states to ally with due to unavailability. For balancing theory to work there has to be an active system of diplomatic communication. This way potential ally’s get the chance to share and recognize their interests and common aims. In the event of a weak state lacking the possibility of external assistance, a partnership with the threatening power can be chosen as a final choice (Walt, 1985). An example would be Finland’s bandwagoning response after the First World War. Its alliance with the Soviet Union was motivated by Finland’s balancing alliance during the war with Nazi Germany which had alienated potential allies that might have gone against Soviet pressure (Singleton, 1981).

One can assume that Syria has been isolated from the international community which is why there is no successful diplomatic dialogue between the country and other across who could potentially aid in decreasing the terror caused by the civil war. As mentioned earlier, the only two countries that are in a partnership with Syria are Iran and Russia which is why Assad’s regime does not balance against a super power but rather chooses to bandwagon with Putin’s demands. Syria in this case is the weaker state who does not have anyone to ally with, leaving it to bandwagon with a much more dominating country than itself.

2.15

Alliance building through common traits

There are numerous reasons why states decide to join forces with each other, one being ideological solidarity. Hans Morgenthau used this term to explain alliances that estab-lished through sharing common political, cultural or social traits. The reason behind ideological solidarity is rather simple. The hypothesis states that the higher the

similar-ities between two or more participants, the higher the likelihood for an alliance (Fedder, 1968). “Although most scholars believe that this is at best a secondary explanation for alliances, the belief that ideological affinities are crucial often appears in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side or opposition to another” (Walt, 1985, p. 19). During the Cold War, American opposition towards the leftist movements in the Third World was based on the belief that such states would obviously ally with the Soviet Union due to their shared ideological traits. Allying oneself with a state that shares similar political views could aid in protecting one’s own political principles. Since the political system in one’s own state is considered the proper way to conduct politics it is desirable to have relations with other states that think alike. It has also been argued that states with similar traits will face each other as less of a threat as it is harder to imagine a “good” state attacking another “good” state. Moreover, building an alliance with similar states could increase weaker regimes legitimacy as it is demonstrating itself as being part of a larger movement (Walt, 1985).

States sharing similar traits can also cause conflict instead of security. If a state’s principle is based for its members to be ruled by a centralized hierarchical movement and thus looking up to a single authoritative leader, then tension increases. Scholars call the effect of ideological solidarity rather paradoxical. A states ideology is seen as a “source of legitimacy” which has to at least affirm universal validity (Walt, 1985). The concept of one ruler for all gets threatened as soon as other single rulers see their position in jeopardy. An example of that would be the constant rivalry in Pan Arabism. Although they were numerous attempts to bring the Arab world’s similar ethnic elements and ideologies into one political sphere of influence, it has led to more tension than understanding (Cleveland et al., 2010). “The more serious the commitment to unity, the more intense the conflict” (Walt, 1985, p. 22). Attempts to establish a union turn into power struggles in which the common ideology is used to justify one’s own actions.

However, it has been argued that if states face danger, they will ally with other states no matter what their ideology dictates. Winston Churchill stated that when faced by danger “if Hitler invaded Hell, I should at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons” (Churchill, 2013, p. 370). During the 1920s when Germany was facing economic and political distress, Britain, France and the United States treated the Soviet Union with arrogance. When Nazi Germany rose to power it started posing a threat to the rest of the world in which previous ideological concepts lost their value (Walt, 1985). Thus one could argue that no matter what the ideological stance of a state is, if it comes to security matters it will always choose its survival even if it means compromising one’s own principles for it. This poses an interesting question. If a states ideology would be left aside as soon as it comes to saving it, why follow an ideology in the first place? According to Kenneth Waltz, living in a bipolar world is the most secure way

of life. Hence, the importance of ideology would increase due to states feeling more secure and thus viewing their principles as more valuable. “Not only will the bipolar rivalry encourage both superpowers to support third parties freely (giving third parties the option to choose the ideologically most compatible side), but the caution that bipolarity imposes on superpower conduct may permit most other states to follow ideological preferences rather than security requirements” (Walt, 1985, p. 25).

2.16

Policy Instruments: Bribery and Penetration

Of course states have to achieve getting the attention of possible allies. How does for example Russia keep Syria dependant on its needs in order to exercise control over the country? The most dominant hypothesis on policy instruments deals with bribery and penetration. This hypothesis states that providing economic or military assistance will establish stable allies as it demonstrates the states encouraging intentions by provoking a sense of recognition or because the recipient eventually becomes dependent on the state providing the resources. Therefore, the higher the amount of aid the stronger the alliance. However, this does not mean that military or economic assistance is always the cause of an alliance. The aid will only be offered and accepted when both participants feel it is in their best interest to do so. Aid can be seen as a result rather than as a cause of forming an alliance (Walt, 1985). The danger with aid is that the donor can pressure the recipient into policies that would not necessarily benefit the weaker partner. The more aid the recipient accepts, the more dependant it become to the donor state. Thus, the donor can increase its threats if it feels like its aims are not being met by the recipient. The dominant state would then have successfully manipulated its weaker partners in addition to getting their full support. Nevertheless, if the recipient accepts all its aid, it will in theory increase in power. It would then no longer have to follow the donor’s wishes. It might be misleading to think that providing a state with economic or military assistance will gain loyal alliances. This is due to the fact that the recipient can use that specific aid to deal with its own problems by means of external assistance. “Foreign aid can make an existing alliance more effective, but it rarely creates one in the absence of shared political interests” (Walt, 1985, p. 30).

Alliance formation can also take place through indirect manipulation of a state’s po-litical system by another. The hypothesis of penetration assumes that alliances can be formed by manipulating foreign governments through indirect means. These can be in the form of lobbying organizations altering policy decisions or public perceptions, public officials with divided loyalties or foreign propaganda. Penetrating a state’s political sys-tem however is not simple. There is a higher chance of success within open societies due to elites being more susceptible to foreign ideas. Furthermore, the act can backfire by

seeming illegitimate which will cause the target state to move further away thus leaving the dominant state with less influence than before (Walt, 1985). Penetration towards an-other political system has to be executed correctly. It won’t work unless the participants already have other strong incentives that will make them form an alliance. The penetra-tion serves as an addipenetra-tional security measure to go with the already existing incentives. This way indirect manipulation of one state won’t seem as dangerous or illegitimate to the other state. Scholars have argued that penetration will show its strongest affects in states with an extremely weak central authority because it could provide the foreign power with legitimate control. Both bribery and penetration will enhance an existing alliance but it won’t be the reason an alliance is being established (Walt, 1985).

2.17

Holding on or breaking off an Alliance

As established above, there are multiple hypothesis theorizing about why states choose to form alliances with each other. However, once an alliance is formed it is vital to maintain it. Scholars have studied the effects of why some alliances manage to keep up their partnerships and why some fail to do so. In times of distress and war, alliance formation is said to be quite stable which might explain the ongoing alliance between Russia and Syria. Since Syria is facing an ongoing civil war, it cannot simply stop its alliance with Russia as it has become dependent on its needs in order to survive. Looking back at history for example, during the Cold War, the western world saw the Soviet Union as a clear threat, which is why the main coalition had a somewhat fixed alliance for over four decades. With the end of the Cold War came the downfall of the original partnership arrangements and paved the way for organizations like NATO (Walt, 1997). Does this mean that an end to the Syrian civil war would cause the end of a Russian-Syrian alliance? Possibly, however the end of the Cold War marked a significant turning point in the study of alliance building. The traditional concept of being committed to mutual military support against a third party has shifted to bringing multiple countries with similar strategic interests and ideological viewpoints together in eliminating existential threats. It is therefore important to understand why some alliances fail and others endure. It provides a clearer overview of state behaviour and foreshadows the success rate of present alliances.

2.18

Reasons for failed alliances

Once a state has eliminated its potential threat by not viewing it as one anymore, the concept of an alliance has the possibility of losing its appeal. The elimination of threat can come in numerous shapes. It could be that there is a chance in power dynamics. A state previously viewed as powerful can stop being conceived as an external threat if its power

decreases. Thus the state in an alliance will have less reason to opt for external support. This is why wartime alliances have a high likelihood of dissolving once the war is over. On the other hand, an alliance can fail to exist due to one state becoming significantly stronger than its partner. The dominating state will have less reason to be in an alliance or dependent on other states due to its increased power. Furthermore, it will be viewed as the new threat to security (Walt, 1997). Alliances can break off due to changes in intentions. If a state has reason to believe that the current alliance is less gainful than previously thought, the partnership is less likely to endure. This also goes for if members of an alliance become increasingly aggressive. Moreover, if states feel that they have found other more effective ways of dealing with their security threat, the alliance will most likely be terminated. “Such a shift may occur because the allies’ capabilities are growing faster than those of their rival(s), or because changes in the nature of military technology make it more difficult for opponents to attack” (Walt, 1997, p. 159). Scholars have argued that offensive alliances are more prone to deteriorate than defensive ones. This is due to the fact that offensive alliances get established to attack a specific target. Once that target has been dealt with, the reason for being in an alliance diminishes. Once could thus state that any form of shift in power or aim places a danger towards an existing alliance. This confirms the previous statement of alliances not being the same as friendships. As soon as the goal of an alliance has been meet or changed, the relationship between members breaks off. If there is doubt towards the efficiency of an alliance it becomes more fragile. Thus, even if the level of threat remains unchanged, uncertainty about degrees of security encourages states to re-evaluate their partnerships. These doubts can be classified into two categories. First, states may think that they do not possess the resources to deter or eliminate their enemies. “If additional resources cannot be found, it may be safer to realign with the enemy or to adopt a neutral position”. This sort of behaviour is mostly detected within weaker states, most prominently during wartime when being on the losing team is more apparent. The second reason why doubts may appear is when states question the genuine interests of its partners. This occurs with allies who are geographically separated or asymmetrically different in degree of power as a threat to one may not necessarily pose a threat to the other. Feelings of unimportance may rise in weaker states compared to their more powerful ally, which brings about the fear of being isolated and abandoned in case of an attack (Walt, 1997). “Skillful aggressors will take advantage of these tendencies by exaggerating their power and portraying their aims as limited in order to raise the perceived cost of resistance and to persuade potential opponents to leave individual victims to their fate” (Walt, 1997, p. 160).

The above arguments assume that states are initially rational actors whose actions are in response to changes within the external environment. Re-defining ones interests as a result of domestic political upheaval can cause an existing alliance to suffer as the