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How Polish politics dealt with a communist past
Sem van Meurs
10666346
Politics of Identity: 73230190LY Dr. M. Medeiros
Department of Political Science University of Amsterdam Wordcount: 8407
Introduction
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Polish democracy is relatively new. In 1991 the first completely free elections were held after a 44 year long communist reign. A mix of post-communist and liberal/catholic parties were voted into parliament and would rule politics for the next ten years or so. Focused on bringing Poles out of positions of hardship, dealing with the communist past and several corruption scandals, Polish politics during the 1990’s were eventful (Millard 2009). The government which was formed after the 2001 elections by a coalition of parties which were direct descendants of the old communist party would be the last government by a party from the left in Poland (Ibid). After a number of high-scale corruption cases and successful campaigning by the right, the coalition of of the left lost three quarters of their seats in parliament (Markowski 2006). The period from 2001 to 2005 can be seen as a turning point in Polish politics .
That is at least the argument that will be put forward in this paper. Since 2015 there has not been any socialist or left-democratic party in any of the two Polish parliamentary houses. In this paper the focus will be on what happened in Polish politics during the 2001-2005 period, which will be presented as a period in which the left lost its political prominence to (center)-right parties. Lustration, which is the process of dealing with the communist past and more specifically old communist informers in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, is the main focus of this research. Especially the attitude Poles have had towards lustration and the (lack of) implementation of it in Polish politics up to 2005. Did Poles attitudes towards lustration correlate with the change in lustration policy in 2005? In order to understand Polish attitudes towards lustration and the lustration policy in 2005, the history of Poland as a democracy since 1989 and how lustration was handled in this period is explained.
By looking into the period before 2001 the build-up to the 2001-2005 period can be understood. Data on sentiment about communism of the Polish citizenry from the period before since the start of Polish democracy will be compared to data from the so called turning point period. Survey data of Poles attitudes towards communism from since the transition towards democracy until 2001 will be compared to the same variable in 2001-2005. The complete trend in attitude towards communism is compared to the history of lustration policy. It is argued that ‘real lustration’ didn’t happen until 2005.
The combination of survey data and an analysis of party politics is something which has not been used in this precise context before. In most of the literature, the focus is on elite politics
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and the way they changed the discourse during this period, because these are seen to be the explanatory factors for the change in the approach to lustration (Markowski 2006 p. 816) (Szczerbiak 2016). Survey data on how this change is perceived or on a felt need for lustration is rarely used in combination with an analysis of elite politics. It is interesting to research lustration policy in Poland, because it goes into one of the core debates in Political Science; are politics and policy dominated by politicians or by citizens? If lustration laws were made a great deal more lenient while data would show a general wish for stricter laws or vice versa, this could be seen as problematic. Polish voters would not get what they want in this policy area. It would confirm what some scholars belief about Polish politics in general. “if we were to single out the most important destabilising factor in Polish politics, it
would have to be the political elite.”(Markowski 2006 p. 816).
The theoretical framework of the paper is split into two parts. First, theories about the link between voter preference and political actions are explored. Self-serving politics and ideological identity are two of the main concepts in this framework. Secondly, theories on lustration and the wider phenomenon of transitional justice are explored. The theory explains where the need from transitional justice comes from, how transitional justice is handled in different situations and what its effects are. The specific place lustration takes in this field is explained last.
Theoretical framework Voters and politicians
In politics there is some belief that the actions of politicians should serve the people. But if we think of politicians as being essentially the same as other human beings, a logical consequence seems to be that politics will not only benefit the public. Politicians could be said to play the game of politics with their own interests in mind as well (Schumpeter 1942 p. 282). So when analysing politics, the interests of the political elite should always be taken into consideration, because they can play an important part in how policy is formed (Downs 1957 p. 136). Downs and Schumpeter both believe that politicians, as all other persons, are purely driven by the desire for personal gain. (Idem p. 137) (Schumpeter 1942 p. 282). Schumpeter compares politics to a market in which people get the goods they want and is thus serving the public, but the desire for profit is generally thought to be force that keeps it running (Ibid). ‘Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of
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gaining votes’ (Downs 1957 p. 137). Because in the view of these authors, all actors act in
order to maximize their personal gain, voters will vote on parties which they believe will benefit them the most (Idem p. 138). Downs then says that in a world where perfect information is infinitely available, the main basis of the vote choice is the actions of the parties during the period that has just ended; campaign promises are seen as a possible scam to lure voters and are mostly ignored by voters (Ibid). But in reality information is not
perfect, nor infinitely available and thus what voters want or is in their interest is not a given. The same applies to the actions of politicians. Information can be gathered, but this requires resources (Idem p. 139).
As an effect of this state of imperfect information Downs points to three processes which have a distinct and important role in this reality; persuasion, ideology, and rational ignorance. Persuasion does not work when people know what they want and on know who to vote for to get the outcome closest to what they wish for. Persuaders can give information to voters and thus change their vote. This means that they have influence over a greater number of votes than ordinary voters. As parties are intent on maximizing their votes, they will base their policies disproportionally on the wishes of these influencers, because these might become the wishes of larger number of people through persuasion (Idem pp. 139-140). Lobbying by powerful individuals is thus effective in politics (Idem p. 141). Downs defends the existence of ideologies, by explaining that changing policy stances creates the belief among voters that a party is unstable. Ideology also forms a voting shortcut; If a voter isn’t sure what to think of a certain policy, but generally agrees with a certain ideology, they will vote on basis of this ideology ( Idem p. 142). Rational ignorance is a term to describe the fact that abstaining from voting can be rational. In order to vote in accordance with one’s wishes, one needs to invest resources acquire the right information. Secondly, if one does not have perfect information, there is a danger of voting against one’s interests. Lastly, the vote of an individual rarely has any real impact (Idem pp. 146-147). Investing a lot of resources, in order to vote, which will most likely have very little impact is irrational. So individuals in general should not be politically informed. It can be rational to be politically informed, if one enjoys knowing this information an sich, the individual believes he will have a large impact because the elections are close or because they are an influencer (Ibid).
According to Downs politicians are after votes, for the sake of the power that comes with these votes; they are not interested in what the people need or want. But when people vote in
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order to protect their own interests, politicians have to make policy that caters to the wishes of voters. If this doesn’t occur, voters will notice the specific candidate is not acting in their interests and will thus not vote for them (anymore). But if citizens don’t vote and politicians realise these people will not vote, the politicians will not act in their interests; they will not get any votes by defending those interests. In the world in which information is imperfect and requires resources to acquire, knowledge of who votes and who doesn’t isn’t clear.
Ideology
Ideology can be split into two parts; one is the collection of policy attitudes and values. The other part is the identity which is formed within the idea of ideology based upon interactions with others, or identity-based ideology (Mason 2018: 868). Mason uses this concept in
describing the political situation in the United States, in which ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are the two main ideologies (idem: 869). An identity exists whenever one feels included in the own group and feels different from others (idem: 867). In this divide between groups social
polarization plays an important role. According to this theory polarization between groups
increases, although this increase is not connected to a greater amount of conflict in the policy arena (idem: 870). The increase is an effect of acting to favour members of one’s own group and disadvantaging others (ibid). Mason finds that the differences in identity-based
ideologies are better predictors of polarization than differences in issue attitudes (idem: 885). Lustration and transitional justice
Lustration is a term which is used to describe the transitional justice which is and was used by former socialist nations in Central and Eastern Europe to deal with their communist past and more specifically to find out what role certain individuals played in the old regime and how to deal with these persons in the new democratic system (Horne 2009: 346). Transitional justice is a tool used by societies to evaluate the change from one form of government to another, to judge people who are identified as having done injustice to strengthen the rule of the previous governing system and to strengthen the notion that the current system is
significantly different from the previous one (Simić 2017: 3)(Stan 2008: 3)(Winter 2014: 23). The phenomenon has been examined all over the world and some scholars argue that it has been present since as early as the fourth century B.C. (Stan 2008: 2). The regions with a history of transitional justice which are written about the most in academic literature are Germany, Latin America, South Africa and the nations that formed after Yugoslavia fell apart
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(idem: 5)(Stan 2008: 1). Lastly, the earlier mentioned socialist states play an important role in the literature on transitional justice.
Transitional justice can take many forms. From seemingly normal procedures such as trials and public apologies to more specialised ones like truth commissions and memorials (Simić 2017: 2). These measures can be categorised on the basis of their effect or intent. First of all, there are measures which acknowledge the injustice done during the prior regime; such measures are apologies, memorials and truth commissions (idem: 4). This acknowledgement can also stem from society, in the form of films, books and other media. A second intent of justice measures is aimed at restoring a balance in society; by forcing payments for reparation or restitution, issues are deemed resolved and as an effect of that justice as well (ibid).
As mentioned earlier transitional justice plays an important role in the process of a regime change. Such a change is in most cases accompanied by a complete overhaul of the judiciary and the political system (idem: 20). People will generally be distrusting of any institution during this transition period; in a transition towards democracy the old system has either just been overthrown by the people because they felt it was not serving them and thus are sceptic of state institutions or the people have not been involved in the change and could feel the change to be a symbolic one. There may also be a more general notion that many individuals who were connected to the previous system and had some kind of power, might still have this power and misuse it. Without identifying these persons it is unknown what function they have in the new system and hence the new regime could be filled with the same people. The distrust of these individuals might generate a distrust of the government. Next, by prosecuting the individuals who are linked to the injustice done by and during the previous regime, the regime itself is prosecuted (Huntington 1991: 213). So the divide between the just new democratic system and the unjust old one is accentuated. Especially in a democracy it is necessary to make the importance and authority of justice clear to the public (ibid). These actions will lead people to trust that the system is different from the other and the belief that democracy is the superior system (ibid).
Creating trust within a society is important. One of the premises of a democracy is that the people are the ultimate deciders, but if institutions are ruled by individuals which are seen as having a past of actively harming the people through injustice or the upholding of a system that harmed them, then these institutions will be distrusted by society (Horne 2009: 345).
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Distrust will thus lead to a general loss of legitimacy of the state. In turn a loss of legitimacy brings about lower levels of obedience and more calls for a change in government (Winter 2014: 30-31). But some scholars argue that transitional justice can lead to distrust in some cases. Most importantly a high rate of prosecution and retribution would lead to a fear of other groups using these instruments to go after one’s own group and thus creating a divide in society (Huntington 1991: 214). Especially when the process is compromised by for example having files misused or a public debate that is filled by allegations, the fear of (unfair)
prosecution grows. This fear of prosecution is detrimental to how a society values its judiciary and in turn democracy (ibid)(Horne 2009: 345). If the political discourse changes and a ‘blame game’ emerges, the valuation of the political arena by voters is likely to become more negative.
While transitional justice thus seems to have possible benefits to society, its implementation differs widely between different countries. Two of the most widely discussed theoretical frameworks that deal with the how and why transitional justice is not the same in every context are focused on self-serving politics and power relations on the one hand and cultural factors on the other (Berneman 1997: 140) (Williams et al. 2005: 23-24). According to the first theory the only factor that has any influence on the existence and implementation of transitional justice is the division of power (Huntington 1991: 215). This view is very much in line with the one Downs and Schumpeter posit. ‘Moral and legal considerations’ will play an insignificant role in the question whether to prosecute individuals who were in powerful positions in the prior regime, if these same people hold similar powerful positions in the new regime (ibid). Even if these persons don’t have the same power in the new system, they are likely to have been part of the transition process. While in this process they will have the desire and more importantly the opportunity to guard themselves from prosecution by
creating exemptions in the upcoming system of transitional justice (idem: 216). But when the political elite of the pre-transition regime lack real power, they won’t be able to exert such influence. So the process towards transitional justice will be dominated by people without any interest in protecting this political elite and be different in nature and scope than when the leaders of the old regime still hold power during the transition period (idem: 217). Even politicians who were not part of the political elite of the old regime, but were still linked to it in other ways, might not want to pursue transitional justice. Justice measures might lead to their pasts coming out in the open, which could hurt their political career (Adler
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The second framework focuses on the distinct cultural qualities that are present in a nation and links these to differences in transitional justice. According to this view culture is the combination of a nation’s traditions and its history. Because states have unique pasts that are important in shaping the values and traditions, it is supposed that not the present situation but the nation’s past is the most important factor in how transitional justice is implemented (Borneman 1997: 142-143). In this theory the norms of values and in turn society have a larger influence on how the policy is decided upon than the political elite.
Lustration in Poland
Poland is an interesting case to discuss, because scholars seem to agree that lustration and de-communization didn’t really happen until 2005, or at least heavily intensified at that time (Stan 2008: 86) (Szczerbiak 2016: 427) (Horne 2009: 353) (Brito 2001: 237). One would expect transitional justice measures to be implemented as soon after a transition as possible. At that time the anger towards the old regime and the desire for retribution is likely to be highest (Simić 2016)(Winter 2014). Why would it take fifteen years for real lustration policy to be put into place? Did public attitude towards lustration change over time? Did the
political elite up to that moment feel lustration wouldn’t be beneficial to them? Or had the desire of both the political elite and the public up to 2005 both been a more stringent lustration, but implementation failed? The case seems to diverge from what the theory on transitional justice would predict to have happened and there is no scholarly consensus as to why lustration happened this late in Poland (Szczerbiak 2017: 325)(Williams et al. 2005). The Polish case is thought to be an interesting case of ‘late lustration’ (Szczerbiak 2016: 427).
“For the purposes of this paper, the Polish convention is adopted, whereby lustration is
understood as ascertaining whether an occupant of or candidate for a particular post worked for or collaborated with the communist security services.”(Williams et al. 2005: 23). It is
important to note that while persons under inquiry in a lustration process are required to come clean about their communist past, people revealing a past connection to the secret police are not automatically barred from the function they are applying to (Szczerbiak 2016: 426). Under the lustration law of 1997 only those who gave false testimonials were banned from taking up a function in the government (Stan 2008: 8).
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10% of Poles were members of the communist party in the last decade under communist rule, 30%-40% of the populations was linked to a party through family bonds (Brito 2001: 220). Informers are in many discussions on de-communization seen as the most problematic group, even worse than former members of the secret police. One reason might be that people feel betrayed when friends, colleagues or family members spy on them in private and because informers might be anywhere a constant fear of being spied upon is created (idem: 223). Poland as a democratic nation could be argued to have emerged in 1989 when the first semi democratic elections were held. In these elections the communist party allowed the re-introduction of the Polish Senate and for non-communist parties to take seats in Sejm, which is the lower chamber. The newfound Solidarity party, which was formed by members of the Solidarity movement, took all but one of the Senate seats and all seats which were not reserved for the communist parties, which totaled 35% of all seats (Millard 2009). Some scholars state the 1991 election, in which no seats were reserved for any party and the first president from a non-communist party was elected, as the real beginning of Poland as a democratic state.
The Solidarity movement was a movement which took aim at the communist system by creating a new Polish national identity, largely based on the Poland before 1945 (Tworzecki 1996). This identity differed a lot from the national identity and symbols put forward by the communist party. The latter were argued to have been constructed, rather than stemming from an essentialist form of Polish society and its people and were there to keep the system intact. The Catholic faith and subsequently the church played an important part in this
reimagination of Polish nationalism (Millard 2009). Catholicism was seen as an inherent part of the Polish nation and linked to important moments in Polish history when its citizens had feared for the prolongation of its existence, mostly because of threats by foreign European powers (idem). Catholicism and the church had received the privileged position in communist society of partial autonomy early on. The church was thus one of the few culturally different institutes in Poland that had real power and freedom to act. As such the Solidarity movement sought to align and connect itself in the minds of the people with the church. This link with the church was not only useful because of the historical significance of the catholic faith, but also because it helped the Solidarity movement to create a strong cultural alternative to communism. By choosing to self-identify with the catholic faith, the movement chose to identify with a coherent set of norms and values which diametrically opposed those of communist Poland. As such the movement could be seen as distinctly different from the regime and even as the (main) alternative. The movement wasn’t just anti-communist, but
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had clear ideas about what constitutes a good society and aspired to change the status quo into a new, well-defined system.
The first non-communist prime minister Mazowiecki famously said a ‘thick line’ between the past communist regime and the new democratic Poland had been drawn (Tighe 2016: 342). This statement was made in the transition year 1989, but already in 1990 when the former revolutionary leader Wałęsa became president, he criticized the agreements which had been made which had led to the regime change and the Mazowiecki government for not changing Poland fast enough (idem: 343). In 1992 a first lustration law was introduced by the new prime minister Olszewski. The law and the government responsible for its implementation were removed soon after though, because it named Wałęsa, who was still the president at the time, and a number of other prominent Solidarity members as informants. When the prime minister was put under pressure, he admitted the list was forged and had to resign. This scandal, the political climate in which politicians were trying to frame each other and the bad handling of secret police files led to a move away from lustration by most politicians (idem: 344)(Tworzecki 1996: 60-61)( Brito 2001: 239). Wałęsa argued against further lustration laws, saying it would undermine the advancement of the Polish nation and its people, by creating a general feeling of distrust and exclusion of an important part of the professional workforce of which many had been connected to the communist regime in some way (ibid). The political spectrum had been split from the start of democracy in Poland; on the one hand there were liberal and Christian parties which both stemmed from the revolutionary
Solidarity movement which was seen as one of the most important factors in the change to a democratic Poland; On the other hand there were the post-communist and social democratic parties, of which some were direct successors of the communist parties (CBOS 2005)(Brier 2009: 65). Ts divide was on the one hand a typical divide between left and right parties, in which the parties connected to the Solidarity movement pushed for market liberalisation and post-communist parties were focused on a welfare state model (ibid). A more important divide between the parties is the social or cultural one; opinions about social cohesion, values, role of the church and de-communization were the main focus point for political debate and partisanship and were greater predictors of voting behaviour than economic issues(idem: 64)(Markowski 2006: 817).
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In the 1997 elections lustration became a hot topic once again. Poles in general still felt the need for de-communization and felt the new democratic system had failed to punish the criminals of the communist regime (Tighe 2016:344). In an opinion poll from 1994 75% of participants believed people who had been connected to the secret police should not be able to fulfil high ranking government functions (Stan 2009: 81). After the elections a coalition of liberal and Christian parties which all had roots in the Solidarity movement took office (Millard 2009). Strangely enough, in 1996 the then ruling coalition of post-communist parties wrote a new constitution in which among other things lustration was reintroduced and the national identity of Poland was put into words (Brier 2009: 66-67). The Solidarity opposition strongly opposed the content and the language used in the text. They criticized the document for only representing the ‘leftist ideological orientation’. They accused the commission tasked with the creation of the constitution of trying to serve the interest of a minority, by defining the nation in such terms as to forego the pluralistic nature of Poland (ibid). This accusation seems to fall in line with the general discourse in which parties on the right claim parties of the left are focused on protecting the interest of the old communist elite, both by protecting them from prosecution and by filling government and companies linked to the government with members of this elite (ibid).
Under the new lustration law “all elected state officials from the rank of deputy provincial
governor up to ministers, prime minister and the President, parliamentary candidates, barristers, judges, prosecutors and leading figures in the public media (approximately
20,000 individuals in total)” were tested for having any past of collaborating with or working
in the secret police (Szczerbiak 2017: 328). If candidates were found to be lying, they were banned from any of these professions for ten years (ibid). in 1998 the new right-wing government created the Institute of National Remembrance, which role it was to inform the Polish public of communist crimes and history and to serve as an archive where researchers, journalist and victims of these crimes had limited access to secret police files (ibid). Although the implementation of the law seemed to break from the prior aversion from lustration, it rarely led to any prosecution (ibid).
The 2001 elections were won by the newly created SLD, which was the party in which all remaining post-communist parties merged in 1999 (Millard 2009). The subsequent election cycle was extremely eventful. in 2002 the Rywin affair came to light, in which prominent members of the SLD were said to have received payments from a prominent media figure
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called Lew Rywin, for which in return he asked for a restructuring of laws concerning the media (Szczerbiak 2007: 205). This event and some other allegations of corruption involving high-ranking officials made the opposition, led by the PiS and PO, call for a crackdown on corruption and wider lustration regulations (Szczerbiak 2017: 328). The corruption was linked to lustration, by identifying the perpetrators of the corruption as ex-communists (Brier 2009: 80) (Millard 2006:1013). The belief that the lustration law of 1997 and the later created institution responsible for its implementation were ineffective was another incentive to call for a more extensive lustration (Szczerbiak 2017: 329).
So in 2005 PiS got the most votes in the election and formed a government with two right-wing, nationalist parties (Millard 2009). This government implemented the most stringent lustration Polish history (Szczerbiak 2016)(Szczerbiak 2017). Between 400.000 and 700.000 Poles would be undergoing lustration. Records on the communist past of almost all people employed by the government, media and in educational institutions were made public. Applicants no longer were punished for giving false anwers; employers set up committees in which someone’s communist record was made a centerpiece in the application process (Szczerbiak 2016: 431). Although the supreme court partially rescinded the new regulations for being unconstitutional in 2007, large parts remained active (idem: 432). As this research is focused on the origin of the decision to implement these measures and why lustration in 2005 seems to break with prior the lustration, what came after the implementation of these measures is not too relevant for this study.
The Kaczyński brothers, which formed the leadership of the PiS party, both have a long history of anti-communist sentiment and subsequent lustration (Bernhard & Kubik 2016). Both had been part of the Solidarity movement and had fulfilled several political roles from 1989 onwards, such as senator, parliamentary member, minister of justice and in 2002 Lech became mayor of Warsaw. They were known for their intense criticism of the transition agreements and their conspiracy theories, in which Poland is desrcibed as being ruled by the
nomenklatura (a term used to describe the communist political elite) (Tworzecki 1996 p. 60).
The PiS had lustration policies in place for internal selection of members. Newcomers were under scrutiny about their political past and their experience and opinions with
de-communization (Millard 2009: 122). So lustration certainly played a role in Polish politics from very early on. A number of parties based a great deal of their campaigns and policy agendas on the belief that Poland needed to be cleansed of its communist past and the
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remnant political elite which were seen as too influential. Up until the 2005 elections socialist and social-democratic parties continued to be major players in Polish politics (Millard 2009). In the 2005 elections the SLD, came in as the fourth biggest party; as of the 2015
parliamentary elections neither the SLD or any other self-describing socialist or leftist party was voted into parliament. It should be noted that Polish elections have very low voter turnouts. in 2004 20.9% of Poles voted for the European parliament elections, but even national parliamentary elections average a 50% turnout, with the 2005 elections 40% turnout being the lowest in Polish history (Millard 2006).
Methodology
The data which is used comes from the Polish General Social Survey (PGSS) 1992-2010, which was held by the Instytut Studiów Społecznych im. Profesora Roberta Zajonca. All surveys were held between January and March. It should be noted that although the
independent variables are in the dataset, the dependent will not be. As changes in lustration policy will be seen as the dependent variable, the values of the dependent variable are known in the sense that the different years in which lustration policy changed and what these
changes entailed are known. All this info comes from prior research into lustration in Poland and is summarised in the preceding segment. The first independent variable will be the opinion people have of communism as a form of government. This variable doesn’t measure the attitude towards a change in lustration policy directly, but both in the reference literature and in the discussion of this paper it is argued that attitudes towards lustration and
communism correlate (Szczerbiak 2017). As lustration is focused on the removal of
communist influences in politics, negative views towards communism are likely to generate a desire for more extensive lustration and vice versa. Even when the desire for lustration is not so much driven by a fear of politics being filled with communist policy stances and more by the feeling that ex-communists are a danger for the political system, ex-communists will be identified with communism as an ideology.
So the communism variable will be analysed in an univariate analysis, in which the focus will be on the difference between years in which policy was made which extended lustration and years in which lustration was kept small. Results are analysed with the help of descriptive statistics. The main focus will be the year 2005, which is argued to be the year in which the most extensive lustration policy was implemented. The main comparison year will be 2002, which is the closest year in which surveys were taken prior to 2005. The years which are
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included in the analysis are 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2005. These are all the years in which surveys were held up to 2005. Using all these years is the best way to show the history of attitudes towards communism in post-communist Poland. In order to show the trend in attitude towards communism, the variable will be recoded into a dichotomous variable. One value will combine the two negative attitudes towards communism and the other value will combine the two positive attitudes with the ‘Don’t know’ option. As people who are unsure about their attitude towards communism are
expected to not be strong lustration supporters, or their motivation for this support could be a completely different one.
One other independent variable is analysed in the paper. Respondents will be split into two groups by age. Respondents born after 1971 are believed to have different attitudes towards communism compared to respondents born before this year. This first group was still young during the communist era and 18 years old or younger during transition period and because of that are presumed to not have as clear a memory or deep an attachment to this period as Poles who were older during this period. As the regime was acting ‘softer’ after 1970, this group will also have experienced less cruelty and violence than the older group (Brito 2001: 220). These two age cohorts will be the independent variable and attitude towards communism the dependent variable in a bivariate analysis. The correlation between the two is measured by using Chi-Square and the phi correlation. For the bivariate analysis attitude towards
communism is recoded into a dichotomous variable, in the same way as has been done for the univariate analysis.
15 figure 1.1
16 figure 1.3
In figure 1.1 and figure 1.2 the results of the univariate analysis of ‘the opinion about
communism’ are represented. In figure 1.3 the variable ‘opinion about communism’ has been recoded into a dichotomous variable. The value 1 represents the combination of the answers ‘Communism is the worst form of government’ and ‘Communism is a bad form of
government, but not worse than other forms’, while the value 0 represents all the other values combined. Because the main focus of this paper is the correlation between negative feelings about communism by the public and policy condemning or challenging communism, it makes sense to check for such negative emotions. People who aren’t sure about their attitude
towards communism; those who are likely to answer ‘Don’t know” or are (somewhat) positive about communism are unlikely to want communism related policy to play a prominent role in politics. By calculating the mean for the recoded variable for every year, the percentage of people who have a negative attitude towards communism in a certain year is calculated. By doing this for every year and then plotting a line, the trend of negative attitude towards communism in the whole dataset is represented. This third figure has been included to represent the data in such a way that one is able to get a quick grasp of the overall trend of the attitude towards communism and serves a a descriptive statistical tool.
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Mean
Median
Range
0.617
0.629
0.204
figure 1.4
The results shown in these first three figures are analysed using descriptive statistics. Both measures of central tendency, as measures of variability play a role. In figure 1.4 these are shown. These statistics have been calculated on the basis of the dichotomous variable of figure 1.3, rather than the original variable which is represented in figures 1.1 and 1.2. It is interesting to see that both the mean and median hover around 0.62, while the lowest value in figure 1.3 is 48.9. This means that on average 62% of Poles had negative attitudes towards communism in the years in which surveys were held. The median shows that in about half the years, 62.9% of Poles or more felt negative towards communism, while in the other half of the surveyed years less than 62.9% of Poles had negative attitudes towards communism. In valuing both the mean and median, one has to note the grouping of the surveyed years. The first four surveys were held one year apart from one another, while the last four surveys were held at intervals of two or three years. Consequently half of the results stem from 1992-1995, a time period of four years, while the other half stem from 1997-2005, a time period of eight years. This is bound to have a significant influence on the measures of central tendency. Both for the sake of balancing these measures as for having a better insight into the attitudes in the later period, it would have been preferable to have access to more frequent surveys in this second period.
In 2002 Poles attitudes differed the most from the mean and median. Only 48.9% of Poles felt communism was a bad form of government. In 1997 and 1999 Poles were second most negative towards communism. Overall, the trend in figure 1.3 shows Poles got less negative about communism by time, until they returned to a higher level in 2005. Attitudes in 2002 are especially interesting because of two reasons; first because they differ so much from all other years. Communism was seen as less worse by a lot of Poles compared to all other years. Although the two preceding years had seen a decrease in disliking of communism, from 1999 to 2002 communism was seen as bad by 9% less of Poles. the years in between 1999 and 2002 would have been interesting survey years, because they would tell us more about the
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slope of decrease. Whether this decrease happened in a relatively even tempo or was sudden could point to a gradual decrease in saliency of communism or memory of it’s role, while the latter might point to a certain important event. The low(er) level of negativity can partly be explained by the high percentage of respondents who answered “Don’t know”; 26% of respondents gave this answer, more than in any other year, as can be seen in figure 1.1. The biggest change in 1997, 1999 and 2002 seems to come from a high percentage of respondents answering “Don’t know”. Secondly, the year is interesting because the difference between 2002 and 2005 is the largest in the dataset, with an increase of 13.6%. Here again it would have been interesting to have data on the years in between, for the same reason of knowing whether the increase was gradual or sudden.
Overall the year 2002 seems to be an odd year; it differs from its preceding years, although it could be argued that the trend of decrease in negative attitudes only intensified, and can be seen as a turning point when compared to the large increase in negative attitudes in 2005. As said before, the period from 2002 to 2005 is the focus of this research, because in this period lustration policy changed the most extreme. So for Poles attitudes towards communism to correlate with lustration policy, the amount of negative attitudes should have increased significantly. The change in attitudes from 2002 to 2005 was the biggest between any consecutive surveys in the dataset. 13.6% of attitudes became negative in comparison to 2002. So there does seem to be a positive correlation between how negative Poles value communism and lustration policy. The change in attitudes can perhap be explained by the Rywin affair of 2002 and other political scandals of the 2002-2005 period, which were heavily linked to communism (Szczerbiak 2007: 205).
19 figure 2.1
figure 2.2
20 figure 2.4
In figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 attitude towards communism is compared and correlated with age in a bivariate analysis. Age is posited to have a possible influence on the attitude towards communism. As people who were under 18 during the communist period and the regime change might have less of a clear memory about this period and thus have less to base their (negative) judgment of communism on. To get an insight into the association of these two dichotomous variables, the phi coefficient can be used. The phi coefficient is a measurement used to describe the association of two dichotomous variables (Allen 2017). Figure 2.3 shows the Chi-Square value of the two variables. Chi-Square is part of the formula to calculate phi and shows whether there is any correlation between the two variables. Chi-Square is
significant at a 95% confidence interval, which means that the two variables are not independent of each other and a correlation exists (Agresti et al. 2017). As can be seen in figure 2.4, phi has a value of 0.026, which means there is almost no correlation between the two variables. The fact that the relation is positive means that people in the higher age group are more negative about Communism. In figure 2.1 and 2.2 this can be seen as well. Because Chi-Square is significant, this association can be accepted. Overall it can be concluded that when all the surveys are combined, the two age groups barely differ in their attitudes on communism. There is a minor positive relation though. It should be noted that in these results all the surveys are used. In theory it would be possible to have a certain year in which
younger people did differ more from the older generation in their valuation of communism, as long as in an other year (or several) an inverse relation between age and valuation existed. This could perhaps be the basis of another study.
Discussion
So what does the data say about the 2001-2005 period and the link between Poles attitudes and changes in lustration policy? Poles felt a lot more negative about communism in 2005 than in 2002, and on a smaller scale than in 1999 and 1997. So it can be argued that the
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change in lustration policy in 2005 correlates with a change in attitude towards communism. It is important to note however that prior to 1997 attitudes towards communism were even more negative. If the attitudes of Poles were a deciding factor for the change in lustration policy in 2005, then why didn’t lustration measures happen in the early 90’s when attitudes towards communism were even more negative?
One possible explanation could be that the political elite at the time didn’t want to explore such lustration policy. The ‘thick line’ doctrine of the first prime minister Mazowiecki is a clear example of this. Combined with later president Wałęsa’s comments about the possible detrimental effects lustration could have on the (democratic) progress of Poland, this
comment can be interpreted as a fear of lustration creating distrust in society. The constant (fear) of prosecution under lustration leads to both distrust towards the government and among citizens (Horne 2009)(Huntington 1991). In this view the political elite can be seen as trying to protect society from the negative effects of lustration; a sort of paternalistic view of politicians. Although the 2001-2005 period had some large corruption scandals involving high-ranking politicians, democracy was more established. Combined with a greater timespan since the actual communist era, which could have a desentizing effect on any feelings of anger towards old communists, this could be a basis for politicians to deem the negative effects of lustration as less dangerous.
A second explanation is based on the premise that the political elite in the early years after the transition were better off without lustration, because this would either bring to light their communist past or create a ‘blame game’ in which no politicians would be safe of public prosecution. As 10% of Poles were directly linked to the communist apparatus and about 30 to 40% through close family ties, it is likely that most parties had members who were part of this first or second group. In the case of communist successor parties this seems abundantly clear, as they are filled with members who were part of the communist party. But as is argued in by Nalepa in her book Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist
Europe, the same goes for post-Solidarity parties (Adler 2011). She argues that as the
Solidarity movement and other protest groups formed the biggest threat to the communist regime, it were these groups which formed the main focus of the secret police (Cardenas 2011). So even these parties, who seem to have an ideological link to lustration, did not push for these measures. These parties were direct descendants of the Solidarity movement which is seen as one of the main forces in bringing down the communist regime (CBOS 2005). Next
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to that they represented themselves as parties of a ‘new Poland’ in which the old communist structures would be replaced. So they created an anti-communist ideological identity, in which lustration would seemingly fit well. However they did not pursue lustration. That would hurt them as well, because members which had been informers to the secret police would be prosecuted. So both party blocs would be negatively affected by lustration. In 2005 the party landscape had changed and most politicians were not in any way linked to the secret police, the political will for lustration was greater. Especially in the PiS party it seems likely that there were none or very little members with a communist past, as this party had an internal lustration policy and its core ( the Kaczyński brothers) had been calling for lustration since the transition period. In this explanation politicians act only to further their own
interests, as Downs and Schumpeter see politicians. While Poles wanted lustration since 1989 and especially parties linked to the Solidarity movement had ideologies in which lustration seems to fit, these parties decided not to pursue lustration measures as these would be harmful to their own interests.
The difference between the attitudes of the two age groups is really small, although a positive relation between older age and negative attitude towards communism does exist. This would imply that age is not a big factor in the attitude towards communism and subsequently in the attitude towards lustration. Maybe some kind of difference in attitudes towards communism based on age does exist, but the cut-off point is different. As the regime supposedly became ‘softer’ after 1970, a better cut-off point would perhaps be based on the age of Poles in this year, rather than 1989 (Brito 2001: 220). Perhaps age also played a greater role in some years than in others.Further research could look into the connection between age and attitude. Conclusion
Polish democracy has been eventful; a great deal of corruption affairs, a recurring blame game in which politicians in high positions don’t back down from forging documents and the large amount of fallen governments are just some examples of this (Brier 2009)(Cardenas 2011). While lustration had been supported by a majority of Poles since the transition to democracy, only in 2005 did ‘real lustration’ take place (Szczerbiak 2016). It is not like lustration had not been present in Polish politics before that. When the old leader of the Solidarity movement, Lech Wałęsa, became president in 1990 he called for some for to be implemented (Millard 2009). Many more politicians would follow his lead in later years. But whenever lustration measures were announced they were quickly revoked. In some cases
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such measures used by politicians to further their own interests and the files or the
prosecution was corrupted in the process, as was the case under prime minister Olszewski (Tighe 2016). Or the measures weren’t effective because hardly any people were prosecuted, which was how the 1997 lustration law played out. Politicians in the 90’s seemed afraid to push for lustration. This wariness can be either explained by a belief amongst politicians that lustration would lead to distrust and weaken the Polish democracy, or a fear by politicians and their parties that lustration would negatively affect them as well by having their communists pasts being made public (Cardenas 2016).
The 2005 elections and subsequent ‘real lustration’ correlates with a higher dislike for communism compared to the years before that, and especially compared to 2002 (ISS 2010). Although attitude towards communism was very average in 2005 if compared to the whole dataset, the change from 2002 to 2005 is still a meaningful one. Most scholars see the many corruption scandals as a direct cause for the change in attitude towards lustration (Szczerbiak 2016)(Markowski 2006). Whether these corruption scandals were interpreted by Poles as having been instigated by a communist elite, or the parties on the right such as PiS created this discourse is an interesting question for further research. The concept of persuasion as Downs defines it would play an important role in such research, as the impact of politicians and/or public figures or institutions like the church on the attitudes of voters would form its core. Another interesting research topic would be the influence of low voter turnout on lustration policy and the way in which Polish parties mobilised voters in 2005. The 2005 parliamentary elections had the lowest turnout of any parliamentary elections in Polish history and how this influenced the electoral result seems interesting. For example, did Poles who traditionally voted for post-communist parties stop coming to the polls in 2005 and later years? Either way Poles felt the need for lustration in 2005. Why the political elite pursued lustration in that year can be explained by the same two explanations as in the last
paragraphs; the danger of lustration to Poland was deemed smaller or the political elite had no or less communist past and would thus not inflict harm to themselves by pursuing lustration.
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