Accepting a wind farm siting:
The effect of co-ownership
and intrinsic motivation
Sophie van den Hoogenband
In collaboration with Evelien Bik, Kevin van der Eijk &
Keya Hovens
Master Thesis Psychology, specialization: Economic and Consumer Psychology
Institute of Psychology
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences – Leiden University Date: 26-06-2017
Student number: s1367323
First examiner of the university: Emma ter Mors Second examiner of the university: Arjaan Wit
Abstract
The current environmental situation requires rapid action and as wind farms can offer a solution to this problem, local residents’ support is crucial. We investigated whether residents’ support for wind farms was influenced by the type of compensation (monetary vs. symbolic co-ownership vs. voice co-ownership) they were offered for the wind farm. In previous research, co-ownership as a compensation has been found to get support from residents near a local wind farm than a monetary compensation, but initiators of wind farm projects often experience difficulties when giving residents near a wind farm voice in the project. Symbolic co-ownership could potentially still offer the benefits of voice co-ownership, without the disadvantages of voice. This study had an experimental one factor between-subjects design (N = 169). Participants read a fictional scenario about a proposed wind farm and a compensation and stated the extent to which they supported the compensation they were offered and the project itself. The results showed that there was no significant difference in support for the compensation and the project between the three manipulated compensations. We did not find support for intrinsic motivation as a mediator of compensation and support, but the results did show a positive relationship between intrinsic motivation and support for the compensation and the project. It is advised to use the present study’s results and recommendations in order to further study the effect of intrinsic motivation on support for wind farms and how different types of compensations can positively affect intrinsic motivation.
Introduction
The current environmental situation requires rapid action, as agreed upon in the Paris Climate Agreement by the United Nations (United Nations, 2015). Therefore, three targets are set by European leaders to be met by the year 2020, one of which is “20% of EU energy from renewables” (2020 Climate & Energy Package, 2016, 1). The realization of this target has proven to be difficult, partly due to opposition of the communities in which wind farms are planned to be built (I&O Research, 2014). Therefore, research has been looking into factors that possibly play a role in the support for a wind farm siting by local communities (Rogers, 1998; Ter Mors, Terwel, & Daamen). A study about different types of facility sitings has found that opposition from the surrounding community stems from a perceived incongruence between the costs and benefits of a facility siting (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, & Aarts, 1993). While the benefits are national or even global, only the local community experiences the costs. For a wind farm these costs can include noise and shade flickering (Environmental impacts of wind power, 2013, 3). Offering a compensation to the local community can restore the imbalance between benefits and costs, and might therefore increase the community’s support for a facility siting
(Kunreuther, et al., 1993). Previous studies comparing different types of compensation have often found a monetary compensation (a one-time or repeated monetary payment) to be unsuccessful in increasing the support for facility siting projects (Carnes, et al., 1982; Claro, 2007; Ferreira, & Gallagher, 2010; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, & Eichenberger, 1996; Jenkins-Smith, & Kunreuther, 2001; Kunreuther, Easterling, Desvousges, & Slovic, 1990; Mansfield, Van Houtven, & Huber, 2002). Community ownership (when the community is offered to be a co-owner of the facility siting in terms of investment, profit, decision making or involvement) is
often found to be a more successful form of compensation (Allan, Mcgregor, & Swales, 2011; Devine-Wright, Hunter, High, & Evan, 2010; Goedkoop, & Devine-Wright, 2016; Kalkbrenner, & Roosen, 2016; Loring, 2007; Slee, 2015; Van Der Schoor, & Scholtens, 2015; Walker, & Toke, 2005; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010; Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008). However, giving the local community a right of say in the project complicates the decision-making process and renewable energy project initiators often experience conflict with communities that have been compensated with co-ownership including voice (Goedkoop, & Devine-Wright, 2016). Fortunately, community co-ownership can also be used as a form of compensation without giving the local community a right of say (i.e. voice) in the project. Multiple studies have suggested that symbolic co-ownership (i.e. co-ownership without voice) can be beneficial in increasing the support for a facility siting of the community (Maruyama, Nishikido, & Iida, 2007; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010). This research aims to experimentally study the differences of co-ownership without voice (symbolic co-ownership), in comparison to co-ownership with voice (voice co-ownership) and a monetary compensation and their effect in the local community’s support for a wind farm.
This research will contribute to the current research base by being the first to investigate the differences between symbolic co-ownership, voice co-ownership and a monetary compensation on the community’s support for the compensation and the project in an experimental design. In addition, this research will be the first to study intrinsic motivation as an underlying psychological construct that might facilitate the differences. This study is of practical value to all renewable energy companies and governments planning on initiating wind farms projects. By providing the benefits from co-ownership while eliminating the
disadvantages from voice, symbolic co-ownership may prove to be beneficial for both the initiators of wind farm projects and communities surrounding wind farms. Ultimately, symbolic co-ownership could help increase the support for wind farm sitings of local communities and thereby stimulate the amount of wind farms used.
Symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership
A substantial amount of research has examined the influence of different compensations on the support for a facility siting, often finding that a monetary compensation does not lead to a significant increase in the support from local residents (Carnes, et al., 1982; Ferreira, & Gallagher, 2010; Frey et al., 1996; Jenkins-Smith, & Kunreuther, 2001; Kunreuther, &
Easterling, 1996; Kunreuther, Easterling, & Desvouges, 1990; Mansfield et al., 2002) and can even lead to a decrease in support (Claro, 2007) compared to no compensation.
However, making the local community a co-owner of the project including voice has been found to be a successful type of compensation in multiple case studies of different types of facility sitings (Allan, et al., 2011; Goedkoop, & Devine-Wright, 2016; Kalkbrenner, & Roosen, 2016; Slee, 2015; Van Der Schoor, & Scholtens, 2015; Walker, et al., 2010; Zoellner, et al., 2008;). In addition, several studies have found that community co-ownership with voice leads to a higher acceptance rate compared to a monetary compensation (Loring, 2007; Toke, 2005; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010) and a more positive attitude towards renewable energy in general (Musall, & Kuik, 2011). These studies suggest that community co-ownership with voice leads to more support for a wind farm sitings than a monetary reward.
Hypothesis 1: Voice co-ownership will lead to more support for the compensation and the
Community co-ownership combines the effects of two concepts: co-ownership and voice. The concept of co-ownership can be explained as being a co-owner of the project, and it does not have to include voice for the community. However, previous studies which have researched the effect of ownership as a compensation have always included voice in the ownership (Loring, 2007; Toke, 2005; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010); the single effect of co-ownership without voice has never been studied. Therefore, in this study, the effects will be separated into symbolic ownership: the single effect of ownership, and voice co-ownership: the combined effects of co-ownership and voice.
Previous research has found that giving community members voice in the project increases the level of acceptance (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2010) and leads to more successful projects (Wolsink, 2007). Since voice ownership combines the effects of co-ownership and voice, this study expects that voice co-co-ownership will lead to more support for wind farm siting compared to symbolic co-ownership.
Hypothesis 2: Voice co-ownership will lead to more support for the compensation and the
wind farm than symbolic co-ownership.
Theoretically, it can be argued that voice co-ownership is the best form of compensation, as it combines the effects of co-ownership and voice. However, providing the local community with voice has proven to be problematic in real life (Goedkoop, & Devine-Wright, 2016).
Therefore, it is of importance to study whether symbolic co-ownership can lead to more acceptance than a monetary compensation, without providing the community with voice in the project.
Previous case studies have indeed suggested that symbolic co-ownership can lead to more support for facility sitings than a monetary reward, without it being necessary to provide the community with voice in the project (Kunreuther, et al., 1993; Maruyama, Nishikido, & Iida, 2007; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010). These studies showed that extra efforts such as named certificates and the possibility to inscribe personal names in a wind turbine gave the community members a sense of ownership, which the researchers suggested to be an important aspect of co-ownership. These findings reinforce the assertion of Devine-Wright (2005) that the
community’s attitude towards wind farms is also dependent on symbolic, affective and social aspects. These studies show the significance people feel in the added value of symbolic co-ownership.
Hypothesis 3: Symbolic co-ownership will lead to more support for the compensation and the
wind farm than a monetary compensation.
Intrinsic motivation
A study by Kalkbrenner and Roosen (2016) found that their participants generally had positive attitudes towards community energy and were willing to participate in community energy projects. This shows that people are generally intrinsically motivated towards community energy. However, studies often find a low rate of acceptance of a wind farm siting, even when the community is provided with a monetary compensation (Mors et al., 2012).
One explanation that has been given for the negative results regarding monetary compensation is the crowding out effect (Frey, & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), which states that “a monetary compensation tends to undermine an individual's sense of civic duty” (p. 746). When community members are offered a monetary compensation, it undermines their willingness to
support a wind farm in their community based on their intrinsic motivation. Multiple studies confirm this effect, showing that when people are given a price incentive, this will lower their intrinsic motivation, which can make the price incentive less effective or even reverse the effect of the price incentive (Frey, & Jegen, 2001; Ma, Jin, Meng, & Shen, 2014; Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, & Matsumoto, 2010). A meta-analysis on motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) offers a more general explanation of the negative effect of a monetary reward, stating that all tangible rewards negatively affect intrinsic motivation. According to these studies, a monetary compensation can decrease the community members’ intrinsic motivation to support a wind farm and ultimately lower the support rate of the wind farm.
Research has found that framing a monetary compensation differently can attenuate money’s negative effects (Heyman, & Ariely, 2014; Yam, 2013). This indicates that framing a monetary compensation as co-ownership (symbolic co-ownership condition) might help avoid the negative effects a monetary compensation usually has. In this way, the symbolic and voice co-ownership compensations are not expected to create the same crowding out effect as a monetary compensation.
Thus, it can be expected that intrinsic motivation of participants towards supporting a wind farm siting is undermined when offered a monetary reward, but not when offered co-ownership. Symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership will therefore lead to more support for a wind farm compared to a monetary reward.
Hypothesis 4: Symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership will lead to more support for the
compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation, and this effect is mediated by a decrease in intrinsic motivation with a monetary compensation.
Method Participants & design
Participants from multiple cities and small towns in the province of South Holland
ranging in age from 1 and 79 years (M age = 43.88; SD = 16.86) volunteered to participate (N = 195; 107 men and 87 women). Their level of education ranged from having completed
elementary school to having completed a university degree. All participants were randomly divided into one of three conditions (66 monetary compensation condition; 67 symbolic co-ownership condition; 62 voice co-co-ownership condition).
This experimental study had a one factor, between-subjects design, with three levels (compensation: monetary compensation vs. symbolic co-ownership vs. voice co-ownership). The effect of the type of compensation (‘Manipulated Compensation), the ordinal between-subjects independent variable, on the support for the compensation (‘Compensation Support’) and project (‘Project Support’), the interval dependent variables, were tested with intrinsic motivation (‘Intrinsic Motivation’) as the interval mediator.
Procedure
In the online questionnaire participants first read and signed the informed consent form and were randomly assigned to one of the three compensation conditions. Participants of all conditions first read the explanation of the situation, which stated the following:
“Please imagine you live in the fictional town ‘Groest’, with approximately 5000 residents. There are plans to build a wind farm near your house in Groest. The area of Groest is exceptionally suitable for a wind farm, partly because of the strong and
continuous wind power in this area. The wind farm will consist of six windmills, spread across an area of 72 hectares (equal to 108 soccer fields). The windmills will last approximately 15 years and together they will, on average, generate the energy to supply 12.000 households with power.
Experts in the field, including academics, engineers and environmental authorities, made an estimate of the expected local nuisance of the wind farm. This estimate showed that the wind farm will be visible from your house and will produce a noise that is audible when you are outside. The maximal noise level is 45 Decibel, which is comparable to the noise an average refrigerator makes.”
Next, all conditions showed the compensation the participants were offered.
[Monetary compensation]
“With the arrival of an energy project like the wind farm in Groest it is customary to offer a form of compensation to residents that live nearby. If the residents of Groest accept the wind farm, all households will be offered a
compensation. Every household nearby the wind farm, including your household, will receive 120 Euros per household per year, for the next 15 years. After 15 years you will have received 1800 Euros.”
“With the arrival of an energy project like the wind farm in Groest it is customary to offer a form of compensation to residents that live nearby. If the residents of Groest accept the wind farm, all householsd will be offered a compensation. Acceptance of the wind farm is seen as an investment by the residents of Groest in this project. Therefore, every household living nearby the wind farm, including your household, will receive a share in the wind farm. With this share you will receive a part of the profit of the wind farm. The share will pay 120 Euros per household per year for the next 15 years. After 15 years your share will have paid 1800 Euros. With your share you will receive an official certificate that
demonstrates your support of the wind farm.”
[Voice co-ownership]
“With the arrival of an energy project like the wind farm in Groest it is customary to offer a form of compensation to residents that live nearby. If the residents of Groest accept the wind farm, all households will be offered a compensation. Acceptance of the wind farm is seen as an investment by the residents of Groest in this project. Therefore, every household living nearby the wind farm, including your household, will receive a share in the wind farm. With this share you will receive a part of the profit of the wind farm. The share will pay 120 Euros per household per year for the next 15 years. After 15 years your share will have paid 1800 Euros. This share also gives you a right of say in meetings about this project. With your share you will receive an official certificate that demonstrates your support of the wind farm.”
All statements and questions used in this study were 7-point Likert scales ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. First, participants’ support for this compensation was measured with the statements: “I think the compensation I was offered is good”, “I think
the compensation I was offered is desirable” and “I think the compensation I was offered is appropriate” (combined into the ‘Compensation Support’ scale, alpha = .788). In addition,
four statements were included to measure the participants’ support for the wind farm project itself: “I think the plan to build a wind farm close to Groest is a good idea”, “I would respond
positively to the proposed wind farm close to Groest”, “I would accept the plan to build a wind farm close to Groest” and “I would protest against the proposed wind farm”. The fourth item
was reverse-coded and all items were combined into the ‘Project Support’ scale (alpha = .947).
In order to measure the mediating effect of intrinsic motivation, three items created especially for this study, based on the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989), were used. In response to the question: “To what extent would the following
statements be a reason for you to accept the wind farm in your area?”, the following statements
were given: “Wind farms are helpful for the environment.”, “Wind farms can help reach the
targets of renewable energy.” and “Accepting a wind farm is a good way for me to contribute to a sustainable world.” (alpha = .887).
To check whether the manipulation was successful, a manipulation check was included with a scale for each manipulation, both consisting of two statements. The first two statements checked for a difference between the monetary compensation condition and the two
project” and “I feel involved in this project”. A scale called ‘Participation’ was constructed
with an alpha of .864. The third and fourth statement checked for a difference between the monetary compensation and symbolic ownership condition on the one hand and the voice co-ownership condition on the other hand (a feeling of influence). The statements were as follows: “I feel I have a say in this project” and “I feel I have a voice in this project”. A scale called ‘Influence’ was constructed with an alpha of .917.
Two general statements were included: “In general I am an advocate of generating energy
by means of windmills” and “Before filling out this questionnaire I already knew a lot about windmills”. A comprehension check was included to account for participants that did not
understand the scenario. Participants of each condition read a statement that repeated the proposal they were offered and they were asked to state whether this was indeed the proposal they received. All the statements repeated the actual proposal, so the correct answer in all cases was ‘true’ rather than ‘false’. Lastly, participants were asked to provide some demographic information about themselves, including their age, gender, place of residence and highest level of education.
After finishing the study, the participants received information about how to apply for the gift vouchers that they could win, and they were debriefed. Completing the entire study took approximately 13 minutes. Gift vouchers worth 25 Euros were distributed among all
participants that were willing to give their e-mail address in order to receive a gift voucher, with a chance of winning that was approximately one out of ten.
Results Preliminary Analyses
Of the 195 participants that finished the online questionnaire, 22 participants did not choose the correct answer in the comprehension check and were excluded from the analyses. Another 4 participants were excluded from the analyses because they were positive outliers on the variable ‘Time’ (M = 13.3 minutes, SD = 12.58), each taking approximately 3 hours to finish the questionnaire (z-scores: 5.61, 6.17, 6.38 and 6.81). Accordingly, the analyses were
performed on the data of 169 participants (61 monetary compensation condition; 57 symbolic co-ownership condition; 51 voice co-ownership condition).
The sample consisted of 91 men and 77 were women (one respondent answered
‘different’) who were between 18 and 79 years old (M age = 44.77, SD = 17.68). Participants, in general, were quite positive about wind farms (M = 5.82, SD = 1.57 on a scale ranging from one to seven) and stated they had considerable knowledge about windmills before the study (M = 4.75, SD = 1.50 on a scale ranging from one to seven).
The normality assumption was violated: for the dependent variable ‘Compensation
Support’ we observed a significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in the voice co-ownership
condition (D(51) = 0.14, p = .017), and in all conditions for the dependent variable ‘Project
Support’ (monetary compensation: D(61) = 0.15, p = .002; symbolic co-ownership: D(57) =
0.20, p < .001; voice co-ownership: D(51) = 0.17, p = .001). However, since the number of participants in each cell was more than fifteen, the ANOVA was robust against non-normality. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was tested with Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances, which was not violated for ‘Compensation Support’ (F(2, 166) = 0.01, p = .989), or
‘Project Support’ (F(2, 166) = .635, p = .531). Since the study was designed in a way that every IP address could only participate once, it can be assumed the assumption of independent
observations was not violated either. There were no outliers on the X variable ‘Manipulated
Compensation’ or the Y variables ‘Compensation Support’ and ‘Project Support’.
Manipulation Check
In order to check whether the manipulation was successful, two manipulation checks were conducted, consisting of four statements in total. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the four statements per condition and of the two scales.
Two one-way ANOVA tests were carried out to check whether the manipulation was successful in creating the intended differences between the three conditions. The results on the ‘Participation’ scale showed no significant results, F(2, 168) = 0.55, p = .575, η2 = .007 (M = 3.92, SD = 1.54) and neither did the results on the ‘Influence’ scale, F(2, 168) = 0.60, p = .552, η2 = .007 (M = 3.43, SD = 1.44). Thus, the manipulated compensation did not influence the extent to which participants felt like they could participate in the project and could influence the project. It can be concluded that the manipulation was not successful in creating the intended differences between the three conditions.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Manipulation Check per Condition
Dependent Variable Monetary Compensation Symbolic Co-ownership Voice Co-ownership
Scale Participation 3.78 (1.69) 3.98 (1.47) 4.09 (1.61)
Scale Influence 3.34 (1.56) 3.52 (1.41) 3.64 (1.44)
Main Analyses
The differences between the three types of compensation were measured on
participants’ support for the compensation and the project. Both variables were used to test the hypotheses. For the first hypothesis (Voice co-ownership will lead to more support for the
compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation.), second hypothesis (Voice co-ownership will lead to more support for the compensation and the wind farm than
symbolic co-ownership) and third hypothesis (Symbolic co-ownership will lead to more support for the compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation.) two
one-way ANOVA tests were conducted to test for any differences between the conditions.
The results of the first ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between the conditions on their scores on the ‘Compensation Support’ scale F(2, 166) = 0.42, p = .655, η2= .005 (M = 4.15, SD = 1.48). The results of the second ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between the conditions on their scores on the ‘Project Support’ scale either, F(2, 168) = 0.511, p = .601, η2 = .006 (M = 4.55, SD = 1.80). These results indicated that participants in the monetary compensation condition, symbolic co-ownership condition and voice co-ownership condition did not significantly differ in the extent to which they supported the compensation and the project (Table 2). Thus, these results did not support hypotheses one, two and three.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of 'Project' and 'Compensation' scale per Condition
Dependent Variable Monetary Symbolic Voice
Compensation Co-ownership Co-ownership
Project 4.57 (1.91) 4.70 (1.73) 4.35 (1.76) Compensation 4.02 (1.48) 4.26 (1.49) 4.18 (1.48)
The fourth hypothesis (Symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership will lead to more
support for the compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation, and this effect is mediated by a decrease in intrinsic motivation with a monetary compensation.) stated a
predicted difference between the monetary condition and the two co-ownership conditions in their support for the compensation and the project, due to a decrease in intrinsic motivation in the monetary condition. The underlying construct differentiating the monetary condition from the two co-ownership conditions was participation. Therefore, a PROCESS regression analysis was used to study whether intrinsic motivation mediated the effect of participation on the outcome variable: support for the compensation (Figure 1) and the project (Figure 2).
Results indicated that participation was not a significant predictor of intrinsic motivation,
β = 0.10, p = .649, which corresponds to the results from a one-way ANOVA stating no
significant differences between any of the conditions on their level of intrinsic motivation (F(2, 168) = 0.18, p = .838). The effect of intrinsic motivation was a significant predictor of support for the compensation (β = 0.39, p < .001) and the project (β = 0.89, p < .001). In correspondence with the ANOVA run in the main analyses, the effect of participation excluding the mediator was nonsignificant for support for the compensation, β = 0.21, p = .387, and the project, β = -0.05, p = .873. The full model including the mediator was non-significant for support for the compensation, β = 0.17, p = .454, and the project, β = -0.14, p = .528, as well. The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 10.000 samples. The results indicated that the bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was non-significant for
compensation, b = 0.04, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = -0.13, 0.23, and project, b = 0.09, SE = 0.20, 95% CI = -0.29, 0.50. These results show that there is a significant relationship between participants’
intrinsic motivation to support a wind farm and their support for the compensation and the project. This indicated that the more people were intrinsically motivated to accept the wind farm, the more likely it was they supported the manipulated compensation and the project itself. However, there was no relationship between the extent to which people could participate in the project and their intrinsic motivation: people who received symbolic co-ownership
compensation and were manipulated to feel like they could participate more, did not differ in their intrinsic motivation to support the wind farm from people who received a monetary compensation. The combination of these effects (the indirect effect) was also non-significant. The complete model, including the indirect and direct effect of level of participation on support for the compensation and the wind farm without intrinsic motivation, was non-significant as well.
In conclusion, the mediation analyses did not offer support for the indirect effect as predicted in Hypothesis 4.
Figure 1. Mediational effects of type participation on ‘Compensation Support’ through intrinsic motivation.
Figure 2. Mediational effects of participation on ‘Project Support’ through intrinsic motivation.
Discussion
The goal of this research was to study the differences of co-ownership without voice (symbolic co-ownership), in comparison to co-ownership with voice (voice co-ownership) and a monetary compensation and their effect on the local community’s support for a wind farm. We studied this experimentally by presenting participants with a fictional scenario about a proposed wind farm, offering them one of the the three types of compensation and asking them to state the extent to which they supported the compensation they were offered and the project itself. We studied whether voice co-ownership would lead to more support for the compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation, whether voice co-ownership would lead to more support for the compensation and the wind farm than
symbolic co-ownership and whether symbolic co-ownership would lead to more support for the compensation and the wind farm than a monetary compensation. The results showed that there were no significant differences in support for the wind farm and the compensation
between the three types of compensations. Participants who received a monetary
compensation, symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership all supported the wind farm and the compensation approximately equally, showing no direct relationship between the type of compensation and support for the wind farm project and the compensation.
We also studied whether the expected increase in support for the project with symbolic co-ownership compared to a monetary compensation was due to the crowding out effect, which predicts a decrease in intrinsic motivation with the monetary compensation (Frey, & Jegen, 2001; Frey, & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ma, Jin, Meng, & Shen, 2014; Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, & Matsumoto, 2010). The present study did not find support for this mediation. However, we did find the expected positive relation between intrinsic motivation to support the wind farm and support for the project and the compensation. Although the types of compensation did not manipulate the level of intrinsic motivation participants felt towards supporting the wind farm, a higher level of intrinsic motivation to support the wind farm was related to more support for the wind farm and the compensation. Previous studies have also found that intrinsic motivation to act environmentally is related to
pro-environmental behaviours (Green-Demers, Pelletier, & Ménard, 1997; Koestner, Houlfort, Paquet, & Knight, 2001; Pelletier, Green-Demers, & Béland, 1997; Séquin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1999; Villacorta, Koestner, & Lekes, 2003). The positive relationship between intrinsic motivation and support for a wind farm and compensation shows the importance of intrinsic motivation and supports the idea that the crowding-out effect might be of relevance in the process.
A possible reason that the present study did not find an effect of type of compensation on support for the compensation and the wind farm is that our manipulation was not as successful as we intended. We expected that the symbolic co-ownership condition would induce a feeling of participation, and that the voice co-ownership condition would induce feelings of
participation and influence. The manipulation checks showed that participants who received a compensation in the form of symbolic co-ownership or voice co-ownership did not feel they could participate in the project more than participants who simply received a monetary compensation, and participants who had voice in the project did not feel they had more influence in the project than participants who did not have voice. These results show that our scenarios were not successful in inducing the feelings of participation and influence we wanted to manipulate.
One reason the scenarios might not have been successful as a manipulation is that they were only fictional. It could be the case that people who are in this situation in real life respond differently than people who are only presented with a fictional scenario (Gold, Pulford, &
Colman, 2014; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005). Studies show that scenarios do not always present the situation optimally (McGlone, Bortfled, & Kobrynowicz, 2007) and that people tend to underestimate the value of money in hypothetical scenarios compared to real-life situations (Murphy, Allen, Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005).
Another reason the scenarios might not have been as successful as we intended is the way the conditions were interpreted in the scenarios of this study, which might not have been optimal. The way the conditions (monetary compensation, symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership) were interpreted in the scenarios of this study did not replicate the effect of
voice co-ownership found in other studies (Terwel et al., 2010; Wolsink, 2007), nor did it support the hypothesized effect of symbolic co-ownership. However, these conditions could have also been interpreted in other ways. Especially symbolic co-ownership (a sense of ownership due to co-ownership in terms of investment, profit or involvement) is open to many interpretations into the scenarios. Previous studies on wind farms have found that inscribing names into wind turbines or being invited to a completion ceremony can evoke a sense of ownership (Maruyama et al, 2007), as well as being able to choose a name for the wind turbines (Maruyama et al., 2007; Warren, & McFadyen, 2010). It is possible that these different interpretations of the symbolic co-ownership condition into scenarios are more successful as a manipulation than the ones used in the present study.
The manipulation might not have been as successful as we intended because of participants’ strong opinions on windmills in general. It could be the case that participants with an extreme opinion on windmills cannot easily be influenced to change their opinion. If this is true, this study’s manipulation might work for participants with a moderate opinion on windmills, but not for participants with an extremely negative or positive opinion on
windmills. Previous research by Ferreira and Gallagher (2010) and Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther (2001) found that mostly participants with no extreme preference in favour of or opposed a facility siting can be influenced by the compensation they are offered. This is also shown by the present study’s finding that a higher intrinsic motivation to support the wind farm goes together with more support for the compensation and the project. Participants who are more inclined to support the project and the compensation might be less sensitive to the difference between the types of compensations, as well as participants who are more inclined
not to support the project and the compensation. These findings suggest it might be
worthwhile to further study the effects of symbolic and voice co-ownership on people with a moderate opinion on wind farms. In order to find participants with a moderate opinion it should be ascertained that participants’ incentive to participate in the study is not based on curiosity or personal interest, but rather on financial incentives (Tishler, & Bartholomae, 2002). This can be accomplished by not informing participants about the topic of the study, but rather telling them it involves a decision making situation and by offering all participants a financial compensation (rather than only a chance of winning a financial compensation) to stimulate a financial incentive.
In order to study how well the present study’s sample represented the Dutch population, it was compared to several other studies conducted in the Netherlands. In this study, the average of the answers to the question of how much participants supported wind farms in general was 5.8 on a scale from one to seven, which corresponds to the average support for wind farms in general in the Netherlands of 7.59 out of ten (I&O Research, 2014). The same study also found that the average support for wind farms being built close by is 5.92 out of 10, which corresponds to the support rate of 4.55 out of seven for the project and 4.15 out of seven for the
compensation found in this study. In conclusion, the support rates for wind farms in general and wind farms being built close by found in the present study seem to correspond to those of I&O Research (2014) on the Dutch populations’ support for wind farms.
The sample was not completely representative of the population on the level of
education, as the average education level of participants was relatively high (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2017). The results show that more participants with a lower level of
education were excluded from the analyses because they did not complete the questionnaire or did not correctly answer the manipulation checks. Therefore, it could be the case that the scenarios were too long or too difficult for participants with a lower educational level. Implications and future research
Although this study did not find an effect of type of compensation on support for the wind farm, the results are valuable to companies and governments starting wind farm projects.
This study has found that intrinsic motivation to support a wind farm has a positive relationship with the support for a wind farm and the compensation. This suggests that wind farm project initiators should focus on intrinsic motivation and finding ways to stimulate it in order to increase the support for the wind farm and the compensation. For instance, the financial compensation could be framed as a monetary award for a pro-environmental attitude, as research has found that an award can increase intrinsic motivation (Domangue, & Solomon, 2010). By stimulating intrinsic motivation, project initiators can both enhance the local residents’ experience of the process and increase the success of wind farm projects.
The theoretical value of this research lies in the experimental design with a scenario manipulation. A major strength of this research is the experimental design, as previous studies looking into wind farm projects have always been case studies (Allan, et al., 2011; Goedkoop, & Devine-Wright, 2016; Kalkbrenner, & Roosen, 2016; Loring, 2007; Musall, & Kuik, 2011; Slee, 2015; Toke, 2005; Van Der Schoor, & Scholtens, 2015; Walker, et al., 2010; Warren, &
McFadyen, 2010; Zoellner, et al., 2008). By studying the effect of different types of
compensation experimentally, the results of participants from different areas, with different economical backgrounds, political preferences, ages and education levels can be compared. This
is of great importance, as research by I&O (2014) in The Netherlands has shown that there is a substantial difference in the support for wind farms between people from a different living area, age and political preference. In addition, this study used a scenarios manipulation, rather than a real world situation, so the differences between the conditions were minimal. In this manner, it was assured that the study could not have been influenced by differences in the situation that are unrelated to the manipulation.
Another value of this research lies in the recommendations that can be made for future research, based on this study’s results. With the way the conditions were interpreted in this research, no effect of the type of compensation on support for a wind farm was found. The results also did not offer support for the crowding-out effect. However, a different interpretation might show to be more successful. As the present study has found that intrinsic motivation has a positive relationship with support for the wind farm and the compensation, it would be valuable to also study whether there are other ways to increase intrinsic motivation. In addition, the results of this research suggest it would be valuable to study whether an effect of type of compensation on support for a wind farm can be found by future research for people with a moderate opinion about windmills in general. Future research is therefore advised to ascertain participants’ incentive to participate is not based their personal interest in wind farms.
Conclusion
The present study did not find a significant difference between a monetary compensation, a symbolic co-ownership compensation and a voice co-ownership compensation in their effect on support for the compensation and the wind farm project itself. It is possible that this study did not find an effect of type of compensation on support because the manipulation was not as
successful as we intended. The present study did not find support for intrinsic motivation as a mediator of the process, but the results did show a positive relationship between intrinsic motivation to support a wind farm and the level of support for the wind farm and the
compensation. It is advised to use the present study’s results and recommendations in order to further study the effect of intrinsic motivation on support for wind farms and how different types of compensations can positively affect intrinsic motivation. As the start and continuation of wind farm projects plays an important role in the fight against climate change, local resident’s support for wind farms is of great importance.
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