Oil crises in the Niger Delta: An analysis of Shell’s crisis response strategies and the attribution of crisis responsibility by the media

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Acknowledgement

Writing this thesis has been a long and challenging road which I could not have done without the support of others. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Johan Christensen for his guidance, help, expertise and patience throughout the whole process. Thank you for allowing me to pursue a research topic that might not be one of the most logical choices for a Public Administration thesis, but has been one that I enjoyed working on. My sincere thanks goes out to the study advisors of Public Administration for helping me get enrolled for the Master Thesis seminar halfway during the semester. I am highly indebted to all the members of the Exam Committee for approving my extension and allowing students, such as myself, to do several internships next to their study. I feel blessed for the experience I have obtained and the people I have met during my internships at ActionAid, HCSS and the Netherlands Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa.

I am also thankful to my elder brother Jelmer and elder sister Eline for their encouragement and constant reminder to keep a cool head (“It’s a master thesis, not a PhD dissertation!”). Your advice on some of the technical issues I faced while writing this thesis, has been very helpful. I want to thank my best friend Shanne for always being there for me, in both the good and bad times. Your positivity and decision to pursue a second bachelor in Law while working full-time is truly inspiring. Final and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional love and support during these past years. Words cannot describe how much I owe to you. I am for example, thankful to my dad for letting me use all laptops available in the house (which unfortunately led to the magical disappearance of one charger) so that I could finish my content analysis on a trial version. I am also extremely thankful to my mom for her nurturing character, willingness to listen to my thoughts and complaints and for providing me with plentiful study snacks for the many nightly hours I spent working on this thesis. I hope that I can make you both proud and that finishing this master will be the start of many great new things.

Myrthe van der Gaast March 2017

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Executive Summary

Crisis communication is an essential aspect of crisis management aimed at restoring an organization’s reputation and guaranteeing its continued success. Situation Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is one of the most dominant theories within the crisis communication literature and provides a framework to predict the level of reputational damage posed by a crisis as well as the most effective crisis response(s). According to SCCT, an effective crisis response must be in accordance to the type of crisis and level of perceived crisis attribution by stakeholders.

This research looks at how Royal Dutch Shell’s reputation has been affected by crises occurring in the Niger Delta. It specifically focuses on two questions: 1. how does Shell respond to crises in the Niger Delta? (admit blame, shift blame, excuse, scapegoating etc.) and 2. to what extent has Shell’s selection of crisis response strategies been in accordance to the attribution of crisis responsibility by the media? Shell’s selection of response strategies will be examined by looking at two crises: the Ogoni crisis of 1995 and the Bodo spills of 2008 and 2009. A content analysis was conducted on 541 media articles published in The New York Times and The Guardian from 1992 to 2015. This research shows that Shell’s long history of unsolved crises in the Niger Delta (crisis history) and an indifferent treatment of stakeholders has intensified the attribution of crisis responsibility and reputational damage posed by a crisis. During both crises, Shell’s initial response was to either deny or diminish the severity of the crisis. In response to intense stakeholder pressure, including lawsuits for human rights abuses against the Ogoni people and absence of fair compensation to Bodo communities, Shell finally adopted more accommodative and victim concerned responses (rebuild/deal responses). However a lacking effort by Shell to commit itself to these promises has seriously undermined the ability of the rebuild/deal strategies to diminish reputational damage.

Key words: Reputation Risk Management (RRM), Situational Crisis Communication Theory

(SCCT), Organizational Reputation, Stakeholders Theory, Oil Crises, Royal Dutch Shell/Shell Nigeria, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).

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1. Introduction

In a context of high uncertainty, organizations are struggling today with how they should protect and rebuild their reputation after a crisis hits the organization. With the growth of independent media as well as increase of digital media circulation, crises have become more common and devastating in nature. As stated by Mitroff et al. (1987) “it no longer a question whether a crisis will strike an organization, but a question of when, how, what form it will take and who and how many will be affected” (p. 291). It is therefore inevitable that crises, no matter their size, will have an unfavourable impact on an organization. Since it is no longer possible for organizations to completely avoid or ignore a crisis, organizations have increasingly invested in implementing some form of effective crisis management to reduce the negative effects of a crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2016, p. 52). Crisis communication is an essential aspect of crisis management and involves the interaction and exchange of information between an organization and its stakeholders before, during and after the occurrence of a crisis (Benoit, 1997). Crisis communication helps organizations select the most appropriate crisis response strategy to a particular crisis. The selection of the appropriate crisis responses is not only crucial to protect an organization’s reputation but also to avoid potential loss of credibility and legitimacy.

A sector that is no stranger to crises is the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry faces different kinds of crises ranging from oil spills, fires, explosions, strikes, injuries, community clashes to falling of global oil prices, that all require a tailor-made response. A good example of an oil and gas company that has experienced many crises is Royal Dutch Shell, and in particular its subsidiary Shell Nigeria. Shell Nigeria, has historically dominated the Nigerian oil sector. Its presence in a country prone to conflict, has however not been without any controversies; Shell Nigeria has been accused of countless of oils spills and human rights abuses in the Niger Delta. A 2006 UNDP report revealed the extent of oil pollution in the region and estimated that a total clean-up would cost over 1 billion dollar, and take up to 30 years (Reuters, 2011). The UN condemned Shell for both falling below its own operational standards and underreporting oil spills in the country. Shell’s bad record on environmental protection in Nigeria has not only resulted in a public outcry among local communities within Nigeria, but has also attracted the attention of international human rights organizations. With the help of international NGO’s, local communities have tried to sue both Shell Nigeria and Royal Dutch Shell for its activities in the Niger Delta; demanding fair compensation and a clean-up of the polluted land.

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4 The many oil-related crises in the Niger Delta and growing criticism geared at Shell’s subsidiary Shell Nigeria makes one wonder whether Royal Dutch Shell has taken appropriate measures to mitigate the negative effects of the various crises inflicted to the company. Despite Shell’s efforts to invest in community projects, adopt CSR policies and improve transparency in oil spill reporting, the company continues to be a regular target of international protests and legal proceedings for misconduct (Hennchen, 2014, p. 1). With Shell being hold responsible for so many different crises in the Niger Delta, it is interesting to see whether it has applied similar tactics to these crises to minimize responsibility. Growing frustration among local Nigerian communities towards Shell’s responses to crises in the Niger Delta suggests discrepancies between what the people demand and what the organization does.

This thesis will focus on the aftermath of a crisis and aims to explore how Shell has responded to two types of crises inflicted to its subsidiary Shell Nigeria. It will conduct a content analysis to discover how media outlets have perceived Shell’s crisis response strategies during two crises: the 1994 Ogoni struggle and 2008/2009 Bodo spills. The central focusof this research is to investigate the relationship between Shell’s crisis response strategies and the attribution of crisis responsibility by the media. The research question of this thesis is formulated as follows:

To what extent has Shell’s selection of crisis response strategies been appropriate to the level of crisis responsibility assigned by the media?

1.2 Theoretical and societal relevance

The theoretical relevance of this research resides within the application of SCCT to crises inflicted to Shell Nigeria. This research will shed light on how the media frames crises, and which response they deem appropriate. It hopes to offer insights into the effectiveness of crisis response strategies as well as the underlying motivations to select lesser effective crisis responses. This research specifically focuses on the media because of its crucial role to inform stakeholders of the organization’s performance. This role by the media is significant considering that they do not only act as “vehicles for organizations to advertise themselves”, but also as active agents shaping social realities (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990, p. 240). After the occurrence of a crisis, media outlets are usually one of the first actors to report on the crisis. Their type of reporting on a crisis affects how stakeholders perceive an organization as well as how crisis responsibility is attributed.

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5 The societal relevance of this topic relates to the impact of Shell on the Nigerian state. Shell’s engagement in Nigeria, followed by other international oil companies, has to a certain extent contributed to the transformation of the Nigerian economy into one that is almost entirely dependent on oil. The overreliance on a single source of revenue has distorted the relationship between the Nigerian government and its citizens, and made the Nigerian government unaccountable to the communities it is supposed to serve. Some commentators have called Nigeria a prime example of the resource curse; in which the country’s oil abundance has contributed to bad governance, corruption, poverty and political instability. Shell’s power in Nigeria has been so extensive that it almost seems to overshadow the Nigerian government. As stated by some critical Nigerian commentators: “the Nigerian government has no power […] Power lies with the oil companies” (Omeje, 2006, p. 47-48). Others have suggested that “the Nigerian state is a shell, and Shell is the Nigerian state” (Ibid.). And while Shell itself may not see itself as taking part in politics, local communities might think otherwise because of Shell’s cooperation with the Nigerian authorities. Shell’s association with the Nigerian military, for whom it has reached out to seek protection against rebels in the region, has been heavily criticized because of the Nigerian military’s history of employing disproportional amounts of violence against its own population. Researching the presence of a multinational company in a conflict prone country helps to discover what role companies can play to break the culture of impunity and how societal pressure can contribute to ethical responsibility.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

This thesis will be structured as follows: it will start by investigating crisis communication literature. In order to assess the various crisis responses available to an organization, it is essential to discuss what a crisis entails. Stakeholder theory will be used to describe the relationship between an organisation and its stakeholders. The theory discusses why it is in the organization’s best interest to take the concerns and criticism from its stakeholders into account. The methodology chapter will go deeper into the operationalization of the research question and hypotheses. It explains which types of methods and data is used to answer the research question as well as the relationship between the different variables. The case study further investigates the presence of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria and discusses two different crises that have potentially affected Shell’s reputation: the execution of the Ogoni nine and the 2008

and 2009 Bodo oil spills. The analysis section will then carefully explain the type of crisis

responses deployed by Shell to these events. A content analysis has been conducted to analyse the perception of the media towards Shell’s selection of crisis response during the above

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6 mentioned crises and assess whether they have succeeded in limiting reputational damage. The final chapter will present the main findings of this thesis and offer recommendations for further research.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Crisis management: overview

2.1.1 Definition crisis and types of crises

A crucial element of the research question that needs further explanation is the concept ‘crisis’. While no universally accepted definition has been established, a crisis usually refers to “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs, 2007b, p. 2-3). An important element of this definition is the perceptual nature of a crisis. It recognizes that crises are socially constructed and that it is the perception of the stakeholders that determines whether an event becomes a crisis.

Authors on crisis management agree that there are three components that separate a crisis from other unpleasant occurrences: a threat, a period of uncertainty and urgency to do something (Boin et al, 2005, p. 2). A crisis is threatening because it creates circumstances that reach beyond the normal incidents that organizations face on a daily basis. A crisis can create three kind of threats; threats to the public safety, financial loss and reputational loss (Coombs, 2007a, p. 1). The three threats are influenced by one another since injuries and loss of lives can lead to financial and reputational loss. Similarly, reputational damage can have a negative financial impact on the organization. The threat of a crisis is usually accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty (Boin et al, 2005, p. 3). Certain crises such as natural disasters (hurricanes, floods and earthquakes) or surprise attacks (hostage-taking, terrorist attacks) can come at a time and intensity that is beyond the expectations of the authorities. During this time, there is much uncertainty about ‘what has happened’, ‘how did it happen’ and ‘what should be done’ (Ibid.). Finally, the urgency component refers to the time pressure on crisis managers to take immediate decisions.

2.2 Stakeholder theory

Stakeholder theory will be discussed in this chapter in order to get a better sense of the different types of stakeholders and their importance to the organization. The chapter explains why it makes strategically sense for companies to develop good relations with their stakeholders.

Stakeholder theory was first introduced by Edward Freeman in his book: Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984). Freeman described that theory as a “new way of thinking about strategic management” (Crane, 2008, p. 63). Stakeholder theory is closely

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8 related to shareholder theory; a theory which claims that corporations do not have any moral obligations or social responsibilities other than maximizing their profit (Friedman, 1970). In contrast to shareholder theory, which focuses on the owners (shareholders or stockholders) of corporations, stakeholder theory highlights the importance of acting responsible towards the environment and the people affected by the corporations’ actions. Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p. 46)1_{. In a more narrow sense, stakeholders include “those} individuals and groups who are vital to the survival and success of a corporation” (Freeman, 1984, p. 58). A distinction is made between two types of stakeholders: primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are the actors who have a direct and contractual relationship with the company (Caroll, 1989 in Damak-Ayadi & Pesqueux, 2005, p. 3). The primary stakeholders include: the employees, customers, owners/investors, suppliers and local communities (Crane, 2008, p. 63). Secondary stakeholders are actors who don’t have a direct relationship with the company, but who are still impacted by its actions (Ibid.). The secondary stakeholders include groups who have a more indirect interest in the company such as the government, NGO’s, academics, trade organizations and the media. A similar distinction can be made between social and non-social stakeholders. Table 1 illustrates the different types of stakeholders. Other distinctions can be made as well such between internal-external stakeholders, institutional/economic and ethical stakeholders.

Primary social stakeholders Secondary social stakeholders

* Shareholders and other investors * Employees and managers * Customers

* Local communities

*Suppliers and business partners

* Government and regulators * Civic institutions

* Social pressure groups

* Media and academic commentators * Trade bodies

* Competitors

Primary non-social stakeholders Secondary non-social stakeholders

* The natural environment * Future generations * Non-human species

* Environmental / interest groups * Animal welfare organizations

Table 1: Stakeholder framework (Wheeler and Sillanpää, 1997)

1_{There is much debate about ‘what or who is a stakeholder’. Although hundreds of definitions exist on the concept}

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2.3 Organizational and media reputation

2.3.1 Definitions

Central elements of this thesis are the concepts organizational reputation and media

reputation. Reputation is in itself difficult to define because the perception of what is and what

not reputable resides within the ‘eye of the beholder’ (Schreiber, 2008, p. 2). The definition of organizational reputation differs per academic discipline but is often described as the “observers’ collective judgement of an organization based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the organization over time” (Barnett et al., 2006, p. 34). Most definitions either refer to organizational reputation as a “state of awareness, […] an assessment or […]an asset” (Barnett, 2006, p 32- 33). Definitions on reputation as an awareness commonly describe reputation as an aggregation of perceptions by the stakeholders on what the organization does, without making a real judgement about it (Ibid.). Definitions on reputation as an assessment include references to reputation as a judgement or evaluation by observers or stakeholders on the esteem of the organization (Ibid.). Finally, definitions that identify organizational reputation as an asset see reputation as a financial resource or as a valuable and intangible economic asset (Ibid.). This thesis will use the definition by Barnett et al. (2006) because it incorporates the element of ‘stakeholder’s assessment’ which this research intends to investigate, as well as changes to the assessment over time.

The concept organizational reputation is closely tied to concepts such as ‘organizational identity’, ‘organizational image’ and ‘organizational reputation capital’. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the three terms and suggests that organizational identity and organizational image together form organizational reputation. In contrast to organizational reputation, organizational identity is built from inside the organization (internal stakeholders) whereas organizational image based on the external stakeholders’ impression of the organization (Feldman et. al, 2014).

Organizational Organizational Organizational Identity Image Reputation

Collection Impressions Judgements of symbols of the firms by observers (Internal stakeholders) (External stakeholders) (Internal and external

stakeholders)

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10 Media reputation on the other hand is a subset of organizational reputation and refers to “the overall evaluation of an organization presented in the media” (Deephouse, 2000, p. 1091). This evaluation subsequently influences stakeholders’ knowledge and opinion of the organization (Ibid., p. 1094-1095). Media coverage on the organization’s performance can be presented in a positive, negative or neutral manner. Media reputation refers in this sense to the “overall favourability of an organization’s media coverage” (Deephouse, 1997). Media reputation is often analysed by looking at the number of news articles on the organization as well as the tone of those articles (Tong, 213, p. 472). The more favourable the media reports on the organization, the more likely members of the public will perceive the organization as favourable (Ibid.). Stakeholders rely heavily on media coverage for their assessment of organizational reputation, because not only does the media provide critical information on the organization’s performance, it also enables stakeholders to voice their opinion (e.g. through reader’s letters) and interact with the organization.

2.3.2 Relationship between organizational reputation and CSR

In an increasing competitive marketplace, corporate social responsibility (CSR) can become critical tool for organizations to improve their reputation and build stakeholder support. As suggested by stakeholder theory, an organization will engage in CSR as a result of pressure from various stakeholders. Responding to their stakeholders’ demands as well as meeting those expectations will likely result into an improved organizational reputation. While an universal definition has not been agreed upon, CSR commonly refers to the “continuing commitment by organizations to contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the community and society at large” (World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 2000, p. 3). CSR incorporates the principles of sustainable development into organizational policies and practices, and places a greater focus on acting in a transparent and accountable manner to improve society as a whole. CSR builds on the assumption that companies and society are intertwined, with companies having a responsibility to meet certain expectations that society regards as ‘appropriated business behavior’ (Wood, 1991, p. 695). A failure to incorporate CSR principles into the business model would make the organization vulnerable to negative stakeholders perceptions (Spangler & Pompper, 2011, p. 217). Since stakeholders are able to contribute to the long-term success of an organization it becomes essential to inform the stakeholders about the organization’s way of doing business. Organizations have an interest in becoming more socially responsible because their stakeholders not only expect them to be, but because they will also be rewarded when

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11 doing so (Du & Vieira, 2012, p. 2). The CSR strategies of the organization must however be aligned with the organization’s prior reputation in order to take effect, because when the organization does not enjoy credibility among its stakeholders, the CSR strategies are likely to produce scepticism (Dell’Atti & Iannuzzi, 2016, p. 47). Adopting CSR strategies by an organization with a bad reputation can be counterproductive and raise suspicion of hidden or selfish motives (Ibid.).

With CSR being actively adopted by for-profit organizations and thus becoming the new status-quo, it comes as no surprise that CSR is also heavily criticized. Critics of CSR argue that there is still “little known about the impact of CSR programs in developing countries” and whether they are in fact beneficial to poor and marginalized people in these countries (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005, p. 506-507). Similarly, critics refer to CSR as nothing more than mere ‘window-dressing’ since it allows the industry to continue business-as-usual. A valid shortcoming of CSR is that it is based on voluntary and non-binding agreements. This research will however not discuss whether Shell’s CSR policies are indeed fulfilling their promises, but look at CSR a form of crisis response to oil crises in the Niger Delta.

2.3.3 Benefits and liabilities of having a positive reputation

As earlier suggested one of the benefits of having a positive reputation is that can lead to sustained competitive advantages. Worldwide demands for increased transparency, greater public awareness, higher expectations by stakeholders and the growth of online communication have contributed to a climate in which companies actively engage in reputation management (Shamma, 2012, p. 151). Organizations strive to obtain a positive reputation since it can improve the perception of the quality of their products or services, help to differentiate the organization from its competitors and attract a high number of investors. In addition, through improved relations with their stakeholders, organizations can better anticipate and respond to social, economic and environmental changes in society and obtain a ‘social licence’ to operate in a community (Hohnen & Potts, 2007, p. 11). Building a positive reputation is a long term investment, but can however also be lost in a split second through misfortune or incompetence. If handled improperly, a crisis can negatively affect the stakeholder’s perception and interaction with the organization and seriously damage an organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2007c, p. 164). A way to reduce reputational damage through crises is by establishing a positive pre-crisis reputation. A positive pre-crisis reputation will minimize the negative effects of a crisis and function as a buffer against the loss of reputation during a crisis (Coombs, 2007c, p. 165). It is generally believed that an organization that has a favourable reputation prior to a crisis will

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12 experience having a stronger post-crisis reputation in comparison to an organization with an already unfavourable reputation (Ibid.).

Interestingly, research has also proven that reputation-building through CSR practices can have the opposite effect (See King & McDonnell, 2012). While a positive reputation not only functions as a form of ‘insurance’ during bad times (also called the reputational halo effect), it can also attract unwanted activist attention (reputational liability effect). When an organization seriously dedicates itself to CSR, they “put themselves in a spotlight, drawing the attention of socially conscious consumers and investors” (King & McDonnell, 2012, p. 2). This attention can improve the customers’ commitment to the organization, but also lead to increased visibility among the public for activist grievances and poor organizational behavior (Ibid.). The public has higher expectations for reputable organizations and will react more negatively to exposed misdeeds than they would to those of unfamiliar organizations, or to organizations with an already negative reputation (Ibid., p. 12-13). Activists are more likely to target organizations that have made commitments to CSR because not only will these organizations attract more media attention, the likelihood that the organization changes their behavior after activist protest is also greater. Organizations that have built a positive reputation feel more incentives to quickly concede to protests’ demands because a failure to do so would damage their reputation and result into a loss of market value (Ibid., p. 21). Consequently, a vicious circle is created in which more investments in CSR practices lead to an improved reputation, which causes the organization to become a target of activism, and finally results into more commitment to CSR (Ibid, p. 23). So while reputable organizations try their best to become socially responsible to their stakeholders, “organizations with a weak reputation will fly under the radar, and get away with irresponsible behavior” (Ibid., p. 24).

2.4

Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is a theory developed by Timothy Coombs which uses the core principles from Attribution Theory to predict the level of reputational damage posed by a crisis as well as the most effective crisis response(s). According to SCCT, the effectiveness of the crisis response depends on the characteristics of the crisis situation, including perceived attribution of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 1999). Selecting a crisis response that matches the attribution of crisis responsibility, creates a more positive perception of the organization’s reputation among the stakeholders (Ibid).

Coombs argues that three factors influence the reputational threat of the a crisis: the

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13 Crisis history relates to whether or not the organization has experienced a similar crisis (crises) in the past. The relational reputation refers to how the organization has treated its stakeholders before the crisis. The prior relational reputation is unfavourable when the organization has a history of treating its stakeholders badly (Coombs, 2007, p. 167). As formulated in Figure 2, the severity of the crisis affects the attribution of crisis responsibility. Similarly, a crisis history and unfavourable relationship with stakeholders intensifies the attribution of crisis responsibility and indicate the potential reputational damage posed by a crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 168).

Severity of a crisis

Crisis response strategies

Crisis type Crisis responsibility Organizational reputation

Performance history (crisis history and relationship history)

Figure 2: Variables and relationship in SCCT (Adapted version of Coombs & Holladay, 2002)

2.5 Crisis types and attribution of crisis responsibility

Crisis responsibility involves the extent to which stakeholders blame the organization for a crisis (Coombs, 2007). Crisis responsibility is an important aspect that needs to dealt with because stakeholders expect an explanation for the actions of the organization (Coombs, p. 170). The assessment of crisis responsibility is highly dependent on the crisis type and severity of the crisis. In order to formulate an effective crisis response, the crisis manager must first assess which type of crisis the organization is facing. Three types of crisis clusters can be identified with regards to attribution of crisis responsibility: unavoidable, accidental and preventable crises (see Table 2) (Coombs, 2007c, p. 167). Coombs distinguishes here between three degrees of reputational threats; small, moderate and high. The more severe the crisis, the higher the degree of responsibility.

During unavoidable crises (e.g. natural disasters), the organization itself is viewed as the main victim of the events. There is a low attribution of crisis responsibility for these types of crises and result in a mild reputational threat. In case of accidental crises (e.g. technical errors or product harm), organizational actions result in an unintentional or uncontrollable crisis. The

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14 organization is only facing a minimal attribution of crisis responsibility and moderate reputational threat. Finally, the intentional or preventable crises (e.g. human errors, organizational misdeed) have a strong attribution of crisis responsibility and lead to a severe reputational threat (Ibid.). In these types of crises the organization intentionally puts people at risk, takes inappropriate actions or violates law and regulations (Coombs, 2007c, p. 168). The general rule for these three types of crisis is: the higher the attribution of crisis responsibility to the organization, the lower the perception of organizational reputation by stakeholders (and thus higher reputational threat) (Coombs, 2007c, p. 171).

Victim cluster

(Minimal attribution of crisis responsibility = mild reputational threat) Natural disaster: acts of nature such as earthquake and tornadoes.

Rumor: false and damaging information about the organization is being circulated. Workplace violence: current or former employee attacks current employees on-site. Product tampering/Malevolence: external agent causes damage to the organization.

Accidental cluster

(Low attribution of crisis responsibility = moderate reputational threat)

Challenges: stakeholders claim that the organization is operating in an inappropriate manner. Technical-error accidents: a technology or equipment failure causes an industrial accident. Technical-error product harm: a technology or equipment failure causes a product to be defective or potentially harmful.

Preventable cluster

(Strong attribution of crisis responsibility = severe reputational threat) Human-error accidents: human error causes an industrial accident.

Human-error product harm: product is defective or potentially harmful because of human error. Organizational misdeed: management actions that put stakeholders at risk and/or violate the law. Table 2: Coombs’ crisis types by crisis clusters (Coombs (2007a & 2007b)

2.6 Crisis strategy responses

The type of response and actions taken by an organization after a crisis has an enormous impact on the reputation of the organization (Coombs, 2006, p. 245). Crisis response refers to all actions and communication taken by an organization after a crisis has occurred. Crisis response strategies protect the reputation of an organization by (1) shaping attribution of the crisis, (2) changing the perception of the organization during and after the crisis and (3) reducing negative affect generated by the crisis (Coombs 1995 in Coombs 2007c, p. 171). Based on the Image Restoration Theory of Benoit (1997), Coombs has distinguished crisis response strategies between primary and secondary responses (see Table 3). The primary crisis responses (denial, diminish and rebuild) are ordered along a continuum moving from defensive, ‘putting the

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15 organization’s interests first’, strategies, to strategies focusing on accommodative, victim concerns (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 171). Secondary crisis response strategies (bolstering) are used on top of the other three strategies.

In case of denial strategies, the crisis manager either denies that there is a crisis, attacks the accuser or blames someone outside of the organization for the crisis. The denial strategy attempts to remove any association between the organization and the crisis event (Ibid.). And if most of the stakeholders accept the denial frame put forward by the organization, the organization is mostly likely saved from reputational damage (Ibid.). Coombs (2006) explains that if a crisis manager is able to successfully convince the target audience that no crisis has occurred, there is no reputational threat and therefore “no crisis equals no threat” (Ibid., p. 247).

In case of the diminish response (excuse or lack of intend), the crisis manager accepts that a crisis has occurred but seeks to diminish the perceived impact of the crisis by emphasizing that the organization either lacked control over the crisis or that the crisis is not as severe as people initially thought. By diminishing the organization’s connection with the crisis, people will start to view the organization less negatively. This strategy will however fail when the stakeholders reject the crisis manager’s frame and when the management is unable to provide solid evidence to support their claims (Coombs, 2007c, p. 171). In many crises, competing crisis frames are created and stakeholders have to decide which one they find the most convincing. Diminishing strategies are most effective for strengthening already existing crisis frames (Ibid.). Excuse strategies and a lack of intent are useful strategies to frame a crisis as an accident since accidental crises are much easier and less costly to handle than intentional crises (Ibid., p. 172).

During the deal or rebuild strategies (compensation and apology) responsibility for the crisis accepted by offering material and or symbolic forms of help to the victims. The deal/rebuild strategies are mainly used for crises that pose a great reputational threat to the organization, such as intentional and accidental crises. Finally, bolstering strategies (reminder, ingratiation and victimage) seek to alter the perception of the stakeholders by presenting new and positive information about the organization. The strategy is used to either remind the stakeholders of the organization’s past good work or to convince them that the organization is also a victim of the crisis and deserves some sympathy. Bolstering offers, in comparison to the other three strategies, only minimal opportunities to develop reputational assets (Ibid.).

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Deny response option (Primary crisis response strategies)

1. Attack the accuser: crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization.

2. Denial: crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis.

3. Scapegoat: some person or group outside of the organization is blamed for the crisis.

Diminish response option

4. Excuse: crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.

5. Justification: crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

Deal / Rebuild response option

6. Compassion/Compensation: crisis manager offers money or other gifts to the victims.

7. Apology: crisis manager indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks the stakeholders for forgiveness.

Bolstering response option (Secondary crisis response strategies)

8. Reminder: tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization.

9. Ingratiation: crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization

10. Victimage: Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too. Table 3. Coombs’ list of crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2006/2007c)

In all cases, the crisis response must match the level of crisis responsibility attributed by stakeholders to the organization. As earlier discussed, stakeholder attribution depends on both the crisis type, crisis history and prior relationship with the organization. Although rebuild strategies seem like the most appropriate crisis response to address the victims of a crisis, it is not always in the best interests of the organization to select this strategy. Not only is taking full responsibility for the crisis (apology) financially more costly, it does not necessary produce a greater reputational benefit than for example excuse strategies (Ibid.). In addition, using rebuild strategies during unnecessary situations can actually worsen the crisis since they give the impression that something is really ‘wrong’ with the organization (Ibid., p. 173).

Based on research by Claeys et al. (2010) Table 4 has matched the most appropriate crisis response strategies with the different crisis types. While Table 4 represents the ideal matches between crisis type and crisis response, in reality, crisis managers are not always free to choose whatever crisis response they like. In practice, the selection of the crisis response strategy often depends on financial resources (Coombs, 2007c, p. 173). If an organization is unable to afford a particular crisis response, they often opt for the second best, less expensive option (Ibid.). The use of a lesser crisis strategy will however be less effective in repairing the organization’s reputation.

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Crisis Type Crisis response strategies

Victim cluster Natural disaster Rumor Workplace violence Product tampering/Malevolence Deny strategies

Attack the accuser Denial

Scapegoat

Accidental cluster

Challenges

Technical-error accidents Technical-error product harm

Diminish strategies

Excuse Justification

Preventable cluster

Human-error accidents Human-error product harm Organizational misdeed

Rebuild strategies

Compensation Apology

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3. Methodology

3.1 Type and purpose of the research

The purpose of this research is to investigate the crisis response strategies taken by an organization after a crisis has occurred (theory-testing). This thesis will apply Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) to two types of crises and determine whether Royal Dutch Shell’s selection of crisis response strategies correspond with the perceived crisis responsibility assigned by the media. As earlier suggested, the risk of selecting an inappropriate crisis response strategy is that it will be less effective in repairing the organization’s reputation. A core element of the research question involves the relationship between Royal Dutch Shell/ Shell Nigeria and its main stakeholders. This research wishes to illustrate the potential risk to an organization’s reputation for failing to incorporate stakeholder perspectives into its core management. Organizations with strong stakeholder relations both prior, during and after a crisis, will achieve greater success outcomes than those organizations that lack such relations (Pearson et al., 1997). An important reason for focusing primarily on media reputation is because the media contains a lot of information on organizational performances that stakeholders use in their assessment on organizational reputation.

3.2 Style and case selection

This thesis is a qualitative comparative research based on the literature of Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and stakeholder theory. The units of analysis are the two crises at Shell Nigeria: the Ogoni struggle and execution of the Ogoni nine in 1994 and the Bodo

oil spills in 2008 and 2009. Although more crises could be identified, the two selected case

studies provide an overview of the different types of crises (environmental and human rights abuse) which Shell has faced during a time period of 23 years. Even though the 2008 and 2009 oil spills at Bodo are only two of the many oil spills that have occurred in the Niger Delta, the spills show how crisis accountability is disputed until court. The units of observation are the

541 newspaper articles gathered through LexisNexis and coded using qualitative data analysis

software.

This research acknowledges that Shell Nigeria is only one of many oil companies that operates in Nigeria. The main reason for focusing solely on Shell Nigeria is because it is the oldest and most powerful international oil and gas company operating in Nigeria. Due to its long history in Nigeria, Shell has experienced many different kinds of crises, varying in both

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19 size and nature, and thus enabling the organization to utilize various response strategies and possibly learn from the outcome.

3.3 Operationalization and causal mechanisms

The causal relationship between all concepts necessary to conduct the analysis is shown in

Figure 3. The independent variables in this study are: crisis type, crisis history, prior relational

reputational and crisis response strategies. Crisis type is selected from either one of the 11 crisis cluster categories as defined by Coombs (see Table 2). Similarly, the crisis response strategies are selected from the 10 response options as described in Table 3 (attack the accuser, denial, scapegoat, excuse, justification, compensation, apology, reminder, ingratiation and victimage). Crisis history and prior relations reputation (arrow D) are either positively or negatively intensifying crisis responsibility and organizational reputation. Crisis responsibility also triggers the emotions of the stakeholders. A high attribution of crisis responsibility will generate feelings of anger among stakeholders, whereas a low attribution of crisis responsibility increases feelings of sympathy towards the organization (Coombs, 2007c, p. 169). Consequently, negative emotions and a negative reputation affect the behavioural intentions of the stakeholder, causing a decreased willingness to buy or use the organization’s products and services. This research will only limit itself to the variables affecting organizational reputation. The dependent variable crisis responsibility refers to the attribution of crisis responsibility by stakeholders towards the organization. The variable looks into who stakeholders perceive to be responsible for the crisis (Shell Nigeria/SDPC, RDS, Non-State Actor, other). Crisis responsibility will be categorized into three crisis clusters: victim cluster (low attribution of crisis responsibility), accidental cluster (moderate attribution of crisis responsibility) and intentional cluster (high attribution of crisis responsibility) (see Table 2). Finally, for the dependent variable media reputation the Meijer and Kleinnijenhuis (2006) index is used, which combines media favourability and media visibility. The index assigns five different tonalities; positive, partially positive, neutral, partially negative, negative (1, 0.5, 0, −0.5, −1), to the newspaper articles and uses the values as a measurement of media reputation. The following formula is used:

𝑦 = 1

|𝑛|∑ 𝑡𝑖

𝑖∈𝑛

where 𝑡_𝑖is the value of tone of new item 𝑖, and n the total of new items for the numbers {1,0.5,0, −0.5, −1}

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20 Crisis A. Crisis Responsibility B1 F1 .

Crisis B3 Crisis History

Response B B2. Strategies F1 . Prior Relational F3 Organizational Reputation C Reputation B4 Emotions D E. Behavioural Intentions

Figure 3: Causal mechanisms in SCCT (Coombs, 2007c)

3.4 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be addressed in this research:

H1: Media outlets report a mismatch between Shell’s selection of crisis responses and the

attributed crisis responsibility

H2: Oil-related crises inflicted to Shell Nigeria in the Niger Delta have negatively affected the

organizational reputation of Royal Dutch Shell in the media

H3: Increasing negative media attention has made Royal Dutch Shell shift from denial response

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3.5 Research method

Content analysis

In order to understand the process of attribution of crisis responsibility by the media, a content analysis has been conducted. Content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 24). Through content analysis, large volumes of data can be analyzed and compressed into more relevant, manageable ‘bits of data’ (content categories). In order to make valid inferences from a text, it is crucial that the classification process occurs in a consistent, reliable and replicable manner.The technique is primarily used to discover patterns or changes between texts over a period of time (e.g. analysis of public attitude in newspapers). Content analysis can be applied to a variety of written, spoken or visual communication material including newspapers, interviews, television shows, advertisement, speeches, or electoral campaigns. The research sample is usually gathered using a specific timeframe, genre or topic.

3.6 Data collection

For the content analysis, online newspaper articles have been gathered from two newspapers; The New York Times (American) and The Guardian (British). The Guardian was selected because of Royal Dutch Shell’s Anglo-Dutch origin, whereas The New York Times for its international perspective. Although originally intended, no Nigerian newspapers articles were included in the dataset because only a scarce number of articles could be retrieved prior to 2010. All articles were collected using the database of LexisNexis.

Newspaper articles were selected on terms such as ‘Royal Dutch Shell’, ‘Shell Nigeria’, ‘SDPC’. A total of 541 articles were collected. Within those selected articles, a division was made between articles specifically focusing on the Ogoni nine / Ken Saro-Wiwa (154), Bodo oil spills (25) and general articles on Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria (362). Between the examined periods of the two crises (Jan 1992 to Dec 2009) and (Aug 2008 to Aug 2015), there was an overlap of 43 articles. In addition to the newspaper articles, Shell’s annual sustainability reports (1998 – 2009) were used for information on their crisis response strategies. Unfortunately, no official media statements by Shell could be found on its website prior to 2011. Secondary literature, such as academic articles, books, websites, NGO’s and governmental reports, was used for additional context information on the two case studies.

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Coding procedure

In order to determine how Shell’s selection of crisis responses has minimized reputational damage to crises in the Niger Delta, each newspaper article was analyzed using qualitative data analysis software: MAXQDA (version 12, product of VERBI GmbH). Each article was recorded as either positive, partially positive, neutral / mixed, partially negative or negative. An article was recorded as positive when the organization was praised for its actions. A negative rating was assigned to articles where the organization was criticized for its actions. A neutral rating meant that the article contained no evaluation of the organization’s performance. Crisis attribution was coded by looking at the level of attribution of crisis responsibility (low, moderate, high, unclear). In addition, a priori and in vivo (during the process) codes were applied during the analysis to determine common themes in the articles (e.g. reference to ecological devastation, adoption of CSR measures, human rights abuses / human rights criticism etc.). After the application of the codes, all the data was reviewed to ensure that all codes had been assigned in a consistent matter.

3.7 Research limitations

Finally some shortcomings of this research can be identified. One of the first shortcomings is related to the data collection. As discussed in the previous section ‘Data collection’, this research was unable to track down official media statements by Shell during the period 1990 – 2011. Although Nigerian newspapers would have enriched the dataset, they could not be used either because only few Nigerian articles, written before 2010, were included in the database of LexisNexis or posted online. In order to guarantee some form of consistency during the examination of both crises, this research was unable to use material published on social media since the 1994 execution of the Ogoni nine took place before the rise of social media platforms. A second limitations concerns some of the main premises upon which SCCT is build. Although SCCT claims that the stakeholders’ perceptions of the crisis situation determines what would be the most appropriate crisis response, the theory is unable to capture the diversity of views among stakeholders. By treating stakeholders as an unitary actor, SCCT fails to recognize the variety of perceptions among stakeholders after the occurrence of a crisis. This research recognizes that selecting different newspapers, for example a purely financial newspaper, might result into different scores of media reputation. This research does however not claim to be exhaustive and mainly aims to show changes in terms of media coverage and attribution of crisis responsibility during the examined period.

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4. Case-study

4.1 Background

4.1.1 Shell in Nigeria

Shell’s engagement in Nigeria dates back to 1937 when Shell D’Arcy Exploration Parties (SDEP) and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP) were granted a licence for oil exploration in the entire Nigerian territory by the British colonial powers. The granted licence gave both companies a monopoly over the whole oil exploration in the country. In order to effectively explore the country, Royal Dutch Shell and BP started a joint venture in 1946 called: Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited.

The first successful oil extraction activities by Shell-BP started in 1956 at the Oloibiri community in the Niger Delta and were soon expanded to other areas in the country which led, amongst others, to the discovery of the Bomu oil field in Ogoniland in 1958. The discovery encouraged the company to explore the rest of the Niger Delta in the 1960s. After the British colonial powers were forced to open up the Nigerian oil market to foreign competitors in 1951, the monopoly status of Shell-BP in Nigeria became threatened. The suspected oil wealth and successes of Shell-BP attracted many foreign oil company like Mobil, Chevron and Agip to Nigeria. Luckily for Shell-BP, all newcomers were restricted to operate in areas previously abandoned by Shell-BP (Frynas, 2000, p. 11). This led to most companies shifting their attention to offshore oil exploration. Despite facing competition offshore, Shell-BP was able to remain the most dominant oil company in the onshore areas in Nigeria.

The most radical change to the Shell-BP structure came with the introduction of the Indigenization of Foreign Enterprises Decree in 1972. In accordance to the act, the Nigerian government acquired 35 percent of the Shell-BP stocks; a percentage which grew two years later to 55 percent. Subsequently, Shell-BP was renamed into Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) / Shell Nigeria in 1979.2_{Shell Nigeria is currently a joint venture} between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (55 percent), Royal Dutch Shell (30 percent), Total E&P Nigeria Limited (10 percent) and Agip Oil Company Limited (5 percent) (Shell Nigeria, n.d.). Shell Nigeria is the largest oil and gas company in Nigeria and its work mostly concentrates on the Niger Delta and some offshore areas. The company has more than 90 oil fields in the Niger Delta, around 1000 producing wells, up to 73 flow stations,

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24 and 2 large oil terminals (Rosenau, 2009, p. 9). With an output of 739,000 barrels of oil per day, the Shell-operated ventures in Nigeria (SDPC & SNEPCo) account for 42 percent of Nigeria’s total daily oil production (1,748,200 boe/d)3 (Shell, n.d. & Opec , 2016).

4.1.2 Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is the third-largest drainage area of the African rivers and is home to 31 million people who belong to different ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Ogoni, Ijo, Urhabo and Andoni. The rivers and swamps in the Delta are believed to be the breeding ground of around 60 percent of all the West African fish stocks (Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 2006, p 1). Before the discovery of oil, the Niger Delta was a major producer of palm oil. Over the years, crude oil from the Niger Delta became increasingly important for the Nigerian economy. Since 1975, oil sales from primarily the Niger Delta region contribute to more than 90 percent of Nigeria’s exports and about 80 percent of the government’s revenue (Worldbank, 2015). The Niger Delta has massive oil reserves; an estimated 600 billion dollars has been extracted from the Niger Delta since 1956 (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 9). But despite the region being called the ‘engine’ of the Nigerian government, overall living conditions are poorer than the national average.

The environment in the Niger Delta has been polluted by countless of oil spills, waste dumping and gas flaring.4_{The pollution has damaged the soil, air and water quality in the Niger} Delta and affected the livelihood of the local population who mostly rely on fisheries and agriculture (Amnesty, 2009, p. 9). The exact amount of oil spills that have occurred in the Niger Delta vary across different scientific reports. According to an UNDP report (2006), a total of 6,817 oil spills have occurred in the Niger Delta, adding up to a loss of approximately 3 million barrels of oil (p. 76). The report highlights that more than 70 percent of the spilled oil was never recovered (Ibid.). The ecological devastation and lack of equal distribution of oil wealth in the Niger region have become a major contributor to conflicts. The loss of livelihood and growing frustration towards international oil companies and the Nigerian government among local communities, has contributed to the emergence of armed groups and criminal gangs who engage in criminal acts such as illegal oil bunkering, pipeline destruction, kidnapping and piracy. The illegal oil is transported to the ports of Nigeria and sold on the international market (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 13).

3_{Boe/d = barrels of oil equivalent per day}

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4.3 Crises in the Niger Delta

The following sections will discuss the two selected crises: the Ogoni struggle and execution of the Ogoni nine in 1995 and the Bodo oil spills in 2008 and 2009. For both crises, Shell’s alleged involvement will be discussed.

4.3.1 Ogoni resistance and execution of the Ogoni nine in 1994

One of the best known human rights’ conflict in the Niger Delta is the struggle by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 1990 Ken Saro-Wiwa started a nonviolent campaign against the ecological degradation of Ogoniland by multinational oil companies, most notably Royal Dutch Shell (Hennchen, 2015, p. 4). Ken Saro-Wiwa demanded an equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth for the Ogoni people, whose land had been destroyed by the activities of oil companies such as Shell (Amnesty International, 2009). At the height of Ken’s campaign, an estimated 300,000 people participated in demonstrations against Shell in the region. Ken Saro-Wiwa’s ability to mobilize people as well as his central role in drafting the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights, which called for political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, made him not only a threat to Shell, but even more to the Nigerian government’s national interest.5_{The Nigerian military} government responded to the Ogoni demonstrations by waging a military campaign (Operation Restoration Law and Order in Ogoniland), to crush what it called ‘radical and secessionist’ MOSOP members (The Guardian, 4 January 1995). In the months following, the Internal Security Task Force by the Nigerian government systematically raided villages, killed hundreds of people and led to the displacement of thousands. In response to the civil unrest and attacks on employees, Shell withdrew all its activities from Ogoniland in early 1993. Despite the withdrawal, the Ogoni continued to attack Shell for the legacy it had left in Ogoniland (oil installations, unprotected pipelines, pollution etc.). (Holzer, 2007, p. 287).

The conflict between Shell and the Ogoni activists escalated on 22 May 1994 when Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists (together called the Ogoni nine) were arrested and charged with incitement to murder. The Nigerian government suspected Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight others to be behind the murder of four Ogoni chiefs, who were on the opposing side of MOSOP. The nine Ogoni activists were quickly tried and found guilty on all charges before a special Nigerian military tribunal (Hennchen, 2014, p. 4). The trial was widely condemned

5_{The 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights demanded self-determination for the Ogoni people, the right to control and use of}

a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni people, an adequate representation in Nigerian institutions, and protection against further ecological degradation of the Ogoni region.

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26 by international observers for being political motivated and based on fabricated charges. On 10 November 1995, the Nigerian military government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight other Ogoni leaders by hanging. Following the execution, Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth and an international boycott of Nigerian products came into effect (The Guardian, 9 November 2010). And while states like United States banned military sales to Nigeria and extended its Visa ban to all “who actively formulate, implement or benefit from policies that impede Nigeria’s transition to democracy”, Shell’s decision to go ahead with a 3.8 billion dollars natural gas plant in Nigeria, led to further outcry among the public (The New York Times, Nov. 16 1995). Shell defended the project by claiming that “job creation and environmental improvements were more compelling reasons to proceed” [rather than making a political statement towards the Nigerian government] (Ibid.)

Shell’s supposed involvement

The execution of the Ogoni nine not only led to global outrage against the Nigerian government but also put Shell in the spotlights. Royal Dutch Shell was accused of collaborating with the Nigerian government to capture and hang the Ogoni nine (Hennchen, 2014, p. 4). Despite international pressure, Shell had refused to speak out against the trial of the Ogoni nine. After the arrest of Ken Saro-Wiwa, Shell declined intervening in the matter by stating that “the company [Shell] does not get involved in politics” (The New York Times, 13 February 1996). When Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow activists were sentenced to death, Shell released a statement in which the company acknowledged to be pressured to use its influence to ask for clemency but stated that it had declined, saying that it would be “dangerous and wrong to use its ‘perceived’ influence to have the judgement overturned” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).In the statement, Shell argued that “an commercial organization like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state” (Ibid.). It was only after the death sentences were confirmed by the Nigerian military council, that former chairman of the Shell Group, Cor Herkstroter, sent a personal letter to the Nigerian Head of State to request a pardon for Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow men on humanitarian grounds. In their 1998 sustainability report, Shell stated that it been “shocked and saddened” when it heard that the executions of the Ogoni nine had been carried out (Royal Dutch Shell, 1998).

While Shell reported that its ply for mercy was ignored by the Nigerian authorities, Saro-Wiwa’s brother, Owens Saro-Wiwa, claimed to have privately met Brian Anderson, top executive of Shell Nigeria, three times before the trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa. According to Owen’s account, Anderson had told him it would be “difficult, but not impossible” to free Ken provided

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27 that MOSOP would call off the protest campaign against Shell (The New York Times, 1996). In the weeks following the execution of the Ogoni nine, media outlets reported that Shell had bribed chief prosecution witnesses; Charles Danwi. Shell had supposedly bribed him to falsely testify against Saro-Wiwa in return for a house, a contract from Shell and 30,000 Naira (90 euros) (Rowell & Kretzmann, 1997). Shell denied all accusations of bribing, as well as making any offer to Owens Saro-Wiwa regarding his brother release.6

In 1996, relatives of the executed Ogoni men initiated a lawsuit at the federal court in New York against Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiary Shell Nigeria. The family members accused Shell of human rights abuses against the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta, which included crimes against humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest and assault. The lawyers representing the family members claimed that the case was not about ‘Shell doing business in a bad place’, but about Shell being an ‘actor’, and not simply a bystander in the conflict (The New York Times, 22 May 2009). Court documents revealed that the family members accused Shell from supporting the Nigerian military during attacks on villages in Ogoniland from August to October 1993 (Hennchen, 2014, p. 4). According to the documents, Shell had asked the Nigerian government to send a notoriously brutal mobile police force, known as the kill-and-go mob, to Okill-and-goniland in order to ‘silence’ social unrest caused by the Okill-and-gonis (The New York Times, 13 February 1996). Shell had allegedly paid both the transportation fees as well as the salary bonuses of the guards who committed the abuses (Ibid.).

In June 2009, Royal Dutch Shell reached a settlement with the relatives of the Ogoni nine for 15.5 million dollars. Despite agreeing to the settlement, Shell did not admit liability for ‘any wrongdoings’ (Financial Times, 2009). Shell denied being responsible for the violence that had occurred in Ogoniland, and claimed that it had only agreed to the settlement to make a humanitarian gesture towards the family members of the executed men (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 4). Shell said they hoped that the payment would help the ‘process of reconciliation’ in Ogoniland (Financial Times, 2009).

4.3.2 The 2008 and 2009 Bodo oil spills

At the end of 2008, two major oil spills occurred at Bodo, a farmer and fisher’s town in Rivers State in the Niger Delta. The two spills lasted several weeks before they were repaired and caused extensive and long lasting damage to the environment and lives of the local communities

6_{In 1996, Shell released a videotape in which Brian Anderson admitted to have met Owen Saro-Wiwa, but denied}