MA Erasmus Mundus Master’s of
Journalism, Media and Globalisation
Searching for an Emerging Populist Communication Style:
A Canadian Case Study
by
Michaela M. Cavanagh
Student ID: 11300426
Master’s Thesis
Supervisor: Dr. Marjolein Moorman
Submitted: June 2, 2017
Abstract
A wave of populism has fundamentally altered many liberal democracies in recent years. However, the way a populist communication style is adopted by mainstream politicians in countries where the wave of populism has not yet hit remains underexplored. This study presents the results of a content analysis of the ideological and stylistic dimensions of populist
communication used by politicians in Canadian federal leadership debates over three election cycles. This study measures populist communication style by focusing on four theoretically well-known elements: references to the people, use of strong and simple language, elite critiques, and negative references to out-groups. The results show that stylistic populism prevails over
ideological populism in a Canadian setting; that anti-elite critiques are more prevalent than references to out-groups in the rhetoric of Canadian politicians; but overall that, contrary to expectations, populist communication in Canada has decreased over time.
Searching for an Emerging Populist Communication Style: A Canadian Case Study
In February 2017, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau addressed politicians, business leaders and high-ranking officials at Hamburg’s historic annual St. Matthew’s Day banquet. In his keynote speech, he spoke of the experiences of “citizens across the political spectrum who are looking for guidance. They’re looking for leadership. They’re looking for a voice. And so far, they’re feeling a little let down.” He implored his audience of elites to “get real” about the challenges facing the middle class. “We all need to leave this [gala], and truly listen to people who are anxious about their futures” (Trudeau, 2017). The Prime Minister’s rhetorical focus on the concerns of ordinary people, instead of the issues plaguing the audience of politicians and elites which he was addressing, has become paradigmatic of a style used by populist leaders — and a style which is increasingly being co-opted by mainstream politicians (Curran, 2004). Indeed, while the term populism is often used today to characterize radical right-wing politicians, parties or movements (Mudde, 2007), scholars now regard populism as “a communication frame that appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to speak in their name … It is a master frame, a way to wrap up all kinds of issues” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). Indeed historically, populism carried a liberal and socialist undertone (Bos and Brants, 2014), and in fact, much research demonstrates that the descriptor ‘populist’ can characterize political parties from one end of the political spectrum to the other, and in regions of the world as diverse as South America, Northern Europe, and North America (Mudde, 2004; Bos and Brants, 2014).
The study of populism is emerging in a variety of country contexts, and need not be restricted to the radical right of the political spectrum (Canovan, 1999; Rooduijn, 2014; Taggart, 2000; Aalberg et al., 2016). While few would argue that populism has taken hold in earnest in
Canada, the country is an interesting context for measuring the prevalence of a populist communication style. This is the case for a number of reasons. Firstly, in recent years the world has witnessed a rise in populist parties in Europe and further afield. In Europe, populist leaders rose to defend the powerless people against the sinister elites after the 2008 financial crisis (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015), and populist parties running on platforms of anti-immigration gained traction (van Spanje, 2010) during and after the 2015 refugee crisis. These trends give some reason to anticipate a potential spill-over effect of the populist communication style which is being employed by populist leaders to mainstream political leaders. While the spill-over effects of a populist communication style between mainstream and right-wing parties within one country have been documented, very few studies have documented the spill-over effects of a populist communication style between country contexts (Wirth et al., 2016).
This study aims to pave a path forward to do so. When looking which parties could lean more heavily on a populist communication style, two schools of thought emerge. One vein of scholarship has focused on populism as an object of study in its restrictive, right-wing form (Ruzza and Fella, 2015, Bos, Sheets and Boomgaarden, 2017), which would empirically mean that more Conservative or right-wing parties would employ heavier populist communication style than left-leaning parties. Another line of scholarship has indicated that populism is traditionally used by challenger or outsider parties to enter the established political order
themselves (Mudde, 2004, Bos and Brants, 2014). Indeed, Mair (2009) asserts that the erosion of mainstream parties’ representational function — that is, the tension between ‘responsibility’ and responsiveness’, or, how responsive mainstream parties are to the needs of the electorate
In a Canadian context, this mainstreaming of a populist communication style can be considered in combination with the stable dealignment which has been occurring for the past decade. The past ten years of Canadian politics has been characterized by a series of minority governments and the traditional third party being elected to the Official Opposition for the first time in Canadian history in 2011. Research shows that a decline in partisanship often indicates a decrease in the legitimacy of mainstream politics, sparking potential for political unpredictability (Bickerton, 2010; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Further, while Canada’s main political parties have shifted to the right in recent years, they are all ideologically similar (Bittner and Koop, 2013) and considered ‘mainstream’, lacking a populist bent in the right-wing understanding of the concept (Mudde, 2012). Thus, the theoretical engine propelling this study forward is: can an increase in a populist communication style be found even in a politically moderate country such as Canada? This study seeks to examine the question of emerging populism in a country which is not known for its populist politics, to assess the existence of a spill-over effect from other countries in which populist politics have a grip on the democratic sphere. Few empirical studies on the use of
populist communication in mainstream country contexts have been conducted (Aalberg et al., Mair, 2009) and so this study aims to fill this gap.
This study performs a quantitative content analysis of Canadian federal leadership debates in 2008, 2011, and 2015 to answer this research question. In this study I define populism as a political communication style which centres around ‘the people’ at its heart and relates outwardly to two ideologically-oriented elements: anti-elitism and the exclusion of out-groups. The aim of this contribution is to further develop a methodology for analyzing populist communication in mainstream contexts; to further refine populism as an object of research through empirical
analysis; and to contribute such clarity in a country context in which populist communication style is potentially mainstreamed.
Populism as an Object of Research
Nearly all contemporary research on populism comes with the disclaimer that populism is slippery concept to define (Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014; Aalberg et al., 2016; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Indeed, different definitions of populism comprise different conceptual
elements which vary greatly from study to study. This theoretical cherry-picking enables scholars to select the specific version of the concept which best suits their research interests (Aalberg et al., 2016). The collective conceptual ambiguity results in a lack of precision and can “endanger the comparability of findings and, as a consequence, impede the accumulation and integration of research results, theory building, and the thorough explanation of the social phenomena at hand” (Aalberg et al., 2016, p. 1). Empirically speaking, there is a dearth of systematic methods to measure populism. However, quantitative text analysis (e.g. Pauwels, 2011) and classical content analysis (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011) have both been used successfully and have inspired a number of larger scale studies on populist political
communication (e.g. Aalberg et al., 2016, Schmidt, 2016). I follow Aalberg et al. (2016) in conceptualizing populism as a general, abstract concept about politics and society that is open to a diverse set of more concrete political ideas and programs depending on national and historical contexts (Aalberg et al., 2016, p. 2). Indeed, inspired by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), I
conceptualize populism as a communication style which features both stylistic elements (references to the people and strong language in thin populism) and ideological elements (anti-elitism and exclusion in thick populism).
Populism in its ‘thin’ conceptualization is considered simply a strategy to mobilize support (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). “Populism, thinly defined, has no political colour; it is colourless and can be of the left and of the right” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 323). Indeed, the stylistic strategy of appealing to the people forms the essential core of populism. A focus on ‘the people’ is what all definitions of populism share in common as their minimum condition — that is, populist actors appeal to and identify with the people, pretending to speak in their name (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). An additional stylistic element which characterizes a populist communication style is included in this study. The use of simple, strong language (Bos and Brants, 2014) that is slogan-based and tabloid-like, as well as exaggerations and ‘verbal radicalism’ (Betz and Immerfall, 1998, p. 2). Strong, simple language makes it easy for the people to understand political actors, which in turn makes the people feel as though their interests are aligned with those of the political actor. Simple language is indicated by using intensifiers such as ‘clearly’, ‘surely’, ‘certainly’ (Bos and Brants, 2014).
Thick populism is made up of a combination of appeals to the people alongside the two outward-turning, ideological dimensions of anti-elitism and exclusion. Anti-elitism drives many radical political movements, but most populism scholars consider anti-elitism as a central feature of populism (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000). Anti-elitist discourse emphasizes the vertical distance between the people and the elites — politicians, bankers, and those in positions of power — who “live in the ivory tower and pursue their own interests” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 324). The enemy of the people sits ‘up there’, high above ordinary citizens. The exclusion of out-groups relates to the primacy of ‘the people’ — the ‘real’ people and their identity need to be protected and defended from out-groups. Who the ‘enemy’ specifically is context-dependent, but can be outsiders such as immigrants, the unemployed, or people of
another religion or race (Rooduijn, 2014). These groups are considered by the people to be less legitimate and thus are stigmatized or excluded. This dimension is considered a horizontal dimension, as the ‘real people’ distance themselves laterally from the stigmatized out-groups (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Having provided the theoretical grounding for the analysis of populist discourse, I will now turn to discuss populism in a Canadian context.
Contextualizing Populism in Canada
Canada today is considered politically moderate (Bittner and Koop, 2013) and has never had a radical right party of any significance (Mudde, 2012). However, Canada has a history of both left- and right-wing populist movements. In the 1880s, varieties of left-wing populism emerged from farmer’s movements in the prairie provinces to combat big business in farmers’ cooperatives. Right-wing populism, on the other hand, was most notably expressed in the Social Credit League of Alberta, which blended antagonism towards central Canadian banks, fundamentalist Christianity, and authoritarian leadership and formed governments between 1935 and 1968. In the 1990s, Preston Manning’s new Reform Party was a successful Canadian conduit of right-wing populism. Reform was a conservative party which fostered antagonism between the common people and powerful special interests (Snow and Moffitt, 2012). It became the official Opposition in the 1997 federal election, but merged with what is now the Conservative Party of Canada in 2000 (Laycock, 2006). Indeed, the emergence and subsequent merging of the Reform Party with the Canadian Alliance Party, and then the Conservative Party, had a major impact on the ideological space of Canadian party politics. Evidence demonstrates that since the 1988 election, the ideological space between Canadian right and left has been substantially reduced, meaning that although the parties are all less different, they are also all more right-leaning than they had been historically (Bittner and Koop, 2013).
This ideological space is expressed through the political communication of the mainstream Canadian parties. When defining and empirically investigating populism, communication plays a central role. Indeed, populism is mostly reflected in the oral, written and visual communication of individual politicians, parties, social movements, or any other actor in the public sphere. In its ‘thin’ conceptualization, populism is stripped from all pejorative and authoritarian connotations. This thin definition of populism dovetails with the present use scholars make of the concept to describe the behaviour of mainstream political actors (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 323). Indeed, researchers have posited that populist discourse is now being co-opted by mainstream political parties (Mudde, 2004). The mainstreaming of populist discourse leads to a ‘softening’ of the discourse to make it more palatable to a wider audience (Curran, 2004). Thus, I expect that this softened discourse will be observed in a Canadian context, which constitutes ‘thin’ populism but not ‘thick’ populism. Thin populism is always a precondition for thick populism, but because there are no classically populist parties in Canada (Mudde, 2012), it is unlikely that ‘thick’ populism, centred around elite critiques and exclusion, will be prevalent in the discourse of Canadian politicians. This study will empirically test Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) assertion that mainstream parties use an ‘empty’, stylistic populist communication style to appeal to voters. Thus, it is
predicted that stylistic populism will be more prevalent than ideological populism in candidate statements.
While at its heart, populism focuses on the people, populism is a relational concept—that is, it refers to a relationship between at least two entities, and describes an antagonism between friend and foe (Priester, 2012). This antagonism is expressed in two ways: between the people and the elites, and between the people and out-groups, and who the enemy is is context-dependent. Firstly, it is important to note that although anti-elitism cannot be considered an
exclusive feature of populism (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) — many radical political movements are driven by anti-elitist attitudes — most populism scholars consider anti-elitism to be a central feature of populism (Taggart, 2000; Aalberg et al., 2016; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Canovan, 1999). In a Canadian context, a number of factors indicate that hostility towards elites will be more prevalent in the discourse of politicians than hostility towards out-groups. Firstly, Canadian national identity continues to be strongly tied to the values of multiculturalism and tolerance (Wayland, 1997). The country’s cultural norms of ‘unity in diversity’ (Winter, 2014) oppose the tenets of the exclusion of out-groups. Further, historically, populist movements in Canada have rarely been characterized by their hostility towards immigrants or other minority groups, but rather largely characterized by their hostility towards those in positions of power (Laycock, 2006). Indeed, we see echoes of this in recent claims made by scholars of populism who have argued that populism’s primary form in contemporary Canadian politics is precisely this division between ordinary Canadians and the elites (Snow and Moffitt, 2012). With the goal of providing empirical evidence for this claim, it is predicted that anti-elite critiques will be more
prevalent in the rhetoric of candidates than negative references to out-groups.
It has been predicted that stylistic populism will prevail over ideological populism in a Canadian context, and that anti-elitism will feature more prominently in the discourse of politicians than negative references to out-groups. There are a number of factors which indicate that overall, a populist communication style is on the rise in Canada. The Canadian political system can be characterized as an historically stable multi-party system which has traditionally been dominated by the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, with the parliamentary structure enabling the third party to have representation in the House of Commons (see Table 1). However, between 2004 and 2011, Canada experienced its longest period of minority governments, and in 2011, the NDP —
traditionally the third party — won enough seats to become the country’s Official Opposition for the first time in Canadian history. This stable dealignment of the political order indicates that partisanship in the electorate is weak—that is, voters are shunning their partisan affiliations— which increases the potential for electoral volatility (Bickerton, 2010). Indeed, the recent transformations in the Canadian political system reflect what Moffitt and Tormey (2014) call the collapse of the legitimacy of mainstream politics. This collapse is characterized by the decline of ideological cleavages, the displacement of class character of politics and the alienation of ordinary citizens from traditional party politics and has led to the increasing ‘stylization’ of the political (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Further, in situations of political instability, leaders of mainstream political parties use a less radical version of populist style as a means to an end — that is, for electoral success and party-building (Snow and Moffitt, 2012). The NDP’s election into the Official Opposition can be seen as the beginning of another fundamental shift in the Canadian political ideological space, driven by a dissatisfaction with the Liberal and Conservative status quo. Indeed, this stable dealignment of Canadian voters indicates these elections are fertile ground for mainstream politicians to employ a thin populist political communication style to appeal to newly nonpartisan and changeable voters. Scholars point to a primary explanation for the rise of populist parties: a widespread disenchantment with the mainstream political establishment (Curran, 2004). For these reasons, it is predicted that an increase in a populist communication style over time
and across parties will be observed. Having presented my expectations for the analysis of
populist discourse in Canadian debates, I will now elucidate the methods I used to measure and analyze this populist discourse.
Table 1. Canadian Federal Parliaments From 2004 to 2015 Year Governing Party
(Leader)
Official Opposition (Leader)
Minority/Majority Government
Third Parties with official party status 2004 Liberals (Martin) Conservatives (Harper) Minority BQ, NDP 2006 Conservatives
(Harper) Liberals (Dion) Minority BQ, NDP
2008 Conservatives
(Harper) Liberals (Dion) Minority BQ, NDP
2011 Conservatives
(Harper) NDP (Layton) Majority Liberals
2015 Liberals (Trudeau) Conservatives (Ambrose)
Majority NDP
Methodology
To empirically investigate populism as a communication style, a sample of political communications products is required. I perform a study in which I compare three election cycles. Through a quantitative content analysis of English-language Canadian federal leadership debates from 2008, 2011, and 2015, this study sets out to measure the presence of a populist
communication style in candidates’ rhetoric.
The debate context is particularly worthy of research attention for two reasons: the first is that there is a dearth of research done using televised debates as a sample for the study of
political communication, particularly in a Canadian context. Second, debates are a quintessential democratic face-off during an election cycle, and voters learn much about candidates from debates (Benoit, McKinney, and Holbert, 2001). Indeed, debates remain one of the few political events which continue to draw the attention of the masses. In 2011, the lone English-language
leadership debate reached 10.6 million viewers. Debates provide opportunities for candidates to speak directly to the people in front of a broad audience. Indeed, it is the paradigmatic moment of political communication in democracies (Sheets et al., 2011).
In order to analyze and understand how populist discourse is used by candidates over time, a quantitative content analysis is the most suitable method. This is because content analysis acts as a systematic inquiry to the study of messages. By using content analysis, researchers are able to gather data that are reliable, valid and replicable (Neuendorff and Skalski, 2002). To measure and analyze the messages diffused by candidates in a debate context and address this study’s research question, content analysis is the most fitting method.
Sample
The content analysis is conducted on debates from 2008, 2011, and 2015. The analysis investigates the change over time in a populist communication style by Canadian federal
leadership candidates. The 2008 debate took place on October 2, 2008, and all five main parties were represented (see Table 2). The 2011 debate took place on April 12, 2011, and included all main parties except the Green Party (see Table 2). The 2015 debate took place on August 6, 2015 and included all main parties except for the Bloc Quebecois (see Table 2).
Table 2. Participating Parties and Party Leaders by Debate Year Party Leader Debate
Year Conservative Liberal NDP Bloc Quebecois Green Party 2008 Stephen
Harper*
Stéphane Dion Jack Layton Gilles Duceppe Elizabeth May 2011 Stephen Harper* Michael Ignatieff
Jack Layton Gilles Duceppe 2015 Stephen
Harper*
Justin Trudeau Thomas Mulcair
Elizabeth May
Note: * denotes incumbent position.
Coding Procedure
The coding of the debates will be conducted by one trained coder according to a codebook, and a secondary coder who will conduct an intercoder reliability test. The televised broadcasts of the debates will be watched and will be coded statement by statement by each speaking candidate. Each variable (discussed below) will be coded in the order specified in the codebook. My sampling units are the televised debates. My data collection unit is each statement by a speaking candidate. I categorize a candidate’s statement as such if it meets the following criteria: 1) is longer than one line; 2) is a complete sentence; and 3) is not an interjection. I analyze the entirety of each of the three English-language debates in order to assess whether a populist communication style has become more common for mainstream Canadian politicians over time. I omit statements by the debate moderator because of the moderator’s non-substantive role as an interlocutor.
Variables
After basic introduction variables like debate year, speaker, and speaker’s party, the codebook measures four variables which constitute either stylistic (thin) populism or ideological (thick) populism. Here I discuss the operationalization of the variables. I separate the variables into stylistic populism and ideological populism. The variables which constitute stylistic populism are both dichotomous: references to the people and language strength (use of intensifier words). The variables which constitute ideological populism are also dichotomous. They include elite critiques and negative references to out-groups.
Stylistic (Thin) Populism. I adapt the operationalization of Schmidt’s 2017 study on
References to the People. Following Schmidt, I operationalize the references to
the people variable as a statement by a speaking candidate which fulfills the following criteria: a) in his or her statement, the speaking candidate explicitly mentions a
population or population group, which is indicated by words like “Canadians”, “nation”, “people”, “population”, “country”, “society”, “community”, “electorate”, “voter(s)”, “citizen(s)”, “tax payer(s)”, “the public”, “public support”, “public opinion”, “ordinary people”, “ordinary Canadians”, “old stock Canadians”, “Canadian youth”, “Canadian families”, “workers”; and b) through his or her statement, the speaking candidate advocates or speaks for the mentioned population (group). In doing so, he or she
explicitly sides with the population (group) and supports their concerns or claims. He or she may also speak in the name of the mentioned population (group) by allegedly expressing their attitude (Schmidt, 2016). This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable — its presence or absence is coded per each candidate statement.
Simple and Strong Language. The simple and strong language variable is
adapted from the operationalization of Bos and Brants’ 2014 study. This variable asks whether the speaking candidate uses intensifier words in their language. Simple and strong language indicates the urgency and decisiveness of the candidate, and makes it easier for audiences to understand the speaking candidate. To qualify as using simple and strong language, the speaking candidate must use intensifier words such as: ‘clearly’, ‘surely’, ‘certainly’, ‘very’, ‘quite’, ‘very’, ‘really’, ‘extremely’, ‘completely’ and ‘pretty’ (Bos and Brants, 2014). This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable as well — the presence or absence of intensifier words used by each candidate in their statement is coded.
Ideological (Thick) Populism. Following Schmidt’s 2017 study once again, I
operationalize the ideological populism variables.
Elite Critique. The elite critique variable encompasses statements by candidates
which include remarks that a) focus on the failure of the state to render the required service (public transport, guarantee the right to justice or safety, the administration, etc.); b) range from criticism of a certain policy measure (regulations, laws, etc. = “actions”) or present situation to direct criticism against the government policy; c) range from criticism of a certain politician, party or group of parties, to criticizing all parties (except their own party), to criticism of the whole electoral system; or d) range from criticism of wealthy individuals to criticism of large corporations to criticism of the capitalist system (Schmidt, 2016). Anti-elite criticism is understood as a negative evaluation of the establishment, e.g. the functioning of the national state, national institutions, as well as concrete policies. Criticism is coded if there are attributed negative attributes
(discreditation, accusations) or denied positive attributes (e.g. rejection of praise or appreciation) to the establishment. Examples include: to be unsuccessful, to fail, to lack something, to be ineffective, not to be able to solve a problem, to be incompetent, to be detached from (ordinary) people, or if the speaking candidate disdains the state/an institution/a politician (Schmidt, 2016). This variable was coded as a dichotomous presence/absence variable.
Negative References to Out-Groups. The second ideological populism variable
consists of negative references to out-groups. The exclusion variable is coded when there are negative references to out-groups made by speaking candidates. To qualify as a reference, the speaking candidate’s statement must fulfil the following criteria: a) in his
or her statement, the speaking candidate explicitly mentions a population or group in society, and b) the candidate him or herself does not belong to the mentioned population or group and the mentioned population or group is not (solely) part of the establishment (Schmidt, 2016). To qualify as an exclusionary or negative reference, the speaking candidate’s statement uses one or more of the following means for negative attribution: verbal discreditation, stigmatization, debasement or degradation; describing the
population or group as a threat/menace/harassment; blaming or accusing the population group; or an evaluative comparison between two groups: contrasting positive attributes of the speaking candidate’s own population group the ascribed negative attribute of another population group (Schmidt, 2016). The references to out-groups variables are coded dichotomously. The stylistic variables — simple and strong language and references to the people — comprise ‘thin’ populism. Conversely, the variables which criticize out-groups or elites — anti-elite criticism and negative references — comprise ideological ‘thick’ populism.
Intercoder Reliability
Using Krippendorff’s alpha, intercoder reliability between two trained coders was assessed on a randomly selected 50-statement sample (approximately 10% of the main sample). The alpha scores for all four variables were within an acceptable range (from 0.80 to 1.00) (see Appendix B for complete list of scores).
Data Analysis
To measure the way a populist political communication style is used by mainstream politicians, I used four main variables — elite critiques, references to out-groups, mentions of the people and language strength — which reflected the stylistic and ideological dimensions of
populism. The total number of candidate statements was 481 (n = 481). The breakdown of the candidate statements by year was roughly equal. See Table 3 for the descriptive statistics of the statements by year, candidate and party. To address my main research question — whether there has been an overall increase in populism over time — and expectations, I created
cross-tabulations for all four populism variables and debate year and party. I then conducted chi-square tests on the four variables to compare the proportion of candidate statements with each of the stylistic and ideological dimensions of populism. To test my expectation that stylistic (thin) populism will be more prevalent in Canadian debates than ideological (thick) populism over time, I first created two new variables: Total Ideological Populism (comprising negative
references to out-groups and elite critiques) and Total Stylistic Populism (comprising references to the people and language strength). Using these two new variables, I performed a paired-sample t-test to enable mean comparisons between ideological populism and stylistic populism. To test my expectation that elite critiques would be more prevalent in Canadian debates than negative references to ougroups across time and across parties, I performed a paired-sample t-test to enable mean comparisons between elite critiques and negative references to out-groups. Having elucidated this study’s methodology, I will now proceed to report my results.
Table 3.
Results
To give an overview of the use of a populist communication style in federal leadership debates in the previous three Canadian election cycles, I will proceed to address my hypotheses. I will first compare elite critiques with the negative references to out-groups; I will compare stylistic and ideological populism, and I will look at how populism has evolved over time, paying special attention to the evolution of Stephen Harper’s discourse in particular, due to his participation and incumbent position in all three debates.
Stylistic versus Ideological Populism
My first hypothesis is that stylistic populism will be more prevalent than ideological
populism in candidate statements in Canadian leadership debates. Hypothesis 1 is
supported. Looking at the total percentages for stylistic populism in Table 4, we see that 56.1% of the total statements contained references to the people, and 46.8% of the total statements contained intensifier words (language strength). In terms of ideological populism, we see that 68.2% of the total candidate statements contained elite critiques, while only 1.2% of the total candidate statements contained negative references to out-groups. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the prevalence of stylistic populism and ideological populism in candidate statements. When composite variables were computed for stylistic populism and ideological populism, the paired-samples t-test revealed that stylistic populism (M = 1.029, SD = .729) was significantly more prevalent than ideological populism (M = .694, SD = .478), t (480) = 10.95, p = .000 (two-tailed). In sum, the evidence supports Hypothesis 1. We see that the stylistic
variables are present in a greater proportion of candidate statements than the ideological variables, and the t-test indicates that this difference is significant.
A cross-party analysis provides more depth to this finding. We turn first to stylistic populism. Regarding the references to the people variable, the Liberal (67.0%) and NDP (62.5%) parties used references to the people in significantly more of their statements than the Bloc Quebecois (44.6%) and the Green Party (45.5%) (see Table 4 (X² (5, n = 481) = 13.18, p = .010). While no significant difference was found for the language strength variable, the Green Party used intensifier words (language strength) more than any other party, while the Bloc Quebecois used the fewest (41.1%). The implications of this distribution will be elucidated in the
Elite Critiques versus Negative References to Out-Groups
My second hypothesis is that elite critiques will be more prevalent in the rhetoric of
candidates in Canadian leadership debates than negative references to out-groups. As we
see in Table 4, Hypothesis 2 is supported. Regarding ideological populism, while 68.2% of the total candidate statements contained elite critiques, only 1.2% of the total candidate statements contained negative references to out-groups (see Table 4). This very low share of negative references to out-groups could be for a number of reasons, and explanations for this will be examined in the subsequent discussion. A paired-samples t-test revealed that elite critiques (M = .681, SD = .466) were significantly more prevalent than negative references to out-groups (M = .12, SD = .111), t (480) = 30.60, p = .000 (two-tailed).
66.95, p = .000) (see Table 4). While the findings for the negative references to out-groups by party are not significant, we see that the Conservative party statements contained the highest proportion of these references at 0.06%, more than double any other party.
Prevalence of Populist Communication Over Time
My third hypothesis is that an increase in a populist communication over time will be
observed. The data shows that Hypothesis 3 is not supported. In fact, a downward trend prevails
across three dimensions of populist communication. I will proceed to review the results over time variable by variable. As can be seen by the frequencies cross tabulated in Table 5, in 2008, 62.5% of candidate statements contained a reference to the people, while in 2015, the same could be said for only 44.8% of candidate statements. A chi-square test revealed a significant negative relationship between references to the people and debate year (X² (2, n = 481) = 11.93, p = .003). Regarding the use of intensifier words (language strength), there was a significant dip in the use of intensifier words in 2011 (36.6%) (X² (2, n = 481) = 11.50, p = .003) while in 2008 and 2015 the percentage of statements with strong and simple language in them remained constant
(52.6%), as evidenced in Table 5. The use of elite critiques increased over time — in 2008, 66.4% of statements contained elite critiques, while in 2015, 72.7% of statements contained elite critiques — however no significant relationship between elite critiques and debate year was observed (see Table 5). Regarding negative references to out-groups, the results were negligible and a significant decline was observed (X² (2, n = 481) = 7.74, p = .021) over time. In 2008, 3.3% of candidate statements contained a negative reference to out-groups; in 2011, .06% of candidate statements contained a negative reference to out-groups; and in 2015 0.00% of candidate statements contained a negative reference to out-groups.
In sum, the data do not support my hypothesis. A decrease in populist communication overall was observed, with significant decreases in the negative references to out-groups variable and the references to the people variable. Overall, we see the 2011 debate as an outlier with regards to the language strength variable but across time the variable remained constant. These results indicate that stylistic populism decreased significantly or remained at a consistent level over time. The two dimensions of ideological populism moved in different directions — the decline of out-group references was significant, while the increase in elite critiques was not.
To gain another dimension of depth on this finding, the evolution of populist
communication in the rhetoric of Stephen Harper will be analyzed to assess whether any trends are reinforced or can be dismissed in the discussion. Regarding stylistic populism, it is observed that Harper’s use of references to the people declined significantly over time (X² (2, n = 481) = 11.41, p = .003), in line with the overall trend across time. There was a decline in the use of
pattern across time, which remained stable from 2008 to 2015 with a significant dip in the use of strong language in 2011. Alternative explanations for this will be elucidated in the discussion. Regarding ideological populism, there was a significant increase in the use of elite critiques by Stephen Harper (X² (2, n = 481) = 8.81, p = .012). This differs from the overall evolution of populist communication over time. While there was also an increase overall across time, this increase was not significant. Reasons for this difference will be expounded in the discussion. Regarding references to out-groups, there was a significant decrease over time (X² (2, n = 481) = 8.87, p = .012), which is in line with the overall trend across time.
In sum, while the patterns in the evolution of populist communication in Stephen Harper’s discourse were similar to the patterns seen in the evolution of populist discourse overall, there were a few differences: the significance of the dip in the strong language variable in 2011 disappeared in Harper’s discourse. Further, the elite critique variable increased
significantly in Harper’s discourse. These differences will be further interpreted in the subsequent discussion.
I proceeded to conduct a final analysis which measured the dimensions of populism on an incumbent party versus non-incumbent party scale (Table 7). It becomes clear that the statements by candidates from non-incumbent parties contain significantly more elite critiques (X² (1, n = 481) = 62.69, p = .000), while the incumbent party’s statements contained more negative references to out-groups than the incumbent parties (1.9% incumbent; 0.9% non-incumbent), although this difference is not significant.
An alternative explanation for these differences which will be further expanded in the discussion is that non-incumbent parties employ more populist communication than the incumbent party
study, I will proceed to engage in a discussion regarding my findings, reflect upon their implications, and upon the limitations of this study.
Discussion
This study presented the results of a content analysis of the ideological and stylistic dimensions of populist communication used by politicians in Canadian federal leadership
debates. I found that stylistic populism prevailed over ideological populism in a Canadian debate setting, which reinforces my first hypothesis. I predicted that anti-elite critiques would be more prevalent than references to out-groups, which was confirmed by my results. Most significantly, I found that populist communication has decreased over time, a finding which opposes my initial prediction. I will now reflect upon these results and discuss their social and scientific
implications.
This study sought to prove that a populist communication style is being increasingly used by political parties in a country context which is not known for its populist politics. However, I found that a populist communication style has decreased in Canadian federal election debates over time. This result is contrary to my expectation and can be counted as this study’s most striking finding. An alternative explanation for why we see a negative trend instead of a positive trend in populist discourse in Canadian election debates could be the shift from a long series of minority governments to a majority government in 2011, and another in 2015. Initially I predicted that the NDP’s electoral success in 2011 would benchmark the beginning of a more prolonged period of political instability, however if we use populist communication as an indicator, this does not appear to be the case. The NDP’s instalment in the Official Opposition occurred alongside the instalment of a Conservative majority government. In the period leading up to 2011, minority governments are characterized by intense partisanship, minimal progress on
legislative items, and loud controversies over relatively minor issues (Norquay, 2010). It is logical, then, that a more aggressive populist communication style using more references to the people, more strong language, and more negative references to out-groups is used during periods of uncertainty than during periods of majority governments. During this time of uncertainty, the two main political parties — the Liberals and the Conservatives — sought to distinguish
themselves from each other to a majority coalition of voters. The two parties did so by
communicating their differences in terms of style and attitude rather than in terms of substantive policy positions (Good, 2010). As Jagers and Walgrave (2007) assert, the more parties
fundamentally oppose the political system in which they operate, the larger the chance they will embrace a populist style — and this can be seen reflected in the discourse of all parties during the period of minority government, in which the political system is destabilized and is
‘anybody’s game’. In 2011, the period of minority governments came to an end and the NDP, the traditional third party, was elected into the Official Opposition for the first time — a success which was precipitated by growing political disaffection and cynicism (Fournier et al., 2013). During and after this substantial tectonic shift in the Canadian electoral landscape, populist communication fell. Indeed, in 2011 and 2015 all dimensions of populist discourse except the elite critiques decreased or remained stable. Once the Conservatives were comfortably in power with a majority in 2011, they and the other parties stopped appealing to and identifying with the people as much as they had during the prior period of uncertainty, and stopped using a strategy of exclusion of other groups to solidify the identity of ‘the people’. While neither the Conservatives nor the other parties abated their critiques of one another or other elites, these critiques did not increase significantly. An alternative explanation for this is that elite critiques increased because the other challenger parties were no longer seeking to appeal to a voter base so much as attack
the incumbent party which, in 2015, had relatively more power in a majority government. This is illustrative of what Bos and Brants call the paradox of populist success: the parties win because of their anti-establishment ideas or because they present as an alternative to the status quo — in this case the NDP — but their electoral success means that they’ve joined the establishment, making it more difficult to appeal to voters using populist discourse (Bos and Brants, 2014).
Another element of the findings which will be explored in more detail is how Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party’s perpetual incumbent position affected his use of the
different dimensions of populist discourse in the debates. One important element of the Canadian debate format is that as a rule, each time a candidate challenges or criticizes the incumbent, the incumbent is given 20 seconds to respond. Stephen Harper spoke far more than any other
candidate — as a comparison, the Liberal party only had 106 statements while the Conservatives had 160 statements. The overall trends in the dimensions of populism across time were echoed in the trends in Harper’s communication. Harper’s use of simple and strong language remained relatively stable with a dip in 2011, which could signify that strong language is a personal characteristic of each candidate’s speech rather than a conscious mobilization strategy. The use of elite critiques increased significantly in Stephen Harper’s political discourse. This could be because in 2008, Harper was sitting in a minority government incumbent position, which meant that although he was in a position of power, he could easily be removed from it — leaving him hesitant to critique his opponents and those in other positions of power. We see an almost inverse relationship between references to the people and the elite critiques in Harper’s discourse over time, which could signify that as Harper became more comfortable in power and won a majority government, he stopped appealing to the people and seeking to relate to them in order to
other political, legislative and economic elites. Harper’s negative references to out-groups fell significantly over the years, which could also indicate, along with references to the people, that as he became established in a position of power, it became less fruitful for him to create a guise of a ‘united people’ against some enemy, but rather dedicate his time and energy in debates to attacking his opponents.
That stylistic populism is more prevalent in Canadian political communication than ideological populism is perhaps not surprising, but merits a closer look. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) posit that empty populism is the bare minimum condition for exclusionary or anti-elitist populism to exist, and some scholars argue that empty populism is regarded as typical for “otherwise established, non-populist actors that use references to the people as a communication strategy to attract and mobilize voters” (Aalberg et al., 2016). Indeed, referring to the people is a strategy used by politicians across the political spectrum to show that they understand the
concerns of the people they claim to represent (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), and intense language can be seen as a way of expressing urgency and tending towards tabloid-style, to grab the
attention of the people.
Limitations and Future Research
Methodologically speaking, conducting a content analysis of debates entailed a few irregularities and peculiarities in both the breakdown of the data sample and the rhetorical patterns of the candidates. As discussed in the methodology, the candidates and the parties which they represented in the debate varied from year to year, and thus it was difficult to get a cohesive picture of the change over time by candidate or by party. For example, Elizabeth May and the Green Party were excluded from the 2011 debate, and Gilles Duceppe from the Bloc Quebecois was excluded in 2015. In coding the debates, I observed that the most marginal parties (the Bloc
Quebecois and the Greens) attacked Harper more frequently, and spoke less about their
substantive policies. Indeed, Duceppe and May use elite critique more than any other dimension of populist communication in their statements. In the same vein, we see Stephen Harper using much of his air-time to defend his policies, his party and himself from the criticisms of the other candidates. In a debate setting, candidates have a limited amount of time to undermine the credibility of their opponents, lay out their campaign platforms in an accessible way, and to align themselves with the viewers. These considerations raise the question of how a content analysis of another election event — in which the candidates were speaking directly to the people, rather than being mediated by and having the agenda set by the moderator and, to some degree, the other candidates — would have played out. Similar studies conducted in other country contexts, such as Bos and Brants (2014) drew similar conclusions to this study — that although many claim that populism is on the rise in the Netherlands and that it spreads amongst mainstream parties, in fact the empirical evidence paints a much more ambiguous picture, noting a downward trend in 2012 (Bos and Brants, 2014). Jagers and Walgrave’s study (2007) found that indeed different dimensions of populism are used differently by political parties in the same country, and that the type of populism adopted by political actors depends on their position in the ‘political game’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 336). This study’s conclusions reinforce these findings, and indeed future research on the relationship between party positions and the type of populist communication employed would be highly beneficial to further an understanding of populism in mainstream parties. Another path of future research would be to perform a cross-country analysis of populist communication — between the U.S. and Canada, for example — to hone a cross-country methodology that can be used in a variety of cross-country contexts, and to draw out the differences in which dimensions are used in which country contexts, and to what degree of
intensity. To establish a more three-dimensional, nuanced perspective on the type of populist communication used by Canadian politicians, a third path of future research could be to apply the same type of content analysis to candidates’ campaign platforms or campaign speeches to assess whether the same patterns emerge, or whether there would be, for example, fewer elite critiques and more references to the people — as the candidates would be speaking directly to the people and not trying to undermine their opponents. In sum, this study makes a preliminary step towards documenting and analyzing populist communication in a mainstream political context.
Conclusion
This study set out to measure the prevalence of a populist communication style in the rhetoric of mainstream politicians in a Canadian debate context. While a rise in populism was not observed, the prevalence of stylistic ‘thin’ populism over ideological populism was confirmed, as was the use of anti-elite critiques over exclusion by Canadian politicians. The relevance of this study remains clear: at a time when extreme right-wing populism pervades western liberal democracies, how are its communicative aspects influencing the political communication styles of mainstream politicians and parties in countries where the populist wave has not yet hit? This study contributes to the development of a methodology for analyzing populist communication in mainstream contexts. Further, this study applied a content analysis to the debate setting, a
quintessential democratic moment which remains under-researched (Sheets et al., 2011). Finally, this study addressed a gap in the research: the communicative aspects of populism continue to be understudied, and especially the use of a populist communication style in a country context where there is not clearly any substantive populism. This content analysis paves the way for future research on populism in a variety of political landscapes.
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Appendix A: Codebook
Variables for the measurement of populist communication styles
VARIABLE 1: Debate Year DEBYR
Code from year of transcript of debate. 1 = 2008
2 = 2011 3 = 2015
VARIABLE 2: Speaking Candidate Name CANDNAM
Which candidate is speaking? 1 = Stephen Harper 2 = Justin Trudeau 3 =Jack Layton 4 = Thomas Mulcair 5 = Michael Ignatieff 6 = Stéphane Dion 7 = Gilles Duceppe 8 = Elizabeth May
VARIABLE 3: Speaking Candidate Party CANDPTY
Which party does the candidate represent? 1 = Conservative Party of Canada
2 = Liberal Party of Canada 3 = New Democratic Party 4 = Bloc Quebecois 5= Green Party of Canada
VARIABLE 4: Reference to the People PEOPREF
Is there an explicit reference to the people present in the speaking candidate’s statement?
0 = No 1 = Yes
This variable encompasses whether the speaking candidate makes a reference to the people. Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people or in the name of the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign.
To qualify as a reference to the people, the speaking candidate’s statement must fulfil the following criteria:
1. In his or her statement, the speaking candidate explicitly mentions a population or
population group, which is indicated by words like: “Canadians”, “nation”,
“people”, “population”, “country”, “society”, “community”, “electorate”, “voter(s)”, “citizen(s)”, “tax payer(s)”, “the public”, “public support”, “public opinion”,
“ordinary people”, “ordinary Canadians”, “old stock Canadians”, “Canadian youth”, “Canadian families”, “workers”
2. Through his or her statement, the speaking candidate advocates/speaks for the
mentioned population (group). In doing so, he or she explicitly sides with the
population (group) and supports their concerns or claims. He or she may also speak
in the name of the mentioned population (group) by allegedly expressing their
attitude.
For example: “Workers and employers, small employers, do not want these tax hikes.”
Code: PEOPREF = 1
EXAMPLES:
Eg: “What we do not need when our economy is threatened by developments in the global economy is tax increases on ordinary Canadian families who pay low taxes, or permanent deficits.”
Code: PEOPREF = 1
Eg: “He likes to talk about standing up against tyrants and dictators and against terrorists, but you know who stands up to dictators and terrorists? Families fighting to keep their family together, hoping for a better life for them.”
Code: PEOPREF = 1
Eg: “Look, we’re doing more of these things to help Canadian families.” Code: PEOPREF = 1
Eg: “At least we should respect the voting public and let them have an informed decision in this election.”
Code: PEOPREF = 1
Eg. “Canada is a country of immigrants” Code: PEOPREF = 1
Eg: “Yes, the economic benefits of immigrants are well known but there is more to them than just workers.”
Code: PEOPREF = 0
This statement would not be coded as a people reference because in this case, the
Eg: “And the reason Mr. Trudeau said he was opposed to small business cuts is he said a large percentage of small businesses are just wealthy people avoiding taxes.”
Code: PEOPREF = 0
This would not be coded as a reference to the people because here the candidate is not explicitly siding with the population category or speaking on their behalf.
Eg: “You have to make sure that you make the polluter pay for the creation that they’re creating. You can’t allow people to use the air, the soil and the water —”
Code: PEOPREF = 0
This would not be coded as a reference to the people because the speaker is not explicitly siding with the population. The reference is neutral and there is no common characteristic shared by ‘people’ in this case.
VARIABLE 5: Anti-Elite Critique ELCR
Does the speaking candidate explicitly criticize the elite in his or her statement? 0 = No
1 = Yes
This variable encompasses whether the active actor makes an anti-elite statement which includes any remarks of the speaking candidate:
-‐ That focus on the failure of the state to render the required service (public transport, guarantee the right to justice or safety, the administration, etc.) à anti-state comment -‐ That range from criticism of a certain policy measure (regulations, laws, future
regulations or laws, etc. = “actions”) or present situation to direct criticism against the
government policy à anti-policy comment
-‐ That range from criticism of a certain politician, party or group of parties, to criticizing all parties (except their own party), to criticism of the whole electoral system à
anti-politics comment
-‐ That range from criticism of wealthy individuals to criticism of large corporations to criticism of the capitalist system à anti-economic elite comment
NOTE I: Anti-elite criticism is understood a negative evaluation of the establishment, eg.
the functioning of the national state, national institutions, as well as concrete policies.
Criticism is coded if there are attributed negative attributes (discreditation, accusations) OR denied positive attributes (eg. rejection of praise or appreciation) to the establishment.
Examples are: to be unsuccessful, to fail, to lack something, to be ineffective, not to be able to solve a problem, to be incompetent, to be detached from (ordinary) people, if the speaking candidate disdains the state/an institution/a politician.
Examples of anti-elite statements (negative evaluations)
-‐ “This Liberal policy is absurd”
-‐ “Our government lacks the adequate instruments to deal with climate change.”
-‐ “The Conservative party has failed to deal with unemployment at the provincial level”
NOTE II: The criticism must be explicitly mentioned. That means the negative evaluation
must be unambiguous and straightforward. Implicit or vague evaluations are not coded. EXAMPLES:
“The Canada Pension Plan, as far as Mr. Harper is concerned, is a tax. We view it as an investment in the future. I’m tired of watching successive Liberal and Conservative
governments dump these massive ecological, economic, and social debts on the backs of future generations.”
Code: ELCRPOLITIC = 1 à Present
“Mr. Trudeau’s plan is frankly reckless, and it’s uncosted. Municipalities across this country are asked to spend the cost to ha—assume the costs of 60 percent of the infrastructure with only eight percent of the tax base. Mathematically that’s impossible, and it’s not sustainable.
But what’s also not sustainable is the old Liberal approach of leaving tens of billions of dollars in debt on the backs of future generation. We are going to be a reliable, long-term
partner for municipalities across the country. We don’t need the short-term thinking of the
Liberals.
Code: ELCRPOLITIC = 1à Present
“I say that we’ve got a Prime Minister who just said that he thinks it’s a good idea
that a bungalow in a lot of our suburbs in places like Vancouver and Toronto is totally out of reach for them. Look at the cost of housing in some of our major cities. It is out of control.”
Code: ELCRPOLITIC = 1 à Present
Eg. “That’s direct action to act on a problem that the other parties have talked about for years but have done nothing about. Yes, Canada’s largest corporations are going to start paying
something resembling their fair share, David, and it’s high time that they did.”
Code: ELCRECON = 1 à Present
“Mr. Mulcair talks about having Minister of the Environment in Quebec, but I was living in Quebec at that time and I remember he was proposing bulk water exports to the United
States for Quebec, and that’s certainly not something we’re interested in.”
Code: ELCRPOLITIC = 0 à Negative evaluation is not explicitly mentioned but vague and
implicit.
This variable encompasses whether the speaking candidate in his or her statement refers in a
negative manner to one or multiple groups in society. This variable — in contrast to the
and does not include criticism that is solely directed to the nation’s establishment (ie. the Canadian government or other elites). In contrast with Variable 4, PEOPREF, this variable encompasses references to sub-populations and sub-groups in society, rather than encompassing the alignment of the speaking candidate with ‘the people’ more broadly.
VARIABLE 6: Negative Reference to Out-Groups OUTREF
Is there an explicit and negative reference to one or more out-groups in the speaking candidate’s statement?
0 = No 1 = Yes
To qualify an exclusionary or negative reference, the speaking candidate’s statement must fulfil three criteria:
1. In his or her statement, the speaking candidate explicitly mentions a population or
group in society.
2. The candidate him or herself does not belong to the mentioned population or group and the mentioned population or group is not (solely) part of the establishment.
3. By talking about this population or group, the speaking candidate uses one or more of the following means for negative attribution:
o Verbal discreditation, stigmatization, debasement or degradation o Describing the population or group as a threat/menace/harassment o Blaming or accusing the population group
o Evaluative comparison between two groups: contrasting positive attributes of the speaking candidate’s own population group the ascribed negative attribute of another population group
NOTE I: Exclusion of one or multiple social groups is understood as a negative evaluation of that social group. Exclusion is coded if there are attributed negative attributes
(discreditation, accusations) or denied positive attributes (eg. rejection of praise or appreciation) to the mentioned social groups.
Examples are: to be unsuccessful, to fail, to lack something, not to be able to solve a problem, to be lazy, to be a threat.
EXAMPLES:
“Studies have shown that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than old-stock Canadians.” Code: OUTREF = 1
VARIABLE 7: Simple and Strong Language LANGSTR
Does the speaking candidate use simple and strong language, employing intensifier words?
