Bachelor Thesis Daan Dura 25th of June 2018
10533494 1st reader: Dr. J. Krause
Peacebuilding and International Relations 2nd reader: Dr. N. van den Kerkhove
daandura@hotmail.com 7222 words
Bachelor Politicologie Core Module: International Relations
Rocket Science
Analysing North Korea’s nuclear discourse
ABSTRACT This thesis analyses 400 articles from the North Korea’s main state-led media platform (KCNA) through a quantitative sentiment discourse analysis, assessing predictors of aggressive nuclear discourse. It finds a significant negative correlation between the scheduling of the June the 12th DPRK-US Summit and aggressive DPRK nuclear discourse, and argues that the DPRK adjusted its reporting in order to more easily acquire economic support and diplomatic support from the US and allies. The paper concludes by saying the KCNA is responsive to both internal and external events and encourages future usage of the platform for analytical purpose.
Contents
Introduction……….………..……….2
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Historical
and Institutional Context of its nuclear program………..………....3
Formulating expectations of nuclear KCNA content………..……….…....5
Data and Method ………..………..……..……….9
Analysis………..………..……..……..…………..11
Major political statements Condition of DPRK-US negotiations DPRK’s reporting on relevant countries & UN Counterfactual analysis………..……..……..……..…………..16
Conclusion………..………..……..……..……….20
Implications Limitations RecommendationsBibliography………..………..……..………22
Introduction
Ever since the ending of the Korean War, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been regarded by many outsiders as an unpredictable black-box at best, and as an extremely dangerous rogue state at worst. An important aspect of its domestic and foreign policy is the complete control of reporting on the country, with as its main pillar the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). This platform functions as one of three main media sources to the domestic population as well as the main mouthpiece for the regime to foreigners. Despite the major developments surrounding the state in recent months, contemporary empirical studies assessing patterns in the platform’s content are absent in academic literature. This thesis addresses this caveat in two important ways. First, although Rich (2014) provides important insight into certain predictors of changes in KCNA content on nuclear weapons, three key contemporary elements remain unaddressed. These are (1) major political statements to and from the DPRK government, (2) KCNA reporting on relevant countries or the UN and (3) the June 12th DPRK-US Summit. This thesis assesses whether these factors influence KCNA content by looking at increase and decrease in aggressive KCNA nuclear discourse. Consecutively, it answers the following research question: ‘Do major political events correlate with aggressive DPRK reporting on nuclear issues and weapons of mass destruction?’. Second, this thesis provides a unique methodological contribution by performing a quantitative sentiment discourse analysis (QSDA). This allows for identification of correlation between the tone of content, making it able to determine in what way content changes as a result of external factors instead of solely
establishing that it changes.
The study finds that there is no significant correlation of major political statements or KCNA reporting on relevant countries and the UN on the amount of aggressive KCNA nuclear
discourse. However, the condition of the June 12th DPRK-US negotiations - ‘scheduled’ or ‘non-scheduled’ - is significantly correlated at the 0.05 confidence level. Qualitative counterfactual analysis comparing the findings with the case of Iran finds no clear similar correlation.
Nevertheless, I argue that the DPRK changed its media discourse as a result of the scheduling of the DPRK-US Summit, rooting my argument in literature claiming that isolationist regimes profile themselves as less militant when the incentives are sufficient and the international environment friendly enough. This claim provides a powerful imperative to the study of isolationist regime’s, suggesting that state-run media are not useless as an analytical tool but highly important to identify key changes in political discourse. It also contests the prevalent
notion that the DPRK is unresponsive to external developments in its media behaviour in general and nuclear media discourse in particular. Further research might establish a shift in DPRK policy on nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The thesis starts with a summary of the developments that lead to the occurrence of the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state. It then proceeds with a theoretical framework that conceptualizes relevant concepts and elaborates on developed theories that describe whether and what kind of relationship exists between the three independent variables and our dependent variable. Also, three main hypotheses and six sub-hypotheses will be formed based on the expected findings of the analysis. Then, the data and methods for the quantitative analysis - multiple regression analysis – as well as the quantitative analysis – comparative counterfactual analysis - will be examined. In the analysis section, the achieved quantitative and qualitative results will be used to answer the nine hypotheses. The thesis will be concluded by sub-sections devoted to conclusion of results, discussion of its limitations, and recommendations for further research.
The Hermit Kingdom: historical and international origins of the DPRK’s nuclear
discourse in state-led media
The DPRK has had a tumultuous political history ever since its militant break-up from the current Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1953. It inherited difficult relations with Japan, South Korea and the United States. Although a cease-fire accord was signed, the DPRK and the ROK are still technically at war, dividing a culturally homogenous country along political lines. After the end of the war, the ROK became backed by the US military, whereas the DPRK got backed by the Russian military. Gradually, the ROK transformed into a democratic and capitalist society, while the DPRK maintained a strict autocratic regime governed by a fusion of predominantly Leninist communism and certain values added by the Kim-dynasty, such as ‘juche’ (international self-reliance) (Clemens 2005: 469-471). At the end of the Cold War, the DPRK saw a sharp decline in military support from Russia. Although it was still conventionally military superior to the ROK, the DPRK started to develop its nuclear weapons program (Rich 2014: 432). One explanation is DPRK’s geographically vulnerable position, with adversaries at its border, combined with the economic incapability of generating a decisive dominance with conventional weapons (idem.). Another explanation claims that the DPRK had a long-standing tradition of using weaponry and
In 1993, the DPRK reported to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, negotiations with the Clinton administration resulted in the pivotal Agreed
Framework1 (Michishita 2009: 139-141). A year later, leader Kim Il-Sung died and was succeeded
by his son, Kim Jong-Il. After DPRK-US Summit relations came to a positive peak at the end of Clinton’s term, the Bush administration did not engage with the DPRK on two of three key negotiating elements: the establishment of a peace deal and the curtailing of DPRK’s missile tests and development. Instead, they focussed solely on its nuclear program. In 2002, the Bush
administration accused the DPRK of possessing a facility able of producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), an accusation the DPRK denied only in explicit terms (idem). The DPRK regime also responded by stating that it would acknowledge its 1994 Agreed Framework obligations if the US would agree on a number of key settlements (idem). This offer was not accepted and in 2003 the DPRK officially exited the NPT.
International tensions mounted further as the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, ushering in the first round of sanctions by the UN Security Council (SC) (S/Res/1718). The DPRK ambassador to the UN rejected the treaty, accusing the SC of applying double standards to the US threats of pre-emptive attack and the single test done under ‘secure conditions’ by the DPRK (un.org 2006)’. He framed the test as a direct result of US aggression but emphasized that the DPRK was explicitly willing to denuclearize the Korean peninsula through peaceful and diplomatic means (idem). In April 2009, the DPRK launches a Taepodong-2 missile, proving its ability to reach the Pacific US naval base of Guam (Michishita 2009: 147). A month later, the DPRK detonates its second nuclear bomb, proving it has successfully manufactured a nuclear device. A month later, the DPRK admits having a facility able of producing HEU (ibid). As the Obama administration gets installed in January 2009, the US showed willingness to negotiate with the DPRK if the latter would show a commitment to denuclearization. The negotiations culminated in six-party talks – involving the DPRK, the ROK, Japan, USA, China and Russia – yielding the Leap Day Agreement in early 2012. This required the DPRK to stop enriching uranium and stop the testing of missiles or nuclear weapons in exchange for food aid and a US statement for future support and non-aggression. However, one month later, the DPRK launches a missile of which they claimed to be carrying a satellite to commemorate the
1
This agreement required the DPRK to shut down its sole plutonium reactor, cap 8000 nuclear fuel containers and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protection in exchange for crude oil for DPRK’s most urgent energy needs and two light-water nuclear plants The accord died primarily due to the fact that the US could not get the plan through congress and thus could not deliver its promise (Clemens 2005: 457).
death of Kim-Jong Il. Nevertheless, US and South Korean officials publicly denounce the flight as a missile test and further UN sanctions follow (Guardian 2009). The Obama administration commits to a strategy of ‘strategic patience’, offering availability for further negotiations only if the DPRK commits to full denuclearization first (Clemens 2016: 332).
In the years following, the DPRK tests two more nuclear bombs - in 2013 and 2016 (last of which it claims was a hydrogen bomb), UNSC sanctions increase further and another long range missile is fired, allegedly to send a satellite into orbit (the Economist 2016). In January 2017, the Trump administration is installed, and US president Trump soon declares the era of strategic patience to be over. He engages in a series of personal insults with DPRK leader Jung-Un over public media until November that year. The DPRK tests its sixth nuclear bomb in September and claims in November to have obtained an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that can reach the US mainland. After months of negotiation, the DPRK and the US announce a meeting between their heads of state in March, followed by a historic summit between Jong-un and ROK president Jae-in. However, the summit, planned to take place on June the 12th, got cancelled by the Trump administration after DPRK officials expressed anger at
continued US-ROK military exercises and public remarks from US officials (The Guardian 2018). Nevertheless, the meeting got restored after DPRK general Kim Yong-chol visited the White House in early June and it got held according to schedule (BBC 2018).
Formulating expectations of DPRK’s reporting on nuclear issues and WMD
Hecker (2010: 52) argues that a vital part of the image the DPRK tries to exert externally is their nuclear military capacity. According to him, the purpose of this is not so much deterrence due to a sensation of insecurity, but more so to gain diplomatic leverage. Either way, the pattern appears to occur stronger when aggressive foreign statements made by relevant countries or UNsanctions increase. In 2006, the DPRK framed UN sanctions as a breach of the denuclearization project on the Korean Peninsula and an excuse to develop more nuclear weapons to gain more leverage, creating a vicious cycle (idem). The aggressive personal political discourse between Trump and Jung-Un in 2017 seems to substantiate this claim, as both sides framed their WMD arsenal as decisive and superior to the other, engaging in a verbal race-to-the-top (The Standard 2017).
Conversely, if foreign statements or direct negotiations with the US promised substantial gains for the DPRK, a general détente in nuclear profiling seemed to occur. However, the DPRK views its WMD as major bargaining elements that are only to be traded away for major support such as direct energy aid or structural economic support (Michishita 2009: 139-141). A crucial aspect in this context is the nature of the US presidency. Rich (2014: 434-435) claims that Republican presidential administrations have a less successful history in achieving
denuclearization with the DPRK than Democratic administrations. For example, during the Bush Administration, the DPRK interpreted Bush’s public characterization of the DPRK to be on an ‘axis of evil’ with Iran and Iraq as an ‘unprovoked heightening of tensions (Solingen 2007)’. Afterwards, KCNA references to nuclear issues peaked (Rich 2014: 439). Furthermore: some scholars argue that neoconservative forces within Republican administrations actively counteract DPRK negotiations as they either do not believe in the merit of negotiating with the regime, rather pursue a strategy of military intervention or rather benefit the political leverage an arms-race creates for a US Missile Defence System2 (Clemens 2010: 209). Hence, one would expect
that the DPRK’s prospect of negotiating with a Republican president, specifically Trump, would not make the DPRK adjust its nuclear WMD policy. Also, following the logic on political statements, one could argue that the DPRK would actually pursue a more aggressive nuclear policy when talks with the US are scheduled as they perceive that this would strengthen their bargaining position.
However, these theories - that rely primarily on a Realist understanding of IR - fail to take into account crucial insights from Liberal and Constructivist IR perspectives. As Potter (2000: 69) argues, a regime’s compliance with international norms of WMD is strongly determined by its degree of isolation and the hostility of the international environment. As such, the condition of the scheduled DPRK-US Summit should serve as a direct predictor for less aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting as the DPRK’s isolation is lessened and the international environment shows intention to come to a peaceful agreement offering substantial returns. Furthermore, given the decreasing economic, political and diplomatic support from Russia and China to the DPRK (Clemens 2016: 321), the state is increasingly experiencing economic exhaustion as a result of isolation and sanctions. If the regime chose to continue its policy of nuclear deterrence in the months preceding the Summit, it will most likely have dimmed its prospects of a beneficial agreement or an agreement at all. This mind shift appears to be empirically grounded as the
2
Such a system has been on the agenda of neoconservatives since Reagan was president and hypothetically would protect the US from any missiles flying into its continental territory.
DPRK has tested zero missiles or WMD’s in the first five months of 2018 as negotiations were held, whereas all preceding years have witnessed missile tests, WMD tests or military aggression (the Economist 2016).
With regard to the DPRK’s reporting on relevant countries or the UN, evidence clarifying the general connection is lacking. One could theorize that if the DPRK would show a friendly stance to the US, its preference for nuclear WMD would decrease as the US clearly has the aim of lessening the DPRK’s nuclear military capabilities as a condition for engagement and support (Clemens 2016: 321). Furthermore, a friendly profile to the US would most likely be a sign of a decrease in DPRK hard-line doctrine (stating that the US cannot be cooperated with (Ibid)). This development could form a very plausible predictor for less aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting. Similarly, if the DPRK were to show an aggressive stance towards the United Nations, it would most likely stop using nuclear WMD as a deterrence since the UN has been condemning this since the start. Otherwise, it is highly unlikely that the UN would answer DPRK’s friendly posture with diplomatic recognition and loosening of straining sanctions. With regard to the southern neighbour, Republic of Korea (ROK), the same logic appears to apply. The ROK has been at the forefront of condemning the DPRK’s military threats and nuclear and missile testing and is openly allied with the US and the UN on the issue. It is unlikely that the ROK would answer DPRK’s friendly posture with trust, economic support and reconciliation if the DPRK were not to stop bringing insecurity to the Korean Peninsula by profiling itself as a nuclear threat. With regard to China, the once friendly relationship between the powerful and supportive
communist neighbour and the small Korean communist state has been decreasing as China has been lowering its political and economic support to the DPRK, not least because of international pressure. Also, China has been increasingly pressurizing the DPRK to halt its nuclear arms build-up, fearful for an escalation or DPRK regime collapse (Rich 2010: 436). As such, DPRK’s decision to show a friendly posture towards China, implies less aggressive reporting on nuclear WMD. With regard to Japan and the DPRK, the two states have a precarious history of former oppressive colonizer (Japan), abductor of 12 Japanese citizens in 2002 (DPRK) and mutual militant adversaries in North-East Asia (Clemens 2016: 214). As such, DPRK’s decision to normalize relations with Japan by profiling itself as friendly could serve as a marker for DPRK’s intent to establish trust and comfortability. It is unlikely that the DPRK would perceive Japan as a potential ally with which it can pursue an isolationist, aggressive agenda. Diplomatic difficulties
would need to be cleared first and Japan is still explicitly allied with the US. Furthermore, Japan explicitly condemns the DPRK aggressive stance on nuclear WMD.
The case of Russia is somewhat complicated because it is hard to determine the exact nature of Putin's international ambitions. If the DPRK profiles itself as genuinely friendly towards Russia - its old powerful ally - it could imply that it accepts that Russia has distanced itself from the DPRK by lowering its political, military and economic support. This could imply that the DPRK acknowledges and respects the increasingly capitalist and liberal path Russia pursues, implying that the DPRK would lower its aggressive, isolationist stance and decrease its aggressive nuclear reporting. On the contrary, friendly reporting on Russia could also imply an attempt to regain its preferred status and imply a continuation or strengthening of its aggressive stance on nuclear WMD. Although the DPRK bought high-strength aluminium tubes necessary for producing HEU from a private Russian trader in 2002 (Zhang 2009), it is unlikely that the DPRK would again become the recipient of significant Russian economic, political and (nuclear-)military support. Since 2006, Russia explicitly condemned DPRK’s aggressive WMD-related behaviour (S/Res/1695).
Based on the literature and assumptions mentioned above, this thesis hypothesizes that: Hypothesis 1: If the DPRK-US Summit is scheduled, the DPRK reporting on nuclear WMD becomes less aggressive;
Hypothesis 2: If the DPRK’s reporting on relevant governments and the UN becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s stance on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive.
Hypothesis 2a: If the DPRK’s reporting on the US becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 2b: If the DPRK’s reporting on the UN becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 2c: If the DPRK’s reporting on the ROK becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 2d: If the DPRK’s reporting on Japan becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 2e: If the DPRK’s reporting on China becomes more aggressive, the DPRK reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 2f: If the DPRK’s reporting on Russia becomes more aggressive, the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD becomes more aggressive;
Hypothesis 3: If major political statements become more aggressive and UN sanctions increase, DPRK nuclear reporting becomes more aggressive.
Method & Data
The analysis consists of a quantitative sentimental discourse analysis (QSDA) (Rich 2010: 447). Followed by a comparative counterfactual analysis (CCA). The QSDA is performed with the statistical software SPSS, using a multiple regression analysis to see whether any statistically significant correlations that are found between one of the three independent variables still hold when controlled for the other two independent variables. The CCA assesses whether a
correlation or claimed causality between the independent variable and the dependent variable in case of the DPRK are also present in the case of Iran (Fearon 1990: 2-3). As Iran is similar to the DPRK in relevant respects, this allows for valid comparison based on empirical data. As a result, this study can additionally substantiate causal inferences in the case of the DPRK.
This study has identified the ROK, Japan, Russia, China, the US and the UN as most relevant parties to the DPRK as a result of their cultural, military, economic and political significance to the regime and non-proliferation negotiations. Hence, the study focuses on these parties when referring to ‘relevant governments and UN’. Initially, data on major political statements and DPRK reporting on relevant governments and UN was coded as ‘friendly’, ‘neutral, or ‘aggressive’. ‘Friendly’ denoted discourse that is characterized by respect for other states’ territory, non-aggression, clear, a constructive effort towards peaceful diplomatic relations and transparent and respectful communication. ‘Aggressive’ denotes discourse that is characterized by a possessive or non-respectful stance towards other states’ territory or a considerable preference for military or verbal violent engagement over peaceful discourse. However, the analysis will focus only on the observations that were aggressive in nature because one axis is needed for comparison and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to interrogate all correlations or their interrelatedness. Also, the data falls primarily in this category enabling more accurate statistical analysis. The data on the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear WMD was coded only as ‘Friendly’ or ‘Aggressive’ as virtually all observed data fell into these categories.
This thesis uses the English content of the KCNA as main data source for DPRK reporting on nuclear issues, major political issues and the DPRK reporting on the five relevant countries and the UN. Using the English translated version allows for research of content that is directly, carefully and frequently constructed by the DPRK regime. This excludes the bias of translation or interpretation. The analysis uses the ‘Latest News’ section of the website as this section is most extensive and largest. Also, the ‘Latest News’ section summarizes the main articles of Rodong Sinmun (DPRK Workers Party newspaper) and Minju Joson (state-run newspaper). This strengthens its validity as an indicator as these papers are attuned to a domestic audience. This fact circumvents the ‘foreign bias’ that KCNA editors exhibit in their translation to English content (Wit et al. (2005). This provides a more accurate impression of general KCNA tone on relevant issues. The study focuses on all 400 articles from the month March. This month is most relevant for our analysis since it encompasses the scheduling of the DPRK-US Summit and ample major political statements.
Major political statements are conceptualized as public statements to the DPRK regime by government officials of the relevant governments or the UN and vice versa. UN sanctions are also included and weighted by a factor of 2.5 because of their significance. Statements by heads of state are weighted by a factor of 2. Apart from using the KNCA as a data source for DPRK official statements, reliable international news-media – e.g. The Guardian, NY Times - are used as data source for officials from relevant governments or the UN. Twitter is used as a data source for identifying statements from president Trump, as he uses it very frequently. The variable was recoded into a dummy-variable isolating the aggressive statements. DPRK reporting on the five relevant countries and the UN was first classified as well and later converted to a dummy-variable showing only observations with aggressive discourse. With regard to the status of DPRK-US Summit, this variable was classified as a nominal variable and categorized into two categories: ‘on’ or ‘off’ (referring respectively to whether the Summit was scheduled or not). The analysis uses the condition of the scheduled Summit via a dummy variable. Reliable international media were used to identify the exact date at which the Summit was scheduled (March 8th).
Data on DPRK’s reporting on the relevant governments and the UN was categorized per state and UN and combined into one variable capturing all aggressive reporting on all governments and the UN per day. The frequencies for aggressive statements for the UN, China and Russia were so low that they were useless for statistical analysis. Hence, the multiple regression analysis focuses only on the US, the ROK and Japan. It relies on a dummy variable capturing all
aggressive DPRK reporting on these three states per day (abbreviated as ‘Possible 3’ (P3)). The data of this variable overlaps considerably with the data on major political statements as I coded aggressive reporting on the P3 as major political statements as well. A control for excessive multicollinearity is included in the analysis. Data on the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear issues and WMD was converted into a dummy variable capturing only the aggressive reports per day. Unfortunately, all observations of the DPRK’s reporting on nuclear issues and WMD happened on 8 days, resulting in a statistical N of 8. This is a considerable limitation of this study as the validity of statistical conclusions becomes questionable under an N of 25. Future research can eliminate this problem by analysing a larger time frame.
Analysis
To give a clear impression of the data discussed, Table 1 shows all frequencies of KCNA discourse on relevant governments or the UN, major political statements, and KCNA discourse on nuclear WMD that is aggressive in tone. At first glance, the ‘P3’ states reach almost similar levels of aggressive targeting. However, a clear ranking emerges when taking into account the aggregate numbers. The USA is the main target, followed closely by Japan and the ROK at a distance.
Table 1. Frequencies of aggressive discourse per variable
Variable Date Status DPRK-US Negot. Major Pol. Statem. DPRK Aggr. China DPRK Aggr. USA DPRK Aggr. Japan DPRK Aggr. ROK DPRK Aggr. UN DPRK Aggr. Russia DPRK aggr. nuclear discourse 01.03.18 Off 14 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 02.03.18 Off 3 0 4 1 1 0 0 2 03.03.18 Off 7 0 4 1 1 0 0 3 04.03.18 Off 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
06.03.18 Off 4 0 3 3 1 0 0 4 07.03.18 Off 12 0 12 2 0 0 0 4 08.03.18 Off 5 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 09.03.18 On 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 10.03.18 On 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 11.03.18 On 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 12.03.18 On 5 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 13.03.18 On 6 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 14.03.18 On 7 0 4 2 1 0 1 0 15.03.18 On 10 0 2 2 3 0 0 1 16.03.18 On 10 0 2 8 2 0 0 0 17.03.18 On 7 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 18.03.18 On 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 19.03.18 On 8 0 2 5 3 0 0 0 20.03.18 On 8 0 3 5 4 0 0 0 21.03.18 On 4 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 22.03.18 On 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23.03.18 On 11 0 4 5 1 0 0 0 24.03.18 On 4 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 25.03.18 On 6 0 2 2 1 1 0 0
26.03.18 On 12 0 5 5 4 0 0 1 27.03.18 On 8 0 4 1 3 0 0 1 28.03.18 On 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 29.03.18 On 10 0 4 5 6 1 0 0 30.03.18 On 9 0 2 3 4 0 0 0 31.03.18 On 10 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 Total / 87.5 0 86 90 53 2 1 15
Table 2 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. Model 1 shows that the
scheduling of the DPRK-US Summit has a negatively significant correlation with KCNA nuclear discourse on the 0.05 confidence level, findings consistent with Hypothesis 1. This implies that, on average, there have been 1.8 less aggressive KCNA nuclear announcements per day since the scheduling of the Summit. These findings support the theory that isolationist regimes become more adherent to international non-proliferation norms when their isolation decreases and the international environment displays intent to cooperate (Potter 2000: 69). The fact that the majority of aggressive nuclear discourse occurred before the scheduling of the Summit further substantiates causal inference. This variable alone explains 51% of the variation in aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting.
Model 2 shows that this correlation is still positively significant when controlled for DPRK’s aggressive reporting on the ROK, the USA and Japan, implying that aggressive reporting on these states does not function as a mediating variable. This test was needed as DPRK
announcements on these states could have been influencing both data of the Summit and DPRK nuclear discourse, resulting in an invalid causal claim. Model 2 also shows that DPRK aggressive reporting on these states has no significant correlation with aggressive DPRK reporting on nuclear issues and WMD on any confidence level, findings inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. These findings contradict the assumption that less aggressive reporting on a country leads to less
aggressive nuclear discourse as the DPRK would want to match its friendship with the expectations on non-proliferation of the other party. Conversely, it also suggests that KCNA
of state and officials do not necessarily lead to an increase in aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting. This finding is inconsistent with two notions: (1) that the DPRK reacts aggressively with threats of nuclear WMD to sanctions and external political statements and (2) that the DPRK always reinforces its own aggressive statements with nuclear threats, an important insight.
Model 3 shows that aggressive international statements between the DPRK and relevant governments or the UN and KCNA nuclear reporting are not significantly correlated, findings inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. Hecker’s theory that predicted that the DPRK would exhibit more aggressive nuclear discourse as a result of more aggressive international statements and UN sanctions seems unlikely in this case (2010: 52). Model 4 shows that, when controlled for
aggressive international statements and aggressive KCNA reporting on the ROK, the USA and Japan, the status of the DPRK-US Summit still has a negative significant correlation with KCNA nuclear reporting. This implies that, on average, there have been 2.4 less aggressive KCNA nuclear announcements per day since the scheduling of the Summit, taken the explanatory power of the other two independent variables into account. The three independent variables combined explain 73% of the variation in the amount of KCNA nuclear reporting. Model 4 also shows that neither aggressive international statements nor aggressive KCNA reporting on the ROK, the USA and Japan have a significant correlation on the amount of aggressive KCNA nuclear announcements. These findings are inconsistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. SPSS collinearity diagnostics confirmed that there was no problematic degree of multicollinearity between DPRK reporting on P3 and major international statements.
Table 3 shows the independent correlations between the ROK, the US and Japan on the
frequency of aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting. It shows that only the aggressive reporting on the ROK has a significant correlation to the dependent variable, findings consistent with
Hypothesis 2c and inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a and 2d. This implies that aggressive
statements towards Japan and the US are not necessarily reinforced by nuclear threats. When not controlled for the effect of the other two states, an increase of 1 in the amount of aggressive reporting towards the ROK is connected to a decrease of 0.82 in the amount of aggressive KCNA nuclear announcements, with the model explaining 72% in the variation of the latter, findings inconsistent with hypothesis 2c. When controlled for the amount of aggressive statements towards the US and Japan this effect implies a decrease of 1.01 in the amount of aggressive KCNA nuclear announcements with every increase of 1 in the amount of aggressive statements towards the ROK. This finding is also inconsistent with Hypothesis 2c, reaffirming the findings from Model 1. Model 4 shows that one observation of aggressive DPRK reporting on the ROK leads to one less observation of aggressive DPRK reporting on nuclear issues and WMD. This strongly contradicts expectations that predicted that the latter would increase as a result of the former. SPSS collinearity diagnostics confirms that there is no problematic level of multicollinearity between the variables.
In general, it is not entirely surprising that the ROK is an exception to the other two states as it is the only P3 state with which the DPRK publicly identifies itself. A potential explanation for this mechanism is theory that the DPRK identifies with the ROK culturally and attempts to ascertain the ROK that it does not cherish hostility towards it when explicitly threatening states like the US and Japan with nuclear WMD. After all, the KCNA discourse mainly attacked the ROK’s
conservative political elite while mentioning the general ROK in a friendly manner (KCNA 2018). An aspect that is problematic about this claim is the fact that nuclear discourse is never directed at the ROK, making it seem superfluous for the KCNA to curb its aggressive reporting on the ROK conservative elite. A more probable explanation for this mechanism is that the pead of ROK condemnations occurred during the trail of Park Geun-hye, ROK’s former president, who was sentenced for corruption and abuse in early April (the Guardian 2018).
To clarify whether the scheduling of the DPRK-US Summit actually caused the DPRK to decrease aggressive media content, I will now assess whether this correlation or causal
Iran. In 2015, Iran agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a result of long negotiations with foreign ministers from the US, the UK, Russia, China, France, Germany and the EU foreign policy chief. The terms of agreement are very similar to the situation in the DPRK, although Iran was in a far less developed stage in its nuclear program. In exchange for export of spent nuclear fuel, a conversion of a plutonium reactor and further restrictive measures, Iran received relieve from most of its nuclear-related sanctions from the EU, the US and UN Security Council (The Guardian 2015). Although the parties negotiating with Iran comprised of 7 delegations instead of just the US in the DPRK case, the US played a dominant role in the Iran negotiations because of its active participation in the negotiation process, the impact of its sanctions on Iran and its military power.
With regard to state-run media, Iran has an official state-run media platform that is comparable with the DPRK’s KCNA in its scope and restrictive nature: the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), that is controlled by the Ministry of Cultural and Islamic Guidance (CFR 2009).
Although the Iranian media landscape is considerably more liberal than in the DPRK, the IRNA is dedicated to providing news that is only in line with Islamic Sharia law and ‘the best interests of the country’ (Iranian Constitution Art. 175). Also, virtually all news outlets down to the ones capable of reaching just a small audience are censored, major websites such as YouTube and New York Times were blocked in 2005 and many journalists and members of the political opposition have been imprisoned since the start of the century (The Guardian 2006, Economist 2017). Given these facts, Iran appears as a valid case for comparison with the DPRK.
Just as the KCNA, the IRNA has an online accessible website with English translated content. Unlike the KCNA it is equipped with an advanced search engine through which we can assess the news around the relevant dates. The JCPOA was created on 14th of July 2015, adopted on the 18th of October that year and implemented on the 16th of January 2016. However, to make an adequate comparison with the DPRK, it is insightful to look at the periods at which (1) external parties and Iran agreed on negotiations regarding non-proliferation and (2)
the US started actively participating in these negotiations first. The first period can be traced back to October 2003. Earlier that year, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) employees had identified traces of uranium-enriched material at Iran’s Natanz nuclear reactor. Active
participation in the negotiations of the US started at April 8th 2009 when then-President Obama announced that his administration was willing to cooperate in future negotiations between the
P5+1 and Iran (Armscontrol.org 2018). Unfortunately, INRA’s archive only covers the period from January 1st 2011 until now.
The first relevant event after that date is January 30th 2012, when it was agreed that an IAEA delegation would start discussions on IAEA’s investigations into potential military uses of Iran’s nuclear program. Interrogating news content of all categories off the months prior to this date using the search entry ‘nuclear’, immediately standing out is the anti-US and anti-Israel stance in many articles. The discourse frames the US as ‘war mongering’ and Israel as a ‘Zionist regime’ supporting criminal activities. With regard to nuclear WMD discourse, the platform clearly frames Iran’s nuclear capabilities as ‘peaceful’, righteous, supervised by external actors and ‘civilian’ in nature (the latter referring to peaceful energy generation). Similar to the KCNA, a considerable proportion of content is dedicated to accusing opposing states of non-adherence to non-proliferation norms.
Not similar to the KCNA is the fact that clear threats are absent. IRNA consistently frames Iran as supporting of peaceful diplomatic - rather than coercive, military - solutions. In the months after the announcement of the negotiations, when a G5+1 round of non-proliferation
negotiations followed in April, a sentiment of relief appears to prevail. This is caused by the idea that ‘the West’ has started to acknowledge Iran’s ‘nuclear rights’ to ‘peaceful nuclear activities’. The discourse frames Iran as willing to cooperate at a diplomatic solution again. Any nuclear threats are absent, although Ayatollah Khamenei - the state’s de facto most influential leader - stresses that ‘[Iran] will defend [itself] against any aggression, whether by the US or by the Zionist regime, proportionally’, referring to conventional arms. Similarly, as with the KCNA, IRNA conveys a message of innocence and non-proliferation of its regime. Remarkable is that this image does not match certain findings claiming that Iran enriched uranium beyond ‘civilian’ limits (IRNA 2012, Armscontrol.org 2010, 2011).
A second important event is the rescheduling of Iran-P5+1 talks in 2013 after they had been halted in April 2013 without reaching a serious resolution. This occurs in August, three days after Iran’s new president takes office. Prevalent in the months prior to this announcement are quotes and reproductions of global non-Iranian officials and policy experts encouraging the US to actively engage in negotiations with Iran and to stop wrongfully accusing Iran of accusing militant nuclear goals. Here as well, Iran is framed as pursuing solely ‘civilian’ nuclear goals. A considerable difference with last event is that nuclear discourse is far more prevalent in the days around the event. Although no explicit threats are made, the same innocent frame of Iran is
conveyed as with the first event. This pattern largely continues in the months after the event. The IRNA profiles Iran has far more diplomatic and pacifist than the KCNA did with the DPRK, yet the degree of propaganda is considerable at the IRNA too. Although explicit threats remain absent in the context of this event, it is remarkable that Iran relies on the same defensive ‘self-protection’ frame as the DPRK, albeit to a different extent.
A third important event to mention is the agreement on the Joint Plan of Action, the predecessor the JCPOA, in January 2014. Although this is not an announcement to negotiations, it might provide insight into the effect that this agreement had on IRNA nuclear discourse. Several elements of aggression can be identified here:
‘Allama Shirazi said that western states are pursuing illogical policy towards Iran. He added that Iran, through its patience, has forced the West to change its aggressive approach towards the Islamic Republic. He added that West had left with no other option but to accept Iran’s peaceful nuclear right.’ (IRNA
2014 - underlining added)
Ayatollah Khamenei has wisely said that US is the enemy of nations especially the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Allama Raja Nasir Abbas Jafari.’ (idem.)
No nuclear arms are used as a threat here - which is perhaps not remarkable since Iran has no proven nuclear WMD - but in this case, aggression and a sign of non-negotiation are clear. In the weeks after the event, condemnation of a postulated militant stance displayed by the US
continued. Nevertheless, explicit verbal condemnations or militant threats were absent. Again, Iran is framed as innocent and willing to cooperate.
A fourth event that is also not an announcement of negotiations but the agreement on a treaty is the agreement on the JCPOA on the 14th of July 2015. The IRNA claims here that ‘The West targets Iran’s scientific progress’ and dubious motives drive the US presence in Afghanistan - the same tone as in previous pre-event contexts - but again the platform voices no explicit militant threats. It mentions a statement of aggression by one of Iran’s Ayatollahs, Mohammad
Shariatmadari:
“The administration of prudence and hope (an allusion to President Hassan Rouhani’s administration) will overpower cruel sanctions [imposed] by enemies against our country,” (IRNA 2015 - original text)
After the event, the tendency of anti-US discourse largely continued but verbal or militant threats were absent.
We can conclude that unlike the DPRK, Iran does not use the IRNA as a platform to explicitly threaten foreign governments with nuclear WMD. In the timeframe analysed there were no nuclear threats made at all and it was hard to identify a convincing correlation between the announcement of negotiations or the agreement on an accord and the amount of aggressive militant discourse (be it nuclear or conventional). To follow Potter’s rationale, Iran might not be isolated enough and the international community not hostile enough for it to generate public non-adherence to non-proliferation norms and nuclear threats (Potter 2000: 69). Given Iran’s increasingly liberal tendencies, a genuine trend towards assimilation with global non-proliferation norms and the international community might be reversing the process described by Potter. As such, Iran might not be a completely valid case after all as the role nuclear WMD play in its society, politics and discourse is marginal when compared to the DPRK. However, one can also project an alternative future trajectory for Iran based on the fact that Iran repeatedly failed to submit information to the IAEA on details on past3 and present nuclear research and
development. If Iran has developed or is developing nuclear WMD in secrecy, it might start manifesting similar behaviour as the DPRK in the future, using nuclear WMD as a deterrent instead of conventional arms. Regardless of these projections, the absence of a correlation or causal mechanism in the case of Iran does not rule out the possibility of a causal mechanism in the case of the DPRK.
Conclusion
This thesis answers its research question in the positive by proving that a significant correlation exists between the scheduling of the June the 12th DPRK-US Summit and the frequency of aggressive DPRK reporting on nuclear issues and WMD. It also shows that an increase in aggressive DPRK reporting on the ROK is correlated with a decrease in aggressive DPRK reporting on nuclear issues and WMD, and vice versa. The implications of these findings are that DPRK state-news is responsive to both internal and external events. This thesis argues that a
3
Referring here to R&D that was performed before the IAEA gained profound supervision of Iran’s nuclear program.
causal link exists between the scheduling of the DPRK-US Summit and the tone of DPRK nuclear reporting that can be explained by an increase in the DPRK’s willingness to adhere to non-proliferation norms. It argues that this shift can be explained at least partially by the increase in economic sanctions in recent years and the gradual withdrawal of economic and political support from China and Russia, stimulating the DPRK to gravitate towards the economic incentives that are proposed by the US and allies upon agreement of a non-proliferation accord. Additionally, it provides additional insight of the role nuclear issues and WMD have in DPRK foreign policy and inter-state relations with relevant governments and the UN. It contests the notion that the DPRK necessarily uses nuclear threats when reporting aggressively on other states. Conversely, its findings suggest that aggressive DPRK major political statements, UN sanctions and aggressive statements by non-DPRK relevant heads of state and officials do not necessarily lead to an increase in aggressive DPRK nuclear reporting. Its usage of nuclear threats appears on the decline and in general, it is less prevalent, impulsive and volatile than one is inclined to believe when constructing on image on the basis of many popular media. As such, this thesis supports the expectation that there could be a significant change occurring in the character and importance of nuclear issues and WMD in DPRK state-media discourse, yet research with a longer time frame would have to substantiate this.
A methodological implication of this thesis is that it shows that QSDA can be used to identify patterns in media platforms established their consciously or unconsciously.4 As such, it
substantiates Rich’s (2014) claim that state-run media that are often considered as useless propaganda actually form important analytical tools for detecting subtle changes in the way in which isolationist regimes like the DPRK frame itself. It urges caution with interpreting the results of this study too literally as the number of observations was dangerously low for statistical analysis. Hence, it encourages future research to perform a similar method on a time frame of at least three months of the same news section to verify the results obtained here. Another entry point for future research is interrogating the interrelatedness of friendly, neutral and aggressive reporting on countries over time in order to identify patterns that can clarify how the DPRK or similar regimes perceive other states as a result of outside events.
4
For instance, the KCNA did not mention the scheduling of the summit at all, yet the findings prove that a significant change has occurred in the period after the event. This implies that although regimes might not intent to
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