Governing Hybrid Threats: Exploring the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats

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Governing Hybrid Threats

Exploring the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach

towards hybrid threats

Leiden University

Thesis MSc Crisis and Security Management Hella Warmerdam, s2635593

Supervisor: Dr. T. Tropina Second reader: Dr. T. Van Steen Word count: 19.856

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Abstract

This thesis is an explorative study into the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats. The topic is relatively new in its current form and unstudied in this context. Furthermore, addressing hybrid threats is of growing importance as the nature of security issues increasingly shifts away from traditional forms and takes on a more hybrid shape. Hence, this paper contributes to the existing knowledge and aims to provide insights for the hybrid threats security policy domain. The subject is explored through conducting a case study on the approach of Dutch ministries regarding hybrid threats. For this purpose, two methods of research are adopted. First, a document analysis of the existing Dutch policy papers regarding hybrid threats is conducted. This analysis serves as the basic outline of the Dutch policy landscape concerning hybrid threats. To complement this basic outline with in-depth insights, semi-structured interviews are conducted with seven government officials that represent the ministries involved in the hybrid threats policy. The study finds that Dutch ministries are not completely aligned in their approach towards hybrid threats. Although there is a formal understanding of what hybrid threats are and how they should be governed, the results show that in practice several hindrances are experienced. It is concluded that the Dutch approach of hybrid threats requires a clearer definitional and governance framework. Finally, this thesis recommends further study on the exact requisites needed to improve the alignment of the ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats.

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List of Abbreviations

European Commission EC

European Union EU

Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Hybrid CoE National Coordinator for Terrorism and Safety NCTV

National Security Council NSC

North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO

Ministry of Defense Min.Def

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy Min.EZK Ministry of Education, Culture and Science Min.OCW

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Min.BuZa

Ministry of Justice and Security Min.JenV Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Min.BZK Scientific Council of Government Policy WRR

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Acknowledgement

Dear reader,

During my bachelor program and my current master program Crisis and Security Management, I developed a deep interest for the intersection between security issues and international relations. My choice to investigate hybrid threats for this master thesis is therefore a conscious one. It highly interests me how both security issues and international relations develop due to contextual changes. While key elements of hybrid threats are claimed to be as old as warfare, contextual developments, such as globalization and modern technology, have severely affected the phenomenon of hybrid threats. Governing such events changes accordingly. As our country intensively cooperates with other countries and organizations, especially the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national governance is increasingly interrelated with international governance. I gained a valuable understanding of governing security issues through writing this thesis on hybrid threats. I especially gained these insights through the conducted interviews with government officials that are involved with the topic of hybrid threats.

Therefore, I first and foremost want to thank the participants of this research. They have made it possible to write this thesis. Specifically, I want to thank Lauren Heida. She is a member of the Counter Hybrid Unit, a special unit within the Ministry of Defense that aims to enhance awareness around hybrid threats. Lauren was willing to introduce me to potential respondents. Her mediation allowed easier access to government officials.

Next, I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Tatiana Tropina and second reader Dr. Tommy van Steen for their trust in this research and for their flexibility during the current Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, I highly appreciate the incredibly warm and valuable support I received from Dr. Tropina.

Last but definitely not least, I want to thank my mother Gabi and my partner Nathan for their endless both practical and mental support. Especially due to the impact of the pandemic, such as libraries being closed down, the road has not always been easy. Nevertheless, I enjoyed writing this thesis and highly value everything I have learned.

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1. Introduction

In a world that is subject to fast and impactful changes, characters of security issues change accordingly. Recently, hybrid threats have gained increasing attention in both the academic and public domain, making hybrid threats a ‘hot topic’ (Bekkers, Meessen & Lassche, 2019). This is rightfully so, as hybrid threats can exploit societal vulnerabilities and cause harm to essential parts of societies, thus posing a severe threat to national security (McGonagle, Coche, Plaizier, & Klus, 2018; Torossian, Fagliano & Görder, 2020).

There is no universal and comprehensive definition of the concept. In general, hybrid threats can be characterized as ‘certain actions that are both coordinated and synchronized, deliberately targeting the institutions and vulnerabilities of democratic states and do so through a range of means’ (The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, n.d., para. 3). The deployed activities ‘exploit the several thresholds, such as detection, attribution and several interfaces, like the interface between war and peace’. Hybrid threats aim to have ‘influence on different forms of decision making on all levels (regional, state, institutional) in order to gain a strategic goal while at the same time undermining the target’ (The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, n.d., para. 3). The description of hybrid threats of The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) is used as there is no universal definition and the Hybrid CoE is a prominent and specialized actor in the field, with whom many European countries are affiliated.

Although the concept of hybrid threats remains a relatively new topic, some of its key elements are as old as time (Iancu, Fortuna, Barna & Teodor, 2016). However, some aspects (such as: the deployment of tools, scope and the caused impact) have developed tremendously, due to technological developments and globalization (Sweijs & Zilincik, 2019; Treverton, Thvedt, Lee & McCue, 2018; Torossian et al., 2020; Bekkers et al., 2019; Iancu et al., 2016). At the same time, states engage in conventional wars to a much lesser extent today due to, amongst others, international agreements, nuclear threats, political and economic reasons. Together, this provides an increasingly favorable climate for states to engage with hybrid threats and warfare to achieve their goals. This favorable climate shows hybrid tactics have 'thrived in the international security context and severely impacted the international order' over the past ten years (Torossian et al., 2020).

However, in spite of extensive interest in the topic, there are still many theoretical and practical challenges (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018). In order to properly and effectively deal with hybrid threats, it is argued that an integrated and comprehensive approach is needed

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(Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018). Yet, the character of hybrid threats is often complex, ambiguous, multidimensional and impactful. This makes it difficult for states and other institutions to formulate effective response measures although they are urgently needed (Torossian et al., 2020).

Since governing hybrid threats in its current form is a relatively new phenomenon, there are no grand theories on the matter. Moreover, there is no complete, comprehensive and universal definition of hybrid threats, neither is there a fixed approach for countering hybrid threats, nor for the governance of hybrid threats. This type of research has not yet been conducted. Hence, in order to mitigate unclarity, this paper serves as a first step in mapping out the current approach of the Dutch government towards hybrid threats, and subsequently aims to fill a gap in the knowledge on the Dutch governing of hybrid threats.

It is of utter importance that more research on hybrid threats is conducted to improve the existing body of knowledge on the matter (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015). This is an issue that, if fully grasped, needs more extensive research, a broader scope, and a wider time frame. The academic field of hybrid threats does not know grand theories yet, as the concept is relatively new and vague. Therefore, this research has an explorative nature, aspiring to provide a first indication of the Dutch governmental approach of hybrid threats.

In addition to being academically relevant, studying hybrid threats is of social concern, as well. The Netherlands has been involved in the topic of hybrid threats for some years now. Western societies have specifically proven to be vulnerable, because of their generally open and democratic systems that leave room for hybrid threats (Treverton et al., 2019; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018). Hence, states have to be ready and adequately equipped to face hybrid threats. In order to properly protect against and respond to hybrid threats, states are recommended to adopt a comprehensive and universal definition to enforce a common interdepartmental understanding of what hybrid threats are.

Moreover, states are recommended to adopt a comprehensive approach of hybrid threats that clearly defines and distributes security tasks, responsibilities and capabilities of governmental actors (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Bekkers et al., 2019). Bekkers et al. (2018) state that: “in the Netherlands and in most Western countries, a comprehensive approach

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Next to these overarching approaches, the government works on hybrid threats on a national level. The Netherlands governs hybrid threats in a relatively decentralized manner, namely by involving multiple ministries that are all involved in formulating policy on hybrid threats, and do so from their own expertise. In order to be less vulnerable, it is essential to identify interconnections and establish an interdepartmental understanding of what hybrid threats are, how they could be approached and how they can be interdepartmentally organized and coordinated. Until now, the Dutch government lacks a comprehensive approach due to its governmental siloed mechanisms and the lack of a central actor, such as a National Security Council (NSC) (Sweijs & Zilincik, 2019; Bekkers et al., 2019; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018).

Thus, it is important to define possible issues at play amongst the involved Dutch ministries that hamper the road to a comprehensive and integral approach (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Bekkers et al., 2019). So far, in the light of lacking this comprehensive approach, no research has been conducted on the specific alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats. As argued, this type of research would be insightful both academically and socially. Hence, this paper aims to answer the following research question: “To what extent are Dutch ministries aligned in their approach

towards hybrid threats?”. To answer this research question, this paper conducts an analysis of

policy documents and semi-structured interviews with government officials.

This research is structured as follows: after this first chapter, chapter two presents an extensive literature review of what hybrid threats are, how they can be countered and in what governance context they can be placed. The concepts discussed in the theoretical framework will serve as factors and indicators of the analytical framework. The third chapter elaborates on the research design, providing methodological justification and presenting the analytical framework. The fourth chapter discusses the results of the document analysis, using official governmental documents such as the most recent Dutch National Security Strategy (Rijksoverheid, 2019) and official policy reports of various ministries. Chapter five presents the analysis of the data gathered in the semi-structured interviews that are conducted with seven government officials from the ministries that are involved with policy on hybrid threats. Finally, chapter six offers a comprehensive conclusion of this research by answering the research question, relating back to the theoretical framework, discussing limitations of this research, offering suggestions for further research and providing practical recommendations.

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2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 What are hybrid threats?

2.1.A A New Phenomenon?

As if it were a new phenomenon, hybrid threats currently receive a great amount of attention, both on a national and international level, and both academically and socially. Yet, the phenomenon is not entirely new. It can be stated that the principle of hybrid threats are as old as warfare itself (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015; Torossian et al., 2020; Bekkers et al., 2019; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Iancu et al., 2016). To illustrate, waging war without actual fighting, one of the aspects of hybrid threats, dates back to the 5th Century Before Christ when

the Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist, stated that ‘to subdue the enemy without fighting is the ultimate art of war’ (Iancu et al., 2016).

However, the use of the term hybrid threats is new, as well as some of its aspects and developments. The term has been introduced and gained global popularity due to two major events: the annexation of the Crimea, and the Russian interference in the United States’ electoral process in 2016 (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Iancu et al., 2016; Hendrych, 2019). Also, several contextual changes drive hybrid threats to the fore that do change the character of hybrid threats, making them worthwhile to study.

The first contextual change is that relational power is growing in importance in this post-Cold War era and states aim to increase their power and status. Second, globalization causes the line between what is internal and external security to blur, affecting the role and status of nation states as they are no longer the sole actor, nor subject. Third, various modern technological developments alter the character of hybrid threats. Fourth, the digitization of the world is rapidly changing the information and media landscape. As gatekeepers of information are changing, the influence of phenomena like fake news have the opportunity to grow. Fifth, a shift is taking place from traditional wars in which armies fought at the battlefield, towards less obvious wars in which a contest takes place between societies. Lastly, the shift from a clear world order during and after the Cold War to a world order in which cosmopolitanism and neo-nationalism have taken place leaves opportunity for historical events to be politically manipulated (Treverton, Thvedt, Lee & McCue, 2018).

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context and some aspects of its character are. The next paragraph will elaborate on the concept and character of hybrid threats.

2.1.B Defining Hybrid Threats

The term hybrid threats lacks a comprehensive and universal definition. This can be problematic both in academic and societal/policy spheres (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Iancu et al., 2016, p. 3; Clarcke & Jackson, 2019). This paragraph will elaborate on the lacking of a clear and universal definition of hybrid threats and will discuss several descriptions and characteristics of the term. Academic literature as well as the view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are taken into account as the two organizations are have a considerable influence on the perception of hybrid threats. In the literature, hybrid threats are widely discussed under several names, amongst which hybrid

warfare, and total warfare. Hence, during this paper, hybrid threats are sometimes referred to

by these terms (Rijksoverheid, 2019; Bekkers et al., 2019).

Discussing the Definition

Lithuanian scholars Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2016) describe hybrid threats as “The phenomenon of asymmetrical, non-military, and mixed fighting” (p. 124). Hybrid threats cannot be categorized into either conventional or non-conventional warfare, as traditional security studies usually categorize threats and wars. Rather, hybrid threats fall in between these categories. The first important element Bajarūnas and Kersanskas (2016) single out is

asymmetry, involving unexpectedness. Hybrid threats and conflicts may involve a symmetric

deployment of asymmetric tools, such as economic pressure, cyberattacks, and diplomatic pressure, and does not necessarily include military action. In addition, if beneficial to the aggressor, hybrid threats may take a long time and might only sometimes, unexpectedly, draw the attention of the public. A second important element is the ambiguity of hybrid threats. Hybrid threat “…intentionally blurs the distinction between the times of peace and war, making it hard for the targeted countries to devise policy responses in a proper and timely manner” (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2016, p. 129). In this way, a grey zone is created in which certain objectives can be gained without crossing the traditional line of (military) warfare.

Whereas Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2016) describe hybrid threats as a way of fighting characterized by asymmetry, non-military actions and a mixture of tools, Bekkers et al. (2019) refer to hybrid threats as coercion, rather than fighting. Furthermore, the mixture of tools is connected to what Bekkers et al. (2019) call the grey zone between peace and war, as several

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tools that are employed in hybrid wars do are not traditionally perceived as weapons that indicate a war. Bekkers et al. (2019) define hybrid threats as follows: “Hybrid threats (or hybrid warfare, hybrid conflict, hybrid tactics, hybrid confrontations, hybrid operations and other hybrid ‘things’) involve the orchestrated use of a wide range of instruments of power to coerce an opponent, falling within the entire spectrum from peace to war”, or put more simply: “multi-domain coercion” (p. 6). Just like Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2016) the authors characterize hybrid threats as being ambiguous. Unexpectedness is not mentioned by Bekkers et al. (2019). Where Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2016) use the word asymmetry, Bekkers et al. (2019) speak of hybrid threats as being irregular and non-linear to define the same principles.

Unlike the aforementioned definitions, the definition of Torossian et al. (2020) includes the means and actors as being a combination between civilian and military, and defines the phenomenon as: “Conflicts between states, largely below the legal level of armed conflict, with integrated use of civilian and military means and actors, with the aim of achieving certain strategic objectives.” (p. 1). Where the focus of the objective of hybrid threats formulated by Bekkers et al. (2019) focusses on coercion, Torossian el al. (2020) focus on achieving a

strategic goal. Furthermore, Torossian et al. (2020) characterize hybrid threats as being complex, having a gradual impact and multidimensional nature, and, like the aforementioned

definitions, being ambiguous.

Lastly, Treverton et al. (2018) describe hybrid threats as “… achieving an outcome without waging actual war” (p. 3). As the aforementioned scholars, Treverton et al. (2018) characterize hybrid threats as being ambiguous, unpredictable and non-linear, and often finding itself in the grey zone between war and peace. As a result of the latter, the authors add that

attribution of hybrid threats or attacks is hindered. As tools are often deployed simultaneously,

across different domains, and stay below this threshold, it is often hard for the targeted country to attribute the threats or attacks and respond timely, or at all.

Scope and Means

As seen in the previous paragraph, the means used in hybrid threats are often used simultaneously and in an integrated manner, working towards an objective (Treverton et al., 2018). This objective might be coercion of another country, or a strategic objective (Bekkers et

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Consequently, tools for hybrid threats may come from the military, political/diplomatic, economic, information, civil, cyber, and legal domain (Torossian et al., 2020; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2016; Bekkers et al., 2019; Lascanjorias & Larsen, 2015; Treverton et al., 2018; European Commission, 2016).

2.2 Countering Hybrid Threats

Having defined the scope and means of hybrid threats, the next paragraph will elaborate on countermeasures suggested in the academic field, complemented by countermeasures proposed in EU and NATO reports. So far, Western states are struggling to formulate an effective and fast response to hybrid threats. It seems that the characteristics that are perceived as strengths of these states simultaneously increase their vulnerability when it comes to hybrid threats. Namely, Western governments, in general, are open, democratic, have respect for rule of law, value accountability through legislative bodies, and respect freedom of speech. Due to these values, the formulation of policy usually takes longer than it would in non-democratic and open states. Hence, the formulated response might be purposeful and well-developed, yet it can slow down their reactions (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018).

Furthermore, hybrid threats are hard to theoretically define and consequently to practically counter (Clarke & Jackson, 2019). Nonetheless, academics have made several attempts to formulate actions that should be taken to counter hybrid threats. To start with, Bekkers et al. (2019) provide a framework of six countermeasures, specifically designed for the Dutch context. This framework will function as point of departure and will be complemented by the work of other scholars.

The first countermeasure that Bekkers et al. (2019) provide is having an integral and conceptual approach through which situational awareness and understanding is generated. This requires government-wide strong analysis and monitoring. The Dutch Organization for applied scientific research (TNO, 2018), Bajarūnas & Keršanskas (2018) and Treverton et al. (2018) affirm this statement. Treverton et al. (2018) emphasize the importance of responding with the whole of government and whole of society, as hybrid threats cannot be targeted merely by the Ministry of Defense. A whole of society approach and beyond also includes creating this awareness beyond the government, for example by educating civil society in recognizing disinformation.

Adding to the whole of society approach, Bekkers et al. (2019), TNO (2018), Clarke and Jackson (2019) and the European Commission (2016) recommend a second countermeasure: building and enhancing resilience in society. Underlying frictions in society

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are making a society more fragile and consequently, more receptive to hybrid threats. Building resilience in society can for example entail strengthening ties between the public and private domain in order to be more resilient as a society (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Treverton et al., 2018). Clarke and Jackson (2019) stress the importance of not overlooking existing approaches that provide tools for countering hybrid threats. Existing approaches in the resilience domain already provide valuable lessons. Hybrid threats should not be underestimated, however, nor should they be overestimated as a result of the current rediscovery of the concept ‘hybrid’.

Third, a NSC is considered in order to guarantee coherence, responsibilities are appointed in a proper way, and priorities are clearly set (Bekkers et al., 2019). Additionally, Treverton et al. (2018) emphasize that democracies are often characterized by bureaucracy and separated institutions, leading to complications in efficiently countering hybrid warfare. The next paragraph ‘The Dutch Landscape’ will elaborate on the organizational structure in relation to the Netherlands.

Fourth, international collaboration is encouraged with other countries, especially with the NATO and the EU, in order to share knowledge and support (European Commission, 2016; Treverton et al., 2018; Bekkers et al., 2019).

Fifth, Bekkers et al. (2019) suggest to ‘respond in kind’, meaning employ various old strategies, such as deterrence, containment, building partnerships with surrounding countries, increasing the cost of hybrid attacks, enhancing counterintelligence efforts, and greater transparency in both the private and public domain.

The last recommendation that Bekkers et al. (2019) provide in the Dutch context involves the development of an early warning system, aimed at detecting when hybrid attacks are being prepared or carried out.

In addition to Bekkers’ et al. (2019) six recommendations., a seventh possible recommendation is made by the European Commission (2016), Treverton et al. (2019) and Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2018) is assessing one’s own vulnerabilities in order to properly counter hybrid threats. The aggressor will always aim for the most vulnerable part, thus assessing one’s own vulnerabilities should always be the starting point for countering hybrid threats.

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The last and ninth possible recommendation offered by Sweijs & Zilincik (2019), is the argument that the traditional concept of deterrence, “… the practice, the process or the situation in which one state relies on the prospect of harm to persuade an opponent not to engage in certain specified behavior” (p. 7) should be reinvented. Deterrence is a countermeasure often discussed by scholars regarding hybrid threats. Common, traditional, forms of deterrence are ‘deterrence by denial’ and ‘deterrence by punishment’. In case of the first form, the enemy is persuaded that he will not achieve its goal, for example by making it physically impossible, or prohibitively costly. Deterrence by punishment refers to the idea that the threat of being punished severely will stop the aggressor from attacking. Sweijs and Zilincik (2019) argue that new challenges require a new form of deterrence. Hybrid threats are not essentially new, but the context of technological developments and globalization is. Hence, a third form is proposed, cross domain deterrence, is proposed and refers to retaliation designed to have an impact in another domain than the domain the aggressor intended to attack (Mallory, 2018).

Naturally, countering hybrid threats does not take place in a vacuum and nor does determining its strategy. Rather, governments address hybrid threats and eventually involve other actors in this process. Therefore, the organizational structure and cooperation will be discussed in the following section.

2.3 Organizational Structure and Cooperation

This section will elaborate on the governance landscape of hybrid threats. First, general ideas on the governance of hybrid threats will be addressed. Second, the Dutch context is featured. As the document analysis presented later in this paper will discuss the Dutch context and organizational structure by analyzing policy reports, this section will only focus on academic work.

2.3.A Governance of Hybrid Threats

Treverton et al. (2018) address the complexity of hybrid threats and democracies addressing them. While democracies, due to their governmental structure, can be slow in responding to hybrid threats, this democratic governmental structure is at the same time highly valued. Democratic states face three main challenges in countering hybrid threats.

The first challenge is that democracies experience more difficulties and more delay in the coordination of decision-making processes than autocratic regimes, as hybrid threats engage both the whole of government and the whole of society. Hence, due to having to run a response

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and policy through different levels of power, it is more difficult for democracies than autocracies to formulate a fast response.

The second, and partially overlapping, challenge Treverton et al. (2018) pose is that democratic states are bureaucratic and exist out of separated institutions. These traits complicate hybrid warfare operations.

Third and last, a state is confronted with ethical principles regarding countering hybrid threats. Democratic states can never act as efficient, comprehensive and orchestrated as autocratic states, and if democratic states would, they would compromise the exact values they try to defend (Treverton et al., 2018).

These three challenges are important to the way democratic states, such as the Netherlands, are able to organize their defense of and approach towards hybrid threats. Additionally, Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2018) propose several issues that should be considered in general when addressing the system and organization of a country in its fight against hybrid threats. The authors pose the following question to address the first issue: “Is there a common interdepartmental understanding of what a hybrid threat is?” (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018, p. 147). In order for states to properly deal with hybrid threats, it is important that a state has a comprehensive security concept as well as a strong political mandate.

Second, the authors consider to what extent sub-organizations within the government cooperate with each other. Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2018) state that the experience of other countries has proven that coordination at governmental level is necessary and essential. It is important that interdepartmental cooperation functions well. Coordination between all involved parties may involve using the same concept, having the same perceptions on severity, having a standard structure of operation and communication.

Lastly, Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2018) recommend considering whether a central agency within the government should be responsible for gathering and analyzing potential threats, or if this should be done by separate agencies within the government.

2.3.B The Dutch Landscape

Just as Bajarūnas and Keršanskas (2018), Bekkers et al. (2019) highlight the importance of having a comprehensive concept of hybrid threats that is adopted in the same way throughout

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appropriately and the necessary security tasks, responsibilities and capabilities are not properly defined and distributed” (Bekkers et al., 2019, p. 19).

Based on an observation, the authors find that even though the involved parties perceive and acknowledge hybrid threats as holistic and having a permanent nature, this hardly changes anything in the behavior of these parties. Furthermore, the involved parties feel that the National Coordinator for Terrorism and Safety (NCTV, sub-organization of the Ministry of Justice and Safety) and the Ministry of Defense are the problem owners of hybrid threats and should recognize and counter integral hybrid threats. They should have the mandate, the resources, the possibility to take action and they should connect all the dots concerning information gathering. However, Bekkers et al. (2019) claim that a comprehensive approach in the Netherlands is lacking as a result of “siloed mechanisms in government as well as public-private cooperation” (p. 19).

Next, Bekkers et al. (2019) define several challenges that are faced by the Dutch government, partially overlapping with several countermeasures presented in the section ‘Countering Hybrid Threats’. Hence, they are only mentioned briefly. First of all, adding to the previous paragraph on comprehensive understanding in the Dutch government, hybrid threats should be recognized for what they are in order to fully comprehend them. Subsequently, both governmental and societal actors should be mobilized to act, adopting a ‘whole of society’ approach. Third, cross domain deterrence is mentioned, as “hybrid challenges are best met by hybrid responses” (Bekkers et al., 2019, p. 20). However, in practice, we see that the Netherlands has a governmental culture of independent departments, making it harder to organize cross-domain response.

Next, the Netherlands should keep playing by their own rules and standards. If the government would take it too far, this would not be credible. Also, the Netherlands should focus on situational understanding and situational awareness of how hybrid threats are orchestrated and function. Building resilience is another important challenge that should be encouraged and initiated by the Dutch government. Moreover, international collaboration should be high on the agenda to enhance the defense system against hybrid threats. Furthermore, the response should be in kind: deploying old strategies such as deterrence, cooperation with other EU-countries and capacity building in vulnerable countries. Finally, Bekkers et al. (2019) recommend the establishment of a NSC, which will be discussed more thoroughly in the next paragraph.

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2.3.C A National Security Council?

In an official report presented to the Dutch government in May, 2017, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) recommends the government to establish a National Security Council (NSC) (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2017). While the expenses on security and defense have decreased over the last years, the security threat has not decreased. Rather, it has changed in its form, for example due to the increased amount of cyber threats. The prime minister should be at the head of a potential NSC as he/she is most suitable to guarantee a policy that has a clear focus, is coherent, and prescribes subsequent actions.

An occasionally heard notion on the organizational structure of hybrid threats within a government is that smaller countries do not need to adopt formal structures or plans because the amount of stakeholders would be limited. Hence, it is argued that the organization and coordination in small countries can be arranged in a decentralized way by having a careful power balance between departments and/or through coordination between individual functionaries. However, the WRR opposes this statement and argues that smaller countries ought to adopt a very high standard strategy formation because of the fact that they are small and therefore have an extremely busy internal and external security agenda. In order to excel in the formation of a security strategy, a small country needs a forceful entity that is able to apply structure and prioritize in a congested security agenda (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2017).

Despite the advice of the WRR, the Cabinet decided not to establish a NSC and therewith a more centrally organized structure of hybrid threats. Though, the Cabinet did decide to intensify the already existing interdepartmental consultation and coordination processes. Bekkers et al. (2019) state that this network approach has some characteristics of a NSC. However, the authors wonder if this is sufficient: “But whether solid organizational structures with clear responsibilities and, if need be, the power to overrule and follow through will not be sorely missed in times of real crises and tough choices remains to be seen.” (Bekkers et al., 2019, p. 21-22).

In the light of the above discussed context on defining, countering and governing hybrid threats, a document analysis and semi-structured interviews are conducted. However, before discussing

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3. Research Design

This chapter elaborates on the research design that is adopted to answer the research question. The chapter is structured as follows: first, the operationalization of the research is elaborated upon. This section takes into account the problem definition and the key concepts of this research, followed by the research question and its sub-questions. The second part discusses the methods used in this research to answer the research question. It first elaborates on the choice for a qualitative research approach, then discusses the adoption of a ‘case study’ as the research design, followed by the outline of the research methods, the way the data is analyzed, the selection and overview of respondents, how data is collected, ethical considerations, and lastly the limitations of this study.

3.1 Operationalization

The topic of hybrid threats is a ‘hot topic’ that currently receives much attention both on different governance levels and amongst academia. No grand theories or perfect governance models are existent yet, nor is there a universal and comprehensive definition of hybrid threats (Clarcke & Jackson, 2019; Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018; Iancu et al., 2016, p. 3). Furthermore, scholars write about countering hybrid threats and the way they ought this to be organized in governments. However, countries adopt different approaches of addressing hybrid threats. The conducted literature study points out that it is important that the topic is addressed in a comprehensive, integrated and unambiguous way. Little is known about the functioning of the Dutch approach of hybrid threats. However, observations of Bekkers et al. (2019) show that Dutch government officials do not seem to be fully perceive hybrid threats as holistic and having a permanent nature. The authors state that the Netherlands lacks a comprehensive approach due to ‘siloed mechanisms in the government’ (Bekkers et al. 2019). Furthermore, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy recommended the establishment of a NSC in an official report. Despite this advice, the Dutch Cabinet decided not to do so.

Given the observations of Bekkers et al. (2019), the disregarded advice of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (2017), it is important to explore the alignment Dutch ministries concerning hybrid threats. The goal is to find out to what extent there is an alignment between Dutch ministries in the approach of hybrid threats and if there are misalignments to be found, what they are and how they are perceived.

To measure the alignment between Dutch ministries, desk research in the form of a literature study was conducted and discussed in the second chapter of this paper and provides

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tools to create an analytical framework. The academic literature shows three important aspects in the approach of hybrid threats: defining hybrid threats, countering hybrid threats, and the organizational structure in which this takes place. As these three themes are the main concepts of this research, the sub-questions of this research are defined accordingly:

1. How are hybrid threats perceived and defined? 2. How are hybrid threats countered?

3. How are hybrid threats governed?

The sub-questions are formulated in order to structurally and coherently answer the research question presented in the introduction of this paper: “To what extent are Dutch ministries

aligned in their approach of hybrid threats?”. In order to answer the research question, an

analytical framework is developed to explore the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach of hybrid threats. Naturally, the three main concepts that are presented in the sub-questions serve as the basis of this operationalization and provide the analytical framework. These main concepts are concretized by specifying indicators. The analytical framework is presented in the next paragraph and can also be found in Appendix E.

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Defining, Countering and the Governance of Hybrid Threats

The first category is defining hybrid threats. The literature review shows that there are numerous definitions of hybrid threats and so far, no universal and comprehensive definition is found and agreed upon. Defining hybrid threats helps to thoroughly grasp the key elements and characteristics that constitute hybrid threats. The perception of what hybrid threats are is decisive in the way hybrid threats are approached. What term does the ministry use exactly, what definition does the ministry use, how is this definition perceived, what are the main characteristics of hybrid threats for the ministry? Hence, defining hybrid threats is adopted as the first category to measure alignment in the approach of Dutch ministries of hybrid threats.

The second category is countering hybrid threats. When hybrid threats are defined and perceived in a certain way, the next step is to decide how to approach and counter them. Ministries may adopt different ways of countering hybrid threats and focus on different areas. What active measures are already adopted in the ministry, how is the policy of countering hybrid threats perceived, what could be done in addition, what is needed?

The third category is the governance structure of hybrid threats in the Dutch government. Assessing the defining and countering of hybrid threats is important, but should be complemented by an assessment of how countering hybrid threats is organized within the governmental structure. As the literature review highlights, the way a hybrid threats are governed is essential and should be comprehensive and integral, according to some scholars possibly even under the authority of a NSC. Hence, it is important to address the governmental structure of hybrid threats in the Dutch context, and how this is perceived by the respondents who operate within this system. See figure 2 below for the operationalization. An enlarged version of this scheme can be found in Appendix E.

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3.2 Research Approach

The combination of the explorative research of this paper, the fact that there are no grand theories on the subject and the wish to capture the respondents’ perceptions on hybrid threats, naturally implies a qualitative research strategy, followed by a constructionist ontology and an

interpretative epistemology (Bryman, 2012, p. 379; p. 33-34). Qualitative research is favored

over quantitative research if the goal is to shed light on thoughts, perceptions and beliefs. A constructionist ontology implies that the truth is regarded a social construct; through the social interaction between actors, the truth is continuously reshaped and reinterpreted. In this way, the social world is viewed as a construct of individuals, rather than something universal or definite (Bryman, 2012, p. 35; p. 179). This reasoning fits the character of this research as this research explores the ideas and perceptions of respondents: matters that might differ from person to person and do not know an objective truth (Hansen, 2014; Hall, 1992).

Lastly, this research fits an interpretive epistemology as a content analysis and interviews are subject to interpretation of the researcher. Hence, there is no universal or neutral way to gain knowledge. Although it can be mitigated as much as possible, the researcher can never completely be separated from the research (Bryman, 2012, p. 28-31).

3.3 Research Design

As this paper is concerned with the complexity of a specific topic, alignment between Dutch ministries in their approach of hybrid threats, a case study design is adopted as research design. A case study design allows to gain extensive and in-depth knowledge on a topic (Bryman, 2012). This fits the character of this research as there is not much information available on the research topic, hence, a case study design enables to do exploratory research by collecting extensive and in-depth knowledge on the landscape of countering hybrid threats in the Netherlands.

This research aims to explore the extent of alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats. To do so, many ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ questions will be asked. Furthermore, this research focuses on a specific situation external to the researcher itself, namely governing hybrid threats in the Dutch context. A case study is useful in providing ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in exploratory research (Rowley, 2002). Additionally, a case study is useful when researching “… a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control.” (Yin, 1994, p. 9). Comprehending one specific case in a detailed and in-depth manner is the objective of a case study design and therefore fits the nature of this research (Bryman, 2012, p. 66-68).

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3.4 Research Method

In order to comprehensively answer the research question and increase triangulation, this paper adopts three research methods: literature review, document analysis and semi-structured interviews. It is essential to gather data through different methods and sources, as triangulation enhances the validity of the research (Bryman, 2012).

The first method is desktop research of the existing literature on hybrid threats. The literature is mainly collected from online libraries. Based on the findings, a theoretical framework is established that serves as the input for the operationalization of this research. The theoretical framework provided the main concepts of this research: defining, countering and the governance of hybrid threats. These concepts function as the foundation of the analytical framework that was presented in chapter three. The findings have constructed the theoretical framework, which was presented in the second chapter of this paper.

The second method is a document analysis (Bryman, 2012). Through this method, official governmental reports are analyzed. The document analysis serves as a basis and exploration on current policy of hybrid threats in the Netherlands. It lays the groundwork for further, more insight, research. Governmental documents have the potential to be biased, but can be interesting because of the biases they might reveal (Bryman, 2012, p. 550). The analysis of government reports is presented in chapter four.

In order to complement the literature review and document analysis with more insight and in-depth information, semi-structured interviews with relevant people are conducted (Bryman, 2012). Adopting semi-structured interviews as a research method is both flexible and structured to a certain extent. This allows the researcher to ask the pre-set questions that are a fixed part of the interview, as well as to go into depth on topics that the respondent specifically raises, or that the researcher finds specifically interesting concerning a respondent (Bryman, 2012, p. 470). In this way, there is room for each interview to take a natural course. Semi-structured interviews fit the character of this qualitative research that aims to shed light on the perceptions of its respondents. A list of the pre-set interview questions can be found in Appendix D.

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After transcribing the interviews, the data is analyzed through the process of coding. The program ‘NVivo’ is used to code the data in an organized manner. Coding allows the researcher to apply structure in the large amount of data, which allows for better analysis. The qualitative and explorative character of this research naturally fits an inductive, data-driven, way of coding. Hence, this research adopts open coding (Bryman, 2012). The data will first undergo open coding as a first step. During this step, the data is subdivided and labeled. By linking open codes together, new codes will arise in the second step: axial coding. In the last step, selective coding, these axial codes are merged into categories. In total, 160 open codes, 30 axial codes and 3 categorical codes are found. The complete code list can be found in Appendix A.

As there are no grand theories present on the subject and this research aims to develop theory, rather than test existing grand theories, this research adopts data-driven coding. Data-driven coding allows the data to take the lead, before the theoretical framework comes into play. This paper therefore adopts grounded theory: analyzing data with an open attitude whilst disregarding the theoretical framework (Bryman, 2012, p. 568). However, inductive coding is never completely without involving theory, and deductive coding never completely without openly assessing the data. Rather, it is an iterative process. Hence, although this paper conducts open coding, the data will also be held in the light of the theoretical framework in the conclusion of this research.

3.6 Respondents and Data Collection

The semi-structured interviews are conducted with seven respondents. Their names and job titles are disclosed to the thesis supervisor with their consent. To protect the anonymity of the respondents, their names and job titles are not mentioned in this thesis. Each respondent works in a ministry that is involved with the policy regarding hybrid threats:

Respondent Ministry

Respondent 1 Ministry of Defense

Respondent 2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Respondent 3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Respondent 4 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations

Respondent 5 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy

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Respondent 7 Ministry of Justice and Safety: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism

All respondents are government officials that work on the policy regarding hybrid threats. The research question of this paper addresses the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats, hence, it is essential that a respondent from every involved ministry is interviewed.

The semi-structured interviews were supposed to take place in person, at the respondents’ location of favor. However, due to the current Covid-19 situation, the interviews take place through a medium such as Microsoft Teams, or Skype (both are perceived as some of the safest options concerning privacy). Besides audio, video is used as often as possible. In this way, the interview resembles a face to face interview as much as possible.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

This research highly values ethical considerations. Hence, several measures are taken. A form of consent is sent to and signed by all respondents before conducting the interview. The form of consent explicitly outlines the terms and conditions of participating in this research, such as the interviews being recorded. The form of consent can be found in Appendix C.

Furthermore, upon requests of all respondents, the names nor the exact functions of the respondents are disclosed to the readers of this paper. This information is merely known by the supervisor and second reader of this research. The same goes for the transcripts of the interviews.

Lastly, besides signing the form of consent, several respondents wish to see in which context their statements are put if a part of the interview is quoted. Thus, as an extra precautionary measure, the quotes used in this paper are first sent to the corresponding respondent to ask for extra verification to use the quote in a certain context.

3.8 Reliability and Validity

This paragraph reflects on the reliability and validity of the research. Both are important aspects with regards to the quality of research.

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or less the same amount of follow-up questions are asked to ensure rich data and all interviews are transcribed and coded in the same manner. The reliability of this research could be stronger if it were conducted by more than one researcher. In that case, reliability could be enhanced when different researchers interpret interviews alike and the interviewer bias is decreased (Lewis, 2009; Bryman, 2012). However, given the individual nature of this assignment, this research was conducted in a way that maximizes its consistency.

The validity of research is concerned with the trustworthiness and meaningfulness of the research: the appropriateness of the tools, methodology, process, and data and if the study eventually measures what it aims to measure (Leung, 2015). To enhance the validity of this research, ‘second tier triangulation’ has been applied, meaning that data is collected through several (three, in this case) different methods (Leung, 2015). The internal validity of this research is expected to be strong due to the comprehensive and in-depth character of this research.

The external validity of this research is relatively limited. Due to the time frame of this thesis the scope of this research is relatively small, as N=7. Because of the small scope of the research and the qualitative case study, it is not possible to generalize the outcomes of this research upon a larger population (Bryman, 2012). However, a case study can suggest further research based on the gained insights.

Lastly, a restriction of the semi-structured interviews is that, although respondents agree to participate, respondents might withhold certain information out of a certain extent of fear. This fear might be directed towards colleagues, the ministry, or others. However, even if the researcher is not provided with the complete truth in words, sometimes certain cues such as pauses in sentences and doubt, are interesting to observe. No hard conclusions can be drawn based on these observations, but they are taken into account.

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4. Analysis of Policy Reports

This chapter provides a structured overview of the results and analysis. This research collects data through two methods: a document analysis of policy reports and semi-structured interviews with respondents from Dutch involved ministries. The document analysis serves as a first understanding of the existing Dutch policy landscape concerning hybrid threats. The analysis of the semi-structured interviews complements this understanding by providing more in-depth knowledge on the Dutch approach on hybrid threats. In line with the sub-questions of this research, both the document analysis and the interview analysis are structured by three main themes: defining hybrid threats, countering hybrid threats, and organizational cooperation. First, the document analysis will be discussed. This analysis serves as a basis in understanding the existing approach of the Netherlands towards hybrid threats. The section will start with a short overview of EU and NATO policy documents, to provide the context in which the Netherlands finds itself due to membership of both organizations.

4.1 NATO and the EU

Next to the purely academic contexts that have been discussed in the theoretical framework, the NATO and the EU are highly engaged with the topic and provide their frameworks on hybrid threats as well.

First of all, the report ‘NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats’ speaks of the absence of a both reliable and official definition of hybrid warfare. Therefore, the NATO defines hybrid threats as: “The true combination and blending of various means of conflict, both regular and unconventional, dominating the physical and psychological battlefield with information and media control, using every possible means to reduce one’s exposure.” (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015, p. 3). An integrated use of means and domains comes forward as being important. Furthermore, the combination of traditional and non-traditional war methods, and the possible withholding from physical violence are emphasized. The authors state that hybrid wars and threats do not take on one single form, and therefore do not know one sole way to be countered. Lastly, actors can be both state and non-state actors that aim to send a political or ideological message (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015).

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“While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their evolving nature, the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological),

which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.” (European

Commission, 2016, p. 2).

As such, the European Commission (EC) does not provide or use a fixed definition of hybrid threats. Just as NATO’s description, the description of the EC emphasizes the integrated use of means and methods, both conventional and unconventional. Additionally, the EC emphasizes the element of asymmetry, staying under the threshold of traditional war, the combination of military and non-military activities, the multidimensional character, and hybrid threats being difficult to attribute.

4.2 The Dutch Landscape

Earlier in this paper, the theoretical framework elaborated upon the academic definitions of hybrid threats, countering hybrid threats and the organizational structure of addressing hybrid threats. This section will discuss how these aspects are perceived in the Dutch government by reviewing several policy papers. There are six ministries primarily involved in formulating policy on hybrid threats. However, in practice, only three ministries issued their own reports and/or letters to parliament, so these will be discussed. Hence, the policy papers that are analyzed are either general policy documents, or policy documents coming from one of these three ministries.

4.2.A Defining Hybrid Threats

In the context of this research, it is crucial to analyze how hybrid threats are perceived and described by the involved ministerial actors. After discussing relevant policy documents and letters to parliament, the concept of ‘disinformation’ and ‘state threats’ are analyzed as they are closely related to the concept of hybrid threats and are found to be important to the analysis of hybrid threats.

Ministry of Justice and Safety

One of the six involved ministries in the issue of hybrid threats is Min.JenV. One of its suborganizations, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV),

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provided their interpretation of hybrid threats in the report Een duiding van het fenomeen

‘hybride dreiging’ (‘an interpretation of the phenomenon ‘hybrid threat’) (NCTV, 2019). The

NCTV perceives the term ‘hybrid threats’ as a new term and acknowledges that the nature and dimensions of conflicts have developed due to technological opportunities, but does not perceive its key elements as new. Rather, the concept entails dynamics that are part of interstate relations since a long time. The concept in this sense refers to a threat that can appear in different forms and can have impact on different levels of national security, and therefore is a threat to national security. The term ‘hybrid’ refers to the combination of tools, the asymmetric character of a threat, the pluriform manifestation and the multiple ways the threat can have impact.

However, the NCTV (2019) argues that the core of thinking about national safety is already constituted by integrality and complexity. Therefore, using the term ‘hybrid’ does not add anything new. Hence, this policy report suggests that it would be more accurate to speak of ‘the threat to national safety by hybrid conflicts’ and defines it as follows: ‘the waging of conflict between states, largely under the legal level of openly armed conflict, with an integrated use of tools and actors, aiming to achieve certain strategic objectives’.

Important aspects in this definition of the NCTV (2019) are the integrated use of tools that might be military and non-military, such as diplomatic, economic, or digital tools, disinformation, foreign interference and military intimidation. Another important aspect is that threats to national safety by hybrid conflicts are often characterized by deception, ambiguity and denial that hamper attribution and an effective response. Lastly, threats to national safety by hybrid conflicts should be perceived as being part of a strategy or campaign; not as loose actions on their own.

Ministry of Defense

A second involved ministry is Min.Def and its suborganization the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD). In their annual report Jaarverslag MIVD 2018 (2019) the MIVD defines hybrid threats in line with the afore mentioned definition of the NCTV: ‘hybrid war or conflict is the integrated deployment of all available political-diplomatic, economic, information, intelligence, cyber, social-cultural and military tools that a state can employ to reach its political-strategical objectives, without engaging in an openly interstate armed

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report of the MIVD (2018) states that hybrid threats are not a new phenomenon, but have obtained a greater impact due to technological changes.

Whereas the NCTV (2019) chooses to address hybrid threats as ‘the threat of national safety by hybrid threats’, the MIVD (2018) does not do the same. It refers to hybrid threats as ‘hybrid threats’, ‘hybrid war’, or ‘hybrid conflict.

Furthermore, in its annual report, the MIVD (2018) mentions that hybrid strategies are often characterized by a high extent of flexibility. The choice of certain tools and focuses may therefore depend on the actor. To illustrate, the objectives of Russia are to undermine NATO solidarity and the trans-Atlantic relationship, and to influence the national and European decision processes. Russia does so by focusing mainly on political, economic, military and influential measures. The main objective of China is to acquire a prominent role on the world stage, leveling the United States.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Min.BuZa does not produce its own official policy document on hybrid threats. However, the magazine, De Veiligheidsdiplomaat, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does write about the ‘fight against hybrid threats’. The article describes hybrid threats in line with the abovementioned definitions. It refers to the integrated and coordinated deployment of tools inside and outside the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law (DIMEFIL) domain. The article furthermore states that the actors are mostly states that use their capacities to undermine their opponents and increase their influence. Traditional responses to these kind of threats are difficult, as their nature is mostly non-conventional.

Moreover, the analysis of the policy documents shows two important aspects that are of particular importance in context of the Dutch approach of hybrid threats. Disinformation is a sub theme within hybrid threats that is perceived as the most well-known aspect of hybrid threats and receives much attention within the government (De Veiligheidsdiplomaat, 2019). Furthermore, it is striking that when reading about the Dutch policy on hybrid threats, often ‘state threats’ are referred to (Blok, 2019). Therefore, the next paragraphs will elaborate on these two concepts in greater detail.

Disinformation

The domain of (dis)information is one of the aspects of hybrid threats and of great importance to all involved ministries. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Min.OCW) and the

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Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Min.BZK) mostly focus on disinformation when addressing hybrid threats. In the letter to parliament from Min.BZK, the ministry states the cooperation with the EU and adopts its definition of disinformation: ‘the demonstrable wrong or misleading information that is created, presented and distributed for economic gain or to intentionally mislead the public, and that can cause damage to the public domain’ (European Commission, 2018). An example of a topic about which disinformation is spread is the crash of MH17. Many theories have circulated since the crash and a significant part seem to be incorrect and designed to create confusion. Furthermore, disinformation can have the intention to manipulate political processes in a country by influencing opinions and behavior of the public. It serves to create division and confusion in order to achieve geopolitical and strategical goals. The use of disinformation is just one of the tools to reach this objective (Ollongren, 2019).

Disinformation is countered based on three main pillars: prevention, strengthening the information position, and reaction. Prevention mostly focuses on increasing resilience amongst civilians and government officials, increasing transparency, and maintaining a pluralistic media landscape. Min.BZK and Min.OCW are working on this pillar. Regarding the second pillar, other actors come into play. Next to Min.BZK, the ministries of Min.BuZa, Min.Def and Min.JenV work on strengthening the information position. This is done by improving the information position through cooperation between the involved parties, international cooperation (EU, NATO, other states), and knowledge development through addressing new technologies. The last pillar, reaction, holds fact-checking in cooperation with journalists, scientists and internet providers, contradicting disinformation through a diplomatic response frame, and an exploration of legal possibilities (Ollongren, 2019).

Lastly, the letter to parliament considers the nature of disinformation as a ‘statelijke dreiging’, meaning a state threat or threat from state actors. It is said that ‘state actors can misuse influence and use deception through manipulated information, which may be as part of a hybrid conflict campaign’ (Ollongren, 2019). ‘State threats’ is a term that is often used in policy papers when addressing hybrid threats. The next section will therefore elaborate on the term and its relation to hybrid threats.

Governing Hybrid Threats: Exploring the alignment of Dutch ministries in their approach towards hybrid threats