PESCO: Why have European states chosen to advance defense integration?

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PESCO

Why have European states chosen to

advance defense integration?

Crisis and Security Management Master Thesis

Bas Nijhuis (S2111098) Universiteit Leiden

Master Crisis and Security Management Supervisor: Dr. L. D. Cabane

Second reader: Prof. dr. A.L. Dimitrova Admission: 09-06-2019

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List of figures

Fig. 1: A timeline of PESCO ... 9

Fig.2: Defense spending as % of GDP ... 26

Fig.3: Share in EU GDP total, 2016 ... 26

Fig. 4: Net contributions by EU member states, 2000-2015 ... 27

Fig. 5: Total defense expenditure ... 36

Fig. 6: A step change for security and defense... 37

Fig. 7: Eiropean collaborative defense equipment procurement ... 39

Fig. 8: Public opinion of defense and security coopeation in the EU ... 44

Fig. 9: Filtered hits for “PESCO” on Factiva, 2009-2019 ... 45

Fig. 10: General government expenditure by function in the EU ... 51

Abstract

At the end of 2017, 25 European Union member states adopted a new defense cooperation program, known as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These member states have different views and relative positions within the Union, but eventually, all endorsed such an integrative move on defense. Four different possible drivers for this move are analyzed: 1. relative power gain, 2. economic benefits, 3. spillover effects and 4. public opinion and political debate. In an analysis that uses the EU’s general interests as a starting point and three focal points (Germany, Poland and the Netherlands) to focus on European integration, it follows that especially the relative power gain and the economic benefits of PESCO are most clearly visible as explanatory for the integrative move. No conclusive evidence for functional spillover pressures is found. Public opinion is generally positive in the EU and the member states, but the political debate has been critical toward PESCO in some member states, including Poland.

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1. Introduction

On November 13, 2017, 23 member states of the European Union signed a joint notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). This marked the first formal step towards a more clear-cut distinction in EU military cooperation. This program creates an overarching structure for different projects in which EU member states can choose whether they want to participate. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU, 2009) already laid down the foundations for this program in article 42.6, which states the opt-in/opt-out nature of PESCO. Commission president Juncker called it the “Sleeping Beauty of the Treaty” because of its high potential to increase defense cooperation, though the growing distrust towards the ‘European Project’ and towards further integration made realization of the plans tough in the years after the failed EU Constitution (Benavente, 2017; Nováky, 2018).

After the constitutional foundation had not been put to use for years, PESCO was put back on the agenda in 2016. Germany published an influential White Paper in that year, in which they explained their views on how PESCO should be shaped (German Federal Government, 2016). Dutch policy officers recognize this as influential for the development of PESCO (see appendix IV). The French and German governments both wanted to increase defense cooperation within the EU and were therefore instrumental in starting new talks about launching PESCO and how that should be shaped. During the Dutch presidency of the Council of Ministers in early 2016, the rough outlines of PESCO were shaped and well into the following presidencies, there were intensive debates on the what and how of PESCO. The decision to join the program was not yet a part of the equation at this stage, as the member states still needed to see how the modalities would be framed. This stage is signified by negotiations on the level of the civil servants, that needed to see whether or not the final proposal would be acceptable to the political leadership in their respective capitals (see Appendices II, III, and IV). The program only gained public attention much later. On the European Council of June 2017, EU’s heads of state and government agreed that within three months’ time, there should be a common list of criteria and commitments with concrete capability projects (Council of the European Union, 2018).

This case fits within a longer debate in the literature on European military cooperation. Multiple authors have noticed a move from a more bi- or trilateral cooperation structure to an elevation to the European level. For example, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014) explain that ‘core state powers’ have moved from the traditional unit of the nation-state to the European level, including defense cooperation (2014: 1, 44-5). Authors such as Violakis (2018) and Börzel and Panke (2014) call this movement the ‘Europeanization’ of the security policy within the EU. Overall, there is agreement on the fact that

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Europeanization of military cooperation takes place (although authors vary in their assessment on the extent to which this is happening), but the primary different insights lie in the question as to what and why this takes place. Explanations are for example to be found in economic gains, balance-of-power thinking (Howorth, 2017; Drent, Wilms, & Zandee, 2017), the construction of a strong European identity or (in the case of a small group of Realist thinkers) overall denial of existence of efficient and structural cooperation in the field of defense (Mérand & Angers, 2014: 57). The literature focuses strongly on where these different views stem from. The literature emphasizes the different integration theories, serving as a basis for the analysis of European integration. This can also be connected to the case of PESCO and its adoption, for it fits within this debate on military cooperation. It seems that more and more of these ‘core state powers’ flow to the European level, not only in terms of operational needs but also in funding and research and development (EEAS, 2018c).

This move is an interesting development. As of May 2019, 25 out of 28 member states of the EU have officially joined PESCO (those who have not joined are the UK which is leaving the EU, Denmark which has a constitutional opt-out of all international defense cooperation and Malta which is still testing PESCO for constitutionality) (EEAS, 2018c). This does not mean that these 25 have similar views on European integration: the degree to which member states are supportive of further integration differs quite strongly. In this thesis, I analyze the case of PESCO from the perspective of the support for further integration by member states. Based on integration theory, drivers are identified that might have explanatory value as to why states have joined the PESCO program. To be able to come to a representative conclusion in this analysis, I employ a case study, in which the primary focus is on the general interests of the EU, with three specific member states as focal points. These focal points follow from identified positions in the European integration debate: Poland has been among the member states to show great reluctance toward further ‘deepening’ of the EU, meaning these member states would be less likely to sign further cooperation pacts (Bruszt, 2015: 44). The other two studied member states are the Netherlands, which is recognized to have become increasingly reserved in the integration debate (Zandee, 2018; Schout, 2018) and Germany, which has been predominantly promoting the ideals of PESCO and further integration of almost all policy areas in the European Union (Allers, 2016; Franke, 2017).

It must be made clear that PESCO is seen as a method to study further (military) integration within the EU, thus placing specific capabilities in the international/intergovernmental arena, while this had previously been regarded as a sole member state responsibility. This provides a different insight from a policy analysis perspective, which would deal with how the policies of and surrounding PESCO are shaped. The choice to be part of a program that is recognized to have previously been a member state

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responsibility according to the TFEU1_{can be seen as an integrative move (Zahariadis & Buonanno, 2018:}

4-6). The aim of this study is to find out why this move has taken place and does not touch upon the policy process after the decision to join the program had already been made. Through this case description, this thesis presents the following research question: “Why have EU member states chosen to deepen defense integration, in the form of the PESCO program?”

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2. Body of knowledge and theoretical framework

The wider question of PESCO and defense integration is of course not limited to this sole program that shapes the current level of defense cooperation in the European Union. To be able to explain a specific position of any of the 25 member states in its position on defense integration and the PESCO program, one needs to look at the broader spectrum of defense cooperation in the EU. This is because PESCO fits the larger paradigm of the Common Security and Defence2_{Policy of the EU, which is a comprehensive set}

of policies in the EU that constitute the whole of defense and security cooperation. To make sense of defense integration and PESCO, this thesis provides a contextual insight of defense cooperation and the inception of PESCO. Moreover, the theoretical background serves as the basis of the analysis of the case of PESCO.

2.1 PESCO: contextual background

To be able to make sense of PESCO, it is necessary to delineate the basic structure and especially the historic developments of defense cooperation in the EU, as they have ultimately shaped the debate on PESCO. A deeper and wider overview of the historic developments of the EU security and defense policies is for example found in Drent, Wilms and Zandee (2017).

In 1991, the then-12 members of the European Community adopted the Maastricht treaty, which formally introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Up until that period, the European Community regarded foreign and security policy as a competence of the member state. After 1991, the European Community became known as the European Union (EU). The tasks of the EU grew beyond the sole economic cooperation which until then had served as the main function and aim of the European interconnectedness. Under the Maastricht treaty, the CFSP became one of the three main pillars (the others being Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the European Communities, which dealt mainly with social and economic policy). Under the CFSP, it remained officially the task of NATO to ensure the territorial defense of Europe, but the EU suddenly also became a security actor. Its objectives were dedicated toward peacekeeping missions and crisis response. This was solidified in the Treaty, by the European Council in 1999. The Council then decided to reinforce the CFSP by launching a specific course of action regarding security and defense, named the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), enhancing the role of the EU as a security actor. This is the precursor to the CSDP the EU knows today. This created an official

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foundation for the deployment of military means for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security (Council of the European Union, 2018).

Since then, the framework for facilitating these goals and the actual deployment of military means has also greatly increased. In 2004, the European Defence Agency was established and in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty provided for the creation of the European External Action Service, the foreign relations service of the EU. However, since 2016 the EU has moved forward with regards to defense and security action plans: the European Union Global Strategy was adopted in June 2016. This document clarified the interests and aims of the EU in the field of defense and security for the near and further future in an increasingly unstable world with many challenges that touch upon the core existential being of the Union (Council of the European Union, 2016). A number of authors also recognized it to be an identity-building exercise for the EU: seeing that the EU is the odd-one-out among global actors, it is also a goal in and of itself to establish a frame of the EU as a security actor that reflects its economic power and ambitions (Pishchikova & Piras, 2017: 104). This fits well within the framework of the realist theory of international relations, which prescribes that any international actor is measured by its power (Pollack, 2015). This frame of increased power could serve the EU in its objectives and ambitions in the international sphere. It is however recognized that there is a simple necessity for the European Union to bring further structure in their approach to defense and security operations, especially in light of the ambitions as set out in the Global Strategy (Drent, Wilms, & Zandee, 2017).

This is also the light in which PESCO must be seen: the increasing ambitions of the EU are embodied in a more structural approach to security and defense. Here, three main goals of PESCO are set out as identified by the European External Action Service (2018): first, the collaboration between member states in the field of security and defense is no longer ad hoc: due to the systemic nature of the program, it will provide a formal, sustainable and binding frame work to facilitate this cooperation. The aim is to structure the progress of deepening the defense cooperation in the EU gradually, which is in line with the ambitions as set out in the Global Strategy. Its aim is to enhance capabilities to provide security and meet the commitments that the EU has to various international partners. Second, the projects in PESCO have been linked to operational needs. This means that the lessons learned from past cooperation are now applied systematically in the framework. It also entails that an increased focus is placed on rising concerns such as cybersecurity, maritime surveillance and training. Third, PESCO is, as mentioned before, not a stand-alone tool. It fits together with two other initiatives that follow from the Global strategy: first is the European Defence Fund (EDF), which was established in 2017. The fund is budgeted from the Multi-annual Financial Framework to directly finance defense cooperation and research collaboration. Additionally, in 2017 a

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program known as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was launched. This is meant as a process to monitor all plans of EU member states to help coordinate defense spending and identify projects for possible collaboration. All this together makes for a comprehensive EU defense package. Governance of PESCO is arranged on two levels: first, the Council of the EU arranges the overall political direction of PESCO and associated defense programs, and also includes an assessment mechanism to identify whether or not member states are fulfilling their commitments. However, at the project level, the member states participating in that specific project will also take care of the management. The main coordination of these projects lies with the lead participating member states, that are determined before commencement of a certain project (EEAS, 2018c; EEAS, 2018d). Below, a timeline of the development of PESCO is provided.

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Figure 1. A timeline of PESCO. Source: EEAS (2018b). Timeline: European cooperation in the area of security and defence. June 2016: Launch of EU Global Strategy September 2016: France and Germany draw up plans for PESCO November 2016: EEAS proposes plans for PESCO

December 2016: European Council adopts defense package including plans on PESCO April 2017: EU leaders review defense package June 2017: European Council agrees on the need to activate PESCO July 2017: proposal for modalities of PESCO from 8 member states July -November 2017: open bargaining on PESCO September 2017: Poland agrees to join PESCO November 2017: Notification by 23 member states with interest to join PESCO December 2017: Ireland and Portugal join PESCO last, European Council adopts the decision to

launch PESCO March 2018: first 17 PESCO projects adopted by European Council

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2.2 Literature review

As stated in the introduction, there is a wide selection of literature on defense and security cooperation in the European Union with regards to historical developments, legal and political frameworks, policy analysis and theoretical understanding of the drivers of this cooperation (see for example Violakis, 2018; Mérand & Angers, 2014; Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013; Cini & Borragán, 2014; Howorth, 2014). The specific focus in said literature is answering the question of to what extent this cooperation in defense and security has advanced. However, authors do not always agree to what extent there has been a ‘Europeanization’ of defense cooperation. For example, Mérand & Angers argue that while one cannot deny the speed with which military integration has taken place in the EU, it is still a “far cry from Europeanization” (2014: 47). However, Violakis (2018: 17-27) and Börzel & Panke (2014) tend to disagree: they argue that the process has advanced so quickly and far-reaching over the past two decades that a ‘Europeanization’ of military integration can indeed be described.

Another significant part in the discussion is focused on the different understanding of full capacities and political will of member states that shape the level of cooperation in the EU (e.g. Mérand and Angers, 2014: 59). The European member states were and remain divided on what role they see for the EU in security and defense. In the literature, three different dichotomies are recognized. First, those who focus of NATO vs. the desire for a greater European autonomy. Second, those who defend national sovereignty vs. proponents of transferring foreign policy into the Community framework. Third and last, those with capacity and support for an active solitary foreign and defense policy vs. the smaller states who are dependent on others for impactful foreign policy (Giegerich, 2015: 440). This then leads to the question why European states have taken more successful steps in Foreign and Security policy after the Cold War ended, while the threat of the Soviet Union had diminished tremendously. Various answers are provided: Howorth argues that the end of the 1980s were characterized by an emergent ‘trans-European awareness’, which served as an alternate answer to the harsh dichotomies of the bipolar nuclear stand-off. The European Community could take a position on the international stage (Howorth, 2014: 3). Others point in a different direction: Giegerich, for example, puts the driving forces more with the external events in which multiple EU member states became entangled. One of the prominent factors recognized is the Jugoslav wars of the earlies 90s, but also the reinforcement programs in the Mediterranean and former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe (Giegerich, 2015: 441). However, this does not focus on the theoretical aspect of analyzing the ongoing integration in defense and security in Europe over the past three decades. Also on defense cooperation, there are many debates on what theoretical paradigm fits

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analyses of this topic best. The part below explains these differences and what theories will be used in the analysis of the PESCO program.

2.3 Theoretical framework

Since the start of European cooperation, primarily after the end of the Second World War, many theories have been developed to be able to make sense of European integration and what underlying factors drive this. Some of the theories of integration were formed during a period of economic integration and these theories tend to have a sole focus on economic aspects of cooperation. However, the level of integration has changed to a larger spectrum of policy areas. The choice for a standard integration theory has therefore also become more complex, as it depends on the focus of the theory on specific aspects of cooperation. For example, the application of neofunctionalist logics are no longer solely reserved for the area of ‘low politics’ and intergovernmentalism can also explain economic integration (Bergmann, 2018). In contemporary debates on the most dominant EU integration theory, scholars agree on (amongst others) two main theories: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. A theory that was developed more recently, about public opinion and identity politics affecting EU integration is postfunctionalism, has gained much attention in the past decade (see Hooghe & Marks, 2019; Kuhn, 2019; Börzel & Risse, 2019). These three major EU integration theories will be used as the theoretical basis upon which the analysis in this paper will be based, due to their recognized influence and explanatory value on further integration in the EU. However, a specific element is largely absent in these three theories, which is specific to security and defense: a power dimension. This dimension is widely present in the available analyses of European defense cooperation and the PESCO program (see e.g. Drent, Wilms, & Zandee, 2017; Biscop, 2018; Major & Mölling, 2019). A further explanation of this power dimension can be offered through one of the classic International Relations theories: realism. Realism offers a paradigm of (hard) power analysis and offers an explanation for security dilemmas (Pollack, 2015). The basic premises of these theories are explained below.

The large variety of EU integration theories that is available is not the only challenging facet of looking at the theoretical landscape surrounding EU integration and subsequent policy-making. It is also a question of the level of analysis: there is a difference between the deepening of integration and the policy-making process, but this difference is not set in stone; where does the analysis of the ‘high-politics integration’ end and must one focus on the policy level? (Pollack, 2015). The epistemological who, what and why of integration is thus seen very differently: who and what has driven the choice for further integration and why has this choice been made? Many of the theories are distinct, but might show convergence on certain facets, such as the main type of actor(s) involved. For example, in the classical

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theory of Realism, the main actor to be recognized is the nation-state (in this sense the EU member state), but the same goes for the basic assumption on which intergovernmentalism is founded (Pollack, 2015: 23; Schmidt, 2018: 1544). Additionally, theories like neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism tend to focus strongly on economic aspects of integration, but have a different understanding of what drives cooperation and will therefore both be considered.

The contextual insight in PESCO and defense integration as it is explained in 2.1, shows that the level of cooperation in the field of defense and security in the EU has risen significantly in the past fifteen years. However, it fails to provide an explanation as to why the level of cooperation, especially in military affairs, has gained this momentum in this timeframe. The literature on defense cooperation in the EU offers different reasons for this momentum. The various assumptions that are made by diverse authors are influenced by the different paradigms of integration that they have used in their analysis. These paradigms follow from the European integration theories that can be used to make sense of integration. The part below sheds light on the aforementioned fundamental integration theories and a framework from which the case of PESCO can be analyzed.

2.3.1 Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism is primarily focused on market integration and deals mostly with economic drivers to explain the drive for integration. It shows some characteristics of classic IR theory, which posits that state survival and the effect of economic growth thereon are to be seen as the number one drive for international relations (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). It reflects the position of dominant sectoral business interests and explains the interconnectedness between fields of European integration as spillover (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016: 50). The theory sees integration as a process, which has its own dynamic. Regional integration is reached by diverse and changing actors, that are rational and seek to find a positive-sum game which has a “a supranational style of decision-making where participants seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests” (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015: 197). The aforementioned spillover effects are reinforcing processes through which the deepening of integration also happens. The cooperation between nation-states may have two consequences: it both opens up new possibilities for cooperation, or it generates unanticipated problems that may require further integration as an answer to these unforeseen problems (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). This can be illustrated by a hypothetical situation: say, the economic stability in the EU is threatened because of the freedom of movement. This could for example be countered by increasing security cooperation in the Union.

The two basic assumptions that follow from neofunctionalism regarding the further integration within the EU are thus that it must either benefit the survival of the state or it must bring economic gain.

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If this is extended to defense integration in the European Union, advancing defense cooperation must be necessary to ensure survival of the EU or a member state (which are closely interlinked in terms of security issues) or the defense cooperation carries recognized economic benefits. There might be functional pressures that can drive these two perceived benefits: a basic premise that the original objective can only be achieved by further integrative actions. This ‘original objective’ can then be the economic improvement or the survival of the state; neofunctionalism predicts that pressure arises when this can only be achieved through additional integration (Bergmann, 2018).

2.3.2 Classic, liberal and new intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism has been recognized to be the second important branch of (EU) integration theory. It also builds on the traditional ideas of international relations theories such as Realism where national governments are the primary actors in further integration. Change is driven by converge of governmental preference and periods of inertia follow diverging national interests (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: 37-8). The very name of intergovernmentalism refers to the way the actors interact: as the main actors are national governments, international cooperation is thus intergovernmental. The opposite of this understanding is supranationalism, in which the ontological basis for cooperation and main actors lies within the higher international realm, where the supranational actors like the European Commission or the European Court of Justice are the main actors (Howorth, 2012). However, supranationalism is not highlighted here, due to the fact that it has been recognized that PESCO has been a move by the national governments and the Council, rather than by the supranational actors (which is a different course of action from for example the European Defense Fund, see e.g. Haroche, 2019; Bakker, Drent, & Zandee, 2016).

Liberal intergovernmentalism as introduced by Andrew Moravcsik in 1993 is a follow-up of this theory, and Moravcsik and other liberal intergovernmentalist thinkers argue that the EU is a successful intergovernmental regime where underlying political factors rather than socio-economic factors (as presumed by neofunctionalism) drives integration through interstate negotiation. Liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the different preferences that are the result of the respective country’s domestic interests and their influence on the governments. The considerations of both domestic pressures and of the government itself are mainly economic; thus, the drive is to achieve economic interdependence, where both the partners may receive a net gain. Additionally, regional integration can be a result of a shifting Balance of Power (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The outcomes of negotiation on any field are the result of bargaining between member states. The bargaining power of states is quite important: within the negotiations, for example package deals or ‘side payments’ have their use to reach the ultimate preference of a certain member state. It is a continuous exchange of favors and larger member states hold more

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bargaining power over smaller member states. One of the main assumptions of the theory is the minimal role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’, such as the Commission or NGOs, as the member state government is the primary actor in decision-making. The supranational institutions are in place to ensure the credible commitment of each of the member states, i.e. to hold them to their promise of commitment. In terms of comparison, the theory of (liberal) intergovernmentalism is similar to neofunctionalism in looking primarily at economic drivers of integration, but neofunctionalism identifies a much larger role for actors other than the member states’ governments (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011; Moravcsik, 1993). Hooghe and Marks (2019) also argue that in this theory, the decision process is the main focus: first, there is a domestic formation of preferences. After, intergovernmental bargaining takes place, which then leads to further EU consolidation. Only at this last stage, there is a supranational role for the policy entrepreneurs as mentioned before. Assymmetrical interdependence among states is one of the main factors that shapes the intergovernmental bargaining; those states that are least in need of the agreement are best positioned to determine the terms of the bargain (Hooghe & Marks, 2019: 4).

New intergovernmentalism as set forth by Bickerton et al. does not necessarily contest (liberal) intergovernmentalism but simply argues that the modus operandi of the EU has changed tremendously and therefore needs a different analytical paradigm to explain the process of integration. The main premises are that deliberation and consensus have become the guiding norms of day-to-day decision-making at all levels. This means that consensus has become the end instead of a means for further supranational integration, i.e. all policy areas rely heavily on intergovernmental decision-making. Problems with domestic preference formation is another one of its main premises: there are too many diverging domestic forces with an overall growing distrust in the political system. This makes it problematic for the main actor as identified by the theory, the member state, to enter negotiations with a specific and ‘predictable’ point of view, due to the various influences that are domestically exerted on the national government. As a final statement, the authors state that the EU is in a state of disequilibrium, meaning that the ‘balance of integration’ as it was proposed by other, older theories has changed to a situation of instability and a contradictory nature of integration (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015).

Specifically in the field of defense and security, intergovernmentalism is seen as one of the most predominant theories. This is due to the fact that security and defense have always had a place as a core state power, in contract to for example economic policy (Haroche, 2019: 2). Even though this view has been contested and it has been argued that these competencies have increasingly moved to the European arena (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014), it certainy remains strongly influenced by the member states. Since the core premise of intergovermentalism revolves around economic interdependence, if one were

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to look at defense cooperation through the intergovernmentalist paradigm, there would be the assumption that defense cooperation must bring a positive net gain for all actors involved. A choice for defense or security integration is driven by intergovernmental bargaining where for example collective procurement or resource pooling brings savings for those member states involved, where the member states try to reach the maximum benefit for their state. An underlying presumption is that those states that will benefit most from further cooperation on defense will choose in favor of integration. The drive is economic or a respective state’s security situation.

2.3.3 Postfunctionalism

One of the more recent and divergent theories is postfunctionalism, which was introduced by Hooghe and Marks in 2009. In their article, the authors claim that European Integration as a process has become politicized in elections and referendums. It is a course and effect of politicization of topics. First, there is a mismatch between the institutional status quo and the functional pressures for multilevel (EU) governance. Then, it is important to see what the arena of decision-making is: private vs. public. In the public arena, the involvement of (mass) media are highly influential.

The local debate and political conflict shapes EU integration, but also vice versa. Therefore, the preferences of the general public and national political parties have shaped the debate and outcome of European integration. Hooghe and Marks speak of the ‘constraints’ of public, majoritarian politics: voters (as representative of the public) are likely to reject or limit integration when they fear to become the economic loser of integration or when they perceive a supranational institution to undermine their national sovereignty or identity. In this theory, identity is the core value around which the argument is shaped and determines support for or dissent of further integration. The theory differs greatly in view with other major theories on the fact that decision-making is not necessarily shaped by rationalist-economic logic (thus functionality), but is rather impacted by other motivations of human behavior, such as communal identity. The postfunctionalist theory sees EU integration as a conflictual process arising from the incompatible belief systems within the European Union (Hooghe & Marks, 2019; Rittberger, Leuffen, & Schimmelfennig, 2014: 195; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This strongly touches upon identity politics which has had an increasing influence on EU integration in the past decades (Kuhn, 2019).

Although public opinion is generally not granted much attention in analyses of defense integration in the EU, there are some who have offered extensive analyses of the effects of public support for EU’s security and defense policies (Irondelle, Mérand, & Foucault, 2015). Militarism or a strategic culture is not widely present in the European Union and has even been dubbed to be “antithetical to the EU’s raison d’être” (Herszenhorn, Bayer, & Barigazzi, 2018). Opposite to these analyses is the finding that public

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support for defense cooperation has consistently been high throughout the EU (Irondelle, Mérand, & Foucault, 2015: 363). It is then interesting to see whether public opinion and the thereto attached national identity discussion have impacted the defense integration debate, certainly in light of the recently renewed interest in the effects of public opinion on EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Kuhn, 2019). The underlying assumption is that a negative public stance towards defense cooperation hampers the quick and smooth development of this cooperation.

2.3.4 Realism

The aforementioned theories are classic EU integration theories and have been developed specifically around the growth and development of the European Community and subsequently the Union. However, multiple writers argue that the classic IR theories such as realism or liberalism do fit the picture as well when looking at European integration (see for example Pollack, 2015; Erdem, 2006; Larivé, 2014; Zwolski, 2018). Realism might not be as dominant as other theories because it has a specific assumption about cooperation. In its key ontological assumptions, nation-states are the only actors that matter and other actors do not possess real and actual power, which is mostly measured in economic prowess and military strength. Thus, by these definitions, the Commission cannot be recognized as an actor within the system. Additionally, the international system is anarchical, thus the no. 1 focus of the nation-state is survival through security, power and relative gain. National interests are framed in terms of power, both economic and military.

The reason why the realist theory has been deemed to be less applicable to the case of EU integration are the assumptions about cooperation, where cheating and relative gains go above the pretense of harmony, which does not fit the scheme of (continuous) growth of cooperation within the EU, where there are net contributors and the outcomes are not immediately measurable (Pollack, 2015: 24). However, especially Larivé argues in his book that specifically for the integration of EU defense and security policies, (neo)realism is best suited to explain this integrative move. He argues that the pressure of the international system has forced the European powers to move closer together (2014: 11). In his explanation, he offers multiple ‘paths’ in the realist explanation, namely bandwagoning, balancing and buck-passing. Bandwagoning refers to the practice of riding along with the success and safety of a highly dominant state, a hegemon, such as the U.S., and buck-passing means that responsibility to deal with the dominant power is passed to other, larger states. However, the most promising and currently applicable ‘path’ might be that of ‘balancing’: a practice wherein a group of states, in this case the European member states, tries to equalize the power against the hegemon or dominant power. Larivé recognizes that “due

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to emerging new threats and the uncertainty of the American military commitment to Europe, the EU would seek to balance against the US, thus leading to deeper security integration” (2014: 13).

2.3.5 Assumptions on integration

All these theories employ a very specific set of assumptions within it to explain the move of European integration. This can be rather limited, as the explanations can also perfectly complement each other. Therefore, it can be argued that using only of these theories is limited in its outlook. For example, neofunctionalism tends to look specifically at economic drivers for cooperation, whereas postfunctionalism creates an image around the effects of public opinion and the political debate on integration. This might be an explanatory factor why e.g. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs have developed a theoretical framework where they apply a basic set of hypotheses on the integration of core state powers. They clarify that such a core state power is a ‘core function of a sovereign government’ (2014: 1). Genschel and Jachtenfuchs argue that these core state powers increasingly flow to the European level. Defense cooperation has originally been one of the fundamental tasks of the sovereign government, already since the rise of the nation-state. They see the move of this core state power, together with public administration and fiscal policy, to the European level (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014: v). In their argument, they provide a set of basic assumptions (hypotheses) which are used as a framework to analyze this move of the core state powers (2014: 12-9). This move is interesting, as they bring multiple hypotheses that follow logically from the different theories, together in one overarching structure. They have created a rather hybrid form of the theories, focusing on ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of integration, of which they claim they want to approach the phenomenon of security integration in a “non-standard approach”, with a larger focus on supranational power but also incorporating elements such as public opinion (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014: 57).

This same principle can also serve as a basis for the analysis of the integrative move of PESCO: accumulate multiple assumptions that follow from the major integration theories. One could apply the four aforementioned theories3_{as prescribed, but as Genschel & Jachtenfuchs and their co-authors have}

described, for the integration of core state powers there are multiple factors at play that are not easily explained following the standard integration theories (2014: 4). The same holds true for the analysis of PESCO and therefore, a combination of basic assumptions following from the four major theories will be used to analyze this integration in the field of defense and security, as exemplified by Genschel and

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Jachtenfuchs. A combination of the above produces four different hypotheses about the integration that formed PESCO:

1. Relative power gain

The basic premise of realism is that international relations are shaped through power play and thus predicts that in defense cooperation, states desire to increase their relative power. Moreover, it is not only realism that focuses on state power; both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism also tend to focus on state survival, shifts in the Balance of Power and power gains as a part of integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Academic writers, think tanks and policy offers alike recognize that PESCO follows a period of uncertainty and turmoil, both within and outside the EU. Examples can be the increased pressure of the U.S. for the NATO member states to take up the burden of territorial protection themselves and increase the budgetary expenses to the agreed 2% of the Gross National Product of the member states, but also the renewed threat of Russia in the East and the migrant crisis in the South (see in depth analyses in Vincent, 2017 and Bakker, Drent, & Zandee, 2016). As stated by a Dutch policy officer (see appendix III):

“[the uncertainties were] more a combination of Brexit and the election of Trump, which put strain on NATO as a military alliance, which led to Germany saying that the EU had to take its own fate in our own hands. This was even further fortified by the activities on the Eastern flank”. Thus, there might be multiple motives to join PESCO with the penultimate goal of increasing the hard power of Europe, to balance the other international forces at play. These motives might include bridging capability gaps, but also the unification as a bloc in terms of power projection. The core assumption is then that EU member states have chosen to join PESCO for its relative power to increase.

Additionally, there is one other factor at play here that is more relevant for those states that were not yet involved with the set-up of PESCO from its initial conception in 2016 and early 2017. The theory of strategic bargaining, meaning that you join a body or program to increase your position of influence, might also have impacted the decision to join PESCO. For example Moravcsik and Vachudova argue that being part of the body or in this case the PESCO program, a member state “wields substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis its EU partners” (2003: 52). Hence, being part of the program also increases the relative power position of those member states that were otherwise left out of the bargaining rounds.

2. Economic benefits

One of the major factors that is considered by most of the integration theories is that of economic benefit of integration. The main focus of both neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist logics is the presumed economic benefit of cooperation. The choice for PESCO can be highly influenced by the promises of economic prowess, which has two aspects that might have played a role: the direct and indirect economic

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and financial benefits. The direct benefits are to be found in the financial program accompanying PESCO, the European Defence Fund (EDF). This program, which is cited to be an example of policy entrepreneurship by the Commission, carries inherent benefits for specific PESCO programs over other initiatives that do not fall within the PESCO program. It thus strongly benefits being part of PESCO, since it is a criterion for a part of the EDF budget to fall within PESCO (Biscop, 2018: 163).

The major part of economic gain will however most probably follow from indirect benefits. The EEAS4_{already recognized that it is mostly about the “maximization of effectiveness of defense spending”}

(EEAS, 2018c). This can be reached in a myriad of ways, all might be intended or unintended effects of PESCO and its cooperation on defense (Biscop, 2018). First, PESCO should impact the European defense industry, both by spending more on European procurement deals, and additionally, by making the defense industry more competitive in comparison with other suppliers in the world. This is potentially deal-breaking, and its full implications will only be apparent in the far future, when all aspects can be analyzed in its totality. However, European leaders have already pled in favor of the European defense industry to be strengthened, so this might have been an interesting factor when considering joining PESCO. A second part of the indirect financial benefit is recognized in cost effectiveness within EU defense spending. Cost effective cooperation can be reached through resource pooling and specified division of labor, which is twofold. On the one hand, it might be very beneficial to cooperate in specific fields, such as a combined naval support unit, or a rotation scheme for assisting units like Search and Rescue teams. Additionally, the European countries now have no form of integrated spending on Research & Development (R&D), whereas a collective effort on R&D would lead to lower costs. The cooperation on R&D bears the bonus of increased interoperability, which would in turn enhance the possibility of working together in field operations. The final possibility for indirect financial benefit is that of a reduced regulatory burden, and with it, lower costs.

3. Spillover

Spillover is one of the main assumptions within the neofunctionalist analyses of European integration. It might well be one of the explanatory factors of the integrative move around defense integration in the EU, and has multiple facets to it. The basic assumption here is that ‘integration leads to integration’, which dictates that PESCO might be the direct result of the level of integration already achieved within the EU. This includes for example the single market policies, but also the freedom of movement, which in turn creates a common risk within the Union. As indicated before, this integration may open up new opportunities for further cooperation or it may create unforeseen problems that might be solved through

4_{European External Action Service, the Foreign affairs service of the European Union, headed by “High}

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further cooperation. This might include a solution to what Haroche (2019) has claimed “the dysfunctionalities of the intergovernmental method (e.g. difficulty gathering voluntary national contributions) and the functionality of available supranational instruments (e.g. funding projects through the EU budget)”. However, it may also be a spillover effect in connection to the economic power of the EU: the traditional economic objectives of the bloc must be guarded, so the member states draw more cooperation in the field of defense into the arena, because these two policy areas are tightly intertwined (Haroche, 2019: 5).

4. Public opinion, media attention and politicization of defense cooperation

The theory of postfunctionalism produces a different assumption about what and why European integration is driven. It stays away from the rational actor analysis that is underlying all three other theories and focuses more on the effects of for example national identity on public opinion toward a certain issue and how that is used in the political arena. This political arena is characterized by conflict: the different opinions lead to clashes over the desired course of action. This is also where this paradigm poses an interesting assumption about defense cooperation: to look at the influence of public opinion and the subsequent political debate within the EU member states on the decision to choose for further defense cooperation and join PESCO. After all, the member state decision is nothing more than an accumulation of the dominant positions within the political debate of a specific member state. This has been recognized by a Dutch policy officer (see appendix III):

“…It was more a question of party politics. Like Portugal, they really had trouble getting it through their national parliament. There was no support from the left coalition partner, so they had to seek support from the right-wing opposition parties. In the Netherlands, it was less of a problem, but still influential. Minister Hennis of Defense and most members of her party, the liberal conservatives (VVD), were showing concerns.”

The overall coverage of the topic in the (mass) media and the possible politicization of defense cooperation and PESCO by politicians which shapes the debate leading up to the decision whether or not to join the program might have impacted that very decision, which makes it interesting to bring into the equation when looking at PESCO.

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3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

To answer the research question, it is necessary to focus on EU member states’ intentions and meaning in the choice for deepening integration. However, deepening integration surfaces through the appearance of specific policy, additional bodies or dedicated programs within the EU. Here, PESCO can be an example of such a integrative move. 25 EU member states have agreed to launch the PESCO program in 2018, but their motivations are not explicit in this endorsement. Even less so does it reflect the position of any member state on the deepening of European integration. It is however interesting to find out from the underlying assumption as described before that not all these member states have a similar position on integration. In order to make a qualitative comparison of these positions and thus their effect on EU defense integration by the adoption of PESCO, this research looks at the EU with three sub-focal points.

All EU member states form the total population from which the case of PESCO can be analyzed. Important to notice however is that the EU as a bloc is also a unit of analysis: after all, the EU member states are by definition part of the European Council and the Council of the EU, the bodies in which PESCO was discussed and are responsible for providing guidelines for PESCO and other defense integration in the EU. Additionally, many of the effects of PESCO are only seen at the EU level. That means that some of the security and economic interests of the bloc are not easily attributed to specific member states or it is not yet predictable which member state will be favored over others by the outcomes of the program. The bloc’s interests are directly the interests of the constituting member states and it is therefore important to see the European Union as an entity and unit of analysis, to be able to make sense of the choice for PESCO. In short: the European Union is an aggregate of its institutions, leaving two different levels of analysis: the Union as a single entity as well as a collection of member states (Bickerton, 2016: 205).

However, the member states are the actors that collectively shape deepening or decelerating of European integration. This is a scale on which all these European member states are located, but their exact position is difficult to pinpoint due to the complexity of integration: to begin with, there are multiple policy fields and various treaty fundaments on which this integration has taken place. However, there is some consensus in the literature on the position of member states on integration, specifically when regarding the field of defense and security. Therefore, only looking at general EU interests does not fit research into European integration since it is the choice of the member states’ governments and not that of the supranational institutions, certainly in the case of PESCO (Biscop, 2018). Hence, it makes sense to look at specific member state interests in addition to the general EU interests. This thesis makes use of three specific focal points.

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These focal points are Germany, the Netherlands and Poland. This is based on the general position of these member states on integration. This refers to the fact that in the literature, analyses show that these countries approach European integration differently (See Bruszt, 2015; Allers, 2016; Schout, 2018). However, for the analysis of European integration and its drivers, it is also necessary to look at these countries’ position within the Union. After all, previous approaches to integration is only part of what a constitutes a country’s profile. Other aspects can also say something about what driver might affect a member state more: for example relative power gain might be different for a country with small or medium-sized armed forces than for states that already have a relatively high capacity. Next to that, the relative economic situation but moreover the (net) financial contribution to the EU can influence the gain of a country with integration, certainly in the case of PESCO. Consequently, for defense integration in particular, it is important to look at economic and military standing of the member state in the EU.

First, Germany has been recognized to have a strong positive view towards integration. It is among the leading member states in the EU that currently drive the ‘motor’ behind security cooperation in the EU, most notably along with France. Although Germany recognizes its role in EU affairs, it explicitly attempts to stay away from any hegemonic discourse (Allers, 2016). Though, Germany is by far the largest economy in the EU by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by accounting for over a fifth of the EU total GDP in 2016 (see figure 3, Eurostat, 2018). Additionally, it is a large net contributor to the EU, with 0.35% of the Gross National Income of Germany being contributed to the EU budget (CBS, 2016). It also has a significant security and defense industry, accumulating up to €28,4bn Gross Added Value (2014). Over 410,000 jobs are directly and indirectly associated with the industry. Next to that, the defense industry shows growth twice as large as the growth rate of the German economy at 7,8% between 2010 and 2014 (BDSV, 2014). However, in military terms, Germany is a relative underperformer if compared to other European powers, specifically France and the UK. In 2017, the country only spent 1.24% of its GDP on defense. Although the government stated in 2018 that an increase of the defense budget will follow in the coming years, it is not likely to transcend more than 1.5% of GDP in spending. Further, Germany struggles with deployability of its relatively few troops. There are only two battalions ready for deployment and the navy faces significant obsolescence, having no operational submarines in early 2018. Out of 244 tanks, only 95 were in service in February 2018 and a similar number is reported for operational aircraft (Heritage, 2018).

These issues are not insurmountable by the Germans themselves, as they have significant economic means to overcome problems of size and obsolescence. However, with Germany’s position in the European institutions where they have disproportionally large influence position, they can use the EU to their benefit, more than other member states (EURactiv, 2009). Furthermore, Germany is not only part

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of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, it also belongs to the Euro-countries, sharing a single currency with 19 other EU member states (European Union, 2019). This is an advanced level of integration where the member states fare better if the currency retains a strong relative position. A combination of the factors mentioned above create an image where Germany is positive toward a European solution for defense and security issues.

As a second focal point, which can be seen as located in the middle of the distribution of support for further integration is the Netherlands. The Netherlands has historically been positive about further integration and, as one of the founding members, is still relatively positive about the European project. Though, in the past years and especially together with the UK, a ‘counter-narrative’ has been established: the Dutch government has expressed increasing concern over the far-reaching influence of the EU in these ‘core state powers’, the field of security included. The Netherlands can therefore be seen as a ‘reserved’ member state. Its open position on PESCO has also been to “stay away from the ideological debate on defense cooperation” (Zandee, 2018; Schout, 2018). Next to its position on integration, the Netherlands is regarded as the “largest of the small member states” and is one of the founding states of the EU, just like Germany. It is a middle-tier power and the Netherlands is known for its pragmatism and consensus building in Brussels, but in the past years the Dutch administrations have consistently pressed for a slow-down of European integration. In contrast to that, the Netherlands desires a strong role for the EU in international affairs (Korteweg, 2017). In economic terms, the Netherlands is a relatively large economy compared to its number of inhabitants and influence in the EU. Its economy constitutes 4.8% of the total EU GDP, 1.6 times larger than for example Poland’s economy while Poland has over 2.2 times its inhabitants. Additionally, it is the EU’s largest net contributor, with over 0,4% of the Dutch GNI being contributed to the EU budget including annual rebates (CBS, 2016). The Dutch defense industry is relatively small in Europe, but it is still recognized as a priority for the current Dutch administration, as the industry employs over 25,000 people. The industry has a joint turnover of €4,5bn spread over 350 companies, most of them small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of them focusing on a ‘niche market’. These niche markets are for example ballistic missile defense, biotechnology, medical technology and maritime technological and industrial capabilities (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2018). The state of the Dutch armed forces is comparable to that of Germany: highly modernized albeit suffering from recent budget cuts, leading to problems in its deployability. Between 1989 and 2016, the number of troops declined with 66% and its equipment also faces obsolescence. However, after 2016, the budget has steadily increased and is set to do so for the coming administration period. For the Netherlands, like Germany, focus has been on international cooperation and together with Germany, they have established a joint Dutch-German army

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corps, headquartered in Münster, Germany. This cooperation has shown the Dutch what further international cooperation can mean in terms of operational capability (Bentinck, 2018).

The third focal point is Poland: together with Hungary, Poland has been the most negative on the influence of Brussels in its core state powers and is currently involved in an (unrelated) judicial conflict with the European Commission, which is illustrative for its position on the deepening of European integration, certainly with regards to security and a struggle for sovereignty (Bruszt, 2015). Poland is one of the more recent members of the EU and it is relatively large in terms of population and size. However, its economy is only mid-tier, ranking similar to that of Sweden and Belgium, constituting 3,0% of the total EU GDP. They have a relatively strong voting and influence position in the European institutions (EURactiv, 2009), but Poland is not a member of the Eurozone and therefore has less connection to the success of the currency. Poland is a large net-receiver of funds from the EU, accounting for 2,1% of its GNI (CBS, 2016). It has a relatively small defense industry, with the 60 largest companies in the industry working together in the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ). This group employs 17,500 people and has a joint turnover of approx. €1,2bn, not insignificant for an economy of this size (PGZ, 2019). It has a large NATO commitment and is one of the few EU member states to practically reach the 2,0% GDP budget spending5

on defense as stipulated by the NATO agreement (Terlikowski, 2018). The Polish armed forces consist of 105,000 active personnel, heavily focusing on its army component where almost 60% of its personnel is stationed. Poland has been steadily increasing defense spending over the past years, most likely induced by fear from the Eastern flank. Next to that, it commits strongly to NATO and in Poland, there is a battle station of the NATO enhanced forward presence mission (Heritage, 2018). The aforementioned characterization of Poland places it at different odds for European cooperation in comparison with Germany or the Netherlands.

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Figure 2. Defense spending as % of GDP. Source: Heritage (2018). Assessing the global operating

environment: Europe.

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Figure 4. Source: CBS (2016). Netherlands largest net contributor EU this century.

A distribution-based case selection is the basis for the choice of these three countries: they are spanned by their respective positions on the support of further integration in the EU. These countries could have been divided differently: for example on the basis of economic strength. However, since the main focus of this study is the choice for integration, the logical distribution is also the extent to which states have previously chosen for integration. The focal points can be classified as typical: these member states are representative for other similar member states (e.g. Poland and its position on integration is comparable to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Bruszt, 2015)). There is no presumption of an expected outcome in these cases: all have endorsed PESCO eventually, the question remains on what that decision is actually based. This design does not encompass the totality of possible interactions between all independent variables and the support of further integration and the choice for PESCO. In a socio-political system, there are too many interactions to measure the full extent of all interconnectivity. However, by comparing the patterns as produced by the operationalization of the question at hand and the application of the theoretical framework, the validity of the study is supported trying to satisfy academic standards. In that same light, a generalization following from a case study is one of the main challenges. There is a basic level of homogeneity among the EU member states and following from the literature, there is a basis

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for comparison between the selected focal points and the population as a whole. With a careful description of these similarities, a basic level of generalization can be realized (Rohlfing, 2012).

3.2 Operationalization

The assumptions as laid out in 2.2.5 will form the basis of the operationalization of the research question of this study. The different theories identify multiple of these drivers that can explain why member states have chosen to join the PESCO project, despite different positions on further EU integration. Each of these different drivers (power gain, economic drive, spillover and public opinion) have produced the specific assumptions about the motivation of joining PESCO. The following will be the basis of analysis for these assumptions:

1. The relative power gain can be both within and outside the EU. Bridging the capability gaps and rise in hard power can serve both the interest of the individual EU member states but also the power projection of the bloc as a polity. This also does not necessarily come as a surprise, since it has been long discussed that the EU lacks a certain hard power, the appropriate military means that corresponds with a bloc of its size (Dempsey, 2014). This can be measured by looking at the challenges currently experienced by the bloc and what relative power gain can mean for the EU and its member states in terms of countering these challenges. This can then be made into a comparison with other power players such as the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Based on academic and open-source analyses, the analysis of this paper provides an overview of the threats to the EU and its member states and the possible power projection to counter this.

2. The economic benefit of PESCO is first found in its relationship with the EDF, so the first aspect of the analysis will be based on the benefits that may follow from the relationship between these programs. However, as indicated before, the large benefits may arise from the indirect savings and pooling of resources at the EU level. If the expected economic effects of PESCO are positive for a member state, then that member state has another reason to choose to join the program. Economic benefits of PESCO and defense cooperation are widely reported upon by the European Union agencies such as the EEAS and the EDA. The economic analysis of this paper can be complemented by scholarly articles looking at economic factors of defense cooperation in the EU. 3. Spillover is less easily measured than proposed military or economic effects of PESCO. Cultivated spillover, the neofunctionalist assumption that supranational actors (such as the Commission) benefit most from integration and will thus drive further integration, has been particularly strong with for example the EDF (Haroche, 2019), but PESCO has been a move by the member states rather than being pushed into this decision by any supranational actor (Biscop, 2018). However,

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functional spillover can be understood as pressures for further integration if the ‘original objective’ cannot be reached by any other means. This is tied in significantly with interdependence. What is specifically important here, is that its effects are “…only as strong as they are perceived by (relevant/important) actors” (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015: 198). Functional spillover then has two sides: on the one hand, there must be an analysis of the relationship between integration in all policy fields (most specifically economic cooperation) and the effects thereof on further defense integration, but also the perceived benefit of that effect. Scholarly analyses are the main source for analyzing possible spillover effects.

4. As Hooghe and Marks argue, public opinion plays a major role in the decision-making process in the EU. It is therefore interesting to see what the general opinion on PESCO was in newspaper articles, but also in (mass-)surveys like the Eurobarometer. Once the negotiations entered the public arena, which happened around mid-2017 (Benavente, 2017), the opinion specifically on PESCO started to surface in media outlets, namely newspapers. However, the analysis does not focus solely on PESCO, since the public opinion fits in the broader image of defense cooperation in Europe. The parameters for analysis of public opinion are more reasonably focused on the general opinion on defense cooperation in the years leading up to PESCO. Subsequently, it is interesting to see how this debate has taken shape in the words and acts of politicians, where the discussion for further integration leads to political conflict. Although it is outside the scope of this paper to provide a full analysis of the political debate within a member state, a summary of this debate can signify how public opinion and political conflict has or has not impacted the decision to join PESCO. This includes a Factiva search for newspaper articles on PESCO and looking at the political debate on PESCO in member states’ parliaments, along with scholarly analyses that have taken the public debate into account.

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4. Analysis

4.1 Relative power gain

European military capabilities have shown a tremendous decline after the end of the Cold War. Where the 14 European NATO member states6_{had a combined strength of 3.1 million active-duty service members}

with 5.5 million reservists. By 2012, this had declined to 1.54 active-duty personnel, this time spread over 24 European NATO members. Interestingly enough, the personnel that served during the Cold War had most likely never seen any action, while the current situation is highly overstretched, where large numbers of the active personnel are at one stage or another of the three stage cycle of deploying (preparing for deployment, deployed or resting) (Howorth, 2014: 73). Although it is recognized that this downscaling of numbers was a move from quantity to quality, the power of the EU has certainly not strengthened through this move. It has even been dubbed that the EU is advertent in keeping its power at necessary strength (Gehring, Urbanski, & Overthür, 2017).

Now, the first question that comes to light here, is why the European Union needs power and how this can be seen. Specifically based on the realist explanation of power, states strive for power to ensure state survival (Pollack, 2015). Although this is a bit of Cold War rhetoric, it still holds value in international analyses: the EU has been confronted with many challenges that threatened to become of conflictual nature for one or more EU member states. Which in turn threatens the integrity of the bloc as a whole. But, is it then necessary to increase power of the bloc? After all, the EU is nothing but a sum of the individual parts in the equation, meaning that there is already strength derived from the individual member states. Moreover, France, the UK7_{and Germany are all listed in the top-10 of global military}

powers (GFP, 2019), so it may be argued that there is little necessity to increase power, even if it is by cooperation. But while this may hold true for these respective individual member states, it means very little to the other EU member states and the EU as a power bloc. To profile as a bloc, one would also expect the unity that is necessary for power projection on such a scale.

The crux is also in this unity, as the threats also target the Union rather than its individual member states. Partly, this is a result that can be compared to spillover: due to the freedom of movement within the EU, the threat as posed by (mass) migration which comes predominantly from the South and Southeast of Europe, all member states play a role in this security issue rather than only those member states that

6_{At that time: the UK, France, Western Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Belgium,}

Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and Iceland.

7_{Since it is unknown whether or not the UK will take part in certain areas of PESCO and there is uncertainty about}