Kant’s Defense of
Free Will and the
Third Antinomy of
Pure Reason
Diederik Visser
Studentnumber 6135242
Supervisor: Dr. T.R.V. Nys
Research Master’s Thesis Philosophy
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Kant’s Defense of Free Will and
the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason
Diederik Visser
Studentnumber 6135242
Supervisor: Dr. T.R.V. Nys
Research Master’s Thesis Philosophy Universiteit van Amsterdam
Table of Contents
Introduction
8
1. The Third Antinomy of Pure Reason
15
1.1 The Thesis: Transcendental Freedom 16
1.2 The Antithesis: Natural Causal Determination 17
2. Transcendental Idealism
21
2.1 The Limitations of Sensibility 21
2.2 Kant’s Dualism: Two Worlds or Two Ways of Considering One World? 23
2.3 Two Worlds 25
2.4 Two Aspects 26
3. Kant’s Resolution
30
3.1 Agency, Practical Freedom and Transcendental Freedom 31
3.2 Nature and Freedom in One Event 36
3.3 Empirical Character and its Intelligible Ground 38
3.4 The ‘Ought’ of Practical Reason 42
3.5 The Limits of Transcendental Investigation 45
4. A Two World Resolution
494.1 Wood’s Compatibilism 49
4.2 Relating Two Worlds 51
4.3 Choosing Your Own History 52
4.4 The Limits of Responsibility and Other Problems 53
4.5 Vilhauer’s Problem of Scarce Responsibility 56
4.6 Freedom Through Laws of Nature 57
4.7 Predictability and Fatalism in Wood 60
4.8 Vilhauer’s Fatalism 63
4.9 Remaining Problems for Wood 63
4.10 Vilhauer’s Panicky Metaphysics 65
4.11 Closing Remarks on Two Worlds 67
5. A Two Aspect Resolution
695.2 The ‘Ought’ of Practical Reason and the Noumenal Perspective 73
5.3 Intelligible and Empirical Character 79
5.4 Knowledge, Predictability and Character 81
5.5 Intelligible Character and the Incorporation Thesis 83
5.6 Predictability and Freedom 89
5.7 Two Strategies 92
5.8 Justification of the Noumenal 94
5.9 Justification of Practical Freedom 98
5.10 Allison’s Contracausal Freedom 100
5.11 Two Options 102
6. Ontological or Epistemic Dualism?
1076.1 Vaida’s Metaphysical Allison 109
6.2 Kant’s Transcendental Theory of Experience and Epistemic Modesty 114
6.3 Vaida’s ontological Dualism 116
6.4 Kleingeld on Kant’s Practical Argument 120
6.5 Clashing Perspectives in Criminal Law 122
6.6 Habermas and the Ineliminability of Freedom 126
6.7 The Persistent Problem of Free Will 131
Introduction
During the history of philosophy, the problem of free will has proven to be a very persistant one. Many centuries of debate have not resulted in anything resembling general agreement concerning the question of whether or not we have the capacity to determine our own will. In the contemporary debate, the problem is often portrayed as the collision of two incompatible worldviews: while the practical ‘participating view’ presupposes our free will, the theoretical ‘observing perspective’ denies the possibility of such a free will. The disagreement seems to owe its enduring character to the intractable nature of both worldviews: while they appear to be in clear contradiction with each other, it also turns out to be very difficult to reject either of them.
The idea that human being posses a free will can be understood as being a basic presupposition contained in our idea of rational agency. We generally suppose that we are able to determine the outcome of our choices on the basis of (good) reasons. As we face a choice, we necessarily assume that multiple possible courses of action lie open to us, and that it is up to us to decide which one we should take. This assumption is perhaps expressed most clearly in our practice of holding persons (morally) responsible for their actions, which fundamentally depends on the idea that, at any moment in time, they could have acted differently than they in fact have.
It can even be argued that the possibility of acting in general depends on the assumption of freedom.1 The concept of an acting agent essentially seems to
include the notion that this agent makes an active contribution, that his or her action makes a difference. Without this notion, it turns out to be very difficult to make sense of the idea of action at all, as agents are reduced to insignificant causal links in the chain of natural events, and action thereby becomes indistinguishable from mere behavior. All in all, it seems to be nearly impossible to think of ourselves as being fully determined according to the immutable laws of nature.
1 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, whenever I am speaking of ‘freedom’ in this investigation, I
The idea that everything that happens in the world is determined by the laws of nature and the preceding state of the world, can be understood as being a basic presupposition contained in our idea of natural science. The nomological explanatory model on which our natural sciences depend, assumes that every occurrance in the world should be explained as being the measurable effect of its preceding cause. The great scientific advances of the past centuries are a testament to the general succes of this nomological model of event-explanation. This succes has resulted in the idea that our natural sciences inhabit a priviliged position when it comes to making objective claims concerning our world. However, as our actions are also considered to be occurances in the world, it is supposed within the scientific worldview that they too should be explained nomologically, as the measurable result of a physical cause. Such an explanation of action is in opposition with the idea that the outcome of our choices is fundamentally up to us. Consequently, there is no room within the scientific worldview to accomodate the assumption of a free will.
Thus, while the great success of the scientific explanatory model seems to urge us to take seriously the idea that we are part of a causally closed world in which everything happens according to natural law, the included notion that the outcome of our choices is ultimately not up to us turns out to be critical for our conception of ourselves as rational agents. Thus we are left with two competing worldviews, neither of which appears to give way to the other.
In this investigation, we will be dealing with the problem of free will as it is encountered by Immanuel Kant. Specifically, we will be looking at Kant’s
theoretical argument for freedom in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. This argument is located in his discussion about the ‘Third Antinomy of Pure Reason’. While I acknowledge the fact that Kant maintains that only a practical argument can convince us of our freedom, I believe it is the theoretical argument Kant provides to create the space required for the practical assumption of freedom, which is responsible for most difficulties related to his defense of freedom.
Kant’s practical argument, based on the demands of morality, ‘merely’ has to show that we have very good reasons for assuming that we are free. The more difficult task Kant faces in his theoretical argument, consists in showing how such freedom is possible in a world in which every single event follows strictly
from the laws of nature and the preceding state of the world. As such, I believe this theoretical part of Kant’s defense is more relevant to the contemporary free will debate, as this argument deals directly with the conflict between our two competing worldviews.
Kant is often considered to be largely responsible for our contemporary understanding of the free will problem. In his approach to the conflict between free will and determinism, he shows a great sensitivity for the difficulty of accounting for the presupposition of freedom that is contained within our idea of rational agency. While he is committed to defending the assumption of a free will, he is also adament in his conviction that the world around us is fully determined. As such, Kant encounters the problem of free will and determinism in what may be its most pressing formulation, thereby anticipating many of the difficulties that still lead to widespread disagreement among participants to the free will debate.
This ongoing disagreement concerning the problem of free will shows itself in the way in which the contemporary debate on this issue is often characterized. Participants to this debate are commonly divided among four basic camps.
Compatibilists can be interpreted as denying that there is any problem whatsoever, as the assumptions of a free will and determinism are perfectly compatible.2Incompatibilists, on the other hand, believe that the assumptions of
free will and determinism contradict each other and that the truth of either one therefore implies the falsity of the other. As this still does not tell us which of the two assumptions should be rejected, incompatibilists can be divided among two further categories: while libertarians believe we should reject determinism to accomodate freedom3, hard determinists believe we should accept the truth of
determinism and thus reject the idea of a free will.4 Our final category is made
up of participants to the free will debate who dispute the general intelligibility of
2 Classic compatibilist accounts include Hobbes 1996 and Hume 1978. Modern compatibilist
accounts include Strawson 1962, Frankfurt 1969, Wolf 1980, Fischer 1982, Wallace 1994, Bratman 1997.
3 Libertarian accounts include Nozick 1981, Ginet 1990, Chisholm 1966, McCann 1998, Kane
1999.
4 Hard Determinist accounts include Skinner 1971, Holbach 2002, Wegner 2003, Pereboom
the concept of free will. These skeptics of the concept of free will, as we might label them, argue that the conditions for possessing a free will can impossibly be met, regardless of whether or not the thesis of determinism is true.5
Despite this effort to divide participants to the free will debate neatly into four camps, Kant thus turns out to be very difficult to place in any of the abovementioned categories. On the one hand, it can be argued that Kant is a compatibilist, because he believes he has succeeded in showing that freedom and determinism are compatible. On the other hand, it can also be argued that Kant is an incompatibilist because he believes that freedom and determinism are ‘naturally’ incompatible, and that they can only be ‘made’ compatible by separating them by way of an appeal to his thesis of transcendental idealism.
This thesis of transcendental idealism leads to yet another difficulty regarding the correct interpretation of Kant’s theoretical argument for freedom. At issue is whether Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena should be interpreted as a distinction between two worlds, or a distinction between two perspectives upon one world. The way this distinction is understood has enormous consequences for the way in which Kant’s entire argument for freedom is interpreted.
These interpretative difficulties concerning Kant’s argument may be explained as a failure on Kant’s part to clearly state his position. However, while it must be admitted that Kant sometimes appears to contradict himself, I believe that - more significantly - these difficulties point to the fundamental problems that must be faced by any serious attempt at arguing in favor of the idea of free will as it is presupposed by our idea of rational agency: attempts like these must deal with the fact that the assumption of such an idea of a free will comes at a certain cost. As we will see during our investigation, all of the interpretations of Kant’s defense of freedom we will be dealing with have to rely on certain assumptions which may be considered highly unintuitive.
This problem is most commonly associated with two-world interpretations of Kant’s Resolution, which have to appeal to far-fetched metaphysical stories to explain the connection between the two assumed worlds. An alternative to this unappealing interpretation is offered by two-aspect interpretations of the Resolution, which approach Kant’s claims concerning our freedom as
epistemological claims, rather than metaphysical claims. However, although these interpretations are indeed far more attractive than two-world interpretations, they still require us to revise certain deep-seated ideas about truth and reality. Moreover, as two-aspect interpreters are committed to the existence of only one world, they are unable to separate freedom and determinism by delegating each causality to a different world. Thus, while these two-aspect defenses of freedom manage to avoid the difficult metaphysics involved in two-world defenses, it may be wondered how they can account for the compatibility of freedom and determinism.
This finally brings us to the main goal of this investigation. Although I am thoroughly convinced of the importance of considering ourselves free and responsible, I also believe that accounting for the possibility of doing so is extremely difficult: on the one hand, we have attempts to defend our freedom that appeal to counterintuitive and difficult metaphysical speculations. While these attempts may result in the possibility of considering ourselves free, it is doubtful whether we are willing to accept the explanation required to account for this possibility. On the other hand, we have attempts to defend the assumption of freedom without appealing to such (problematic) metaphysics. While I emphasize with such attempts, it is doubtful whether they really succeed in making freedom and determinism compatible.
Taking into account this difficult dilemma, in the following investigation we will be concerned with trying to establish whether Kant’s theoretical argument for the possibility of freedom can provide the basis for an acceptable defense of free will. We will carry out our investigation by looking at Kant’s own words, and by comparing some of the different ways in which Kant’s words have been interpreted. As is indicated by the above dilemma, our assessment of Kant’s argument will not depend solely upon its effectiveness in securing our freedom: we will also have to be willing to accept all of the other implications related to such an argument. Thus throughout our investigation, we will have to have to keep asking ourselves two questions: First, does the argument succeed in securing the possibility of freedom? And second, can we accept the further implications of this argument. It is only after both questions can be answered affirmatively, that we can justifiably say that we have have arrived at an acceptable argument for the possibility of a free will.
Some of my reasons for selecting Kant’s defense of freedom as the focus of this investigation may have already become clear during the course of this introduction: the gravity of the free will problem as it is encountered by Kant urges him to come up with an elaborate and sophisticated attempt at solving this problem. Many elements of his defense are still being used in order to argue in favor of free will. The fact that the interpretations that have been given to Kant’s defense of freedom are so varied, makes this defense especially suited for the purposes of our investigation. It allows us to consider very different kinds of approaches to the problem of free will, which nevertheless all appeal to the same point of reference. Besides having this advantage, I simply believe Kant’s groundbreaking defense of freedom can still offer us many valuable insights into the problem of free will. If our investigation does not manage to arrive at an acceptable interpretation of Kant’s theoretical argument for freedom, I hope that it at least sheds some light on why such an argument is so difficult to arrive at.
We will begin our investigation into Kant’s theoretical argument for freedom by looking at the opposition of freedom and determinism as it is presented by Kant in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. After this introduction of the problem, we will go into Kant’s thesis of transcendental idealism, as it is this thesis which should allow us to resolve the opposition between freedom and determinism. We will consider both the two-world and the two-aspect interpretation of Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena. With the thesis of transcendental idealism in hand, we will then have a close look at Kant’s Resolution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. As we will see, this Resolution leaves many difficult and important questions unanswered, particularly concerning Kant’s complex idea that one and the same event admits of two separate causal explanation. Accordingly, we will be dealing with varied attempts to make sense out of Kant’s argument in the Resolution. First, we will be concerned with interpretations of the Resolution based on the two-world approach to transcendental idealism, after which we will go into interpretations of the Resolution based on the two-aspect approach to transcendental idealism. As will turn out, the two-aspect interpretation of Kant’s Resolution is in general much more attractive than the two-world interpretation. Nevertheless, I believe this interpretation still does not provide a fully satisfying answer to the question
of how one and the same event can be explained by appeal to both freedom and determinism. To conclude our investigation, then, we will be concerned with trying to spell out our options for dealing with this remaning problem.
Chapter 1:
The Third Antinomy of Pure Reason
With freedom being such a central concern for Kant, it comes as no big surprise that his first critical argument in favor of our freedom can be found in his first critical work, the Critique of Pure Reason. While this first Critique is part of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, in the background his practical concerns also play a crucial role.Already in the foreword to the B-edition of the first Critique, he expresses his concern for the possibility of freedom and morality and the positive role his theoretical philosophy can fulfill in this regard, leading up to his famous pronounciation that certain knowledge has to be denied in order to make room for faith (Bxxx).6 The restriction of knowledge that is implied by
Kant’s theoretical philosophy should allow for the possibility of considering ourselves free and, therefore, morally responsible.
An important part of Kant’s argument for this restriction of knowledge aims to show what happens when we overstep the boundaries of a legitimate use of our reason. In the second chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic, entitled The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant presents us with four such cases, each case corresponding to one of the four classes of the categories of judgment. All four antinomies concern judgments about ideas lacking any corresponding objects given to us in experience. They consist of a thesis and a contradicting antithesis, both of which can be reached by seemingly valid reasoning.7 Kant
emphasizes the unavoidability of the four antinomies: reason necessarily strives for complete knowledge and will always come up with legitimate questions it simply cannot answer. Regardless, it will still try to do just that, and the four
6 References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B page numbers of the
first and second edition.
7 For the purposes of this thesis I will focus almost exclusively on the Third Antinomy, dealing
with the apparent conflict between freedom and natural causation. The other three antinomies also focus on what Kant calls ‘cosmological ideas’ (A408/B435). The First Antinomy looks at the question whether space and time are finite or infinite. The Second Antinomy questions whether composite objects are composed of indivisible simple parts, or if such simple parts do not exist. The Fourth Antinomy, finally, asks whether or not there is an absolutely necessary being.
antinomies are the result of this attempt to solve four ‘natural and inevitable problems of reason’ (A462/B490).
It is easy to see the function of the antinomies within Kant’s argument for the restriction of knowledge: reasoning about ideas lacking corresponding objects of experience inevitably leads to contradicting conclusions, so we can have no knowledge about these ideas. Aside from the fact that within Kant’s argument this general function of the antinomies helps to secure the possibility of freedom, the Third Antinomy is of special interest here. It deals directly with the opposition between freedom and determinism, as the thesis assesses our freedom, while the antithesis states that everything happens according to the laws of nature. The Resolution to this Third Antinomy contains Kant’s first critical argument in favor of our freedom. We will begin at the beginning, however, by taking a closer look at the Third Antinomy itself.
1.1 The Thesis: Transcendental Freedom
In the thesis of the Third Antinomy, the necessity of assuming a causality through freedom is asserted:
“Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them.” (A444/B472)
This thesis is then followed by a proof which starts off from the assumption that there is only a causality through laws of nature. If this is the case, then every event presupposes a preceding event as its cause. But if every event implies such a presupposition, this obviously also applies to the preceding events which function to explain their causal consequences. Unsurpisingly, an infinite regress follows, since there can never be a first event as long as every event presupposes another preceding event. The law of nature, however, consists in the fact that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined beforehand. But as we have just seen, such a full causal explanation is impossible as long as we assume only a causality through natural laws. Therefore the assumption the proof starts off from, that there is only a causality through laws of nature, turns out to contradict itself, justifying the assumption of another causality.
This other causality is, then, a causality through freedom. The introduction of this concept concludes the proof for the thesis. It states:
“Accordingly, a causality must be assumed through which something happens without its cause being further determined by another previous cause, i.e., an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances that runs according to natural laws, hence transcendental freedom, without which even in the course of nature the series of appearances is never complete on the side of the causes.” (A446/B474)
The causality through freedom is here labeled transcendental freedom.
Although this term is introduced in the antinomies and might therefore be viewed as a product of unwarrented metaphysical speculation, it will turn out that the definition of transcendental freedom Kant provides here is in fact an accurate representation of his own position. This is not to say, of course, that it is clear exactly what he has in mind when he speaks of ‘an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances’. On the contrary, there is wide disagreement over the correct interpretation of Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. The way in which this concept is interpreted obviously is of crucial importance for the overall assessment of Kant’s defense of freedom. Accordingly, we will get back to this issue at length when we go into the different interpretations that have been given to Kant’s defense of freedom in the Resolution to the Third Antinomy.
1.2 The Antithesis: Natural Causal Determination
After the proof for the thesis claiming freedom must be assumed, follows immediately the contradicting antithesis, claiming there is no freedom:
“There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.” (A445/B473)
As is to be expected, the antithesis assesses exactly what was denied in the thesis, and supposedly shown to be incoherent in the proof for this thesis. The following proof for the antithesis employs the same strategy as the proof for the thesis, and starts off from the assumption it opposes, which, in the case of the antithesis, is transcendental freedom. Such freedom implies the possibility to begin a entirely new series of events, which in turn implies full causal independence from preceding events. This means transcendental freedom is in
contradiction with the law of causality: ‘[It] is a combination between the successive states of effective causes in accordance with which no unity of experience is possible, which thus cannot be encountered in any experience, and hence is an empty thought-entity (A447/B475).’
The proof for the antithesis continues this strategy of appealing to Kant’s own theory of experience to expose the concept of transcendental freedom as meaningless. This theory states that our possibility for experience relies, among other things, on the causal connections between the objects of our experience. As such, transcendental freedom does not fulfill this condition and cannot, therefore, be a part of our experience. Freedom from natural law may be seen as a freedom from coercion, but this independence also separates it from all possible guidance of rules and turns it into lawlessness.8 While nature may
compel us to keep on looking for preceding causes because a first cause can never be found, it does offer us unity of experience. Transcendental freedom may provide us with such a first cause, but it can only do so at the cost of breaking with the guidance of the rules that allow us to have objective knowledge of the world.
Kant continues the Third Antinomy with some remarks on both the thesis and antithesis. In his remarks on the thesis he calls attention to the limited definition
he has so far given to the concept of transcendental freedom (A448/B476). He acknowledges the difficulty philosophers have in comprehending the possibility of a causality of absolute spontaneity. He notes that we do not need to understand how this might be possible: just as with the causality of nature we simply have contend ourselves with the a priori recognition that such a causality must be assumed. He continues by stating that all that has been shown so far, is that this causality must be assumed in order to be able to make sense of the origin of the world. Everything after this first cause could just as well unfold completely according to natural laws. As is put negatively in the proof for the antithesis, all Kant has so far is an empty idea: while there are reasons for its
8 Kant is of course well known for his insistence that freedom does not equate with lawlessness.
Freedom consists in following the law one has set for oneself. This moral law is the categorical imperative and it functions exactly to avoid the assimilation of freedom to lawlessness. However, this intimate link between freedom and the moral law is not explicated by Kant until the Groundwork.
assumption, this fact tells us nothing about the content of the idea. Even so, Kant says, the capacity to start a series of events from itself, if not understood, has been proven and this allows us to speculate about the possibility of attributing to substances within the world the capacity to act out of freedom:
“[...] here we are talking of an absolute beginning not, as far as time is concerned, but as far as causality is concerned. If (for example) I am now entirely free, and get up from my chair without the necessarily determining influence of natural causes, then in this occurrence, along with its natural consequences to infinity, there begins an absolutely new series, even though as far as time is concerned this occurrence is only the continuation of a previous series. For this decision and deed do not lie within the succession of merely natural effects and are not a mere continuation of them; rather, the determining natural causes of that series entirely cease in regard to this event, which indeed follows upon that series, but does not follow from it; and therefore it must be called, not as far as time is concerned but in regard to causality, an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.” (A450/B478)
It is of course clear that from the very beginning Kant has human beings in mind as the appropriate subject for freedom, and in the above quote he finally relates freedom to a human being, namely himself. But in his remarks he also wants to emphasize the limited proof of freedom that can be secured. Still, even though this proof is limited, it can be employed to make sense of the possibility of an absolute beginning and this allows Kant to make the crucial move of allowing for speculation about the possibility that we, humans, could have the capacity to initiate such an absolute beginning.
The above quote also provides some explication of the idea of an absolute beginning as applied to the idea of human transcendental freedom. It should not be interpreted as a first cause in the sense that it precedes everything else in
time. It is a fist cause in the sense that it starts a completely new series of causal events. A series that follows only from that first cause, not from anything preceding that cause.
The remarks on the antithesis are basically a restatement of the antithesis itself, so I will not go into them very deeply. Kant notes how someone who repudiates freedom would defend his position by denying the necessity of
assuming a beginning for the world. The idea of an infinite succession may be incomprehensible, but this doesn’t justify getting rid of the rules that make experience possible. This is followed by a restatement of the complaint that even if we assumed transcendental freedom, it could never be part of our experience (A449/B477, A451/B479). What turns out to be crucial for the possibility of resolving the Third Antinomy, is the fact that the entire antithesis merely establishes that freedom cannot be experienced. As we will see more clearly later on, this will allow Kant to say that both the thesis and the antithesis are true: while a causality of freedom must be assumed, such freedom can never be part of our experience.
This concludes our treatment of the Third Antinomy. The key to solving all four antinomies is presented by Kant not much later, in the form of the theory of
transcendental idealism. In the next chapter, we will take a look at this thesis and how it relates to the Third Antinomy. This is also where the first major interpretative issues regarding Kant’s defense of freedom will come into play.
Chapter 2:
Transcendental Idealism
In Section Seven of The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant informs us about the presupposition shared by all four antinomies. Each of them assumes that if the conditioned is given, the entire series of its conditions is given as well. In other words, the absolute totality of the series of conditions is taken for granted. But, as we have seen, this leads to great difficulties and ultimately brings reason to an ‘unavoidable conflict with itself (A494/B525).’ Thus, Kant points to this shared presupposition as the source of the contradictory conclusions of the four antinomies.
Transcendental Idealism can simply be described as the negation of this presupposition. It asserts that it is impossible for us to account for everything that is given to us in experience, without assuming something beyond our experience as its ground.
2.1 The Limitations of Sensibility
The above definition is, however, simply one way of looking at Kant’s theory of transcendental idealism, by relating it to the antinomies. The theory is introduced in the first Critique prior to the chapter on the antinomies. When Kant proposes transcendental idealism as the key to the solution to the antinomies, he begins by recalling his earlier argument for the thesis:
“We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves.” (A491/B519)
Here we are provided with a somewhat different definition of transcendental idealism. The thesis asserts that the phenomenal world of our experience has no existence independent of the thoughts of rational human beings. With this thesis, Kant breaks with the traditional notion that a world of objects simply exists for us to perceive. This naive picture of unproblematic epistemological access to the world assumes a largely passive role for human beings as they simply receive the information from the world of objects. Kant, by contrast, emphasizes the active role humans play in constituting the world of our experience. The world of objects we experience only appears to us the way it does because of what we actively add to it ourselves. Consequently, this world exists only insofar as we, finite rational beings, experience it.
So what do we add to this world ourselves? Kant arrives at an answer to this question by an analysis of the necessary conditions for objective knowledge. All of our experiences will have to fulfill these conditions, so they apply universally. Kant famously argues for the a priori status of these conditions: they are not to be found within the world, instead they logically precede the world and partly determine it. The conditions divide into two groups: the a priori forms of intuition of space and time, and the synthetic a priori judgements known as the ‘categories’ (A161/B200).
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant attempts to establish the a priori status of space and time. He argues that these concepts cannot be abstracted from our experience and at the same time have to be assumed in order to make experience possible. Space and time are the a priori forms of our intuition and, as such, transcendentally ideal: they have no existence outside of our thoughts
(A22-49/B37-73).
The other group of ‘ingredients’ contributed by us to the world of experience consists in Kants famous categories. These synthetic a priori judgments are, according to Kant, necessary presuppositions for the possibility of knowledge in general. I will not go into each of the twelve categories here, as this will take up quite some space and is not necessary for our purposes. What is important, however, is that one of the categories deals specifically with causality. It is the synthetic a priori judgment that every event is determined by another event preceding it (A189/B232-3). The fact that this judgment is one of the categories means that the full causal determination of the world is only a characteristic of the world as we experience it. This should provide Kant with the conceptual
space needed to account for the possibility of freedom. More about this later, when we take a look at the Resolution to the Third antinomy.
Thus transcendental idealism is a theory that emphasizes our crucial role in the constitution of the phenomenal world. An object is not something we simply find within the world: it is intuited in space and time, and partly constituted by judgments of pure reason. Therefore the theory is at the same time a denial of the absolute totality of the series of phenomenal conditions. As we have seen, such totality is presupposed by all four antinomies. Transcendental idealism tells us that this series of conditions only has reality in relation to our thoughts. The transcendental realist confuses this relative reality with absolute reality and thus ends up with his reason in conflict with itself (A491/B519).
Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, only grants empirical reality to the world as we experience it. This world only has objective reality because of the constraints we impose to make experience possible. However, the fact that this reality is only a reality in reference to our thoughts, does not in the least undermine its objectivity, since it is precisely these constraints which make objectivity possible in the first place. But, although empirical knowledge about our world therefore has every right to a claim for objectivity, at the same time this experienced world is transcendentally ideal.
2.2 Kant’s Dualism: Two Worlds or Two Ways of Considering
One World?
It is generally agreed that Kant’s assumption of transcendental idealism leads to a form of dualism. This dualism is expressed by Kant in various ways. The object we experience is contrasted with the unknowable thing-in-itself, which is the ground of the object of our experience (A45-6/B63). The resulting distinction is perhaps best known as the one between phenomena and noumena (A249/B306), or, when contrasting the two worlds at large, between the phenomenal world
and the noumenal world. As has been made clear, we can have no knowledge of the noumenal world. Nevertheless, we are able to make sense of the concept and the necessity of assuming such a noumenal world. Therefore Kant also refers to this world as an intelligible world: we cannot know it but we can think it
Human beings are, obviously, part of the phenomenal world. But this implies that they also belong to the noumenal world, which is, after all, the ground for the phenomenal world. As is the case with all empirical objects, we can only know each other, and even ourselves, as an appearance. Kant usually refers to the distinction between the (causality of the) phenomenal human being and its ground as a noumenon, as the distinction between empirical character and
intelligible character (A539/B567). Our empirical character is subject to natural causality while it is the intelligible character that should provide us with the freedom Kant is defending.Therefore, it can be said that the distinction signifies the contrast between freedom and determinism. As such, this distinction and the way it is interpreted will turn out to be very important in assessing Kant’s overall defense of freedom. We will get back to this once we arrive at the Resolution to the Third Antinomy. First, we will take a look at some contrasting interpretations of Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena in general. This will provide us with the wider context in which to place the different views on empirical and intelligible character.
While it is generally agreed that transcendental idealism implies dualism, there is much disagreement about how we should understand this dualism. The debate on the status of the dualism inherent to transcendental idealism is most easily characterized as a conflict between a metaphysical two-world
interpretation on the one side, and an epistemological two-aspect interpretation on the other. Two-world interpreters believe transcendental idealism tells us that there is second, hidden, noumenal world beside our phenomenal world. Two-aspect interpreters believe transcendental idealism tells us that we have two irreducible perspectives upon one world. Although the debate regarding the correct interpretation of transcendental idealism is often characterized along the lines of this opposition, within these two opposed camps there are still many disagreements, mainly about the ways in which the two worlds or aspects should be related to one another. For clarity’s sake, we will ignore these differences for now, although they will return later on.
Before we look at the these interpretations of transcendental idealism, I should note that the following overview is in no way exhaustive of all the positions taken on the subject. We will limit ourselves to some of the most influential interpretations, also taking into account their relevance to Kant’s defense of freedom.
2.3 Two Worlds
So what does Kant mean exactly when he says that there are two worlds? It seems most natural to assume that he means exactly what he says and this is what the two-world interpretation does. It attributes to Kant the claim that reality is made up of two distinct worlds: besides the phenomenal world of our experience there is also the inaccessible noumenal world. This interpretation is also known as the two-object interpretation, for it holds that there are two distinct sets of objects: appearances and things-in-themselves.9
The phenomenal world is the world we experience and can have knowledge of. While we also inhabit the noumenal world, this world is merely something we have to assume as the ground for the phenomenal world, without ever being able to experience it. At the same time, however, the noumenal world is in a sense more real than the phenomenal world. While an appearance in the phenomenal world depends on the thoughts of human beings for its existence, the noumenal thing-in-itself exists independently from human cognition and its characteristics would be exactly as they are now if there were no human beings at all. Because of this, the noumenal world possesses a sense of absoluteness the phenomenal world lacks.
The two-world interpretation comes with serious difficulties. To begin with, it implies a very radical restriction of our knowledge about the world. Although it is generally accepted that the first Critique implies a restriction of our knowledge, on this interpretation any knowledge about the real world seems impossible. While we experience the phenomenal world, this world exists only in our thoughts. It seems we are completely separated from the world as it truly exists. On this interpretation, transcendental idealism amounts to what is often considered an unattractive form of phenomenalism, comparable to that of George Berkeley, according to which all we have access to are our own representations.10 Such a radical scepticism, moreover, contradicts Kant’s own
9 The two-world or two-object interpretation first appears in the earliest review of the first
Critique, by Christian Garve and J.G. Feder (1782). More recent supporters include Peter Strawson (Strawson 1966) and Paul Guyer (Guyer 1987).
position which states that appearances we have knowledge about are no less real than things-in-themselves.
Another problem concerns the apparant paradox in assuming the existence of a noumenal world we can have absolutely no knowledge of.11 If we take
seriously the claim that we are restricted from any knowledge concering this world, how can we ever know it really exists? And, even if we assume it does exist, how can we be sure that it affects our sensibility and thereby forms the ground for our phenomenal world?
Problems like these contribute to a fairly widespread rejection of transcendental idealism among adherants of the two-world interpretation. Peter Strawson dismisses it as a ‘disastrous model’. His rejection is for a good part based on the grounds stated above.12 Paul Guyer largely agrees and criticizes
the ‘dogmatic metaphysical character’ of Kant’s theory.13 Both claim that Kant
should indeed be interpreted as a two-world advocate, but then reject the resulting model as highly implausible.
With its insistence on the existence of two distinct worlds, the two-world interpretation treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory. If we follow this interpretation, transcendental idealism makes various substantial and far-stretching claims about reality. Claiming that the world we know has no existence but in our thoughts, and that space and time do not belong to the world as it exists in-itself, is philosophically extravagant and also clashes with most people’s commonsense ideas about the world. This is why many defenders of Kant’s transcendental idealism maintain that the two-world interpretation is not an accurate description of Kant’s theory. The most populair alternative is the two-aspect interpretation, to which we will now turn.
2.4 Two Aspects
An influential proponent of this interpretation is Henry E. Allison and here I will focus on his approach to transcendental idealism.14 According to Allison, it is a
mistake to interpret transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory. He
11 Idem, p.4-5
12 Strawson 1966, p.21-2 13 Guyer 1987
proposes to interpret it as an epistemological theory instead.15 Viewed this way,
transcendental idealism doesn’t imply the existence of two separate worlds or sets of objects, but merely emphasizes two possible ways of considering one world or one set of objects. This means that phenomena and noumena are ontologically identical. What separates them is only the way in which they are known.
On the one hand, we can consider an object the way we normally do: from our own, human standpoint. How the object appears to us is heavily influenced by our specific type of cognition. The appearance has to conform to the specific
epistemic conditions under which human beings can know the world. Different types of cognition will imply different epistemic conditions. In our case, the object has to be intuited in space and time (the sensible conditions) and united by the categories (the intellectual conditions). Taking up this standpoint presents us with the phenomenal world, or, more accurately, the phenomenal aspect of the world.
On the other hand, we can imagine a standpoint that is unlike any other, in that it is not subject to any of the epistemic conditions that are tied to specific types of cognition. Such an all-encompassing standpoint can also be seen as opposed to the idea of a standpoint, which relates to a specific location. From such an all-encompassing standpoint an object can be considered independent from any specific type of cognition. If we take up this standpoint, we are presented with the noumenal aspect of the world.16
Of course, as humans we cannot actually do this, all we can do is imagine such a standpoint. When we think of objects apart from the epistemic conditions that apply to us, we are simply left with an empty concept, or the idea of a concept in general. For us, the thing-in-itself has no content. This is different, however, from claiming that things-in-themselves, or noumena, form a separate set of objects we have no access to. As I already stated, on the two-aspect interpretation, there is only one set of objects. We do have access to this set, but only under certain epistemic conditions. Thus we cannot know this single set of objects in certain aspects: we cannot know it apart from our specifically human type of cognition.
15 Allison 2004, p.16 16 Idem, p.17
When we compare Allison’s epistemological approach to the metaphysical approach of the two-world interpretation, it becomes clear that the two-aspect interpretation avoids many of the difficulties related to the two-world interpretation. Since on this account appearances are certain aspects of objects, the claim supported by the two-world interpretation, stating that phenomenal objects exist only as mental representations, is contradicted. Thus, unlike the two-world interpretation, it does not collapse into a form of phenomenalism akin to that of Berkeley.
Moreover, it also doesn’t involve the paradox of making ontological claims about the principally unknowable thing-in-itself. While the two-world interpretation has to assume its existence as the ground for our phenomenal world and as affecting our sensibility, Allison’s two-aspect interpretation merely posits the thing-in-itself as a theoretical construct. It is simply the idea of a thing independent from any epistemical condition.17
All in all, Allison’s two-aspect interpretation largely manages to save Kant’s transcendental idealism from becoming the unattractive theory that is implied by the two-world interpretation. However, this is not to say the interpretation is unproblematic or uncontroversial. There are many passages in the first Critique which do equate appearances with mental representations (such as the one quoted above, at the beginning of this section). On the other hand, it might be doubted any interpretation can escape facing such contradicting passages, as Kant’s own words at times seem to contradict each other. It seems difficult to prefer either of the two interpretations purely based on looking at Kant’s own words, other considerations will also have to play a role. An important consideration for me is the fact that I intend to employ some notion of
17 It might be argued (and is in fact argued in Vaida 2009) that Allison does not completely avoid
the paradox, by claiming that things-in-themselves are not spatiotemporal. Even though spatiotemporality is an epistemical condition to be abstracted in order to arrive at the empty concept of the thing-in-itself, this does not by itself prove that things-in-themselves in fact lack this property. However, this criticism involves a metaphysical reading of Allison’s interpretation, according to which he makes an ontological claim about things-in-themselves. But on Allison’s own account, the thing-in-itself is by definition not spatiotemporal since it simply is an object of experience after we abstract from it our epistemic conditions. It is a theoretical construct to show the limts of our cognition rather than an ontological claim about the world.
transcendental idealism in order to defend the possibility of freedom. Therefore I am primarily interested in an interpretation of transcendental idealism that best serves this purpose.
It has probably become clear by now that I think the two-aspect interpretation is far more attractive than the two-world interpretation. This interpretation makes the assumption of transcendental idealism much more easily acceptable than the metaphysically heavy two-world interpretation. If a succesful defense of the possibility of freedom depends on this assumption, this is of course a great advantage. However, the fact that this interpretation is the most easily acceptable of the two does by no means imply that it is also the interpretation that serves best to defend the possibility of freedom. As we shall see later, the two-world interpretation creates room for freedom by positing two distinct sets of objects and attributing freedom to one and determinism to the other. But it is not so easily obvious how a two-aspect interpretation is able to preserve the possibility of freedom. How can one set of objects be both determined and free? It might turn out that the most attractive interpretation of transcendental idealism proves unsuccessful in defending our freedom.
We will get back to this in much more detail when we go into the different interpretations that have been given to the Resolution of the Third Antinomy. First, however, we will take a close look to the Resolution itself.
Chapter 3:
Kant’s Resolution
Having pointed to transcendental idealism as the key to resolving all four antinomies, Kant sets out to show, for each individual antinomy, how this resolution is arrived at. After arguing for the falsity of both the thesis and antithesis of the First and the Second Antinomy, and before turning to the Third Antinomy, he points to a difference these first two antinomies have with regard to the last two antinomies.
The first two mathematical antinomies deal with questions concerning quantity
(the First Antinomy concerns the finity or infinity of space and time, the Second Antinomy questions whether composite objects are composed of indivisible simple parts). As such, they are only concerned with conditions which are part of the homogenous series of conditions composing our phenomenal world. Because of this, they only allow for other sensible conditions to enter. Also being part of this same series of conditions, these conditions can never lead to something unconditioned. The last two dynamical antinomies, by contrast, deal with questions concerning existence, in which quantity plays no role.Therefore, they allow for a condition which is not part of the phenomenal world (A530-1/ B558-9). It stands outside of the series of homogenous phenomenal conditions and this way allows for a way out of the infinite regress that was not available in the cases of the first two antinomies. This means that, under the assumption of transcendental idealism, both the thesis and the antithesis of the last two antinomies can be true (A532/B560). In the case of the Resolution of the Third Antinomy, this means that Kant has to show how it is possible that full causal determination of the phenomenal world and transcendental freedom can coexist side by side.
Kant’s argument in the Resolution can be divided into four crucial steps. The
first step consists in showing how the concept of practical freedom, as it is contained in our idea of agency, in fact presupposes transcendental freedom. In the second step, Kant has to show how this transcendental freedom and natural causality can exist side by side. He tries to do this by showing how one and the
same event allows for two distinct but compatible causal explanations, appealling to two distinct causalities, namely freedom and natural causality. In order to say that we act free, the causal explanation of our actions by appeal to freedom should also take some priority over its causal explanation by appeal to nature. In the third step of the argument, Kant argues for such priority, by showing how empirical character is grounded in intelligible character. The fourth
step consists in showing how pure reason can be practical, by appealling to the special status of the ‘ought’ that is expressed by our reason. In this final step, Kant at last point out the crucial link between freedom and reason, as he sets out to show how reason can provide the law that is presupposed by the idea of a causality of freedom. We will now go into each of these four steps individually.
3.1 Agency, Practical Freedom and Transcendental Freedom
Kant begins the Resolution of the Third Antinomy by pointing out that we can think of only two kinds of causality regarding everything that happens: first, we can think of a causality through nature, and second, we can also think of a causality through freedom. As has already become clear, a causality through nature must always presuppose a preceding and determining cause for each event that takes place. A causality through freedom, by contrast, does not presuppose such a preceding and determining cause:
“By freedom in the cosmological sense, on the contrary, I understand the faculty of beginning a state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature. Freedom in this signification is a pure transcendental idea, which, first, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and second, the object of which also cannot be given determinately in any experience, because it is a universal law - even of the possibility of all experience - that everything that happens must have a cause, and hence that the causality of the cause, as itself having happened or arisen, must in turn have a cause; through this law, then, the entire field of experience, however far it may reach, is transformed into the sum total of mere nature. But since in such a way no absolute totality of conditions in causal relations is forthcoming, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in
turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection.” (A533/B561)
In this quote, Kant mainly provides a short restatement of his earlier remarks on transcendental freedom in the Third Antinomy. Note that he incorporates remarks not only from the thesis, but also from the antithesis: he points out the impossibility of experiencing freedom. This impossibility was used to argue against the idea of transcendental freedom in the antithesis, as it would render the idea empty. Kant does not argue against this point, on the contrary, his transcendental idealism implies the impossibility of knowing noumena, and thus also transcendental freedom. He acknowledges that transcendental freedom may therefore be seen as an empty idea. However, its assumption by reason is justified nonetheless, since without the assumption of such an empty idea, a totality of conditions can impossibly be arrived at: something outside of experience is needed, an this can be nothing but an empty idea.
The fact that points from both the thesis and the antithesis are incorporated should not come as surprising, considering the fact that we have just seen that under the assumption of transcendental idealism, the last two (dynamical) antinomies allow for the thesis and antithesis to both be true at the same time. This also confirms my earlier point, that despite being situated in a chapter concerned with reason coming into conflict with itself by overstepping its boundaries, the thesis of the Third Antinomy represents Kant’s own view on freedom.18
The above mentioned quote ends with a reference to action. We have seen that Kant first introduces his concept of transcendental freedom without reference to things such as humans, agency and morality. It is only later that he briefly relates the idea of freedom to himself, when he describes his own
18 If both the thesis and antithesis can be true, it might be objected that the thesis doesn’t
represent Kant’s own view on freedom any more than the antithesis does. While this could be argued, it is clear that it is in the thesis where Kant presents us with his central concept of transcendental freedom. The antithesis is true, but limited to the phenomenal world or perspective. Because it excludes the possibility of freedom, the antithesis can also be regarded as a problem Kant want to solve, while the thesis points to Kant’s solution for this problem. Therefore, I think I am justified in claiming that the thesis represents Kant’s own view on freedom, rather than saying that the thesis and antithesis both equally represent Kant’s own view.
freedom in deciding whether or not to get up from his chair. It is in the Resolution where Kant finally relates his concept of transcendental freedom to the concept of practical freedom. Immediately following the above quote, he continues:
“It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is grounded, and the former constitutes the real moment of the difficulties in the latter, which have long surrounded the question of its possibility. Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice is sensible insofar as it is
pathologically affected (through moving-causes of sensibility); it is called
an animal power of choice (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically
necessitated. The human power of choice is indeed an arbitrium sensitivum, yet not brutum but liberum, because sensibility does not render its action necessary, but in the human being there is a faculty of determining oneself from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible impulses.” (A533-4/B561-2)
Unlike the concept of transcendental freedom, the concept of practical freedom relates immediately to action. It demands independence from sensuous necessitation in making choices, and because of this, it allows anyone in possession of this capacity to truly determine one’s own actions, and thereby also oneself. Kant attributes this capacity to humans, who he claims, although they are affected by sensuous impulses, are not necessitated by these impulses. The concept of practical freedom can perhaps best be explained as an expression of the presuppositions directly contained in our idea of human
agency. This concept of agency is intimately tied up with the idea that we are (generally) able to make our own choices in such a way that we can be held morally responsible for them. Practical freedom shows us how our relation to the world must be in order to answer to this idea of agency.
It contains, most importantly, a condition of independence from natural forces and is, therefore, best interpreted as a negative concept of freedom: it is primarily freedom from natural necessitation. It is, however, always connected to a positive concept of freedom, namely the capacity to begin a series of events from itself, that is, transcendental freedom (A553-4/B581-2). Ultimately, this
means that for Kant, agency implies practical freedom grounded in transcendental freedom.
In the thesis of the Third Antinomy, Kant defines transcendental freedom as ‘an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances that runs according to natural laws (A446/B474).’ This definition is analytically distinct from Kant’s definition of practical freedom, but it turns out that practical freedom does in fact depend on transcendental freedom. While practical freedom emphasizes independence rather than an absolute causal spontaneity, ultimately, the only way such independence can be achieved is by having this capacity to begin from itself a series of appearances. Kant points to this dependence of practical freedom on transcendental freedom as the cause of the difficulties surrounding the possibility of practical freedom.
It might be objected that practical freedom does not necessarily presuppose transcendental freedom. While the idea of practical freedom largely corresponds to the common-sense notion of agency, in which we are able to make our own choices and can therefore be held responsible for these choices, the concept of transcendental freedom and its insistence on absolute causal spontaneity at first glance seems to go far beyond this commonsense notion of agency. The idea that persons act from absolute spontaneity, that they are uncaused causes, is by many considered as philosophically extravagant and, moreover, higly problematic.19 Kant is, of course, not oblivious to the difficulties
surrounding the idea of transcendental freedom. Despite this, he is still adament in his conviction that our commonsense idea of agency indeed presupposes the problematic concept of transcendental freedom. He continues:
“It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of sense were mere nature, then every occurrence would be determined in time by another in accord with necessary laws, and hence - since appearances, insofar as they determine the power of choice, would have to render every action necessary as their natural consequence - the abolition of transcendental freedom would also simultaneously eliminate all practical freedom. For the latter presupposes that although something has not happened, it nevertheless ought to have happened, and its cause in appearance was thus not so determining that there is not a causality in our power of choice such that, independently of those natural causes and even opposed to their
power and Influence, it might produce something determined in the temporal order in accord with empirical laws, and hence begin a series of occurrences entirely from itself.” (A534/B562)
Here, Kant connects the concepts of transcendental freedom and practical freedom by appeal to what could be interpreted as the first instantiation of his famous ‘ought implies can’ principle. He argues that since practical freedom presupposes that something which did not happen, ought to have happened, it thereby at the same time presupposes that its natural cause was not so determining that it could not have happened.20 The ‘ought’ also plays an
important part in the last step of Kant’s argument in the Resolution. For now, I will merely note that here, Kant has very quietly introduced a crucial characteristic of the practical freedom contained in our idea of agency: it assumes the existence of alternate possibilities. The ‘ought’ tells us that it only makes sense to think about a choice that is before us, if we assume that more than one outcome is within our reach. This shows itself especially when we regret the choice we have made: we experience the resulted outcome and realize an alternative, better outcome was available to us. If agency essentially involves making choices, it is intimately tied up with the idea of alternate possibilities.21 This shows clearly why for Kant, practical freedom must be
grounded in transcendental freedom: without another causality besides the causality of nature, there is no room whatsoever for alternate possibilities. So, although transcendental freedom does not follow from practical freedom analytically, it is a necessary precondition for upholding practical freedom in a fully determined phenomenal world.
This means that if we agree with Kant that the concept of agency inherently includes the possibility to make choices independent from, and opposed to, the causality of nature, in such a way that from the same situation, multiple outcomes are possible, it turns out we may indeed have to admit to
20 Kant’s ‘ought implies can’ principle will play a more prominent role in his later, practical works,
especially in ‘Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason’ (Kant 1999).
21 This obviously also applies to Frankfurt-style cases. Habermas argues convincingly that
although these cases may provide useful insights for the moral evaluation of behavior, the condition of alternate possibilities is still indispensible from the participant’s perspective from which we have to make decisions. Habermas argues, as I do here, that this only makes sense given the assumption of alternate possibilities. (Habermas 2007)
