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The  perpetuation  of  America’s  permanent  

war  economy  in  the  21

st

 century  

 

 

 Analysing  the  entanglement  of  interests  in  the  acquisition  process  of  

Northrop  Grumman’s  ‘Global  Hawk’  

     

MSc  Politicologie,    Internationale  Betrekkingen    

Universiteit  van  Amsterdam     Master’s  thesis     2016          

Titus  Reijntjes  

10070294  

Design  title  page:    Richard  Podkolinski  

 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ...  4  

INTRODUCTION  ...  FOUT!  BLADWIJZER  NIET  GEDEFINIEERD.   CHAPTER  1:  THE  GREAT  DEPRESSION,  WORLD  WAR  II  AND  THE  RISE  OF  PERMANENT  U.S.   MILITARISM  ...  10  

1.1  THE  GREAT  DEPRESSION,  WORLD  WAR  II  AND  THE  DECREASE  OF  FAITH  IN  CAPITALISM  AS  A  HUMANE  ECONOMIC   SYSTEM  ...  11  

1.2  THE  RISE  OF  MILITARY  KEYNESIANISM  ...  12  

1.3  POST-­‐WAR  U.S.  IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  PERMANENT  U.S.  MILITARISM  ...  14  

1.4  ONGOING  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  AND  HIGH  MILITARY  SPENDING  IN  THE  POST-­‐COLD  WAR  ERA  ...  15  

CHAPTER  2:  THE  IMPACT  OF  PERMANENT  U.S.  MILITARISM  ON  THE  AMERICAN  SOCIETY  ...  17  

2.1  THE  SOCIAL  AND  SPIRITUAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PERMANENT  MILITARISM  FOR  AMERICAN  SOCIETY  ...  17  

2.2  THE  ECONOMIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PERMANENT  U.S.  MILITARISM  ...  18  

CHAPTER  3:  AMERICAN  POLITICS,  WHO  GOVERNS?  ...  20  

3.1  THEORIES  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS  ...  20  

3.2  WHICH  THEORETICAL  TRADITION  BEST  CAPTURES  THE  REALITY  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS?  ...  21  

3.3  THE  POWER  ELITE  AND  THE  MILITARY-­‐INDUSTRIAL  COMPLEX:  AN  ENTANGLEMENT  OF  INTERESTS  BETWEEN  ELITE   ACTORS  FROM  POLITICS,  ECONOMICS  AND  THE  MILITARY  ...  24  

3.4  THE  IRON  TRIANGLE  ...  25  

3.5  THE  IRON  TRIANGLE  AND  DEFENCE  CONTRACTING  ...  26  

3.6  INTEREST  GROUPS  AND  THE  ARGUMENT  OF  PLURALISM  ...  28  

3.7  DEFENCE  CONTRACTORS’  POWER  GAMES:  THE  REVOLVING  DOOR,  FRONT  LOADING,  AND  POLITICAL  ENGINEERING  ...  29  

CHAPTER  4:  THEORY-­‐TESTING  PROCESS  TRACING  ...  32  

4.1  WHY  FOCUS  ON  DRONE  TECHNOLOGY?  ...  32  

4.2  WHY  FOCUS  SPECIFICALLY  ON  THE  GLOBAL  HAWK  DRONE?  ...  33  

4.3  THEORY-­‐TESTING  PROCESS  TRACING:  FORMULATING  A  CAUSAL  MECHANISM  ...  34  

4.4  THEORY-­‐TESTING  PROCESS  TRACING:  TRANSLATING  THEORETICAL  EXPECTATIONS  INTO  CASE-­‐SPECIFIC   PREDICTIONS  ...  37  

4.5  THEORY-­‐TESTING  PROCESS  TRACING:  DATA  AND  EVALUATION  OF  THE  CASE-­‐SPECIFIC  PREDICTIONS  ...  39  

CONCLUSION  ...  52  

LITERATURE  ...  53    

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As   my   studies   draw   to   a   close,   I   am   happy   to   look   back   on   my   years   at   the   University   of   Amsterdam.  It  was  a  stimulating  period  in  which  I  greatly  expanded  my  skills  and  capabilities.   The  master  International  Relations  has  enabled  me  to  bring  together  many  of  my  interests  and   expand  my  knowledge  on  a  variety  of  topics.    

 

My  thesis  has  allowed  me  to  work  on  a  fascinating  topic.  However,  I  could  not  have  done  this   without  the  help  of  certain  people.  First  of  all,  I  am  grateful  to  my  supervisor  Polly  Pallister-­‐ Wilkins   for   her   constructive   criticism   and   reassuring   words   of   advice   on   writing   a   master’s   thesis.  Secondly,  I  would  like  to  thank  my  family,  Claartje  van  Well,  Stephan  Reijntjes  and  Dido   Reijntjes  for  showing  me  unwavering  support  in  times  of  difficulty.  Not  just  during  the  time  of   writing  this  thesis,  but  also  more  in  general,  you  have  always  supported  me  in  whatever  ways   possible,  for  which  I  am  very  thankful.    

                               

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defined   by   global   military   presence   and   projection   of   power   through   constant   foreign   interventions  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012).  Since  then,  the  U.S.  has  been  at  war  somewhere  every   year.  It  fought  wars  in  Korea,  Nicaragua,  Vietnam,  the  Balkans,  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  as  well  as  in   Chile,   Grenada,   Panama   and   multiple   countries   in   Africa   (Melman,   2003).   Besides   these   conflicts  the  United  States  has  engaged  in  hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  of  military  interventions   and  “low  intensity  operations”  around  the  world  (Cunningham,  2004,  p.  556-­‐557).    

 

This  state  of  permanent  war  is  sustained  by  its  own  niche  economy,  consisting  of  thousands  of   American  industrial  enterprises  with  millions  of  employees  who  research,  design,  produce,  and   deliver  material  and  services  to  their  main  client,  the  Department  of  Defence.  The  proportion   of  this  permanent  war  economy,  measured  in  terms  of  the  annual  budget  of  the  Department   of  Defence,  is  staggering.  Consistently,  the  U.S.  spends  more  on  its  military  than  any  other   nation  in  the  world.  With  a  military  budget  of  $597  billion,  the  U.S.  spent  more  on  its  military   in  2015  than  the  next  eleven  highest  spending  countries  did  combined  (Business  Insider,  2015).   Even   allowing   for   some   periods   of   spending   decline,   U.S.   defence   spending   has   shown   an   upward   trend   since   the   demobilization   following   World   War   II,   with   annual   U.S.   military   budgets  continuously  exceeding  $350  billion  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012,  p.  417).    

 

To   account   for   its   huge   military   apparatus,   the   U.S.   has   articulated   several   justifications   throughout  the  decades,  all  of  them  framed  in  terms  of  an  “external  threat  to  U.S.  national   interests”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  76).  To  rationalize  the  continuous  growth  of  the  military   apparatus   that   commenced   in   1950,   the   American   people   were   told   that   permanent   war   mobilization  was  necessary  to  contain  the  ‘communist  threat’.  Since  then,  this  threat  has  been   supplanted  by  the  somewhat  vague  notions  of  ‘rogue  states’,  ‘global  terrorism’,  ‘the  axis  of   evil’,  ‘militant  Islam’  and,  more  recently,  ‘enemies  of  democracy’  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  76).    

 

Accordingly,   every   fiscal   year   the   most   expensive   weapon   systems   are   procured   under   the   rhetorical  guise  of  national  security.  A  search  of  the  keywords  “National  defence”  in  the  video   library  of  C-­‐Span,  a  political  broadcasting  platform  providing  access  to  proceedings  in  the  U.S.   House  of  Representatives  and  Senate,  will  invariably  lead  one  to  come  across  politicians  arguing  

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tomorrow’,  and  that  ‘military  budget  cuts  are  [therefore]  a  threat  to  the  national  security’.    

While  there  may  be  some  truth  to  the  proposition  that  a  country  like  the  United  States  needs   a  strong  military  to  protect  its  global  interests,  the  enormous  amount  of  resources  the  U.S.   spends  on  its  military  every  year  cannot  solely  be  explained  from  the  perspective  of  national   security.   To   truly   understand   the   U.S.   ‘military   metaphysic’,   we   need   to   look   beyond   the   dominant  political  discourse  of  national  security  and  study  the  way  in  which  those  who  profit   from  increased  military  spending  are  combining  their  efforts  to  keep  the  United  States  in  a  state   of  permanent  military  preparedness  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012,  p.  415).      

 

As   scholars   discussing   the   strands   of   literature   on   the   military-­‐industrial   complex   and   the   American   war   economy   point   out,   “there   is   an   economic   and   political   power   elite   that   is   predominant  within  American  society,  and  [it]  is  cohesive  on  core  shared  values  and  rules  of   the  game”  (Cunningham,  2004,  p.  561).  Military  spending  provides  employment,  profits,  and   resources   for   the   corporations,   communities   and   political   actors   engaged   with   the   military   industrial  complex.  Therefore,  corporate,  military  and  political  elites  have  a  vested  interest  in   keeping  the  vicious  cycle  of  increased  defence  spending  and  American  militarism  spinning,  and   will  collectively  try  to  offset  any  efforts  to  reduce  it  in  scale  and  scope  (Cunningham,  2004,  p.   561;  Feinstein,  2012).  Because  of  this  cycle,  ongoing  U.S.  militarism  is  said  to  be  “driven  not  so   much  by  some  general  or  abstract  national  interest,  as  it  is  by  the  special  interests  vested  in   the   military-­‐industrial   complex   that   need   an   atmosphere   of   war   and   militarism   in   order   to   justify  their  lion’s  share  of  public  money”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  3).    

 

In   1961,   American   president   and   former   commanding   general   Dwight   Eisenhower   warned   about  the  entanglement  of  interests  between  the  U.S.  military  establishment,  the  arms  industry   and  certain  agents  within  the  American  federal  government  when  he  spoke  about  the  military-­‐ industrial  complex:    

 

We   have   been   compelled   to   create   a   permanent   armaments   industry   of   vast   proportions…This  conjunction  of  an  immense  military  establishment  and  a  large  arms   industry  is  new  in  the  American  experience.  The  total  influence  is  felt  in  every  city,  every  

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must  guard  against  the  unwarranted  influence,  whether  sought  or  unsought,  by  the   military-­‐industrial  complex.  The  potential  for  the  disastrous  rise  of  misplaced  power   exists  and  will  persist  (Eisenhower,  1961).  

 

In  this  thesis  I  will  look  at  the  workings  of  the  military  industrial  complex  and  study  whether  the   “unwarranted  and  misplaced  power”  of  which  Eisenhower  spoke-­‐-­‐that  is,  power  that  results   from  the  entanglement  of  interests  between  elite  political,  corporate  and  bureaucratic  actors-­‐ -­‐still   persists   in   the   councils   of   government   today.   By   uncovering   the   linked   interests   of   members  in  Congress,  key  actors  within  the  Department  of  Defence,  and  the  American  arms   industry,   I   will   study   whether,   in   the   21st   century,   governmental   decision-­‐making   on   the   acquisition   of   weapon   systems   is   influenced   by   corporate   interests.   However,   since   it   goes   beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to  study  the  influence  of  the  military  industrial  complex  upon   the  perpetuation  of  America’s  war  economy  in  the  21st  century  as  a  whole,  I  will  exclusively   focus   on   one   instance   specific   to   more   contemporary   times   in   which   the   influence   of   the   military   industrial   complex   may   manifest   itself:   the   federal   acquisition   process   of   Northrop   Grumman’s  Global  Hawk  drone.    

 

When  George  W.  Bush  painted  the  picture  of  “tens  of  thousands  of  al-­‐Qaeda  trained  terrorists   in  at  least  a  dozen  countries”  and  the  United  States  embarked  upon  a  global  war  on  terror,  the   American  way  of  war  began  to  transform  from  one  that  was  temporally  and  spatially  bound  to   one  that  could  effectively  happen  anywhere  at  any  time  (Beck,  2002;  Gregory,  2011).  It  is  within   this  frame  of  the  “everywhere  war”,  that  the  use  of  ‘traditional’  full-­‐scale  military  operations   and  equipment  is  seen  as  impractical  and  the  U.S.  military  increasingly  relies  on  Unmanned   Aerial  Vehicles  (UAV’s)  as  the  main  alternative  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2013;  Shaw,  2013).  As  budgets   for  drone  programs  have  increased  significantly  from  $363  million  in  2001  to  $4.61  billion  in   2016,   it   is   important,   however,   not   to   look   at   the   increased   military   use   of   drones   as   an   inevitability  that  accompanies  the  United  States’  military  switch  from  traditional  to  asymmetric   warfare   or   to   blindly   accept   the   ‘fact’   that   drones   provide   a   financially,   technically,   or   operationally  superior  means  of  defence  relative  to  alternative  technologies  (Center  for  the   Study   of   the   Drone,   2016).   Instead,   we   should   consider   the   possibility   that   the   increased  

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advance  its  interests.    

To  my  knowledge,  within  the  scientific  debate  concerning  America’s  war  economy  and  the  role   of  the  military  industrial  complex  in  perpetuating  it,  no  work  has  yet  focused  exclusively  on   drone   technology   and   the   way   in   which   corporate   drone   manufacturers   are   wielding   their   political  power  to  promote  the  military  use  of  drones  in  the  21st  century.  As  such,  by  answering   the  following  research  question,  this  thesis  aims  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  scientific  debate   concerning  the  perpetuation  of  America’s  war  economy  in  the  21st  century:    

 

How   did   the   entanglement   of   interests   between   Northrop   Grumman,   certain   members  in  Congress  and  elite  actors  within  the  Department  of  Defence  influence   the  federal  acquisition  process  of  Northrop  Grumman’s  Global  Hawk  drone?  

 

In  what  follows,  I  will  first  shed  light  on  the  context  in  which  permanent  U.S.  militarism  and  its   concomitant  war  economy  emerged.  By  discussing  the  context  of  the  Great  Depression  and   World  War  II,  the  first  section  of  chapter  one  will  show  that  the  United  States  initially  used  the   expansion  of  its  military  apparatus  as  a  means  to  an  end  in  the  process  of  stabilizing  its  own   economy  and  thereafter  to  stabilize  the  world  economy  as  well.  Subsequently,  the  last  section   of   chapter   one   will   discuss   some   of   the   most   important   rival   explanations   for   ongoing   U.S.   militarism  in  the  post-­‐Cold  War  era.    

 

In   chapter   two,   I   will   delve   into   the   ways   in   which   permanent   militarism   has   influenced   American  society.  Here  I  will  show  how  permanent  militarism  has  shaped  social  institutions   with  seemingly  little  connection  to  battle  and  review  some  of  the  most  important  spiritual,   social  and  economic  consequences  of  sustained  high  military  expenditures  for  the  American   people.    

 

In   chapter   three   I   will   focus   on   theories   of   American   politics   to   find   out   how   we   can   best   understand   the   fact   that   annually,   the   United   States   continues   to   spend   huge   amounts   of   resources  on  its  military  in  excess  of  what  is  needed  for  maintaining  national  security,  despite   the  overall  negative  effects  of  high  military  spending  on  American  society.  By  reviewing  the  

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elites  and  organized  interest  groups  who  have  the  most  influence  over  shaping  public  policy   and  who  should  therefore  be  the  starting  point  of  the  forthcoming  analysis.  However,  given  the   fact   that   private   interests   cannot   dominate   policy-­‐making   without   complicity   from   both   legislators   in   Congress   and   bureaucrats   in   government   agencies   who   actually   make   and   implement   policy,   I   will   subsequently   discuss   the   mid-­‐range   theory   of   the   ‘iron   triangle’   to   elucidate   how   the   overlapping   interests   of   business-­‐oriented   interest   groups,   Congressmen   and  bureaucrats  can  lead  to  the  passing  of  very  narrow  ‘pork-­‐barrel’  policies  that  only  benefit   a  small  segment  of  society  while  the  interests  of  the  public  at  large  are  neglected.    

 

After   having   laid   a   theoretical   foundation   for   understanding   how   the   United   States’   war   economy   is   perpetuated,   chapter   four   will   discuss   the   method   of   ‘theory   testing   process   tracing’,  which  will  be  applied  to  the  federal  acquisition  process  of  Northrop  Grumman’s  Global   Hawk.   This   application   will   discern   whether,   in   the   21st   century,   America’s   war   economy   is   proceeding  on  track  with  the  predictions  of  existing  theories.  In  chapter  four  I  will  also  discuss   my  main  findings,  followed  by  a  conclusion  in  chapter  five.

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 01                              The  Great  Depression,  World  War  II  

                 and  the  rise  of  permanent  U.S.  militarism    

       

In  the  United  States’  long  and  varied  history  of  violence  and  war-­‐making,  World  War  II  and  the   Great  Depression  that  preceded  it  represented  major  turning  points.  During  those  years,  the   scale  and  scope  of  U.S.  war-­‐making,  militarism  and  the  arms  industry  expanded  massively,  and,   more  significantly,  took  on  a  permanent  form  (Cunningham,  2004,  p.  556;  Coyne  &  Duncan,   2013).  Prior  to  World  War  II,  wars  with  U.S.  involvement  were  each  followed  by  a  period  of   military  demobilization  which  reduced  the  size  of  the  military  establishment  to  its  pre-­‐war  size.   After  World  War  II,  this  reduction  also  took  place,  but  only  very  briefly,  as  “the  subsequent   remilitarization  that  started  under  President  Truman  in  the  late  1940’s  continued  unabated  to   [modern  times]”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  39).    

 

Since  Truman’s  presidency,  the  U.S.  has  maintained  a  global  military  presence,  configured  its   forces  for  global  power  projection  and  countered  existing  or  anticipated  threats  by  relying  on   a  policy  of  global  interventionism  (Bacevich,  2010,  p.  14).  In  the  words  of  Coyne  and  Duncan   “by   the   end   of   the   [second   world]   war,   the   idea   of   defence   had   become   one   of   constant   preparation  for  future  wars  and  foreign  interventions  rather  than  an  exercise  in  response  to   one-­‐off  threats”  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012,  p.  415).  

 

In  order  to  comprehend  why  the  United  States  embarked  upon  the  path  of  permanent  war   after  the  demobilization  following  War  II,  this  chapter  will  show  how  U.S.  militarism  has  been   interrelated  with-­‐-­‐and  used  in  service  of-­‐-­‐the  American  ‘project’  of  capitalism  since  the  Great   Depression.  The  first  section  will  argue  that  growing  anti-­‐capitalist  sentiment  during  the  Great   Depression  led  the  United  States’  established  order  to  look  for  ways  to  end  the  grave  economic   circumstances  and  restore  trust  in  capitalism  as  an  economic  system.  These  efforts,  in  turn,  led   to  military  deficit  spending  as  a  way  to  stimulate  the  lagging  economy.  The  second  section  will  

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argue  that  U.S.  planners  constructed  a  liberal  international  order  after  World  War  II  to  retain   the  United  States’  level  of  overall  supremacy  in  the  post-­‐war  era.  To  achieve  this  order,  ongoing   U.S.  militarism  played  a  crucial  role,  as  it  helped  “safeguard  and  keep  open  global  markets  and   resources  to  U.S.  Capital”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  54).  Finally,  section  three  will  discuss  several   explanations  for  ongoing  U.S.  militarism  in  the  post-­‐Cold  War  era.    

 

1.1  The  Great  Depression,  World  War  II  and  the  decrease  of  faith  in  capitalism  

as  a  humane  economic  system  

The  Great  Depression  was  a  dramatic  event  which  shook  the  American  people’s  beliefs  about   the  way  in  which  capitalism  worked.  After  the  catastrophic  stock  market  crash  on  October  29th   1929,  also  knows  as  ‘Black  Tuesday’,  the  United  States  spent  more  than  a  decade  in  economic   crisis.  Millions  of  Americans  lost  their  jobs,  and,  as  a  result,  people  from  all  strands  of  society   began  to  think  that  capitalism  had  failed  them  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2013;  Library  of  Congress,   n.d.).    

 

Many  people  found  it  difficult  to  understand  why  “in  a  country  with  abundant  resources,  the   largest  force  of  skilled  labour  and  the  most  productive  industry  in  the  world,  the  depression   had  occurred  and  could  not  be  resolved”  (Library  of  Congress,  n.d.).  Moreover,  because  the   depression  was  caused  by  the  mechanisms  of  capitalism  itself,  people  began  to  believe  that   market  economies  were  inherently  unstable  and  that  “the  only  means  of  recourse  to  a  failing   market  was  the  increase  of  state  intervention”  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2013,  p.  220).    

 

The   failure   of   the   market   mechanism   to   provide   people   with   their   basic   needs   led   many   Americans  to  lose  faith  in  capitalism  as  a  self-­‐adjusting  and  humane  system.  Among  the  working   classes,  as  well  as  in  the  ranks  of  the  middle  and  lower  middle  classes,  demands  were  made  “to   do  away  with  the  unreliable,  and,  at  times,  brutal  forces  of  market  mechanism”  in  favour  of  a   regulated  and  managed  national  economy  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  40).    

 

As   professor   Hossein-­‐Zadeh   points   out,   “Contempt   with   the   status   quo   and   the   desire   for   change   swelled   the   ranks   of   communist,   socialist   and   other   opposition   parties.”   The   joint  

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communist  presidential  candidates  won  more  than  one  million  votes,  while  the  number  of  third   party  votes  in  congressional  and  local  elections  were  even  more  conspicuous  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,   2006,  p.  52).  The  outbreak  of  World  War  II  then,  further  undermined  the  viability  of  capitalism,   as  it  heightened  the  need  for  government  intervention  in  the  economic  affairs  of  the  nation   even  further  and  led  to  discussions  about  economic  nationalism  and  self-­‐sufficiency  should  the   war  interrupt  foreign  trade  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  41-­‐43).  

 

1.2  The  rise  of  Military  Keynesianism  

The   established   order   of   the   United   States,   which   consisted   of   business   and   government   leaders,  understood  that  the  widespread  popular  discontent  and  unrest  of  the  working  class,   combined  with  issues  of  economic  self-­‐sufficiency,  formed  a  serious  threat  to  their  interests.   The   leaders   of   big   businesses   with   high   stakes   in   international   trade   and   investment   were   especially  anxious  of  a  scenario  in  which  the  United  States  would  be  largely  self-­‐sufficient  within   the  Western  hemisphere.  In  response,  they  set  out  to  “restore  trust  in  [the]  market  mechanism   and   defeat   sentiments   of   economic   isolationism   in   favour   of   globalization”   (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,   2006,  p.  41).    

 

In  doing  so,  the  American  established  order  was  highly  influenced  by  the  economic  ideas  of   John  Maynard  Keynes.  Keynes,  who  became  well  known  for  his  anti-­‐cyclical  economic  theory,   argued   that   the   Great   Depression   might   continue   indefinitely   unless   government   spending,   financed  by  a  budget  deficit,  were  increased  sufficiently  (Independent  Institute,  2001).  Taking   into  consideration  the  popular  acceptance  of  defence  spending  as  opposed  to  other  forms  of   deficit   spending,   it   was   John   Maynard   Keynes   who   acknowledged   the   potential   of   military   spending   to   solve   the   ongoing   problem   of   unemployment   (Coyne   &   Duncan,   2013).   An   exogenous  rise  in  military  spending  would  increase  aggregate  demand  and,  if  there  is  spare   capacity,  increase  utilization  of  resources,  Keynes  argued  (Dunne,  Smith  &  Willenbockel,  2005).      

Indeed,  military  deficit  spending  seemed  to  stimulate  the  economy,  as  the  massive  American   war-­‐mobilization  during  World  War  II,  financed  by  deficit  spending,  coincided  with  the  return   of  prosperity  for  the  American  people.  During  the  years  of  war,  millions  of  men  and  women   served  overseas  and  almost  all  who  remained  at  home  dedicated  themselves  to  supporting  the  

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war  in  whatever  ways  possible.  As  a  result,  some  17  million  jobs  were  created  and  the  Gross   National  Product  (GNP)  rose  by  70  percent  between  1939  and  1944  (Independent  Institute,   2001).  By  1944,  the  level  of  unemployment  had  even  shrunk  to  1.2%,  the  lowest  rate  ever   achieved  (Library  of  Congress,  n.d.;  Gilder  Lehrman  Collection,  2013).  Renowned  economist   and  opponent  of  the  military  industrial  complex  Seymour  Melman  summarized  this  war  deficit   scenario  as  a  “business  boom  [which]  brought  economic  opportunity,  better  living  and  money   in  the  bank  to  almost  all  who  participated  in  it”  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2013,  p.  221).    

 

However,  while  most  Americans  were  enjoying  the  return  of  prosperity,  in  the  midst  of  the  war   effort   U.S.   planners   were   already   preoccupied   with   ensuring   the   United   States’   economic   viability  in  the  post-­‐war  era  (Stokes,  2005).  Concerns  began  to  emerge  that,  in  the  short  term,   “the  removal  of  military  funds  at  the  war’s  end  would  result  in  [yet  another]  economic  collapse”   and  arguments  were  made  that  war  spending  should  continue  after  the  war  concluded  (Coyne   &  Duncan,  2013,  p.  222).  Moreover,  it  was  believed  that  in  the  long  term,  the  sustainability  of   U.S.  capitalism  was  intrinsically  tied  up  with  the  creation  of  a  world  capitalist  system,  as  the   ability  to  usurp  resources  from-­‐-­‐and  export  goods  to-­‐-­‐foreign  markets  was  seen  as  crucial  for   continuous  economic  growth.  In  a  1944  congressional  testimony,  Undersecretary  of  State  Dean   Acheson  pinpointed  the  core  of  the  problem  when  he  proclaimed:  “It  is  a  problem  of  markets.   We   have   got   to   see   [that]   what   the   country   produces   is   used   and   sold   under   financial   arrangements  which  make  its  production  possible.  Under  a  different  economic  system,  you   could  use  the  entire  production  of  the  country  in  the  United  States,  but  under  our  system  of   market  mechanism,  the  government  must  look  to  foreign  markets”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.   79).  Along  the  same  line  of  reasoning,  State  Department  post-­‐war  planner  Benjamin  Cohen   argued  that  “a  major  need  of  the  post-­‐war  U.S.  economy  [was]  to  create  purchasing  power   outside   of   [the   U.S.]   which   [could]   be   converted   into   domestic   purchasing   power   through   exportation”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  49-­‐50).    

 

Thus,  it  was  argued  that  in  order  to  ensure  the  long-­‐term  viability  of  U.S.  capitalism,  the  United   States   would   not   only   have   to   smoothen   its   business   cycles   by   employing   the   Keynesian   framework  of  government  deficit  spending,  it  would  also  need  to  open,  secure  and  enure  that   foreign  markets  flourished  through  U.S.  imperialism  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2013,  p.  221).  In  other  

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the  U.S.  established  order  “went  way  beyond  restructuring  schemes  on  a  national  level;  they   amounted  to  a  comprehensive  restructuring,  or  rescue  mission,  of  capitalism  on  a  global  level”   (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  53).  This  was  a  mission  in  which  the  U.S.  military  would  play  a  pivotal   role.  

 

1.3  Post-­‐war  U.S.  Imperialism  and  the  emergence  of  permanent  U.S.  militarism    

In  constructing  a  world  capitalist  system  conducive  to  capital  penetration  and  circulation,  the   U.S.  ruling  elite  faced  a  number  of  monumental  challenges:  they  had  to  help  rebuild  many  of   the   world’s   war-­‐torn   economies,   re-­‐establish   the   paralyzed   international   trade   system,   and   curtail  or  roll  back  governmental  involvement  in  the  economic  realm  of  many  countries,  as  the   events  of  the  Great  Depression  and  World  War  II  had  effectively  supplanted  ‘the  invisible  hand   of  the  market’  by  government  sponsored  reforms  and  government-­‐regulated  economies  of  war   (Stokes,  2005,  221;  Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  49,  53).  

 

The   challenges   of   reconstruction   and   re-­‐establishing   international   trade   and   economic   interdependence  were  met  rather  peacefully,  as  they  predominantly  involved  high  levels  of   U.S.  foreign  direct  investment  into  Europe  and  Japan,  together  with  the  formation  of  such  U.S.-­‐ dominated   multilateral   financial   institutions   as   the   IMF   and   the   World   Bank.   However,   the   curtailment  of  government  involvement  in  the  economic  lives  of  many  countries  proved  much   harder  to  accomplish  by  ways  of  consent  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  50;  Stokes,  2005,  p.  222).   This  was  especially  apparent  in  the  less-­‐developed  world,  where  many  countries  opted  for  a   socialist-­‐oriented  path  of  development  and  where  anti-­‐colonial  national  liberation  struggles   often   went   hand   in   hand   with   anti-­‐capitalist   revolutions.   Accordingly,   the   resistance   to   the   American  project  of  world  capitalism  was  fierce  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  53).  

 

However,   as   the   socialist-­‐oriented   path   of   development   threatened   to   restrict   the   global   mobility  of  U.S.  capital  and  forestall  the  creation  of  a  liberal  international  economic  order,  the   United   States’   response   was   even   fiercer.   From   proxy   wars,   counter-­‐insurgency   campaigns,   ‘containment  and  rollback’,  to  covert  coups  to  unseat  insufficiently  pro-­‐U.S.  governments,  the   United  States  used  its  military  power  extensively  during  the  Cold  War  to  “safeguard  and  keep  

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open  global  markets  and  resources  to  U.S.  capital”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  1;  Stokes,  2005,  p.   223).    

1.4  Ongoing  military  operations  and  high  military  spending  in  the  post-­‐Cold  War  

era    

Morality  aside,  for  the  greater  part  of  the  twentieth  century,  U.S.  militarism  and  concomitant   high  military  spending  can  be  justified  based  on  economic  grounds,  as  permanent  war  proved   quite  profitable  not  only  for  the  U.S.  ruling  class,  but  also  for  the  average  American  citizen.  As   U.S.   military   power   helped   create   an   international   liberal   economic   order   in   which   the   American  economy  could  survive  and  flourish,  it  brought  the  United  States’  citizens  significant   economic  gains.  Such  gains  were  felt  either  directly,  by  way  of  military  or  defence-­‐related  jobs,   or   indirectly,   through   benefits   that   flowed   from   the   opening   up   of   foreign   markets   to   U.S.   capital  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006;  Stokes,  2005).    

 

However,  as  professor  Hossein-­‐Zadeh  points  out,  “this  pattern  of  economic  gains  flowing  from   [U.S.]  military  operations  seems  to  have  somewhat  changed  in  recent  years,  especially  in  the   post-­‐Cold   War   world”   (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,   2006,   p.   2).   Apart   from   the   fact   that   technological   developments   during   the   Cold   War   radically   reduced   the   labour   intensiveness   of   military   production  and  thus  the  degree  to  which  military  spending  boosts  the  economy,  in  the  post-­‐ Cold  War  era,  U.S.  military  operations  had  become  ever  more  wasteful  and  cost-­‐inefficient.   Indeed,  according  to  some,  these  operations  have  since  become  so  economically  burdensome,   that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  justify  them  on  economic  grounds,  at  least  not  for  the  average   American  citizen  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  1-­‐3).    

 

If  not  on  economic  grounds,  then  how  does  the  U.S.  Military  substatiate  its  sustained  and  high   defence  expenditure  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War?  According  to  the  United  States’  official   justificatory  discourse,  in  the  post-­‐Cold  War  era,  the  threat  of  “rogue  states,  global  terrorism,   the  axis  of  evil,  [and,  more  recently],  enemies  of  democracy”  to  U.S.  national  interests  have   necessitated   the   United   States’   continuous   expansion   of   its   military   establishment   (Cunningham,  2004,  p.  558;  Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  23).  

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Without  denying  that  these  threats  are  real,  some  scholars  have  argued  that  post-­‐Cold  War   U.S.   defence   spending   seems   to   be   out   of   sync   with   the   threat   that   rogue   states   or   global   terrorists  actually  pose  to  the  U.S.  national  interest.  Cunningham,  for  example,  pointed  out     that  in  2004,  the  U.S.  spent  approximately  “26  times  the  combined  total  of  [what]  the  six  ‘rogue   states’  (Iran,  North  Korea,  Syria,  Cuba,  Sudan  and  Libya)  spent  on  defence,”  while  Coyne  and   Duncan  emphasize  that  in  2010,  the  U.S.  spent  29%  more  on  defence  than  it  did  at  the  height   of  the  Cold  War  in  1986.  In  their  own  words:  “there  has  been  a  nearly  30%  increase  in  spending   to  fight  a  variety  of  enemies  not  classified  as  a  world  superpower,  as  the  Soviet  Union  was   through  the  1980s”  (Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012,  p.  417;  Cunningham,  2004,  p.  558).  

 

The   fact   that   sustained   high   U.S.   military   spending   in   the   post-­‐Cold   War   era   cannot   be   adequately  rationalized  on  economic  grounds  nor  by  national  security  arguments  has  led  critics   to   formulate   a   number   of   alternative   explanations.   One   of   the   most   popular   explanations   attributes  ongoing  U.S.  militarism  and  concomitant  high  military  spending  in  the  post-­‐Cold  War   era  to  the  powerful  ascent  of    “neoconservative  militarists”:  an  influential  group  of  ideologues   “bent  on  spreading  the  American  economic  and  political  system,  along  with  American  power   and  influence”  (Hossein-­‐Zadeh,  2006,  p.  2).  A  second  and  related  explanation  revolves  around   the  political  inadequacies  of  George  W.  Bush  as  president.  Proponents  of  this  view  consider   Bush’s  need  to  maintain  his  strong  status  as  commander  in  chief  and  his  desire  to  be  looked   upon  as  a  ‘war  president’  as  major  causes  of  ongoing  U.S.  militarism  in  the  21st  century.  The   third,  and  probably  most  widely-­‐held  alternative  view  is  that  U.S.  militarism  of  late  is  driven  by   an  American  desire  to  secure  access  to  more  and  cheaper  sources  of  gas  and  oil  (Hossein-­‐ Zadeh,  2006,  p.  2-­‐3).    

 

Without  denying  the  importance  and  contributory  role  of  these  previous  explanations,  in  the   remainder  of  this  thesis  I  will  focus  on  theories  that  attribute  the  United  States’  drive  to  war   and  militarism  to  the  influence  of  those  elite  domestic  interests  that  are  vested  in  the  business   of  war  and  military  expansion.  However,  before  looking  at  theories  of  elite  domination  in  more   detail,  let  us  consider  some  of  the  most  important  consequences  of  permanent  militarism  on   the  American  society.  

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02                                                                  The  impact  of  permanent      

                         U.S.  militarism  on  the  American  society  

       

2.1  The  social  and  spiritual  consequences  of  permanent  militarism  for  American   society  

Besides  the  grave  and  lasting  impact  U.S.  militarism  has  had  on  the  lives  of  millions  of  people   worldwide,  it  has  also  fundamentally  shaped  American  society  itself.  As  scholars  discussing  the   strands  of  literature  on  American  militarism  and  the  American  war  economy  point  out,  the   continuous  war  efforts  by  the  United  States  have  influenced  American  society  profoundly  in   spiritual,  economical  and  political  ways  (Cunningham,  2004;  Duncan  &  Coyne,  2013;  Melman,   2003).    

 

Trillions  of  dollars  have  been  spent  on  military  and  defence  since  the  1940s,  establishing  a  vast   and  entrenched  national  security  apparatus  that  reaches  into  virtually  all  domains  of  American   life  (Cunningham,  2004).  As  such,  U.S.  militarism  has  created  an  ”entangled  system”  in  which   not  only  profound  amounts  of  labour  and  resources  are  allocated  to  military  purposes,  but  in   which  various  other  institutions  in  society  are  shaped  in  synchrony  with  military  goals  (Farish  &   Vitale,  2010).    

 

Universities,   primary   and   secondary   schools,   the   media   and   popular   culture   all   have   been   influenced  by  decennia  of  U.S.  militarism  (Cunningham,  2004).  From  what  can  be  gathered   from  university  research  predominantly  funded  by  the  Department  of  Defence,  to  Hollywood’s   war-­‐nostalgic  films  like  Black  Hawk  Down  or  Saving  Private  Ryan,  to  TV-­‐shows  and  video  games   that  glorify  the  use  of  violence,  militarism  is  an  ideology  and  a  set  of  practices  that  has  invaded   every  sector  of  American  life  (Cunningham,  2004;  Lutz,  2002;  Guerlain,  2013).    

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In  her  ethnographic  study  on  the  effects  of  militarization  on  American  society,  Catherine  Lutz   describes  how  such  a  process  has  brought  about  a  “shift  in  general  societal  beliefs  and  values   necessary  to  legitimize  the  use  of  violence”.  This,  in  turn,  has  resulted  in  ‘a  military  definition   of   reality’   undermining   and   even   replacing   the   common   sense   of   the   nation.   American   militarization  has  resulted  in  the  deeply  and  widely  held  belief  that  “humans  are  by  nature   aggressive  and  territorial,  that  force  is  the  only  way  to  get  things  done  in  the  world,  and  that  if   one  weapon  creates  security,  1.000  weapons  create  that  much  more”  (Lutz,  2002,  p.  724-­‐725).   Furthermore,  Lutz  demonstrates  how  militarism  has  reshaped  social  relations  between  those   who  might  benefit  from  militarization  and  those  who  do  not,  but  have  to  bear  some  of  its  costs   anyway.  In  part,  this  is  also  where  an  American  resistance  to  social  welfare  benefits  comes   from,   as   militarism   divides   American   society   between   “those   soldiers   and   veterans   with   universal  health  care,  a  living  wage,  and  other  benefits,  and  those  without  them”  (Lutz,  2002,   p.  724).    

 

2.2  The  economic  consequences  of  permanent  U.S.  militarism  

Every  gun  that  is  made,  every  warship  launched,  every  rocket  fired,  signifies  in  the   final  sense  a  theft  from  those  who  hunger  and  are  not  fed,  those  who  are  cold  and   are  not  clothed.  This  world  in  arms  is  not  spending  money  alone,  it  is  spending  the   sweat   of   its   labourers,   the   genius   of   its   scientists,   the   hopes   of   its   children  

(Eisenhower,  ‘Chance  for  Peace’  speech,  1953).      

However  important  as  social  and  spiritual  consequences  of  American  militarism  may  be,  it  is   the   realm   of   economics   that   has   arguably   been   influenced   most,   as   ongoing   high   military   expenditures  have  given  rise  to  a  permanent  war  economy  that  interacts  with  and  subsumes   the   private,   non-­‐military   economy.   Even   though   there   are   intellectuals   like   O’Connell   who   argue  in  favour  of  the  permanent  war  economy  by  pointing  out  the  fact  that  it  has  yielded  a   host  of  beneficial  technologies  such  as  the  internet,  civilian  nuclear  power  and  GPS  Navigation,   most  scholars  discussing  the  strand  of  literature  on  the  economic  consequences  of  military   spending  take  a  more  critical  position  (Cunningham,  2004;  Coyne  &  Duncan,  2012;  Guerlain,   2013;  Melman,  2003;  O’Connell,  2012;).    

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Coyne,  Duncan  and  Melman,  for  example,  have  written  excellent  works  on  the  opportunity   costs  that  accompany  military  spending.  Opportunity  cost  can  be  defined  as  the  cost  of  an   alternative  that  must  be  forgone  in  order  to  pursue  a  certain  action.  In  the  case  of  military   spending,  the  most  obvious  opportunity  cost  is  the  money  spent  on  the  war  economy,  as  this   allocated  resource  clearly  can  not  be  used  to  build  infrastructure,  provide  social  services  or   enhance  the  quality  of  facilities  such  as  public  schools.    

 

Over  the  last  65  years,  the  United  States  has  annually  spent  50  to  70  percent  of  its  discretionary   budget  on  military  spending,  thereby  redirecting  much-­‐needed  resources  away  from  its  private   economy  (White  House,  n.d.).  This  has  led  to  a  situation  in  which  the  United  States  ‘pays’  for   its  military  power  abroad  with  a  wide  range  of  domestic  problems  including,  but  not  limited  to   the   most   expensive   and   least   effective   healthcare   system   in   the   world,   a   deteriorating   infrastructure,   a   mediocre   education   system   in   comparison   with   the   rest   of   the   world,   7.7   million  Americans  living  in  “worst  case  housing”  and  1  out  of  5  American  children  born  into   poverty  (CommonWealth  Fund,  2014;  Department  of  Housing  and  Urban  Development,  2015;   Feeding  America,  2014;  Melman,  2013;  Ryan,  2013).  All  of  these  factors  are  important  and   startling  indicators  of  what  has  been  forgone  as  a  result  of  the  United  States’  permanent  war   economy.                      

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03                                            American  politics,  who  governs?  

 

The  powers  of  ordinary  men  are  circumscribed  by  the  everyday  worlds  in  which   they  live,  yet  even  in  these  rounds  of  job,  family,  and  neighbourhood  they  often   seem  driven  by  forces  they  can  neither  understand  nor  govern.  'Great  changes'  are   beyond  their  control,  but  affect  their  conduct  and  outlook  nonetheless.  (C.  Wright  

Mills,  The  Power  Elite,  1956).    

3.1  Theories  of  American  politics  

Considering  the  grave  social,  spiritual  and  economic  consequences  of  sustained  high  military   expenditures  on  American  society,  how  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  that  annually,  the  United   States  continues  to  spend  huge  amounts  of  resources  on  its  military  in  excess  of  what  is  needed   for  maintaining  national  security?  What  are  the  forces  that  are  keeping  the  United  States  in  a   state  of  permanent  military  preparedness  despite  the  overall  negative  effects  of  high  military   spending  on  its  society?  

 

To  answer  this  question,  it  is  crucial  to  understand  who  actually  governs  the  United  States.  Is  it   the  broad  body  of  U.S.  citizens  who  are  shaping  public  policy  through  democratic  institutions,   or  do  economic  elites  and  special  interest  groups  dominate  policy-­‐making  by  way  of  lobbying   and  fraternizing  with  public  officials?  Within  the  body  of  literature  on  American  politics,  three   important  theoretical  families  can  be  discerned,  each  offering  different  hypotheses  as  to  which   actors  have  how  much  influence  over  shaping  public  policy:  Majoritarian  Electoral  Democracy,   Economic-­‐Elite  Domination  and  Biased  Pluralism  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014).    

 

Theories   of   Majoritarian   Electoral   Democracy   emphasize   the   sway   of   the   median   voter,   attributing  U.S.  governmental  policies  to  the  collective  will  of  the  average  citizen  (Hacker  &   Pierson,  2010;  Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  565).  The  average  citizen,  or  median-­‐voter,  is  understood   as  the  “swing  voter  in  the  middle  of  the  distribution  of  opinion  and  income  among  voters”  and  

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is  allegedly  able  to  discipline  politicians  through  “electoral  reward  and  punishment”  (Gilens  &   Page,  2014,  p.  566;  Hacker  &  Pierson,  2010,  p.  154).  According  to  majoritarian  theories,  policy   preferences   of   the   median   voter   drive   policy-­‐making   as   vote-­‐seeking   parties   tend   to   place   themselves  in  the  centre  of  voters’  most  preferred  positions  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014).    

 

The  tradition  of  Economic-­‐Elite  Domination  asserts  that  “U.S.  policy-­‐making  is  dominated  by   individuals  who  have  substantial  economic  resources,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  ownership   of  business  firms”  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  566).  This  tradition  emphasizes  how  economic  elites   “may  dominate  key  issues  in  U.S.  policymaking  despite  the  existence  of  democratic  elections”,   as  they  exert  political  influence  through  foundations,  the  media  and  lobbyists  (Gilens  &  Page,   2014,  p.  566).    

 

Finally,  theories  of  Biased  Pluralism  focus  on  the  role  of  business-­‐oriented  interest  groups  in   shaping   public   policy.   Corporations,   businesses   and   professional   associations   are   said   to   influence  public  policy  by  lobbying  and  fraternizing  with  public  officials,  moving  through  the   revolving  door  of  public  and  private  employment,  providing  self-­‐serving  information  to  officials   and  by  spending  a  great  amount  of  money  on  electoral  campaigns  (Hacker  &  Pierson,  2010;   Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  567).    

 

3.2  Which  theoretical  tradition  best  captures  the  reality  of  American  politics?  

While   the   aforementioned   theoretical   traditions   have   given   rise   to   substantial   bodies   of   literature,  each  supported  by  a  great  deal  of  empirical  evidence  concerning  the  importance  of   various  sets  of  agents,  the  different  predictions  of  these  theories  have  seldom  been  tested   against  each  other  within  a  single  statistical  model,  thereby  making  it  difficult  to  assess  which   group  of  actors  have  the  most  power  in  shaping  public  policy  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  564).     However,  in  their  Princeton  University  study  “Testing  Theories  of  American  Politics”,    Martin   Gilens  and  Benjamin  Page  have  done  exactly  this.  By  looking  at  a  unique  data  set  that  includes   the  policy  preferences  of  average  citizens,  economic  elites  and  organized  interest  groups  on   1,779  policy  issues  and  comparing  it  to  what  policies  actually  ended  up  becoming  law,  Gilens   and   Page   were   able   to   “analyse   the   independent   effects   of   each   set   of   actors   upon   policy  

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the  policy  preferences  of  each  set  of  actors  and  what  actions  the  government  actually  took,   Gilens  and  Page  have  been  able  to  elucidate  how  much  independent  influence  average  citizens,   economic  elites  and  organized  interest  groups  have  over  shaping  public  policy.    

 

In   an   ideal,   democratic   America,   the   likelihood  of  Congress  passing  a  law  would   reflect  the  degree  of  public  support  on  that   given   issue.   For   example,   if   50%   of   the   public  supported  an  idea,  there  would  be  a   50%  chance  of  it  becoming  law.  If  80%  of   the  public  supported  it,  there  would  be  an   80%   chance.   The   plotted   line   for   such   an   ideal   democracy   can   be   seen   in   figure   1,   with   the   X-­‐axis   representing   the   public   support   for   any   given   idea   and   the   Y-­‐axis   representing   the   likelihood   of   Congress  

passing  a  law  that  reflects  any  of  these  ideas  (Represent.us,  n.d.).    

What  Gilens  and  Page  found  however,  was   rather  unsettling  and  in  opposition  to  what   one   would   expect   in   a   functioning   democracy:   the   preferences   of   average   citizens   seem   to   have   a   “non-­‐significant,   near   zero”   impact   on   U.S.   policy-­‐making   (Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  572).  Their  findings   show   that   “when   one   holds   constant   net   interest   group   alignment   (that   is,   the   preferences   of   organized   interest   groups)   and  the  preferences  of  affluent  Americans,  it   makes  very  little  difference  what  the  general  

public  thinks.  The  probability  of  policy  change  is  nearly  the  same,  around  30%,  whether  a  tiny   minority  or  a  large  majority  of  average  citizens  favour  a  proposed  policy  change”  (see  figure  2)   Figure  1:  The  ideal  governmental  representation  of  the   average  American  citizen.    

Source:  Represent  Us,  n.d.  

Figure  2:  The  actual  governmental  representation  of   the  average  American  citizen.  

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(Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  572).  This  means  that  the  number  of  American  voters  for  or  against   any  policy  issue  has  no  independent  impact  on  the  likelihood  that  Congress  will  make  it  law   (Represent.us,  n.d.).  Pure  theories  of  Majoritarian  Electoral  Democracy,  which  posit  that  “the   driving  force  behind  policy  change  is  the  ability  of  the  median  voter  to  discipline  politicians   through  the  electoral  connection”  can  therefore  decisively  be  rejected  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.   572;  Hacker  &  Pierson,  2010,  p.  154).    

 

By  contrast,  the  study  also  showed  that  both  economic  elites  and  business-­‐oriented  interest   groups  have  a  “large,  highly  significant  and  independent”  impact  on  U.S.  policy.  According  to   Gilens  and  Page,  “reality  is  best  captured  by  mixed  theories  in  which  both  individual  economic   elites   and   organized   interest   groups  

(including   corporations,   largely   owned   and   controlled   by   wealthy   elites)   play   a   substantial  part  in  affecting  public  policy,  but   the   general   public   has   little   or   no   independent   influence”   (Gilens   &   Page,   2014,  p.  572).  This  means  that  the  flat  line  in   figure  2  only  accounts  for  the  bottom  90%  of   income  earners  in  America  (since  Gilens  and   Page   have   taken   policy   preferences   at   the   ninetieth   income   percentile   as   proxies   for   the   preferences   of   economic   elites).   Taken  

together,   economic   elites   and   business-­‐oriented   interest   groups,   those   who   can   afford   lobbyists,   get   their   own   line,   which   is   much   closer   to   the   ideal   of   figure   1(see   figure   3)   (Represent.us,  n.d.).  Even  though  a  strong  status  quo  bias  remains  evident,  when  economic   elites  and  organized  economic  interests  want  something,  the  government  is  much  more  likely   to   do   it.   Conversely,   when   they   don’t,   the   likelihood   of   the   idea   becoming   adopted   by   the   government   is   very   low.   Indeed,   they   even   have   the   power   to   completely   stop   it   from   happening  (Gilens  &  Page,  2014,  p.  572;  Represent.us,  n.d.)  

 

Figure  3:  The  governmental  representation  of  economic   elites  and  business-­‐oriented  interest  groups  

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