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Does increased descriptive representation lead to better substantive and symbolic representation? Case study of Rwanda and Senegal
Emma Wienbelt
S2018535
Dr. Leila Demarest
02-06-2020
8839 words
Abstract: This paper seeks to answer if, as previous literature states, women’s increased descriptive representation positively influences women’s substantive and symbolic representation by using a most different design study of Rwanda and Senegal. Their differences could provide meaningful insight in which factors are important in achieving increased women descriptive representation and which are not. Moreover, their differences could show which political climate enhances women’s substantive and symbolic
representation best. In order to do so I used literature on Rwanda and Senegal, long term development rapports, legislation documents and data from the world bank, world value survey and the afro barometer. The in-depth analysis of Rwanda and Senegal showed that in both Rwanda and Senegal gender quotas directly caused women’s increased descriptive representation. Moreover, domestic women movements were crucial for the adaptation of the gender quotas. Furthermore, few legislative gains were made and women’s increased
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1. Introduction
Scholars often see the presence of women in the political arena precondition for balanced development policies (Kessel, 2001). They argue that when women are marginally
represented in politics it becomes very unlikely that gender-sensitive policies, like abortion, will emerge from government. But is this necessarily true? Does increased descriptive
representation of women indeed lead to increased substantive and symbolic representation of women’s interest (Bauer & Burnet, 2013)?
A lot of research on women’s political participation in Africa has focused on parliamentary representation (Arriola & Johnson, 2014). However, in Africa, the executive government often holds the most political power. Therefore, besides looking into women’s representation in parliament, scholars have also argued that it is necessary to look into women’s appointment as cabinet ministers. The question if female ministers are more effective than female
legislators in representing women’s interest remains highly relevant (Adams & Scherpereel & Jacob, 2016). Thus, in this paper I will examine the effect of increased women
parliamentarians and women ministers on women’s substantive and symbolic representation. In order to understand women’s descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation and how they relate to each other I will explain what they mean and afterwards explain their
connection to each other. Descriptive representation refers to the similarity, for example in terms of race and gender, between representatives and the represented (Barnes & Burchard, 2012). Thus, an increase of women’s descriptive representation means more women in government institutions. Substantive representation refers to legislator acting on behalf of their constituents, thus women’s substantive representation is determined by how well women leaders represent the interests of women, supporting and making policy decision favourable to women and the issues that most affect them. Symbolic representation refers to the represented feeling effectively represented. Thus, women’s symbolic representation can be understood as women feeling fairly represented. Moreover, people’s attitudes about women politicians and women engagement in politics is part of women’s symbolic representation (Bauer, 2012). Scholars argue that increased women’s descriptive representation could positively effect women’s substantive and symbolic representation. Pitkin’s (1967) study argues that descriptive representation of women results in increased women’s political engagement among the population and thereby positively effects women’s symbolic representation. Furthermore, Pitkin argues that women’s descriptive representation changes people’s
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perceptions of politics. Instead of thinking of politics as an all men game, politics is a women’s game too. Thus, societies can change attitudes towards women in leadership positions (Bauer, 2012).
Women’s descriptive representation can also affect women’s substantive representation through more attention to women’s issues, like abortion and health care (Barnes & Burchard, 2012). Several scholars argue that female politicians are more likely to address women’s issues. Thus, increased descriptive representation of women could partly explain the successes in women’s symbolic and substantive representation.
Therefore, before analysing women’s substantive and symbolic representation in Africa and how it developed over time, I will look into women’s descriptive representation. What is Africa’s history with regards to women’s rights, and how did some countries experience increased descriptive representation of women whilst other didn’t? Scholars argue that the decrease of conflict in Africa, gender quotas, changing international norms, the empowered (international) women’s movement, Africa’s patriarchal culture, the electoral system, institutional structures, political transition and a new constitution all help/obstruct women’s gateway to cabinet ministers and legislatures (Toraasen, 2019; Barnes & Burchard, 2012; Yoon, 2004; Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Adams & Scherpereel & Jacob, 2016; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013; Muriaas & Tonessen & Wang, 2013; Paxton & Hughes, 2006).
To further examine how increased descriptive representation affects women’s substantive and symbolic representation, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of two cases: Rwanda and
Senegal. Rwanda and Senegal provide interesting cases because they are very different when compared to each other but do both experience high women representation in politics. Thus, this paper will be a most different design study. I will look into the different factors that obstruct/helped women’s descriptive representation in Rwanda and Senegal. After that, I investigate the impact of this descriptive representation on the advancement of women’s position in society. Lastly, I will discuss the most ideal climate for women to successfully represent women’s interests.
2.0. Africa’s history regarding women’s rights
To fully understand the position of African women in society and how increased women representation in politics can be achieved this section provides information about Africa’s history regarding women’s rights. As explained, increased descriptive representation of women can positively effect women’s substantive and symbolic representation. Therefore,
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understanding the causes of Africa’s increased descriptive representation is a necessity to understand changes in women’s substantive and symbolic representation. Thus, next section will explain the causes of Africa’s increased descriptive representation. The following section will provide information about women’s substantive and symbolic representation in Africa. Lastly, we will look into the situation of Africa regarding women’s representation nowadays.
First, Africa’s history of women’s rights. Whilst women were never fully equal to men in the political sphere, African women played important roles in society in pre-colonial times (Tripp, 2017; Abiola & Bukola, 2019). They governed kingdoms, established cities, launched military conquests, founded states and were the major food producers of Africa’s society and thus had ownership of land (Hawkins, 2018). Unfortunately, women first lost power with the spread of the Islam and Christianity and later due to colonization (Tripp, 2017). The spread of Islam and Christianity made women subordinate to men. Under the sharia law men had more rights than women (Abdallah, 1982). The rise of colonialism in Africa brought strange educational, religious, economic and political influences and redefined the role and place of women (Abiola & Bukola, 2019). Women lost control over land and therefore became more economically dependent on men. Frequently, they also lost the political rights they enjoyed in pre-colonial times (Arriola & Johnson, 2014). Colonial masters instituted a patriarchal
government and granted men access to land, markets and civil service. This marked the beginning of male dominated politics.
After independence, women were further side-lined from the political life with a few
exceptions. It was not until the 1990s that re-emergence of female political leaders occurred (Tripp, 2017). The increased global pressure for inclusion of women in politics and the emerging international women’s movement, together with the decline of conflict in Africa after 2000, all generated a better environment to stimulate these trends (Paxton & Hughes, 2006; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013). The international women’s movement grew over time and gained power. They even began to cooperate with the United Nations and international non-governmental organisations, which try to diffuse global norms to nation states. Thus, the international women’s movement became more able to transmit a discourse of substantial gender inclusion to nation states over time.
In the beginning of 1990s women international non-governmental organisations emphasized the need for thresholds and targets for women in political decision-making positions and even recommended gender quotas to facilitate this. They recommended laws requiring women to make up a certain percentage of governments or parliament assembly. This led to almost all
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countries in Africa (and elsewhere) to implement some type of electoral gender quota. Women got greater access to parliaments and cabinets (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013; Muriaas et al. 2013). In spite of gender quota’s, the changing international norms regarding women’s representation, the decrease of conflict in Africa and the
empowered international women’s movement, what more caused the re-emergence of African women in parliament and cabinets?
2.1. The causes of increased African women’s descriptive representation
The following paragraphs discuss, one by one, how Africa’s patriarchal culture, the electoral system, institutional structures, political transitions together with new constitutions and domestic women’s movements all positively or negatively influence women’s pathway into politics (Paxton & Hughes, 2006; Barnes & Burchard, 2012; Yoon, 2004; Adams et al. 2016; Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Toraasen, 2019).
First of all, Yoon (2004) suggests that Africa’s culture shapes social attitudes and stereotypes towards women’s roles. These in turn, influence women’s decisions to run for elective office and affect people’s voting decisions. In particular the patriarchal culture, which developed in Africa through colonialism, hinders women’s entry into the national legislature. The
patriarchal culture relegates women to subordinate roles and discourages women from becoming candidates as well as it lowers their probability of winning elections.
Secondly, several scholars argue that the type of electoral system affects the level of women representation. Countries that use a single-member district electoral system tend to have fewer women in parliament (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Adams et al. 2016; Yoon, 2004). One
explanation could be that female candidates often have to deal with voter prejudice against women’s ability to assume legislative duties. Therefore, because each district can only nominate one parliamentarian, parties tend to be less likely to nominate women. On the other hand, multi member proportional representation systems are more in favour of women. They promote the representation of diverse social groups including minorities and women.
Furthermore, parties will try to balance tickets by including more women to appeal to a broader segment of voters.
Also, institutional structures of executive office can influence women’s chance of getting appointed as minister (Adams et al. 2016). Bauer and Okpotor (2013) argue that the recruitment method for cabinet ministers, the specialist or generalist appointment method, influences women’s likeliness to be appointed as minister. With the Generalist method, more
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common in parliamentary systems, prime ministers select cabinet ministers from among parliament members sitting on the governments side. With the specialist method, more common in presidential systems, cabinet ministers are mainly selected from outside the parliament on the basis of their experience and knowledge of specific policy areas. The legislature has to approve the ministers selected by the president. Bauer & Okpotor (2013) argue that the women are more likely to be appointed in regimes that use the specialist model, since the president can choose from women within and outside the parliament. On the
contrary women in the generalist model first have be elected into parliament before having a chance of getting elected as minister.
Moreover, political transitions and new constitutions can encourage women into politics. Bauer and Burnet (2013), Adams et al. (2016) and Muriaas et al. (2013) argue that rapid and highly disruptive political change, whether regime change or civil war, provides significant opportunities for women. Women utilize the political transition period and insert themselves into the political process to demand more representation (Barnes & Buchard, 2012).
Therefore, many countries that did experience rapid change often have gender equality provision in their constitution whilst country’s that gradually and peacefully developed merely kept their old constitution, in which gender equality is absent.
Lastly, domestic women movements are crucial in gaining women’s empowerment. Women activists tend to put pressure on leaders to appoint more women to political positions (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Adams et al. 2016; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013). They organise press
conferences, petition campaigns and protests. Women’s organisations also encourage women to stand for parliamentary seats and they train prospective female candidates (Yoon, 2004). Furthermore, they help women activists to develop national reputations for promoting greater transparency in governments institutions and greater equity in access to public services (Arriola & Johnson, 2014). For example, in 2005 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became president of Liberia and thereby the first female president of Africa (Ford, 2018). This victory would not have been possible without the support of women groups. The women groups helped with organising successful voter registration and mobilizing support of Sirleaf’s candidacy. In return, Sirleaf appointed more women to cabinet and actively promoted women’s rights by, for example, signing an executive order on domestic violence (Adams et al. 2016; Ford, 2018).
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2.2. Women’s substantive and symbolic representation in Africa
Now that the factors that obstruct/ help women gain descriptive representation are clear, what can be said about the effects of increased women’s descriptive representation on women’s substantive and symbolic representation in Africa? Bauer (2012) summarizes how more women in parliament has had a positive impact on institutional cultures within parliament, on legislation, and on civil society in different African countries. Women parliamentarians have made gains in family law, gender-based violence and property rights and more women executives were appointed. Bauer & Okpotor (2013) argue that cabinet ministers generate the same effect. Women ministers improved legislation with regards to women’s rights. Thus, Bauer (2012;2013) and Okpotor (2013) provide us with evidence that increased descriptive women representation indeed positively effects women’s substantive representation.
For example, in Uganda the women members of the constituent assembly provided strong pro-women provisions in the new 1995 constitution (Bauer, 2012; Wang, 2013). Nevertheless, women legislators still faced challenges. The no-party political system together with district elections provided women with disadvantages. Luckily in 2006, Uganda changed its electoral system in a multiparty system and implemented universal franchise which resulted into more women parliamentarians. Since 2006, quite few laws important to women have been passed. In 2009 alone the domestic violence, anti-female genital mutilation, and marriage and divorce bill, all with women provisions, were advanced through parliament.
Bauer (2012), Wang (2013) and Muriaas et al. (2013) conclude that women’s participation in cross-party women’s parliamentary caucuses and working together with women activists and women’s organizations in civil society enhances African women’s accomplishments. Women caucuses help unite women from different parties, ethnicities, religions and generations to work on one common goal representing all women interests. Women’s competition rather than cooperation poses a threat for women’s substantive representation. Of course, women parliamentarians must be willing to represent women interests. Women civil society movements furthermore help with putting pressure on the government to implement the progressive women laws debated.
However, some scholars are sceptical about the effects of increased women in parliament. They argue that national legislatures are weak in Africa and therefore women’s increased presence in parliament might be meaningless (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Arriola & Johnson, 2013; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013; Wang, 2013). Furthermore, limitations exists on less than
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democratic political systems and their success on women’s participation in politics (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Bauer, 2012). Often, dominant party systems have high percentages of women in politics. Some scholars argue that dominant party systems only use women’s representation to rally support, internationally by cultivating national legitimacy and domestically by
obtaining women votes, and to quiet dissent (Muriaas et al. 2013). In reality, women
representatives in dominant party systems just serve the dominant party and their opinion on policies. Thus, the dominant party thereby turns the quota policy into another instrument of control (Wang, 2013).
What were the effects on women’s symbolic representation? Bauer (2012) argues that increases in descriptive representation hugely influence women’s symbolic representation. The rise of women elected to parliament and cabinet in Africa introduced a new gender perspective in the legislative process. In addition, the increased visibility of women in leadership positions in politics slowly changed the attitudes of women and men towards women in politics. Women parliamentarians and ministers acted as important role models, women in society became more engaged with politics and felt empowered in terms of their ability to speak up and voice their concerns in every day settings. For example, In Cape Verde and Mozambique, the presence of more women members has led to the country’s population willing to invest more resources in girls and women (Bauer & Okpotor, 2013). Therefore, Bauer (2012;2013) and Okpotor (2013) argue that as women’s descriptive representation increases, the political engagement gender gap decreases. Not because men’s engagement falls but because women’s political engagement (voting, discussing about politics with friends etc.) rises.
2.3. Africa’s situation nowadays
When examining the percentages of women representation in politics in Africa nowadays, big differences between countries are visible. Within Africa there are countries with high women representation percentages as well as countries with very low percentages of women
representation in politics (UN WOMEN & Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2020). The
Interparliamentary Union and UN women analyse women representation in parliament and cabinet around the world. Rwanda, as their data shows, has the most women in parliament of the world on 1 January 2020, 50 percent. Rwanda also has a high percentage of women minsters in cabinet (53,6 percent) and therefore ranks eight of the world. On the other hand, Nigeria with only 5,4 percent of women representatives in parliament ranks 185 of the world on 1 January 2020. Moreover, Nigeria has only 10,3 percent of women in cabinet and
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therefore ranks 147 of the world. Thus, whereas in some countries women are very well represented, in others women are barely engaged in politics.
Over time Africa (and the rest of the world) evidently put effort in promoting more women in decision making positions. The conference on Women held in Beijing 1995 called for at least 30 percent of women in national parliaments (Mutume, 2004). This led to more states
adopting gender quotas in their constitution. Since then the number of women in leadership position has been rising. Data of women’s representation in parliament in 2000 shows the growth (Inter-Parliamentary Union). In 2000, Rwanda only had 25,7% percent of women in parliament instead of 50% nowadays. Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional average of women in parliament was only 12.1% in 2000 but developed to 24% in 2019. Despite the positive developments in Africa, more needs to be done. In a lot of African countries women are still underrepresented. The question of what is the most effective way to achieve women’s representation remains.
3. Case selection: Rwanda and Senegal
Rwanda and Senegal provide interesting cases when examining the relation of descriptive women representation on the one hand, and substantive and symbolic women representation on the other. Both countries experience high women descriptive representation, but differ on many other aspects. Hence, this paper will be a most different design study. A comparison of both countries could provide meaningful insight on the different causes of increased
descriptive representation. Furthermore, comparing Rwanda and Senegal could provide understanding about the conditions that lead to the most effective women’s substantive and symbolic representation.
As table 1 shows Rwanda had 63.8 % of women in parliament and 35.5 % of women in cabinet in 2015 (Inter-Parliamentary Union). Senegal had 42.7 % of women in parliament and 20% of women in cabinet. In 2015, Rwanda had the highest percentage of women in
parliament in the world, Senegal ranked sixth of the world. To compare, Sub-Saharan Africa’s average of women in parliament in 2015 was only 23.1 %. Data of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UN women shows that on 1 January 2020 Rwanda and Senegal still score high on women’s descriptive representation. Rwanda still has the highest percentage of women in parliament of the world. Senegal currently ranks fourteenth of the world. Surprisingly, where Rwanda has 53,6 % of women in cabinet and takes in the 8th position in the world, Senegal only has 21,9% of women in cabinet and takes in the 82th position of the world.
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Therefore, the differences between Senegal and Rwanda and their amount of women in cabinet functions could be interesting to analyse. Are women minsters in Rwanda more influential than in Senegal when it comes to representing women’s interest? Or are other factors, like the degree of democracy, more important in explaining the effectiveness of women minsters representing women’s interests?
Table one also shows other differences between Rwanda and Senegal. First of all, they had a different colonial history. Rwanda was under German and Belgium rule, Senegal was a colony of France. Does their colonial legacy, particularly the political system implemented by their colonial rulers, affect women’s position in society differently? Secondly, they have a different history of conflict. Adams et al. (2016), Bauer and Burnet (2013) would argue that Rwanda has an advantage over Senegal regarding women’s descriptive representation. They argue that disruptive political transitions often provide opportunities for women to change the institutional structure in their advantage. After independence, Rwanda experienced a brutal genocide. The end of the genocide came together with a political transition and new
constitution, in which a gender quota was adopted. Despite that Senegal did not experience a disruptive political transition, but has held elections ever since independence, a gender parity law was implemented. How did Senegal accomplish this without the turbulent political change?
Furthermore, Rwanda’s and Senegal’s main religions could affect women’s representation differently. Do Islam and Christianity lead to different opinions on women’s role in society? Some scholars link the Islamic heritage to patriarchal values and lack of gender equality (Toraasen, 2019; Muriaas et al. 2013). Fourthly, Senegal is known as a stable multi-party democracy since independence in 1959 and ranks free on the 2015 freedom house index (Toraasen, 2019; freedom house index). Rwanda, in opposition, has a one dominant party system and develops increasingly authoritarian since the end of the genocide in 2003 (Bauer & Burnet, 2013). Therefore, Rwanda ranks not free on the 2015 freedom house index. Which political climate provides the most effective representation of women? Fifthly, Rwanda’s and Senegal’s bad economic environment could influence women’s motivation to engage in politics, positively as well as negatively. For example, women could use a countries bad economic situation as motivation to make things better and engage in politics. Whilst negatively, women could end up with disbelieve in a country’s government and therefore decrease interest in running for elective office (Yoon, 2004).
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Lastly, ethnicities could play important role in a countries politics and therefore influence women’s chances of getting appointed to parliament or cabinet (Arriola & Johnson, 2014). Senegal is known for her ethnic diversity, the Wolof, Fula and Serer are Senegal’s biggest ethnic groups. However, Senegal’s ethnic diversity does not result in ethnic politics (Koter, 2016). None of Senegal’s major parties represent one ethnic group, instead their party lists consist of candidates all with different ethnic backgrounds.
In contradiction, Rwanda only has the Hutu’s (85%), Tutsi’s (14%) and Twa’s (1%) as ethnic groups. Furthermore, ethnicities were politically salient in Rwanda (Newbury, 1998).
Rwandans colonial rulers implemented policies which favoured the Tutsi’s and thereby deepened ethnic polarisation. Hutu’s and Twa’s, for example, had fewer opportunities to attend school. Since independence, contenders for power tried to mobilize their constituencies by using their ethnic identity. Because of Rwanda’s history of winner takes all politics,
whereby the losers face death or flight out the country, ethnic politics resulted in Rwanda’s genocide. Hutu extremists took control of the country and started killing all Tutsi’s and Twa’s. Thus, after the genocide, to prevent such a thing from happening again, Rwandans government banned ethnicity from public life (Lacey, 2004; Ingeleare, 2010).
To examine the differences between Rwanda and Senegal, I will first look into the different causes of women’s descriptive representation in Rwanda and Senegal. After that I will
examine literature, data and reports that cover information about women’s gains in society. To conclude I will look into the differences of Rwanda and Senegal and how they impact
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Table 1: Women in politics in Rwanda and Senegal in 2015 and their main cultural and economic differences
Data drawn from world bank, UNDP and freedom house
4.0. Causes descriptive representation Rwanda
In Rwanda the constitutional gender quota, implemented in 2003, states that a minimum of 30% of women are required in all decision making bodies in the government (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Burnet, 2008 & 2011). The adoption of this quota can be explained by
Rwanda’s political transition after the genocide and civil war, which provided opportunities for women’s movements to lobby into politics. The war started in 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-led rebel movement founded in Uganda, invaded the country. In 1993 the Arusha Peace Accords were signed with the RPF, which outlined Rwanda’s transition to multi-party politics and democratic elections, made an end the civil war.
Unfortunately, Rwanda’s peace did not last long. When president Habyarimana was killed on 6 April 1994, Hutu extremist took control over the government (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Burnet, 2008 & 2011). The Hutu’s started a genocide against the Tutsi’s and Twa’s as they were portrayed as enemies of Rwanda. When Hutu extremists started the genocide, the RPF resumed the war and brought the genocide to an end in July 1994 by taking control over the majority of the territory. The end of the war resulted in the installation of a transitional government which consisted of all the political parties that did not participate in the genocide and was led by the RPF. To reconstruct Rwanda, the transitional government started working
Rwanda Senegal
Women in Parliament 63.8% 42.7%
Women in Cabinet 35.5% 20.0%
Colonial rulers Germany, Belgium France
History of conflict Tutsi genocide, civil war No civil war, did participate in wars.
Main Religion Christianity Islam
Freedom house score Not Free Free
GDP per capita 711.8 1186.3
Ethnicity Hutus 85%, Tutsi’s 14% and Twa’s 1%
Wolof’s 43.3%, Fula’s 23.8%, Serer’s 14,7%, Jola’s 5% and other small ethnic groups
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on a new constitution. Women activist saw the new constitution as an opportunity to enhance women’s rights through the implementation of a gender quota.
Rwanda’s women civil society association grew in the late 1980s due to international aid they received (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Burnet, 2008 & 2011). After the genocide, the surviving civil society association leaders started working together with civil servants in the ministry of gender and the few women parliamentarians in Rwanda and successfully lobbied for changes in the inheritance laws to protect children and women’s rights to property and land (Burnet, 2008). Women activists also were responsible for the inclusion of rape and sexual torture as among the most serious crimes in the genocide stature, additional rights for pregnant and nursing women in the workplace and a law which included the whole lists of rights
established in the UN Nation declaration on the rights of children (Oxford human rights hub & University of Oxford & Faculty of Law Oxford, 2015).
Moreover, long term development strategies were implemented before the gender quota and are still in power today. For example, Vision 2020, implemented in 2000, wants to provide education and health for all, update and adopt gender laws and practice positive
discrimination policy in favour of women with focus on the tertiary level and employment opportunities (Rapport, VISION 2020). In addition, within Rwandan’s poverty reduction strategy, implemented in 2002, gender is a cross-cutting issue (Rapport poverty reduction strategy, 2013-2018). Finally in 2003 the constitution included explicit language codifying men and women’s equality and providing for gender quotas in all decision making bodies of the government.
Thus, one could say that Rwandan’s women’s movement already started the evolution regarding women’s rights well before the implementation of the gender quota. In spite of the few women parliamentarians, substantive gains were made. Furthermore, the international women’s rights movement also helped Rwanda’s domestic women’s movement and provided access to UN agencies and international aid organizations to help fund them (Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Burnet, 2008). Lastly, Rwandans specialist method to appoint minsters, together with Rwandans proportional representation in multi member districts to elect parliamentarians works in the advantage of women (Adams et al, 2016; Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013; Yoon, 2004).
Nevertheless, the high level of women in politics might be designed to cover the fact that the Anglophone Tutsis dominate in government (Berry, 2015). The promotion of women in
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Rwandan’s politics may also be a strategy to attract foreign aid and investment, as Rwanda is highly aid dependent because of the country’s ambitious social programmes (Abbott & Mugisha & Sapsford, 2018; Burnet, 2008 & 2011). Rwanda tries to present itself, by putting more women into politics, far more democratic than it actually is. Moreover, implementing a gender quota might be a way to quiet dissent and present itself willing to be democratic to Rwanda’s population.
4.1. Causes descriptive representation Senegal
In 2010 president Abdoulaye Wade implemented the Senegalese law on parity, which obliges all parties to nominate an equal amount of men and women in all government institutions (Toraasen, 2019; Sané, 2014). The first elections after the law on parity was implemented showed her effectiveness, the number of women representatives in National Assembly increased from 22.7% to 42.7%. After that, women’s representation in Senegal remained stable.
As in Rwanda, the Senegalese women’s movement played an important role in putting gender parity on the political agenda (Toraasen, 2019; Sané, 2014). Senegal has a strong tradition of women activism, throughout history women have always tried to improve their rights and political chances. In 1957 they announced for the first time that they felt excluded from politics and wanted to have a say in decision making processes. Their activism worked, in 1963 Senegal’s first female parliamentarian was elected. In 1985 Senegal adopted the CEDAW protocol which seeks to eliminate discrimination against women. Moreover, domestic laws which guaranteed women’s rights were implemented.
For example, in 1999 a law on supressing violence against women was adopted. Rape, female circumcision, incest and sexual harassment are now illegal and have increased penalties (Kane, 2019; International convention on civil and political rights, 2018; committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, 2015). In addition the amended constitution in 2001 recognizes and guarantees equality between men and women. Men and women have equal access to property, land, education, health, equal salary and taxation and women were granted maternity rights. To ensure education, Senegal adopted a law which provides free education for all children between 6 and 16 in public institutions. Furthermore, in 2005 Senegal adopted the regional Maputo protocol which safeguards women’s rights. Finally in 2010 the gender parity law was adopted.
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The adaptation of the law on parity would not have been possible without the help of the Senegalese council of women, COSEF, and the Senegalese Association of Women Jurists, AFJ (Toraasen, 2019;Sané, 2014; Wahlers, 2013). They advocated for the need of true female citizenship wherein women are present in decision making positions. Whereas COSEF was more occupied with campaigning to get to the attention women’s minor political
representation, AFJ was occupied with developing proposals to the electoral code to achieve gender parity. After years of campaigning COSEF found an ally when Abdoulaye Wade was elected for president in 2000. This meant that they finally could influence Senegal’s male dominated politics as the president holds a great deal of power in Senegal. The executive rarely votes down his proposals. President Wade adopted a new constitution which guaranteed women’s right and access to decision making institutions. Finally, COSEF together with AFJ could start working on a new gender parity law.
Furthermore, just like Rwanda, Senegal’s specialist method to appoint ministers works in the advantage of women (Adams et al, 2016; Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Bauer & Okpotor, 2013; Yoon, 2004). If Senegal’s mixed voting system, wherein half of the votes are allocated through proportional representation and the other through plurality voting, does women any favour remains disputable. But, it certainly advantages women more than a single district voting system.
Lastly, president Wade’s image of a modern reformer, with regards to women’s increased rights under his presidency, can be doubted (Toraasen, 2019). Wade lost popularity after years of concentrating power to the executive, infrastructure problems and increasing costs of living. To gain support internationally as well as domestically Wade, just like Rwanda, might have implemented the law on parity. Developing countries who are heavily indebted, like Senegal, are largely dependent on foreign aid, foreign investment and tourism and therefore are more likely to adopt gender quotas than more financially independent countries (Toraasen, 2019; Bush, 2011). The international community often has preconditions for developing countries to receive aid. Liberal democracies in which every part of society is represented receive more aid than the ones who don’t. Therefore, political leaders of developing countries, like Senegal, might implement a gender quota strategically to present themselves as
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5. Effects on women’s substantive representation
Now that the factors which helped with the implementation of gender quota’s and women’s increased descriptive representation are clear, what can be said about their effects on women’s position in society? To give answer to this question I will examine women’s gains in
substantive and symbolic representation.
Rwanda
According to Bauer & Burnet (2013) the increase in women’s descriptive representation, in Rwanda, had limited to no effects on women’s substantive representation. They point out that the majority of legislative and policy achievements to protect women’s rights were
implemented before the gender quota in 2003. Furthermore, they argue that little gains have been made since 2003, because Rwanda’s increased authoritarianism has as a result that women tend to support legislative proposals emerging from the executive and avoid advocating for issues perceived as combative. On the other hand, one could argue that because of all the gender laws already implemented, few substantive gains were needed to empower women by law. Only Rwandan’s patriarchal society poses a barrier to women taking advantage of their rights.
However, Rwandan women did generate some substantive gains although some of them have mixed results. For example, the establishment of a ministry of gender and family promotion and the implementation of a national gender policy, which aims to ensure effective gender mainstreaming in education, agriculture, gender based violence and sexual and reproductive health (Oxford human rights hub et al. 2015). Also, in 2004 a national health care programme, ‘mutuelles de santé’, which grants women access to low cost family planning services, was implemented (Berry, 2015). Thus, in theory women who paid for the ‘mutuelles’ system can request contraceptives. In reality Rwanda’s culture which values women’s virginity prevents unmarried women to access these services (Berry, 2015). Unmarried women might fear judgement or are sometimes denied contraceptives by pharmacists. As a consequence, 47% of Rwanda’s pregnancies are unintended. In Rwanda unmarried mothers are shamed by their community and have few relationship and career options. Therefore, some will undergo illegal abortion (within Rwandan law abortion is still a crime) and risks several years of prison.
Moreover, in 2008 the gender based violence bill was adopted. The law prohibits any act that results in bodily, psychological, sexual and economic harm to somebody just because they are
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male or female (Law no. 59/2008 of 10/09/2008; ministry of gender and family promotion, 2015; Bauer & Burnet, 2008). This law also establishes that men and women have equal right to property and employment. Therefore, the GBV bill added important protection to women. In addition, the labour law, adopted in 2009, prohibits child labour, forced work,
discrimination and violence and punishment on the work floor (Law no. 13/2009 of
27/05/2009). Thus, all Rwandan’s, men and women, deserve equal opportunities for jobs and equal pay for work of equal value.
Lastly, the land law implemented in 2013 established that land ‘owned’ by couples married under community of property has to be registered in the joint name of both spouses (Oxford rights hub et al. 2015; law No 43/2013 of 16/06/2013). Before this law was adopted families in Rwanda’s patriarchal society often had traditional household arrangements (Abott & Mugisha & Sapsford, 2018). Land and other property was owned by families and inherited in the male line. Thus, the wife, as she was from outside the family, was unable to own land or other property at all.
Women however, despite the new possible gains, found that the law still makes them dependent on men because they must get married in order to take advantage of the land law (Berry, 2015; Oxford rights hub et al. 2015). In addition, Rwanda’s demographic imbalances due to the genocide and extreme poverty make marriage impossible for all Rwandan women to achieve. Rwanda’s genocide led to disproportionate death, displacement and imprisonment of men. As a consequence 15% of Rwandan women aged between twenty and thirty-five remain unwed. Furthermore, male youth in the rural parts of Rwanda are expected to construct a house for their bride-to-be and have to pay a bride price in order to get married. 18% of the male youth, however, lives in extreme poverty and thus barely have enough food to eat let alone built a house.
Whilst the laws and long term development strategies are important in promoting women’s rights, real progress has to be measured in the outcomes. In order to examine this, I will look into data conducted from the world bank to examine Rwandan women’s socio-economic position and world value survey to examine Rwandan’s perception on women in society. Unfortunately, the world value survey only has conducted information about Rwanda for the years 2007 and 2012. Thus, with regards to Rwanda’s perceptions on women, we will compare those two years.
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Table two shows us that Rwandan’s GDP per capita annual growth is unstable. Over time Rwandan’s annual GDP ranged between 0.6% and 8.2%, however it remained positive thus one could say that over time Rwandans economic situation got a little better. Still, Rwanda remains poor, 60% of the population still lives of $1.90 a day (Hughes, 2017). When looking into women making their own decisions with regards to health care, household purchases and visiting family, luckily Rwandan women’s situation got better as the percentage increased from 39.3% in 2000 to 65.4% in 2015. In addition Rwandan’s health care programmes which are included in the VISION 2020, Poverty Reduction strategy and national gender policy provide to be effective. In 2015 90.7% of Rwandan women giving birth were attended by health staff. Lastly, Rwanda’s school enrolment gender equality ratings show that the education gender gap is closing and thus that VISION 2020 and their free education for all programme provided success. Boys and girls are equally engaged in primary education, in secondary education girls are even better represented. However, the gender gap remains in the tertiary sector.
Table 2: Socio economic position women in Rwanda
2000 2005 2010 2015
GDP per capita annual growth rate 2.5% 7.4% 4.6% 6.1% Women participating in own health care,
household purchases and visiting family decisions (women 15-49)
39.3% 47.1% 58.7% 65.4%
Births attended by skilled health staff 31.3% 38.6% 69.0% 90.7% School enrolment gender equality rating
(1= gender equality, < 1 in favour of men, >1 in favour of women) Primary Secondary Tertiary 1.0 0.9 - 1.0 0.9 - 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.8
Data drawn from the world bank
In spite of table 2 showing positive developments, table 3 shows more negative developments. The only somewhat positive development is the increase in people (4.3%) who think men and women having equal rights is an essential characteristic of a democracy. On the contrary, Rwandan men and women who reported gender equality with regards to jobs as ‘high’ decreased. This is weird because one would expect that after 2009, when the labour law was
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implemented which prohibits discrimination, gender equality would rise. One explanation could be that whilst most Rwandan’s are engaged in non-wage employment, more men moved out of the agricultural self-employment sector towards wage employment than women did (ESTA & RWFO, 2014). Men’s movement out of the agricultural sector was partly made possible by the massive increase in the construction industry. Because these jobs entail high physical demands this had little impact on women’s employment.
Another negative development is the decrease in Rwandan men and women who think it is never justifiable for a men to beat his wife. Because of the gender bill adopted in 2008 one would expect a more positive development. This shows that even if laws and awareness raising campaigns in the eradication of gender violence are implemented, social attitudes take time to change.
Table 3: Rwandans perceptions on women
2007 2012
Male Female Male Female Gender equality index jobs, percentage
of people who reported ‘high’
58.3% 66.8% 30.0% 40.0% Justifiable for a men to beat his wife,
Percentage of people who reported
‘never justifiable’ 46.7% 53.7% 3.8% 4.2%
Democracy: men and women have equal rights, percentage of people who think its’s an ‘essential characteristic’ of a democracy
30.0% 35.3% 32.2% 41.7%
Data drawn from the world value survey, fifth and sixth wave.
Senegal
Just like Rwanda, the effects of women’s increased descriptive representation on women’s substantive representation are mixed. Most of the progressive laws implemented happened before the implementation of the law on parity (Toraasen, 2019). This could be because Senegal’s women movement lost it’s ally when in 2012 president Wade lost the elections. Macky Sall was elected as new president of Senegal. Exceptions include the amendment of Senegal’s nationality code in 2013 which ended the unequal treatment of men and women
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with regards to their ability to pass on the Senegalese nationality by marriage, descent or adoption (Kane, 2019; International convention on civil and political rights, 2018; committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, 2015). With the new amendments, Senegalese women can now transfer their nationality to their husbands and children.
Moreover, in 2016 the mining code came into power which prohibits discrimination between men and women with respect to their wages.
However, discrimination of women in the Senegalese law and in practice remains (Kane, 2019; international convention on civil and political rights, 2018; United Nations Human Rights, 2015; committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, 2015). The Senegalese family code and lack of an abortion law show that further development on
women’s rights is needed. Within the Senegalese family code the marriageable age for girls is 16 and for boys 18, and women can remarry only after specific time sloth ranging from 3 months to 300 days starting from the dissolution of the last marriage. Moreover, the family code grants husbands all the marital and paternal power. As a consequence the husband is the head of household, has all the custody rights and decides the marital home. Data of the world bank supports this finding, still in 2020 Senegalese women cannot be the head of household the same way as a man. Lastly, the family code should enable both men and women to have equal access to land ownership. The reality however remains different. Kane’s study reveals that two thirds of men say they inherited the land in their possession from their parents. As a result, women own less than 2% of land. In addition, under the Islam law men have more right to inheritance than women.
Secondly, just like Rwanda women in Senegal lack the full right to abortion. Despite that the Maputo protocol obliges states to allow pregnant women and girls to abort in cases of rape, incest or sexual assaults and when the women’s health is in danger, Senegal did not adopt such law (Kane, 2019; international convention on civil and political rights, 2018). Within Senegal’s law nowadays abortion is illegal and can only be banned if three doctors agree that the life of the women is in danger. If that is not the case, women who abort face the risk of two years imprisonment and a fine. However, in 2014 a multidisciplinary committee was established in partnership with the directorate for health of mother and child to advocate for the enactment of a law which allows Senegalese women to abort in cases of incest and rape.
Furthermore, the Senegalese state established another committee in 2016 to revise the Senegalese law and decrease women’s discrimination (committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, 2015). The established committee to revise the Senegalese law
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promises a hopeful future for Senegalese women, but what can be said about the socio-economic position of women in Senegal nowadays? In order to examine this I will look into data conducted from the world bank.
Table 4 shows that over time Senegal’s annual GDP per capita growth did develop. From 2014 and onwards Senegal’s annual GDP per capita growth remained between 3 and 4 percent. Despite this positive development, Senegal remains it’s struggle with poverty.
Furthermore, in spite of the somewhat positive development, an increase of 4.5%, of women’s ability to participate in decisions about health care, household purchases and family visits during 2005-2017, in 2017 still only 14.1% of Senegalese women took part in such decisions. In addition female genital mutilation remains a problem in Senegal. Despite the law on
violence against women already implemented in 1999 and the Maputo protocol who prohibit female genital mutilation, 24% of Senegalese women are still cut in 2017.
On the contrary, the percentage of women who belief her husband is justified to beat her decreased with 19.5% percent and therefore shows a more positive development. Women seem to be more conscious about the Senegalese law that prohibits violence against women. Still, in 2017, 45.7% of Senegalese women do think violence is justifiable within marriage. Therefore, more needs to happen to make sure all Senegalese women know that it’s is never justifiable (by law) for a men to beat his wife. Moreover, during 2000-2017 the percentage of births attended by skilled health staff increased with 10.6%. Although this is a positive development, Rwanda shows us that more is possible. Lastly, Senegal’s school enrolment parity rates show that over time Senegal’s law which stipulates free education for all children between 6 and 16 years in public institutions is somewhat successful. Over time the gender gap in primary and secondary school did close. Even, in 2017 more girls than boys were enrolled in primary and secondary school. However, the gender gap in tertiary education remains. Domestic work, sexual abuse in schools, early marriages and pregnancies obstruct women’s success in school (Kane, 2019). As a consequence, boys attain higher education than girls.
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Table 4: Socioeconomic position women in Senegal
2000 2005 2011 2015 2017
GDP per capita annual growth rate
0.8% 3.0% -1.3% 3.4% 4.1%
Women participation in own health care, household
purchases and visiting family decisions (15-49)
- 9.5% 17.7% 9.9% 14.1%
Women who belief a husband is justified to beat his wife if they argue, she burns the food, neglects the children, goes out without telling or refuses sex (15-49)
- 65.2% 60.0% 56.5% 45.7%
Female genital mutilation prevalence
- 28.2% 25.7% 24.2% 24.0%
Births attended by skilled health staff
57.8% 51.9% 65.1% 53.3% 68.4%
School enrolment gender equality rating (1= gender equality, < 1 in favour of men, >1 in favour of women) Primary Secondary Tertiary 0.9 0.7 - 1.0 0.7 - 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.1 0.6
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6. Symbolic representation:
As discussed, women’s increased descriptive representation can positively influence women’s symbolic representation. Is this the case in Rwanda and Senegal? To answer this question I will look into data conducted from the world value survey to analyse Rwanda and afro barometer to analyse Senegal.
Rwanda
Table 4 shows that since the gender quota implemented in 2003, men and women’s
perceptions of men being better political leaders changed positively with regards to women’s symbolic representation. Men and women increasingly disagreed with men being better political leaders. Moreover, men’s and women’s interests in in politics increased. The percentage of women who reported that they were somewhat interested in politics grew with 20.7% which shows that Rwandan women are more engaged with politics in 2012 than they were in 2007. This is in line with Toraasen (2019) and Burnet (2008) who conclude that Rwandan women’s increased political representation positively influenced Rwandans respect for women political leaders and women in general. Women politicians in Rwanda today, unlike the past, are respected in the same way as male government officials. In addition, women are more engaged with politics and speak out more in public meetings. Their views are not dismissed anymore because of their gender as was the case in the past.
However, the increase in men and women who belief that when jobs are scarce men should be prioritized over women indicates a more negative development. It shows that Rwanda’s patriarchal society with deeply embedded gender roles, for example, men should be the main cost winner and the head of the household, are hard to change. Maybe more time is needed for Rwandans society to fully change its attitudes towards women being equal to men.
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Table 5 Rwandan women’s symbolic representation
2007 2012
Male Female Male Female Men make better political leaders
than women do, percentage of people who ‘disagree’
36.0% 42.1% 45.8%% 39.9%
Interest in politics, percentage of people who are ‘somewhat interested’
36.0% 33.6% 56.3% 54.3%
Job scarce: men should have more right to a job than women,
percentage of people who ‘agree’
29.8%% 19.7% 47.3% 37.4%
Data drawn from the world value survey, fifth and sixth wave.
Senegal
Table 6 shows us that the adoption of the law on parity has led to positive development of women’s symbolic representation and shows a gendered polarisation of attitudes towards women as political leaders. The support for men being better political leaders decreased among men and women. However, in 2016-2018 (and the other time periods) men’s support for statement one was higher than women’s support. In addition, both men’s and women’s support for women deserving the same chance being elected to political office increased during 2011-2018. Moreover, in 2016-2018 (and the other time periods) more women strongly agreed with statement two than men.
The overall increase in women’s symbolic representation and women being more positive about women politicians is in line with Toraasen (2019). She concludes that since women were the victims of discrimination, as they were excluded from politics, they are more likely to recognize the discrimination and therefore support gender quotas. Men on the other hand have never experienced gender discrimination and will therefore be more likely to favour the status quo as a gender quota decreases their chances of getting elected. The men and women who remain to support the statement men being better political leaders than women probably see women in politics as a violation of appropriate gender roles. The deeply embedded patriarchal culture together with the Sufi Islam regard women as being sub-ordinate to men.
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Women should not be aiming at leadership positions but should listen to their man’s authority.
Table 6. men versus women as political leaders
2011/2013 2014/2015 2016/2018 Agree ‘very strongly’
with statement 1: Men Women 27.1% 13.4% 38.5% 14.0% 18.2% 7.2% Agree ‘very strongly’
with statement 2: Men Women 32.8% 48.4% 39.0% 66.7% 53.7% 70.7%
Statement 1: men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women. Statement 2: women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.
Data drawn from the online data analysis tool of the afro barometer
7. Conclusion
In this paper I sought to examine the effect of women’s increased descriptive representation on women’s substantive and symbolic representation by using a most different design study of Rwanda and Senegal. Literature on Africa provided possible factors that can help or obstruct women’s descriptive representation. Moreover, literature on Africa lets us to believe that increased descriptive representation of women positively influences women’s substantive and symbolic representation in Africa. Are the same dynamics visible in Rwanda and Senegal, or do their differences generate different outcomes?
First of all, Rwanda and Senegal both experienced an increase in women’s descriptive representation directly caused by their implementation of gender quotas (Abott et al. 2016; Bauer & Burnet, 2013; Burnet, 2008 & 2011; Sané, 2014; Toraasen, 2019; Wahlers, 2013). Furthermore, domestic women movements, with help from international agencies, were crucial in both countries in putting gender quotas on the political agenda. Also, in both Senegal and Rwanda the government presents itself as liberal and democratic, by putting more women and minorities in politics, to attract foreign aid and investment, as they both are poor countries who are aid dependent However, different dynamics were also visible. Rwanda experienced a political transition in the aftermath of a genocide and civil war and
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implemented a new constitution in which women could enhance their interests. Senegal did not experience such a transition. Apparently, political transitions and the implementation of a new constitution provide opportunities for women but aren’t necessary for the adaptation of gender quotas.
Secondly, what were the effects of Rwanda’s and Senegal’s increased descriptive
representation on women’s substantive representation, and did women’s socio-economic position in society improved? Since the implementation of both Rwanda’s and Senegal’s gender quotas few legislative gains were made. Most of the progressive gender laws were implemented before then. Women’s active civil society, working together with the few women parliamentarians and ministers, made the substantive gains possible (Bauer & Burner, 2013; Burnet, 2008 & 2011; Sané, 2014; Toraasen, 2019). Therefore, one could argue that active women organisations instead of women’s increased descriptive representation results in increased substantive women representation. Furthermore, one could argue that because of all the gender laws already implemented, few legislative gains were needed to empower women by law. Therefore, since the implementation of the gender quotas few legislative gains were made.
The limited substantive gains for women in Rwanda could also be due to Rwanda’s increased authoritarianism (Bauer & Burnet, 2013). Women politicians could perhaps open the debate on women’s issues, but at the end of the day the RPF decides which laws are implemented and which are not. In Senegal the limited substantive gains could also be due to a shift of interests of President Sall (Toraasen, 2019). President Wade actively sided with women organisations to implement the law on parity and other progressive gender laws. Since 2012, when president Sall was elected, fewer progressive laws have been implemented. The
interests of the president are likely to influence Senegal’s policies as the president holds a lot of power. Therefore, if a president’s interests lie with women gaining rights, he faces few constraints to do so.
With all the gender laws and long term development projects implemented women’s socio-economic position is for sure better than it was two decades ago in Rwanda and Senegal. However, the deeply entrenched gender roles in Rwanda’s and Senegal’s patriarchal society still make it impossible for women to take advantage of all their legal rights. For example, despite the land laws implemented in Rwanda and Senegal, women remain dependent on men (Berry, 2015; Kane, 2019). In order for women in Rwanda to gain access to land they must get married, in Senegal the reality remains that women own just 2% of land in the country.
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Thirdly, did the increase in women’s descriptive representation positively affect women’s symbolic representation in Rwanda and Senegal? The answer is yes, both in Rwanda and Senegal the perception of politics as an all-male game changed into women also being able to participate in politics (World value survey, Afro barometer). However, the gendered division (men being more negative about female politicians) visible in Senegal and Rwandans who belief that when jobs are scarce men should be prioritized over women, show that Rwandans and Senegal’s deeply embedded gender roles are hard to change and still influence people’s perceptions of women.
In short, despite Rwanda and Senegal being very different, the same dynamics are visible. Rwanda and Senegal show that increased descriptive representation positively influences women’s symbolic representation, however it does not necessarily result in increased substantive representation. Women’s active civil society seems to be just as effective. To further develop the position of women in Rwandans and Senegal’s society, they should adjust their patriarchal culture into a culture that is more women friendly. To say which political climate provides the most gains for women is difficult. On the one hand, Rwanda’s women’s socio-economic development promises a more hopeful future than Senegal. On the other hand, when looking into women having a say in politics Senegal’s democracy scores higher than Rwanda’s increased authoritarianism wherein women follow the RPF’s lead.
Future research should focus on the influence of women ministers on women’s substantive and symbolic representation in African countries. Whilst Senegal provides us with a well-functioning democracy it has few female ministers and thus little can be said about the effects of female ministers. Rwanda has a lot of female ministers but is an authoritarian state.
Therefore, the direct effects of female ministers have to be questioned as the indirect
influence of the views of the RPF may be just as influential. Thus, research on countries with high percentage of female ministers in a well-functioning democracy, like South-Africa, could provide meaningful insight.
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