Leaving for War: A comparison of the Kurdish Foreign Fighter and the Jihadi Foreign Fighter Movements

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Paul Müller (S2101092) Master thesis as part of the Capstone

"Western Jihadist Foreign Fighters” Supervisors: Dr. Bart W. Schuurman & Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Word count: 20,000 (27,000 incl.

Appendices & Bibliography)

Institute of Security and Global Affairs

Leiden University – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Leaving for War

A comparison of the Kurdish Foreign

Fighter and the Jihadi Foreign Fighter

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management. This thesis is part of a capstone project on western foreign fighters at the Hague Center for Security Studies (HCSS).

Paul Müller, s2101092 Master Thesis

August 2018

M.Sc. Crisis and Security Management Faculty: Governance and Global Affairs Campus The Hague

Leiden University Supervisor:

Dr. Bart W. Schuurman 2nd_Reader:

Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker Capstone Supervisor:

Reinier Bergema, Strategic Advisor at HCSS

Provision of datasets:

R. Bergema (Jihadist Foreign Fighters)

S. De Craemer (Non-Jihadist Foreign Fighters)

Cover Picture: ‘A Peshmerga soldier walk to place a Kurdish flag near the frontline with ISIL on November 16, 2015 in Sinjar, Iraq. Kurdish forces, with the aid of massive U.S.-led coalition airstrikes, liberated the town from ISIL extremists, known in Arabic as Daesh, in recent days. Although many minority Yazidis celebrated the victory, their home city of Sinjar lay in almost complete ruins’ by John Moore/Getty (edited). Original illustration adapted from Getty Images (2015). Retrieved June 10, 2018, from: https://www.gettyimages.de/ereignis/kurdish-peshmerga-control-sinjar-after-driving-out-isil-with-u-s-airstrikes-591819685

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I

Abstract

The Syrian Civil War has seen a large influx of foreign fighters to the ranks of two opposing belligerent powers: The Islamic terrorist organization ISIS on the one hand and the Kurdish militias in northern Syria on the other hand. The aim of this master thesis is to investigate the similarities and differences between the Western European individuals who decided to join one of those two movements.

Based on intensive data collection and following a methodological, codebook centered framework by Sageman (2004), Bakker (2011), and Bergema (2015), this thesis contrasts two extensive datasets regarding socio-demographic facts, pre-participation-, and network characteristics of the fighters, and identifies how the two observed groups – the Jihadi and the Kurdish foreign fighters – differ.

The results show that there is no clear profile of a foreign fighter, however, clear differences are visible between the two respective groups. Foreign fighters joining the Kurdish movement are on average not just older but also better educated and vocationally more successful. They mostly have their ethnic and cultural roots in the West, where many of them served in their countries’ military.

Jihadi foreign fighters on the other hand overwhelmingly had cultural and ethnic roots in the Arabic world. Stemming from lower class backgrounds they were often associated with criminal organizations and found their way to the conflict zones through personal connections among friends and family.

This research encourages to continue to deepen the understanding of foreign fighting detached from religious confinements and identifies numerous issues that require further and deeper analysis.

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II

Acknowledgments

I would like to present my sincere appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Bart Schuurman for his supportive and constructive guidance. Also, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker for his work as a second reader.

Many thanks to Reinier Bergema and Simon De Craemer who kindly provided me with the data they had collected for their research. This gave me a head start and helped me to create a more comprehensive dataset. Thank you.

Finally, I am grateful to my family for their never-ending support and to the amazing people I met here in Wijnhaven. You made it an exceptional and fun year!

Paul Müller, Den Haag 5 August 2018

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III

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of the territory controlled by Rojava as of 02.2014 & 10.2016 ... 14

Figure 2: Potential countries of origin (Red) & Syria (Green) ... 15

Figure 3: Age Distribution among Kurdish foreign fighters ... 29

Figure 4: Gender Balance among Kurdish foreign fighters ... 30

Figure 5: Countries of origin of Kurdish fighters (red) and Syria (green) ... 31

Figure 6: Geographical Origin of Kurdish foreign fighters (Cases) ... 31

Figure 7: Geographical Origin of Kurdish foreign fighters (in percent) ... 32

Figure 8: Residence Kurdish foreign fighters ... 33

Figure 9: Geographical Origin of Jihadi Foreign Fighters (cases) ... 34

Figure 10: Geographical Origin of Jihadi Foreign Fighters (in percent) ... 34

Figure 11: Residence Jihadi Foreign fighters ... 36

Figure 12: Geographical origin of former soldiers ... 42

Figure 13: Wave of departure ... 51

Figure 14: Gender Comparison ... 54

Figure 15: Comparison of ethnic and cultural origins ... 55

Figure 16: Comparison of educational experience ... 56

Figure 17: Comparison of occupational statuses ... 57

Figure 18: Comparison of military experience ... 58

Figure 19: Comparison of departure waves of Kurdish and Jihadi Foreign fighters ... 60

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VI

List of Tables

Table 1: Foreign fighter definitional elements by author ... 10

Table 2: Applicability of foreign fighter definitions by author ... 11

Table 3: Variables of the original codebook regarding Jihadi foreign fighters ... 17

Table 4: Variables of Codebook KurdFF regarding Kurdish foreign fighters ... 18

Table 5: Socio-demographic variables ... 21

Table 6: Pre-participation timeframe characteristics ... 23

Table 7: Network Characteristics ... 24

Table 8: Participation Characteristics ... 24

Table 9: Age of Kurdish foreign fighters ... 28

Table 10: Countries of Origin of Jihadi foreign fighters ... 35

Table 11: Highest completed educational experience of Kurdish foreign fighters ... 38

Table 12: Highest completed educational experience of Jihadi foreign fighters ... 38

Table 13: Occupation status of Kurdish foreign fighters ... 40

Table 14: Occupations status of Jihadi foreign fighters ... 41

Table 15: Age comparison former soldiers & civilians ... 42

Table 16: Date of departure ... 50

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VII

List of Abbreviations & Glossary

AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst; The

Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service.

Antifa Antifaschistische Aktion (German); a left-wing

political movement.

EUROPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement

Cooperation, the law enforcement agency of the EU.

HCSS The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. Often referred to as

“IS”, “ISIL” or “Daesh”.

Jihad In the context of this thesis: a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty (Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition).

JihFFMON the Dutch Jihadist Foreign Terrorist Fighter Monitor.

MLKP Marksist-Leninist Komünist Partisi

(“Marxist-Leninist Communist Party”). A left-wing party in Turkey. Banned under terrorism charges.

Peshmerga A group of loosely organized Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq.

PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (“Kurdistan Workers'

Party”). A militant left-wing, political movement in Turkey.

PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (“Democratic Union

Party”). A leading party in Rojava.

Rojava Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. A de facto

autonomous region in northern Syria.

Sharia Islamic laws based on the Koran.

Taliban A fundamentalist Muslim movement active

predominantly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Yazidi A religious minority in predominantly Iraq & Syria.

YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (“People's Protection

Units”). The armed wing of the PYD.

YPJ Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (“Women's Protection

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1

1. Introduction

1.1 Introdu ction

Linda Wenzel and Ivana Hoffman had quite a lot in common. Born just a few years apart in the northern half of Germany to later divorced parents they found stability in their ideologies: Islam and communism respectively. Having dropped out of school, they made their way to Iraq and Syria with the help of Facebook contacts. Eventually, they both ended up on the battlefields in the ongoing civil war – but on opposing sides. Hoffman joined the Kurdish Militia YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel; English: People’s Protection Units) She, then 19, died on March 7, 2015, as the first western woman to die in battle against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). Wenzel, 16, on the other hand, was arrested in Mosul by Iraqi troops in July 2017. She, allegedly, had been fighting for the terrorist organization and been part of “moral guardian” militias in the city, enforcing the rules of ISIS and punishing those violating their strict interpretation of the Islamic sharia law (Pancevski, 2017; Hall, 2017; Connolly, 2017; Osborne, 2015; BBC, 2015; Yücel, 2015). There seem to be many similarities in the pathways of the two young women. They seem to have had similar upbringings and they both decided to move to a war-torn area thus becoming so-called “foreign fighters”, however, on different sides and with different rationales. Hoffman and Wenzel were not the only people from Europe joining Kurdish militias or the Islamic State.

“More than 200 people from Germany fighting with Kurdish forces against ‘IS’” read the headline of the Deutsche Welle website in early 2017 (Winter, 2017), quoting government statements. Other western countries observed similar phenomena (Harp, 2017). The motives of these so-called foreign fighters were, as far as one can tell, as diverse as their origins, ranging from a lack of belonging or purpose (Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016, p. 22), religious reasons (Middle East Eye, 2015), to political and ideological reasons (TelesurTV, 2015; Blake, 2018). The foreign fighters joining the Kurdish movements and combatting the “greater evil” of ISIS are often considered to be the “good guys” in the west (Malet, 2009). However, their characteristics and backgrounds might not be so different from the people they combat. However, while the individuals joining ISIS and the ones joining Kurdish militant groups possess seemingly similar traits (Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016, p. 55), they come from a wide range of countries; have many different backgrounds, and a multitude of underlying motivations to join the fight (Mendelsohn, 2011).

While the phenomenon of foreign fighters joining Kurdish groups had been relatively unnoticed, a similar process in the same timeframe attracted massive public and academic

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2 interest: the high number of Western foreign fighters joining the Islamist terrorist groups ISIS (Bakker & Singleton, 2016). Different than the Kurdish phenomenon, the stream of ISIS foreign fighters has been subject to extensive academic scrutiny; efforts have been made to collect extensive data on these Europeans who go to Iraq and Syria to fight on behalf of ISIS. By way of illustration, The Hague Center of Strategic Studies (HCSS) has systematically developed a database of Jihadi foreign fighters, mostly from the Netherlands. Based on a methodological framework by Sageman (2004) and Bakker (2011), it compiled information on a wide variety of key characteristics of Jihadi foreign fighters. A similar approach is the basis of this thesis. A database will compile characteristics of Kurdish foreign fighters. The dataset will be used to identify and explain key features. Finally, the compiled dataset of Kurdish foreign fighters will be compared to data regarding jihadi foreign fighters, thus enabling a contrasting view of the two related, but opposed phenomena. The following question will be posed: “To what extent do the socio-demographic, biographical and pre-engagement characteristics differ or are similar between ‘foreign fighters’ from Europe joining Jihadi militias in Syria in comparison to ‘foreign fighters’ joining Kurdish militias in Syria during the Syrian civil war?”

This master thesis will thus examine who these people are that leave their peaceful homeland behind and move to a place dominated by war, mostly with the intent to join the armed conflict. In extensive research, data on life paths and backgrounds of Kurdish foreign fighters from 15 European countries is collected and analyzed. The research will identify characteristics common among the foreign fighters and contrast the populations of Kurdish- and Jihadi foreign fighters based on these characteristics. The thesis will comment on the extent to which tools established for analyzing Jihadi fighters are applicable to understand the phenomenon of other groups of foreign fighters thus adding to the understanding of the phenomenon in general. In doing so it will add to the literature on terrorism and radicalization, more specific to the literature on foreign fighting, examine, among others, if these mentioned umbrella terms are applicable to the case. Additionally, it will add to the limited literature on political violence and foreign fighting in Kurdistan. Foreign fighting itself is an old phenomenon that changes over time. The analysis of the current phenomenon of foreign fighting taking into account not just the attention-grabbing aspect of Jihadi foreign fighting but multiple actors and sides will allow European policymakers to adjust their policies to this changing nature of foreign fighting. Based on data-driven analysis, they can address local, societal, and political needs accompanying the emigration of some of their citizens to war zones and the possible return of people into society who left to fight a war that, arguably, is not theirs.

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3 1.2 Res earch Questi on

In pursuit of adding knowledge to the understudied phenomenon of Kurdish foreign fighters as well as the comparative study of foreign fighter groups in general, the research question of this thesis reads as follows. “To what extent do the socio-demographic, biographical and pre-engagement characteristics differ between European ‘foreign fighters’ joining Jihadi militias in Syria and those joining Kurdish militias in Syria during the Syrian civil war?”

This question comprises multiple elements that require closer elucidation. The chosen characteristics portray aspects of the individuals’ life up to the point of their departure. Whereas socio-demographic factors provide relevant basic information of the individual, biographical variables try to identify factors that might have been consequential in pursuing the individual to become a foreign fighter. Pre-engagement factors enlighten possible patterns of recruitment, motivation, and network. These factors follow analytical frameworks developed by Sageman (2004) and Bakker (2011). A closer look at the factors is conducted in the chapter regarding the methodology of the thesis. An elucidation of the concepts of ‘foreign fighter’, ‘jihadi-‘ and ‘Kurdish militias’ is presented in the literature review and methodology. The limitations of the research question regarding geographical and temporal boundaries are due to constraints regarding time and scope of the research.

1.3 Jus tificati on

1.3.1 Theoretical relevance

Foreign fighters have been studied extensively in recent years. Mostly, however, with a focus on individuals joining Islamist groups (e.g. ISIS). Other groups of foreign fighters have seen less academic attention. Only limited research has been conducted on foreign fighters joining Kurdish groups (Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016; Orton, 2017; Patin, 2015; De Craemer, 2017). The existing literature in this regard centers especially on the Peshmerga and YPG militias in Iraq and Syria and provides mostly basic information on the individual fighters and their backgrounds. More in-depth research regarding biographical and motivational factors behind the individual’s decision to join an armed conflict on behalf of Kurdish forces is yet sparse. Comparative research between differently motivated foreign fighter groups on opposing sides of a conflict has, by all appearances, not yet been conducted, leaving behind a notable gap in the extensive academic interest on terrorism, political violence, and foreign fighting in the recent years. This thesis aims to add a piece of knowledge to the literature by providing a well-founded answer to the important questions addressed. As the literature review will show,

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4 foreign fighting, in general, is seen as a phenomenon where people support an insurgency against the government. Indeed, many scholars exclude this form of foreign support from their definition of foreign fighting (Malet, 2013; Hegghammer, 2010). However, this does not always hold true, as the presented case shows (see also: Mares, 2017, p. 32). The research will thus add to the literature on this sub-phenomenon of foreign fighting and help expand the scope of its observation field.

With the amount of existing literature in contradistinction to its scientific relevance as well as the converging phenomenon of religiously motivated foreign fighting, the proposed research will fill a gap and add important aspects to the existing body of literature regarding foreign fighting and terrorism research in general. The compiled dataset, as an outcome of the research, can be used to compare the sample of Kurdish foreign fighters with other datasets with similar variables (e.g. foreign fighters in other timeframes; foreign fighters associated to other groups and ideologies) thus opening the door for a wide variety of future comparative research.

The comparison with Jihadi foreign fighters allows for a discourse centered around the assessment that not just fundamental Islamists find the way to Iraq and Syria but people with different ideologies and backgrounds. The contrasting of populations will reveal differences and similarities, potentially identifying driving forces and events behind foreign fighting decisions, thus adding to the understanding and the literature on foreign fighting and the Syrian civil war itself.

1.3.2 Societal relevance

The societal relevance of the phenomenon is high. People out of the center of society leave a peaceful country to join an armed conflict. Those people - students, parents, former soldiers, civilians – are often exposed to violence in their target area. Increasing the understanding of the phenomenon allows policymakers to pursue knowledge-based policies. This knowledge can help to reduce the number of foreign fighters by identifying early indicators, implementing targeted policy solutions and increase social resilience to ideological and other influences that might eventuate in foreign fighting. While, due to the terroristic intent of some Jihadi foreign fighter returnees, the seemingly pose a higher risk to society it is nevertheless relevant to assess Kurdish foreign fighters. Both populations of groups were potentially exposed to violence and trauma. When returning they might require re-integration measures and psychological care. The comparative nature of the research provides policymakers with insights on whether solutions

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5 applicable to a certain population also apply to other populations. The knowledge of foreign fighters acquired in the context of the Syrian civil war can furthermore give policy direction for future conflicts and future waves of departures of voluntary combatants.

1.4 Meth ods

The data collection for the comparative research was based on a codebook with 72 variables. These variables assessed socio-demographic factors (e.g. age; nationality; education), biographical pre-participation indicators (e.g. traumata; ideology; convictions) and network characteristics (e.g. interaction with other foreign fighters; recruitment). Additionally, while not covered by the scope of the research question, participation characteristics (e.g. involvement in armed conflict in Syria, return; death) were recorded to provide a more complete picture of the individual foreign fighter pathways.

By utilizing pre-existing databases (De Craemer, 2017; Patin, 2015; Orton, 2017) and six weeks long open-source research (especially newspaper articles, government reports, social media) a list of 110 Kurdish foreign fighters in Syria and their respective information on the basis of the codebook was created, resulting in more than 2,000 entries overall. The compiled data was sorted and contrasted to a dataset of the ‘The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’ (HCSS) regarding Jihadi foreign fighters as well as additional studies and reports on the topic. Subsequently, these findings are presented and discussed.

1.5 Ou tlin e

After this introduction, Chapter two will first introduce the terms necessary to understand the phenomenon. By reviewing the academic literature it will provide the basis for understanding the complex nature of the phenomenon. Definitional difficulties and gaps, as well as their relevance, will be explained. This is followed by a short oversight over the Syrian conflict and the involved actors.

Chapter three will introduce the methodology behind data measurement, -gathering and -exploitation. The basis of the data gathering is a codebook. The creation of the codebook will be described and the utilized variables identified and explained. Additionally, the data sources are presented and the limitations and the validity of the research examined.

Chapter four presents the findings of the data collection on Kurdish foreign fighters in the YPG and contrasts them to preexisting datasets on Jihadi foreign fighters who joined ISIS during the Syrian civil war. It will first compare the findings to the dataset of the Dutch Jihadist

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6 Foreign Terrorist Fighter Monitor before adding additional datasets and studies regarding socio-demographic, biographical and pre-engagement information of Jihadi foreign fighters in Europe. The chapter closes with a discussion regarding the findings and draws a conclusion with regard to the research question. It needs to be pointed out that, while the findings are identifying characteristics, processes and particularities in the two populations i.e. Kurdish and Jihadi foreign fighters, this thesis will not explain what these variables mean for the increment processes due to constraints regarding time and scope of the research.

Finally, chapter five will summarize the findings and present a conclusion with regard to the research question posed. This conclusion will furthermore refer to hiatuses in the academic engagement with foreign fighting against the backdrop of this thesis and will highlight needs for future research. The thesis concludes with the bibliography of the used literature and other sources and multiple appendices comprising the utilized codebooks.

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7

2. Background

2.1 L iterature Revi ew

Foreign fighting is not a new phenomenon. Armed conflicts from the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, to the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the Bosnian War in the 1990s attracted foreigners who joined the combat committed to fight for the cause they had chosen – sometimes on opposing sides (Malet, 2009, p. 101). In recent years, the focus of academia has been on Jihadi foreign fighting especially. This included conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia and Iraq – and now has returned to Iraq and Syria where great attention is given to foreign fighters among the ranks of ISIS (Fritz & Young, 2017, p. 2). Just recently other forms of foreign fighting – foreign fighting without Islamist motives – have returned to the public eye.

Clearly, to understand foreign fighting one has to define the parameters under which individuals are considered as “foreign fighters” and under which they are not. There are numerous ways to label the phenomenon – terms in use include foreign volunteers, global insurgents or transnational insurgents often supplemented by an adjective (e.g. terrorist, jihadist) to specify the type (Bakker & Singleton, 2016, p. 12). This thesis, however, will rely on the initial term “foreign fighters” due to its widespread usage and proven applicability. Working with this rather ubiquitous term requires a precise definition which has been attempted by a number of researchers and organizations.

Most famously David Malet, in his monography on the subject, defines foreign fighters as “noncitizen of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts” (2013, p. 9). Insurgency, so Malet following the definition of Modelski (1964), describes a “faction in an internal war that does not control the legitimate (i.e., internationally recognized) machinery of the state and is therefore (at least initially) in the weaker position”. (Malet, 2013, p. 10). Other definitions of “insurgency” equate the term with revolts aiming to overthrow the government1_.

This contrasts with numerous historical cases where foreign fighters joined pro-state movements such as the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, Jews joining the Israeli armed forces in 1948-49 from abroad2, fighters siding with Croatia during the Yugoslav Wars, and “Shia foreign fighters” supporting the Syrian government in its civil war (Fritz & Young, 2017, p. 4; Clarke & Smyth, 2017).

1_{See Merriam-Webster dictionary: Insurgency is “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an}

organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency”

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8 The definition by Malet implies that foreign fighters need to be unpaid or not expecting to be paid volunteers. They need to be foreign i.e. have a different national background than the place where they fight, and they need to join an insurgency. The definition excludes persons enlisted in foreign militaries who are ordered to support the fight abroad; persons who join a foreign army “for pay or citizenship”; as well as employees of private military companies under contract in the respective country (Malet, 2013, p. 9).

With regard to the role of insurgencies, a key element prevalent in a big number of definitions, it will have to be assessed how, and to what extent, these restrictions come into effect in the observed conflict with its ambiguous actors i.e. the partly state-like entities of the ISIS caliphate and the Kurdish Rojava federation.

Thomas Hegghammer (2010, p. 57) advocates a similar definition as the one by Malet. He defines foreign fighters as “an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid.” This definition thus excludes mercenaries, soldiers, exiled rebels and diaspora members with “preexisting stake[s] in the conflict” as well as international terrorists participating in “out-of-area violence against noncombatants” (p. 58). However, especially the definitional aspect of “kinship” has shown to overly constrain the applicability – a vast number of foreign fighters are second-generation immigrants from countries affected by foreign fighting and thus possess kinship to the region without possibly ever having been there. A revised definition by Hegghammer from 2013 thus departs from the restrictions of kinship as well as limitation on persons joining insurgencies (2013, p. 1) defining foreign fighting as “any military activity (training or fighting), using any tactic (terrorist or guerrilla tactics), against any enemy (Western or non-Western)—so long as it occurs outside the West.”

The political scientist Barak Mendelsohn distinguishes between foreign-trained fighters and foreign fighters. “Foreign trained-fighters” describes people moving abroad to receive training e.g. in terrorist training camps and who subsequently return to their country of origin to carry out acts of terrorism (Mendelsohn, 2011, p. 193). This phenomenon of foreign-trained fighting falls not under the scope of the research. It will thus not be considered. While Mendelsohn does not give a clear definition of foreign fighting, he points out that the phenomenon is not restricted to a particular (religious) ideology. He argues that foreign fighting mostly happens in asymmetric conflicts such as guerilla fighting or resistances and that foreign fighters rarely were a “prominent aspect of modern-day warfare”. Mendelsohn also suggests different levels of “foreignness”. While “foreign” usually refers to the nationality of people, the

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9 degree of foreignness can differ widely. Mendelsohn exemplifies that by pointing out that people from other nearby widely can be seen as foreign, whereas transnational volunteers (e.g. Pakistani Taliban joining the Afghan Taliban) have a lesser foreignness often united in a transnational identity (p. 192; see also: Malet, p. 205 regarding transnational Muslim identities). The degree of foreignness is thus often not just linked to the nationality of the foreign fighter but to the “foreign fighter’s sense of identity” (p.192).

Numerous other authors have attempted other ways to define foreign fighting highlighting and excluding different aspects. Some are very specifically aimed to certain groups, such as the foreign fighter definition by Cilluffo et.al. according to whom (western) foreign fighters “refers to violent extremists who leave their Western states of residence with the aspiration to train or take up arms against non-Muslim factions in jihadi conflict zones” (Cilluffo, Cozzens, & Ranstorp, 2010, p. 3). Definitions by EUROPOL3_{or the Middle East}

Analyst Jahangir Arasli4 mirror this focus on religious ideology. Question marks can be raised regarding most of these definitions in light of the current and historic examples of non-religious/jihadi foreign fighter movements. The limits put in place by these definitions make them unusable for the phenomenon of Kurdish foreign fighters as well as numerous other predominantly secular foreign fighter phenomena.

While these definitions seem to be too restrictive for the cases discussed in this thesis, others put looser restrictions on what defines a foreign fighter. Kristin Bakke (“transnational insurgents [… are] non-state actors who, for either ideational or material reasons, choose to fight in an intrastate conflict outside their home country, siding with the challenger to the state”) lifts the restrictions of voluntariness and pay, thus opening the door for mercenaries and other forms of paid fighters, but restricts the foreign fighters to challengers to the state, thus not allowing for pro-state actors or actors clashing with other non-state group (Bakke, 2013, p. 32). Such a definitional restriction to anti-government fighters was criticized by Fritz et.al.,5 stating that “there does not appear to be any theoretical reason for this omission [of pro-government or other counter-insurgent sub-state groups]” (Fritz & Young, 2017, p. 4).

The focus on anti-government fighters and terrorists is repudiated by Ian Bryan, stating in 2010 that “[D]istinguishing foreign fighters from terrorists may be meaningless today […]

3_{Foreign fighters are “individuals motivated by religion, who leave their country of origin in order to train, fight}

or perform extremist activities in war zones” (Azinovic & Jusic, 2015, p. 13 as cited by Schmid (2015), p. 4).

4_{“A foreign Islamist fighter is a volunteer combatant actor with no apparent link to the area of the ongoing armed}

conflict yet bound to it by his sense of the perceived Muslim religious duty” (Arasli, 2015, p. 69) as cited by Schmid (2015), p. 4.

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10 but it is worth remembering that the categories are not identical” pointing out that we would “welcome a transnational movement to fight the jihadists, but we would not welcome one that sought to impose an equally dangerous order” (Bryan, 2010, p. 26), thus foreshadowing some of the events described in this thesis.

Another less restrictive definition is applied by Moore and Tumelty who, assessing the foreign fighter movement to Chechnya, define foreign fighters as “indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary regard, enter a conflict zone to participate in hostilities” (Moore & Tumelty, 2008, p. 412).

Finally, a definition by Oktay Bingöl takes into account that foreign fighting, while not being explicitly supported by the respective states, often finds implicit corroboration by it. Bingöl thus concludes that “[f]oreign fighters are individuals; who are not citizens of one of the conflicting parties, and who participate in one of the parties to fight, resort to violent acts, give or receive training for this purpose, and to provide support by other means; and act with individual, ethnic, religious and ideological purposes as well as variable interactions of material and organizational interests and in most cases, under the implicit and in exceptional cases explicit control and direction of the States” (Bingöl, 2016, p. 51).

Author Fore igne r Insu rgen cy V ol unt ee r/ U npai d N on -G over nm ent A gent Lack o f K ins hi p li nk s Ideo logi ca l / G eogr ap hi cal res tr ict ion s Malet (2013) x x x x - - Hegghammer (2010) x x x x x - Hegghammer (2013) x - - - - x Cilluffo (2010) x - - x - x EUROPOL (2015) x - x - - x Arasli (2015) x - x - x x Bakke (2013) x x - x - -

Moore & Tumelty (2008) x - x - - -

Bingöl (2016) x - - - - -

Table 1: Foreign fighter definitional elements by author6

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11 The political situation in Syrian Kurdistan in the examined timeframe exemplifies and highlights the weaknesses of many current foreign fighter definitions. Definitions containing religious elements excludes the mostly secular Kurdish movement. Some definitions also give rise to questions regarding the nature of the actors examined in this thesis. One point to consider is the character of the actors examined. The peculiar nature of them makes it difficult to apply a clear-cut definition. Both the ISIS caliphate and the Kurdish Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (“Rojava”) had state-like structures during the timeframe examined and fought against actors other than the state/government. Point of issue are here attributions such as “insurgency” and “counter-insurgency”. Can the fight of the YPG against ISIS be seen as an Insurgency against the Caliphate or is it a counter-insurgency against the ISIS uprising? Can the YPG, the official military organization of a de-facto autonomous state like structure, be understood as a non-state actor? Are westerners supporting the YPG, a group receiving military support from multiple western states, to be considered “radicals” or “extremists”? This thesis does not endeavor to answer these questions. However, the definitions need to take such nuances into account and ensure that it is applicable to both Kurdish and Jihadi foreign fighters. This is done by precautionary ruling out definitions containing elements of insurgency, ideology, or inapplicability for both phenomena.

Author Applicable to Jihadi FF? Applicable to Kurdish FF? Non-applicable element Malet (2013) x - Insurgency

Hegghammer (2010) x - Insurgency, Non-Gov. Agent

Hegghammer (2013) x x -

Cilluffo (2010) x - Ideology

EUROPOL (2015) x - Ideology

Arasli (2015) x - Ideology

Bakke (2013) x - Insurgency

Moore & Tumelty (2008) x x -

Bingöl (2016) x x -

Table 2: Applicability of foreign fighter definitions by author

The objective of a definition is to be applicable while still being as precise and concise as possible. The definition by Hegghammer from 2013 does, while being applicable, not fulfill these criteria since its relative vagueness opens the door for a wide variety of westerners, from mercenaries to exiled rebels. Bingöl’s definition, while being applicable, lacks precision and

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12 conciseness in favor of clarifications regarding pecuniary, organizational, and state control – aspects that are not contemplated or do not bring to bear in this thesis.

This thesis will fall back the definition provided by Moore and Tumelty but will add some slight modifications. The definition underlying the research thus states that foreign fighters are non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, individual purposes, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary regard, enter a conflict zone to participate in, or support, hostilities. The modifications were put in place to reflect the supportive intentions of some foreign fighters (e.g. wives of foreign fighters) as well as the individual motivations of numerous anti-ISIS foreign fighters that were identified in previous research.

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13 2.2 H istory & Actors

The conflict rampaging in Syria is certainly one of the most complex issues in recent history. This chapter will only provide a very rough and superficial overview of the situation and highlight some of the many actors involved to allow for a better placement of the research at hand into the historical context.

Following the regional unrests of the Arab spring in 2011, protests in Syria grew and were soon met with violent countermeasures by the authorities under President Bashar al-Assad. The subsequent civil war gave rise to a number of (Islamic) opposition forces. Most notoriously the Islamist terrorist group ISIS, who soon established control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria and, in June 2014, declared the establishment of a new caliphate. This realization of a goal many Sunni Muslims have had for centuries – based on apocalyptic prophecies in their religious scriptures – catapulted ISIS to the “center of gravity in global jihad” (Vick, 2014). Underscoring its global aspirations with terrorist attacks in locations worldwide, ISIS proved to attract followers around the globe, some of which decided to the group in Iraq and Syria – one half of the foreign fighter phenomenon examined in this thesis. Since then, military action by Syria, its allies, and other foreign countries have resulted in a massive loss of territory and military personnel. As of 2018, ISIS in Syria was mostly eradicated (Glenn, 2018; Burke, 2017; BBC, 2018; Blanchard, Humud, & Nikitin, 2014; Barrett, 2017).

In the north of Syria another group, the Kurds, fortified their position against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war. Multiple countries in the region – Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey – have substantial Kurdish populations. These minorities were often faced with discrimination while struggling for the creation of a state or autonomous region. While the fractions inside these Kurdish areas are deeply fragmented and often hostile towards each other, many were united in their aspiration to create an independent Kurdistan under the guidance of the imprisoned Kurdish nationalist leader Abdullah Öcalan and his ideas of “Democratic Confederalism”, a leftist-communalist ideology.

In 2012, the war had forced the Syrian president Assad to pull out his troops from the Kurdish dominated northern region and deploy them against ISIS and other opposition forces. This power vacuum allowed an uprising of the Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its armed wings, the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ). The PYD, allegedly the Syrian sister party of Öcalan’s militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), a party classified as a terrorist movement in Turkey and the EU, established a foothold in the three Syrian Cantons Afrin, Jazira, and Kobanî. In January

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14 2014 these cantons declared their autonomy as Democratic Federation of Northern Syria – often titled Rojava.

Clashing with ISIS in its south while propagating a leftist-democratic utopia for the region, the PYD and its militias YPG/J attracted a movement of foreign fighters willing to join their fight – the other half of the foreign fighter phenomenon examined in this thesis. Since then Rojava has extended its territory in Syria but is, since January 2018,

confronted with the Turkish military offensive “Olive Branch” in Afrin which targets the PKK and the PYD, parties classified as terrorist organizations by Turkey (Tuck, Silverman, & Smalley, 2016, S. 14; Orton, 2017, S. 12; International Crisis Group, 2014; Cagaptay, 2017; Gupta, 2016; Cavusoglu, 2018).

Figure 1: Map of the territory controlled by Rojava as of 02.2014 & 10.2016 (copied and modified under CC0, Panonion, 2017)

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15

3. Methodology

3.1 S ampl e

The goal of this research is to establish a comprehensive database of foreign fighters with western backgrounds joining Kurdish armed forces and compare it to data of foreign fighters with a western background joining ISIS. While it is advantageous to gather data for foreign fighters from all countries of origin affected, this would extend the scope of the research. Furthermore, it would limit the comparability with the preexisting sample of jihadi foreign fighters, which was limited to a small sample of countries of origin, primarily the Netherlands. While, ideally, the study would compare datasets from identical origins this is not feasible since this would result in a nominal sample size of Kurdish foreign fighters. The scope of the data collection was thus extended to encompass all European members of the “Western European and Others”-Subgroup, as classified by the United Nations (UNAIDS, 2009, p. 29). This list encompasses Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,

Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. However, Turkey was excluded from the research scope, since their direct involvement in the “Kurdish Question” and the affiliation of a

large group of its citizen (approximately 15-20%) to Kurdistan would contradict the essence of “foreign fighting” (Seufert, 2015; Nader, Hanauer, Allen, & Scotten, 2016).

This definition of Europe was chosen since it allows the inclusion of a big number of countries, thus enlarging the sample size while upholding a relative historical and cultural similarity to the initial sample. To counteract the extension of the Kurdish foreign fighter sample, the comparative part of this study will, while primarily focusing on the HCSS-sample with the same methodological framework, also take additional qualitative studies of Jihadi foreign fighters from the mentioned countries into account, thus finding a compromise between identical methods and identical samples.

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16 3.2 Data Measurement

To address the presented question the research will draw on a quantitative, data-driven analysis of two populations of foreign fighters. A codebook was created to ensure the systematic and comparable collection of data. This codebook7 (subsequently titled ‘codebook KurdFF8’) targets the collection of data regarding Kurdish foreign fighters in Syria. It took variables identified and used by the Dutch Jihadist Foreign Terrorist Fighter Monitor (JihFFMON) and its respective codebook developed by Bergema et. al. (subsequently titled ‘Codebook JihadFF’9) into account.

This codebook driven approach is essential for the comparability of the data. Since two datasets are being contrasted with each other, it is relevant that the compilation of this data followed the same guidelines. Applying the same codebook to the data collection regarding both Jihadi and Kurdish foreign fighters thus ensures that the entries are based on identical basic assumptions. Otherwise, different interpretations of variables (e.g. how to define social classes, education statuses, the specific moment at which the age of the fighters are recorded) would adulterate the comparability of the results. Basing the data collection on a rigid framework, i.e. these codebooks is thus an essential prerequisite for achieving valid results.

The codebook JihadFF had been used for the compilation of data regarding Jihadi foreign fighters in Syria. The results of this data collection by Bergema et.al. had resulted in the creation of the ‘Dutch Jihadist Foreign Terrorist Fighter Monitor’ (DJFTFM, 2017). This dataset will be used as the main source of information regarding Jihadi foreign fighters in the comparative analyze later on. Studies based on the HCSS datasets are also taken into account (de Bont, 2015).

Utilizing the data from Codebook JihadFF allows for a direct comparison between the two different groups of foreign fighters based on the use of identical and/or almost identical variables in its catalog of questions. This thus makes it possible to compare the pre-existing datasets of jihadi foreign fighters with the datasets regarding Kurdish foreign fighters directly. Only such a methodically similar way of capturing data makes it possible to compare the datasets truthfully thus allowing scientific accuracy. Using a similar codebook in the data collection of Kurdish foreign fighters as had been used to gather data regarding Jihadi foreign fighters thus is essential in allowing comparability in accordance with the purpose of the research question.

7_{See Appendix 1}

8_{Short for Kurdish foreign fighters} 9_{Short for Jihadi foreign fighters}

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17 3.2.1 Creation of Codebook JihadFF

The variables of the initial Codebook JihadFF were based in part on a codebook that Gill et al. (2014) developed for their study on the backgrounds of 119 lone-actor terrorists. The respective variables were adapted by Bergema to be more applicable to the case of jihadi foreign fighters. Bergema’s Codebook JihadFF can be subdivided into six sections, encompassing in total 145 variables and sub-variables (see Table 3):

# Sections: Codebook JihadFF Number of Variables

1 socio-demographic characteristics 30 Variables

2 pre-jihad timeframe characteristics (general) 50 variables and sub-variables 3 pre-jihad timeframe characteristics

(jihad-connected variables)

34 variables and sub-variables

4 network characteristics 19 variables and sub-variables

5 in-jihad characteristics 3 variables

6 post-jihad characteristics 9 variables

Table 3: Variables of the original codebook regarding Jihadi foreign fighters

These variables served as a foundation for the variables of Codebook KurdFF (see appendix).

3.2.2 Codebook KurdFF

Given the different nature of the Kurdish foreign fighter, as well as the scope of the research, not all variables from Bergema’s codebook were used. The socio-demographic variables were adopted fully into Codebook KurdFF. The variables of subdivision 2 and 3, describing characteristics in the ‘pre-jihad timeframe’ do not apply fully due to their focus on Islamism. Factors such as religious radicalization/networks, and an intensification of beliefs, as well as questions inquiring if people in the environment of the individual knew of their jihadist ideology, are targeted to explain characteristics common of Islamist fighters. They do not apply to other forms of foreign fighters.

However, the respective subdivisions and key variables were altered to be applicable to the nature of the Kurdish foreign fighters while upholding the possibility to compare the data between the different data sets. Due to the limited scope of the research, only selected variables out of subdivision 2 and 3 were utilized in Codebook KurdFF. Selected network characteristics (e.g. describing the connections and recruitment processes of the foreign fighters) were incorporated in Codebook KurdFF. ‘In-Jihad characteristics’ and ‘post-jihadi characteristics’

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18 do not fall within the scope of the research question. However, key variables were subsumed as ‘participation characteristics’ (e.g. involvement in armed conflict in Syria, return; death) to provide a more complete picture of the individual foreign fighter pathways.

The final Codebook KurdFF was reduced in size compared to Codebook JihadFF due to the limited scope of the research. However, multiple variables were altered to meet the needs of the different nature of the Kurdish foreign fighter population. Multiple new variables were included since the research revealed the necessity to specify certain aspects.

The precise nature of the alterations and the variables included, as well as the rationales behind it, will be examined in the subsequent chapters (3.2.3 Socio-demographic characteristics; 3.2.4 Pre-participation timeframe characteristics & 3.2.5. Network & Participation characteristics). The final Codebook KurdFF was subdivided into the following categories:

# Sections: Codebook KurdFF Number of Variables

1 socio-demographic characteristics 36 Variables 2 pre-participation10 timeframe characteristics

(general)

15 Variables

3 pre-participation timeframe characteristics (ideology connected variables)

7 Variables

4 Network characteristics 9 Variables

5 Participation characteristics 5 Variables

Table 4: Variables of Codebook KurdFF regarding Kurdish foreign fighters

Codebook KurdFF ergo is divided into five categories with 72 variables in total. These categories allow insight into fundamental questions regarding the foreign fighter: Who are these persons? What do they do and think? Moreover, with whom are they associated? The codebook sections are a framework to answer some of these questions and thus address the general aspects posed in the research question of this study. A research question inquiring about “socio-demographic, biographical and pre-engagement characteristics” of the fighters. Eventually, this will provide findings in the sub-categories “Age”, “Gender“, “Geographical Factors “, “Family Status“, “Education“, “Socio-economic Status“, “Occupational Status“, “Military Service“,

10_{Participation describing all functions related to “Foreign fighting” on behalf of the respective Kurdish movement}

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19 “Criminality“, “Network characteristics“, “Motivational & Ideological reasons“, “Psychological make-up“, and “Participation characteristics“.

Previous research has shown that these aspects described provide highly relevant insight into the biographies and processes that “make” foreign fighters and terrorists. Studies regarding the “origins” of terrorism have e.g. identified correlations between socio-economic factors and terrorism (Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks, & Schneider, 2012), the role of networks has been described extensively by Sageman (2004). The characteristics of foreign fighters captured in the study at hand are based largely on his methodological framework that has proven to be of useful guidance and providing high explanatory power for a large number of subsequent studies. These are ranging from the examination of mass public shootings (Capellan & Anisin, 2018), organized crime, gang membership (Pyrooz, LaFree, Decker, & James, 2018) and other forms of crime. Its applicability to the case of foreign fighters thus seems given – and has been utilized successfully in that regard by a multitude of researchers (Bakker & de Bont, 2016; Bakker, 2011; Bergema R. J., 2015) and institutions (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2017 ). The characteristics and domains examined in this study are thus consistent with methodologies and approaches of prior terrorism and foreign fighting research.

3.2.3 Socio-demographic characteristics

The category “socio-demographic characteristics” refers to a group of variables defining key aspects of the foreign fighter populations. These variables include basic data of the foreign fighters such as age and gender, but also first biographic background information such as education, profession, or criminal convictions of the individual. Collecting these variables allows us to determine the composition of the group of foreign fighter. This consequently allows for a meaningful insight into the overall “identity” of foreign fighter. When comparing two groups, such as two populations of foreign fighters, it is highly advantageous to identify their basic characteristics and draw results already from basic data. These mostly definitive characteristics of persons, such as age or gender, allow a clear specification of the groups thus providing the basis for a comparative examination. Socio-demographic characteristics are thus essential for identifying the different kinds of people joining armed movements and making them comparable.

Some variables were added or altered with regard to previous codebooks. The variable ‘Age’ refers to the age of the individual at the time of their departure, when identifiable. Initial

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20 data analysis revealed a high percentage of former military members among the Kurdish foreign fighters. Two variables (“1.25a - How much time did the individual spend in theater?”; “1.25b - Did the individual serve in the Middle East? (if yes: specify)”) were added to reflect this. The variables were chosen to identify possible connections to their later engagement as foreign fighters since previous research had shown that former US-soldiers who had served in Iraq chose to become Kurdish foreign fighters to continue their government’s efforts in the region privately (Fritz & Young, 2017, p. 14).

Also added was a variable identifying affiliations to gangs or radical organizations (“1.26a. – Did the individual take part or was affiliated to gangs or radical political organizations? (if yes: specify)”). This variable was added to reflect the fact that multiple Kurdish foreign fighters had been active in such organizations (e.g. Antifa, biker gangs). The understanding of such connections might add a deeper level of understanding to the motives of the individuals. Questions regarding the ideology of the foreign fighter were altered to address the different nature of the Kurdish phenomenon. A “second layer” of motivational driving forces was gathered by not just inquiring about the political ideology of the research subjects but by inquiring about their personal reasons for joining the fight in Syria.

The variables regarding socio-demographic characteristics were the following. Information related to the indicators but not ascertainable by the variables was recorded in a separate dataset. # Variable11 1.1 ID 1.2 Official Name 1.3 Kunya 1.4 Gender 1.5 Date of Birth 1.5a Age when joining* 1.6 Place of Birth 1.7 Nationality

1.8 Municipality of Residence 1.9 Size of place of Birth

1.10 Size of Municipality of residence 1.11 Marital status at the time of traveling 1.12 Marital status of the traveler's parents

1.13 Did the traveler have any children when leaving for Syria? 1.14 What are the (Cultural/ethnic) roots of the traveler's family? 1.15 What is the religious affiliation of the traveler's family?

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21 1.16 Education

1.17 Does the traveler have any University experience?

1.18 Does the traveler have any exceptional academic achievement? 1.19 What is the socioeconomic status of the traveler?

1.20 Was the traveler employed when leaving for Syria? 1.21 What is the category that fits the individual’s occupation? 1.22 Does the individual have any military experience?

1.23 Was the individual in the military at the time of traveling? 1.24 How many years of military experience does the individual have? 1.25 Does the individual have combat experience?

1.25a How much time did the individual spend in theater?* 1.25b Did the individual serve in the Middle East?*

1.26 Accused of any criminal activities?

1.26a Did the individual take part or was affiliated to gangs or radical political organizations?*

1.27 Does the individual have any previous criminal convictions? 1.28 Was the individual ever arrested as a juvenile?

1.29 Was the individual previously imprisoned?

1.30 Was the individual's ideological orientation that inspired these actions easily identifiable?

1.30a What was the ideology of the individual?* 1.30b What were the motives of the individual?*

Table 5: Socio-demographic variables (* marks indicators novel to the codebook in comparison to previous research)

3.2.4 Pre-participation timeframe characteristics

The category “Pre-participation timeframe characteristics” refers to a group of variables identifying more private characteristics of the foreign fighters. Events and activities in the life of the foreign fighter prior to his departure to Syria are being examined. This allows an insight into the character, the belief systems and possible formative events in the life of the foreign fighters. These factors include personal traumata, mental illnesses, criminal behavior and drug use as well as factors observing the attitudes of the individuals regarding political and religious issues.

While the previous category of socio-demographic factors only provided a superficial analysis of basic characteristics, the identification of pre-participation timeframe characteristics provides potential insight into why the actors chose to join an armed conflict. Millions of individuals in Europe possess similar socio-demographic characteristics as foreign fighters, whether it be age, ethnic background, or education. Only the individual personality traits of the respective foreign fighters – their personal career up to the point of becoming a foreign fighter – allows a deeper understanding of why they eventually found their way to Syria. These factors

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22 are thus essential to examine, to understand the individual foreign fighters as well as the foreign fighter phenomenon in general.

The gathering of such data requires in-depth research and might not always result in sufficient data due to the private and hidden nature of the data points. Variables regarding traumata were simplified to cope with the smaller scope of the research. Whereas Codebook JihadFF enquired about multiple factors of potential personal trauma, Codebook KurdFF summarizes such traumata as personal, academic, professional and financial trauma. This allows for an inclusion of these potentially relevant topics without going too much into detail. Other variables look at substance abuse, mental illnesses, elevated stress levels, and other anomalous factors.

Naturally, due to the private nature of these factors, the data gathering produced only limited results. Nevertheless, it is important to gather such data to get a better understanding of the motivational forces behind the individual’s decision to become a foreign fighter. Several variables of Codebook JihadFF were excluded in Codebook KurdFF. These variables went too much into detail for the scope of the research or represented minor circumstantial factors and, while certainly interesting, could not be incorporated.

Same holds true for category three (pre-participation timeframe characteristics [ideology connected variables]). It is a substantially slimmed down version of the initial Codebook regarding Jihadi foreign fighters. Several indicators concerning ideological changes and expressions of the individual were pooled. It is essential for the research to understand ideology-based push-factors to give a more complete picture of the individuals and to allow for comparison between the two groups of jihadi- and non-jihadi foreign fighters. Since the examination of ideological factors is not the focus of the research, it will only be touched upon briefly. Radicalization processes will not be examined.

The variables regarding pre-participation timeframe characteristics were the following.12

# Variable

2.1 Did the individual experience a recent professional setback/trauma?* 2.1.1 If yes, when did this occur?*

2.2 Did the individual experience a recent personal/domestic setback/trauma?* 2.2.1 If yes, when did this occur?*

2.3 Did the individual experience a recent academic setback/trauma?* 2.3.1 If yes, when did this occur?*

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23 2.4 Did the individual experience a recent financial setback/trauma?*

2.4.1 If yes, when did this occur?*

2.5 Did the individual have a history of mental illness? 2.5.1 If yes, what treatment did the individual receive? 2.6 Was the individual socially isolated?

2.7 Was there a proximate upcoming life change? (e.g. military deployment) 2.8 Did the individual have a history of substance abuse

2.9 Did the individual engage in any form of violent behavior prior to traveling to Syria?

2.10 Was the individual recently under an elevated level of stress?

3.1 Did the individual produce letters/public statements/verbal statements to a wider audience prior to traveling to Syria?*

3.2 Did the individual make verbal statements to family/friends about his beliefs with regard to the Syrian conflict?

3.3 Did at least one person know about the individuals (extremist) ideology prior to traveling to Syria?

3.4 Did the individual glorify/express a positive attitude towards the Kurdish (resp. Jihadi) question?*

3.5 Did the individual's ideological/religious orientation change prior to traveling to Syria?

3.5.1 If yes, when did this occur?

3.6 Did there appear to be a 'tipping point' in the progression of the grievance that precipitated the offender's movement on a pathway to engage in foreign fighter (FF) activities?

Table 6: Pre-participation timeframe characteristics (* marks indicators novel to the codebook in comparison to previous research)

3.2.5 Network & Participation characteristics

The category “Network characteristics” touches upon the connections and the inclusion of the individual into networks (both face-to-face and virtually). It assesses to what extent the individual was acting as part of a group or individually and examines, at least in basic terms, how the recruitment process took place and what it was instigated by. Understanding these factors is essential. They provide insights into how the departure of individual foreign fighters turned into a wider movement. Also, they indicate if the respective foreign fighter phenomena are bolstered by group dynamics or can be seen as a more individualized occurrence. Understanding the networks behind the movements also helps to understand the roles of recruiters, both in person and virtually13 The variables in question aim for a better understanding of the pathways of individuals and networks thus eventually allowing better policy solutions.

13_{the initial data gathering had indicated that a great number of foreign fighters were recruited or got in touch with}

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24 The variables regarding network characteristics were the following.

# Variable

4.1 Was the individual part of a wider network?

4.2 In which social context did the individual decide to leave for Syria? 4.3 What instigated the decision of the individual to travel to Syria?

4.4 Did the individual interact face-to-face with members of a wider network? 4.5 Did the individual interact virtually with members of a wider network? 4.6 Did at least one other person know about the individual's research, planning

and/or preparation prior to travelling to Syria?

4.7 Was there evidence to suggest that the individual read or consumed literature/propaganda from a wider movement?

4.8 Is there evidence that there may have been command and control links with others with regard to traveling to Syria?

4.9 Did the individual try to recruit others or form a group prior to traveling to Syria?

Table 7: Network Characteristics

Category five (participation characteristics) addresses the questions what militias the individual joined, if he took part in armed conflict (new variable), if he was killed, if returned to Europe or stayed abroad. While not addressed by the research questions this completes the picture of the foreign fighter pathway. Questions of reintegration, traumata, or other occurrences while in Syria will not be addressed. These participation variables thus provide insight into what happened to the fighter while being abroad.

The variables of Codebook JihadFF regarding Jihadi foreign fighters were altered to mirror the changes in Codebook KurdFF; findings were condensed to reflect this. The variables regarding participation characteristics were the following.

# Variable

5.1 When did the individual travel to the Syrian conflict zone? 5.2 Which local actor was the traveler affiliated to?

5.3 Was the FF involved in armed conflict in Syria? 5.4 Did the individual return from Syria

5.5 Was the individual killed in Syria?

Table 8: Participation Characteristics

3.3 Data Gathering & Data s ources

It is clearly difficult to identify all the foreign fighters covered by the research question, given the secretive nature of the topic. Equally difficult is the collection of data needed to answer all variables. To do so, data was gathered by desktop research using a wide range of data including academic sources, government statistics and reports (e.g. Bundesregierung, 2017), reports and analyses by think-tanks, media, and Non-Governmental-Organizations. The analysis of social

Leaving for War: A comparison of the Kurdish Foreign Fighter and the Jihadi Foreign Fighter Movements

Leaving for War

A comparison of the Kurdish Foreign

Fighter and the Jihadi Foreign Fighter

Abstract

Acknowledgments

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations & Glossary

1. Introduction

2. Background

3. Methodology