Master Thesis, MSc Political Science, International
Organisation
Abstract
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) added an environmental action to its agenda: environmental harmful fisheries subsidies. The start of this development, the agenda and how it was influenced, is yet unstudied. The aim of this thesis is to fill this knowledge gap by answering the following research question: How did a policy entrepreneur influence the topic of fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the WTO? In this thesis, I argue that a policy entrepreneur exercised influence on the WTO fisheries subsidies agenda through several policy entrepreneur tools as social acuity, defining problems, team building and leading by example. Furthermore, I state that the concept of a policy entrepreneur should be expanded and include multiple and collective policy entrepreneur(s). This is tested in the case of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations through a single case study and process tracing. The results show that New Zealand and UNEP are both acting as a policy entrepreneur for the same goal, where New Zealand is a collective policy entrepreneur and in UNEP an individual policy entrepreneur. This shows that to address similar environmental subsidies in the WTO, the power of policy entrepreneurship should be taken into account.Supervisor: Dr. H. Van Meegdenburg Second Reader: Prof. Dr. D.C. Thomas S1517694 11-6-2019 Word Count 9939
Jong, E.V. de
The WTO’s Fisheries
Subsidies Negotiations:
Policy Entrepreneurs influencing
the WTO agenda.
Master Thesis, MSc Political Science
International Organisation
1 Table of Contents
1. Introduction ... 1
2. Literature Review ... 3
2.1. The fisheries subsidies negotiations, its potential and its challenges ... 3
2.2 The WTO’s Agenda ... 5
3. Theoretical Framework ... 6
3.1 Agenda Power ... 7
3.2 Policy Entrepreneurship ... 8
3.3 Policy Entrepreneur Tools ... 9
3.3.1 Social Acuity ... 9
3.3.2 Defining problems ... 10
3.3.3 Building teams ... 10
3.3.4 Leading by Example ... 11
4. Methods and Case Selection ... 11
4.1 Case studies and methods ... 12
4.2 Case selection ... 13
4.3 Data collection ... 13
5. Analysis WTO Fisheries Subsidies ... 14
5.1 Fishes’ Window of Opportunity... 16
5.2 New Zealand as Policy Entrepreneur ... 18
5.3 UNEP as Policy Entrepreneur ... 21
6. Discussion ... 23
7. Conclusion ... 25
1 1. Introduction
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an interesting actor to study in global environmental governance. With 151 member states the WTO is one of the main organisations that determines the rules of international trade (Sumaila et al., 2007). From the year 2001, this organisation is going into a new and remarkable direction as it added a form of environmental action, the fisheries subsidies negotiations, on its agenda. These negotiations on the fisheries subsidies started in 2001 in order to clarify and improve existing disciplines on fisheries subsidies (WTO, 2001). During the years, the negotiations developed into an environmental direction and eventually, in 2005 at the Hong Kong talks, the focus of the negotiations is on how to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies through the WTO (WTO, 2005). Currently, in 2019, an agreement has not been reached.
A leading actor in these negotiations is the coalition Friends of Fish (FoFs)1 which seeks to reduce fisheries subsidies (WTO, 2017). They are the main advocators for this subsidies reform and play an important role in the negotiations. The coordinator and leader of FoFs is New Zealand (New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, n.d.-a; Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d.). Besides the official meetings, also non-profit organisations are influencing the negotiations through parallel events. In these parallel events the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the leading environmental authority that advocates for the global environment (UNEP, n.d.), is active on the fisheries subsidies issue (von Moltke, 2016). Overall, the negotiation processes within the WTO is interesting to study. Especially this development, where a trade organisation adapts an environmental mandate, is a unique situation. Trade and environmental action are often seen as contradicting, being that the rapid growth in international trade plays an important role in the damaged caused on the environment (OECD,
1 A coalition formed of the WTO members: Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru and the United States.
2 2005). Study on this topic gives insight into the opportunity of the WTO in taking environmental action and on how similar subsidies issues can be addressed within the WTO.
While the fisheries subsidies negotiations of the WTO have received close attention in several studies (Bahety & Mukiibi, 2017; Bigdeli, 2008; Doelle, 2004; Grynberg, 2003; Jinji, 2012; Kumar, Kumar, Stauvermann, & Chakradhar, 2019; Reiterer, 2009; Sumaila et al., 2007), the emergence of the issue did not receive much attention. Only von Moltke (2016), Head of UNEP’s Trade, Policy and Planning, addressed in her book the emergence of the fisheries subsidies issue in the WTO. This books gives a comprehensive and clear overview of this issue and is therefore valuable, however, the book is primarily informative and cannot be considered as independent research. This shows a knowledge gap on the explanatory theory of the fisheries subsidies emergences on the agenda and on how this is influenced. Other research is done on the agenda of the WTO (Albin & Young, 2012; Beyers & Kerremans, 2007; Bütler & Hauser, 2000; Jansen, 2012; Jawara & Kwa, 2003; Levi & Murphy, 2006; Maton & Maton, 2007; Murphy, 2010; Narlikar & Tussie, 2004; Siqueira, 2014), but theory on the role of a policy entrepreneur and influence on the agenda of the WTO is missing.
Therefore, I argue there is a knowledge gap on the understanding a policy entrepreneur and its influence on the agenda of the WTO and propose to fill this gap with the following research question: How did a policy entrepreneur influence the topic of fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the WTO? Where I argue that the answer lies in the power of a policy entrepreneur, an individual that advocates for policy change (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Ringius, 2001). The policy entrepreneur exercise this influence through four characteristics: social acuity, defining problems, building teams and leading by example (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). These tools enable policy entrepreneurs to influence the agenda of the WTO. To explain policy entrepreneurship in the WTO, I propose to broaden the definition of a policy entrepreneur. Instead of only stating that a policy entrepreneur can take
3 the shape of a single individual, I state that it can also take the form of a collective actor, i.e. a state or international organisation. Furthermore, I argue that multiple policy entrepreneurs can advocate independently for the same policy change, during the same period, while having different motives and interest.
This thesis is divided into six sections. In the first section, I explain the research gap on the fisheries subsidies negotiations and agenda-setting within the WTO with a literature review. In the second section, I discuss the theoretical framework with a focus on the concepts of policy entrepreneurship, power, and the tools to influence the agenda. In the third section, I elaborate on the methodology, a single case study, and the data collection. After this, in the fourth section, I will focus on the analysis and discuss the events and processes around the WTO negotiations where I identify two policy entrepreneurs in this case: New Zealand and UNEP. In the discussion, section 5, I elaborate on what this means for the theory of policy entrepreneurship and which lessons can be learned for influencing the agenda of the WTO.
2. Literature Review
The topic of the fisheries subsidies negotiations is mainly studied from two angles, one with the focus on the potential of this development and the other with the focus on the current negotiations. In this literature review, I argue why another angle should be addressed, the start of this development: the role of policy entrepreneurship in influencing the agenda of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies.
2.1. The fisheries subsidies negotiations, its potential and its challenges
The WTO and its potential as a trade organisation to address environmental action is discussed by several scholars (Bigdeli, 2008; Doelle, 2004; Jinji, 2012; Kumar et al., 2019). Firstly, there are scholars that discuss the effect of the fisheries subsidies negotiations on future implications
4 (Bigdeli, 2008; Doelle, 2004). Doelle (2004) shows that the fisheries subsidies negotiations are seen as an example of how trade organisations can motivate nations to take action on climate change and Bigdeli (2008) discusses how a successful agreement on the fisheries subsidies can open the way for other similar environmental subsidies issues (Bigdeli, 2008). The WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations can be seen as an example of how to address similar issues on a trade agenda and show the potential of this development if the negotiations are successfully concluded.
Secondly, there are scholars which question if an elimination of the fisheries subsidies have the desired outcome of protecting the marine environment (Jinji, 2012; Kumar et al., 2019). These studies conclude that eliminating fisheries subsidies is not sufficient, further commitments on technology, knowledge transfer, fishing capacity and illegal activities has to be made (Kumar et al., 2019). Also the effects of this measurement will differ depending on the conditions of the member states (Jinji, 2012). However, both authors agree, that action on harmful fisheries subsidies is necessary and a step into the right direction.
Thirdly, there is the group of scholars which focussed on the process of the fisheries subsidies negotiations (Bahety & Mukiibi, 2017; Grynberg, 2003). The negotiations are challenging, especially because of the concerns from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)2 (Jawara & Kwa, 2003). LDCs depend largely on fisheries for the wellbeing of their poor citizens and need subsidies to be able to compete in the international market. But on the other hand, LDCs also have an interest in a future with healthy fish stocks (Bahety & Mukiibi, 2017; Grynberg, 2003).
Lastly, there is one comprehensive book on fisheries subsidies negotiations in the WTO written by von Moltke, the head of UNEP’s Trade, Policy and Planning (von Molkte, 2016).
2 LDCs countries which are member of the WTO are Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
5 One chapter focusses on the emergemce of the issue and describes the complex processes and events around this development. The book is written very comprehensively, but also very descriptive. The explanatory theory of how the issue emerged on the agenda of the WTO is lacking. Overall, the book functions as a valuable guide on the complexity of the WTO’s fisheries negotiations, although it should not be considered as independent research.
This shows there is a knowledge gap on the explanatory theory of the emergence of the fisheries subsidies in the WTO. Others scholars did study the agenda of the WTO in general, as I will discuss in the following section.
2.2 The WTO’s Agenda
The agenda of the WTO is not unstudied (Albin & Young, 2012; Beyers & Kerremans, 2007; Bütler & Hauser, 2000; Jansen, 2012; Jawara & Kwa, 2003; Levi & Murphy, 2006; Murphy, 2010; Narlikar & Tussie, 2004; Reiterer, 2009; Siqueira, 2014). Reiterer (2009) and Albin & Young (2012) point out that the scope of the WTO has changed, as more topics are included into the agenda of the WTO. This leads to more agenda complexity and eventually results in difficulties for having successful outcomes in negotiations (Albin & Young, 2012). Other scholars show that the agenda-setting within the WTO can also be influenced from outside, for example by NGOs (Murphy, 2010) or through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO (Bütler & Hauser, 2000; Siqueira, 2014).
Furthermore, studies on the WTO demonstrate that coalitions play a significant role in the WTO and influencing the agenda (Jansen, 2012; Jawara & Kwa, 2003). There is agreement between scholars that coalition building in the WTO is difficult and not always successful (Levi & Murphy, 2006; Narlikar & Tussie, 2004), creating coalitions can be a real challenge.
In general, these studies show the complexity of the WTO’s agenda and the challenges to influence it. In agenda-setting and shaping theory, a policy entrepreneur is mentioned as an
6 actor, an individual, which advocates for policy change and which can influence the agenda (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Ringius, 2001). The role of policy entrepreneur in WTO negotiations is unstudied; I propose to fill this gap by analysing how a policy entrepreneur could influence the agenda of the WTO in the case of the fisheries subsidies negotiations.
To conclude, the literature on the topic of the fisheries subsidies negotiations of the WTO varies from the potential of the WTO to take environmental actions and the challenges of the fisheries subsidies negotiations. The beginning of this development, the theory on how the topic emerged on the agenda, is yet undiscovered. Overall, research on the WTO agenda shows the complexity and challenges of influencing the WTO’s agenda. The theory of how issue emerge on the WTO agenda and the role of a policy entrepreneur is unstudied. I propose to fill this knowledge gap by answering the following research question: How did a policy entrepreneur influence the topic of fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the WTO? In the next section, I will elaborate on how I understand the relation between a policy entrepreneur and its influence on agenda of the WTO.
3. Theoretical Framework
To explain how the topic of fisheries subsidies is influenced on the agenda of the WTO, I adapt the concept of a policy entrepreneur. As contribution to existing theory on policy entrepreneurship, I argue that the concept of policy entrepreneurship should be expanded to include collective and multiple policy entrepreneurs. The tools used by policy entrepreneurs are social acuity, defining problems, team building and leading by example. Based on these tools I will identify the policy entrepreneurs and discuss how they influenced the agenda of the WTO.
7 3.1 Agenda Power
Agenda-setting is the process that determines which issues are, or are not, addressed during the decision-making. Very briefly, it is a list with priorities that shows upon what there should be decided (Kingdon, 2011; Princen, 2011). This makes agenda-setting a crucial aspect of decision-making and negotiations, because the first step of obtaining your interest would be to put your issue on the agenda. In order to be able to put an issue an issue it is important to recognize the window of opportunity, in other words ‘the right time to act’ (Kingdon, 2011). According to Kingdon’s (2011) multiple stream model the window of opportunity is there when there is a combination of three streams: the problem, a solution and a political will. When those streams come together, there is the opportunity to influence the agenda. After an issue is added to the agenda, the development of the issue continues and the agenda takes shape. Through framing, how concepts and assumptions are used to structure reality (Princen, 2011), the content of the issue is defined. In the case of the fisheries subsidies this can influence if the negotiations are focussed on the economic or environmental aspects of the issue.
Agenda-setting and -shaping are thus both important aspects of international negotiations. Especially, because being able to influence the agenda is a form of power. Power is not merely the control of the action from one actor over another, power is also exercised when a participant influences how the other perceives the scope of possible decisions (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Barnett & Duvall, 2005). In the case of the WTO this means that agenda-setting and framing is a form of institutional power, where through the rules and procedures of an institution power can be exercised by defining the actions and conditions perceived by others (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). This institutional agenda-setting and -shaping is thus open to influence and gives room to exercise power. By determining what topic is put on the agenda and how this issue is defined influences the scope of possible decisions, this thus results in power. An actor who can exercise this power, and thus influence the agenda, is a policy
8 entrepreneur (Charli Carpenter, 2007, p. 102). In the next section, the concept of a policy entrepreneur is discussed.
3.2 Policy Entrepreneurship
The actor I understand as responsible for the emergence and shaping of the agenda is a policy entrepreneur: an actor that advocates for policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 649). In existing theories (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Ringius, 2001) this is seen as an individual who invest their own energy, skills, time and reputation to influence politics and policy development (Ringius, 2001, p. 38). However, as I will argue in this thesis, a policy entrepreneur does not have to be a single individual. In the case of the WTO, I argue the entrepreneur can take the shape of a collective actor, e.g. a state or international organisation. Within these states and organisation there are still individuals who temporarily take a leading role, however, I argue the overall organisation should be considered as the policy entrepreneur. Especially in international negotiations where the processes of agenda-setting and -shaping can take several years, I argue that not one individual is responsible. Because of elections, power changes and job rotation within states and organisations it is unlikely that one person is involved during the whole process. Although, during the agenda-setting and -shaping process the state or organisation continues to advocate for the policy change. For this reason, I understand a policy entrepreneur also as collective actors that advocate for policy change. Eventually, the organisation or state invests its energy, skills time and reputation to influence the agenda. Furthermore, policy entrepreneur theories primary focus on the role of one policy entrepreneur that advocates for the policy change (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Ringius, 2001). However, as I will argue in this thesis, it is possible to have multiple policy entrepreneurs who advocate for the same policy change. They advocate
9 for the same change, at the same time, in parallel events and with different motives and interests for the change.
3.3 Policy Entrepreneur Tools
The strategies for policy entrepreneurs to influence these processes is studies by multiple studies, herein they stress the importance of social positions (Battilana, 2006), framing (Aukes, Lulofs, & Bressers, 2018; Kingdon, 2011; Princen, 2011) and coalitions (Béland & Cox, 2016; Ringius, 2001). Mintrom and Norman (2009, pp. 650–654) combine these strategies and described them as four characteristics which enables policy entrepreneurs to influence policy making: social acuity, defining problems, building teams and leading by example. This are tools for a policy entrepreneur to influence the agenda. The following paragraphs will discuss these characteristics.
3.3.1 Social Acuity
In order to identify the window of opportunity a policy entrepreneur should have the right networks, knowledge and social skills (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 652). By making good use of policy networks and earlier obtained knowledge, policy entrepreneurs know when the time is right for action. Also social skills are important, the more a policy entrepreneur is respected and appreciated by others, the more success it can achieve (Battilana, 2006; Mintrom & Norman, 2009).
In the case of the WTO fisheries subsidies reform, this means that the policy entrepreneur should have relevant policy networks related to fisheries, subsidies and environmental issues, but also to the WTO negotiations and structure in general. Furthermore, the entrepreneur should be respected and appreciated by the WTO and its members in order to be allowed to influence the agenda.
10 3.3.2 Defining problems
Defining problems, to ‘frame’ the problem strategically, is a powerful tool for a policy entrepreneur (Princen, 2011). How a problem is framed determines what individuals and groups, also called venues, will pay attention to them (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 652; Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013). Different actors have different interests and methods to deal with problems, therefore policy entrepreneurs should go ‘venue shopping’. They have to choose the venue which offers the best change to achieve their goals and frame the issue accordingly (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, p. 1318). Framing an issue is thus very important as it influences who is going to act and what the perceived actions and solutions are.
In the case of the WTO and the fisheries subsidies reform, this means that the issue of the fisheries subsidies should be framed as an economic issue with consequences for the future. An economic frame gives priority to the issue and makes the WTO suited to address the fisheries subsidies.
3.3.3 Building teams
The strength of a policy entrepreneur comes from its ability to work together. To succeed it has to create a team with different types of knowledge, skills and also motivation for the policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 653). Furthermore, coalitions are important in international negotiations because the size of a coalition demonstrates how big the support for the policy change is (Béland & Cox, 2016; Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 653; Ringius, 2001). According to Keohane (2005, pp. 51–52) cooperation takes place and coalitions built when a win-win situation, a situation where everyone benefits from the measurement, is created.
In the case of the WTO fisheries subsidies this means that the policy entrepreneur could be working with a skilled team with different expertise. Furthermore, the policy entrepreneur should create a situation of ‘mutual gains’ for a coalition as an incentive to work together.
11 3.3.4 Leading by Example
To show the possibilities of the policy change, reduce the perception of risks for the decision makers and win credibility a policy entrepreneur can use the characteristic leading by example. (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 653). It increases the likeliness that decisions makers agree in favour of the policy change.
In the case of the fisheries subsidies this means that the policy entrepreneur, it could use its own successful unsubsidized fishery sector to show that the reform could solve the problem of overfishing and create a sustainable economic future.
To conclude, in the case of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies I except that not a single individual, but a collective actor i.e. a state or international organisation, was responsible for influencing the agenda. In addition, I expect that in this case not one but two policy entrepreneurs, with different motives and interests, where active during the agenda-setting and shaping process.
This agenda power is exercised by using several policy entrepreneur tools. The policy entrepreneur can use its network and expertise to identify the right time for action (social acuity) or frame the issue as both economic and environmental (defining problems). Furthermore, it can create a skilled team and a big coalition, which shows their support (team building), or reduce the perception of risks by showing the possibilities (leading by example). These tools can result in agenda-setting and shaping power and influence the fisheries subsidies issue on the agenda of the WTO.
4. Methods and Case Selection
With a single case study, I will analyse how a policy entrepreneur could influence the agenda of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies issue. Through process tracing, I will test my hypothesis of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurship. Furthermore, this thesis will contribute to the
12 knowledge on how the influence the agenda of the WTO for other similar environmental harmful subsidies.
4.1 Case studies and methods
For this thesis, I use a single case study in order to test the hypotheses of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurs influencing the WTO’s fisheries subsidies agenda. A case study is ‘an analysis where a researchers explores a small number of cases (as few as one) in detail, to see whether events unfold in the manner predicted and (if the subject involves human behaviour) whether actors speak and act as the theory predicts’ (Van Evera, 1997a, p. 29). In other words, a case study is a research based on a detailed description of one (or a small number) of case(s) which test if the actors act as the hypothesis predicts. It enables us to learn in-depth from the uniqueness of the single case itself (Simons, 2014, p. 19). For this thesis, I use the theory confirming or infirming case study: an analysis of a single case within the framework of established generalization. The single case of the fisheries subsidies negotiations gives insight in the role a policy entrepreneur plays by putting environmental issues on the WTO agenda. The case study functions here as a test of the hypothesis, which can be confirmed or contradicted (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). I will examine how the fisheries subsidies issue was influenced on the agenda of the WTO and I will test the role of a policy entrepreneur. The tool used for this analysis is called process tracing. This approach allows us to look at key elements of a hypothesized causal mechanism within a case and identity if this mechanism was actually operating (Bennett, 2008, pp. 3–4; Crasnow, 2012, p. 658). An imperfection in the method of a single case study is the lower external validity, therefore, generalization to other cases must be done with caution (Van Evera, 1997b, pp. 51–52). However, a case study is very well suited in order to explain the causal relation (Crasnow, 2012, p. 658). The explanatory power of a single
13 case study is valuable to test the hypothesises of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurs influencing the WTO agenda.
4.2 Case selection
As described in this thesis the fisheries subsidies negotiation is a unique development of the possible environmental action taken by a trade organisation as the WTO. By focussing on the way policy entrepreneurs can exercise power in the form of influencing the agenda is a contribution to the broader analysis of similar processes and the theory of policy entrepreneurship, agenda-setting and agenda shaping. Moreover, it contributes on knowledge of how other forms of similar subsidies (agriculture, energy for fossil fuels of water cycle subsidies (OECD, 2005)) can be addressed within the WTO. Being that the fisheries subsidies negotiations are the first of its kind, this thesis contributes to the knowledge of the agenda processes for similar cases in the future and how this can be influenced.
4.3 Data collection
The data collection for this thesis consists of official documents and archival records of the WTO, New Zealand and UNEP. These documents give insights in the agendasetting and -shaping process and shed light on the role of a policy entrepreneur. In depth interviews with the negotiators and representatives of the coalition would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the different strategies however, this is due to the scope of this thesis not feasible. A detailed examination of the official documents, archival records will therefore be the main source of data. The book on the fisheries subsidies and the WTO by UNEP will be a guide in the complexity of the negotiations, however, data will be used with caution and verification will be done whenever possible, as this book cannot be seen as an objective source.
14 Overall, this data collection provides understanding of the process and the role of a policy entrepreneur to set the environmental issue on the WTO agenda.
5. Analysis WTO Fisheries Subsidies
The emergence of the fisheries subsidies issue on the agenda of the WTO was a long process with multiple breakthroughs and key events. In order to answer the research question ‘How did a policy entrepreneur influence the topic of fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the WTO?’ I will take the two key events for the agenda-setting and –shaping processes into account: the Doha Round and the Hong Kong talks.
The first phase, until the emergence on the Doha Round, takes place from 1990 until 2001. In this period, the fisheries subsidies issue gained international attention through several studies (FAO, 1992; Porter, 1998; OECD, 1998), the rise of fish trade (FAO, 2018; von Moltke, 2016, p134), international agreements and declarations (Caddy & Griffiths, 1995; FAO, 1995; United Nations, 1992; von Moltke, 2006, p133) and the born of the WTO in 1995 (WTO, 2019-a). Eventually, in 1997, conferences and official proposals started to discuss the WTO as solution (von Moltke, 2016, p135; WTO, 1997-a; WTO, 1997-b; WTO, 1997-c). In 1999, a joint intention to seek a mandate on fisheries subsidies at the agenda of the Seattle negotiations was done, and the FoFs was created (WTO, 1999-b; von Moltke, 2016, p139). However, due to ‘the battle of Seattle’, protests out of fear for globalization and the North-South clash, the negotiations collapsed and the emergence of the issue on the agenda failed (Seattle Municipal Archives, n.d.; Vidal, 1999; von Moltke, 2016, pp.144-147). Eventually, the issue of fisheries subsidies emerged on the agenda of the WTO agenda in the Doha Round in 2001 with the aim to clarify and improve knowledge on this issue (WTO, 2001).
The second phase, until the commitments at the Hong Kong talks, takes place from 2001-2005. In this period, the topic takes shape. Discussion were on the existence of a
15 connection between fisheries subsidies and depletion (WTO, 2001). Furthermore, several workshop were organised to discuss the fisheries subsidies issue (UNEP, 2002; UNEP, 2004). Eventually, commitments were made at the Hong Kong talks in 2005 to negotiate a ban on fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing (WTO, 2005). This was an agreement on the negative effect of fisheries subsidies on overcapacity and overfishing: a breakthrough that shaped the environmental character of the fisheries subsidies issue.
Currently, in 2019, the negotiations are still ongoing and an agreement has not yet been reached (WTO, 2019-c). Other important breakthroughs for the environmental character of the fisheries subsidies issue where for example in 2007 when the chair of the Negotiation Group on Rules (NGR)3 established a very ambitious draft (WTO, 2007) and the agreement to comply with point 14.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2017 (WTO, 2017). However, the focus of this thesis lies in the start of the negotiations, the agenda-setting and -shaping process, therefore other developments after the Hong Kong talks are not analysed.
As discussed in the theoretical framework I expect multiple policy entrepreneurs to be responsible for influencing the agenda of the WTO. I argue this was possible due to several tools as social acuity, defining problems, team building and leading by example. Furthermore, I discuss the policy entrepreneur not specifically as an individual and state that a policy entrepreneur can take the form of a collective actor.
The next sections elaborates on the developments that created the window of opportunity for the fisheries subsidies issue. Furthermore, it elaborates on the policy entrepreneurs that I identified in the case of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations. New Zealand, a country with the one of the strongest unsubsidized fishing industry and leader of the Friends of Fish coalition (von Moltke, 2016, p139; Office of the United States Representative,
3 The Negotiations Group on Rules is the section of the WTO where the member negotiate on the set of rules which are applied to all the members (WTO, 2019-d).
16 n.d.; New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, n.d.-a) and UNEP, who is seen as one of the leading authorities in environmental matters (UNEP, n.d.) and who organises several parallel events around the fisheries subsidies issues in the WTO (von Moltke, 2016;UNEP, 2002; UNEP, 2004)).
5.1 Fishes’ Window of Opportunity
As discussed in the theoretical framework, the multiple stream model states that the right time to act, the window of opportunity, is when there is a combination of a problem, a solution and political will. For the fisheries subsidies issues to emerge at the WTO agenda, and to be influenced by a policy entrepreneur, the streams should be present. These streams started to appear around 1990 when several developments contributed to create and increase awareness. Firstly, awareness on the problem of fisheries subsidies and its harmful effect on depletion was created by several studies (FAO, 1992; Porter 1998; OECD 1998). These studies contributed to the emergence of a problem, fisheries depletion, and made a link with the solution, reducing fisheries subsidies. The relevance of these studies for the WTO meetings is visible in several proposals made by member states in WTO meetings where they refer to these studies (WTO, 1997-a; WTO, 1997-b). These studies are the start of defining the problem and referring to international trade organisations as a solution.
Secondly, awareness on the fisheries subsidies issue was created by international declarations and agreements in the 1990s, e.g. the Cancun declaration on responsible fishing, the UN’s Ria Declaration on the Environment and Development of the Earth Summit and the FAO’s Rome consensus on World Fisheries (Caddy & Griffiths, 1995; FAO, 1995; United Nations, 1992; von Moltke, 2006, p133). This shows the growing importance of the fisheries
17 crisis as a global issue. The begin of recognition for the fisheries depletion problem in general. Furthermore, it created international importance and political will on the fisheries issue.
Thirdly, the political will increased because of the growth in fish trade that showed the importance of fish for states their economies. This resulted in more attention from policy makers on the fisheries subsidies issue and increased their willingness to take action (FAO, 2018; von Moltke, 2016, p134).
Lastly, a solution was created with the birth of the WTO on the first of January 1995. The WTO is a follow up on the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (WTO, 2019-a). In the time of GATT, there was a tuna-dolphin dispute between the USA and Mexico. In this dispute, the USA wanted to ban the import of tuna and dolphins based on environmental arguments, and this was fought by Mexico. The USA lost this dispute, what created aversion in the USA’s public spheres: How was it possible that a foreign country could influence their environmental policy? Eventually, the case was never pursued, however, it led to several negotiations between the USA and Mexico and with that influenced the negotiations of the WTO’s birth. This created the addition of environmental considerations in the WTO (WTO, 2019-b). The room for environmental made the WTO suited to address the fisheries subsidies issue.
As a result, these four developments created a window of opportunity to address the fisheries subsidies issue on an international trade agenda. There was a problem (the fisheries subsidies and depletion), a solution (the WTO) and a political will (economic growth fish trade). It was the right time for policy entrepreneurs to advocate for a fisheries subsidies reform. For the fisheries subsidies case I argue New Zealand and UNEP can be identified as policy entrepreneurs, their actions and their role in the negotiations are discussed in the following sections.
18 5.2 New Zealand as Policy Entrepreneur
New Zealand made, together with the USA, the first official proposal to address the fisheries subsidies. The USA was the first with the proposal on the 19th of May 1997 (WTO, 1997-b) wherein they stated that: ‘These subsidies promote over fishing and undermine the sustainability of the resource. These subsidies also distort trade leading to less efficient production’- (WT/CTE/W/51 – paragraph 1). Three days later, on the 21th of May, also New Zealand made a proposal (WTO, 1997-c): In our view it is both timely and appropriate to examine the relationship between trade distortions in the fisheries sector and problems of fisheries resource sustainability (WT/CTE/W/21 – paragraph I.2.). In New Zealand’s proposal also several references were made to studies of the negative effect of subsidies on sustainable fish stocks. Both proposal had in common that they address the problem of fisheries subsidies and connect it with economic consequences and they argue that the WTO should take action on this issue. Where the USA made an ‘hard’ statement direct implying that there is relation between fishing subsidies and depletion of fishing resources, New Zealand did a more ‘soft’ and indirect statement and asked for further investigation on this relation. Based on these proposals you would assume the USA to be the strongest and most active advocator for a change in the fisheries subsidies. However, after these statements New Zealand took a leading role in the negotiations. New Zealand is the leader of FoFs and organises several parallel events around the WTO fisheries issue. Furthermore, the USA recognises and thanks New Zealand for their leadership on the fisheries subsidies (Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d.) and also New Zealand itself states being the leader of FoFs (New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, n.d.-a). It is therefore that I identify New Zealand as a policy entrepreneur that advocates for the fisheries subsidies reform. Other indicators that show that New Zealand is a policy entrepreneur is their use of policy entrepreneur tools, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
19 During the emergence of the issue on the Doha Round, New Zealand was active on the issue through official proposals and coordinating the FoFs. By making one of the first proposals, New Zealand had the ability to define the problem of the fisheries subsidies. The focus of the proposal on the economic consequence, together with environmental references, sets the tone for the discussion. Especially the focus on the economic impact has important consequences. It made that the issue rose in the Negotiation Group of Rules (NGR) and not in the environmental section of the WTO. In the NGR, WTO members discuss the rules that can be handled by the dispute settlement mechanism. If an agreement is reached on fisheries subsidies rules, it can be prosecuted through the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO (WTO, 2019-d). Breaking the rules can therefore have serious consequences, which makes it more likely that the rules are followed. A reason for advocator for a subsidy reform to want the issue in the NGR.
In addition, New Zealand’s role of leader of the FoFs is an example of building teams and social acuity. It gives New Zealand access to different types of knowledge and skills from the other FoFs members. The majority of the FoFs members have a strong unsubsidized fishing industry (von Moltke, 2016, p139), which shows their mutual gain. Both characters of the tool building teams. Moreover, leading FoFs is an example of social acuity. It shows that New Zealand is accepted and respected as the leader on this issue.
For the developments around the Hong Kong talks New Zealand is active by organizing workshops. For example, New Zealand organises a three-day during workshop focussed on the special treatment of the LDCs (von Moltke, 2016, p151). An example of both social acuity, defining problems and teambuilding. New Zealand is accepted and respected to host the workshop and lead the negotiations; this shows the tool of social acuity. Furthermore, New Zealand could once more define the problem of the fisheries issue by focussing on the special treatment of LDCs. This lead to a focus in the negotiations on how to address the issue instead of whether the issue should be addressed at all. Additionally, it shows the tool of teambuilding,
20 New Zealand needed cooperation from LDCs in order to take the negotiations further and increase the support for a reform in the fisheries subsidies.
During the whole process, New Zealand is using the tool of leading by example. New Zealand is one of best performing fisheries nations, has a strong unsubsidized fisheries sector and is world leading in fisheries sustainability (von Moltke, 2016, p139; Seafood New Zealand, n.d.). This shows the possibilities, reduces the perception of risks for a fisheries subsidies reform, and increases the likeliness that people agree with New Zealand’s proposals.
Because the use of policy entrepreneur tools and the leading role, New Zealand can be identified as a policy entrepreneur. However, I argue this is not done in the form of individual entrepreneurship. Between the Doha Round (1997) and the Hong Kong talks (2005), New Zealand had three secretaries of foreign affairs4 (New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, n.d.-b). This shows that during the agenda-setting and -shaping of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies different persons were responsible for the foreign trade and New Zealand’s international representation. This shows that different persons were managing the interests of New Zealand during the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. Information on which persons explicitly where responsible for the fisheries subsidies negotiations in the WTO is unavailable, however, these changes in secretaries imply that this responsibility has changed between individuals. During the negotiations, New Zealand continued to keep the same course and advocate for their own fisheries interests. Therefore, I identify New Zealand, in the case of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiation, as a collective policy entrepreneur. Being that New Zealand fishing industry is an important sector for the state’s economy (Seafood New Zealand, n.d.) we can assume that New Zealand’s motives for this change is for a big part economic. Having less
21 subsidies in other countries would decrease New Zealand’s international competition in the fishing sector and make their international position stronger.
In conclusion, New Zealand is acting as a collective policy entrepreneur in the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations. By leading the FoFs coalitions, organising conferences and workshop and through the official negotiations, New Zealand uses the four policy entrepreneur tools to influence the fisheries subsidies agenda in the WTO.
5.3 UNEP as Policy Entrepreneur
Besides New Zealand, also UNEP can be identified as a leading actor in the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations. UNEP was active during parallel events, i.e. workshops and conferences, on the issue of subsidies and fisheries depletions (Porter, 1998; UNEP, 2002; UNEP 2004; von Moltke, 2016). Through these parallel events, UNEP could influence member states’ understanding of the issue and the WTO negotiations. UNEP is not an official actor in the WTO structure, however, they are referred to 24 times during the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations5. Furthermore, the WTO (WTO, 1999-a) highlights the cooperation between the WTO and UNEP. This shows that their actions are seen and taken into account during the WTO’s decision-making and that they can influence the WTO fisheries subsidies agenda. For this reason, I state that also UNEP can be seen as a policy entrepreneur for the fisheries subsidies reform. Other indicators that show that UNEP acted as a policy entrepreneur is their use of several policy entrepreneur tools.
UNEP was for the emergence of the fisheries subsidies at the Doha Round active with two activities: creating awareness through studies on the connection of fisheries subsidies with depletion and a conference focussed on the issue of fisheries subsidies (Porter, 1998; von
22 Moltke, 2016). The studies are an example of the policy entrepreneur tools of social acuity and defining problems. As UNEP is a recognized and leading authority in environmental matters (UNEP, n.d.), this means they have the expertise, knowledge and respect regarding environmental issues. These characters are needed for the tool social acuity and made it possible for UNEP to create awareness with publishing studies and recognise the window of opportunity. Furthermore, the studies are a good example of the tool defining problems. By creating awareness and describing the problem in the studies, UNEP could frame the issue as an environmental problem that is created by international trade. This connection with trade is necessary to address the issue on an international trade agenda.
The conference organised by UNEP together with World Wildlife FUND (WWF)6 (von Moltke, 2016, p135) on the fisheries subsidies shows also the policy entrepreneur tools of social acuity, defining problems and building teams. Firstly, they made use of their reputation and authority to create awareness and discussion of the topic; this is an example of social acuity. Secondly, they leaded the discussed of the issue at the conference, which gave them the opportunity to frame the issue in terms of an environmental problem and international trade. A form of defining problems. Lastly, the policy entrepreneur tool building teams. This time they worked together with the WWF. UNEP’s and WWF’s main concerns are with nature, addressing the problem of fisheries subsidies is thus a mutual gain, which is necessary for building teams. With this cooperation, they have access to different type of knowledge, skills and expertise and therefore increase their changes to accomplish change.
For the development of the environmental character at the Hong Kong talks, UNEP also played an important role. The issue already emerged on the agenda of the WTO but did not yet made the hard connection with depletion. In the time from 2001 until 2005, UNEP organised multiple workshops on the issue to inform and educate member states (UNEP, 2002; UNEP
23 2004). This is a good example of defining problems and social acuity. By taking the lead to create understanding of the issue, UNEP has the possibility to frame the issue. The first statements of acceptation the relation is done by multiple member states during one of the conferences organised by UNEP (von Moltke, p144). This shows that their influence has effect and leads to emergence of the fisheries subsidies issue on the agenda of the WTO.
Lastly, UNEP is an international organisation and not a state with the possibility to grand subsidies. Therefore, it does not have the potential to use the tool leading by example in the case of the fisheries subsidies.
This analysis shows that UNEP can be seen as a policy entrepreneur. Within UNEP, one individual is responsible for the management of the fisheries subsidies issue: Anja von Moltke. She represents UNEP during activies around the fisheries subsidies and contributed to several papers, studies, publications, workshops and the book ‘fisheries subsidies, sustainable development and the WTO’ (von Moltke, 2016, p. xvii). The role of UNEP influencing the fisheries subsidies is thus a form of individual policy entrepreneurship. Being that UNEP is an environmental orientated organisation, we can assume that UNEP’s actions are out of environmental concerns.
Overall, UNEP is a form of individual policy entrepreneurship and influences the fisheries subsidies agenda by creating awareness and understanding of the issue through studies and parallel events. The policy entrepreneur tools UNEP uses for this are social acuity, defining problems and building teams.
6. Discussion
For the fisheries subsidies issue to emerge on the agenda of the WTO the window of opportunity was created by several developments: studies on fisheries depletion, international agreements and declarations for the fishery sector, a rise in fishery trade and the born of the WTO with
24 room for environmental considerations. The analysis suggests that two policy entrepreneurs, New Zealand and UNEP, can be identified who took this opportunity and advocated for the policy change. These findings confirm the expectations that a policy entrepreneur can be hold responsible for the influence of the fisheries subsidies issue on the agenda of the WTO. Furthermore, the data answers the research question of how policy an entrepreneur influences the agenda of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations.
New Zealand is active during the official negotiations and as leader of the FoFs. To advocate for a fisheries subsidies reform, all the policy entrepreneur tools are used by New Zealand. This is mainly done out of economic interests. Due to changes of the representatives of New Zealand, this policy entrepreneur should be seen as a collective policy entrepreneur. This requires an expansion of the general theory of policy entrepreneurship that suggest this can only be an individual. Furthermore, also UNEP can be identified as a policy entrepreneur. UNEP influences the WTO’s fisheries agenda through studies, workshop and conferences and uses the policy entrepreneur tools: social acuity, defining problems and building teams. Within UNEP one individual, Anja von Moltke, is responsible for the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations, therefore, UNEP should be seen as an individual policy entrepreneur. As a leading environmental authority, their interest is primarily on environmental concerns.
This data gives insights in the several events and actions that took place around the fisheries subsidies negotiations. In these actions, I interpreted several policy entrepreneurs tools, however, if these tools where consciously and strategically used by the policy entrepreneur is open to discussion. In-depth interviews with the negotiators and representatives could give a definitive answer, however, this was due to the scope of this thesis not feasible.
Overall, this analysis provides new insights into the concept of policy entrepreneurship. In the case of the WTO fisheries subsidies, multiple policy entrepreneurs advocate for the same policy change. They influence the agenda parallel from each other and with different interests.
25 Moreover, in the case of international negotiations in the WTO the concept policy entrepreneurship could be expanded with a differentiation in individual and collective policy entrepreneurship. This would create room to understand states and international organisations as a policy entrepreneur, as was the case with New Zealand. Moreover, the data contributes to the understanding how the agenda of the WTO can be influenced through the policy entrepreneur tools of social acuity, defining problems, team building and leading by example. This information can provide guidance to address other similar (harmful) subsidies within the WTO.
However, being that this research is a single case study and external validity is low, generalisation should be done with caution. Further research on similar cases of international negotiations should be done to further understand the possibility of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurs influencing the agenda.
7. Conclusion
The WTO, the leading organisation in determining international trade rules, added a form of environmental considerations on its agenda: tackling harmful environmental fisheries subsidies. An interesting development being that trade and environmental action are often seen as contradicting. The fisheries subsidies issue emerged on the WTO agenda at the Doha Round in 2001, with the aim to clarify and improve the relation between the fisheries subsidies and depletion. During the years the issue continued to develop and take shape, in 2005 at the Hong Kong talks, the focus became explicit environmental: instead of the question if fisheries subsidies are causing depletion, the question became on how to address the issue.
Earlier research on the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations discussed the potential of the negotiations and showed that the issue can form an example of how other environmental harmful subsidies can be addressed through the WTO. Furthermore, research is done on the
26 development of the negotiations and the challenges it faces. The beginning of the fisheries subsidies issue, how the issue emerged at the WTO agenda and how this can be influenced, was yet unstudied. Other research on the WTO agenda in general showed the challenges and complexity of influencing the WTO agenda. However, literature so far did not discuss the role of a policy entrepreneur, an actor that can advocate for a policy change and influence agenda, in the WTO.
In this thesis, I filled this knowledge gap by answering the following research question: How did a policy entrepreneur influence the topic of fisheries subsidies on the agenda of the WTO? Where I argued the answer lies in the concept of a policy entrepreneur that could influence the agenda through several policy entrepreneur tool. Furthermore, I argued that in the case of these international negotiations the concept of policy entrepreneurship should be expanded. First, I state that a policy entrepreneur can take the form of a collective actor, due to power changes and rotations of responsibilities, not always one individual can be responsible for advocating for the policy change in the case of international negotiations. Second, I argue that multiple policy entrepreneurs can be active and advocate for the same policy change parallel from each other and with different interests.
Through a single case study and process tracing, I tested these hypotheses on the case of the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations. The analysis suggested that two policy entrepreneurs can be identified which advocated for the fisheries subsidies reform: New Zealand and UNEP. New Zealand used the policy entrepreneur tools primarily through official meetings and leading the FoFs. In the period of the emergence and shaping of the topic on the agenda there as a change of power in New Zealand. This indicates that multiple people were responsible for the actions of New Zealand. Therefore, New Zealand can be identified as a collective policy entrepreneur. UNEP used the policy entrepreneur tools mostly at parallel events on the issue, through studies, conferences and workshops. Within UNEP, one person
27 was responsible for the fisheries subsidies through the years: Anja von Moltke. Therefore, this policy entrepreneur can be seen as a case of individual policy entrepreneurship. These findings indicate that the concept of policy entrepreneurship could be expanded, however, generalisation should be done with caution. Further research to the role of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurship is necessary.
Overall, the analysis answered the research question and confirms the hypothesises of multiple and collective policy entrepreneurship in the WTO’s fisheries subsidies negotiations. It showed that New Zealand, as a collective policy entrepreneur, and UNEP, as an individual policy entrepreneur, could influence the topic of the fisheries subsidies through official and parallel events and with the use of the policy entrepreneur tools social acuity, defining problems, building teams and leading by example.
To address similar environmental subsidies in the WTO the power of policy entrepreneurship should be taken into account. States and international organisations can influence the agenda of the WTO by using several policy entrepreneur tools and hereby accomplish environmental action.
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