Rebel Groups:
Ally or Foe?
An Analysis of State Sponsorship and the Case of the Women’s Protection Unit
Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management Manon Verdiesen (s2092573)
Capstone: “Rebel Propaganda in Civil Wars” Dr. Johannes Vüllers (Supervisor)
Dr. Bart Schuurman (Second reader) 9 of June 2019
19102 Words (Excluding front page, pages i-vi and list of references)
Cover picture: Asia Ramazan Antar was a renowned YPJ fighter; she was internationally known for her appearance and military skills. In August 2016, Asia was killed by the Islamic State (Gol, 2016). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37337908 (Accessed on 5th June 2019).
i Abstract
In the post-World War II era, third parties have altered their use of direct warfare. Presently, they delegate this practice to rebel groups. This delegation has significant advantages for these parties because they can exercise influence in an external conflict and remain rather anonymous. They need limited resources and thus, it is less costly than entering into a direct war. In addition, rebel groups are dependent on state sponsorship; without it they would not be able to sustain themselves. These groups employ rebel diplomacy in order to establish legitimate status and to receive recognition as a credible actor. Third party interference has tremendous effects on a civil war’s duration and outcome. Hence, there is a profound academic relevance to study international actors’ conditions under which this practice evolves. This thesis tested the current theories on state sponsorship for rebel factions and it conducted an in-depth analysis on this phenomenon. The single case study method was utilized because this gave the researcher the opportunity to establish a thorough understanding of the complex dynamic between external state support and rebel organizations. The following three theoretical perspectives: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy, were applied to the selected case study: the Women’s Protection Unit (YPJ). This study distinguished between great (considering EU and US) and regional powers (Iraq, Syria and Turkey) because of these players’ have varying decision-making processes affecting the aforementioned conditions in connection to the chosen case study. The main results of this research show that geopolitics have a lasting effect on state sponsorship because when an external state has significant strategic interests in a certain region the likelihood of support for rebel factions increases. Moreover, regional power does not affect state sponsorship due to the fact that these powers are hesitant to back rebel groups because they experience direct consequences from an adjacent conflict and have concerns about the rebel factions becoming too powerful. Lastly, rebel’ diplomatic endeavors may contribute to a group’s credible image. However, rebel diplomacy may have a limited impact on state sponsorship. State support for rebels involves much fluidity and ambiguity and therefore, this study sheds light on the complexity of this recurring phenomenon.
ii Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everyone who was of a great support throughout this whole process, your different insights have positively challenged me and excelled my performances.
iii Table of Contents Abstract………i Acknowledgements……….ii Table of Contents………...iii List of Tables………..iv List of Abbreviations………..vi 1. Introduction……...………...1
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework………..5
2.1 Literature Review………...5
2.1.1 Why and how do states support rebel groups?...7
2.1.2 Why do rebel groups accept state sponsorship and which means do they employ in order to receive it?...9 2.2 Theoretical Framework………....11 3. Methodology……….17 3.1 Research design………...17 3.1.1 Case study………...18 3.1.2 A comparative research………....19 3.2 Operationalization………...21
3.3 Data gathering and sources………..22
3.4 Limitations………...23
4. Results and Analysis………....24
4.1 Results……….24
4.1.1. Regional powers’ (Syria, Iraq, an Turkey) interests in the Syrian crisis and their stance towards the YPJ……….26
4.1.1.1 Syria’s interests in the Syrian Civil War and its stance towards the YPJ………....26
4.1.1.2 Iraq’s interests in the Syrian Civil War and its stance towards the YPJ………27
4.1.1.3 Turkey’s interests in the Syrian Civil War and its stance towards the YPJ…………...28
4.1.2 Great powers’ (US and EU) interests in the Syrian conflict and YPJ………...29
4.1.2.1 The US’ interests in the Syrian Civil War and its stance towards the YPJ………29
4.1.2.2 The EU’s interests in the Syrian Civil War and its stance towards the YPJ…………...31
iv
4.2 Analysis………...33
4.2.1 Geopolitics and the US and EU’s stance towards the YPJ………...34
4.2.2 Regional Power and Syria, Iraq and Turkey’s stance towards the YPJ………..37
4.2.3 Rebel diplomacy and state sponsorship for the YPJ………..39
5. Discussion and Conclusion………...41
5.1 Potential avenues for future studies………...44
6. List of References……….46
6.1 Academic books and journal articles………..………..………46
v List of Tables
Table 1:
Regional powers and support for the YPJ 29
Table 2:
Great powers and support for the YPJ 33
Table 3:
Hypothesis on geopolitics and state sponsorship 37
Table 4:
Hypothesis on regional power and state sponsorship 39
Table 5:
Hypothesis on rebel diplomacy and state sponsorship 40
Table 6:
Overview table – State sponsorship for the YPJ and the three theoretical perspectives: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy 44
vi List of Abbreviations
EU: European Union FSA: Free Syrian Army IS: Islamic State
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government
PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) PYD: Democratic Union Party’s (Partiya Yekîtîya Demokratîk) SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola US: United States
YPG: People’s Protection Unit (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) YPJ: Women’s Protection Unit (Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê)
Chapter 1: Introduction
Throughout the history, multiple states decided to support a wide range of rebel groups in conflicts. For instance, in the Cold War era, the United States (US) and Soviet Union backed various insurgents (Karlén, 2017). Currently, external state support for rebel groups can be seen in the following civil wars: Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Somalia, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Karlén, 2017). Thus, it is not a new phenomenon, but rather a common and old-fashioned practice (San-Acka, 2016). As Salehyan (2010) explains, “[t]he delegation of conflict to rebel organizations is a frequently used technique employed by states wishing to avoid the costs of warfare.” (p. 510). For instance, Iran and Syria both sponsor Hezbollah in their fight against Israel. In the 1980s, the US backed various belligerents in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Furthermore, Pakistan sponsors on an on and off basis the Kashmiri rebels. These partnerships provide them power in the area, however they do not have to engage in direct warfare. Even though states support rebel groups on a frequent basis, scholars paid scant attention to this practice, making it a neglected research field. There is a clear need to further investigate this phenomenon because otherwise it is not possible to fully grasp a conflict’s dynamics (Salehyan, 2010), especially currently “... many civil wars are fundamentally shaped by international rivalries.” (Salehyan, 2010, p. 495). In this epoch, traditional direct warfare is becoming an exceptional practice. Most states replace it by indirect warfare e.g. state support for rebel groups. Thus, IR and conflict scholars should address this phenomenon because it is becoming an indispensable practice in their area and it has tremendous effects on conflicts and wars (Salehyan, 2010).
Karlén, San-Acka and Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham established exploratory studies on state sponsorship for rebel groups. However, more research is needed on this subject matter regarding the specific conditions under which this state support happens. Therefore, this thesis sets out to address the following research question: under what conditions do international actors support rebel groups? This study will zoom in under which conditions international actors back belligerents. In order to further examine these conditions, the following three theoretical lenses will be applied to this phenomenon: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy. This research assumes that these perspectives may influence a state’s decision to support rebel groups. For instance, geopolitics may play a role in state sponsorship for rebel groups because third parties may interfere in an external conflict where their foreign policy interests are in jeopardy (Salehyan, 2010). Regional power may influence a state’s decision to back rebel organizations because in order to contain a possible spillover effect of the adjacent conflict, it may decide to support a rebel group (Kathman, 2011). The use of rebel diplomacy may increase the likelihood of state sponsorship for rebel organizations because it
2 contributes to a group’s legitimate status (Huang, 2016). There is a clear need to shed light on these perspectives in order to study in-depth under which conditions international actors support rebel groups.
If a state supporting a rebel group appears to be a common practice, there is another counter-phenomenon, directly linked to it, that needs to be taken into account. One state may in fact choose to back a certain rebel group and nevertheless, another state may disagree with this stance. Therefore, a state’s decision to support a specific rebel group depends on its individual motives. The following example sheds light on this dynamic: the US decision to support the Kurdish forces in the Syrian Civil War. The US sees them as a valuable ally in the fight against Assad’s regime and the Islamic State (IS) and hence, it gives them their support in terms of weapons (Griffing, 2018) and verbal support (McKernan, 2019). However, Turkey has condemned the Kurdish forces as terrorist groups, and informed the other UN’s Member States that they have launched, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (the right of self-defense), a ‘legitimate’ military operation against them (Begec, 2018).
On 13 January 2019, US President Donald Trump threatened Turkey via Twitter that if they would attack the Kurdish forces in Northern Syria, the country will experience dire economic repercussions. However, Turkey was not intimidated by Trump’s statement. On the contrary, it highlighted once again that they view the various Kurdish groups as ‘terrorist organizations’ and thus, strongly disagree with the US’ supporting stance (McKernan, 2019). Turkey considers them terrorists due to past several attempts by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), under the ruling of Abdullah Öcalan, to establish their own nation-state on Turkish territory. Hence, they discern them as a potential threat to their national security (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). This example shows a specific situation in which one country decides to support certain rebel groups (US) while the other country (Turkey) strongly opposes this stance.
As the US-Turkey example has shown, a state’s decision to support a rebel group may vary between countries and highly depends on a state’s own political agenda. The existing literature on a state’s motives to sponsor a rebel group lacks to address this in-depth. For instance, San-Acka has shown with her study that the likelihood of countries deciding to sponsor a particular rebel group is high when they share a common foe, and/or have similar ideational characteristics, and the supporting state is a strong player (San-Acka, 2016). However, the current body of knowledge does not distinguish among the various types of supporters, e.g. it lacks a general understanding of how great and regional powers’ positions may affect their decision-making process to back a rebel group (Karlén, 2017).
3 Great powers may support rebel groups in order to secure their access to natural resources (Roberts, Secor and Sparke, 2003) and regional powers may back these groups in order to contain a conflict’s spillover effects (Kathman, 2011). Therefore, this thesis will elaborate further on the existing knowledge and include the various types of supporters and their individual decision-making processes to enter into or refrain from a ‘partnership’ with a rebel group.
It is crucial to understand the dynamics connected to a country’s decision to sponsor a rebel group and what are the consequences or benefits of this decision for both the players involved. For example, state interference via a rebel group can provide them a strong foothold in an external conflict (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). The rebel group can be seen as an extension of a state’s indirect power, namely it gives them an opportunity to pursue its own interests in the civil war and it reduces its own costs in terms of resources. However, external state support for rebel groups may have significant implications on the duration and outcome of the conflict (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). Specifically, it may prolong the conflict and increase the intensity of casualties (Karlén, 2017). Thus, a state’s decision to sponsor a rebel group in a conflict may have significant consequences on the evolvement of the conflict and international security as a whole: “Threats to international peace and security not only arise from states but also from rebel organizations, which often benefit from state sponsorship and foreign sanctuary.” (Salehyan, 2010, p. 510).
As shown above, it is important to get a better grasp on the specificities of the dynamics that lead to external state support for rebel groups. This research will conduct a within-case design in order to get a better understanding of the current gap in the existing literature. This study has selected the Kurdish Women’s Protection unit (YPJ) as its case study because of the US and Turkey ideas about the Kurdish forces, which as mentioned earlier, being in stark contrast with each other. The US perceives them, in fact, as a valuable asset in their fight against IS, while Turkey condemns them as terrorist groups and sees them as a potential threat. Therefore, this case shows in practice how different dynamics may lead to support or disengagement with a certain rebel group and it highlights the complexity of state sponsorship for rebel groups. It presents the various factors at play and how it can shape the international actors’ strategies. Moreover, this case shows an interesting triad of a global power (US) vs. regional power (Turkey) who have conflicting ideas about supporting a local rebel group in Northern Syria (YPJ). It sheds light on the macro, micro, and meso level, which are necessary to look into in order to establish the conditions under which an international actor may decide to support a particular rebel group.
4 This thesis will be structured according to the following outline. Chapter one will present the research problem; research question; academic and societal relevance; and reading guide. Chapter two will outline the current body of knowledge in this particular field. It provides a literature review of existing studies on external state support for rebel groups and other relevant studies relating to this field, such as third parties in civil wars, state support and safe havens and rebel diplomacy. In addition, it will present the theoretical framework addressing the issues at stake from different perspectives provided by different research fields that represent a valuable contribution to the present analysis. Lastly, this chapter highlights what this particular study will contribute to the current knowledge on this phenomenon, presenting three main hypotheses. Chapter three will set out the methodology. It presents the case of the YPJ and sheds light on the research design; operationalization of the dependent and independent variable(s); data gathering and sources; research limitations. Chapter four will present and analyze the findings. The concluding chapter will establish a discussion and conclusion. Moreover, it provides a section on potential avenues for future research.
5 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
This thesis’ main objective is to examine under what conditions international actors sponsor rebel groups. During the last decade, various scholars have conducted some research on this particular subject and hence, this study will depart from their established findings. First, a literature review will be presented. The articles “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups” by I. Salehyan, K. Skrede Gleditsch and D. E. Cunningham and “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations” by I. Salehyan the thesis “Sponsors of War: State Support for Rebel Groups in Civil Conflicts” by N. Karlén, and the book “States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups” by B. San-Acka are the backbone for this research. Their main findings will be linked to other relevant studies in the fields of third parties in civil wars, state support and safe havens and rebel diplomacy. It is necessary to provide an overview of the existing literature in order to identify the neglected areas that this research aims to address. Second, the theoretical framework will be outlined. This section will elaborate further on the identified gap in the current body of knowledge: the distinction of types of supporters and their motives to sponsor rebel groups. The following three theoretical perspectives will be applied: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy.
2.1 Literature Review
This section presents the existing body of knowledge on external state support for rebel groups. Moreover, it addresses the main findings of the following studies in the areas of third parties in civil wars, state support and safe havens and rebel diplomacy. It is necessary to touch upon these areas in order to further research the state sponsorship for rebel groups phenomenon.
Presently, international wars and foreign military attacks are scarce. However, this does not mean that external states do not exercise indirect forms of force, e.g. they could inflict economic disincentives or sponsor insurgents (Salehyan, 2010). In 2008, Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan established the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars data set (NSA). This data set has shown that since 1945, 66 countries backed at least one or multiple rebel groups. The NSA data set demonstrated that for instance, the Soviet Union/Russia has sponsored 18 rebel organizations; China has backed 16 rebel groups; The US and Libya have supported each 14 rebel organizations; Cuba has sponsored 12 rebel groups; and Iran has backed 11 rebel organizations (the NSA data set in Salehyan, 2010). Scholars associate external state support for rebel organizations with the Cold War era because it was
6 a recurring trend in this particular period. It provided the Soviet Union and US the necessary means in their rivalry to gain authoritative dominance. However, state sponsorship for rebel groups did not only take place during this time. In the post-Cold War era, various external states supported various rebel organizations, such as Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Iraq, Tanzania, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, it can be said that this phenomenon occurred on a greater scale during the Cold War (Salehyan, 2010).
Even though third parties mostly refrain from practicing direct force in outside conflicts presently, they often indirectly interfere in civil wars. These parties meddle in external conflicts because they want to secure their own foreign policy interests (Kathman, 2011). These interventions are mainly drenched by self-interested motives: “States may intervene opportunistically to pillage resources, weaken an enemy, or affect regime change.” (Kathman, 2011, p. 849) or they may intervene to reduce “... instability or ceasing costly hostilities.” (Kathman, 2011, p. 849). They may choose to support rebel groups or the government, which is at stake (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). According to Modelski (1964), internal conflicts do not take place in a vacuum, on the contrary; its outcome is of great concern for external states (Modelski, 1964 in Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). However, third parties’ meddling practices in civil wars may have great implications on the duration and outcome of the conflict (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008).
Karlén’s study (2017) outlines various consequences that third party interference may have on a conflict’s nature. As Karlén (2017) states, it may prolong the duration of the civil war because the parties can continue to fight due to the non-exhaustive resources: “[a]s resources are plentiful, the parties can regularly rearm and thus they never reach a mutually hurting stalemate.” (p. 21). In addition, he argues that when various external states are meddling in an outside conflict, the internal parties are unable to come to a mutual agreement. The external parties impose their own interests and therefore, the situation becomes more complex and difficult to solve: “[t]he more actors that are involved, the more complicated the bargaining environment becomes, as each actor has a stake in the negotiations.” (Karlén, 2017, p. 22). Moreover, external state support may contribute to a more lethal nature of an armed conflict (Rasler, 1983; Lacina, 2006; Heger & Salehyan, 2007 in Karlén, 2017). Again Karlén (2017) claims: “[e]xternal states can make advanced weaponry accessible to the belligerents that they would otherwise not have access to. This enables the warring parties to inflict far greater damage.” (p. 22). Furthermore, rebel groups become less dependent on locals when they receive external resources (Weinstein, 2007 in Karlén, 2017). This may result into the targeting of innocent civilians and casualties (Karlén, 2017). The external support for rebel groups in an internal conflict may have implications on the international relations between the external state sponsor and
7 target government in the conflict (Schultz, 2010; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012 in Karlén, 2017). External support may contribute to the tensions among the various rebel groups and thus, result into fighting between them (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012 in Karlén, 2017). Lastly, external state support may complicate a post-war country’s democratic transition (Colaresi, 2014 in Karlén, 2017). According to Karlén, the population may view the newly established government as weak because they did not manage themselves to gain power instead they needed external assistance, and are seen as a satellite government that is dependent on the external state:
“Rebel groups or governments that allied with external states face the possibility of a post-conflict crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, since they may be viewed as being little more than a puppet government controlled by the external supporter.” (Karlén, 2017, p. 23). This section has established the plausible effects which third party interference may have on a conflict’s duration and outcome. However, it did not elaborate in-depth on why external states choose to sponsor rebel organizations and why rebel groups accept their sponsorship. The following sections will discuss these matters. First, external states’ reasoning behind state sponsorship for rebel groups will be presented. Second, rebel groups’ motives to accept this support will be highlighted.
2.1.1 Why and how do states support rebel groups?
The above section has shown that third parties often meddle in external conflicts (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). Nevertheless, they do not directly interfere in a civil war. On the contrary, Salehyan explains that in the post-World War II era, they sponsor rebel groups in order to gain presence in an outside conflict (Salehyan, 2009 in Salehyan et al., 2011). Various reasons exist for this phenomenon for instance, external states perceive these groups as a valuable asset to weaken their outside enemies (Salehyan et al., 2011). According to San-Acka, rebel groups may outweigh a state’s absence of state allies. Salehyan (2010) adds state support for rebel groups is beneficial because they remain quite anonymous because they do not employ direct use of force, instead this role is outsourced to rebel factions: “[t]o hide their actions, states will covertly support rebels to foster ambiguity about the origins of the civil conflict and avoid blame.” (Salehyan, 2010, p. 508).
Salehyan et al. argue that external state support for rebel organizations mainly depends on their foreign policy agenda and relationship with the target government. The threshold for an external state to sponsor a rebel organization is high due to it is seen as an antagonistic act. They only assist them when a dispute is at hand or they strongly oppose the current regime and thus, are aiming to overthrow it. State sponsorship for rebel groups has various advantages: they do not have to launch an inter-state
8 war against their enemy however, they can delegate it to these groups. It is less costly in terms of material resources, casualties and international sanctions (Salehyan et al., 2011). Third parties only provide rebel organizations with some means, such as weapons, safe havens etc. (Carter, 2012). In addition, it entails strategic advantages, e.g. rebel organizations are seen more as a legitimate actor in the area and they are better informed on the conflict’s latest developments and situation (Salehyan et al., 2011). This section has outlined the various reasons on why and how states support rebel groups. Nonetheless, does every rebel group meet the external state’s criteria to collaborate with them? Or do certain characteristics prevail in order to establish a partnership? The following part will elaborate on which features confer to state sponsorship for a rebel organization.
Salehyan et al. (2011) argue that the likelihood is high that an external state supports a rebel group when the group is moderate in terms of power: “... external support is less likely when rebel groups are very strong and very weak … .” (Salehyan et al., 2011, p. 734). The likelihood of state sponsorship for rebel organizations is high when the target state receives external support from other parties, transnational connections and a shared adversary exist (Salehyan et al., 2011). San-Acka (2016) agrees with Salehyan et al.’s statement, namely the likelihood is high that an external state backs a rebel group when they have an enemy in common, and she adds, a state has to experience domestic turmoil and lacks the means in terms of resources of direct use of force against its rivalry (San-Acka, 2016):
“States provide international support to rebels that target their adversaries, especially if they are troubled domestically and face constraints to extraction and mobilization of resources to deal with their adversaries through conventional means, and they do not have conventional state allies to call on for help in times of need.” (San-Acka, 2016, p. 150-151).
She also explains that states choose to cooperate with rebel organizations when they share ideational characteristics (San-Acka, 2016). San-Acka (2016) concludes that:
“The highest level of support occurs when a state and a rebel group have a common adversary (i.e. a rebel group targets a state’s adversary) and/or share ideational ties, and a state is relatively strong, vis-à-vis the rebel group.” (p. 152).
This section has shown which factors contribute to states’ decisions to cooperate with rebel groups. However, it should be questioned why rebel organizations accept their assistance. The next section will elaborate further on this matter.
9 2.1.2 Why do rebel groups accept state sponsorship and which means do they employ in order to receive it?
The earlier sections have established the external states their side of the coin in this matter. Nonetheless, the side of the rebel groups was barely touched upon. It was only mentioned that third party interference has much impact on an external conflict’s outcome and duration and thus, has significant consequences for rebel groups. The following question arises: why do rebel organizations accept state sponsorship? According to Carter, rebel organizations are experiencing constant drawbacks in obtaining the necessary means that are required to combat the regime and its internal survival. The target government has greater access to resources than rebel groups. Thus, external state support for rebel organizations could diminish their inner struggle for resources (Carter, 2012). As Hoffman, Byman and Richardson’s studies show, external states may provide them with money, training, weapons and safe havens (Hoffman, 2006; Byman, 2005; and Richardson, 2006 in Carter, 2012). Byman argues that “[o]ne of the most important forms of assistance a state can offer … .” (p. 65) is the provision of a foreign safe haven (Byman, 2005). When a rebel organization has access to one, it contributes to the group’s internal maintenance and decreases the risk of being eliminated (Carter, 2012).
Nevertheless, state sponsorship could also have significant negative consequences for rebel groups. For instance, the target state perceives a foreign safe haven as a significant security threat and thus, it will make attempts to destruct it and exercise direct attacks on the operating rebel organization. This has significant consequences for the sponsor, such as material damages and civilian casualties and hence, it may prevent these attacks by providing detailed information on the group to the target state in order to diminish the damage (Carter, 2012). Furthermore, Carter (2011) adds “... sponsors have greater capacity to meaningfully cooperate with the target in repressing the group relative to host states that are not sponsors.” (Carter, 2011 in Carter, 2012, p. 135). To summarize, an external state’s provision of a safe haven may have positive as negative outcomes for the group. However, they perceive it as an important tool because it provides them an established secure territory and therefore, the potential risks do not outweigh the positives and thus, they accept this form of support. Practice has shown that even strong groups may yield for state sponsorship because they are dependent on foreign resources and safe havens in their fight against the target regime (Carter, 2012). Other studies have shown that external state backing for rebel groups increases their chances to become the winning party in the conflict (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008; Gent, 2008; Lyall & Wilson, 2009; Akcinaroglu, 2012 in Karlén, 2017). Overall, rebel organizations benefit extensively from external state support even though it goes hand in hand with significant disadvantages and thus,
10 they do not shy away from seeking state sponsorship (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008; Gent, 2008 in Jones and Mattiacci, 2017).
As the above sections have shown, external states and rebel groups profit from collaborating with each other. However, the following aspect requires some further attention: how do rebel groups become a legitimate partner for external states? Which means do they employ in order to persuade them? Rebels weigh every decision they make; they are selective in their use of force. They can be seen as strategic players, who exercise deliberate efforts in framing their narrative to the international community. They make various attempts to influence the possible interveners their perceptions in terms of perceiving them as a potential candidate (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017) e.g. rebel organizations “... will portray themselves as strong and resolute, capable of defeating the government in short order with international support.” (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017, p. 3). They mobilize state sponsorship by establishing a detailed picture on the overall costs that are needed to combat the target (Benford and Snow, 2000 in Jones and Mattiacci, 2017). In addition, they utilize diplomacy efforts, such as sending delegations, opening foreign offices, launching lobbying campaigns abroad etc. (Huang, 2016). Jones and Mattiaci perceive rebel group’s use of social media, such as Twitter also as a form of rebel diplomacy (Jones and Mattiaci, 2017). These endeavors provide them the opportunity to show the international actors that they are a credible substitute to the current regime.
Rebel diplomacy is a vital tool for rebel organizations to establish a legitimate image to the international arena (Huang, 2016). Particularly, they “... can assure states that they are more than a violent military organization, are politically organized and willing to cooperate, can mingle with policymakers and diplomats, and are capable of holding peaceful talks.” (Huang, 2016, p. 100). Furthermore, states also make extensive use of diplomacy, thus rebel groups who utilize diplomatic efforts may be recognized by the international community as ‘states’ because they are capable of playing a role in foreign affairs, which is a prerequisite in the international acknowledgement of a certain actor as a state. Lastly, it contributes to their domestic image and this may have positive outcomes on how the international community view the rebel group and sees them as a credible actor (Huang, 2016).
To summarize, the current state of the art points out that nowadays, third parties exercise indirect power in an external conflict via secondary groups, such as rebel organizations (Salehyan, 2009 in Salehyan et al., 2011). This has various advantageous for them, namely it involves fewer costs in terms of resources (Salehyan, et al., 2011) and they can remain anonymous (Salehyan, 2010). In turn, rebel groups are dependent on state sponsorship due to their constant inner struggle for resources and
11 thus, even though it comes with significant downsides, without it they cannot sustain themselves (Carter, 2012). Therefore, they put great effort in shaping the international community’s perception on their image (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017). They brand themselves as legitimate partners via rebel diplomacy endeavors (Huang, 2016).
The existing literature contributes to some extent to this thesis’ main research question: under what conditions do international actors support rebel groups? Nevertheless, more in-depth research is required in order to give a more detailed overview under which conditions external states provide state sponsorship for rebel organizations. As this literature review has shown, little attention has been paid on a) the distinction between state supporters, b) their different decision-making processes and motives, and c) the consequences of the interrelation of these two variables on the conditions under which state support for rebel groups occurs. This research aims at addressing this knowledge gap by differentiating between two main supporters, i.e. great and regional powers, and by providing an in-depth analysis of their motives and manners of intervention on the chosen case study. The next section will further elaborate on this matter.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The literature review has laid down the existing findings on the interplay between the external states and rebel groups. However, it did not differentiate between the different types of supporters, such as great and regional powers. Karlén has identified that earlier studies on this phenomenon did not include these types of sponsors and how their position may influence their decision-making process to sponsor rebel organizations (Karlén, 2017). Thus, a current gap exists and this thesis’ aims to address it. Accordingly, this section will make a distinction between great and regional powers and, it will elaborate on their motives and capabilities of state sponsorship. It will address the subsequent questions: why, when and how external state support may occur. In addition, the following theoretical perspectives will be applied in order to look at this matter: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy.
As mentioned earlier, it is necessary to distinguish between the great and regional powers as types of supporters because they may have different stances to back rebel groups. This section will zoom in on the first type, namely the great powers. Waltz (1979) defines great powers “... as the military most powerful actors in the system.” (Waltz, 1979 in Bisley, 2012, p. 5). In other words, states who possess the strongest armies are seen as great powers. This definition has been widely contested. Gehring,
12 Urbanski and Obertür argue that the European Union (EU) can be seen as a great power, even though it lacks a common military (Gehring, Urbanski and Obertür, 2017). According to Mearsheimer, great powers are the most influential actors who have significant leverage in the fields of foreign and security policy (Mearsheimer, 2003 in Gehring et al., 2017). The EU meets Mearsheimer’s definition because the EU’s discourse in the Ukrainian crisis has shown that it had influence on Russia’s security situation, and thus it acted as a great power. It employed its market power and imposed economic repercussions upon Russia and this had significant negative consequences for the country (Gehring et al., 2017). This thesis does not employ Waltz’s definition of great powers due to its narrow scope. However, it will apply a broader definition that includes actors who lack a military force but exercise significant influence in international affairs and diplomacy (Dodds, 2013).
This section will touch upon the latter type of supporters: the regional powers. Destradi (2010) explains “[r]egional powers are often conceived of as ‘regional leading powers’, states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbours.” (p. 903). Nonetheless, various divergent definitions of regional powers exist in the literature (Destradi, 2010; Parlar Dal, 2016). However, as Destradi (2010) states, most scholars agree with each other on the following aspects regarding regional powers:
“... a) that these states belong to the region considered; b) that they display a superiority in terms of power capabilities, that is, that they possess the largest power share in the region and, c) that they exercise some kind of influence on the region.” (p. 905).
This study assent with the above stated features and thus, it defines a regional power as follows: it is a member of a particular region, it has a prominent and leading role and, it exercises some form of power in the area.
As stated in the literature review, third party interference occurs in multiple external conflicts. Their motives behind intervention are driven by self-interest; they want to exercise power in regions, which are beneficial to them. For instance, they have interests in a certain region due to its rich resources, such as oil, minerals, gas etc. (Roberts et al., 2003). Geopolitics is a widely challenged concept, some scholars “... concentrate on the geographical significance of the nation-state and the international system while others focus on the globalization of world politics.” (Dodds, 2013, p. 27). For example, modern geopolitics is not only limited to states’ practices. On the contrary, it involves a wide range of actors, such as the private and public sector, NGOs, rebel groups etc. These agents experience all various consequences from political, economic and environmental instabilities (Caldara and
13 Iacoviello, 2017). Geopolitics’ concept has evolved overtime from the “... study of statecraft and the Great Powers … .” (Dodds, 2013, p. 29) to “... an intellectual terrain concerned with and influenced by the interaction of geography, knowledge, power and political and social institutions.” (Dodds, 2013, p. 29). In line with Dodd’s perspective, this research considers geopolitics in a comprehensive manner, thus including a wide range of factors, such as geography, power, and many more that contribute to the interplay between states and actors.
The different schools of thought have different opinions about geopolitics. In the scope of this research, the neorealist lens will be applied in order to study this concept because great powers, such as the US, utilizes this lens in their policy and interests in the Middle East region (Hazbun, 2010). In addition, this idea is one of the dominating schools of thought in the IR theory on regional powers because it provides to explain “... the regional ‘actorness’ of states.” (Parlar Dal, 2016, p. 1427). In neorealism is the nation-state “... the primary unit that needs to be secured against outside threats.” (Lundborg, 2019, p. 232). Furthermore, in this school of thought a state’s self-preservation stands central and via material power it can exercise power elsewhere (Telbami, 2010). Telbami (2010) claims “Neorealism can account for some motives of states, it accounts for their basic drive to attain security and, beyond that, to attain some relative power as an instrument for implementing a state’s other motives.” (p. 163). Lastly, it also takes into account the actions of smaller countries e.g. the Middle Eastern states united themselves when the US intervened and their main driver was self-preservation (Telbami, 2010).
To summarize, according to neorealists, when great and regional powers feel threatened by external threats, which may be directly or indirectly targeted at them, they will exercise power in order to regain their own sense of security (Telbami, 2010). For example, they may experience this when their access to important resources are jeopardized (Roberts et al., 2003) or they are concerned with a conflict its potential spillover (Kathman, 2011). Thus, they decide to take measures in order to counter these threats. As shown earlier, they mostly reach out to rebel groups to gain a foothold in the conflict. They delegate the use of direct force to the rebel organizations (Salehyan et al., 2011) and, remain quite anonymous (Salehyan, 2010). They only provide them with means, such as weapons, training, safe havens, and money (Hoffman, 2006; Byman, 2005; and Richardson, 2006 in Carter, 2012). They perceive rebel groups as a potential partner, especially when they make extensively use of rebel diplomacy. The utilization of diplomacy efforts contributes to a credible picture of a group (Huang, 2016).
14 This study argues that there are three causal mechanisms in place, namely the theoretical perspectives: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy (independent variables: X) may have an effect on external states’ support for rebel groups (dependent variables: Y). These theoretical perspectives may influence a state’s decision to sponsor rebel organizations. This section will link the independent variables to the dependent variable in order to show the different causal mechanisms in place. Moreover, three hypotheses are established and will be presented.
Geopolitics may have implications on state sponsorship for rebel groups because when states have significant strategic interests in certain regions, there is a great chance that they may interfere in an external conflict (Roberts et al., 2003). For centuries, “many wars … have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns.” (Roberts et al., 2003, p. 887). For instance, the US intervened Iraq in order to monopolize Iraq's oil reserves. The US has profound strategic interests in Iraq and thus, it decided to interfere in Iraq’s domestic sphere (Roberts et al., 2003). This research has shown that an alteration has taken place in states their use of force. Namely, nowadays they mostly refrain from using direct warfare instead, they utilize indirect forms of force to exercise power in other regions (Salehyan, 2010). For instance, in the 80s the US supported rebel groups in Afghanistan in order to secure its own interests (Salehyan, 2010). States provide rebel organizations with the required means and delegate the direct use of force to them. They choose to outsource this because it has many advantageous for them in terms of resources (Salehyan et al., 2011) and anonymity (Salehyan, 2010). This assumption leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis on geopolitics: When a state has significant strategic interests in a certain region the likelihood of external state support for local rebel groups increases.
The hypothesis on geopolitics sheds light on the dynamic of external state support for rebel organizations and highlights the correlation between geopolitics and state sponsorship. However, geopolitics does not only influence states’ determinations to support rebel groups. Regional power may also have a stake in this phenomenon. Regional powers are more susceptible to the conflict’s direct consequences. They may be closely located to the conflict’s border and consequently, feel threatened by their neighbor’s situation and exercise force in order to contain the spillover effect (Kathman, 2011). Previous studies have shown that when a target government or rebel groups receive state sponsorship the chances increase that the conflict will spillover to its adjacent countries (Young, Stebbins and Frederick, 2014c). Additionally, Young et al. (2014c) argue that “[s]hared ethnicity is a key variable when assessing the prospects for conflict spilling across borders within a given region.”
15 (p. 10). Practical examples of countries who have experienced conflict spillovers are Uganda, Bosnia, Nicaragua, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan, Afghanistan, Libya, and Lebanon (Beardsley, 2011 in Young et al., 2014c). A neighboring conflict may spread violence, ethnic tensions, instability and refugees to its adjacent countries (Young et al., 2014c). Young et al. (2014c) explain that “[n]ot knowing and perhaps fearing the outcome of a neighboring conflict often leads state actors to behave either more offensively or more defensively.” (p. 12). They may choose to directly intervene, negotiate a settlement or sponsor insurgents in order to secure their national security (Young et al., 2014c). This assumption leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis on regional power: When a regional power interests are in jeopardy and/or it is concerned with a potential spillover effect from an adjacent conflict the likelihood of external state support for rebel groups increases.
As this study has shown, external states may choose to support rebel groups in order to have a stake in an external conflict. They select rebel groups who they perceive as legitimate actors. For instance, in the 80s, the US and South Africa supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA portrayed itself as an anti-communist group and thus, they discerned it as a legitimate actor in their fight against the Marxist-Leninist MPLA government (Huang, 2016). Rebel organizations make use of rebel diplomacy in order to influence a state’s perception of the group (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017) because these groups are dependent on state sponsorship without it they can barely sustain themselves (Carter, 2012). Diplomatic efforts contribute to their credible status. For example, they may send delegations abroad or open foreign offices and so on (Huang, 2016). This assumption leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis on rebel diplomacy: Extensive use of rebel diplomacy increases the likelihood of external state support for rebel groups.
States perceive rebel organizations as “... wantonly violent, greedy, and criminal.” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Mueller, 2004 in Coggins, 2015, p. 105). However, their use of rebel diplomacy assists them to positively shape actors’ perceptions. An example is that, in 2011, the Libyan belligerents made extensive use of rebel diplomacy e.g. Twitter posts in order to gain support from the US. The Libyan rebels’ elaborate use of Twitter resulted into a legitimate status and hence, the US decided to support them in terms of army supplies and soldiers (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017). Thus, this study assumes that if rebel groups utilize rebel diplomacy the chances increase that state sponsorship will
16 occur, because their diplomatic endeavors provide them with a credible status and thus, actors are more willing to back them.
To conclude, this study will examine if geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy affect a state’s decision to support a rebel group. These three hypotheses will be applied to the case of the YPJ in order to gain an in-depth understanding under which conditions international actors back rebel organizations. The next chapter will put emphasis on this thesis’ methodology.
17 Chapter 3: Methodology
Chapter one of this thesis has set out the research problem and its relevance. In addition, it has shed light on this study’s main objective, namely investigating the conditions under which international actors support rebel groups, with emphasis on geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy. Chapter two has introduced the existing body of knowledge, the current gap in the literature and has established three hypotheses. This chapter will outline the chosen methodology for the present study and the specific research design. Furthermore, it will present the chosen methods for data collection and analysis and the limitations concerning this research.
3.1 Research design
This thesis’ aim is to explore the conditions under which international actors sponsor rebel groups. The following theoretical perspectives will be addressed: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy in order to get a better understanding of these conditions. This study has been constructed following a deductive qualitative within-case design, and it employed the process tracing tool in order to analyze in-depth the various conditions under which state sponsorship for rebel groups occur. This particular design was chosen for various reasons. Firstly, the deductive approach was selected in order to test the existing theory on the studied phenomenon from an abstract to a more concrete theory (Neuman, 2014). Secondly, the qualitative research method was chosen because this thesis derives its data from secondary sources, such as words and illustrations (Neuman, 2014). Thirdly, a within-case design was selected because this gives the researcher the opportunity to understand the in-depth interactions between the dependent variable and independent variables (Jones and Mattiacci, 2017). Lastly, the established findings were analyzed with process tracing. This method was selected because it provides the researcher the necessary tools to get a better understanding of the dynamic between the dependent variable (support) and independent variables (geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy).
Langley argues that there are seven strategies, which can be employed in process tracing (Langley, 1999). This study selected her ‘alternate templates strategy’ because it is mostly utilized in “... the study of decision processes … .” (Langley, 1999, p. 699) and “... this strategy provides a powerful means of deriving insight from a single rich case because the different theoretical interpretations provide the base for comparison needed.” (Lee, 1989; Yin, 1994 in Langley, 1999, p. 699). This research analyzed the varying decision-making processes of various international actors to support the YPJ. In this case, the theoretical lenses: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy were
18 applied separately in order to guarantee accuracy among them (Langley, 1999). This research design contributes to the understanding of different states’ motives to form or refrain from an alliance with the YPJ, according to the specificity of the selected case. More broadly, the YPJ case analysis will serve as an example to further improve the understanding of the phenomenon on state support for rebel groups on a general level. The next section will present this study’s case study.
3.1.1 Case study
In 2013, the Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jinê or YPJ) was established, as a self-governing women’s army. The YPJ’s members are solely women and they originate from different parts of Kurdistan e.g. Syria, Iraq and Turkey (Del Re, 2015). Del Re (2015) argues:
“These women are acquiring a prominent role in the strenuous fight against Assad in Syria on one side, and against the so-called IS on the other. They have become an icon of heroism and bravery with a number of celebratory epithets that exalt the uniqueness of their choice and condition.” (p. 85).
This group has affiliation with the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel or YPG) (Del Re, 2015). The YPG’s military faction consists of both women and men (Bengio, 2016). This unit plays a vital role in the Syrian civil war because they are in the frontline in the fight against IS and the resistance to the Assad regime (Hevian, 2013 in Way and Akan, 2017). The YPJ and YPG are both part of the Democratic Union Party’s (Partiya Yekîtîya Demokratîk or PYD) militant wing and, the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK) army division trains and supports these militant factions. The international community labels the PKK as terrorists due to Turkish’s hostile relationship with this group since 1984 (Paasche and Gunter, 2016).
The YPJ is a leftist oriented political organization, and it incorporates parts of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology (Paasche and Gunter, 2016), such as Öcalan’s embracement “... of Bookchin’s paradigm of democratic autonomy (Simsek and Jongerden, 2018, p. 17). The YPJ strongly aspires the right of equality among minorities, women and men (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). Simsek and Jongerden (2018) explain that the YPJ “… rejects patriarchal, homogenizing and assimilating apparatuses in the service of modern nation states … .” (p. 17) Thus, much controversy is in place among the international actors whether to cooperate with them because of their ties with the PKK and its leftist political orientation (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). The YPJ is an interesting case because it sheds light on the complex dynamics under which conditions international actors support rebel groups. Especially, if we analyze it within the scope of the Kurds’ position in the Middle East. So, in
19 order to get a better understanding of it, it is crucial to divulge into a brief digression within the Kurdish context.
The international community perceives the Kurds as a stateless population (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). Kurdistan, their nation, is an imaginary utopia; they do not have an autonomous state; instead its population is dispersed across four territories: Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey (Chiu, 2018). However, in 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) managed to establish a de facto autonomous state (Chulov, 2017 in Clary, 2018). The KRG only experiences some degree of independency (Chiu, 2018). Chiu (2018) continues, Kurdistan is in fact “ ... not politically organized or unified … .” (p. 346). This also means that unity does not always reign among the Kurds’ various factions. However, they consider each other as rivals and have hostile attitudes towards each other (Paasche and Gunter, 2016; Müller, unpublished thesis, 2018). Öcalan made an attempt to unify the different Kurdish areas, advocating for the creation of an independent and united Kurdistan (Müller, 2018)
Throughout the Kurds’ existence, they have faced oppression in their fight to establish an autonomous region or statehood (Müller, 2018). Currently, they experience much resistance from IS because the Kurds openly do not align and comply with their ideology. On the contrary, their own aspirations of secularism and gender equality provokes IS’ hostile stance towards them (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). The Syrian Civil War provided the various Kurdish military units (PKK, YPG and YPJ) leeway to conquer the Syrian cantons: Afrin, Jazira and Kobane. In the beginning of 2014, these cantons declared themselves as a self-governing area. This autonomous region is also known as Rojava (Müller, 2018). As the example of Kurdistan in Iraq shows, the Kurds do not aspire to conquest other areas, they only want to secure their own territory (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). The ingredients to establish a democratic Kurdish state are available (Bengio, 2016). Although, they still have to overcome various obstacles, such as the international recognition and support of their cause (Chiu, 2018). This section presented the YPJ’s case and established an overview of the Kurds’ situation. The next part touches upon the international actors who are this thesis’ unit of analysis. It introduces the universe of cases and presents the case selection.
3.1.2 A comparative research
Salehyan et al.’s study focused primarily on rebel groups, as their unit of analysis (Salehyan et al., 2011). San-Acka’s research included as unit of analysis a triad, namely she analyzed a rebel organization, target state and potential supporters (San-Acka, 2016). This specific study’s unit of analysis are the international actors, and it implements a top-down approach. This research has chosen to compare diverse international actors who have a different stance towards state sponsorship for the
20 YPJ, in order to research under which conditions international actors support rebel organizations. The following actors were selected as universe of cases: the US, EU, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. These actors were chosen because in this case they are the most important players. The US has significant interests in the Middle East because it has rich natural resources, such as oil and gas reserves (Martin, 2013), and it is dependent on this region’s supply of resources. It imports vast amounts of petroleum from Iraq and Saudi Arabia (EIA, n.d.) and thus, it needs to secure its access to it. The EU also has significant interests in the Middle East’s oil reserves and hence, it needs to safeguard its access to it (World Energy Council, 2019a). In addition, it has to cope with a significant influx of Syrian refugees and therefore, it needs to take up measures in order to halt this refugee flow (Miller, 2016). The Arab Spring and especially, the Syrian Civil War, have implications on Turkey’s regional power position and hence, it exercises force in order to maintain its status in the region. Its foreign policy deliberations are based on the Kurdish matter and thus, the Kurds’ situation has a significant impact on Turkey’s acts in the Middle East (Bank & Karadag, 2013). Iraq and Syria’s civil wars have a profound impact on the region’s discourse; the conflict’s outcome may change the current dominant positions which are in place (Parlar Dal, 2016). Besides, both countries’ wars have provided the Kurds an opportunity to establish themselves further (Müller, 2018). These actors all have different opinions towards the sponsoring of the YPJ, and these will be briefly touched upon in this section. An in-depth understanding of their motives will be established in the following chapter: Results and Analysis. In January 2015, the YPJ gained much momentum by the international community when they managed to defeat IS in Kobane. They were portrayed as heroines who were able to overthrow the evil IS (Simsek and Jongerden, 2018). However, the international actors echoed different sounds and interact differently with them. For instance, the US ‘openly’ supports the YPJ (Mckernan, 2019). Turkey strongly disagrees with the US’ stance and condemns them as a terrorist group (The Guardian, 2019). Turkey’s rejection of perceiving the YPJ as a potential ally has coerced the EU1 to refrain from
such a potential partnership (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). This study has chosen to also include Syria and Iraq due to their vital positions in the Syrian Civil War. This research selected a diverse case selection strategy in order to compare these various actors their opinions towards state support for the YPJ. This strategy’s main purpose is “... the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions.” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 300). Lastly, this thesis’ starting point for analyzing the interaction between the international actors and the YPJ is the beginning of January 2015. This point was chosen due to the importance of the earlier mentioned event that have seems the YPJ’s
1 The EU consists of 28 Member States. This research chose to narrow down its focus on the three most influential
countries in terms of GDP of the EU: France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Eurostat, 2018). In addition, they have the most seats in the European Parliament (Europarl, 2018).
21 success in overthrowing IS in Kobane. This victory led to the West’s perception of the YPJ as a legitimate group (Simsek and Jongerden, 2018). The YPJ still plays a vital role in the latest developments of the Syrian Civil War and thus, this research will include the ongoing developments in 2019.
3.2 Operationalization
The dependent variable is support, as shown in the literature review, various forms of state sponsorship exist, such as the provision of weapons, money, training and safe havens (Hoffman, 2006; Byman, 2005; and Richardson, 2006 in Carter, 2012). This study will include the above mentioned levels of state support without questioning a differentiation among them, as this goes beyond the scope of this present research. For the purpose of this research, solely material supporting actions will be included in the ‘state support’ frame. Support will be measured on the macro (US and EU), micro (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) and meso (YPJ) level. This study assumes that the macro and micro level have a stronger position in the decision to support rebel groups, thus their geopolitics and regional power influence their state sponsorship for rebel organizations. As previously mentioned, the US has personal interests in the Middle East because this region is in possession of rich resources (Roberts et al., 2003; Martin, 2013) and thus, want to exercise power in this area. Moreover, Syria is Turkey’s neighboring country and, the latter is concerned with Syria’s developments due to the potential spillover effect, such as the YPJ conquering Turkey’s territory (Paasche and Gunter, 2016). The meso level may give a final push in contextualizing the state’s decision due to the rebel group’s use of rebel diplomacy. Thus, the different dynamics among these different levels will be in-depth examined. The independent variables are geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy.
The geopolitics independent variable sheds light on the great powers’ diverse strategic interests in terms of economic, military, and political challenges and/or gains in the Middle East. For instance, the US and EU are both dependent on the Middle East’s energy resources (World Energy Council, 2019a and b) and therefore, conflicts in this region may jeopardize their access to it and affect their economies. They may exercise ‘indirect force’ in order to safeguard their access to these resources. They may reach out to rebel groups and delegate the practice of direct force to them (Salehyan, 2010). This study measures these great powers’ interests in the Syrian Civil War and shows if they back rebel organizations in order to influence the Syrian conflict’s outcome. This support may be beneficial in order to secure their foreign policy interests.
22 The regional power independent variable sheds light on a state’s regional dominance in a particular region. This research considers Turkey, Iraq and Syria as regional powers. However, the reasoning to be considered as a regional power differs among them. Existing literature on regional powers highlights that Turkey can be labelled as a regional power, namely it has the highest material power and military expenditure in the region. Syria and Iraq can be seen as regional powers because they have a great stake in the region’s discourse, even though their material power and military expenditure are on average in comparison to the other regional powers in the area, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel (Parlar Dal, 2016). The Syrian Civil War has had a significant impact on the region’s discourse and thus, Syria and Iraq’s situation contribute extensively to it. This civil war’s outcome may have great consequences on the region’s power division. For instance, according to Parlar Dal, between 2000-2010, Turkey’s status as a regional actor rose significantly. However, the Syrian conflict had several implications on its regional domination (Parlar Dal, 2016). This research measures these countries’ interests in the Syrian Civil War and investigate if these countries sponsor the YPJ. This study assumes that these powers will support rebel groups in order to contain the Syrian Civil War’s spillover effect.
The rebel diplomacy independent variable sheds light on rebel groups’ diplomatic efforts. Huang (2016) defines “... “rebel diplomacy” as a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during civil war for the purpose of advancing its military and political objectives.” (p. 90). For instance, rebel organizations may open international offices, send delegations oversees etc. These endeavors help to shape international actors’ perception of rebel organizations and contribute to their perception of them as a legitimate partner (Huang, 2016). This study researches the YPJ’s rebel diplomacy efforts. It consults newspaper articles in order to find out which endeavors they undertook and if it resulted into new partnerships. This research assumes that rebel diplomacy will increase the likelihood of state sponsorship for rebel groups.
3.3 Data gathering and sources
This study collects solely data from secondary sources, such as official statements, news articles, scholarly articles and books. It is not based on empirical analysis instead; secondary sources are used to answer this thesis’ research question. The following databases are consulted in order to retrieve these sources: Leiden University's online library catalogue and Google Scholar. These databases provide each access to a wide range of relevant scholarly articles and books on the Syrian Civil War, YPJ, external state support for rebel groups, rebel diplomacy, geopolitics, regional power etc. The Google search engine is used in order to retrieve relevant news articles and official statements. Desk research was conducted in order to answer this study’s research question. This method contributed to
23 the collection of relevant data. These findings are analyzed in the following chapter with the process tracing method.
3.4 Limitations
This research’s focus lies on the state’s motives to support rebel groups. It goes beyond the scope of this study to take into account the rebel group’s motives for cooperation. This study chose to solely zoom in on the state’s own motives to support rebel groups due to its aim of putting the accent on researching the level of influence of the following concepts: geopolitics, regional dominance and rebel diplomacy in a state’s decision to back a certain rebel group. This thesis selected one case study in order to get a better and deeper understanding of the complex dynamic between state sponsorship and rebel groups. Furthermore, this study takes into account secondary sources leaving out primary and empirical ones in order to fulfill the established scope of the research, i.e. to test and assess previous established theory. The consideration of primary sources might constitute a following step to this research that can lead to further development on new field-based discoveries.
24 Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
The first three chapters presented the framework of this study. An extensive review of the existing literature on the subject at issue, the definition of a suitable theoretical framework and consequential hypotheses were established. This chapter will present the findings and related analysis. The literature review has shown that since more than half a century, state sponsorship for rebel groups is a common practice because it has great benefits for third parties to enter into a partnership with a rebel group in order to influence a conflict. Moreover, rebel organizations are dependent on external state support and thus, they put effort to shape a state’s perception of viewing them as a legitimate actor e.g. rebel diplomacy. However, as the literature review has shown, there is still a gap in the current state of the art namely a more in-depth analysis is needed of the conditions under which international actors back rebel groups.
There is a clear need to further explore which factors contribute to a state’s motives to support rebel groups because state sponsorship for rebel organizations is a recurring phenomenon and it can have profound consequences on the specificity of the conflict in which the support plays a role. The theoretical framework pinpointed this gap and has shown that in order to get a better grasp of these conditions that the following theoretical perspectives need to be taken into account: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy. This study assumes that these three factors influence a state’s decision to back rebel organizations in an external conflict and thus, this study formulated three hypotheses and this chapter’s aim is to test them. In order to test these assumptions, the case of the YPJ was selected due to its clarity in showing in practice how various dynamics may lead to state sponsorship for rebel groups. This chapter will firstly present the main findings relating to this matter. Secondly, these results will be analyzed with the process tracing tool’s alternate templates strategy wherein the three theoretical perspectives: geopolitics, regional power and rebel diplomacy will be applied to the motives of international actors to support or disengage with the YPJ.
4.1 Results
This section presents the relevant findings, which are required to answer this study’s research question: under what conditions do international actors support rebel groups? As mentioned in the methodology chapter, this thesis utilized a deductive qualitative within-case design. This research is testing existing theories on this subject matter and thus, the researcher collected secondary data by consulting various newspapers, scholarly articles and books on the issue at stake. The researcher gained the following insight after conducting extensive research on the matter at issue, one of the main findings are: the best way to analyze in-depth the action of the YPJ, the support the group
