Return to Sender: Expanding securitization theory in the case of Dutch policies regarding returning foreign fighters 2012-2019

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Return to Sender

Expanding securitization theory in the case of Dutch policies

regarding returning foreign fighters 2012-2019.

Fieke Ettes s2105500

Masterthesis Crisis and Security management Supervisor: Dr. T. Abbas

Second reader: J.H. de Roy van Zuijdewijn MA Citation style: Turabian

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1. Introduction

The recent and still ongoing conflict in Syria, and the formation of the Islamic State on both Iraqi and Syrian territories, have attracted a substantial amount of western foreign volunteers that partake in the many sides of the conflict. Among these volunteers, there is a large part of individuals that can be characterized as foreign fighters (FF’s) and/or foreign terrorist fighters (FTF’s). They actively provide support or fight, in the conflict in the area itself. The complex nature of the conflict in Syria means that many FF’s fight on the many different sides of the conflict. However, the current FF phenomenon is heavily associated with the rise of the Islamic State, ISIS, Daesh, or one of its many other (given) names.1_{The group’s ‘success’ in}

accumulating territory in conflict-ridden Syria in a relatively short amount of time and its jihadist ideology attracted many foreign fighters amongst which an unprecedented amount of westerners.2 The estimated total amount of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is between 25,000 and 30,000.3 With an estimated 5,000 Europeans.4 Of these, an estimated 280 are Dutch jihadist foreign fighters.5

The amount of attention given to the foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq in the media, politics, policy, and academics, has eclipsed the fact that the phenomenon is not new.6_{As the power and territory of IS have started to wane in the past two to three years,}

more attention has been given to returning foreign fighters in the west, so-called returnees. In Europe these returnees were early on, in 2012 already perceived a potential danger by

1_{David Malet, "The European Experience With Foreign Fighters And Returnees", in Who Are They,}

Why Are They (Not) Coming Back And How Should We Deal With Them? Assessing Policies On Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters In Belgium, Germany And The Netherlands. Brussel: Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, 2018,6.

2_{Jeanine De Roy Van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, "Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case}

Of Afghanistan, Bosnia And Somalia", ICCT Research Paper (Online) 5, no. 2 (2014): Introduction.

3_{Reinier Bergema Project Leader) et al. (2017-): Jihadist Foreign Fighters Monitor (JihFFMON).}

(HCSS Project). URL: https://dwh.hcss.nl/apps/ftf_monitor/

4_{Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard, "The Homecoming Of Foreign Fighters In The Netherlands,}

Germany And Belgium: Policies And Challenges", ICCT, Last modified 2018,

https://icct.nl/publication/the-homecoming-of-foreign-fighters-in-the-netherlands-germany-and-belgium-policies-and-challenges/.

5_{De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, Returning Western Foreign Fighters, Introduction.} 6_{David Malet. "Why Foreign Fighters?" Orbis 54, no. 1 (2010), and J.H. de Roy van Zuijdewijn.}

”Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: The Connection Between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and Terrorist Activity in The West.” Master Thesis., University of Utrecht, 2014.

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intelligence agencies, however, policies regarding this danger were slow to develop.7_Several

attacks and plots involving returnees in the subsequent years, lead to the perception of returnees as a threat.8_{Even in The Netherlands, that for a long time was free of IS-inspired}

attacks, more and more attention was given to returnees.

According to certain scholars on the subject foreign fighters, and thus returnees became/have become a ‘securitized’ issue. The periodization of the securitization of foreign fighters and returnees in the Netherlands can only be placed between the first wave of Syria/Iraq travelers and later waves. The first individuals to leave for Syria and Iraq to fight for Isis from the Netherlands did so at the end of 2012. According to scholars on the subject, 2014 became a turning point for the issue of returnees, the first attack by a returnee was committed in Brussels. From then on the issue gathered much attention from policymakers in European and Dutch society and politics.9_{The securitization of an issue means that a certain}

amount of attention is given to the issue and it is viewed through a national security lens, which generates resources to combat the issue. This viewing of the issue of returnees through a national security lens is not strange in regards to the attacks that were carried out in Europe by former foreign fighters. However, the implications of securitization for an issue can be great, as will be further explained in the theoretical outline. The implications of securitization on an issue however are often assumed to have a certain influence on measures taken by governments to combat an issue. This is also the case for Wittendorp in his article “Displacing the National Security-Narrative: on the (de-) securitization of the governmental

and Legal Response to Foreign Fighters”. He connects certain measures to securitization

where others do not. For instance, restrictive measures are related to securitization whereas reintegration programs are not. A certain relation to the repressiveness of policies and securitization is implied. The theory of securitization however does not concern itself with the effect of securitization on policies or measures. However, it does discuss the effect of the securitized ‘speech act’, which would lead to the opening up of resources. The nature of the

7_{Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard, The Homecoming Of Foreign Fighters In The Netherlands, ICCT,}

Last modified 2018, https://icct.nl/publication/the-homecoming-of-foreign-fighters-in-the-netherlands-germany-and-belgium-policies-and-challenges/.

8_{Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard, The Homecoming Of Foreign Fighters In The Netherlands, ICCT,}

Last modified 2018, https://icct.nl/publication/the-homecoming-of-foreign-fighters-in-the-netherlands-germany-and-belgium-policies-and-challenges/.

9_{Edwin Bakker, Christoph Paulussen and Eva Entenmann, "Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters:}

challenges Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of this Pan-European Problem", Security And Human Rights 25, no. 1 (2014):16

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resources however is unknown. The theory however does discuss: “securitization generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind”. This leaves a gap of knowledge in the theory of securitization, a gap that will be addressed in this thesis. Knowing that securitization does not necessarily relate to repressive measures and Wittendorp stating that securitization has lead to certain restrictive measures regarding returnees leaves one to wonder if the securitization of returnees in the Netherland has indeed lead to repressive measures regarding the issue in the Netherlands. This will be addressed in this thesis: To what extent is the policy regarding jihadist returnees more repressive for the period 2014-2019 than in the period 2012-2014, both on a national and a municipal level as a result of the securitization of the phenomenon? The periods of comparison: 2012-2014 and 2014-2019 are most relevant for this thesis because they show the period when jihadist travelers left the Netherlands to join IS and other terrorist groups in the conflict in Syria/Iraq, and the time after the securitization of returnees, namely form 2014 on. The focus on policy is relevant because it will deal with the gap in the theory of securitization and the academic assumption that securitization has a certain effect on policy measures. 2014 is used as a division between the two period, since this is the year most scholars cite as the year securitization of foreign fighters and returnees took place

The objective of this thesis is to explain the character of the Dutch policies regarding returnees prior and after the securitization of returnees in order to add to the theory of securitization and to understand the mechanisms that have led to the policies regarding returnees in the Netherlands. There are two expectations of the research outcomes: 1. The securitization of an issue is visible in policy documents regarding the issue after securitization took place. 2. A second expectation is that the securitization of the issue would have led to more repressive policies in the time period after 2014, since the securitization would have opened up more leeway and support for hard policies. This would mean that securitization in this case would lead to repressive policies. To be able to confirm or disprove this, the gap of knowledge in the theory of securitization as explicated above, will be discussed further in the theoretical outline in chapter two. In this chapter, the relevant academic literature regarding returnees in the Netherlands will be discussed, as will the academic debate regarding the definition of the foreign fighter and returnee. Also the definition between so-called ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policy and measures will be given in this chapter.

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In the third chapter, the methodological basis of this thesis will be explicated. The basis of this methodology is a triangulation of methods: discourse analysis, empirical comparison by the analysis of measures, and interviews. These methods heavily lean on the interpretivist ideas of research methodology.

In the analytical chapters, a comparison will be made for national and municipal measures respectively, between the measures instated during the period 2012-2014 and the period 2014-2019. Thus before and after the issue of returnees became securitized. This will empirically show the difference or similarity between the measures from the different periods. First, the discourse in the Dutch policies regarding foreign fighters and returnees will be analyzed. The focus is on the construction of the threat of returnees in policy documents in order to analyze if the language used in these documents is securitized or not. In the analytical chapters the following sub-questions will be answered:

- Chapter 4: To what extent and in what way is a threat constructed by the Dutch government in its policy documents for the period 2012-2019?

- Chapter 5: To what extent can the policies introduced during the period 2014-2019 be characterized as repressive in comparison to policies introduced during the period 2012-2014 on a national level?

- Chapter 6: To what extent can the policies introduced during the period 2014-2019 be characterized as repressive in comparison to policies introduced during the period 2012-2014 on a municipal level?

Relevance:

This thesis addresses a gap of knowledge as discussed in the section above. The societal relevance of a study into securitization of this specific subject is the fact that the securitization of the subject has lead to a redistribution of means. In a interview with NOS (Dutch news broadcaster) the current minister of Justice and Security Fred Grapperhaus, describes this redistribution following the “very serious threat, posed by international terrorism”, that has lead to a surge of drug related crimes in the Netherlands. The securitization of this subject has lead funds away from other important issues. Counterterrorism measures also bring with it some long term effects on society. Beatrice de Graaf cites the effects described by Laura K. Donahue on the adoption of new powers and counterterrorism laws: “a spiral within which special institutional interests are embedded and creep into the everyday (criminal) realm. This function of creeping and institutional

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engraving of counterterrorism measures in a society’s fabric brings with it all kinds of political, social and economic costs, not in the least a loss of legitimacy, infringements on civil liberties, or a loss of credibility in the security domain.”10_{This proves the relevance of}

securitization of counterterrorism measures and their characterization. Certainly if these measures lead to the acceptance of institutional repressiveness. This would mean that the root of the problem is not addressed, only repressed.

10_{Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Coutnerterrorism Performance: A comparative study, Londen:}

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2. Theoretical outline

2.1. Introduction:

In this theoretical framework both the literature review and the main theory used in this thesis will be discussed. First, the focus will be on the academic debate on the concept of the foreign fighter and returnee will be explicated. This debate is shaped by the historic cases of foreign fighters that are often used to study the phenomenon. The main scholars that will be discussed are Malet, Heghammer, and De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Wittendorp. Furthermore, the theory of securitization will be dissected in its relevance in relation to this thesis will be explicated. This chapter will finish with certain suppositions based on securitization theory will be offered. In addition, a scale of policy measures will be included to offer a reference for analysis of the policy measures that are studied in this thesis.

As mentioned in the introduction, the phenomenon of the foreign fighter is not new. Thus the historic cases of foreign fighters take up a great part of the academic literature on the phenomenon. This is certainly the case for the works by David Malet, Thomas Hegghammer, and Jeanine De Roy van Zuijdewijn. All research the past cases of foreign fighters and question each other's definition of foreign fighters. Although each research focuses on a different premiss of research, a debate on the definition of the foreign fighter is visible in their work. The academic research into foreign fighters is a relatively new trend that went hand in hand with the explosion of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. This resulted in the fact that the historical cases of foreign fighters were, and are still often used as comparative case studies. This is why other authors that will be discussed here include this historical element.

In his article “why Foreign Fighters”, David Malet focuses on international recruitment of foreign fighters by analyzing historical cases, such as the international brigades of the Spanish civil war and Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). He is considered as one of the main scholars who has historized the phenomenon. According to Malet the concept of foreign fighter existed long before the term was coined. They were just not perceived as the same. Malet is also one of many scholars who have tried to explain why most current day FF’s are Muslim, citing the emergence of the defensive jihad-narrative as the main reason. In

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addition to historical case focus and trying to explain the phenomenon, Malet tries to historicize the concept of Foreign Fighters. In his conclusion, Malet states that foreign fighters are:

“most recruits are neither mercenaries nor fanatics bent on domination. Rather than for greed, most mobilize in response to the perceived threat. Recruits may have their motives of adventure, the vindication of the group, or simply lack of better alternative opportunity, but recruiters across highly varied conflicts in time and space consistently use the same frame of defensive mobilization.”11

This citation thus gives a characterization of the concept by Malet.

Thomas Hegghammer broadens this definition of Malet in some ways. In his opinion a foreign fighter:

“is someone who leaves or tries to leave the West to fight somewhere else”12_{and “Foreign fighting” includes any military activity}

(training or fighting), using any tactic (terrorist or guerrilla tactics), against any enemy (Western or non-Western)—so long as it occurs outside the West. Co-ethnic war volunteers (e.g., American Iraqis going to Iraq) are counted as foreign fighters.”13

Hegghammer also goes on to differentiate between the ‘local rebel’ and the ‘international terrorist’. He sees the foreign fighter as someone that exists between these two concepts.14

One of Hegghammer's main critics on his point is Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn. She argues that Hegghammer uses a very broad definition when defining a foreign fighter. De Roy van Zuijdewijn argues that a distinction should be made between foreign fighters that actually fight in conflict and those who just enjoy training in a foreign country. The field where De Roy van Zuijdewijn adds to the existing literature on foreign fighters is in the

11_{Malet, "Why Foreign Fighters?", 114.}

12_{Thomas Hegghammer, "Should I Stay Or Should I Go? Explaining Variation In Western Jihadists'}

Choice Between Domestic And Foreign Fighting", American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013):1.

13_{Hegghammer, "Should I Stay Or Should I Go?”, 1.}

14_{S. Wittendorp, "Displacing The National Security-Narrative: On The (De-)Securitization Of The}

Governmental And Legal Response To ‘Foreign Fighters", Security And Global Affairs: Jihadists In Syria And Iraq, no. 2017 (2017): 20.

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characterization of five types of foreign fighters. She makes this division in the type by their post-conflict ‘path’. She does this by historicizing the foreign fighter phenomenon. She defines the following types: ‘the martyr, the veteran, the recruiter, the reintegrated fighter, and the terrorist.’ Of these five types, the latter three are the most important for this thesis. This is because these types of foreign fighters can be described as returnees. De Roy van Zuijdewijn uses this characterization as a potential clue of the threat each type may pose in the future.

The definition of the concept of the returnee however is subject to debate. As Hans van Miert argues in ‘The Right Target in Sight? Returnees and the current Jihadist Threat’ the conflict in Syria and the fallout of the disintegration of the Islamic State has led to more types of returnees than posed by Zuijdewijn. Van Miert determines that there is an argument to be made that there are more types of returnees that can not be defined as foreign fighters. The returnee label is also often used for women (non-combatant) and the children who left with their parents to live in the Islamic State and those born there.15 However, the conceptualization of returnees is often different across different studies van Miert states. He does ask if the word returnee has the right connotation? Or could it be said that a different term should exist to distinguish combatants from non-combatants and the threat that is associated with the term ‘returnee’? Van Miert proposes that a differentiation should be made between the concept returnee and the ‘soldiers on a foreign mission’. Seeing the IS operatives that return to commit terrorist attacks in the West as different from the disillusioned returnee.16

2.2. Debate on the threat posed by returnees:

The academic focus regarding returnees has quite understandably focused on the threat that they could pose for their respective home countries.17_{The literature on western returnees}

from Syria and Iraq as a threat has expanded as the amount of people returning has grown.

15_{Nicola Davenport (Ed.) et al. (2017, July): Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and}

their Families. (RAN Manual). Amsterdam: Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). 20. URL:

https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf

16_{Hans Van Miert, "The Right Target In Sight? Returnees And The Current Jihadist Threat", Security}

And Global Affairs: Jihadists In Syria An Iraq, no. 2017 (2017): 35.

17_{For instance: David Malet and Rachel Hayes, "Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite Threat?",}

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The focus has been for instance on policy advice in relation to their labeling as a threat. In the question of how to control the current threat that is posed by returning foreign fighters

Both Hegghammer and De Roy van Zuijdewijn go into the question of the threat, that is often identified in relation to the presence of foreign fighters. The approach to answering this threat question is often the study of a historical case. This is the case for the studies mentioned by Hegghammer, van Zuijdewijn, and Malet. Often these studies also try to give policy advice to governments in dealing with this threat. However, the question if returnees pose a threat is not the question posed in this thesis. What is more important is the reaction of governments to the supposed threat by returnees. In most of the articles mentioned, there is an assumption made about the securitization of returnees by western societies and governments. This is visible in the studies by Simon Minks and Bibi van Ginkel, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Stef Wittendorp.

2.3. The relation between threat and assumed measures: Securitization

In their article ‘Addressing the Challenge of Returnees: Threat Perceptions, Policies and Practices in the Netherlands’, Van Ginkel and Minks observe, a bit apprehensively, that the dutch policies towards returnees have evolved more and more towards a security approach. They conclude that: “The debate in the Netherlands concerning FTFs and returnees is highly politicized.”18

This cautious assumption of politicization is intensified by De Roy van Zuijdewijn. According to De Roy van Zuijdewijn, the foreign fighter issue has become securitized rather than politicized. “Today the foreign fighter issue has become strongly securitized and criminalized, and has increased levels of fear of terrorism in European countries.” It has “become the number one security issue in many countries. Many resources and much attention are now devoted to this issue.”19

Wittendorp argues that this securitization of foreign fighters is also the case for returning foreign fighters and the Netherlands. In his article “Displacing the National

18_{B. Van Ginkel and S. Minks, "Addressing the Challenge of Returnees: Threat Perceptions, Policies}

and Practices in The Netherlands", in Who Are They, Why Are They (Not) Coming Back And How Should We Deal With Them? Assessing Policies On Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters In Belgium, Germany And The Netherlands. Brussel: Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, 2018, 58.

19_{J.H.,De Roy van Zuijdewijn. "Terrorism And Beyond: Exploring The Fallout Of The European}

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response is strongly influenced by national security concerns with the effect of limiting the space for long term approaches for coping with foreign fighters’ as well as their own experiences in a non-securitized way.”20 “This article argues that the governmental response to the travel of European and American citizens to the battlefields in Syria/Iraq, and in particular when it concerns those citizens joining the so-called Islamic State (IS), is securitized.”21_{Thus, according to Wittendorp, Foreign Fighters have become securitized. For}

the policies relating to this reaction to returnees and foreign fighters, this means that they are shaped by this security gaze. He divides these policies into legal action, restrictive measures, and measures for restricting movement.22 The measures relating to securitization are thus characterized as repressive by Wittendorp. He sees re-integration programs for returnees/ former foreign terrorist fighters as an example of de-securitization. The relation between securitization and repressive policies is however not explained, neither is the relation between de-securitization and reintegration programs.

2.4. The theory of securitization:

The section above, shows the assumption of securitization of a phenomenon, having a repressive effect on policies. However, the theory on securitization, which will be discussed in the section below, does not discuss this effect.

So what is the theory of securitization? The theory of securitization is a product of the Copenhagen School, a School that fits into the tradition of Critical Security Studies. This academic tradition can be described as follows: “Central to CSS is the shared assumption that security threats and insecurities are not simply objects to be studied or problems to be solved, but the product of social and political practices. CSS aims to understand how those practices work and their social and political implications.”23_{It understands security as a practice. Thus}

there are no objective threats that exist outside this human construction of the threat. It is the

20_{Stef Wittendorp, "Displacing The National Security-Narrative: On The (De-)Securitization Of The}

Governmental And Legal Response To ‘Foreign Fighters", Security And Global Affairs: Jihadists In Syria And Iraq, no. 2017 (2017): 18.

21_{Wittendorp, "Displacing The National Security-Narrative”, 18.} 22_{Wittendorp, "Displacing The National Security-Narrative”, 19.}

23_{Claudia Aradau et al., "Introducing Critical Security Methods", in Critical Security Methods: New}

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interpretation by humans that constructs this threat. An issue is constructed into a threat by a speech-act performed by a political actor that transforms the issue at hand into a security issue. The speech act is successful if the actor can convince its target audience that the issue is a security issue. It threatens their way of living or even existence. Securitization theory does assume that successful securitization “generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind".24 This idea of emergency measures gives the impression that it would generate allocation of funds, new policies, etc, that are allocated or generated beyond the normal democratic rules. However, this is not made clear within the theory of securitization studies.

Another form of success of securitization is measured in how well the actor can convince the target audience that the issue is a threat and E. Balzacq broadens this definition by integrating the ‘strategic purposes’ into the theory. Thus not only by defining securitization as a speech act but as a broader contextual discourse. He proposes not only to analyze securitization by analyzing the speech act but also by “the idea that the audience, political agency, and context are crucial if overlooked, aspects of securitization that should guide the analysis of the linguistic manufacture of threats in world politics.”25_{The fact that}

there is a change expected in the way an issue is dealt with once the security gaze is applied, implies that this security gaze has a certain performative effect. “It shapes its understanding of the problem at hand according to the aspects that define this gaze”.26_{So the language or}

speech act used that is used to define the security gaze has an influence on the response and measures. Securitization studies focuses on analyzing the act and the likely results: extraordinary measures of that act, but not on analyzing the results of securitization in the measures themselves.27

So what are the effects of securitization on a policy? In multiple studies securitization is linked to restrictive measures in policies, as the examples in the section above of Van Ginkel, De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Wittendorp show. Since securitization is focussed on a threat it is possible to assume that more restrictive measures will be the result of a securitized

24_{Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security : A New Framework For Analysis Boulder}

CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, 5.

25_{Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces Of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience And Context",}

European Journal Of International Relations 11 (2005): 173.

26_{Wittendorp, "Displacing The National Security-Narrative”, 19.}

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policy. However the securitization theory does not trouble itself with the outcome of securitization, merely the process is described and analyzed. The theory does state that extraordinary measures are used that can go beyond “otherwise binding rules and regulations”. The authors that introduce the study of securitization, Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde also conclude that securitization it goes ‘beyond politics’ gives it a negative connotation as being something that is not wanted or undemocratic.28 Therefore more hard, or relatively unethical measures are to be expected. Measures that would require new or revised laws via an undemocratic path of construction. This is also the interpretation of Bourbeau in his study of the securitization of migration he defines the process of securitization as “integrating discursively and institutionally an issue into security frameworks that emphasize policing, control and defense.” Still, this does not offer a characterization of policies that are affected by securitization. It again gives in a certain connotation. To give this characterization in this thesis, the nature of preventive and repressive policies and measures are explored under the next heading. Is this also the case for the policies regarding returnees in the Netherlands?

2.5. Preventive and repressive: Soft and hard

For the analysis of the policies regarding returnees, this paragraph will define what is meant when we talk about policies and the range measures that they can include. The policies discussed in this thesis are part of Dutch public policy. Public Policy is the result of: “a strategic action led by a public authority to limit or increase the presence of certain phenomena within the population”.29_{The characterization of these policies is often divided}

into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ measures. In the academic literature about soft versus hard policies, these types of characterization are used to delineate different policy measures and methods from one another.30 Hard policy measures range from implementation for legislation or regulation and when non-compliance occurs there is a sanction.31 Especially this possibility of sanctions is what gives it the characterization of being ‘hard’ and thus repressive. Soft

28_{Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis, 23.}

29_{"CCNPPS > What We Do", Ncchpp.Ca, Last modified 2020,}

http://www.ncchpp.ca/62/what-we-do.ccnpps

30_{Kerry J. Kennedy, Jacqueline Kin-Sang Chan, and Ping Kwan Fok. "Holding Policy-Makers to}

Account: Exploring "Soft" and "Hard" Policy and the Implications for Curriculum Reform." London Review of Education 9, no. 1 (2011): 44.

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policy on the other hand is linked to measures such as “recommendations, education campaigns and strong advocacy”.32_{Thus soft and hard policies have the same goals, the}

means however are different and the characterization given to both are different. Where the hard policy is repressive, soft policy is more preventive-oriented.

Soft and hard measures in counterterrorism policies, more specifically policies in response to the foreign fighter phenomenon, are described by Christophe Paulussen:

“[new laws and measures] could be divided into ‘soft’, preventive measures, such as inter-cultural and interreligious dialogue, engagement with Islamic communities and the use of counternarratives/messages, and ‘hard’, repressive measures, such as the deprivation of nationality and criminal prosecutions.” “This of course does not preclude some repressive measures also having a preventive dimension. In fact, one can see a trend in which criminal law is increasingly used as a preventive tool, with a stronger focus on the prosecution of preparatory acts. (...) however these kinds of examples are not viewed as ‘proper’ preventive measures seeking to remove the underlying causes of why people may engage in criminal conduct in the first place.”33

Paulussen thus gives a more fitting definition for the measures that are to be expected specifically in the policy domain of counter-terrorism. The nuance that certain repressive measures also have a preventive tool is clearifies the grey-areaś between soft and hard measures. Also hard and repressive are linked.

Jessica Stern describes the meaning of soft measures in counterterrorism as follows: “seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual’s return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts.”34_{Thus according to Stern preventive measures}

focusses on radicalization. The link between soft measures and deradicalization efforts is also interesting since it links a clear goal to these soft policy measures.

32_{Kennedy et al., “Holding Policy- Makers to account”, 44.}

33_{Christophe Paulussen, "Repressing The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon In Western Europe:}

Towards An Effective Response Based On Human Rights", ICCT Research Paper (Online) 7, no. 10 (2016):4

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The division between soft and hard measures will serve as a analytical tool for this thesis in answering the question whether in a certain time period, measures regarding returnees can be characterized as hard or repressive. Repressive measures, thus ‘hard measures’, are measures that pertain to: criminal law/ judicial such as the deprivation of nationality but are also restrictive in freedom and can include sanctions.

Soft measures are: Preventive oriented and thus focussed on radicalisation/de-radicalisation. Seek the engagement of communities and “seek to remove underlying the underlying causes why people may engage in criminal conduct in the first place” and a return to society.

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3. Methodological framework

3.1. Introduction

As the main question of this research focuses on the securitization of the returnee phenomenon and its influence/ on Dutch national policy regarding the phenomenon. This means that this study is a case study of the influence of securitization on public policy. The theory of securitization is tested and expanded through the use of empirical data collected within the case of the returnee phenomenon and its policies within the Dutch national context.

This is done by analyzing the language used in these policies through discourse analysis. This method of analysis will be explained further below. To be able to answer the main question, the language of securitization is explained.

This analysis is strengthened by using interviews with different policymakers on the subject of returnees in three (or more) through interviews. This to offer an extra check on the effects of securitized language in policy in practice.

An extra check is the pre-securitized period of returnees, before 2014 (2012-2014) and the securitized period from 2014 on (2014-2019). By comparing the two it will be possible to distinguish the changes in the policies regarding returnees within the securitized period.

These different methods used in combination offer a scientific triangulation. The idea behind this triangulation is that it offers more perspectives and thus strengthens the analysis and provides an accurate conclusion.35

3.2 Method of data analysis: Discourse analysis

As was mentioned before this study will use discourse analysis to analyze the policy sources. Discourse analysis is an often-used method to analyze securitization. Discourse analysis analyzes why and what meaning is given to an abstract concept, and is thus often used to analyze speech acts. It analyzes the products of writing and talking, thus language and how

35_{Lawrence W. Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative And Quantitative Approaches, 7th ed.}

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this language is used in the meaning-making of an issue. Thus in this study, we will analyze the language surrounding the returnee phenomenon (and by default foreign fighters) in the case mentioned below (See: Case study selection).

So what is discourse?

“Discourse as a singular type of competence is always implicit in dialogues and conversations - that is, it is an overriding mode of speaking and cultural thinking that works its way into dialogues and conversations. The latter two are its manifestations and though these we can reconstruct the nature of discourse and how it both shapes and reveals specific kinds of worldview.”36

Thus discourse is about language and is a medium for analysis of worldviews. This means it is a culturally and historically decided social construction. It functions in the following way: “The ways we use language in conversations constitute primary vehicles for establishing, maintaining, defining, and cuing social relations, roles, categories, and above all else a way of viewing the world.”37_{Thus it is the discourse and the meaning-making within this}

discourse that decides power relations between different people and different groups. This reveals “shared values, worldview, beliefs and biases.”38_{Thus it also functions as a way to}

decide identity and what distinguishes your group from the other. 39 This relates to the function of intertextuality “or the ability to directly or indirectly allude ideas and texts that have special value to the group.”40

So what do we analyze when we analyze discourse? We analyze how others interpret the world.41_{We do this by searching for labels, values and qualities, metaphors, and}

concepts. In this thesis this is redefined in marginalized and dominant patterns, Selves and Time according to Hansen.

36_{Marcel Danesi and Sara Greco, Case Studies In Discourse Analysis Munchen: LINCOM Studies in}

Pragmatics, 2016, 12.

37_{Danesi and Greco, Case Studies In Discourse Analysis, 13.} 38_{Danesi and Greco, Case Studies In Discourse Analysis, 14.}

39_{Stef Wittendorp, "Method Lab Discourse Analysis (1)", Lecture, Faculty of Governance and Global}

Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, 2019, slide 11.

40_{Danesi and Greco, Case Studies In Discourse Analysis, 14.} 41_{Wittendorp, "Method Lab Discourse Analysis (1)", slide 7.}

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As a way to structure the discourse analysis, this thesis will follow Hansen’s four dimensions for structuring discourse analysis. These dimensions are: Intertextual Model, Selves, Time, and Event. In discourse analysis, multiple intertextual models can be used. The difference between the models is the analytical focus, the object of analysis, and the goal of the analysis. For this thesis model 1, which focuses on the official statements by institutions and model 2 that focuses on the wider political debate will be used. Therefore a combination of the object of analysis will be official texts but also political texts and parliamentary debates on the subject will be used. As long as it makes a statement about official policies. The goal of the analysis is to define the response of official discourse on critical discourses. The second dimension of the Selves focuses on the actors to be researched. As was defined in the research question the focus of this research will be on Dutch policy. The Selves to be researched are therefore the Dutch government and parliament and corresponding governmental institutions, that produce these policies. The third dimension of Hansen is Time. In this thesis, the cases will illustrate a longer historical period and not one moment in time. In regards to the events used, there is only one in this thesis. The event is the Dutch returnee, and therefore this study will focus on the responses of the Selves, to the event, which in this case is the policy issue of returnees. In order to answer the main question of this research, a comparative temporal angle is used. The comparison of the pre-2014 returnee policies and the post-2014 till present policies.

Since discourse analysis is in itself a constructed method of analysis that relies heavily on its underlying theory of the social construction of language, it poses a few limitations. Although the method is widely accepted and used, there are a lot of different approaches used in its analysis. Phillips et al, detail a theoretical debate amongst scholars on the true reflection of reality the results of discourse analysis would pertain to. However, they conclude: “Discourse analysis has proved a useful theoretical framework for understanding the social production of organizational and inter-organizational phenomena.” Its use for this thesis is that the process of securitization in itself is a language construction, by the transformation of an issue into a threat by speech-acts. Therefore discourse analysis is a useful method when studying securitization.

3.3. The language of securitization:

In order to select the right discourse, the following paragraph will deal with the language of securitization: what does the theory say about this? However, to be able to make un-

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predestined interpretation, as the method of discourse analysis support/underscores, this will not be used as the framework for analysis. However, it is important to make the right claims so this frame of securitization language is purely meant as a further insight into the securitization theory. Therefore we will further define the speech-act of the securitization process.

As the founders of securitization theory, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, write in their book ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, a securitization speech-act is not decided by the use of the word ‘Security’.42_{However, an issue has to be defined as an}

existential threat, requiring the emergency measures that are often associated with security issues. It is assumed that when one talks of the security issue the emergency is implied and thus does not have to be prevalent in the language of the securitizing actor. However, it is still important that the audience accepts this language of threat construction.

Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde see the security argument constructed as follows: “They are about the future, about alternative futures - always hypothetical- and about counterfactuals. A security argument always involves two predictions: What will happen if we do not take “security action” (the threat), and what will happen if we do (how is the submitted security policy supposed to work? ).43_{A successful speech act, therefore, is:}

“ a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, a possible way out- the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and so on.”44

This frame leaves room to the author for the interpretation of the securitized policies and therefore will be something to look out for in the analytical chapters of this thesis. In chapter four it will be analyzed if the language used is securitized. In the following chapters this language is put into relation with the characterization of the measures that were introduced in the examined periods. In these chapters, chapters 5 and 6, this frame is a guideline for analysis. In the analyzed documents regarding policies for returnees the characterization of measures will be used: Is this measure in line with the securitized

42_{Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security : A New Framework For Analysis, 27.} 43_{Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security : A New Framework For Analysis, 27} 44_{Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security : A New Framework For Analysis, 33.}

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language and how can it thus be ordered in the category of hard or soft policy measures. This means that a certain codification is not used. However the meaning of certain phrases as securitized will be related to the characterization of the measure that it promotes.

3.4. Method of data collection: Expert Interviews

As a form of scientific triangulation of research methods, the method of the interview is included in this thesis. It is used as a check of the initial discourse analysis and thus will serve as a medium of supplementation to the initial analysis. The interviews were conducted with four different policy makers within three different municipalities within the Netherlands that are already dealing with the returnee phenomenon or expect to be in the future, and thus fall under the category of expert interview. There is a methodological debate on the use of expert interviews opposed to more quantitative methods such a survey.45 However in this thesis the expert interview provide insights into the practice of policy and measures regarding returnees in relation to the theory of securitization. This theory is too complex to translate into a survey. Also the limited data on policies used by municipalities justifies the use of interviews with policy advisors regarding policies on returnees for different municipalities. They provide a needed insight into the experience of municipalities with policies regarding returnees.

The method of interviews can be seen as a face to face data-collection method. In this thesis, the conversational approach is used. This secures that the questions are answered interpreted in the way the interviewer meant. It also provides direct answers to specific questions. In the appendix, the transcribed interviews can be found.

3.5. Case study selection:

As was mentioned before this thesis uses the case of the securitized returnee phenomenon in the Netherlands. In order to test the theory of securitization and what it means for policy. The case study method is often used in qualitative research. It offers in-depth orientation on a case and emerges the researcher in its subject. Case study research the case’s internal features as well as the context. The method is suitable for discourse analysis since it offers the best results in reshaping theory. One of the aims of this thesis. It is very suitable for in-depth research into a certain phenomenon, such as the returnee policies in the Netherlands. The case

45_{Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz, Interviewing Experts London: Palgrave}

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study method relates “The micro-level to the macro-level”.46_{In this case, the smaller case of}

securitization within the returnee policies in the Netherlands is used to connect to the macro theory of securitization.

In this thesis, the temporal comparison between two periods is used. The pre-2014 case is compared to the post-2014 case of policies regarding jihadist returnees. 2014 is used as a demarcation since this is year researchers see securitization of the returnee phenomenon happen in western society, as was mentioned in the preface to the thesis. However, in the discourse analysis in chapter 4 must prove if securitization is also visible in policy documents.

3.6. Data Collection and sources:

Since the aim of this research is to measure securitization in returnee policies in the Netherlands, it is obvious that statements relating to these policies will form the basis of data collection. Therefore primary and secondary source data will be used for analysis. More specifically government developed materials will be gathered. This ranges from policy briefs to government reports and output generated by the Dutch parliament. This preludes to the declarative policy made by the following Dutch national institutes: The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), The Dutch intelligence services (AIVD), the Military Intelligence Service (MIVD), The Dutch National Police (Nationale Politie). These agencies are all a part of the Ministry of Security and Justice (V&J) or the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), so the products regarding returnees of these ministries will also be analyzed. The declarative policy is “policy that is included in action plans and strategies.”47_{As was mentioned above, the data used for this research is found in}

publicly available governmental products. Also, some statements by national politicians such as the prime minister and other ministers, about the Dutch national policy regarding returnees will be used to illustrate the cases.

The gathered data is also demarcated on a temporal basis, from the first wave of foreign fighters that left for Syria or Iraq from the Netherlands in late 2012 on till present. As

46_{Neuman, Social Research Methods, 42.}

47_{S. Wittendorp, R. de Bont, J.H. de Roy van Zuijdewijn and E. Bakker, Dealing with Jihadism: A}

Policy Comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US (2010 to 2017), 2017, ISGA Report, 8.

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was mentioned in the analysis differentiation is made between the 2012-2014 case and the 2014 - present case.

The documents to be analyzed are open-source documents as provided by government websites. They mainly include the Dutch National Threat Assessment (DTN) made by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security. These documents are produced approximately four times a year to inform the parliament. These are often accompanied by policy letters by the responsible minister: the minister for Justice and Security which is often also named the minister for Security and Justice in the studied period. These letters explain policy actions that are already taken and are intended to be made by the ministry to combat threats named in the DTN. Sometimes specific documents explaining certain policy strategies are published separately. As is the case for the, in this thesis immensely important, The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism and the factsheet returnees. Some institutions other than the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security offer some perspective on policies taken, such as the public prosecution office (Openbaar Ministerie, OM).

On municipal level documentation is less freely available. Thus interviews with policy advisors offer an insight into missing documentation. However in national policy documents, much is said about policies on a municipal level.

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4. Discourse Analysis of policy

documents 2012-2019

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the policy documents of the Dutch national government during the period 2014-2019 regarding returning foreign fighters are analyzed. This analysis focuses on the construction of the threat in these documents and asks: is this securitized language? The method of analysis is discourse analysis, which was explicated in the methodological chapter of this thesis. The question which will be the focus in the chapter, is: In what way and to what extent is a threat constructed by the Dutch government in its policy documents for the period 2012-2019? As was mentioned in the methodological chapter, the documents under review are the Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism, and the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN; Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland), where the latter serves as the main source. The accompanying policy letters written by the minister of Justice and Security (or Security and Justice), describing the policy implications to the respective dtn’s, are the main component used since they describe policy measures.

The construction of the threat in these policy documents was reviewed and can be explicated in two-fold: the nature of the threat and the way to protect from the threat. This is according to the securitization theory’s view on the construction of the threat. The nature of the threat can be seen as follows: there is a real threat, it is complicated or broad and it is long term. The protection from the threat is constructed as follows: we protect the Dutch rule of law, we protect by an international approach and we protect by intensifying measures. Each of these steps will be explicated below and with each of its chronological order.

In documents regarding the National Counter-Terrorism strategy 2011-2015, it is international jihadism that is named as the most likely threat against the Netherlands. This policy focuses on the prevention of terrorist attacks from the outside. However, there is a certain marginal focus on the Dutch jihadist traveling abroad and joining transnational networks of jihadists.48_{There is a focus on prevention and certain self-knowledge regarding}

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the ‘war on terrorism’: “what this strategy expressly does not intend to be is a renewed ‘war on terrorism’, an incitement to battle a specific religious minority groups or a Dutch contribution to the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’”.49_{Even the possibility of reproduction of}

the threat gets attention in this specific policy.50 An important note to make is that this policy clearly states that: “Terrorism cannot be combated exclusively with the help of criminal law and the punishment of perpetrators (...) in tackling terrorism it is therefore inevitable that we focus on prevention.”51_{However, it goes on to argue to make legal action in an earlier phase}

possible. This paragraph illustrates the point of origin in which the next few years of contra-terrorism policy is based upon. In this way, it creates a starting point for this thesis in its analysis of policy documents in successive years. However, it is important to notice that this policy regards international jihadism and terrorism and is not specific to jihadist travelers and returnees, a phenomenon that existed but not too worrisome extent.

4.2. The nature of the threat: the unknown but real threat

In the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands number 28 (from hereon the Dutch acronym DTN will be used), made by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (from hereon the Dutch acronym NCTV will be used), published in March 2012 the main focus is on jihadism, specifically the international networks of jihadist organizations. There is marginal attention for possible returning jihadist foreign fighters but there is little focus on Dutch jihadist travelers, but still, it is named as a concern. The measure of taking the Dutch citizenship (a measure that is later implemented) from jihadist travelers is already considered at this stage, even before the first large ‘wave’ or group of Dutch jihadist travelers traveled to Syria.52

In the DTN 29, the dominant pattern is the threat the international jihadist networks, however, Salafism is named for the first time as an ideology that could be worrisome. It is however not yet directly linked to radicalization and foreign jihadist travel. The concern about jihadist travelers is still there because there is an increase in persons traveling abroad to join jihadist groups. The threat that these persons pose is emphasized by pointing out the

49_{"Nationale Contra-Terrorismestrategie 2011-2015". Den Haag, 2011, 22.} 50_{"Nationale Contra-Terrorismestrategie 2011-2015". Den Haag, 2011, 28.} 51_{"Nationale Contra-Terrorismestrategie 2011-2015". Den Haag, 2011, 99.}

52_{Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid. "Samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld}

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unclear and unknown nature of the threat. However, this is nuanced “there are no indications for a functional relation between an attack and the stay of the perpetrator in the border area of Afghanistan or Pakistan.”53_{This shows the marginal and underlying pattern of phrasing the}

unknown nature of jihadist foreign travel as an unknown threat. In October of that same year, the DTN 30 report is released, and its tone starts to get more urgent regarding jihadist travel and jihadist groups within the Netherlands. The dividing line between non-violent Islamist activism and jihadism is described as being fluid. They describe the danger of further radicalization of these groups that would make it possible that they would allow and or promote the use of violence in the future. However, the threat of returnee is not a pattern in this document.

This changes in the DTN 32 (march 2013) when it becomes apparent that a larger amount of Dutch citizens have traveled to Syria to fight against the Assad regime, mostly motivated by jihadist groups and ideology. It is in this DTN that the first characterization of the threat that returnees would pose is given by the NCTV:

“ Jihadist travelers may pose a threat to Western interests in the areas in which they are active. In addition, travelers who succeed in reaching their destination can once again encourage new jihad motivated to travel by others. Upon their return, there is a possibility that they have gained ‘street credibility’ because of their battle experience and there is a risk that they will exert influence on radicalization-prone youngsters. Furthermore, they can turn to targets in the Netherlands.”54

This emphasis on this new phenomenon by this security service must also be seen in addition to an earlier observation made by the NCTV in DTN 31(December 2012). In this DTN the NCTV observes that the attention in Dutch society for subjects such as radicalization and terrorism has decreased over the past few years. They see this as a point for concern.55 In DTN 32 the threat of jihadist travelers and returnees is again problematized, they see big

Terrorisme Nederland 29". Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2012.4.

Terrorisme Nederland 32". Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2013, 4.

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challengers regarding the phenomenon in the future which emphasizes the unclear and uncertain nature of the threat as named in earlier DTN’s. In DTN 34 (November 2013), the unclarity of the threat is mythicized further. It is no longer just unknown but also a disguised threat. How it is ‘disguised’ is not explicated, however, it is clear to the NCTV that this disguised threat needs a “refined” approach.56_{Finally, in DTN 35 (February 2014) the}

jihadist travelers are considered to be the main threat described in the DTN. Returnees however are not yet considered to be the main threat or component of the threat posed by jihadist travelers.

This changed after the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels by a French jihadist traveler who had participated in the war in Syria. The NCTV related this attack directly to the threat that returning jihadist travelers pose to Europe and The Netherlands: “But with the murders in Brussels, that which European Counter-terrorism agencies, including the AIVD and the NCTV, have warned about in the past months has passed: the specific threat that the approximately 3000 European Syria-travellers pose.”57 In later DTNs such as DTN 37 and 38, the complexity of the returnee threat is further explicated and its complexity is emphasized. However, it is again related to the broader jihadist threat that has played such a big role in the past 20 years of western threat assessments. After 2016 the unknown nature of the threat is no longer cited in the threat assessments, returnees however are.

4.3. The Nature of the threat: The complex or broad threat.

The complexity of the threat is of course related to the previous paragraph which describes the construction of the unknown nature of the threat. The focus in this paragraph, however, is focussed more on the broadening of the threat in the DTN documents and shows how the threat continually being complicated in these documents.

In DTN 29 (June 2012) there is concern expressed about the increasing number of persons traveling abroad with jihadist intentions. The word that is related to this increase in the number of jihadist travelers is ‘diffuse’, which relates to the unknown nature of the

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threat.58_{In the successive DTN, the threat is related to radicalization but not further}

explicated. However, as we have seen in the previous paragraph in the DTN 32 the threat as seen by the NCTV is discussed extensively. The main part of the threat however is focussed on the incentive these jihadist travelers could give to others. So the focus is still on jihadist travel, and a minor pattern is the threat they could pose on their return. 59 This shows a marginal pattern of fear for returnees. However, in that same document, the threat that returnees pose is broadened or explicated further: “Returnees, of whom some may be very radicalized and prepared to use violence may pose a threat.”60

In the successive DTN 33, the components that make up the threat of returnees is again added on to. The radical and the preparedness to use violence were cited in earlier DTN’s are supplemented with traumatization that might have happened by their witnessing or participating in battle.61_{In DTN 33, the open borders in Europe are first cited as being a}

component of the threat posed by returnees. The open borders would make it easier for foreign fighters to return under the radar. This concurs with the first return of Dutch jihadist foreign fighters from Syria.62 This return of Dutch foreign fighters, but especially the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels by a French returnee seems to have had an accelerating effect on the description and content of the threat posed by returnees in the documents and policies described in the DTN by the NCTV. The threat and problem posed by returnees are now posed as follows: Their numbers, the internal jihadist threat that could pose for Dutch society, their battle readiness, their role in further facilitating and recruiting others and it

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being a European problem due to the open borders.63_{In the DTN 36 ( June 2014), the threat}

is added on to further described as a ‘sustainable and comprehensive threat’.

This further complexity of the comprehensive threat posed by returnees results in August of 2014 in the ‘The Netherlands Comprehensive action program to combat jihadism’, which describes the measures taken or that could be taken by national but also local governments to address the broader threat of jihadism but is specially designed to prevent jihadist travel to Syria and Iraq, but also describes measures taken or that can be taken against returning foreign fighters. However, this shows that there is a quick shift going on in this time period, from a focus on mainly jihadist travelers and returnees, to again the broader jihadist problem.64_{At this same time, it is emphasized that the new ‘Comprehensive Action}

Programme to combat jihadism’ might not be future-proof according to the NCTV. They see radicalization and terrorism as a continuously changing phenomenon that may warrant new action in the future. This shows that the threat is always undergoing new complication of the nature of the threat and makes way for new measures that might be applied in the future.65

In 2015 there is a new focus on the local or internal terrorist, someone that might not even have traveled to Syria or Iraq to fight for jihadist groups or lived in the caliphate of IS, but could be tasked by these organizations with. This threat is further explained in the DTN 39:

“The complexity is mainly the result of the diversity of actors and the interaction between them. The threat is posed by individuals (whether or not inspired by calls to action from conflict zones), transnationally run or facilitated networks, sleeper cells, and disturbed individuals who may attempt to carry out copycat attacks. (...) whether returnees or

Terrorisme Nederland 35". Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2014, 2-6.