Combatting irregular migration from West Africa : a study on the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts

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Combatting Irregular Migration

from West Africa

A Study on the Effectiveness of the

EU Migration Compacts

University of Amsterdam

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations

Name: A.M.L. (Marlinda) van der Hoff Student number: 10591354

Date: 23 June 2017

Supervisor: prof. dr. Jonathan Zeitlin Second reader: dr. Saskia Bonjour

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Preface

After having spent the past semester on this Master thesis, I can say that I am very happy with the results. However, it has not been an easy process, as I experienced a high political sensitivity surrounding the topic of EU migration policies. Despite my eagerness to conduct interviews with policy-officers on the negotiation process surrounding the EU migration compacts, I did not receive any significant responses. This led to a change in the original research approach, of which this thesis is the result. Nevertheless, I regret that I have not been able to zoom in on interaction processes between the negotiating parties, which had my original interest.

My thesis supervisor, prof. dr. Jonathan Zeitlin, has helped me through this tough process and guided me in the set-up of my research approach in an outstanding fashion. He has consistently explained his views with regard to the thesis, attentively read and commented on my draft versions, and answered any of my questions which I had sent to him. His guidance in steering me in the right direction has been highly valuable, and I would like to thank him for his supervision. In addition, I would like to thank my friend, Sezen de Bruijn, for having a final critical look on the reasoning steps in this thesis.

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Abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States) AFSJ Area of freedom, security and justice

AQIM Al-Qaida in the Maghreb

AU African Union

CAMM Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility CIGEM Migration Information and Management Centre

(of the Republic of Mali)

CMC Crisis Management Concept

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EDF European Development Fund

EEAS European External Action Service EPA Economic Partnership Agreement

EU European Union

EUCAP European Union Capacity Building

EUTF EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa

EUTM European Union Training Mission

Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency

(successor of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union as of 6 October 2016)

GAMM Global Approach on Migration and Mobility IOM International Organization for Migration JHA Justice and Home Affairs

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NAPTIP National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters

(of the Federal Republic of Nigeria)

NCFRMI National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons

(of the Federal Republic of Nigeria)

NIS Nigeria Immigration Service

NNVS Nigerian National Volunteer Service PSC Political and Security Committee SOP Standard Operating Procedure

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Introduction

On 19 April 2015, a shipwreck off the coast of Italy was estimated to have killed up to 850 passengers. It was described as the worst disaster involving the flow of migrants seeking to reach Europe across the Mediterranean Sea (see e.g. Reuters 2015; The Guardian 2015a; The Washington Post 2015; CNN 2015). Nevertheless, numerous similar “humanitarian tragedies” in the Mediterranean Sea had already preceded this horrible event, and more mass drownings were to follow.

Solving the “migrant crisis” became a political priority for the EU. One of the points on the new European Agenda on Migration (which was published in May 2015) was to “work together with partner countries to put in place concrete measures to prevent hazardous journeys” (European Commission 2015a: 5) in the fight against irregular migration to the EU. A little over a year later, in June 2016, this broad objective was translated into a new Partnership Framework on Migration, which articulates the need for comprehensive cooperation with countries of origin and transit in the form of tailor-made migration compacts with, amongst others, a number of West African countries: Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal (European Commission 2016b). With these migration compacts, the EU has attempted to take new measures with these partner countries in order to, for instance, address the root causes of irregular migration or enhance the return rate of irregular migrants in Europe.

Whereas the EU has, from time to time, reported on successes of the migration compacts (see e.g. Maurice 2016; EURACTIV 2016; The Guardian 2016b), there has been criticism as well, e.g. from scientists. Remarks have been made, for instance, about possibly unwelcome effects of a strong migration focus of EU development policy (see e.g. Castillejo 2016), about the misimpression of statistics showing an enormous decrease in the number of migrants being smuggled from Niger (see e.g. Tinti 2017b), about the short-term focus of the efforts by the EU (see e.g. Furness 2016), or about the (lack of) ownership of the partner countries with regard to the migration compacts (see e.g. Massarenti 2016). Ultimately, these remarks can be traced back to the question whether the migration compacts are actually effective; that is, to what extent the migration compacts have actually initiated new activities and what their effects have been.

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This has raised my interest in assessing the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts from a scientific point of view as well. One might question to what extent the EU is able to implement its policies in regions in the world which fall outside of the scope of the legal and institutional boundaries of the EU. Moreover, one might wonder which factors play a role in determining to what extent the EU is able to execute new policies in the West African partner countries. One could consider, for instance, the interests of the EU and the partner countries; the bargaining power of the EU; the capacities of the EU on certain policy areas; or the ability of partner countries to successfully participate in the migration compacts and implement the desired policies. These considerations have led to the following research question, which I attempt to answer in this thesis: to what extent have the elements of the EU migration compacts in West African countries been effective, and how can the effectiveness be explained?

This thesis zooms in on the efforts of the EU surrounding the migration compacts; that is, on the instruments which the EU has used in order to implement new rules or policies in the partner countries – Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal – with the aim of reaching the goals as described in the Partnership Framework on Migration. In this sense, it concerns the efforts of the EU from approximately early 2016 – when the EU started to invest in its “new” external migration policies in the partner countries – to early 2017 (in light of the data available). These efforts were made on various policy areas linked to the external migration policies. For instance, in order to reduce the outflow of irregular migrants from West Africa, the EU was determined to invest in the socio-economic development of the partner countries, border management, as well as combatting migrant smuggling. Moreover, the EU had identified the issues of return and readmission and legal migration as crucial parts of the migration compacts (European Commission 2016b). In this sense, the EU migration compacts consisted of different elements. In accordance, this thesis zooms in on the efforts of the EU with regard to the different elements of the migration compacts.

It is important to know that the migration compacts do not reflect completed packages of identified policy areas and concomitant rules and policies to be implemented in the partner countries concerned. One can deduct from the progress reports on the EU Partnership Framework (European Commission 2016e, 2016f, 2017b) that the migration compacts reflect a process of continued negotiation between the EU and the partner countries on the framework of cooperation on migration and on the accompanying rules and policies which follow from it. Hence, in the research on the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts, the latter refer to the processes in which the EU and the partner countries identify the elements of the migration compacts and elaborate on them by implementing new rules and policies.

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This research takes the EU external governance approach as its theoretical framework. Within this framework, a number of theories are distinguished which try to explain the effectiveness of EU external governance; that is, the extent to which the EU can exert its influence on partner countries in the process of making and executing new policies on their territory. In this thesis, these theories are tested in the context of EU external migration policies in West African countries. With this, the conclusions of this thesis build on existing scientific research on other policy areas and in other regions in the world, and contribute to a more holistic comprehension and assessment of the validity of the EU external governance theories. Moreover, a better understanding on EU external governance with respect to different policy areas and different regions in the world could help policy-officers in realistically assessing their options and chances on EU external policies – for instance on migration – based on which they could adapt their political strategies.

Prior to the data analysis, this thesis firstly provides a historical overview of the policy framework and instruments on migration within which the EU migration compacts can be understood. The second chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework of EU external governance, in which the concept of “effectiveness” is further defined and six hypotheses are formulated for explaining the effectiveness of EU external governance. This chapter is followed by an elaboration on the research design in this thesis.

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1. Historical overview: migration policies in West African countries

Examining the historical development of the policy framework and instruments on migration provides a context within which the EU migration compacts can be understood. The first section zooms in on the phenomenon of migration from West Africa to Europe and its characteristics. In the second section, the historical development of the policy framework and instruments on migration will be elaborated. The third section zooms in on the EU’s policy responses to the “migrant crisis” of 2015, and introduces the new policy frameworks and instruments that have been set up.

1.1 Migration from West Africa

Every year, thousands of Africans try to make the dangerous journey to Europe through crossing the Mediterranean Sea, with the risk to become subject to human rights violations as a result of human smuggling. Record numbers of African migrants have been arriving in Italy, with around 170,000 on an annual basis, and around 4,000 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea each year. Moreover, a number of migrants varying from around 200,000 up to one million are estimated to be waiting in Libya to cross this sea (see e.g. The Guardian 2015b; The Telegraph 2016; IOM 2017a). These migrants mostly come from West African countries and from the Horn of Africa. Politicians and media have oftentimes referred to this phenomenon as a “plague”, “invasion” or “flood”, which not only suggests xenophobic attitudes toward these migrants, but also indicates the extremity or vastness of the issue that Europe is perceived to be facing (see e.g. De Haas 2008; Flahaux & De Haas 2014).

Given the extensive attention to the phenomenon of irregular migration in recent years, one could assume that migration from the African to the European continent is a relatively new phenomenon. However, irregular migration from Africa to Europe has been taking place for many decades. Nevertheless, a number of changes can be witnessed with regard to migration trends in and from West Africa. Firstly, the number of people that choose Europe as their destination has been increasing tremendously (Flahaux & De Haas 2014). The increases in the number of migrants leaving Libya and crossing the Mediterranean Sea can be explained by

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Libya’s restrictive immigration policies in the early 2000s and by the instability in Libya of the past six years, which has also disrupted regional labor markets (De Haas 2008; Migration Policy Centre 2013; Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke 2015; Ceesay 2017). Secondly, due to the changing demography in West Africa, most of the migrant population consists of youth (Ceesay 2017).

Another myth to be unraveled consists of the belief that irregular migration is solely directed toward the European continent. In contrast, a closer look shows that migration mostly takes place among West African countries themselves (see e.g. Flahaux & De Haas 2014; ICMPD & IOM 2015). A relevant policy instrument in this respect is the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol (1979) which, inter alia, gives citizens of ECOWAS member states the right to stay in an ECOWAS country other than their country of origin for up to ninety days without a visa (provided they possess a valid travel document and an international health certificate). Despite discussions on the practicalities and difficulties with regard to the implementation of the rules that are related to this protocol (see e.g. Bolarinwa 2015), it provides a context for under-standing migration within West Africa.

General trends to be witnessed regarding the countries in West Africa are a deterioration of security, high levels of unemployment, and droughts and other natural disasters (IOM n.d.-b). This creates a mixed picture of what the drivers of irregular migration could be. The concept of mixed migration is oftentimes used to point out that irregular migration can be, or often is, driven by a combination of factors, and hence that the categorization of migrants poses difficulties (see e.g. Van Hear 2011; Kumin 2014; Palm 2016; Wittenberg 2017). Nevertheless, on average less than thirty percent of the migrants who have arrived in Europe irregularly are granted asylum or subsidiary protection (Eurostat 2016).

1.2 Development of EU policy frameworks on migration

As was mentioned in the previous section, managing migration from abroad has been a key issue for West European countries. Although these countries set up and deployed measures within their own territory with the aim of limiting immigration, the necessity for an EU external dimension of migration policy increased due to the inadequacy of domestic border controls in managing migration. This external dimension has mostly dealt with migration control, e.g. by strengthening border controls, combatting illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking, or returning irregular migrants. Moreover, it has contained the element of prevention of irregular migration, e.g. by changing the factors that influence people’s decisions to move (Boswell

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2003). Here, the EU has been attempting to achieve its policy objectives by establishing partner-ships with countries of origin and/or transit (see e.g. Carrera, Radescu & Reslow 2015).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, entered into force in 1999), with its introduction of the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), forms the legal basis of the EU’s external migration policies. As this treaty moved cooperation on immigration and asylum from the third pillar of the EU – Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – to the first pillar – the European Community – the European Commission was given the legal competence to propose policies on immigration and asylum issues and to negotiate with non-EU member states on these issues (Boswell 2003). The Tampere Council Conclusions (1999) gave further rise to the establish-ment of multi-annual working programmes on the AFSJ, in which policy frameworks – including on (the external dimension of) migration – were further developed. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007, entered into force in 2009) gave the EU the legal competence to conclude agreements with non-EU member states, including on readmission (Wessel, Marin & Matera 2011).

The first elaborate EU policy framework on the objectives, elements and instruments of its external migration policies came with the Global Approach to Migration (European Commission 2005). This called upon the EU to pursue more balanced and comprehensive external migration policies in two respects: firstly the integration of third countries in a dialogue on, and in the implementation of, migration policies; and secondly the extension of the scope of EU external migration policies, e.g. to the policy area of development by means of the migration-development nexus (Kunz & Maisenbacher 2013).

Generally, migration partnerships or mobility partnerships were regarded as key instruments of the Global Approach to Migration (European Commission 2007, 2009). The notion of bilateral partnerships stresses the set-up of cooperative arrangements which facilitate dialogue, capacity building and technical cooperation, and is based on the belief in benefits of migration policies for all parties, as they serve the interests of EU countries, of countries of origin and transit, and of migrants (Kunz, Lavenex & Panizzon 2011; Kunz & Maisenbacher 2013). EU member states played a significant role in the development of these partnerships; within the Council of Ministers, they would always mandate the negotiation of new partnerships and had control over the content of these partnerships (Reslow & Vink 2015).

In particular, the EU negotiated on Mobility Partnerships with a number of third countries to the south and to the east of the EU territory. Each partnership would take the form of a legally non-binding political declaration between interested EU member states, the European Commission and the concerned third country (Reslow 2012; Carrera, Radescu &

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Reslow 2015), which would reflect “the main strategic, comprehensive and long-term cooperation framework for migration management with third countries” (European Commission 2007). By establishing a Mobility Partnership, a third country would commit to readmitting its own nationals, discouraging illegal migration, improving border control, combatting human trafficking, and improving domestic social and economic conditions. In return, the EU – on behalf of the participating EU member states – could offer improved opportunities for legal migration, provide financial and/or technical assistance to help third countries develop their capacity to manage migration, and improve the procedures for issuing visas to nationals of the third country (Reslow 2012; Carrera, Radescu & Reslow 2015).

In 2011 the EU enhanced this comprehensive approach with the announcement of the new Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM), with the aim of ensuring more “coherence and integration” in the EU’s strategies and programmes on migration and mobility, foreign policy and development (European Commission 2011). Hence, the GAMM under-scored the linkages between different policy instruments (e.g. partnerships, dialogues and agreements) and set these within an overarching framework insofar as they address issues of migration and mobility (Carrera, Radescu & Reslow 2015). Furthermore, replacing the earlier Mobility Partnerships, the EU proposed a new instrument, namely the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM), the difference being that visa facilitation agreements and readmission agreements would no longer be necessary elements of a CAMM (Reslow 2012; Carrera, Radescu & Reslow 2015).

1.3 Policy responses to the “migrant crisis”

From 2014 onward, the EU has seen a tremendous increase in the number of irregular migrants reaching its territory by crossing the Mediterranean or Aegean Sea (IOM n.d.-b). The two main routes of attention have been the Eastern route to Greece from Turkey, mostly used by migrants of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan descent, and the Central Mediterranean route to Italy from Libya, mostly used by migrants from West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

In May 2015 the EU presented a new European Agenda on Migration. Aside from proposing a number of immediate actions in response to this high number of arriving migrants, the EU underscored the importance of intensified cooperation with partner countries in order to combat irregular migration (European Commission 2015a). Later that year, a total of 66 countries and related institutions participated in the Valletta Summit on Migration. The participants adopted a political declaration and an action plan focusing on a number of issues:

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addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; enhancing cooperation on legal migration and mobility; reinforcing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; preventing and fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and improving cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.

As documents on follow-up policy decisions generally contain references to the Joint Valletta Action Plan, the latter can be seen as an umbrella framework within which policies have been further developed and implemented. In this regard, the following policy frameworks and instruments are worth mentioning. Firstly, an EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa was launched at the Valletta Summit, with a focus on the Sahel region, the Lake Chad area, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The total value of this fund amounts to €1.8 billion, originating from the EU budget and some additional contributions from European countries. Secondly, in June 2016 the EU launched a new Partnership Framework on Migration, laying the foundations of an enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility with countries of origin and transit (European Commission 2016b). However, despite the fact that large efforts have been made on enhancing cooperation on migration with countries of origin and transit, this had not yet resulted in a decreasing number of migrants that attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya and surrounding countries (European Commission 2017b).

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2. Theoretical framework: EU external governance

In order to answer the research question of this thesis, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework that provides an understanding of the various aspects of the research subject which are to be studied. The first section introduces the EU external governance approach, which forms the theoretical framework of this thesis, and elaborates on the phenomenon of influence under network governance. In the second section, the concept of “effectiveness” is further defined. In the third section, various factors which could explain the effectiveness of external governance are elaborated upon from three different perspectives. With this, a total of six hypotheses are formulated for explaining the effectiveness of EU external governance.

2.1 Understanding influence under network governance

The study of European integration comprises a broad research strand which forms a bridge between numerous sub-disciplines of political science, for instance international relations, comparative politics and policy analysis (Jachtenfuchs 2001). Within the study of European integration, the governance approach takes as the research subject “the modes and process patterns of European policy-making and the interaction of public and private actors from the subnational to the supranational level” (Schimmelfennig & Wagner 2004: 657). In other words, whilst focusing on policy-making processes of the EU, one can use the governance approach to analyze the nature of interaction between the multiple actors on various levels which are involved, and to assess when and how the concerning policies are influenced.

Within the governance approach, particular attention is given to the phenomenon of Europeanization, where the focus of research is on the influence of EU policies and political processes on those of other states and institutions as a result of interaction between multiple parties (see e.g. Héritier et al. 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Schimmelfennig & Wagner 2004; Börzel & Risse 2012). With regard to the external dimension of Europeanization, governance – generally typified as “external governance” – refers to the EU’s influence on the domestic processes and policies of non-EU member states, for instance in the light of EU enlargement,

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EU neighborhood policies, and beyond (see e.g. Lavenex & Uçarer 2004; Lavenex 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Börzel & Risse 2012).

The literature on EU external governance distinguishes several modes through which external governance – influence on the domestic processes and policies of non-EU member states – takes place. The traditional mode of governance has been hierarchical governance, as reflected in the traditional “Community” or “Monnet” method, which consists of non-EU member states’ adaption to a predetermined set of EU rules or legislation. This mode of governance is characterized by a vertical process of command and control, as the EU transfers its own acquis communitaire – a predetermined, non-negotiable set of rules – and ensures compliance through regular monitoring mechanisms (see e.g. Lavenex 2008; Lavenex & Wichmann 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Here, the EU generally follows a strategy of conditionality (i.e. reinforcement by reward), where the prospect of large rewards given by the EU – ranging from trade and cooperation agreements to full EU membership – is used by the EU in order to make non-EU member states comply to certain conditions (i.e. existing rules under the acquis communitaire) that the EU has set (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004).

However, the EU is hindered from applying hierarchical governance to the EU migration compacts in West African countries for two reasons. Firstly, the EU is unable to provide sufficient rewards in order to make these countries comply to EU policies on migration. Given that the countries concerned are not eligible for obtaining significant EU rewards, for instance in the form of EU membership – mostly due to their geographical position – these countries fall outside of the scope of the legal and institutional boundaries of the EU (see e.g. Lavenex 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Therefore, these countries are not politically motivated to comply with existing EU rules. Secondly, the process of setting up the migration compacts does not consist of transferring already existing internal EU policies to partner countries in West Africa. Instead, it consists of a process in which policies need to be made in joint collaboration with the partner countries. Here, the EU does not influence the domestic processes and policies of the partner countries by projecting or transferring rules under the acquis communitaire onto these countries; instead, the EU can only exert its influence on partner countries in the process itself of making and executing these policies (Lavenex 2008, 2014; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Börzel & Risse 2012).

The mode of governance which describes this type of EU influence on non-EU member states, is network governance. Rather than via law and jurisdiction, policy issues are dealt with via bargaining or arguing in functionally specific forms of organization, such as (decentralized) agencies or other coordinating policy networks. These networks, in which the participating

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parties are formally equal, “usually produce less constraining instruments that are based on mutual agreement, and often prescribe procedural modes of interaction rather than final policy solutions” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 797-798). In other words, network governance is process-oriented, horizontal, voluntary and inclusive, which implies participatory openness in decision-making processes and practices (see e.g. Lavenex 2008; Lavenex & Wichmann 2009).

In the process of interaction which takes place under network governance, a number of mechanisms for influencing policies and political processes are distinguished in EU studies, which can fall under bargaining or socialization (Checkel 2005; Börzel & Risse 2012; Lavenex 2014). To give a hypothetical example with regard to the EU migration compacts: when a partner country is informed that the EU aims to deploy policy officers on migration in a certain project, this country assigns within its domestic institution a contact point or sets up a team working on migration. Here, it can be argued that this decision results from a process of bargaining and/or socialization. Regarding bargaining, the partner country could have made utility calculations with respect to different options, and could have concluded that assigning a contact point or a team within its domestic institution would bring the largest expected benefit for this country. Regarding socialization, the partner country could have (subconsciously or nonreflectively) internalized the practical norm of having a contact point or a team working on migration within its domestic institution, and considered this to be in accordance with social expectations.

2.2 Defining effectiveness of external governance

Within the external governance approach, effectiveness is understood in terms of rule selection – the extent to which a non-EU member state accepts the policies that are proposed or suggested by the EU; rule adoption – the extent to which these policies are transposed into the domestic legislation of the non-EU member state; and rule application – the extent to which the non-EU member state acts upon this renewed legislation (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). However, this definition brings along a number of issues. Firstly, according to this definition, effective-ness should be assessed in terms of a sequence of stages, and implementation of policies is understood as a hierarchical, top-down process (Wunderlich 2012). However, under network governance, there is no EU legal framework to be transferred; instead, a process of negotiation can result in joint policies or practices which do not necessarily follow from a change in domestic legislation. In other words: the implementation of agreed policies or practices do not

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necessarily require a change in legislation. Secondly, the implementation of agreed policies or practices does not necessarily result in achieving the related goals or objectives of the EU – which, in the case of the EU migration compacts, entails reducing the number of irregular migrants to Europe (see e.g. Youngs 2009). Thirdly, this definition implies that the policies concerned have already been fully framed by the EU and have their final form when they are “transferred” to the non-EU member states (Wunderlich 2012). However, in the process of bargaining and arguing in a network constellation, input from non-EU member states can contribute to attaining the EU’s goals or objectives on the policy issue concerned. This means that assessing the effectiveness of external governance requires the acknowledgement of bidirectional influence as opposed to merely unidirectional influence.

Taking these points into account, three levels of effectiveness can be distinguished. The first level of effectiveness is rule adoption, referring to the extent to which policies are agreed on which are in line with the goals or objectives of the EU. The second level is rule application, which is defined as the extent to which these agreed policies are implemented in practice. Finally, effectiveness is assessed in terms of goal attainment, referring to the extent to which the policy goals or objectives of the EU have actually been achieved as a result of adopted and applied migration policies.

2.3 Explaining effectiveness of external governance

Now, the question is under which conditions the EU is able to effectively agree on policies, implement them, and reach its objectives in a network constellation with non-EU member states. The literature distinguishes several factors for explaining the effectiveness of EU external governance in these respects. In this section, three types of factors will be elaborated and applied to the context of the EU migration compacts. For each type of factors, hypotheses will be formulated for explaining the effectiveness of EU external governance.

The first type of factors is brought forward from an institutionalist perspective. This perspective refers to institutionalization aspects of the EU in order to explain the effectiveness of EU external governance. According to this perspective, policies on a certain issue are more likely to be adopted and implemented when they are more precise, binding, and enforceable (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). As such, the effectiveness of EU external governance is said to be dependent on the extent of legalization on the policy issue concerned within the EU. However, with regard to the EU migration compacts – as is explained in the previous section – we are not dealing with a transfer of policies from the EU to non-EU member states

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which takes place in a vertical set of stages from legalization to implementation. Hence, one cannot refer to the acquis communitaire on the EU on the external dimension of migration in order to explain the effectiveness of EU external governance. An alternative institutionalist explanation would not refer to the level of legalization with regard to the policy issue concerned, but to the institutionalization of the EU as a precondition for agreeing on and implementing policies. In order to agree on and implement policies – in joint collaboration with the non-EU member state concerned – the EU needs to have the regulatory capacity to formulate, adopt, and implement a set of rules. This regulatory capacity does not only consist of the formal competences or legal authority of EU institutions on a certain policy area, but also of the administrative capacity to act in this policy area. Regulatory capacity can be reflected, for instance, in the mandate of an EU agency, in the set-up of policy frameworks or instruments with clear rules in terms of policy objectives and implementation, or in the formal and practical ability to punish non-adjustment to the rules that have been set (Bach & Newman 2007). Such a form of institutionalization could contribute to the extent to which the EU and the non-EU member state concerned agree on and implement certain policies.

Hence, from an institutionalist perspective, one can formulate the following hypothesis on the effectiveness of EU external governance:

H1: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of rule adoption and rule application increases with a stronger regulatory capacity of one or more EU institutions to deal with the relevant policy issue.

The second type of factors is brought forward from a domestic structure perspective. This perspective refers to policies and organizational processes and practices of non-EU member states in order to explain the effectiveness of EU external governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Wunderlich 2012). For instance, if there was great political opposition to negotiation with the EU on migration issues, it would be more difficult to reach an agreement on migration policies. Alternatively, if a non-EU member state had a higher level of state capacity, it would be better able to implement the policies that are agreed upon.

Before formulating hypotheses in accordance with the domestic structure perspective, a more nuanced understanding of its different elements in relation to the different levels of effectiveness is needed. It is crucial to remember that the effectiveness of external governance – as is explained in the previous section – can also consist in the exercise of influence by non-EU member states. They may, for instance, possess knowledge on better ways for implementing

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policies with the aim of attaining certain objectives, as a result of which the EU might alter the suggested policies. This means that, in assessing the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of goal attainment, one should take into account the extent to which input from non-EU member states can contribute to this.

In the formulation of the hypotheses which are presented below, I have incorporated this aspect only in assessing the effectiveness in terms of goal attainment. Effectiveness in this sense can be said to depend on the level of expertise of a non-EU member state on a certain policy issue – in this case, on combatting irregular migration to Europe. This expertise can be utilized optimally within a more cooperative, participatory form of organization within this non-EU member state, and when this country has a positive attitude toward solving the issue on irregular migration to Europe.

Also in assessing the effectiveness in terms of rule adoption and rule application, I merely look at the necessary preconditions in accordance with the domestic structure perspective. With this, a positive attitude toward solving the issue of irregular migration to Europe will increase the likelihood that a non-EU member state agrees on a related policy. Moreover, a non-EU member state is more likely to implement a policy on migration when it has the capacity to do so – for instance, when it possesses sufficient financial and/or material resources.

Hence, from a domestic structure perspective, one can formulate the following hypotheses on the effectiveness of EU external governance:

H2: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of rule adoption increases with a politically positive attitude with regard to solving the policy issue concerned as suggested by the EU.

H3: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of rule application increases with a higher level of state capacity of a non-EU member state.

H4: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of goal attainment increases with a higher level of expertise of a non-EU member state on the policy issue concerned, a more cooperative, participatory form of organization, and a politically positive attitude with regard to solving the policy issue concerned as suggested by the EU.

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The third type of factors is brought forward from a power-based perspective. According to this perspective, the effectiveness of EU external governance increases with the bargaining power of the EU. In order to assess the bargaining power of the EU, one can look at historical, socio-cultural, geopolitical, and economic factors on a macro-level – referring to the overall relations between the EU and a non-EU member state – as well as on a meso-level – referring to these relations with respect to the policy issue of migration in particular (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Wunderlich 2012). In general, the more bargaining power the EU has, the more it will be able to make a non-EU member state comply to its suggested policies with the aim of combatting irregular migration to Europe.

However, in a similar way as with the domestic structure perspective, the exercise of influence by non-EU member states – resulting from a high level of expertise on their side – may contribute to the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of goal attainment. Therefore, in some instances, a high level of EU bargaining power could be detrimental in terms of achieving its goals or objectives on migration. The reason is that, with a high level of EU bargaining power, the EU is less likely to perceive the need of taking into account the input from a non-EU member state in the process of agreeing and implementing policies under joint collaboration. Hence, if the input from a non-EU member state can contribute to policies which are more likely to reach the objectives than the originally suggested policies, a medium EU bargaining power – allowing for more inclusion of a non-EU member state in the negotiation process – would enhance the effectiveness of EU external governance.

Hence, from a power-based perspective, one can formulate the following hypotheses on the effectiveness of EU external governance:

H5: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of rule adoption increases with higher EU bargaining power.

H6: the effectiveness of EU external governance in terms of goal attainment increases with a medium EU bargaining power when a non-EU member state has a higher level of expertise, a more cooperative, participatory form of organization, and a politically positive attitude with regard to solving the policy issue concerned as suggested by the EU.

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3. Research design: qualitative, comparative case study

EU external governance is understood to vary both across regions as well as policy fields (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Moreover, as can be deduced from the theoretical frame-work, characteristics with respect to the region might play a role in determining the effective-ness of EU external migration policies. It follows from this that the scope of the research is limited to a specific policy field and a specific region – in this case, being the EU migration compacts in West African countries.

In this light, a case-oriented research design is most suitable. Whereas a large-N research design – analyzing a large number of migration policies across the globe – would allow for generalizations based on relationships of causality, a small-N (comparative) case study design focusing on a detailed understanding of complex configurations, which can only provide for temporally and spatially limited generalization, is more feasible and desirable (Della Porta 2008). Hence, this research can best be characterized by a qualitative, comparative case study design.

Despite the limits in terms of generalization, this design allows for a selection of cases which are homogeneous – as they regard a specific policy issue in a specific region in a specific period of time – which is beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, it enhances the reliability and comparability of measures and indicators, as social phenomena occurring in both cases can be analyzed more similarly with cases that are comparable. Secondly, it leads to more theorizable research results; given that the contexts of each of the cases are more likely to be similar, it is more salient that variance on the dependent variable – the effectiveness of EU external migration policies – can actually be traced back to, and explained by, one or more of the independent variables of this research (Gerring 2004; Della Porta 2008).

The EU has proposed to construct migration compacts with four West African countries: Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. With the unit of analysis being EU migration compacts in West African countries, cases can best be distinguished on a country basis, as the EU uses a tailor-made approach for each individual country. Each country – according to the EU – has its unique circumstances in which migration issues need to be situated, with differences between countries of origin and countries of transit, and differences in socio-economic and political

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contexts that can account for the root causes of irregular migration (European Commission 2016b). With this in mind, EU external migration policies in West African countries form the population to which the empirical findings of this research can be generalized.

3.1 Data and methodology

The empirical data for conducting the analyses are collected in the form of documents and previous analyses. Official EU documents provide us with a basic overview of the several elements of the EU migration compacts, and can be used as a primary source for assessing and explaining the effectiveness of the compacts. Moreover, (scientific) reports from transnational organizations, think-tanks, and researchers in the field of political science, EU studies, and/or who are specialized on West African countries, can provide us with more insights on the various elements of the migration compacts. This information is used as an additional source to strengthen the assessments and explanations on the effectiveness of the compacts.

The fourth chapter focuses on understanding the EU migration compacts. It provides an overview of the general policy areas which are covered with the migration compacts, along with the general policy objectives related to them. Knowing these policy areas and policy objectives gives us a guide for analyzing the effectiveness of the migration compacts (which will be relevant in the fifth chapter). For the purpose of understanding and explaining the methods for analyzing and explaining the effectiveness of the migration compacts, Figure 1 is already presented on the next page, which provides an overview of the policy areas and policy objectives of the migration compacts based on the first chapter of this thesis.

The fifth chapter deals with the analysis of the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts. With each country, the level of rule adoption and rule application is measured for the different elements of the migration compact concerned. This will be done as follows: based on the instruments which the EU has deployed, it will be assessed if and how they have led to the agreement on taking certain actions (e.g. in the form of signing a formal declaration or approving a project), and to what extent actions are actually taken based on this agreement (i.e. the implementation of policies). In order to measure the level of goal attainment, for each country separately as well as holistically, I look at data corresponding to the various objectives.

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Depending on the policy areas on which the EU focuses for a partner country, an assessment can be made of the outflow number of irregular migrants, the return rate, the number of legal residents, and the number of arrivals in the EU.

The sixth chapter focuses on explaining the effectiveness of the migration compacts by testing the six hypotheses which have been formulated in the theoretical framework of this thesis. Here, I attempt to explain to what extent variances in effectiveness – the dependent variable – can be explained by the three perspectives that are mentioned in the theoretical frame-work. With this, one should carefully consider whether to explain variances in effectiveness between the countries (i.e. between the cases), or variances in effectiveness between the different elements of the migration compacts, or both. Each explanation is suitable for a different axis of comparison. Firstly, as the independent variable belonging to the institutionalist perspective – EU regulatory capacity – primarily explains to what extent the EU can pursue policies on different policy areas, this variable allows best for explaining variances in effective-ness between different elements of the migration compacts. Secondly, as the independent variables belonging to the domestic structure perspective refer to characteristics with regard to different policy areas as well as country-specific characteristics, these variables are useful for

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explaining variances in effectiveness between different elements of the migration compacts as well as between different countries/cases. Thirdly, as the main independent variable belonging to the power-based perspective – bargaining power – describes relations between the EU and each of the countries on a macro-level, this variable is merely suitable for explaining variances in effectiveness between different countries/cases.

In terms of measuring the phenomena and testing the hypotheses, the following should be noted. When it comes to explaining variances in effectiveness, it suffices to look at relative comparisons on the independent variables and on effectiveness between the different elements of the migration compacts and/or the different countries/cases. For instance, if the elements of the migration compact with Niger were more effective than the elements of the migration compact with Senegal, and if I attempted to explain the variance in effectiveness between Niger and Senegal by looking at the state capacity of both countries, it should be assessed whether Niger has a higher level of state capacity than Senegal. For this, it is not necessary to have absolute measurements of the levels of state capacity of both countries; it suffices to be able to compare the levels of state capacity on a relative scale. Therefore, in the sixth chapter, I prefer providing the contexts which indicate the presence or absence of the phenomena to be measured, over conducting absolute measurements on these phenomena.

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4. Understanding the EU migration compacts

The aim of the EU Partnership Framework is to work toward a coherent and tailored engagement by setting up migration compacts with third countries to better manage migration, with specific reference to Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal in West Africa. The migration compacts differ from previous EU policy tools for managing migration in two ways. Firstly, with the migration compacts, the EU has expressed more explicitly its ambition to create and maximize the synergies between different policy domains with their different policy tools. This entails the integration of objectives related to combatting irregular migration in other policies of the EU (e.g. on development aid or border control). Moreover, it means that all these policies, insofar as they relate to combatting irregular migration, should be tuned in coordination with each other, so that all efforts reinforce each other optimally. Secondly, with the migration compacts, the EU more explicitly calls upon all EU member states to collaborate and to act coordinately (European Commission 2016b). In contrast, with previous mobility partnerships, EU member states could choose to opt in or opt out, meaning that the Mobility Partnerships can be less considered as supranational EU policy tools (see e.g. Reslow 2012; Carrera, Radescu & Reslow 2015).

The EU has identified several objectives of the migration compacts: addressing the root causes of irregular migration; enhancing border and migration management and combatting migrant smuggling; increasing the return rates of irregular migrants in the EU who not eligible for asylum; and offering legal migration channels. From these objectives, along with the short-term goals of the migration compacts – saving lives in the Mediterranean Sea and enabling migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous journeys – one can deduct that the ultimate goal of the migration compacts is to combat irregular migration from West African countries to Europe (European Commission 2016b).

In order to reach these objectives, the EU has pursued multiple tracks. As will be further explained below, a financial tool was established with the aim of funding projects in countries of origin and transit that support the objectives with regard to the migration compacts. Further-more, the EU has used existing coordination frameworks on issues (e.g. security) where it already provides support to partner countries, and aligned these frameworks with the EU policy

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framework on migration. Finally, the EU has engaged in political negotiations with partner countries in order to enhance cooperation on certain policy issues. The negotiations can aim at signing formal agreements and/or at enhancing practical cooperation without such a formal agreement. With each of these tracks, the EU has underscored the importance of local coordination mechanisms for effective cooperation, translated into “networks of EU experts on the ground in third countries” (European Commission 2016b: 8).

4.1 Cross-country instrument: the EUTF

One of the main instruments which the EU has used in light of the migration compacts, is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Although this financial instrument was set up in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration, it plays an important role in light of the EU Partnership Framework on Migration in general, and the EU migration compacts in particular. This is because the strategic objectives of the fund are well in line with the goal of addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement. The projects which are funded by the EUTF should contribute to one or more of these objectives: greater economic and employment opportunities; strengthening resilience of communities (and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and displaced people); improved migration management; and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration (European Commission n.d.-b). Originally, €1.8 billion was set aside by the EU from the European Development Fund, along with financial contributions from a number of individual EU member states. However, over the course of time, the pledged amount has increased up to over €2.8 billion (European Commission n.d.-b).

As was explained in the first chapter of this thesis, a distinction is made between three regions: the Sahel region and Lake Chad area (which includes the countries studied in this thesis), North Africa and the Horn of Africa. For each of the regions, a manager has been appointed by the European Commission, who can, inter alia, propose actions to the Operational Committee of the concerned region for approval. The EU delegations in the African partner countries play a key role in the process of identification of possible actions. This identification is based on thorough local dialogue with local stakeholders, such as delegations of EU member states, civil society organizations, national authorities, and research facilities. The aim of this is to enhance the understanding of local contexts in order to make a better assessment of the beneficiaries to be targeted and the most suitable implementing partners (European Commission n.d.-b).

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This section provides a brief explanation of the context surrounding the partner countries of the EU migration compacts. For each country – Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal – an overview is given on the general relations with the EU, the issues on irregular migration which the EU has identified with this country, the history of the country’s collaboration with the EU and individual EU member states on combatting irregular migration, the policy areas which are covered by the EU migration compact with the country, and the instruments which the EU has used for the purpose of establishing the migration compacts.

Mali

Overall, relations between the EU and Mali can be characterized by the EU’s focus on security activities, particularly in the north of Mali. The EU has set up two CSDP missions with the aim of training the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard (EEAS 2016b). With regard to migration, the EU funded the Migration Information and Management Centre (CIGEM) from 2008 to 2013, with the aim of preventing potential migrants from attempting to migrate to Europe (Trauner & Deimel 2013). Moreover, Mali has made bilateral agreements with France and Spain on, inter alia, labor migration (ICMPD & IOM 2015). However, the results have been limited; in 2014 a record number of 10,575 irregular border crossings in the EU by Malian citizens were detected. Moreover, the return ratio has been around ten percent in the last couple of years (European Commission & EEAS 2016a).

With regard to migration from Mali, the EU has mainly been interested in achieving progress on return and readmission, and preventing potential migrants from attempting to migrate to Europe. The latter objective is generally related to the context of socio-economic development (in terms of, inter alia, poverty reduction and creating employment opportunities for youth) and peace and regional stability (including improved governance and security and improved border management). Although Mali shares the EU’s interests on security, border management and development, it considers migration as historically and economically important. Not only do remittances from abroad form a significant proportion of Mali’s economy, but especially in the regions of Kayes and Bamako, migration is seen as a model of success (European Commission & EEAS 2016a).

In this light, the EU has identified the issues of security and border management, development, return and readmission, and legal migration as (possible) areas in which collaboration on migration could be strengthened (European Commission & EEAS 2016a). As

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will be further explained in the next chapter, the EU has been engaged in political negotiations with Mali, and has made use of two CSDP missions under the Sahel Region Action Plan in order to reach its objectives regarding the migration compact with Mali (European Commission 2016e, 2016f, 2017b).

Niger

When it comes to irregular migration, Niger has been typically categorized by the EU as a country of transit for migrants originating from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and other West African countries. The region of Agadez is a central hub for a large number of migrants trying to reach Libya, potentially in order to cross the Mediterranean Sea. To clarify: it was estimated that, in May 2016, over 16,000 people per week transited through Niger on their way north. As a result, the EU has mainly been interested in achieving progress in terms of reducing the outgoing migration flows from Niger and on voluntary returns of migrants from Niger to their country of origin (European Commission 2016f).

Given this context, the EU has suggested to focus on the areas of enhancing border management, combatting migrant smuggling and trafficking, and further investing in the economic development of Niger. This latter objective is generally related to the security-development nexus. Especially in northern Niger, which is characterized as a volatile region with high levels of insecurity, the vibrant migrant smuggling economy provides jobs and (hence) a “security equilibrium”. This implies that a sustainable alternative for migrant smuggling is lacking; if people were no longer able to earn a living smuggling migrants, a significant part might fall back into criminal, or even terrorist, activities (see e.g. The Africa Report 2015; Tinti 2017a). Investing in the socio-economic development of Niger is aimed toward providing employment alternatives in the short term, while also addressing root causes of irregular migration in the long term (European Commission 2016f).

Still, attempts to curb irregular migration have been far from new; Niger has attempted for years to crack down on migrant smuggling networks, but in vain. Beyond the lack of alternative employment opportunities besides migrant smuggling, a source of incapacity to stop irregular migration comes from the Nigerien authorities themselves. With corruption by local security forces being entrenched in the migrant smuggling economy, Niger has brought to attention the fact that it needs significant aid from IOM and the EU in order to strengthen its governance capacity and to curb irregular migration (see e.g. The New York Times 2015; Reuters 2016; Malm 2016).

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As will be further explained in the next chapter, the EU has made use of a CSDP mission under the Sahel Region Action Plan and has supported activities by IOM – on, inter alia, strengthening regional cross-border cooperation and providing assisted voluntary return – in order to reach its objectives regarding the migration compact with Niger (European Commission 2016e, 2016f, 2017b).

Nigeria

When it comes to irregular migration from West Africa to Europe, Nigeria is regarded as the most important country of origin, with over 23,000 irregular border crossings in the EU of Nigerian nationals having been registered over 2015. Moreover, the rate of return has been falling in the last couple of years, with around 33 percent in 2015 (European Commission & EEAS 2016b; European Commission 2016e).

Overall, the EU and Nigeria have established good relations on a number of policy areas. Cooperation has strengthened through political dialogues on e.g. peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, energy, and environmental sustainability. Besides broad Nigeria-EU Ministerial dialogues (which are held annually), the EU and Nigeria have held a number of local dialogues on migration and development, of which the last one took place in 2013 (EEAS 2016c). More specifically, the basis of collaboration between the EU and Nigeria on migration is formed by a working arrangement with Frontex (2012). This working arrangement provides the framework for collaboration on combatting irregular migration, for instance through communication and information sharing in the field of border management activities. In addition, a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) was signed with Nigeria in March 2015, which provides an open-ended framework for collaboration on migration (apart from the element of return and readmission). Moreover, Nigeria has concluded bilateral readmission agreements with Ireland, Italy and Austria (European Commission & EEAS 2016b).

Both Nigeria and the EU have expressed their interest in combatting irregular migration, e.g. through enhanced border management. However, whereas the EU also lays its focus on achieving progress on return and readmission, Nigeria has shown interest in labor migration agreements with the EU in order to promote migration through legal channels (European Commission & EEAS 2016b). Taking into account the working arrangement and the CAMM as frameworks for migration collaboration along with the interests of both parties, the EU has identified the issues of security and border management, development, return and readmission,

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and legal migration as (possible) areas in which collaboration on migration could be strengthened. As will be further explained in the next chapter, the EU has been engaged in political negotiations with Nigeria on return and readmission, and has made use of networks for practical cooperation in order to reach its objectives regarding the migration compact with Nigeria (European Commission 2016e, 2016f, 2017b).

Senegal

Senegal has been a relevant country of origin for a number of EU member states for many years. In dealing with migration issues, Senegal has preferred bilateral arrangements with individual EU member states over arrangements with the EU as a whole. In this light, France Spain and Italy – the three main countries of destination regarding irregular migration from Senegal in the 2000s – have been searching for cooperation with Senegal on the issue of irregular migration. Ultimately, a formal agreement was reached between Spain and Senegal on combatting irregular migration. This agreement consisted of a Frontex operation at the Senegalese coast, to which Spain, France and Italy contributed by deploying assets and personnel. This operation led to a significant decrease in irregular migration toward the Canary Islands: from over 35,000 irregular migrants in 2006 to practically zero from 2008 (Frenzen 2010; Chou & Gibert 2012). Nevertheless, irregular migrants from Senegal are now taking the inland routes through Niger and Libya. With 6,352 irregular border crossings in the EU by Senegalese nationals having been registered over 2015 and an annual return rate of around 22 percent, irregular migration from Senegal to Europe is still seen as an issue by the EU (European Commission & EEAS 2016c; European Commission 2016e).

Relations between the EU and Senegal are generally described as “excellent and dynamic, based on trade, development cooperation, political dialogue and shared fundamental values” (European Commission & EEAS 2016c: 3). Strategic interests of the EU with Senegal, as described in the EU-Senegal joint planning document (2014), extend to strengthening the regional economy and enhancing regional stability through, inter alia, good governance, socio-economic development, social protection and education. Nevertheless, cooperation on irregular migration between the EU and Senegal has been very limited, which is also reflected in the un-successful negotiations on the EU Mobility Partnership at the end of the 2000’s (Chou & Gibert 2012). This can (at least partially) be explained by the differences in perspectives and interests on migration between both parties: whereas the EU has been mainly interested in achieving progress on return and readmission and preventing potential migrants from attempting to

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migrate to Europe, Senegal considers migration as historically and economically important. Not only do remittances from abroad form a significant proportion of Senegal’s economy; migration is seen as a model of success (Deutsche Welle 2015; European Commission & EEAS 2016c).

In this light, the EU has identified the issues of development, return and readmission, and legal migration as (possible) areas in which collaboration on migration could be strengthened (European Commission & EEAS 2016c). As will be further explained in the next chapter, the EU has been engaged in political negotiations with Senegal (on return and readmission) in order to reach its objectives regarding the migration compact with Senegal (European Commission 2016e, 2016f, 2017b).

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5. Analyzing the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts

As was explained in the previous chapter, the EU has taken multiple tracks in realizing its migration compacts: from financial support to projects and existing missions and coordination frameworks with the partner countries to political negotiations. This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of these instruments. Whereas the first section deals with the effectiveness of the EUTF as a cross-country instrument, in the second section the effectiveness of the instruments is analyzed for each individual partner country. Here, effectiveness is assessed in terms of rule adoption (level 1) – the extent to which policies are agreed on that are in line with the goals or objectives of the EU – and in terms of rule application (level 2) – the extent to which these agreed policies are implemented in practice. This analysis of rule adoption and rule application is conducted by means of a relative comparison of the status quo with the situation prior to the migration compacts. In other words: the analysis is directed toward the additional measures which have been taken on top of the already existing frameworks of EU collaboration on migration with the partner countries. Finally, in the third section the effectiveness of the instruments is analyzed in terms of overall goal attainment (level 3) – the extent to which the policy objectives of the EU have actually been achieved as a result of adopted and applied migration policies.

5.1 Effectiveness of a cross-country instrument: the EUTF

EU reports and factsheets on the EUTF seem to communicate in a highly positive way about the results which have been achieved. These have mainly been measured by the number of projects which have been approved (along with their headings) and the amounts which have been allocated to these projects. The EUTF annual report 2016 provides us with a clear overview of all activities until the end of December 2016. Most notable is that in the Sahel region and Lake Chad area, a tremendous amount of €918.5 million has already been allocated to a total of 65 projects (European Commission n.d.-a). On average, the implementation of these projects runs until 2020 (Akvo n.d.); however, no official documents on the actual implementation of the projects can be found. Overall, this shows a relatively high level of

Combatting irregular migration from West Africa : a study on the effectiveness of the EU migration compacts