Contentious content : research on the quality of Dutch written media coverage in Afghanistan (2001-2013)

(1)

Contentious Content

Research on the Quality of Dutch written Media Coverage in Afghanistan (2001-2013)

©Ton Koene Yester Thielen

Master Thesis Political Science; International Relations Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam

June 2014

(2)

Dedicated to all war correspondents, of whom twenty-five percent suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder upon return (Reuters 2010).

(3)

Word of thanks

The author of this research wishes to thank the following persons for their contribution to the realization of this thesis.

First, the editors and journalists of the analysed newspapers for their time and valuable insights regarding Dutch war journalism in Afghanistan.

Second, supervisor Tjitske Akkerman and advisor Geertje Haverkamp for their constructive feedback and patience.

And third but certainly not least, my friends and family for proofreading and continued mental support.

(4)

1. Introduction

In war, the first casualty is the truth

Aeschylus {{3 Knightley, Phillip 1989}}

‘They lie, they lie, they lie.’

Dutch non-embedded veteran Minka Nijhuis giving advice to ‘rookie’ non-embedded journalist Nathalie Righton {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}

The Dutch military has been involved in three missions in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2013. For Dutch war correspondents it was a decennium marked by two significant shifts. For the first time in history, the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) launched a full-scale policy arranging for journalists to accompany them on their missions in Uruzgan and Kunduz {{28 Klep, Christ 2011: 21}}. Many journalists used this opportunity to write directly from inside Dutch military camps, generating a steady flow of articles. These articles are checked by Ministry of Defence officials to prevent jeopardizing Operational Security (Mans,

Meindersma & Burema 2008). A minority of journalists choose to report ‘non-embedded’, which means that the journalists provide for their own food, housing and translator. Simultaneously, the written media has changed considerably due to new technological improvements, while facing a wide array of financial difficulties between 2001 and 2013. Both subscription- and advertising revenues dropped dramatically, forcing reorganisation. The phenomenon of embedded journalism and the strong changes in Dutch written media are the independent variables in this research. How do these two developments interact with the journalistic process of Dutch war correspondence in Afghanistan?

In an ideal democracy the public has access to accurate and unbiased information, provided by the media {{45 Lippmann, Walter 1997}}. When political decisions have to be made involving the military this is even more important. This journalistic function is more

(6)

watchdog journalist as a guardian is to supply citizens with information they must have ‘to prevent the abuse of power’, and to ‘warn citizens about those that harm their interests’ {{22 Rendall, Steve}}. In order to function properly, journalists need to have a certain distance from the powers and challenge them, as opposed to propagandist journalists. The media is doing its job as a watchdog when it is described as ‘dedicated to objectivity, neutrality, fairness, and impartiality’ (Ibid.). Embedded journalism is criticised for neglecting these principles. The most outspoken critic of the Dutch embed policy is veteran war correspondent Arnold Karskens, stating that:

‘In my opinion there are only two good reasons to report a war going ‘embedded’: either you are lazy and find it convenient or you do not have any money and think it is nice and cheap. It has nothing to do with journalism. There is no such thing as an ‘embedded-journalist’. Either you are ‘embedded’ or you are a journalist.’ {{91 Thielen, Y.}}

Embedded journalism

Embedded journalism refers to 'news reporters being attached to military units, involved in armed conflicts' {{8 Werdmuller, Barbara 2012: 7}}. The term 'embedded journalism' can be applied to many interactions between the military and the media in the past. In recent history the 2003 Iraq war signified a tipping point for embed policy, with 775 reporters and photographers being ‘embedded’ at the start of the war {{36 Tuosto, Kylie 2008}}. The sheer scale of journalists accompanying United States military units in Iraq was unprecedented. According to {{17 Cortell, Andrew 2009}} Bush’ decision was based on the idea that an embed policy would be helpful to win the war in the eyes of the domestic- and world public. The Vietnam war caused U.S. government suspicion towards the media, allegedly ‘losing the war at home’ {{3 Knightley, Phillip 1989}}. The Dutch MoD states its embed-policy is

implemented:

‘(…) To showcase the importance and the developments of the mission and its specific

assignments in a professional manner, to reach the public, visitors, politicians and others that are involved.’

(7)

To achieve this goal, Dutch journalists were offered a free direct flight to Uruzgan. Their food, shelter and security is provided by the MoD. Typically Dutch embedded journalists stayed for two weeks, rarely leaving camp. All submissions were reviewed by a MoD communication officer to ensure the Taliban would not get a hold on valuable strategic information. According to {{13 Pfau, M. 2004}} this can result in blurred lines between the media and the military. During the Dutch military mission Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), 121 embedded journalists covered Afghanistan, compared to 12 non-embedded journalists {{39 Boom, Joeri 2010: 34}}.

The Dutch case

The Netherlands is not a very important player in the international geopolitical arena, being a small country lacking military power. The country’s most important ally is the United States, which it supported in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Netherlands has shown commitment to international order, cooperation and peace {{92 Van Vree, F.}}. Ranking number 22 on the world most peaceful countries, it is very hesitant to engage in military activities {{43 Vision of Humanity}}. This hesitation is reflected in politics, where the Kunduz police training mission between 2010 and 2013 is a clear example. This mission could only get the required support in parliament by clarifying it would not be a fighting mission in any way. Dutch trained Afghan cops were required to sign a contract stating they would not enter military operations {{49 Righton, Nathalie}}. This shows Dutch public is relatively critical of military engagement, increasing the importance of both Dutch public opinion and the Dutch media in conflict areas.

(8)

2. Research questions and structure of the research report

Critique on the Dutch embedded policy resonated well with the Dutch audience, spurring academic research on the dichotomy of embedded versus non-embedded journalism until the year 2008 (Van Klink 2007, Mans et al. 2008 Beckers 2008, Jonkers 2008). Whereas research on the period 2008-2010 is thin stretched, it is non-existent until 2013,

incorporating the Kunduz Trainings Mission {{8 Werdmuller, Barbara 2012}}. Furthermore, available research focusses mostly on the embedded policy and outcome of newspaper content, without taking editorial decision making into account nor its impact on newspaper quality.

German communication scientist Stephan Ruβ-Mohl (1996: 142) noted that trying to measure newspaper quality is as undoable as ‘hammering a pudding onto a wall’. Yet he does suggest three ways to measure newspaper quality:

-looking at the quality of the newspaper as a product. Is the newspaper faithful to truth and does it live up to its goals?

- looking at the opinion of professionals. The vision of journalists and editors on the quality of their work.

- looking at the journalistic process. The objectivity of the journalist is examined, as well as accuracy and controllability.

The main question therefore comes with an important note: it is not intended to judge the quality of Dutch newspapers persé, but to investigate the developments influencing the quality via the journalistic process. Doing so establishes the role of Dutch written media in the provision of information. The embedded versus non-embedded comparison provides a firm handhold when gauging article quality, and is a striking example of contemporary media dynamics.

(9)

2.a Research question

Main question:

What are the main factors that influence the quality of Dutch written media coverage in Afghanistan (2001-2013)?

Sub questions:

1. How does embedded reporting differ from non-embedded reporting in the Dutch written press?

2. Besides the embedded policy, what other trends impact coverage of Afghanistan in the Dutch written press?

2. b Structure of the report

These questions are answered by doing a content analysis, literature research and seven expert interviews. Chapter three, ‘War journalism’, provides the necessary theoretical and historical framework. In the first section the connection between media, public opinion and democratic government is explained. Second, a brief history of the profession of war correspondent is given, illuminating both practical and content related problems of the profession.

The fourth chapter describes the Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan and technical aspects of the Dutch embed policy. How did the Dutch embed policy develop and how did it impact press coverage of Afghanistan? In the first section, this means a closer examination of the embed policy itself. What are the rules that journalists need to uphold? What are the selection criteria for participating journalists? Is Karskens statement that embedded

journalists are confined to camp true {{91 Thielen, Y.}} {{39 Boom, Joeri 2010}}? How are the pieces reviewed? These questions touch upon much of the core of the various critiques on embedded journalism and clarify the debate. The second part of the fourth chapter zooms in on the personal experiences of journalists Nathalie Righton and Joeri Boom{{39 Boom, Joeri 2010; 38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}. Both have written profoundly about their work in Afghanistan. Whereas Righton worked mainly non-embedded, Boom usually worked under

(10)

the protection of the MoD. Both raise questions about the way the Dutch embed policy is implemented, and provide valuable insights into the journalistic process.

The fifth chapter focusses on the first sub question: How does embedded reporting differ from non-embedded reporting in the Dutch press? Lower thresholds and upper limits of quality of Dutch newspaper coverage are examined. Four articles are discussed in depth, an embedded piece of good quality and an embedded piece of dubious quality {{40 Beckers, Erik 2008}}. Idem for two non-embedded articles.

The sixth chapter expands this micro comparison to a systematic overview of the differences between embedded and non-embedded news coverage of the Dutch written media. This chapter outlines the most important differences between embedded and non-embedded journalism on differences inter alia: quality, tone, frame and bias ((Klep 2011, Werdmuller 2012)(Klink 2007, Jonker 2008). Clarity on the actual differences between embedded and non-embedded reporting is a prerequisite for understanding the interaction between the embed policy and the changed journalistic reality.

The seventh chapter addresses the final sub question: Besides the embed policy, what other trends impact coverage of Afghanistan in the Dutch written press? This chapter digs deeper into contemporary factors that are undermining the profession of war correspondent in the Netherlands. Prominent examples are the credit crunch and falling newspaper advertising and subscription revenues. Interviews with editors and journalists provide insight in exactly how the journalistic process is affected by these developments.

(11)

3. War journalism

3.a The relation between public opinion, the media and democracy

Dutch public opinion on Afghanistan

The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported and imagined. Our brains have to develop shortcuts to make sense of the complex reality surrounding its existence. For example, we continuously see images at a maximum of 1000 frames per second, with an average of 20 frames per second, whilst in reality a near infinite frames per second is launched upon us. Our brains simplify information by necessity, creating a picture inside our heads of the world beyond our reach (Lippmann: 18).

Some of these shortcuts are shared by multiple members of a group, allowing to see and hear beyond our personal senses. In this process of interaction, there is constant alteration of images and opinions via communication. This is the second tier of simplification

(Lippmann: 19). Try getting an image you see in someone else’s mind using only words. It requires simplification, and thereby a certain distortion of reality. The simplified aggregated opinions and collective view of a defined population is the rough definition of public opinion {{93 britannica}}.

The observation that public opinion is –by definition- simplified and misleading in relation to the real world makes one wonder what its most important factors are in today’s society. The seminal work ‘Public Opinion’, written by the influencial journalist and political scientist Walter Lippmann in 1922 remains relevant today. According to Lippmann, the most important factors limiting our access to high-quality information are: artificial censorships, the limitations of social contract, the comparatively meagre time available in each day for public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a complicated world and finally

(12)

the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of men’s lives (Ibid: 18).

All these factors are relevant for the Dutch public receiving information via written media on Afghanistan. However, the Dutch written media is not the only source of information

influencing Dutch Public opinion on Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Dutch Public Opinion on Afghanistan

This simple figure clarifies the importance of the Dutch written media, and its relation to public opinion. The central position of the Dutch written media is due to its ability to create news. The written press is the most important creator of stories, which is later copied by television, radio and internet. In the Netherlands, a majority of parliamentary questions are related to news which first appeared in a newspaper or magazine {{88 Oosterbaan, W.

Dutch news and information on Afghanistan

Dutch Public opinion on Afghanistan

Internet,

books

International media

Dutch

written

media

Direct communication and social networks Other media, f.e. television, radio

(13)

2008}}. The people’s consent is especially salient when matters of the military are involved. Not only do matters of the military require a substantial investment in resources and people, the moral aspect of undertaking such action is important. In the case of the Netherlands this increased salience has resulted in the downfall of the Cabinet Balkenende IV, due to a failed third extension of the Task Force Uruzgan mission.

It is important to note that the influence of public opinion on democratic government is by all means an ideal type, which originated by the need for checks and balances for

government power. If public opinion is completely on side with government policy, its policy will be more effective and government officials will likely get re-elected. Vice versa

government policy which is 100% against opinio communis will be ineffective and the officials will face electoral punishment. This results in a government actively engaging with the media to deliver their policy to the public. This relationship between government and media is by no means a one-way street. Whereas the government is dependent on the media for communicating its policy, the media is dependent on the government for a steady flow of stories {{45 Lippmann, Walter 1997; 2 Einsiedel, E. 1991}}. In Uruzgan there existed a symbiotic relationship between the MoD and the press as well: the military wants stories about what they are doing in Afghanistan, and the press is always in need of a story.

Most literature on the relationship between media and democracy discusses three primary functions of the media {{94 van Cuilenburg, J.J. 2006: 321}}{{95 de Boer, C. 2007}}.The first is the information function, in which the media have to inform citizens on government policy and its execution. Second the expression function, making sure politicians know what is important for people. The third function is the watchdog function, in which the media control and critique government policy and execution. These normative ideas reflect an ideal type of media, which by definition differs from reality. What are these differences between ideal type and reality and what are its causes?

(14)

Journalistic principles

In the Netherlands there are different instruments for accomplishing journalistic self-regulation. One of the most internationally accepted standard for journalism is the Code of Bordeaux of 1954, amended with an article on racism in 1986. This declaration of nine articles counts as a standard of professional behaviour for journalists who ‘gather, send, spread and comment on news and information {{96 Wikipedia}}.’ In 1995 the Dutch union of editors published the ‘code for journalism’, based on the code of Bordeaux {{95 de Boer, C. 2007:65}}. A short summary of its most important points:

A reliable and multiform journalism is very important for a democratic society, that cannot function well without informed citizens and a free flow of ideas. In that open society the journalist has the right of free news gathering, and the responsibility to deliver the news in accordance with truth, honesty and independence.

In accordance with the truth means delivering news with verified facts, a separation

between facts and opinions and a degree of controllability. Independent news should avoid conflicts of interests and accepting payments that might influence the news. It should be correct in the protection of sources, apply adversarial and maintain privacy. Finally, news should be gathered openly, meaning a journalist should reveal its identity, not create incidents and not use illegally obtained information unless a major public interest is served. Inferences about the quality of coverage in this paper are based upon these guidelines {{95 de Boer, C. 2007}}.

3.b A short History of War Correspondence

Practical problems

A war correspondent ‘covers stories first hand from a war zone’, which is accompanied by a set of recurring difficulties. The dangerous aspects of the profession are notorious. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists states 1056 journalists have been killed since 1992 {{97 CPJ}}. The 2003 war in Iraq resulted in 163 journalistic casualties (May 2014). In 20 years of war in Vietnam 63 journalists got killed, making Iraq the most lethal war for

(15)

journalists since World War II. Losing their neutral status, journalists have increasingly been targeted as victim of kidnapping and murder. According to renown war correspondent Sam Riley:

‘Thanks to the disaster in Iraq and Al Qaeda efforts, journalists are frequently seen as not only legitimate targets but good ways of getting publicity’ {{21 Reporters Without Borders}}

Afghan, Dutch, French, Italian, Japanese and U.S. journalists have been abducted In Afghanistan. An entire system is built on abducting, usually to get ransom {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013: 58}}. Nine Dutch journalists got killed in the last twenty years across the globe (Karskens 2014: 193) . In Afghanistan 29 journalists got killed since 2001, none of which were Dutch {{97 CPJ}}.

War journalists operate under physical threats and psychological pressure {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013; 20 Reuters 2010; 98 Karskens, A. 2014}}. Other main obstacles are related to poor communication and infrastructure in war zones, making it hard to travel and send out news reports to editors {{98 Karskens, A. 2014}}.

Content related problems

There are a number of recurring content related problems for war journalists. Understanding and describing a specific conflict requires knowledge and background information of the country and combatants (Ibid.). (Forced) patriotism and or (unconscious) symbiosis with one of the combatants or involved parties can affect a neutral position and result in self censure {{13 Pfau, M. 2004}}. According to Karskens (2001: 45), the ideal war correspondent would be a robot hovering across the battlefield, noting acts of war. Of course this is not possible in reality, so Karskens states the two main goals of a war journalist are to gather as much points of view as possible and try to establish an eyewitness account or reconstruction {{91 Thielen, Y.}}. Journalist Frits van Exter points to the friction between the requirement of objectivism and war journalism:

‘True war journalism does not exist, because reporting of a war in a professional acceptable way, or a safe or objective way, has never succeeded.’ (Werdmuller 2012: 12).

(16)

Karskens finds it understandable that circumstances push subjectivism, noting this has not changed much in time:

In the 80-year war there were many journalists on the side of Prince Maurits who wrote positive stories about him. He was a sort of protector and provider. When they would speak ill of him they would not be allowed to accompany him the next time. You see the same with journalists travelling to Afghanistan. Don’t be too negative, be nice, adapt to the military point of view. This way you keep your friends and can be sure you will be invited again. This has not changed much. {{91 Thielen, Y.}}

Furthermore, objectivism is hindered by strategic logics of competing factions. ‘Winning the hearts and minds of the people’ is an important stated objective of the Dutch military operating in Afghanistan {{28 Klep, Christ 2011}}. The objective of defeating the Taliban can only be achieved with the help of the Afghan people. If the Taliban is isolated, cut off from popular support, they will have a hard time operating. In reality, many in Afghanistan help the Taliban. Therefore, in this asymmetrical conflict, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces have a hard time distinguishing civilians and Taliban resulting in civilian Afghan casualties (Ibid.).

There has been a significant shift in Afghan support for OEF forces. Where many Afghans rejoiced at the end of Taliban reign, the dominant narrative in 2014 is that all foreign troops should leave as soon as possible. Anti-Western conspiracy theories are common, fuelled by terrible events such as the Maywand District murders. In 2010, a group of rogue U.S. Army soldiers murdered at least three Afghan civilians. They referred to themselves as the ‘Kill Team’ {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013: 76}}.

Not only Afghan popular opinion is of strategic importance for the competing factions in Afghanistan, so is Western public opinion. The Taliban benefits from war fatigue from the United States and its allies, whose military capabilities are strongly related to political and (to a lesser extend) popular will. This explains the engagement of Taliban in modernities like Twitter and Facebook {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}. A well-known Taliban saying states: ‘Americans got watches, we got time.’

(17)

This saying refers to the inevitable retreat of Western forces due to a lack of domestic and political will to continue fighting in Afghanistan. In the Netherlands Public Opinion is closely monitored by the MoD in a monthly poll during TFU {{99 Vos, A. 2009}}. A small sample of 180 is used. The poll measures interest in the mission, knowledge on the mission, trust in the military acceptation of risk and support for the mission. Because of the monthly long term measurement a pretty interesting image appears, with developments that hint at the influence of the Dutch press.

The MoD’s objective to bring the mission under the public’s eye seems have had effect. 50-70% of recipients are knowledgeable about the Uruzgan mission. The peak in September and October 2007 of 70+ % can be explained by important events: Cabinet briefing on the battle of Chora, attention for the bombing of Kakrak and the political discussion on the expenditure of Task Force Uruzgan (Ibid.) {{31 Van der Meulen, Jan}}.

On the matter of public support the MoD polls find a constant in which support and opposition are not far apart. {{99 Vos, A. 2009}}. In July 2008, 33% support, 32% oppose and 35% are in doubt. In the same month an elaborate poll among 19.500 Dutch citizens by Éenvandaag found 57% of the Dutch people oppose and 33% support the mission {{31 Van der Meulen, Jan}}. The main reason opposition presented for opposing the mission is the changed nature of Task Force Uruzgan. People felt the mission had become a fighting mission instead of a reconstruction mission.

War journalism in recent conflicts

Vietnam

During the war in Vietnam American reporters got all the space they wanted. They were free to accompany troops and there was no censorship. In the early years of the war, journalists were not very critical, supporting their government in fighting communism. Later on both press and public became increasingly critical on developments like carpet bombings, napalm, defoliants, 60.000 American casualties and excesses like the My Lai massacre {{3 Knightley, Phillip 1989}}.

(18)

Modern technology like lightweight portable cameras, enabled fast and mass distribution of up to date recordings of warfare related affairs. This was the first war to be broadcasted on television in people’s homes. Soon military leaders and politicians realised the importance of ‘winning the war at home’. It was felt the war was lost because of a hostile and critical press coverage. The press was accused of being instrumental in negatively influencing public opinion and creating an anti-war atmosphere {{8 Werdmuller, Barbara 2012}}.

Dealings between military and press have always been grainy and difficult. Journalists not only stand in the way (literally), yet can also present stories in a pretty one-sided way {{39 Boom, Joeri 2010; 98 Karskens, A. 2014; 38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}. In the Netherlands, this led to a story in De Telegraaf on Dutch soldiers feeling discredited by criticism of the Dutch press {{40 Beckers, Erik 2008}}. Conversely, journalists criticise both government and military of spinning and twisting the truth. Governments adapted ways of managing news, leading to the ire of journalists who felt their independence and critical function was being

undermined.

During the Falkland/Malvinas war between the United Kingdom and Argentina only a small amount of journalists was allowed to accompany British troops. Their work was under strict censorship. The British government wanted to completely control coverage, which might not have been necessary due to the prevailing British patriotic mindset of the time {{28 Klep, Christ 2011}}.

Golf war 1990-1991

During the first golf war the United States devised a new system of information

management. Journalists were not allowed to go to the front independently. They were stationed in press pools alongside army units. Only journalists from the United States, Great Britain and France were allowed. Disregarding the rules and heading in on your own meant the journalist would get arrested and send home. Overly critical journalists would get their license withdrawn. Media coverage of this war emphasised clinical and technological aspects, with black and white footage showing a cross followed by an explosion. The public was shown a very clean and neat war {{5 McLaughlin, Greg 2002}}.

(19)

2003 Iraq war:

In recent history, the phenomenon ‘embedded journalism’ came under the attention of academics due to its unprecedented scale and formalisation in the 2003 Iraq war {{13 Pfau, M. 2004}}.

Political scientist Brandenburg (2007) calls the Iraq embed policy a ‘public affairs initiative’ of the U.S. Defence department; with the stated goal of ‘telling the factual story – good or bad-before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions. Brandenburg sees a positive change in the decreased censorship, where a post hoc compulsory review is replaced by ‘censure at the source {{18 Brandenburg, Heinz 2007: 951}}. However, Brandenburg (2007) states the embedding of journalists blurs the boundaries between military and the media: journalists become part of the ‘team’, diminishing their ‘watchdog’ function. Pfau et al. (2004) find that embedded reporters produce stories that are more favourable in tone of the military and its personnel in particular. He explains this by the effects of ‘enculturation’, where journalists face life threatening situations alongside soldiers, leading to value internalisation and norm fading.

(20)

4. The Dutch involvement in Afghanistan (2001-2013)

Interest of the Dutch public and press in Afghanistan is an obvious result of the Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan. This chapter examines Dutch military involvement in recent conflicts, and its rippling effects on Afghanistan military press relations. The formal aspects of the Dutch embedded policy are outlined in the second part. Lastly, experiences of Dutch journalists Joeri Boom and Nathalie Righton concretely describe the dealings of Dutch war correspondents in Afghanistan (2001-2013).

4.a The Dutch military in recent conflicts

During the wars in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Bosnia 1992-1995, Kosovo 1999) the Dutch military eventually intervened under NATO cooperation. NATO primarily used bombing raids, preventing casualties. Therefore there was no embed policy {{5 McLaughlin, Greg 2002}}. U.N. troops were send in an effort to defuse the cruel and chaotic fighting. A Dutch U.N. battalion was stationed at the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in march 1994. A small press pool is available for journalists who want to join Dutchbat. However, they are not allowed in the enclave by Bosnian Serbs surrounding the Muslim enclave. Therefore no journalists were present when the Serbs invaded Srebrenica and deported and killed 8000 Muslim men. This event greatly impacted Dutch military and politics. At the battle of Chora in Afghanistan 2007, lieutenant Larry specifically mentions Srebrenica as a reason for his commitment in defending Afghan civilians at Chora in 2007:

‘’Chora is an enclave as well’, Larry states, ‘it’s between the mountains, just like Srebrenica. ‘We saw a large number of refugees here, as well as a fighting militia.’’ {{39 Boom, Joeri 2010: 35}}

The media in Bosnia was hesitant due to the safety issues imposed by the situation. They preferred to keep their journalists away from the real hotspots. Furthermore, the means appointed to the reporters were limited and there were no permanently stationed

(21)

reporters. This resulted in a poor quality and fluctuating quantity of coverage. After the war, Western press is accused of bias, focussing solely on Serbian war crimes, without paying any attention to war crimes committed by Croats and Bosnian Muslims {{40 Beckers, Erik 2008: 45}}. The conflict got simplified and framed into good and evil. In Kosovo this meant the Western media quickly sides with Kosovarians. Accounts on Serbian war crimes were copied without hesitation, whereas war crimes committed by Kosovarians were ignored. Also there is much emphasis on the cleanliness of the NATO airstrikes without paying much attention to reports on civilian casualties {{1 Karskens, A. 2001}}.

When the grim reality about what happened in Srebrenica on July 1995 surfaced and the press was confronted with the MoD’s attempts at downplaying Dutchbat failure, the media swiftly turned against the Dutch military. A heated public debate on the Dutch military ensued. This ‘Srebrenica syndrome’ made the MoD realise that, in order to ensure broad support for operations, military engagement had to be better communicated to the home front {{42 Mans, Ulrich 2008: 12}}. The restructuring of the Dutch military in response to Srebrenica brought slow but significant change to the institution’s media approach, becoming more proactive.

Towards an embed policy

In 2003 the Dutch cabinet decided to send around 1100 troops to Iraq. In this mission, the Dutch MoD took the first steps towards the full fletched embedded policy of Task Force Uruzgan in 2006 {{28 Klep, Christ 2011}}. Public Information Officers (PIO’s) at the military headquarters in the Hague were tasked to actively engage with the media and to experiment with the facilitation of journalists in their area of operations. Over time these arrangements between journalists and the military became more flexible; in the late 2004 onward the MoD started to offer embedded trips to Iraq {{42 Mans, Ulrich 2008: 11}}. Journalists could now interview individual soldiers and include their quotes. There was an informal consensus that everything was allowed as long as it would not compromise the mission (Mans et al: 13). No forms or statements had to be signed for embedding in Iraq. Another aspect of the informal procedure in Iraq was the selection of journalists; MoD headquarters contacted a small

(22)

group of journalists from the various media and facilitated their coverage of the Iraq mission (Ibid.).

Initially the media showed little interest in covering embedded in Iraq, making it hard for the MoD to find journalists who wanted to go visit the mission. The main reasons are related to public demand. The province of Al Muthanna seemed unappealing for continues press coverage and developments in Baghdad were found to be more interesting. Besides, there was great reluctance to send reporters into a high risk environment. However, the first steps towards a fully operating Dutch embed policy were made, the next step would be to

formalise relations between the MoD and the media and create the large scaled embed program that came to be in Uruzgan 2006-2010 (Mans et al 2008: 14).

The Dutch involvement in Afghanistan

The Dutch involvement in Afghanistan started in 2001. After the attacks of 9/11 2001, the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The stated goals were to make Afghanistan a stable and safe democratic state, and destroy Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Netherlands initially supported OEF with ships, airplanes and a submarine {{28 Klep, Christ 2011: 24}}. From 2002 onward the Netherlands participated in a new mission, the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO. They supported the mission with 250 troops in November 2002. In 2006 the NATO took over command from the United States. February 2006 would be the start of a more serious commitment by the Dutch

military, engaging in the mission Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). They would participate with 1400 troops, taking control of the southern province of Uruzgan. Initially the plan was to control the province between 2006-2008. This period was later prolonged to 2010 (Ibid.).

Uruzgan is a very inhospitable and poor part of Afghanistan, with low socio-economic development. The Netherlands applied the so-called 3D concept; Development, Diplomacy and Defence {{40 Beckers, Erik 2008: 34}}. The stated goal was to create more safety, better Afghan government and developmental projects. Afghan military and police was trained, a hospital was built, medical availability increased from 9% to 65%, the number of school attending children doubled and 16 kilometre of asphalt road was constructed between Tarin Kowt and Chora {{28 Klep, Christ 2011: 21}}. 24 Dutch soldiers died, including the son of

(23)

commander in chief Peter van Uhm. The TFU mission had cost 1.4 billion euro and 600 million was spend on developmental programs (Ibid.).

From beginning untill end, the mission was a controversial one. When the Netherlands are requested to contribute to ISAF in June 2005 the political decision-making is troublesome. Cabinet coalition partner D’66 initially opposes the mission, fearing a combat mission. Biggest opposition party PvdA eventually supports the mission on condition of a strict separation of ISAF- and combat activities (Werdmuller 2012: 19). Military historian Klep mentions the traditional Dutch preference for constructive aspects instead of fighting, therefore the mission had to be sold to the Dutch public as a reconstruction mission (Klep 2011: 16). According to Beckers (2008) this initial caution backfires when reports about heavy fighting in Chora and Kakrak reach the Dutch public, causing confusion. The Dutch government seems to have learned from this. When sending soldiers to Mali in 2014 no explicit preference for reconstruction over combat is communicated. In 2007 the Dutch cabinet decides to prolong the mission to 2010, after a United States initiated NATO request. In 2009 NATO calls for another extension, with reduced military presence. After fierce political debate the dispute on TFU extension leads to the fall of the cabinet Balkenende IV (Ibid.).

As a direct result of the failed agreement on TFU, alternatives for Dutch presence in

Afghanistan were explored. On the 7thof January 2011 the Dutch cabinet (Rutte I) decided to conduct an police training mission in Kunduz. The Germans provide security in Kunduz, yet supporting Dutch troops and F-16’s were deployed. The mission ensured a strict educational side; none of the Dutch deployed units were to be used in ISAF related military activities {{49 Righton, Nathalie}}.

This was a direct result of the fierce public and political debate in the Netherlands, leading up to the mission. Supporting a minority Cabinet, the PVV did not agree to the Kunduz police training mission. Therefore Groenlinks, ChristenUnie and D66 were needed for approval, resulting in a wide array of demands, most notable that the trained Afghan personnel was not to engage in offensive action. The mission maintained 500 Dutch soldiers and ended in the summer of 2013 {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}.

(24)

The Dutch embed policy in Afghanistan

The report Eyes wide shut? The impact of embedded journalism on newspaper coverage of Afghanistan studied the problems surrounding the Dutch embed policy in Afghanistan. The report notes Dutch guidelines are relatively lenient compared to the embedded policies of the United States, Great-Britain, Canada and Australia (Mans et al: 15). Dutch journalists choosing to go embedded in Afghanistan have to sign and abide to the MoD’s code of conduct. Its main points are:

1. Respect safety:

because of the safety of soldiers, the embedded journalists have to put their written or audio-visual material up for revision prior to publication.

2. Respect the individual:

For operational or security reasons a soldier prefers not to mentioned in an article or be on camera.

3. Respect home base:

The journalist always has to allow the MoD to inform a soldiers family members when he/she is involved in an incident before publication.

4. Respect the coalition:

other coalition partners may have a different media policy. The journalist has to take this into account.

In the selection process there are official restrictions, every professional journalist can request a place on a military plane to Afghanistan (Mans et al: 16). The timing of the embedded trip is up to the military, three seats are available for two week periods. In Afghanistan, freedom of movement is restricted to camp and negotiated military patrols. The MoD is formally and practically responsible for the safety of the embedded journalist. The MoD’s control over content is limited to operational security, to make sure no details on the private lives of soldiers get compromised.

(25)

There are no official sanctions applied to offenders, yet they will get send to the Netherlands upon refusal to cooperate.

All major newspapers accepted the conditions that accompany the embedded policy. From the point of view of the press the embedded policy is considered as better than nothing. Righton names the Dutch military as just one ‘of the competing factions’, providing insight in military operations {{100 Thielen, Y.}}. Both Righton and Boom engaged in both embedded and non-embedded journalism, yet Boom has been more clear in his criticism, calling it semi-journalism {{39 Boom, Joeri 2010; 38 Righton, Nathalie 2013}}. Karskens is by far the most outspoken Dutch critic of embedded journalism, stating that

‘The whole endeavour of embedded journalism was a blunder. They agreed to the MoD’s terms way too easily. This made it difficult for the Dutch public to find out the truth about what was happening in Afghanistan’ {{91 Thielen, Y.}}

For the most embedded journalists, the biggest problems are their restriction to camp, problems finding the Afghan side of the story and some cases of censure, when operational security was applied too broadly.

4.b Two journalistic expert insights

The next section of this chapter provides an analysis of the experiences of war

correspondents Joeri Boom and Nathalie Righton. Both have won journalistic awards for their work in Afghanistan and their books on these experiences, respectively ‘Als een nacht met duizend sterren’ (Joeri Boom) and ‘Duizend dagen extreem leven’ (Nathalie Righton). Reviewing their accounts provides valuable insights required to answer the research

question of this thesis, decreasing the level of abstractness in the process. Joeri Boom mainly wrote as an embedded journalists whereas the non-embedded status dominates for

Nathalie Righton. Furthermore the two experiences are chronologically complementary; whereas Boom visited Afghanistan from 2006-2010, Righton was correspondent from 2010

(26)

until 2013 {{38 Righton, Nathalie 2013; 39 Boom, Joeri 2010; 47 Boom, Joeri 2014; 49 Righton, Nathalie}}.

Joeri Boom (1971) is a correspondent working for ‘De Groene Amsterdammer’ and ‘NRC Handelsblad’. Boom has reported on conflicts in Kosovo, Macedonia, Darfur, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Five times he travelled to Afghanistan as an embedded reporter, whereas he made six non-embedded trips. The embedded versus non-embedded dichotomy is an important theme in his book, struggling with issues of (self)censorship and the one-sidedness of embedded reporting.

Comparing his embedded trips with his first non-embedded trip Boom writes:

‘My earlier flights to Afghanistan were expensive projects, but my trip from Eindhoven does not cost me a penny. The Ministry of Defence provides transportation, costs and shelter for journalists and we are able to live and work amongst troops. ’ (Boom 2010: 25).

Like the majority of embedded journalists, Boom stays in Uruzgan for two weeks. Quickly after his arrival in 2006 he is confronted by several limitations. He is not allowed to bring his own photographer Jeroen Oerlemans. He has to rely on photographs provided by the Ministry of Defence instead. His gut feeling that the pictures provided by the Ministry of Defence frame the Dutch mission in a positive way is confirmed by a research by Jonkers (2008). Systematically comparing pictures issued by the MoD with independent photographs shows a bias. The MoD issued photos are relatively peaceful, focusing on construction rather than war (Ibid: 26).

A second point of journalistic discomfort is Booms clear dependency on the Dutch military’s provision of security. Lacking Afghan connections, He cannot travel in Uruzgan unescorted. Local military command decides it is not possible to join all patrols (Boom 2010: 26). The war correspondent suggests there is also a subtle psychological factor, making him identify and relate with the soldiers that surround him. They share a language, culture and danger (Boom 2010: 59).

A third, more formal note is the clear discomfort caused by a signed Code of conduct and supplementary control by MoD communication experts (Boom 2010: 27). The journalistic Code of Conduct requires all embedded journalists to follow safety instructions and put their

(27)

reports up for review at all times prior to publication. Consequently, press officers can reject the submission of a piece due to a possibility of harming operational security (OPSEC). When Boom joins a dangerous, two week patrol in the Chora Valley, he faces three journalistic dilemma’s. Under the influence of nearby danger, he notices the urge to use heavy means in interrogating a Taliban prisoner. He calls the blurring of his moral boundaries a ‘war classic’ (Boom 2010: 140). Secondly the soldiers give him training in how to use a Glock and Kalashnikov, in case it would be needed for his self-defence (Boom 2010: 142). Finally he feels the need to do his part in the team he is in, taking on a joined night shift. When an ANA (Afghan government) soldier accidently fires his gun, Boom finds himself faster behind the scope of a MAG-machine gun than he would have liked (Boom 2010: 141). In his concluding remarks, Boom notes that embedded journalism is a ‘treacherous form of journalism’ leading to a ‘mild form of propaganda’. The first interests of the press officers guiding the embedded journalists are not in line with the public interest, but with the interests of the Ministry of Defence (Boom 2010: 318). According to Boom, readers,

listeners, viewers and editors should decide what they want. If they want to read stories on the dealings of Dutch soldiers abroad journalists should work embedded. When the

audience wants the war correspondents to investigate the (often bizarre) reality behind war violence, embedded journalism is not the way to go(Ibid.).

Nathalie Righton (1976) experiences as a war correspondent in Afghanistan are well documented in her book ‘Duizend dagen extreem leven’ and a three hour documentary. Compared to Booms account, she puts more emphasis on general difficulties for all

journalists in Afghanistan, daily struggles and disadvantages and advantages of working as a woman in Afghanistan. As for most journalists, safety is a primary concern for Righton. Her chief-editor, family and herself all feel she should not risk her life for a story.

‘But it is not that easy. If everyone would say no all the time, there would be no correspondents in Afghanistan’ (Righton 2013: 73).

Before departure Righton scrupulously studied the safety-situation in Afghanistan, resulting in a ten-paged safety plan which she knows by heart. A big part of her safety plan consists of

(28)

saved her life once. Fearing the very realistic chance of kidnap, she never announces her travels on Twitter or Facebook. There is a script ready for what needs to happen when she gets kidnapped, with for example a list with questions that only Righton knows the answer to. Furthermore she did a three day course to prepare for stressful moments, for example getting scoffed at a control post, being hold at gunpoint and light sexual intimidation. Even though she is an atheist, Righton wears a veil or a burqa in Afghanistan. She does so reluctantly, but it helps to keep her safe. She states:

‘I am in a conservative Islamic country, so adapting is the right thing to do. I am not an activist, but a journalist’ (Righton 2013: 51)

Righton finds it difficult to contact Afghan women, let alone become friends. They are not allowed to leave the house in the evening, when Richton’s work is over. In the short moments of communication it is difficult to connect. When Righton has a picnic with a couple of Afghan women, her translator is on the lookout to prevent them getting bothered (Righton 2013: 53). Women are absent in Afghan public life.

Afghan men do not look Righton in the face, and walking without male company leads to harassment by sexually frustrated Afghan men or worse. However there are also advantages of being a female journalist in Afghanistan. Unlike her male colleagues she can communicate with Afghan women, giving her insight in their opinions on issues like; women who get put in jail for getting raped or refusal to marry (Righton 2013: 56).

During her stay in Afghanistan, Righton is confronted by fierce anti-Western sentiment, the results of terrorist attacks and despair. She sees many of her colleagues drinking and depressed. To maintain her mental health she sets strict rules for herself, controlling what she can in a fundamentally uncontrollable environment. Seventy percent of her time is spend on safety measures. Being an non-embedded journalist in Afghanistan is an arduous and difficult task.

(29)

5. Different methods, different stories

The Dutch embed policy had an unquestionable impact on Dutch newspaper coverage in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2013, 161 journalists reported embedded, whereas 10 journalists were predominantly embedded {{8 Werdmuller, Barbara 2012}}. But do non-embedded and non-embedded reporters write different stories? Are non-embedded journalists ‘dogs under the command of the Ministry of Defence’ as Karskens bluntly stated {{44 Karskens, Arnold}}? Zooming in on the embedded versus non-embedded comparison helps understand the main question of this research. Most of the analysed differences have much in common with differences of quality. For example, using only one source in a newspaper article is generally an indicator of bad quality compared to an article that uses multiple and different sources. The primary goal of this chapter is therefore to delineate outcome differences between embedded and non-embedded reports, and the secondary goal is to clarify the dynamics of the news coverage in Afghanistan by focusing on its outcome. This chapter consist of an analysis on articles written in and about Dutch involvement in Afghanistan (2001-2013). Two articles of questionable quality will be discussed, one written by an author with embedded status and one written by an non-embedded journalist. The same will be done for two articles of high quality.

A series of four articles by embedded journalist Joeri Boom in 2007 on TFU is discussed, as well as a series of four articles by non-embedded journalist Nathalie Righton on the Kunduz police training mission in 2011 (see also chapter 4.b) {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014; 49 Righton, Nathalie}}. This selection is based on their winning of ‘de Tegel’ award for high-quality journalism with these articles. There is no negative counter award for ‘de Tegel’ for

journalism gone wrong, except maybe the Council for journalism, which can put a verdict on journalism, based on journalistic codes of conduct and ethics discussed in chapter 3.a {{57 rvdj 2014}}. No journalistic complaint has been filed concerning Afghanistan. Research by Beckers (2008) suggests two cases of journalism gone wrong: an article written by

embedded journalists Teun Lagas and George Marlet, and a series of articles written by non-embedded journalist Arnold Karskens {{52 Karskens, Arnold; 51 Karskens, Arnold; 50

(30)

bad news first, these are discussed first. Some quotes are displayed at length, limiting the danger of decontextualisation.

In 2007 Karskens wrote three articles on the Dutch military operation in Uruzgan and civilian casualties: ‘The spring offensive is coming’, ‘Mission despair’ and ‘Bloodbath and the Dutch’. Several of these articles are problematic, especially for readers uninformed on Afghanistan and the context of the Dutch mission (Beckers 2008: 135). It is not surprising that ‘bloodbath and the Dutch’ is the most contentious article. This article is accompanied by three photos of wounded Afghan people looking wearily in the eye of the camera. The subtitle of the photo states:

‘Injured people caused by ‘cleansing operation’ in the Baluchi-pas in July 2006, photographed by Afghan human rights commission AIHRC. The role played by Dutch soldiers merits an investigation {{52 Karskens, Arnold}}.

Karskens states in the lead of the article:

In July 2006 an estimated sixty people died at fighting surrounding three villages in Uruzgan where Taliban were hiding. One witness speaks of extrajudicial executions. Dutch soldiers participated in the move, killing eighteen people. A reconstruction raises question about the role they played (Ibid).

At this moment in time the actions of the Dutch special forces, killing 18 Taliban warriors greatly impacted Dutch news coverage. Karskens article plugs into collective attention by linking it to executions – a grave allegation. Despite there being only one witness for confirmation does not keep Karskens from putting it in the lead.

Miss Golalai Achakzai, head of the department of monitoring and research of the

independent Afghan human rights commission AIHRC spoke with a lot of witnesses. Their statements are combined in a map with pictures of injured people. For security reasons she could not give the names of these witnesses but in the conversations it became clear a witness saw paratroopers coming from the sky after the bombardments. ‘One witness told me that people were lined up and shot to death.’ According to her information the July move injured sixty to seventy people. She does not know the percentage of Taliban. Furthermore,

(31)

there was a lot of material damage. Dozens inhabitants whose house, crops and/or livestock was lost, went begging at the gate of governor Munib in Tarin Kowt for support.

Attacks on civilians or their houses are a war crime, according to the humanitarian law of war. As is deliberately killing execution style. But whether it is indeed a war crime the Afghan human rights commission cannot say ‘before local research has been done on the spot’ (Ibid.).

Beckers (2008: 158) states it is very remarkable there are witnesses mentioning

paratroopers. Because of the high risk of a paradrop directly above enemy territory this tactic is very rare – even for paratroopers. Beckers feels Karskens should have questioned the reliability of such uncontrollable reports more firmly. Karskens is more sceptical and careful in his book Pleisters op de ogen, pleister op de mond on the Kosovo war:

In Racak forty-five dead Albanians were found, of whom twenty-three together in a ditch, on the 15th_{of January 1999. The scene appears to be result of an execution. Head of OVSE} Willam Walker, knows enough after a short sighting and talks about extra juridical

executions by Serbian police units in Dutch newspapers. In the Dutch NOS-journal there is no room for nuance either. Presenter Pia Dijkstra hits the war drum in an interview with minister of foreign affairs Van Aartsen. She asks: ‘How long will the West continue to remain wilfully ignorant?’ and ‘Is it not time for intervention?’ {{1 Karskens, A. 2001: 68}}

(…)

On the 19th_{of May De Telegraaf repeats the words of American ‘special ambassador on war} crimes’ David Scheffer, that there have been at least seventyfive mass executions and ‘at least’ five thousand men have been murdered. The facts are uncontrollable, the media function as writing servants. Instead of a short story pointing the readers to the sheer uncontrollability of such numbers, such news appears in big headlines {{1 Karskens, A. 2001: 72}}.

When comparing Karskens’ articles with these statements in his book a contradiction appears. In Uruzgan the facts are uncontrollable as well yet Karskens is not hesitant to state the highest death toll estimates in Afghanistan.

(32)

Karskens’ shift in perspective can be explained by taking his political agenda into account. He frequently attended opposition-led discussions on Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan and makes television appearances on a regular basis. According to Beckers his exceptional strong position in the embedded discussion and engagement in juridical procedures sometimes seem to put pressure on his journalistic integrity ({{40 Beckers, Erik 2008: 129}}. In chapter 3.a Karskens’ exceptional principal and fierce stance in the embedded discussion is reflected, and his reports are no different. He attacks the uniformity in Dutch media and takes pride in not having many friends in the business ({{56 Karskens, Arnold}}) {{91 Thielen, Y.}}.

Karskens highly critical tone and anti-TFU bias are in many respects outliers, not

representative for Dutch media coverage in Afghanistan {{52 Karskens, Arnold; 56 Karskens, Arnold}}. Usually mistakes made in Dutch Afghanistan coverage are more subtle and harder to pin down. This piece by embedded journalists Teun Lagas en George Marlet does not appear very problematic at first sight:

During heavy fighting in Chora dozens of civilians died, according to observants. The Taliban used civilians as human shields. It is impossible to look through walls from an F16 making The number of civilians casualties unknown. In public representation this is difficult to combine with reconstruction, which was after all the premise for this mission.

Beckers states the author of this article has done a bad job contextualising, displaying a lack of military knowledge (2008: 143). When F-16’s strike they use an observant on the ground, which is ISAF prescription. On the other hand Beckers does not take into account that prescriptions do not necessarily reflect combat reality. Beckers does not find striking

mishaps of embedded journalism, suggesting that there is a decent lower threshold in Dutch Afghanistan coverage. The next article however shows the way a military and patriotic bias can slip into embedded coverage:

Title: In Biblical Uruzgan the Taliban rules {{54 Van der Joolen, Olof}} Date: 18-05-2007

(33)

Lead: Commander of the Dutch military in Uruzgan sends in extra troops to the strategically important region Chora.

First three paragraphs:

The last days there were some heavy firefights. AD-reporter Olof van Joolen spent 72 hour among soldiers.

As the Mercedes jeep is rumbling downhill, corporal Remco tightens his grip on the mounted machine gun. ‘some action after all,’ he yells. In a big dusty cloud a Toyota Hilux is rushing towards us. This pickup truck probably carries two Taliban warriors. On the run after Dutch scouts fired some warning shots.

They get a sign to stop, but ignore it. All guns on board turn straight forward. Fifty meters more and the machineguns will fire. The Afghans hesitate, but decide to stop and leave the vehicle. The Dutch search and question the two. The Afghans are carrying nothing, which means they are probably Taliban. Their car is spotless as well. The soldiers can only say ‘thank you’, because ‘We cannot do anything without evidence, ‘ lieutenant Elwy clarifies {{54 Van der Joolen, Olof}}.

The readers empathy is drawn to the soldiers endeavour, doing the best they can in a hostile environment. This is a direct result of the journalists embedded status, leading to stories on military events and short-term episodic events.

An example of embedded journalism of high quality is a series of four articles by Joeri Boom in 2007, appearing in magazine De Groene Amsterdammer {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014}}.

Presenting titles and leads clarifies the general jist of the articles {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014}}.

Article 1

Date: 29 June 2007

Title: ‘Like a night with a thousand stars’

(34)

Article 2

Date: 7 September 2007

Title: Nothing to see in Uruzgan

Lead: Politicians visiting the Dutch mission in Afghanistan are not allowed to leave camp. What does the cabinet know? And Congress, where the diminishing support should be restored?

Article 3

Date: 28 September 2007

Title: Man be honest, this isn’t ISAF anymore, is it?’

Lead: The situation in Uruzgan is getting worse. Reconstruction work has been delayed for weeks as the fighting with the Taliban forces intensifies. It is time for the Ministry of Defence to acknowledge reality.

Article 4

Date: 21 November 2008

Title: Battle won, war lost

Lead: Defence released images of fighting Dutch military in Uruzgan, simultaneously announcing press restricting measures. Next to Karskens, Boom also writes about the operations of Dutch paratroopers, yet on a different event. Boom lets Captain Larry do the talking in his article:

Captain Larry is in charge of a company of paratroopers of the regiment shock troops from Assen. The unit is a part of the Airmobile Brigade. ‘cutting and sawing’ he calls the combat operations. ‘This has little to do with reconstruction work.’ When the Taliban launched a big attack last Saturday night, he had one watchword: ‘We raised the shocktroop flag at the district office, and it will stay there.’ {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014}}

(35)

Boom digs into the dynamics of combat, in which Larry’s memory of Srebrenica plays a role, as well as the prevalent sense of brotherhood strengthening Larry’s decision to stay and fight (See also chapter 3).

Dutch sensitivity on fighting is reflected thoughtfully in Booms articles. In article 2 Boom describes a video, released by the MoD which caused some uproar in the Netherlands to both demonstrate and explains Dutch sensitivity on military affairs. First the reason for the released video is stated, second the resulting media dynamic in the Netherlands.

A month ago commander in chief Dick Berlijn expressed there was too much attention for ‘negative business’, or battles. Yet last week he told Nova: ‘We want to give a fair image and show this mission is not just about reconstruction. Perception should not be out of reach of the reality in Afghanistan.’ In the same broadcast the Socialist Party (SP) lost track, calling the video ‘propaganda’. The Ministry of Defence supposedly tried to change the image of the mission from reconstruction to fighting. Earlier the SP claimed the opposite (Ibid.).

The reaction by SP member Van Bommel shows the importance of accuracy in reporting on such contentious topics. Political abuse is always lurking. The Dutch press however, was not very cautious in the way this video was announced and presented to the public.

In Article 2, Boom states:

The sloppiness of the Dutch press is remarkable. That the NOS was showing ‘heavy fighting’, as was reported by BNR, Novum, Nova and Trouw is wrong. It was one fight, it lasted

relatively short and it was not heavy. De Volkskrant confused two fights with each other. The paper describes the bad military performances of six Americans who travelled along.

However, they are not on the video of august 20th_{. They were in the foot patrol that got} attacked on the 25th (Ibid.).

Boom provides valuable reflections on the limits of the profession. The differences between observations, on the ground reality and images presented to the Dutch public strengthen Booms report and analysis. The tension between soldiers on the ground and their superiors is exposed. De Tegel’s jury describes his style as excellent: cool, held-back yet delivering the message convincingly {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014}}. It’s critical without finger pointing, and he

(36)

This article is checked by the Ministry of Defence for operational information. Its findings could not be verified by independent Afghan sources {{47 Boom, Joeri 2014}}.

Three years later, Righton writes about the police training mission in Kunduz. A series of four articles in ‘de Volkskrant’ give the reader a good idea about what the mission entails. The complicated decision making process resulting in the Kunduz police training mission,

resulted in a mission weakened by compromise. The trained Afghan cops should not engage nor be trained for military engagement. Leitmotif in Righton’s series is whether this is realistic {{49 Righton, Nathalie}}.

Article 1

Date: 15 Februaryi 2011

Title: ‘But hey, it’s war right. It’s fighting or dying.’

Lead: Unrealistic, is how cops view the idea that they will not fight. ‘The army is unable to cope. We have to fight.’

Photo subscript: Tasha (21) has been a cop for three months. ‘I quit school to make money for my family. I cannot read or write: I could only find a job as a cop.

Article 2

Date: 22 February 2011

Title: From illiterate farmer to cop in six weeks

Lead: The students mainly learn how to survive. The Germans of the police school in Kunduz know it is war in this part of Afghanistan.

Photo subscript: Afghan police in training is explained tactical procedures by using Play Mobil dolls.

(37)

Article 3

Title: Kunduz: half a million per cop

Lead: Partially educating one Afghan cop in Kunduz costs the Netherlands over half a million euro this year. This is revealed by figures by the Dutch Ministry of Defence and the police of the province of Kunduz. The training mission started in July en costs 105 million euro this year.

Article 4

Title: Cops in Kunduz want more training

Lead: The Afghan cops that are trained by the Dutch, think twelve hours of lessons is not enough. The intervals between lessons are so big much is forgotten.

Photo subscription: Police recruit Najib Tanho (30) standing between two colleagues in Kunduz.

Taking a look at the titles, leads and photo subsciptions of these articles tells us Righton takes a subtle critical stance on the Kunduz police training mission. The strength lies in the way Righton puts the Afghan trainees in the centre of attention. Third article, paragraph one:

The six week training he receives at the police school of German trainers is not long enough, Abdul R. states. But he is happy with every lesson he can get. The most important thing he learns as a cop is: ‘Respond to terrorist attacks on checkpoints like we role-played today at school. Learning how to protect oneself against mines buried in the ground is important too.’ What he is missing at police school? ‘ We mostly learn how to respond to an attack. I want to learn how to search buildings and villages to find and take terrorists out. I am going to need that in my district when the Taliban arrive.’

(38)

on a calculation on the cost of the training of an Afghan cop (half a million). It is tempting to frame this as a simple disgrace. However, Righton puts it into the context of the geopolitical reality of the Netherlands, which is dependent on the United States for security. In this trade off the Netherlands often provides legitimacy to U.S. foreign policy. Clingendael is a Dutch independent think-tank on international relations.

Defence expert Ko Colijn, director of Institute Clingendael, thinks half a million per cop is surprising. For a good image he deems it better to ‘split the total cost of the mission by all cops that are trained during three years.’ He finds the Dutch operation ‘expensive, but not more expensive than those by other countries.’

Colijn finds the question whether training cops is worth hundreds of millions a political one. ‘You have to take the reputation of the Netherlands into account.’ When you do not play along, you get neglected. ‘That may be harmful for a small economy that has a strong profile as juridical centre in the upholding of international law.’

The jury comment states her large and quality network in Afghanistan helped Righton to do her work with perseverance and common sense {{49 Righton, Nathalie}}.

However she is not the only one writing high quality article’s in Afghanistan. De Jong’s article: ‘The mock fight with the Taliban’, digs into the role of the Taliban in relation to local conflicts. This reports length (4500 words) is unusual, allowing the reader to get good insight in a complex situation. This is very important for a complete and nuanced idea of what is going on.

‘The tlo rapport describes local conflicts on zar, zan and zamin, gold, women and land, which have been the focal point of conflicts for centuries between competing Pathan tribes. In Uruzgan, mainly the Popalzai (Karzai’s tribe) get indignated for stealing land. In Deh Rawood the conflict is on irrigated and thereby precious land. Other districts have countless examples of commanders illegally confiscating government land. The tlo rapport mentions the ‘severe lack of economic possibilities’ in the region. Furthermore, the inhabitants feel the ISAF have made unjust arrests and failed to take cultural sensibilities into account.’ Tlo saw the dark clouds in the sky and warned for ‘a possible transformation from a civil uprising onto a civil movement.’ {{55 De Jong, Antoinette}}

(39)

Conclusion

This chapter was the first of two steps in understanding the quality of Dutch newspaper coverage in Afghanistan. A good sense of ‘good quality coverage’, is now established, even though it remains an elusive concept. The Jools article highlighted the danger of going embedded, namely losing objectivity in multiple ways. Non-embedded Karskens articles showed reversed loss of objectivity is a hazard as well. {{100 Thielen, Y.}}. Both Boom and Righton’s articles are rimming with insight on various aspects of the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan.

In academic debate opinions on Karskens work vary. Van Klink (2007) builds heavily on both Karskens historical work (2001) and criticism, emphasising the problematic aspects of embedded journalism. She would like to see others follow Karskens example. Beckers (2008: 147) takes a firm stance against Karskens, calling it ‘activism disguised as journalism’.

Reading Karskens articles you understand Beckers point. Furthermore, Karskens declared he would prefer no coverage on Afghanistan to only embedded coverage {{91 Thielen, Y.}}. However, Beckers is missing the bigger picture. More points of view highlighted in a conflict results in a higher degree of pluralism in coverage. So even though Karskens’ articles might not be completely objective and neutral, the focus on war from an Afghan point of view is very rare in Dutch media coverage.

Contentious content : research on the quality of Dutch written media coverage in Afghanistan (2001-2013)