The Position of Islam and the Muslim Minority in Contemporary
Serbia: A case study
MA Thesis in Eastern European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author: Bogdan Koetsier
Main Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Kemper
Second Supervisor: Dr. Christian Noack
Month, year of completion: October 2014
Contents
Introduction p. 5
CHAPTER 1 The two rivaling Islamic Communities and their legitimacy p. 10
1.1The growing influence of religion p. 11
1.2 The Islamic Communities in Serbia p. 12
1.3 The Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) p. 13
1.4 The Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS) p. 15
1.5 The ICiS-ICoS conflict p. 16
1.6 Legitimacy and Authority: the legal framework p. 20 1.7 Legitimacy and Authority: historical continuity p. 24
CHAPTER 2 Mosque Construction and Property Restitution p. 27
2.1 Mosque construction p. 28
2.2 Restitution of Religious Property p. 30
CHAPTER 3 The Educational System p. 32
3.1 What has been written on history school books in Serbia? p. 33 3.2 General trends in history text books and the role of the state p. 34 3.3 The representation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire in history text books p. 36
CHAPTER 4 Interreligious Dialogue p. 41
4.1 General developments in Inter-religious Dialogue p. 42
4.2 Interreligious dialogue in Serbia p. 42
5.1 The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina p. 47 5.2 Turkey’s role in reconciliation of the ICiS and ICoS p. 49 5.3 Turkish foreign policy and Neo Ottomanism p. 52
5.4 Saudi Arabia and Islamic radicalism p. 58
Conclusion p. 63
Introduction
When the former communist Yugoslavia disintegrated, the new independent states, formed in the process, had to redefine their identities. Ethnicity played a central role and Serbs, derived new identity from the defeat against the Turks 1389 in Kosovo. The Serbian feudal state perished at that time and the Ottomans ruled over Serbs till 1878, when Serbia became an independent state. The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was of paramount importance in preserving national heritage and Christian profile in spite of massive conversions to Islam. After the fall of communism the confrontation between Christianity and Islam became one of the main features in Serbian politics: consequently the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) started to play a major role again.
In its constitution Serbia is defined as “the state of the Serbian people [i.e. Orthodox Christians] and all other citizens that live in it”.1 In the context of increased importance of
religion it is interesting to note that in Serbia there exists a concentrated Muslim minority of mainly Bosniaks in the economically weak region of Sandžak, a region in the South-Western corner of the country. This thesis deals with the position of this minority and its relation to the Serbian state and the SOC. Given the fact that the position of the Orthodox Church, with its sheer size and number of followers2 is in a way monopolistic, the question arises what the position of other confessional communities is. My initial hypothesis was that Muslims (in Sandžak) are oppressed in various ways.
However, in the course of my research this initial hypothesis proved somewhat simplistic. There is namely remarkable difference between Serbia and the other former republics of Yugoslavia when it comes to the organizational structure of the Muslim communities. The Islamic Communities in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina all position their spiritual centre in Sarajevo, where the Rijaset3 of the Islamic Community of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICoBH) is located. In contrast, Serbia presents a more complex case as since 2007 the country has witnessed a rivalry between two Islamic Communities that both claim legitimacy based on historical continuity: the Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) based in Novi Pazar and the Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS) based in Belgrade. This rivalry has ever since provoked a state of strong polarization between the two communities which has led to violent confrontations between supporters of the two factions. This highly
1 Article 1, Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.
2 According to the 2011 census, out of a total population of 7.1 million citizens, 6079396 declared themselves as being Orthodox and 222828 as Muslim.
political rather than religious dispute revolves around one core problem: the ICiS locates its administrative and spiritual centre in Sarajevo while the ICoS locates theirs in the Serbian capital Belgrade.
This suggests that the Muslims in Serbia are divided. In order to be able to grasp the complexity of this issue the role of the Serbian state deserves a closer examination. Specifically, the ICoS was allegedly created by the state the secret services and maintains good relations with the authorities as well as with the SOC. On the other hand, the ICiS strongly criticizes the role of the Serbian authorities in the protection of religious rights and the, as they see it, obstruction of economic development in Sandžak. At the forefront of this critique stands the politically active Mufti Muamer Zukorlić (the former president of the ICiS, currently head of the Sandžak Muftiate) who closely cooperates with the ICoBH in Sarajevo. In his involvement in the public debate he aims to end the alleged continuous discrimination of Bosniaks in Serbia. On the other hand, the SOC in unison with the Serbian state authorities, has been trying to promote the Mufti Adem Zilkić, reis-ul-ulema (Grand Mufti) of the ICoS and his followers.
In this thesis, I aim to answer the following research questions:
I. To what extent can we maintain that the Muslim community in Serbia is being oppressed by the state?
II. What are the political consequences of the existence of the two rivaling Islamic Communities in Serbia?
III. What overall conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation between the Islamic Communities in Serbia on the one hand and the state and the SOC on the other?
The goal of this thesis is twofold. My intention is to place the specific conflict within the Islamic Community in a broader general context of the position of Muslims and Islam in Serbia which is strongly related to the political-ethnic tensions and opposing national and ethnocentric narratives that have resulted from the 1990s crises. This general context in Serbia can also function as a mirror of the situation in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Hypotheses
Despite the existence of a legal framework that guarantees the protection of minority and religious rights, the development of the Islamic community is obstructed in a number of
ways. Nationalist sentiments, both Bosniak and Serb, are fed by the way in which their respective media are reporting. In fact, one can speak of two radically opposed perspectives. At the same time the manifestation of these views in the public debate is even stimulating polarization rather than promoting mutual understanding. My expectation is that a similar statement can be made about the way in which history is portrayed in Serbian history school books.
The foundation of a second Islamic Community, the ICoS, is very likely to be an initiative (co)organized by Serbian state actors. This initiative resulted in the weakening of the Islamic community as a whole and has a number of serious implications for the interests of the Islamic community. Firstly, the initiative affects religious rights, such as the restitution of religious property and the appointment of religious teachers in public schools. Secondly, it causes absence of the ICiS in ‘interreligious dialogue’ initiatives, because they refuse to participate in any meetings with representatives of the ICoS - an, in their eyes, illegitimate organization. Furthermore, the division in the Islamic Community could be interpreted as an obstruction in the process of inter-religious/ethnic tolerance as the followers of the ICiS are forced into a position of constant conflict with the authorities.
Methodology & Structure
Considering that my research is strongly focused on the contemporary situation, literature on some of these issues has yet to been written. Therefore, apart from the study of the available literature and reports from a variety of local media, a significant part of the data that I have used is drawn from interviews conducted during work visits to Serbia in the fall of 2013 and summer of 2014. The individuals that I interviewed include:
Safeta Biševac – Bosniak journalist for Danas daily newspaper
Milan Vukomanović – sociologist of religion - University of Belgrade
Radmila Radić – Historian specialized in SOC history – Institute for Contemporary History Belgrade
Dubravka Stojanović – Historian specialized in historical revisionism and the study of school books – University of Belgrade
Aida Ćorović – Former Director of the Novi Pazar based NGO Urban In, currently MP for the Democratic Party
Darko Tanasković – Orientalist and former Ambassador to Turkey and the Vatican - Professor at the faculty of Oriental Studies - University of Belgrade
Jahja Fehratović – President of the Bosniak Democratic Community
Edin Đerlek – Assistant to the President of the Mešihat of the ICiS (Mufti Mevlud Dudić) and spokesman for the Bosniak Democratic Community
Marko Oršolić – Theologian, sociologist and Fransiscan priest involved in interreligious dialogue initiatives
Note that I am aware of the necessity to cautiously interpret the information I gathered from these interviews. I expect to come across contradictory statements which are politically motivated and therefore far from objective sources.
In order to present a complete picture of the position of Islam in relation to the state and the SOC, there are a number of key issues that I will discuss in this thesis.
In the first chapter I will give an introductory overview of the two Islamic Communities and their conflict and the issue of their legitimacy and authority by analyzing the claims that they make and the state’s position in this dispute. I will also shed light on the political background of the conflict because of the strong involvment of Bosniak politcal parties in this issue.
In the second chapter I will turn to the question of mosque construction and property restitution. Firstly I will discuss the possible problems that Muslims in Serbia face in the construction of mosques. Another important issue in this section will concern the restitution of religious property that was confiscated under the auspices of the communist regime. In 2006 legislation was adopted in order to regulate the return of religious property but, as I will show, there are significant problems in this field when it comes to the Islamic Communities.
Thirdly, I will emphasize the aspect of history schoolbooks the Serbian educational system. I will draw from the few sources that exist on the topic of history school books and the way in which they portray Islam and the Ottoman Empire.
Next to the relation of the rivaling Islamic Communities to the state, I chose to dedicate an additional chapter to interreligious relations. In this fourth chapter on inter-religious dialogue I will discuss the initiatives to promote inter-inter-religious dialogue and the obstacles that these initiatives are faced with.
In the last section I will cover the foreign influence on the Islamic Communities in Serbia. Most important in this context is clearly the influence from Bosnia, which is the administrative and spiritual centre of the ICiS. Historically, not only Bosnia but also Turkey
is a major factor of influence. I will discuss the attitude of these foreign actors towards the split in the Islamic Community as well as the financial aid, as far as there are concrete data that Muslims in Serbia receive such aid from abroad. Additionally I will elaborate on the presence of Saudi funding networks and the issue of ‘Wahabbism’ in Serbia.
In the final chapter I will give a concluding summary of the preceding chapters and will return to the initial hypotheses and discuss their plausibility based on the accumulated evidence.
CHAPTER 1 The two rivaling Islamic Communities and their legitimacy
In this introductory chapter I shall in the first place direct my attention towards some key issues regarding the context in which the division between the currently rivaling Islamic communities arose. These communities are the Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) and the Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS). I will first address the growing influence of religion in contemporary Serbian society and the existence of two radically opposing Serbian and
Bosniak ethno-nationalist narratives. Then I will discuss the organizational structures of the ICiS and the ICoS and will present the genesis and development of the conflict between the two communities. Finally I will address the legal framework and the question of legitimacy and authority.
1.1 The growing influence of religion
Religion is by many authors considered both a dividing marker of nations on the Balkans and a basic integrative element of contemporary nations. It is presented as a pier of a system of ethnic values and the primary mover of development of national consciousness. This is a common characteristic of the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian nations where religion represents an element that in the building of the nation has an important constitutive role.4 This intimate
connection between national identity and religion has led to the complete identification of these two elements in the public discourse. What follows is that a Serb can only be an Orthodox believer, a Bosniak only a Muslim and a Croat only a Catholic. In the case of Serbia, an overwhelming majority of the population expressed themselves as Orthodox believers in the last census of 2011. The census results showed that Muslims, after Orthodox and Catholic believers, constitute the third largest religious community in Serbia. In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) is closely connected to the Serbian state. It is in a sense the state religion despite the fact that according to the Serbian Constitution the Republic of Serbia is a secular state and that all churches and religious communities are equal. This phenomenon is dubbed ‘political orthodoxy’ by the sociologist of religion at the University of Belgrade Milan Vukomanović. It has been gaining ground since the period in which Vojislav Koštunica from the Serbian nationalistic Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka
Srbije) led the Serbian government (2004-2008). According to Vukomanović, political
orthodoxy is “a post-socialist hybrid that developed as a type of synergy between some more extreme and radical factions in the SOC, their para-clerical organizations such as Dveri5 and some parties that are more favorably inclined toward the SOC such as the Democratic Party of Serbia. A coalition, in the political meaning of the word, has been formed between these groups. A number of high ranking priests of the SOC have manifested themselves in political performances and they openly propagate a political position in which public, societal life and the political relations in this country are being profiled in an Orthodox way. It is a manner of interference in public politics with a normative approach.”6 This hegemonic and privileged
position of the SOC in combination with its close cooperation with the state therefore
4 Denita Sarač Rujanac, Odnos Vjerskog i Nacionalnog u Identitetu Bošnjaka od 1980. do 1990, Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju 2012, p. 28.
5 Which has become a political party in the meantime. The first political party in the Serbian system that has some Orthodox connotations in their values.
represents an important background to keep in mind in the analysis of the status of the
Islamic communities in Serbia. Furthermore, according to Turkologist Ivan Kostić7 “there is a continuity of nationalist ideology that is fueled by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and nationalistically oriented scholars. This factor is constantly present disregarding which political party is leading the government.”8 This dominant trend has a significant impact on
how Islam and Muslims are framed in the public discourse.
Like in the case of the Serbian Orthodoxy, which became one of the primary carriers of the Serbian national identity, Islam has had a similar function in the Bosniak identity. The prewar turmoil, war and genocide have facilitated an historically unprecedented politicization and ‘nationalization’ of Islam.9 In the rhetoric of the ICiS, the Sandžak based community of
Muslims in Serbia, the government in Belgrade is principally “pro-Serbian” and “anti-Bosniak” and is structurally obstructing the development of the region of Sandžak where the majority of Bosniaks in Serbia reside. The critique of the ICiS is in the first place aimed at the ICoS, the other community of Muslims in Serbia, as a from their point of view
illegitimate organization, and in the second place at the Serbian government, which is allegedly working together with the ICoS in the repression of Bosniaks in Serbia.
1.2 The Islamic Communities in Serbia
The history of Muslim organisations in Serbia is complex. At the time of the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 two parallel Islamic communities already existed: one for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro with its seat in Belgrade, and another for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, with its seat in Sarajevo. In 1930 the unity on the Islamic community in Yugoslavia was established with this Law which states that “All Muslims in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia constitute one independent Islamic religious community under the reis-ul-ulema as the supreme religious leader.” The seat of the
reis-ul-ulema was transferred to Belgrade. In practice this centralization did not dissolve the
division of the Yugoslav Muslims. On the contrary, the division remained in the structure of
7 Currently working on his PhD on the evolution of Bosniak identity at the University of Belgrade and director of the Balkan Centre for the Middle-East.
8 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014.
9 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states, New York: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 168.
religious administrative organs because a medžlis10, a vakuf (Arab: waqf)11 council and a
vakuf directorate were created both in Sarajevo and in Skopje despite the central spiritual
authority in Belgrade.12
In 1947 with the formation of the SFR Yugoslavia the unified and centralized Islamic Community in the SFR Yugoslavia (ICiYu) was formed. It had its center in Sarajevo.
The disintegration of the Yugoslavia in the 1990s into independent entities created the conditions for the formation of new organizational structures for the Islamic Communities in the successor states. This resulted in the abolishing of the ICiYu. A meeting in Istanbul in the fall of 1994 that was attended by the representatives of the newly formed mešihats13
represented the formal dissolving of the ICiYu.14 The existing split between the currently
rivaling Islamic communities in Serbia, the Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) and the Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS) goes back to this period.
The predecessor of the ICiS was established in 1993. The ICoS mešihat was
established in 1994. In February 2007 the ICoS upgraded itself and founded the autonomous
Rijaset of the ICoS in Belgrade and claimed authority over Sandžak. There was an immediate
reaction. In March 2007 the ICiS was founded which then claimed authority over Below we will look at the details of this development.
1.3 The Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS)
The predecessor of the current ICiS, the Islamic Community in Sandžak (ICiSa), was established in 1993 under the formal name Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Sandžak, and covered the part of Sandžak located within Serbian borders, the Montenegrin part falling under the responsibility Rijaset of the Islamic Community in Montenegro (ICiM). The ICiSa was created as a branch of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICBiH) with its seat in Sarajevo. This is clearly defined in the Constitution of the ICBiH which states that
10 Local organizational unit of the Islamic Community which often corresponds with the administrative borders
of a municipality.
11“Waqf, in Islamic Law, the act of founding a charitable trust, and, hence the trust itself. The essential elements
are that a person, with the intention of committing a pious deed, declares a part of his or her property to be henceforth unalienable and designates persons or public utilities as beneficiaries of its yields.” Source: Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. XI, Leiden 2010, p. 59.
12 Emil Turković, ‘Istorijsko-pravna analiza dinamike pravne regulative Islamske zajednice u Srbiji’, in:
Novopazarski Zbornik 2013, Dragica Premović Aleksić ed., Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras 2013, p. 218
13 After the rijaset, the highest executive religious and administrative organ in the Islamic Community, the second highest religious and administrative organ is the mešihat which is responsible for a designated area. 14 Srđan Barišić, ‘Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije’, Filozfija i Društvo, No. 2 (2008), p. 118.
„the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Sandžak [i.e. the ICiS], the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Croatia and the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Slovenia are an integral part of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”15 At the central board assembly of the ICiS held on 27 March 2007 in Novi Pazar, a new constitution was adopted which was founded on the basis of the ICiSa. The proceedings were attented by reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić16, at the time the Grand Mufti of the ICBiH and supreme head of the community, and
Muamer Zukorlić17 who was chosen as the president and head Mufti of the newly formed
ICiS. The ICiS was now organized into four regional administrative units: the Sandžak Muftiate with its seat in Novi Pazar, the Preševo Muftiate with its seat in Preševo, the Belgrade Muftiate with its seat in Belgrade and the Novi Sad Muftiate with its seat in Novi Sad. The seat of the Mešihat of the ICiS is located in Novi Pazar, where the important administrative and educational institutions are located too: the Faculty for Islamic Studies, a two year Islamic Educational Academy where the language of instruction is Bosnian and which hosts guest lecturers from Bosnia and Macedonia regularly; the Gazi Isa-Beg
medresa, an Islamic school whose male section was established in 1990 and the section for
girls was established in 1996; and the International University of Novi Pazar (IUNP), a secular university created by the ICiS which is formally registered as a vakuf. These educational institutions all fall under the strong influence of Zukorlić. The issue of
accreditation of the IUNP presents a specific issue of relevance for the ICiS. This educational institution which has been active since 2002 represents one of the symbols of the
achievements which have been made under the leadership of Zukorlić. When the facility was built, Zukorlić enjoyed the support of the government in Belgrade but the university has however been unable to get the necessary accreditation from the state. Furthermore in 2006, the initiative to establish a state university in Novi Pazar came from the then prime minister Vojislav Koštunica. This was seen as a political tool by Sulejman Ugljanin of the Sandžak Party for Democratic Action (SDAS) (Stranka Demokratske Akcije Sandžaka) who thought it
15 Constitution of the ICBiH Article 1 (1997)
16 Mustafa Cerić was the Grand Mufti of the ICBiH from 1993 untill his successor Husein Kavazović took over in 2012. In the course of his mandate, he developed a strong relationship with ICiS Mufti Zukorlić.
17 Born on 15. February 1970 in the village of Orlje near Tutin where he grew up with his parents and two younger brothers. Elementary school he finished in his home town. Secondary school at the Gazi Husrev-Beg medresa in Sarajevo. He served in the military for one year in Gospić, Croatia. Studied Sharia Law (Usuli Fikh) at the Islamic University „El-Emir Abdelkader“ in Constantine, Algeri. Master studies in Qur'an exegesis (Tefsir) at Al-Jinan University in Tripoli, Lebanon. Speaks, writes and reads Arab language and speaks Turkish. Professor at the „Gazi Isa-beg“ medresa in Novi Pazar and for religious subjects and Arab language at the Islamic Pedagogical Academy (Faculty of Islamic Studies). President of the Mešihat of the ICiSa from 1993 to 2007 and president of the Mešihat of the ICiS from 2007 to 2013. Currently Zukorlić is the head of the Sandžak Muftiate of the ICiS.
could weaken the favorable position of Zukorlić’ IUNP.18 This example shows the strong political character of the ICiS and ICoS conflict. I will come back to the political background in subchapter 1.4.
The Mešihat of the ICiS publishes a monthly magazine since 1996 named Glas
Islama (the Voice of Islam) which deals with religious, cultural and societal issues. This is
done by the active publishing house El Kelimeh in Novi Pazar, which also features a book store in the building that houses the Faculty of Islamic Studies.
1.4 The Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS)
The second of the two most important Islamic Communities in Serbia, which in contrast to the ICiS that is still part of the ICiBIH, is the autonomous Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS). The Mešihat of the ICoS was formed in 1994 in Niš and covered the entire territory of Serbia, excluding Sandžak and Kosovo. On 19 February 2007, in the Bajrakli mosque19 in
Belgrade, with the adoption of a new Constitution, the Rijaset of the ICoS was founded with its seat in Belgrade and Hamdija Jusufspahić20 was chosen as the reis-ul-ulema. Since 11 October 2007 the reis-ul-ulema is Adem Zilkić who succeeded Jusufspahić. Currently the ICoS is divided into three muftiates or organizational administrative units: the Serbian (Srbijanski) Mešihat with its seat in Belgrade, the Sandžak Mešihat with its seat in Novi Pazar and the Preševo Mešihat with its seat in Preševo.21 The educational institutions of the
ICoS include: the Bakije Hanume medresa in Prepolje, the Sinan Beg medresa in Novi Pazar and the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Belgrade which was founded in 2011. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Belgrade opened a branch department in Novi Pazar in that same year. At the time, according to Danas, there were 20 students taking classes in Belgrade, and 45 in
18 Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and
Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014,
p. 223.
19 With the retreat of Ottoman forces from Belgrade after the Great Vienna War (1683-99) all mosques in Belgrade (at least 73) were destroyed except for the Bajrakli mosque. It was torched in 2004 as a revenge for the burning of churches in Kosovo.
20 Administered the Bajrakli mosque and endorsed the Milošević regime. His son, Muhamed Jusufspahić is currently the Belgrade Mufti. Source: Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges
since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, p. 216
21 Srđan Barišić, ‘Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije’, Filozfija i Društvo, No. 2 (2008), p. 124.
Novi Pazar.22 According to the ICoS, the ethnic composition of their followers is very heterogeneous. Their followers consist of 30% Bosniaks, 18% Albanians, and 52% Roma, Ashkali, Goranci, Egyptians, Turks and others. The fact that the ICoS emphasizes this heterogeneity is strongly related to the way in which the ICiS presents itself, as a mainly Bosniak institution.
1.5 The ICiS-ICoS conflict
The creation of the Rijaset of the ICoS in February 2007 was interpreted by the ICiSa and the ICBiH as a unilateral and illegitimate act. The core of the conflict is clearly reflected in the names of the two organizations. The ICiS gravitates towards the Rijaset of the ICBiH in Sarajevo in which it identifies its administrative and spiritual centre, whilst the independent ICoS is oriented towards its headquarters in Belgrade. The conflict is not based on any religious differences. Both organizations consist of Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi school of Islamic Law. Unsurprisingly, the proclamation of the ICoS and the subsequent establishment of its Sandžak mešihat has caused furious reactions on the part of the ICiSa. One month after the creation of the ICoS, as a reaction the ICiSa with the support of the ICBiH established the ICiS which incorporated three new muftiates into its organizational structure. Consequently, both organizations claim to be the legitimate representative
organization for all Muslims in Serbia. In Novi Pazar, the ICiS mešihat, a significant complex in the center of town, is located only about a hundred meters from the ICoS mešihat office, a very small building. Both IC’s thus have officers in the same towns but exact information of the loyalty of mosque communities cannot be found. According to Ivan Kostić, there hasn’t been many changes in the loyalty of mosque communities since the initial years of the dispute. Only with the emergence of a third option23 of imams that are dissatisfied with the
conflict, it is possible that something on the ground has changed. Mosques in Novi Pazar largely fall under the jurisdiction of Zukorlić which implies a majority of mosque
communities are oriented towards him.24 According to Darko Tanasković the loyalty of
mosque communities is of a fluid character, these loyalties change over time and are a subject
22 Slađana Novosel, 'Konzultativni Centar za Studije na Daljinu', Danas, 21 March 2011,
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/konsultativni_centar_za_studije_na_daljinu_.55.html?news_id=212057, Consulted on 27 October 2014.
23 In 2013, approximately 100 imams from both IC's have organised themselves in an alternative group to advocate for unification of the two communities.
to propaganda manipulation from both sides. To be able to assess the exact number, specific field research needs to be conducted on the spot in order to collect the necessary data.25
Later in 2007 the conflict escalated. Zukorlić described the developments in Sandžak at the time in the book Fenomen Muftija (The phenomenon Mufti) edited and partly written by Muhamed Filipović, member of the Bosniak Academy of Sciences. On 2 and 3 October 2007 when Zukorlić was on a visit to Morocco, a group of imams headed by Adem Zilkić, got to together in Hotel Tadž in Novi Pazar, where they issued the request that Zukorlić should resign as the President of the Mešihat of the ICiS, head mufti and Sandžak mufti within 6 hours. On 6 October, in a meeting attended by representatives of all the important institutions of the ICiS, unanimous support was given to Zukorlić and the actions of the ‘illegitimate’ ICoS were strongly condemned. 26 These developments sparked a range of
violent incidents in and around ICiS institutions, telephone threats aimed at ICiS representatives and the repression of ICiS favoring media.
The conflict also reflects the rift in local politics in Sandžak. Political life of the Bosniaks in Sandžak has been revolving around a constant rivalry between two political parties: the Sandžak Party for Democratic Action (SDAS) (Stranka Demokratske Akcije
Sandžaka), which was formed as the Sandžak branch of Alija Izetbegović’ SDAS in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP) (Socijaldemokratska Partija
Srbije). The SDAS, led by the former Novi Pazar mayor Sulejman Ugljanin and former
Minister without portfolio (2008-2014), the SDP by the current Serbian government Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications Rasim Ljajić, who defected from the SDAS in the 1990s. Although Zukorlić used to cooperate with these two key Bosniak political players, they got into a conflict. In 1993 Sulejman Ugljanin was forced to flee Serbia, being accused of secessionism by the authorities. This created a void for the
accumulation of power for Zukorlić.27 An interesting aspect of the background of the current
conflict between the Islamic Communities is disagreement between two factions in the Sandžak mešihat which has been smouldering since 1998. Zilkić used to lead a group of imams in Tutin who were at the time voicing their dissaproval of Zukorlić' course.28 Much of
25 Correspondence with Darko Tanasković, 21 August 2014.
26 Muamer Zukorlić, ‘Izvestaj Muftije o Pokusaju cijepanja Islamske Zajednice’, in: Fenomen Muftija, Muhamed Filipofić ed., Novi Pazar: 2012, p. 111-112.
28 Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and
Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014,
my sources and interviewees, point to Ugljanin as being the key player in the creation of the ICoS with the aim of damaging Zukorlić power base and reinforcing his own political position. In 2007, when the conflict between the ICiS and ICoS arose, two cooperating blocks existed: Ljajić-Zukorlić and Ugljanin-Zilkić. Whilst the latter still exists, the first alliance has come to an end. Another good example of the political background of this issue is evident in the developments surrounding the functioning of the Bosniak National Council (BNC) at the 2010 National [minority] Council elections. The detereorating relations between Zukorlić and his former political affiliates Ljajić and Ugljanin have lead to the formation of a new Bosniak political party in 2010 which was firmly controlled by Zukorlić, the Bosniak Democratic Community (BDC) (Bošnjačka Demokratska Zajednica). Chairman of the BDC is Emir Elfić, Zukorlić' brother in law. After Zukorlić and Elfić got into a conflict, the party was however, split up with the formation of the Bosniak Democratic Community of Sandžak (BDCS) (Bošnjačka Demokratska Zajednica Sandžaka) in 2013. For the 2010 elections of the Bosniak National Council, Zukorlić led the list of the Bosniak Cultural Community (the predecessor of the BDC) and won a majority of the votes. After this victory, constituting the council was made impossible by the government in Belgrade. It introduced a new regulation on a necessary two thirds majority for doing so a day before the Council was constituted and calling for new elections. According to the Belgrade Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, this interference with the regulations followed from the authorities being unhappy with Zukorlić’ faction winning the elections.29 Zukorlić, who doesn’t recognize the BNC, believes
the Bosniak minority council only represents the interests of Ugljanin and the Serbian state. What followed was the formation of a parallel BNC30, by representatives of Zukorlić.
Around the same time, a heated discussion arose related to Islamic religious education in public schools.31 Mevlud Dudić (at the time rector of Zukorlić’ IUNP and currently head Mufti of the ICiS) was replaced by Adem Zilkić in the Board for Religious Education (Komisija za Veronauku) following a government decision on 29 July 2010. Before this decision was made, both IC’s - Mevlud Dudić on behalf of the ICiS and Muhamed Jusufpahić on behalf of the ICoS - and all other traditional religious communities were represented in the
29 Uknown Author, 'National Bosniak Election: Test for Serbian Government', Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Belgrade October 2010, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB-No69.pdf, p. 3.
30 On 26 October 2014 new elections for the minority councils in Serbia took place. The BDCS, with its list 'Za
Sandžak, Bošnjake i Muftiju' (For Sandžak, Bosniaks and the Mufti [Zukorlić]) accused Ugljanin and his list 'Za Bošnjačko Jedinstvo' of election fraud in Tutin (one of the municipalities where Ugljanin's party is in power). At this time, the final results of the BNC elections have not yet been made public.
31 Religious education was introduced in Serbian public schools in 2001 by the government of Zoran Đinđic, who was regarded by Zukorlić as a close partner. Apart from Zukorlić, who understandably supported this law, the SOC was one of the main lobbyists for the introduction of religious education.
Board.32 The ICiS consequently claimed that it was made impossible for religious teachers affiliated with this Muftiate to teach classes in a number of Serbian cities and towns. They were delibaretly replaced by representatives from the ICoS on the initiative of the Ministry of Education.33 Zukorlić also accused the SOC of having an interest in marginalizing the Islamic Community and criticised bishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović for „violence against Islamic religious education“.34 This issue remains one of the primary injustices that the ICiS is
adressing in its critique aimed at the government.
According to Zukorlić, in the efforts to divide the Islamic community a significant role is reserved for the Ministry of Religions35 and the intelligence services, members of the Jusufspahić family in Belgrade, the municipality administrations of Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica headed by Sulejman Ugljanin, criminals and tycoons in Sandžak and some
government and local media.36 Ivan Kostić is convinced that since the turbulent bifurcation of the two communities, the ICoS has been organizing bogus activities in unison with the state. He states that: “the rijaset in Belgrade is a secret service creation that has been working for the government for decades, starting from the war in the 1990s [‘the Jusufspahić dynasty']. Besides the fact that the state broke up the IC, you have therefore a force within the Islamic community that is obstructing the development of a number of processes. They have been in the Bajrakli mosque [in Belgrade] for 48 years and they have been issuing reports to the government and in the media on the building of new mosques the restitution of waqf property but this is a complete facade. How can we see that this is only a facade? The past years this was completely uncovered. It was almost funny. For every human it became clear what actually is happening. They built a medresa, with substantial funds from Azerbajdjan37, a nice building with 4 floors. An Islamic faculty, but there are no students, no professors, it simply
32 J. Čalija & S. Bakračević, 'Zilkić predstavlja Muslimane u komisiji za veronauku', Politika, 20 August 2010, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Zilkic-predstavlja-Muslimane-u-komisiji-za-veronauku.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014.
33 J. Čalija & S. Bakračević, ‘Dupli spiskovi islamskih veroučitelja’, Politika, 4 September 2010,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Dupli-spiskovi-islamskih-veroucitelja.lt.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014.
34 Author unknown, 'Zukorlić optužio SPC da želi slabu islamsku zajednicu', Kurir, 2 September 2010, http://www.kurir-info.rs/zukorlic-optuzio-spc-da-zeli-slabu-islamsku-zajednicu-clanak-47236, Accessed on 10 October 2014.
35 The Ministry of Religions was replaced by the Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious
Communities in 2012.
36 Muamer Zukorlić, ‘Ízvestaj Mešihata o Napadu na Jedinstvo Islamske Zajednice’, in: Fenomen Muftija, Muhamed Filipović ed., Novi Pazar: 2012, p. 117.
37 At the time the Serbian government was cooperating with Azerbajdjan, which funded the restauration of the Tašmajdan Park in Belgrade. Kostić stresses that the funding relation to the ICoS cannot be claimed with complete certainty.
doesn't exist.“38 These allegations are rejected by Arabist Darko Tanasković39 who states that
“unlike others that believe the ICoS was artifically created by the secret services, the main argument that is to prove the illegitimacy of the IcoS, I believe the Islamic community really divided itself. It is nonetheless in the interest of the state to have the center of the Islamic Community in Belgrade. There is no doubt that the state has given full support to the ICoS. If there was someone who supported the creation of the ICoS, it was Sulejman Ugljanin and not some government in Belgrade as Zukorlić is claiming.“40
The status quo of the division in the Islamic community is interesting although much of the allegations of the role of the state and Sandžak local political factors in the creation of the ICoS remain shrouded in mist. It is however clear that despite the efforts by Ugljanin (and the ICoS) to marginalize Zukorlić, most mosque communities in Serbia remain loyal to the ICiS. Furthermore, Zukorlić' community has been actively building an institutional
infrastructure in Sandžak and controls the largest functioning Islamic educational facilities in the country. The conflict between the two communities nonetheless results in serious
consequences for the development of the Islamic community in Serbia. The issue of religious property is an important issue in this regard. This will be discussed in the second chapter. First I will shed light on the state legislation with regard to religious communities, the core subject of the sub chapter.
1.6 Legitimacy and Authority: the legal framework
In a secular state, it is for the legitimacy and legality of a religious community of crucial importance that the state recognizes it. Recognition from the state and incorporation in the existing legal framework that relates to religious communities is of vital importance to these communities. This relates to the protection of religious rights and the interest of the Muslims such as the restitution of religious property that was confiscated following the coming to power of the communist regime (Chapter 2), and the supply of religious teachers in the state educational system. Furthermore, registration and recognition from the state secures
subsidies. In the context of the existence of two Islamic communities in Serbia that have been in conflict over the question who is the legitimate representative organisation for Muslims in
38 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014.
39 Professor at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Oriental Studies. Former Ambassador to Turkey (1995-1999) and the Vatican (2002-2008).
Serbia, the state's legal framework deserves a closer examination. I will therefore now turn to the Law on Churches and Religious Communities which was adopted in 2006 and regulates the legal status of religious communities. The legitimacy of the Islamic communities is next to the state legislative framework also based on the existence and activity of educational and administrative structures and the presence of followers.
The Law on Churches and Religious Communities41 was adopted in 2006 and distinguishes between traditional [and other or “non-traditional”] churches and religious communities. According to the Law, traditional churches and religious communities have a “historical continuity of multiple centuries in Serbia” and include, the SOC, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, Reformed Christian Church and the Evangelical Christian Church, the Islamic Community and the Jewish Religious
Community.42 These seven traditional communities inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
With regard to the SOC historical continuity is explained in article 11 which states that: “The continuity of legal personality acquired by virtue of the Document on Spiritual Authority (Decree of the National Assembly of the Principality of Serbia of May 21, 1836) and of the Act on the Serbian Orthodox Church ("The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia", No. 269/1929) is recognized to the Serbian Orthodox.” An additional paragraph of Article 11 states that “The Serbian Orthodox Church has had an exceptional historical, state-building and civilizational role in forming, preserving and developing the identity of the Serbian nation.”43 Nominally all traditional religious communities enjoy equal status, but it
seems that the SOC due to its historical role, national significance and the definition of Serbia in the Constitution (“The Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it […]”44) is considered to be more important. In significant state matters, political officials consult SOC foremen, and not the foremen of other religious communities. In this light, it is interesting to see how the SOC as a majority religious institution manifests itself regarding Islam as a minority religion. In January 2010, daily Newspaper Blic reported a statement by Patriarch Irinej that it is the philosophy of Islam that Muslims, when they are numerically small can behave themselves and be correct, but when they become preeminent
41 The Law has been continiously the target of critique from civil society organisations claiming that non traditional religious communities are the victim of discrimination. Religious communities that are not
recognized as traditional started a lawsuit against the state claiming that the Law conflicts with the Constitution. 42 Law on Churches and Religious Communities of the Republic of Serbia (2006), Article 10.
43 Law on Churches and Religious Communities of the Republic of Serbia (2006), Article 11. 44 Consitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 1.
and superior, they exert pressure. Both the ICiS and ICoS severly criticized the Patriarch for this statement.45 The next day, Irinej publicly apologized. Nevertheless, in underlines the arrogance of the SOC when it comes to a minority community like Muslims.
All post-Milošević draft laws on religious communities in Serbia recognize only seven religious organizations as traditional or historical ones, while all others have to undergo a registration procedure. Such a policy towards religious communities is based on the
tradition of the prewar monarchy (until 1945) and the role and place of the SOC as a state church in that political system.46
According to the 2013 US State Department analysis of religious freedom in Serbia, “the Serbian constitution provides freedom of religion but some laws place restrictions on this freedom. These restrictions generally stem from the law’s special treatment of the seven traditional religious groups. Bylaws on religious education, property ownership and social welfare also distinguish between traditional and non-traditional religious groups and their members. Although registration is not mandatory for religious communities, unregistered groups encounter difficulties in the opening of bank accounts, purchasing or selling property and publishing literature. The grants value-added tax refunds and property tax exemptions only to registered religious groups. Registered religious groups are also exempt from paying administrative taxes and filing annual financial reports.” 47
The Islamic Community is a traditional religious community based on “the continuity of legal personality acquired by virtue of the Act on Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ("The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia", No. 29/1930) [which] is recognized to the Islamic Community.” As there is only one Islamic community mentioned here, and given the fact that the Register of Churches and Religious Communities of the Government Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities (Government Office for Religion, previously the Ministry of Religion) also only refers to simply the “Islamic community”, the question arises what the legal status of the two major Islamic communities exactly is. Interestingly, the Government Office for Religion has put up links on its homepage to both the ICoS and ICiS websites.48
45Author Unknown, ‘Patrijarh Irinej uvredio islam’, B92, 28 January 2010,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_id=407291&dd=28&mm=01&yyyy=2010 , Consulted on 25 October 2014.
46 U.S. State deparment, 'Serbia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report,
'http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222477.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014.
47 Ibidem.
48 Official website of the Office for the Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities, http://www.vere.gov.rs/, Consulted on 26 October 2014.
Another important but confusing aspect of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities is presented by Article 19 which states that “a religious organization whose name contains the name or part of the name denoting the identity of the Church or religious community already entered into the Register or of the one who had filed the application before, shall not be entered into the Register.”
According to Darko Tanasković, referring to this Article, „every traditional church [and religious community] can be only one, and not two or more. It is in the interest of the state, for example, not to have the Montenegrin Orthodox Church as a registered religious community. The state cooperates with both Islamic communities but they cannot be registered both because of the constitution.“49 Ivan Kostić on the other hand explains that „all the
traditional religious communities that are recognized by this Law needed to only apply for that legitimacy. They don't need to register. It is not a new registration, they [the Islamic Religious Community] were namely registered in 1930. It is only necessary to claim the existence of historical continuity and thus legitimacy. They [i.e. ICoS and ICiS] both claim continuity from the 1930 Law on the Islamic religious community. Both the Rijaset of the ICoS and the Mešihat of the ICiS call upon that Law of 1930 and that they are thus the legal successors of that Islamic Community. Registration is only needed for 'new' religious communities, in other words non-traditional religious communities. Hare Krishna for
example can only register its organisation if there is no Hare Krishna organisation registered yet.“50 The state has however refused to register Hare Krishna, as well as the League of
Baptists, the Pentecostal Church and the Protestant Evangelical Church from Subotica. This hampers their possibilities to function properly. At the same time, the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches are not registered either but recognized by the state and they are allowed to operate freely.51
Regarding the „traditional“ Islamic Community, both the ICiS and ICoS appear to be
de facto recognized by the state, but as I will show in the next subchapter, a state decision on
the legitimacy and historical continuity of both communities has not been made.
1.7 Legitimacy and Authority: historical continuity
49 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 50 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014.
51 U.S. State deparment, 'Serbia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report,
I will now turn to the claims made by the Islamic communities that are to confirm their historical continuity and thus legitimacy. At the central board assembly of the ICiSa held on 27 March 2007, a new constitution was adopted forming the ICiS. Article 1 of the
constitution states that „the Islamic community in Serbia […] is the one and unique
traditional religious community for Muslims from the area of Sandžak, the Preševo Valley, Central Serbia and Vojvodina, the Muslim diaspora and other Muslims who accept it as their own.“52 Furthermore, “the Islamic community bases its legitimacy on the Qur’an, Sunnah, the historical continuity from šejhul-islam (Arab: Shaykh al-Islām) from Istanbul through
menšura (Arab: manshur)53 and murasel, religious-legal and religious-educational institutions
of the Muslims in Serbia, and the the will of the ulama and members of the Islamic community.54 According Tanasković, the claim of historical continuity pointing at the decisions made by the Shaykh al-Islām in Istanbul is a weak argument: “One part of the Muslims in Serbia believe that legitimacy and continuity can only follow from the Ottoman legacy [from Istanbul]. This is a weak argument because the Rijaset of the ICBiH was a Autro-Hungarian institution that was created to detach the Muslims in BiH from Istanbul. These Muslims have a moral and emotional loyalty towards Istanbul.“55 Although at the time the reis-ul-ulema and the medžlis ulema56 were chosen in Vienna, their appointment was formally confirmed by the šejhul-islam in Istanbul.57 In his hutbas – sermons delivered at the time of the Friday prayer - the reis-ul-ulema in Sarajevo would first praise the Kaiser Franz Joseph followed by the Caliph in Istanbul. The final authority however lay with the office of the šejhul-islam.58 Despite the Austro-Hungarian intention drawing the Islamic Community into its sphere of influence ‘artificially’, the ICBiH remained predominantly loyal to Istanbul.
Similarly, the ICoS draws its legal foundation from the menšura of šejhul-islam. The recognition of Islam as a lawful religion of the principality of Serbia with the decision the
52 Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Article 1 (2007).
53 A formal document which confirms that a specific person is the legally appointed or chosen reis-ul-ulema and as such is empowered to, in terms of Sharia Law, give similar authorizations to subordinate religious officers (murasel). In the Bosnian praxis this is called menšura, a term that entered the Bosnian Islamic administration from Ottoman institutions and the Ottomans took it from preceding Muslim states. In 1930, the last menšura was issued in Istanbul. From then on, they are issued in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
54Constitution of the ICiS Mešihat, Article 2. 55 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 56 Council of the most prominent religious representatives.
57 Emil Turković, ‘Istorijsko-pravna analiza dinamike pravne regulative Islamske zajednice u Srbiji’, in: Novopazarski Zbornik 2013, Dragica Premović Aleksić ed., Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras 2013, p. 220.
58Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans,
State Council of the Principality of Serbia of 18 May 1868 is mentioned in the the ICoS constitution.59 Moreover, in accordance with the Law on Churches and Religion
Communities historical continuity and legal subjectivity is drawn from the 1930 Law on the Islamic religious community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Tanasković was a member of a state commission with the task of determining which Islamic community has historical continuity . This working group was established in 2009 on the initiative of the Minister for Religions Bogoljub Šijaković. Its aim was to to acertain facts on the historical contiuity and legal legitimacy of the Islamic Community in the Republic of Serbia. It was an ad hoc formed internal body that filed a report to the relevant Minister. 60 Filed on 23 July 2010, the report concluded that the only the ICoS can enjoy
historical contitunity and legitimacy61, but the conclusion of the Working Group was never formalized nor produced any administrative, legal or political consequences, so Tanasković. According to the orientalist, „legally speaking, one could claim that the ICoS has legitimacy and continuity because the preamble of its Statute contains a reference to all decisions made in by the Principality of Serbia as well as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Zukorlić does not recognize these decisions and thinks these are unimportant.“ Tanasković continues saying that there was an idea to make both Islamic communities equal before the Law, and to tolerate the ICoS as a legitimate religious community in relation to the state whilst tolerating the ICiS in its relation to Sarajevo. This however wasn't realised because of fear for the consequences on the ground.62 One could say that there are three options from the state perspective: either recognize both communities, recognize only one, or let the situation simmer in its current form. Realistically speaking, Kostić says, the Serbian state is not able to tackle this issue. It has enough problems to deal with at the moment, of which Kosovo is one. There is therefore no need to let the powderkeg Sandžak explode.63
Both the ICiS and ICoS are de facto recognized by the state, but de jure a formal decision has not been made on the issue of historical continuity. Instead, since the 2010 establishment of the Working Group that determined ICoS as the legal successor of the Islamic Religious Community of 1930, no action has been taken by the state to resolve this
59 Constitution of the IcoS Rijaset, Article 3.
60 Correspondence with Darko Tanasković, 21 August 2014.
61 Aleksandar Raković, ‘Turska Inicijative i Islamska Zajednica', Politika, 29 January 2013,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/ostali-komentari/Turska-inicijativa-i-Islamska-zajednica.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014.
62 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 63 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014.
issue. The development and stability of the Islamic community is at the same time
jeopardized by the current situation. One of the important consequences following from the existence of the rivalry is the process of the restitution of vakuf property which has
consequently come to a complete standstill. This will, next to mosque construction, form the core of the following chapter.
One of the problems facing Muslims in Serbia is the return of religious properties that were confiscated during the crackdown of the communist regime on religious communities. The three most important institutions for Muslims were all abolished in the early phase of communism: Sharia courts, educational institutions and waqfs64 (largely expropriated and
nationalized in 1945-1958).65 I will now turn to the issue of mosque construction followed by
the issue of waqf restitution, one of the main points of critique of Muslims at the Serbian government.
2.1 Mosque construction
65 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post-Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011, p. 49.
Today, there are some more than 190 mosques in Serbia, of which 120 are located in Sandžak, 60 in Southern Serbia – the Preševo Valley where a siginicant Albanian minority lives - one in Belgrade, one in Niš, one in Mali Zvornik and one in Subotica. Before the Great Vienna War (1683-99), there were at least 73 mosques in Belgrade. Following the withdrawal of the Ottomans, all of them were destroyed, except for one, the Bajrakli Mosque in Belgrade’s Dorćol district 66, which is currently the seat of the ICoS Rijaset. According to
the Serbian 2011 census there are 22.909 Muslims living in Belgrade.67 Clearly, the Bajrakli
mosque, which with its 120 square meters only provides space for 300 believers, does not meet the demand of this significant group of believers. According to Belgrade Mufti
Muhamed Jusufspahić, Muslims in Belgrade make use of a number of improvised places of worship throughout the capital.68 The IC has sent requests to the government to build new mosques in the Belgrade area but the official response was that the land had to be purchased on the open market. However, buying property for religious purposes is almost impossible, considering the heavy burden of historical and mythical attitudes.69 Considering the
significant amount of Muslims in Belgrade, it is clear that there is a strong need for more mosques in the capital. The city authorities, however, have abstained from qualitative reactions to these requests, passing responsibility from one department to another.70 According to Zilkić, outside of Sandžak and the Preševo valley there is a serious lack of places of worship. Muslims have experienced similar problems in this field such as the hindrance of municipal authorities in Bačko Novo Selo as well as other towns and cities where, according to Zilkić, the Law on the building of Religious objects is not being
implemented.71 Next to obstacles in the building of mosques in the larger Serbian cities, there have been instances of aggression aimed at Islamic heritage. On 17 March 2004, ethnic violence broke out in Kosovo and Metohija which resulted in the destruction of numerous
66 Ahmet Alibašić, , ‘Serbia’, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Vol. 4 (2012), p. 461-462.
67 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia 2011, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, p. 38.
68 T. Zorić, ‘Intervju: Muftija mr. Muhamed ef. Jusufspahić’, ICoS Sandžak Muftiate Official Website,
’ http://www.mesihatSandžaka.rs/vijesti/495-intervju-muftija-mr-muhamed-ef-jusufspahic.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014.
69 Svetlana Seferović, ‘Bosonogi na Betonu’, 4 December 2008, Vreme, ttp://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=764210, Accessed on 6 October 2014.
70 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post-Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011, p. 96.
71 [It's not clear which law Zilkić exactly means] Dževad Zejnelović, ‘Gradićemo džamije u svim gradovima gdje postoje interesi Muslimana’, ICoS Official Website,10 September 2014,
http://izs.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=648:gradi%C4%87emo-d%C5%BEamije-u-svim-gradovima-gdje-postoje-interesi-Muslimana&catid=133:intervjui&Itemid=588, Accessed on 6 October 2014.
Orthodox churches and other places of historical and sacral value. The following day, these events provoked a surge of anti-Islamic reactions in several cities across Serbia. The
retaliation that followed included the burning of mosques and other sacral buildings of the Islamic Religious Community in Belgrade, Niš and Novi Sad. A few days later the
management of the Military Museum in Belgrade ordered the destruction of nišans72 from the
15th and 16th centuries. A military institution (in at the time Serbia and Montenegro)
consequently also participated in the destructive acts of mostly younger citizens of Belgrade and Niš.73
Unlike in Belgrade, the Sandžak region, where Muslims form a majority, seems to experience little problems in the construction of mosques. This was underlined by Jahija Ferhatović, president of the Bosniak Democratic Community, during my visit to Novi Pazar, who was not able to mention any obstacles faced by the ICiS in this respect.74 According to Zukorlić, in the past 20 years the ICiS hasn’t been able to get any building permits for its new mosques in Novi Pazar.75 The Sandžak Muftiate appears to be building what it wants on properties that they claim to be waqf . In July 2013, the foundation for the forty-first mosque in the ICiS medžlis of Novi Pazar has been laid.76 Currently, the ICiS is building a mosque in Sjenica which is planned to feature the tallest minarets in Europe.
Although little has been written in scholarly literature on mosque construction in Serbia, it appears that those regions where Muslims form a minority, and especially in urban centers, the Islamic Community is facing challenges. In Sandžak on the other hand, Muslims face little or no restrictions in the building of places of worship, despite the alleged illegality of these activities.
2.2 Restitution of religious property
Property restitution has a particular significance for religious communities in their financial stability as well as in carrying out activities of religious, educational and charitable nature.
72 Authentic and very rare tombstones that date from the Turkish period.
73 Milan Vukomanović, 'What the Church can(not) be asked about: The Serbian Orthodox Church, state and society in Serbia', Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2005, p. 18.
74 Conversation with Jahja Fehratović, 29 June 2014
75 S. Bakračević, ‘Muftija Zukorlić gradi bez Dozvola’, Politika, 8 November 2013,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Srbija/Muftija-Zukorlic-gradi-bez-dozvola.lt.html, Accessed on 6 October. 76 Author Unknown, ‘Novi Pazar – Temelji za 41. džamiju; Muftija: ‘Nećemo stati dok ne napravimo preko 100 džamija’, SandžakPress, 19 July 2013, ’ http://Sandžakpress.net/novi-pazar-temelji-za-41-dzamiju-muftija-necemo-stati-dok-ne-napravimo-preko-100-dzamija, Accessed on 5 October 2014.
Furthermore, it can decrease the dependence of religious communities on the state and foreign donors as well. 77 The alleged state-led obstruction of the restitution of waqf property is one of the key injustices that the ICiS emphasizes. In 2006, the Serbian government adopted the Law on the Restitution of Property to Churches and Religious Communities which regulates the restitution of properties confiscated after 1945. The Law is firstly problematic for the Jewish Religious Community because it does not cover property
confiscations during the German occupation. For the Islamic Communities, the Law has not yet produced desired results either. In January 2014, Serbian state media reported that more than 50% of religious property had been returned to the SOC, the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish Religious Community. According to the Agency for Restitution, the speed of the process of restitution since the adoption of the 2006 Law has been satisfactory whilst emphasizing that there is no discrimination involved. Furthermore the Agency expressed the expectation that all confiscated properties will be returned in the coming four to five years. Mileta Radojević, director of the Office for the Oooperation with Churches and Religious Communities, asserted that the problem regarding the restitution of [waqf] property to the Islamic Community is that it has not yet been defined which of the two communities is the rightful heir to this property.78 Both the ICiS and ICoS have filed requests for the restitution of identical properties as they both claim to be the legitimate successor of the Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as registered in 1930.79 The division among Muslims in Serbia has therefore resulted in no restitution whatsoever for the Islamic Communities.
Although the Law on Resitution forbids the selling of [waqf] properties to third parties which are due to be returned to religious communities80, there have been instances of
attempts to sell these properties through the Agency for Privatization.81 Director of the Waqf Directorate of the ICiS (Vakufska Direkcija), Sead Saćirović, claims that the ICoS was created in order to give the state a motive not to work on the restitution of Islamic religious
77 Ina Merdjanova & Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009, p. 85-86.
78 Author Unknown, ‘Crkvama Vraćena Polovina Imovine', RTS, 4 January 2014, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1487150/Crkvama+vra%C4%87ena+polovina+oduzete+imovine.html, Accessed on 6 October 2014.
79 Draško Đenović, ‘Srbija: Restitucija – Dokle smo stigli?’, 6 June 2011,
http://www.centar9.info/articles/pdf/RESTITUCIJA_-_Clanak_final.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014. 80 Zakon o Vraćanju Imovine Crkvama I Verskim Zajednicama (2006), Article 36.
81 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post-Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011,
