Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations of the Middle East
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ETTING THE SCENE FOR A NEW GULF WAR
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AUDI
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RANIAN CONUNDRUM
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COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ON THE SIMILARITIES ANDDIFFERENCES THAT MAKE UP THE INTRICATE
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RANIANRELATIONSHIP
Name: Axel Xavier Patrice de Puteani Rigault Jørgensen Student Nr: 11127821
First reader: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Second reader: Dr. Paul Aarts
It is a truism that almost any sect, cult, or religion will legislate its creed into law if it acquires the political power to do so.
Chapter I. Introduction ... 8
1.2 Relevance of the research ... 10
1.3 Roadmap of the thesis ... 12
Chapter II. Theoretical framework ... 13
2.1 On realism ... 14
2.2 Neorealism and neoclassical realism ... 15
2.3 Neoclassical realism in the context of Saudi-Iranian relations ... 16
2.4 Variables that conform to neoclassical realist thought within the Saudi-Iranian framework ... 17
2.5 Conclusion to Chapter II ... 22
Chapter III. Methodology ... 24
3.1 Process tracing ... 24
3.2 Variables ... 26
3.3 Operationalization of variables ... 27
3.4 Data ... 33
Chapter IV. Informative background relevant to the analysis ... 39
4.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... 39
4.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran ... 41
4.3 The importance of Bahrain ... 43
4.4 Conclusion to Chapter IV. ... 45
Chapter V. Comparative analysis – Similarities ... 47
5.1 Support for regional proxies and groups ... 47
5.2 Nuclear weapons ... 57
5.3 Religion, a similarity or difference? ... 61
5.4 Conclusion to chapter V ... 68
Chapter VI. Comparative analysis – Differences ... 70
6.1 Military spending. ... 70
6.2 Ethnic nationalism ... 77
6.3 Alliances to foreign powers ... 80
6.4 Regime typology ... 87
6.5 Collective memory ... 92
Chapter VII. Conclusion ... 99
7.1 Conclusion ... 99
7.2 Implications ... 103
7.3 Discussion and Further Research ... 104
List of abbreviations
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds Force ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KHA: Kata’ib Hezbollah LeT: Lashkar-e-Taiba
NWFP: North-West Frontier Province UNSC: United Nations Security Council WMDs: Weapons of Mass Destruction
List of Maps and Figures:
Map 1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Map 2. The Islamic Republic of Iran.
Map 3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia vs Islamic Republic of Iran: a proxy war in the Middle East. Figure 1. Saudi Arabian military expenditures 2011-2014.
Figure 2. Iranian military expenditure 2011-2012.
Chapter I. Introduction
On January 2nd 2016, Saudi authorities executed a prominent Shia cleric by the name of Nimr Al-Nimr. The Sheikh, a vocal supporter of the 2011 Arab uprisings against the Saudi regime, was among 47 people that the Saudi government put to death on terrorism charges.1 Sheikh Nimr was a prominent and outspoken cleric who raised the issue of the marginalised and oppressed Shia minority living in the Eastern province of the Kingdom.2 Immediately after the sentence was carried out, the Iranian foreign ministry and other branches of the Iranian government publically condemned the execution. The reason for the rapid Iranian response was due to the fact that as the major Shia power in the region, Iran has taken on the role as protector of the many Shia minorities in the Middle East.3
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been in a constant power-struggle ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The execution of Sheikh Al-Nimr has only served to once more revive Saudi-Iranian hostility and the animosity between the two regional powers has reached new heights. The delicate situation seems to be rooted in Sunni and Shia disputes, dating back to the foundation of Islam in the 7th century. The struggle between the Sunni and Shia denominations only accentuates the ever-growing Saudi-Iranian opposition. The Sunni-Shia divide, however, is but one of many variables that need to be taken into account when presenting a comprehensive analysis of the antagonism present between the Islamic Republic and the Saudi kingdom.
In more general terms, the two nations are entangled in a complex cold war when it comes to regional hegemony and influence in the Middle East – a duel that began in1979.4 The escalating rivalry is sustained by important geopolitical and ideological differences in foreign and domestic policy. Iran, an Islamic Republic, which advocates commitment to the revolutionary Islamic cause, is firmly opposed to the staunchly conservative absolute Saudi monarchy, which prefers the preservation of the regional status quo. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran’s ideological standpoints are firmly vested in a fusion of religion and politics, which
1 BBC 2016 “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia executes top Shia Cleric” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35213244 02/01/2016, retrieved on 22/02/2016. 2 BBC 2016 “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Anger at execution of top Shia cleric” available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35214536 02/01/2016, retrieved on 22/02/2016.
3 Terrill, W. Andrew (2011) “The Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p. 3.
serves to legitimise the two respective regimes, or the regimes’ policies.5 While the former uses its Wahhabi doctrine to legitimise the rule of the House of Sa’ud, the latter is unequivocally opposed to the monarchy as an institution.6 After all, the revolution toppled the Iranian monarchy – the Pahlavi dynasty – and opened the route for the Islamic regime that has been in power ever since. Including regime typology or religious creed, there are also many other important differences that separate the two regimes, such as major alliances or historic experiences, which also take part in increasing the levels of mistrust between them.
During the last decades, a variety of incidents that have only served to increase tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken place. Amongst the most damaging of these are the many proxy wars fought between the Saudis and Iranians in different theatres across the Middle East. From Yemen to Syria, and from Bahrain to Lebanon, Riyadh and Tehran are settling their disputes through proxies, and a large network of allied factions and groups. The overt and covert support to respective proxies is only accelerating sectarian divisions from the Arabian Peninsula to the Mediterranean, and is setting the scene for an ever-increasing conflict escalation between the two states. The Iranian republic and the Saudi monarchy are playing a balancing game in an effort to check each other’s growing power, and within the framework of such a balancing strategy, a wide array of foreign and domestic policy determinants come into play.
In the domain of international relations, hegemony – which is vital in the Saudi-Iranian context – implies a state’s capacity for coercion (military strength), and a strong degree of control and influence (ideological control) over the structures of the international, or regional system.7 If two countries strive for regional hegemony, which is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia, it will automatically intensify the existing rivalry between these two. The quest for hegemonic ascendance, very much in line with the theory that will be adopted for this thesis, is what seems to be the foreign policy-apex for the Saudi and Iranian authorities – namely that both countries strive to become the dominant power in the region.8
5 Bank, André, Richter, Thomas & Sunik, Anna (2013) “Long term monarchical survival in the Middle East: A configurational comparison, 1945-2012” German Institute of Global and Area studies, Hamburg, p. 17 6 Terrill (2011), p. 5.
7 Antoniades, Andreas (2008) “From Theories of Hegemony to Hegemony Analysis in International Relations” Center for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex, Brighton. p. 2 And Carranza, Mario E. (2010)
“Reality Check: America’s continuing Pursuit of Regional Hegemony” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 3, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 407.
This thesis will present, analyse, and investigate the many reasons for the ever-growing levels of mistrust and resentment existing in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. This thesis’ starting point will begin with the Arab uprisings in 2011, more precisely, with the March uprisings against the Saudi-backed Bahraini monarchy. The reason being that Bahrain is at the heart of the Saudi-Iranian political struggle. Not only is the island nation situated in the Persian Gulf, between Saudi Arabia in Iran, the country is also ruled by a Sunni royal family in a predominantly Shiite majority populated country.9 More importantly, the 2011 Bahraini uprising is a perfect point of departure because Saudi-Iranian animosity greatly intensified after Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in an effort to quell the peaceful protests, which were led by the mostly Shiite populace.10
Although the thesis will use 2011 as a point of departure, it will also be building on events and experiences dating back to the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and other historic phenomena, in order to deeply understand the root causes of today’s rivalry. The Saudi-Iranian contest will, in the long run, become one of the most potent geopolitical duels in existence due to the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are two different opposing powers, with different belief systems, different political apparatuses and different opinions regarding regional order. Although the duel remains a cold war as of this day, conflict is on the horizon. Thus, my research question goes as follows:
How can we explain the increasing hostility between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran after 2011?
1.2 Relevance of the research
The research presented in this thesis will reflect the problems in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, and the reasons for their growth. The underlying basis of the animosity reverberated by both parties is rooted to literature on various political science genres, such as international relations, Middle Eastern studies and comparative politics.
The increasing level of hostility between two regional leaders justifies the need for a careful and effective study concentrated on unearthing how the negatives in the above-mentioned relationship came to be. Although Saudi-Iranian relations have been frigid ever since 1979,
9 Wright, Robin (2001). Sacred Rage, the Wrath of Militant Islam Touchstone. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Publishers, p. 115.
they have undoubtedly taken a turn for the worse in the last few years. As such, this research will contribute to the debate that has been present in academic circles since the Islamic Revolution. The debate on what constitutes the current hostility, however, is not constant or on-going. Due to the fact that at times, the relationship has shown signs of betterment, the debate can recede. By cause of recent circumstances that have explicitly impaired the relationship once more, it is time to research the very foundation of the dilemma present. The research underneath will not solely focus on explaining the reasons for current animosity, such as the execution of Sheikh Al-Nimr, or the several other occurrences that have shaped the relations since 2011. In order to fundamentally draw attention to the debate in its entity, research variables that have yet to be fully appreciated in this case-specific context must be evaluated. This research will add value to the current academic debate on the inter-state rivalry, as it will present a scientifically comprehensive investigation of all variables taking part in intensifying the Saudi-Iranian rivalry until present day. Authors and experts in the field, such as Andrew Terrill (The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security), Barry Rubin (Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power), or Matthew Levitt (Hizballah and the Qods force in Iran’s shadow war with the West) all present systematic research in a satisfactory manner, however, they do not necessarily target every aspect of the current rivalry. While their research on certain aspects is categorical, purely centralising one’s research on one topic does not present a fully systematic analysis of the root causes that make up the current rivalry between the two regional powers. To the best of my knowledge, there are few cases of cross cutting analysis comparing domestic and international similarities and differences that together form the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Further reasons for the scientific relevance of this thesis is based on the fact that it will present an international relations theory, and demonstrate its method. It will build on theory that expresses reasons for domestic and systemic variables to be taken into account when analysing an inter-state rivalry (Rose, 1998). While other positivist theories explicitly scrutinise the state in the international environment (Waltz, 1988), the theory adopted for this research will elaborate and enrich the justification for the reasoning behind Saudi-Iranian hostility.
The social relevance of the on-going relationship between the two countries is paramount for the larger Middle East. This is because in the current relationship, there are many variables that are not only important for the two counties in question, but for many other countries region-wide. Iran and Saudi Arabia embody so many characteristics that are creating conflict in different Middle Eastern countries. Variables that the Saudis and Iranians use against each other are often transfused to conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Religious denomination,
regime type, and support for radical organisations are all variables that create an insecure political ground in these countries. The Shia-Sunni divide, which is firmly reflected due to Saudi-Iranian tensions, is then reverberated in countries with uncertain and unstable ethnic, sectarian and political platforms. For these reasons, civil war between different political factions, between religious denominations, and between groups with different ethnic makeup take root. Regional security and stability is tormented because of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and as long as the two countries will be entangled in a cold war with such a wide array of complex components, peaceful settlements in different regional conflict theatres will remain an illusion. Conclusively, the cost of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is being experienced by large segments of the Middle East.
1.3 Roadmap of the thesis
In my second chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. It will thoroughly define the theory that will be used in the context of the research question above. It will display and develop an existing theory of international relations, and the rationale behind the choice of this specific theory. The third chapter will introduce the methodological structure of the thesis, before it presents the case-specific method that will be applied. This chapter will also provide the thesis with a comprehensive operationalization of key variables that are included that form the backbone of the analysis. The chapter will conclude by displaying the data and the main sources of the thesis.
The fourth chapter will present a brief background of Saudi Arabia and Iran, including Bahrain’s role in the regional duel between the two. The following chapters will be dedicated to the main part of the thesis, which is the in-depth analysis of the causes, reasons and motivations behind the increasing hostility between the two nations. The last chapter will thoroughly conclude the vital attributes of the analysis, while comprehensively answering the research question.
Chapter II. Theoretical framework
In order to comprehensively answer the research question of this thesis, a thorough theoretical framework, extensively explaining the various internal and external factors of Iranian and Saudi foreign and domestic policies needs to be applied. The essence of the research question, that is, the increasing hostility present in the current Saudi-Iranian relationship, needs to be described, explained, and analysed.
In this thesis, one specific international relations theory, namely neoclassical realism will be employed in order to describe the on-going hostility present in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. Neoclassical realism, an offshoot of both classical realism and neorealism, is a theory that was first introduced in 1998 by Gideon Rose,11 an American political scientist and the current editor of Foreign Affairs.12 In the theoretical framework that will be presented underneath, neoclassical realism will be defined and developed, in order to give the reader insight to the backbone of the theory and the concepts involved. In order to do this, the theory will have to be broken down into several pieces, and then reconstructed, in order to present a detailed structure of the core of neoclassical realism. As we shall see, this theory is a fusion of different types of realist thought. It combines both domestic and international structures into its train of thought.13
Firstly, this chapter will present the reasons why I believe neoclassical realism’s distant relation, namely neorealism, lacks certain theoretical factors and advantages in order to comprehensively analyse the Saudi-Iranian power struggle. Secondly, the neoclassical approach will be developed and defined underneath in order to give the reader insight in the nature of the concepts involved and the functions they serve to the research question at hand. The third part will associate neoclassical realism to the Saudi-Iranian relationship, thus describing its importance and why this specific theory is relevant to such a case study.
11 Rose, Gideon (1998) “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 146.
12 Council on Foreign Relations 2016, “Gideon Rose” available at http://www.cfr.org/staff/b112 2016, retrieved on 01/03/2016.
13 Foulon, Michiel (2015) “Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities” International Studies Review, University of Warwick, Coventry, p. 635-636.
2.1 On realism
In order to fully appreciate the theoretical components presented by neoclassical realism, we need to go back to its forefather, classical realism and its other variants, to accurately describe their shortcomings, and the reason why the former holds more merit when it comes to the analysis of the Saudi-Iranian conundrum.
In the Melian Dialogue, a passage in Thucydides’ work on the Peloponnesian Wars, a statement that is considered archetypical in realist tradition briefly epitomizes the realist point of view: “The dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must”.14 In an anarchic world, the powerful do what hey must to survive, while the weak are left with nothing. On the global scene, realists thus assume that the very essence that drives a state is survival. As the most predominant school of thought in international relations for several decades, classical realism and its successor neorealism, present a distinctive thought on the nature of the international system, diplomacy, war and peace. Realism assumes that the struggle for power should be measured on the state level. This is derived from the above point; that the international system is in a state of anarchy, and the state actors have to look after themselves in a system where the only means of survival is power.
Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism presents a systemic-based level of analysis, where the only actors with true power is the state.15 As Waltz himself states on neorealism: “A system theory
of international politics deals with forces at the international, and not at the national, level”. 16 Whatever policy a state implements domestically is irrelevant in order to comprehend a state’s national interests in the international system. This exact point is where Waltzian neorealism breaks with Rose’s neoclassical realism.
Neoclassical realism does not directly disagree with the core assumptions of neorealism; rather, it adds value to its theory in the form of including a domestic level analysis to the systemic based approach advocated by Waltz. The difference lies within state behaviour, which neoclassical realists believe is shaped, but not entirely commanded by systemic incentives, because domestic factors also have a role to play in forging state behaviour.17
14 Martin Hammond (2009). Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 302. 15 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1988) “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Volume 18, Issue 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge p. 618. 16 Ibidem.
2.2 Neorealism and neoclassical realism
Neoclassical realist theory, although reasonably similar to former realist schools of thought, presents a distinctive feature, which is absent in older forms of realism. As explained, neoclassical realism holds, as its distant cousins, that the state is the major player in the international system and that a state’s position in the international hierarchy is dependent on its relative material power capabilities.18 Furthermore, neoclassical realist scholars also assume realism’s core assumption, which is the anarchic state of nature in international politics.19 On the contrary of neorealism, however, the neoclassical approach also takes into account a state’s domestic factors, as a way of further explaining foreign policy decisions and outcomes proposed by respective states in the international system.20
Scholars of international relations have often debated and criticised each other’s works, and unfortunately, it rarely leads to compromise or academic agreement.
Although all theories present valid points, the theoretical differences between them cannot be overwritten. Neoclassical realism, however, fuses theoretical assumptions taken from several works. It is not solely a systemic theory, nor does it display strictly a domestic level of analysis of foreign policy. It is however, a combination of both. For neoclassical realists, “domestic politics affect how the government devises foreign policy in response to binding
structural incentives”.21
The interest of neoclassical realism is then to explain the behaviour behind approaches to foreign policy, which according to its architect Gideon Rose, is a combination of the international system, domestic factors, and the relationship between these two.22 It is a dual approach, encompassing both systemic (international in this sense) and domestic variables on foreign policy. It is, in other words, a theory that focuses on both the unit level (the state in the international system) and the level underneath the unit level, that is, the domestic policies of that state. It is a mix of offensive realism, arguing that systemic factors are always dominant, and Innenpolitik, that focuses on the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy.
18 Rose (1998), p. 146.
19 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man, the State, and War. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, p. 232. 20 Rose (1998), p. 146.
21 Foulon (2015), p 635-636. 22 Rose (1998), p. 146.
As Rose notes, “Understanding the links between power and policies requires close
examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented”.23
2.3 Neoclassical realism in the context of Saudi-Iranian relations.
In order to fully appreciate the diverse set of variables involved in the complex relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a theory focusing on systemic and domestic factors is key. Neoclassical realism brings forth this option. Neorealism, although incredibly coherent when it comes to explaining the international system from a systemic point of view, does not present the opportunity of taking domestic politics into account.24 The reason for the importance of domestic-level variables in this specific context is straightforward – several Saudi and Iranian foreign policy factors are rooted in the specific domestic political arena. The most potent example for both countries is religion. If we depart from Ayatollah Khomeini’s stance on foreign policy, we notice that the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy adheres to Islamic values and ideals. Islam, being a religion, is a socially constructed design, which is firmly vested in the domestic arena of Iranian politics as the ideological basis of the state.25 This means that religion, a domestic level variable, is at the basis of Iranian foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is like Iran’s, one that is heavily influenced by the country’s dominant religious denomination. As the country’s modern history has predominantly been shaped by the monarchy’s alliance with the Ulama and the Wahhabi order,26 it is understandable that Saudi foreign policy is a product of its domestic, and specifically religious factors. What does that mean for neorealist theory, which solely stands by a systemic point of view and refuses to take domestic level variables into account in the analysis of state behaviour?
Neorealism has severe shortcomings, because it would not by principle be able to explain how religion, a domestic variable, could take up such an extensive role in explaining a country’s foreign policy.
23 Idem, p. 147.
24 Baylis, John, Smith, Steven & Owens, Patricia (2014). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 106.
25 Juneau, Thomas & Razavi, Sam (2013). Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. Oxon: Routledge, p. 6-7.
26 Bonnefoy, Laurent (2013) “Saudi Arabia and the export of religious ideologies” Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre/Norsk Ressurssenter for fredsbygging, Oslo, p. 1-2.
Religion, however, is but one of several domestic components that are important characteristics in Iranian and Saudi Arabian respective foreign policies. Domestic variables such as different forms of nationalism, ethnicity and regime typology are other variables that would be considered irrelevant for other realists, but that also take part in interpreting the research question. This is the foremost reason why neoclassical realism, which does consider domestic level variables, is a richer and more adapt theory when it comes to explaining the increasing animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Zakaria notes, “A good explanation
of foreign policy should not ignore domestic politics, or national culture or individual decision makers”.27
Neoclassical realism thus provides more explanatory richness to the research question, than what Waltzian neorealism would propose. As explained, however, neoclassical realism also takes systemic factors into account. As Rose notes: “Its (neoclassical realism) adherents
argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist”.28 In other words, systemic variables are still at the
core of the theory. The importance of these foreign policy variables in the Saudi-Iranian relationship is critical. In order to gain an in depth examination of the external causes, driving the mentioned relationship toward a hostile rivalry, neoclassical realism is the most logical theoretical framework applicable. Neoclassical realism thus provides reason to analyse both systemic and domestic policy variables, which gives will give the dissertation a more fertile theoretical account of what is causing the animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Under the neoclassical realist umbrella, variables that directly influence the Saudi-Iranian relationship need to be taken into account, in order to comprehensively describe the reasons for the existing hostility. These variables are the outcome of the neoclassical realist theory discussed above.
2.4 Variables that conform to neoclassical realist thought within the Saudi-Iranian framework
27 Zakaria, Fareed (1992) “Realism and Domestic politics, a review essay” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 197.
The segment underneath is not the methodological operationalization of the variables included in this thesis, which comes later, but rather a short analysis of why these exact variables embody neoclassical realism.
As neoclassical realism adopts a combination of systemic and domestic variables, which translates to a theoretical merger of classical realism, neorealism and innenpoltik, we need to look at both types of variables, and the manner in which these play a role in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Let us firstly focus on the systemic variables.
2.4.1 Military spending, alliances and proxies
Neoclassical realist scholars, like previous realist thinkers, take a keen interest in power, which is the backbone of its theory. Power comes in the form of relative power capabilities, which in many cases can be translated into military capabilities. Military capabilities, whether they are meant as an offensive or a defensive instrument, is the prolonged arm of power. However, there are those who mean that comparing levels of military spending are not definitive when it comes to measuring relative power. But it is not insignificant either. A high level of military spending is in fact a gauge for, on the surface, analysing the way foreign policy is implemented. If states increase their military budgets year by year, such as Iran29 and especially Saudi Arabia,30 it points to an aggressive foreign policy. An aggressive foreign policy correlates with realist thought, in which the only means for state survival is through power.31 Furthermore, a different assumption that connects power, military strength and military spending, which perfectly corresponds to the Saudi-Iranian relationship, is the military expenditure-security hypothesis which states: “The greater the level of threat to a
state’s security, the higher the level of military spending”,32 something that is echoed by Waltz. This hypothesis assumes that a state’s foreign policy is driven by state survival, which is at the basis of realist thought.
29 Business Insider 2015, Ghasseminejad, Saeed “Iran’s military budget is going to get a huge boost from the nuclear deal” available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-military-budget-is-going-to-get-a-huge-boost-from-the-nuclear-deal-2015-10?IR=T 30/10/2015, retrieved on 23/02/2016.
30 Financial Times 2015, Kerr, Simeon “Saudi Arabia to boost defence spending by 27% over five years” available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f3b5708-0903-11e5-b643-00144feabdc0.html#axzz40zNHUDQY 02/07/2015, retrieved on 23/02/2016.
31 Mearsheimer, John J. (2013) “Structural Realism” in Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve. International relations theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73-78.
32 Castillo, Jasen, Lowell, Julia, Tellis, Ashley J., Munoz, Jorge & Zycher, Benjamin (2001) “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth” RAND, Santa Monica, p. 53-55.
Conclusively, there is a clear correlation between neoclassical realism, relative power capabilities, military power and military spending, which accentuates the need for applying the latter as a variable for measuring the increasing hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
As part of military spending, we also need to consider the elephant in the room, which in the Iranian-Saudi relationship, is nuclear weapons. This is especially relevant for Iran, who many analysts believe have tried to acquire such weaponry in recent times.33
Nuclear weapons are not a variable in itself; as such they need to be categorized. As states use huge amounts of capital in order to acquire such arsenals, they fall under the umbrella of military spending. Nuclear capabilities according to Waltz, have changed how states contributed to their own security, but that the introduction of nuclear weapons in the international system has not changed the state of anarchy in which realists believe we find ourselves.34 Although states that acquire nuclear armaments change their approach to power, they do not change the structures of the international political order. Because nuclear weapons are the culmination of power due to their enormous destructive capabilities, they act as a guarantor of state survival, and as such are highly relevant for neoclassical realism, and further, for this thesis.
Alliances are among the most fundamental components of international relations. For neoclassical realists, just as for other realist schools, trough its fixation on state security and power, alliances are critical. They enhance state security and are used by states as a response to a change in the level of external threat.35 In the context of the hostility present between Iran and Saudi Arabia, alliances play a vital part of the respective states’ foreign policies. This is especially relevant for Saudi Arabia whose alliance to the world’s foremost superpower – the United States – has lasted for decades. Even without mentioning Walt’s or Waltz’ bandwaggoning, balancing, buck-passing or chain-ganging, which are fundamental for realist theories of alliances, it is deducible that alliances in general take up a considerable amount of realism’s academic thinking. This confirms the importance of this variable in the on-going Saudi-Iranian struggle, and its close relation to neoclassical theory.
33 Foreign Policy 2015, Allison, Graham “Iran already has Nuclear Weapons Capability” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/03/iran-already-has-nuclear-weapons-capability/ 03/03/2015, retrieved on 24/03/2016.
34 Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000) “Structural Realism after the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 5.
35 Reiter, Dan (1994) “Learning, Realism and Alliances: the Weight of the Shadow of the Past” World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 490.
In later years, there have been several concrete cases of so-called proxy wars being fought between the two regional powers. In following the undefined rules of proxy warfare, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran have directly engaged one another, but have used confederates in order to carry out such actions on each other’s behalf. Although the actors are different, along with the methods, proxy war, just as interstate conflict, is a form of warfare. War is an outcome of aggressive state policy, and is the apex of state survival and the echo of the maximisation of power. War is always on the horizon and as such states are destined to fight them. Using a Clausewitzian approach,36 realists believe that international politics is a struggle for power between states and the culmination of high politics is war because of the self interested and power seeking fashion in which states behave. War is a natural and unavoidable element of the international environment. Proxy war takes a different form and is perceived differently, but it is a form of war nevertheless. As warfare belongs to the structure of foreign policy, it is a systemic variable for realists. As neoclassical realists follow the same principle guidelines as other realists on this matter,37 the adoption of proxies and the usage of these in proxy war is by its very nature an aspect that directly corresponds to a variable of interest for this research.
2.4.2 Ethnic nationalism, collective memory and regime type
As neoclassical realism is a fusion of different realist thought, many variables that would otherwise be inadmissible under neorealism can be absorbed into the theoretical analysis of this thesis. In relevance to the level of analysis, neoclassical realism presents the opportunity of integrating ideational and domestic variables, as previously mentioned. In an effort to demonstrate the relevance of the use of neoclassical realist theory, and invalidate other forms of realism earlier, religion was exemplified as a domestic variable with excessive importance for the formulation of Saudi and Iranian foreign policy. There are, however, other domestic policy factors that also take part in the development of foreign-policy output. Ethnic nationalism, collective memory and regime typology bear influence on this process.
Ethnicity is an identity-based factor that falls within the realm of neoclassical realism, because it is rooted to the individual in society, which makes it a component of domestic policy. Ethnicity is important, as it is a tool that can be used by policy makers in their
36 Howard, Michael & Paret, Peter (1976). Carl Von Clausewitz: On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7.
37 Rathbun, Brian (2008) “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism” Security Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, p. 296-297.
formulation of foreign policy. A vivid yet drastic example is how the Hitler regime used the myth of the “Aryan race”38 as a tool to bread hatred against what he saw as non-Aryans, such as the Jewish or the Slav peoples. In his foreign policy, ethnic hatred was then used to invade large parts of Eastern Europe. When a state-duel thus opposes two (or more) countries that are composed of mostly different ethnic groups, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, it can create tensions that can further be used as an assertive foreign policy instrument. In essence, ethnicity is a decisive element of domestic policy, and domestic policy variables fall under the umbrella of neoclassical realism.
Ethnic nationalism interacts with the context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the sense that is a domestic and ideological factor that is often used is the construct of foreign policy. Throughout history, ethnic nationalism has been used as a rallying cry to foster fervour and pride in ones ethnic group or country. Because neoclassical realism adopts ideational concepts into its theory, ethnic nationalism is a valid and significant variable that can act as a determinant to foreign policy-making of states. This is the case for Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it is thus a variable that increases the level of hostility between the two nations. Like religion, it influences the systemic structure of the international scene, although it is rooted in the domestic arena.
To analyse the Saudi-Iranian relationship without considering the respective regimes of both countries would be an uphill battle. It is the regime that makes the policy, which is implemented as foreign policy doctrine. As both Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s policies are deeply rooted to ideology, and their ideological state apparatuses dominate society, it would be an impossible task to investigate the levels of distrust between the two countries, when much of it is fuelled by ideological differences advanced by the respective regimes. Neorealism and its adherents would argue that a state’s regime type or its ideological standpoint ought to be disregarded in order to understand the international system.39 As previously mentioned, however, neoclassical realism confronts this fully systemic level of analysis and makes room for domestic variables, such as regime type. As Zakaria notes: “A good account of a nation’s
foreign policy should include systemic, domestic and other influences”.40 In short, Zakaria does account for domestic regime types in order to understand how foreign policy choices are
38 Bhopal, Raj S. (2014). Migration, Ethnicity, Race and Health in Multicultural Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 178.
39 Kaufman, Robert G. (2007). In Defense of the Bush Doctrine. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, p. 24.
shaped. Trying to understand the hostility in the Saudi-Iranian relationship without looking at the regimes’ ideologies would be contrary to all reason. It is precisely because Saudi Arabia and Iran’s regimes are deeply ideologically vested that it is crucial to consider it as an explanatory variable in the research question’s context.
Collective memories of a nation’s past can be an instrument that politicians can use to enforce a specific foreign policy. This historical narrative is vital to understand the underlying causes of the duelling Saudi-Iranian relationship. Collective memory is part of political culture because of its usage for political mobilization, and as such it acts as source of policy choice.41 Zakaria argues for the fact that the creation of a country’s foreign policy can include cultural explanations.42 As collective memory is part of the cultural arena, its function becomes clear in relevance to neoclassical realist theory, because culture is a domestic and ideational variable. One of the most potent historical examples is taken from 1930s Germany. Adolf Hitler constantly referred to the reasons why Germany lost the First World War and used these reasons as a political mechanism, to attract people – especially war veterans – to his cause. In other words, Hitler’s political platform was based, among others, on an historical memory that Germany had experienced in the past. In itself, collective memory would be put to use as an excuse for invading Poland (See Hagen: 2009: Mapping the Polish Corridor).43 In short, collective memory of nations on certain events, experiences and incidents that breeds mistrust and hostility is a determinant factor to analyse in relevance to this thesis.
2.5 Conclusion to Chapter II
The rationale behind the use of neoclassical realism in this thesis is meant to present a richer and more diverse theoretical framework, than other forms of realism would for the same research question. This theory is applied in order to maximise the explanations so to answer the research question in the most coherent and scientifically probable manner. It is a single approach, using neoclassical realism to explain the systemic and domestic variables that form the foundation of the Saudi-Iranian relationship. In this manner, all factors relating to the
41 Brady, John S., Crawford, Berverly & Wiliarty, Sarah E. (1999). The Post-War transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity and Nationhood. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, p. 25.
42 Zakaria, Fareed (1998). From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 18.
43 Hagen, Joshua (2009) “Mapping the Polish Corridor: Ethnicity, economics and geopolitics” Imago Mundi, The International Journal for the History of Cartography, Routledge, Abingdon.
increasing levels of animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be demonstrated to present a systematic and comprehensive analysis.
Chapter III. Methodology
The following thesis will be built on the basis of a qualitative methodological approach. In order to explain the analytical framework that will be used in this thesis, comparison is key. Thus the dissertation will take the form of a comparative case study. The reason for the use of a qualitative and not a quantitative approach is because the former is better suited at gaining awareness of elemental opinions, reasons and motivations. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis serves at obtaining more pragmatic and a more realistic view of the current hostility present in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, something that numerical data (i.e. quantitative analysis) does not offer the thesis.
This case study will be constructed as an in depth examination of the factors that Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively use in their approach to each other.
In general, comparative case studies “involve the analysis and synthesis of the similarities,
differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal”.44
This is why a comparative case study is a preferred option when it comes to understanding and comparing the contrasts and likenesses that establish the rivalry between the two opposing regional powers. When it comes to the particular methods of this thesis, process tracing will be employed as part of the methodological approach.
3.1 Process tracing
The aim of this paper is to acquire evidence that contributes the base for causal inference, which will give credence to the research question. Process tracing is one of the most fundamental tools of qualitative analysis.45 This method is defined as “the systematic
examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator”.46
44 Goodrick, Delwyn (2014) “Comparative Case Studies” Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 9 UNICEF Office of Research, Florence, p. 1.
45 Collier, David (2011) “Understanding Process Tracing” Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4, University of California, Berkeley, p. 823.
According to Checkel, “Process tracing means to trace the operation of the causal
mechanism(s) at work in a given situation”47. As a qualitative method, data coinciding with
process tracing comes in the form of expert surveys, historical memoirs, documents, press accounts, interview transcripts, and similar forms of data.48
Leading experts in the field, such as George and Bennett have coined process tracing as
“method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”.49 On basic terms, using process tracing means to “trace the operation of
a causal mechanism in a given situation”.50 The goal of this method is to map the process of a
case; this serves at exploring the magnitude to which it corresponds with earlier, theoretically derivative expectations about the structure of the mechanism.51 In the above statements, there is one repeated word that is key – mechanism – more precisely, the tracing of causal mechanisms. The latter is defined as “a complex system which produces that behaviour by of
the interaction of a number of parts”.52 The case study, such as the one that will be embarked
on in this thesis, will then have to identify those elements and cement the independent and dependent variables together.
The comparative case that will be presented in this dissertation can take on different forms of process tracing. The one that will be put to use is called explaining-outcome process tracing. It serves at analysing how a specific cause (A) leads to a specific outcome (B).53
This method can be used when we have the following scenario; first, we know what B is, namely the outcome. In the context of the research question B is then increasing hostility
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, we do not know what A is, namely the cause,
which is to be investigated in the thesis. The goal is to perfectly explain why or how B, the outcome, happened. To accomplish this, developing and solving the many factors that contributed to B, will craft an acceptable explanation.54 In the comparative analysis of this
47 Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (2008). Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 116.
48 Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2015). Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6.
49 Given, Lisa M. (2008). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., p. 70.
50 Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005) “It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics” Arena Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, p. 6.
51 Ibidem.
52 Glennan, Stuart S. (1996) “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” Erkenntinis, Vol. 44, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, p. 52.
53 Punton, Melanie and Welle, Katharina (2015) “Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps” Centre for Development Impact, the Insitute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, p. 2. 54 Ibidem.
thesis, the many factors and causes (A) that relate to the increasing hostility between the Gulf giants (B), will be explained.
If there is a negative to be added to this sort of process tracing, it is that explaining-outcome process tracing is case-centric. This entails that the reproduction of this method is not necessarily generalizable to other case studies, as it only achieves relevant explanations for the case under investigation.55 However, this process tracing method is still the most used hitherto, and by reasons explained, is appropriate for the research of this thesis.
3.2 Variables
As explained in the theoretical framework earlier, there is a long list of variables that are appropriate for a comparative case study such as this. These factors will be examined along with the mentioned appropriate theory in order to thoroughly describe the augmented tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran going back to 2011, and historically back to 1979. Before beginning to operationalize the different variables employed in this thesis, there is a need to determine the dependent variable in the research question.
How can we explain the increasing hostility between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran after 2011?
The dependent variable in the research question is “increasing hostility”. By the use of the many independent variables that will be presented underneath, the dependent variable will be measured on different levels, all relating to the increasing hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The variables derived from neoclassical realism, which in this thesis, emphasise the use of systemic, domestic and ideational factors as the threefold causes for foreign policy output, will concentrate on the material and immaterial variables. Underneath, the operationalization of all variables – that is the process of rigorously defining variables so they become measurable56 – will be presented. The dependent variable “increasing hostility” is without any doubt the most crucial variable of this thesis. This is what we want to monitor, in order to examine how it is affected by the many independent variables relating to the thesis at large. More straightforwardly it is dependent on other factors conferred to it.
55 Ibidem.
3.3 Operationalization of variables
3.3.1 Systemic variables
Military spending
Time period: 2011-2015. For military spending, the analysis will span from 2011 to 2015, as this is the most contemporary data available to us. Relevantly, 2011 was also the year of the Bahraini protests, and the Saudi intervention that took place there. For nuclear weapons, the time period is not as important as for conventional military spending, but because the United Nations Security Council imposed its first round of sanctions on Iran in 2006, this is the period that will be the starting point of this analysis. The measurement of this variable includes occurrences and incidents up to the summer of 2015, as this was when Iran and several world powers signed the nuclear agreement.
Military spending is an important asset to measure in relation to a state’s military prowess. In neoclassical realist theory, military power is a factor determining a state’s relative power capabilities in the international system. In black and white, the more capital a state uses on military spending, the more powerful their military becomes. The more powerful a state’s military machine is, the more power they have in the international system. Taking into account that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are in a regional duel, they are both expanding their respective fighting forces in order to increase their power, and to balance each other out. The reason for the importance of this variable in light of increased hostility is then comprehensible. The more money the two nations use on armaments and equipment, the more they perceive each other as threat, and it thus serves the purpose of increasing the level of hostility between the two. Another component of military spending comes in the form of nuclear weapons purchases. Although neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia are in possession of weapons of mass destruction, the acquirement of nuclear weapons into their respective arsenals would most likely be disastrous. Because of its destructiveness, nuclear weapons may very well be the most powerful symbol of state power that exists. Not simply in terms of damage, but also in terms of leverage it brings to the states that obtain these. In later decades, many believe the Iranian regime has been in the process of acquiring such weapons, although
they deny any such claims.57 Although it seems doubtful due to the recent nuclear deal struck with the Iran,58 there is always a slight possibility. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has, in response to an eventual nuclear-armed Tehran, also tried to obtain such weapons.59 The reason nuclear arms are immensely significant when it comes to the research question’s dependent variable is because a nuclear armed Iran, or a nuclear armed Saudi Arabia would be considered as a substantial threat to the entire survival of the opposing state. As such, nuclear weapons in the hands of Riyadh, or Tehran would be the upmost precedent for increasing hostility and resentment between the two.
Alliances to foreign powers
Time period: 1930s - present day. The reason the 1930s is at the starting point of the measurement of this variable is because this was the time when the Saudi-American alliance was engineered. Because the alliance is still in existence, the measurement’s end point is set to 2016.
When looking at the geopolitical aspect of power, having a deeply entrenched alliance to a strong foreign government can have many perks. The stronger an ally state is, and the closer the relationship between allies is, the more it enhances both allies’ power and prestige. The power of two (or more) nations combined makes for a more dominant figure than what one nation without allies would impress upon a third party. If it were ever to arise, the fundamental element of any alliance, that is military assistance in case of conflict, can either act as a detriment for a third party to take offensive action, or as a counterweight towards the third party in case offensive action is taken. Alliances can affect increasing hostility between nations. If an alliance is stuck between two governments, an enemy of the first state can become an enemy of the new ally by default. The Iranian contempt of the both Saudi Arabia and the U.S., who are allies, is a valid example of the mentioned case. Furthermore, an
57 Foreign Affairs 2012, Waltz, Kenneth N. “Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb
July/August 2012, retrieved on 11/03/2016 And The Atlantic 2012, Zenko, Micah “What will Iran do if it gets a
nuclear bomb” available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/ 22/02/2012, retrieved on 11/03/2016.
58 BBC 2016 “Iran nuclear deal: key details” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655 16/01/2016, retrieved on 11/03/2016.
59 Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016 “Saudi Arabia, Nuclear” available at http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/saudi-arabia/nuclear/ March 2016, retrieved on 11/03/2016.
alliance to a strong power may also be considered a threat to a third party in means of power capabilities.
Regional proxies
Time period: 1979 – present day. To present the most redoubtable proxies involved for Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, this measurement will span from the Islamic Revolution until present day. This is due to the fact that it was after 1979 that Iran begun to fervently employ groups and proxies as a foreign policy mechanism, which made Saudi Arabia take by example, and adopted the same strategy. As of now, the respective proxies are more involved and embraced than ever before, which explains the year of 2016 as the ending period for the measurement of this variable.
In this thesis, although they fall under the same category of variables, I differentiate between an official state alliance, and support, overt or covert, to groups, factions and even governments. For example, when Iran started lending support to Hezbollah, Hezbollah was solely a military faction, not a political party, nor the official representatives of the Lebanese government.60 Giving support to foreign organisations, just as an alliance would, does increase a state’s power in terms of leverage, military capability, and material force. This can increase the level of hostility between two nations, if the third party (the organisation, the faction) also opposes the interest of the rival. An historic example can be when the Soviet Union, through the Comintern, lent support to various revolutionary communist parties all over Europe, in an effort to overthrow the bourgeoisie and the ruling governments of the respective countries.61
Within the framework of this variable, there can often be direct support for groups that engage in proxy wars against an enemy state. The proxy variable would also serve within the structures of neoclassical realism. As a proxy engages in terrorist activities, or directly in full-scale open combat, their success or failure will rest on their power – military or other. As relative power capabilities are the most crucial component of neoclassical realism, proxies are a valid factor when it comes to explaining these explicit theoretical variables. In the frame of reference of the research question, this variable definitely augments tension between states.
60 Levitt, Matthew (2013) “Hizballah and the Qods force in Iran’s shadow war with the West” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p. 1, 2.
61 Encyclopædia Britannica 2016 “Third International” available at http://www.britannica.com/topic/Third-International 2016, retrieved on 09/03/2016.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been through their fair share of proxies in the recent decades,62 and these proxies may very well become the source of future conflict escalation between the two Middle Eastern giants. Both countries are supporting either proxy groups used against each other or proxies engaging in proxy wars throughout the region, and this shadow warfare is the closest both countries have come to a direct military confrontation. This is why it is crucial to emphasise the importance of this variable in the context of rising tensions.
3.3.2 Domestic and cultural variables
Religion
Time period: 1979 – present day. 1979 was the year that Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran, and transformed Iran into an Islamic Republic, with religion as the apex of political power. This is when the religious aspect of the current Saudi-Iranian rivalry took root. This variable has been operated as a policy tool fervently ever since.
As a socially constructed cultural system, religion is one of the most influential and historically significant variables to be measured in the following thesis. In the framework of Iranian-Saudi rivalry, it is a decisive factor in both countries’ domestic and foreign policies. Although this variable is extremely potent in light of the research question, the definition of religion is rather hazardous. There are a wide variety of definitions of religion, from different perspectives and researchers.63 The goal here, however, is not to define it, but solely to characterise it into the context of the thesis. In this thesis, “religion” will be synonymous with “Islam”, whether it is the Sunni or Shia denomination. The importance of religion for both countries is observable by looking at their governments, their flags or their national mottos for instance. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy, governed by Islamic law,64 and on the country’s flag, the Shahada, the Islamic creed, is inscribed.65 Iran is an Islamic Republic,66
62 Kagan, Frederick W, Majidyar, Ahmad K, Plekta, Danielle & Sullivan, Marisa Chochrane (2012) “Iranian influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan” The American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the
Study of War, Washington D.C., p. 9 and Al Monitor 2015, Geranmayeh, Ellie “Why Iran, Saudi Arabia keep locking horns on Syria” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/iran-saudi-syria.html
18/09/2015, retrieved on 11/03/2016.
63 McGuire, Meredith B. (2002). Religion: the Social context. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, p. 8.
64 Stenslie, Stig (2012). Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of Succession. Oxon: Routledge, p. 9. 65 Index Mundi 2015 “Saudi Arabia flag description” available at
http://www.indexmundi.com/saudi_arabia/flag_description.html 30/06/2015, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
while the country’s motto and flag inscription is the Takbir – the term describing “Allahu Akbar”– meaning God is great in Arabic.67 In other words, one does not need to be an expert to interpret that religion plays an imposing role for both states. The reason religion is tremendously important in the thesis’s context however, is also due to the different interpretations of Islam that opposes the two nations. While one is Sunni, the other is predominantly Shia. This opposition is what personifies the bigger picture, namely the hegemonic nature of the Iranian-Saudi struggle, and how respective versions of Islam are put to use as a policy mechanism for both states.
Ethnic nationalism
Time period: Irrelevant, but culturally and historically, from the 7th century-present day. The measurement of this indicator will propose arguments that exhibit how ethnic nationalism is used present day, as a policy tool for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The reason the 7th century is the proposed starting period is because of the Arab-Islamic conquest of Persia, and the subsequent ethnic rivalry that has lasted ever since.
Just as religion is arduous to measure, so is ethnicity. Different studies give different definitions to ethnicity, just as the case with religion. In anthropology, ethnicity refers to “The
identification of a group based on perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes a group into a people”.68 As religious sectarianism is common in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, so is ethnic sectarianism. This is because of the fact that the Iranians predominantly belong to the Persian ethnicity, while the Saudis are Arabs.69 Rather than being rooted to the political power divide, however, ethnicity and ethnic resentment between Arab and Persian is rooted in history, which goes back to the Muslim invasion of Persia in the 7th century.70 The Arab-Persian
67 Index Mundi 2015 “Iran flag description” available at http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/flag_description.html 30/06/2016, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
68 Encyclopædia Britannica 2016, Robotham, Donald K. “Anthropology: the Study of ethnicity, minority groups and identity” available at
http://www.britannica.com/science/anthropology/Special-fields-of-anthropology#ref839804 2016, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
69 The Economist 2012 ”Same old sneers: Nationalist feelings on both sides of the Gulf is as prickly as ever” available at http://www.economist.com/node/21554238 05/05/2012, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
70 Al Arabiya 2011, al-Zahed, Saud “Hatred of Arabs deeply rooted in Persians, says Iranian intellectual” available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/09/170927.html 09/10/2011, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
divide is frequently embraced by to both states’ authorities, which only serves to increase hostility between Riyadh and Tehran.71
The historian Robert H. Wiebe defined nationalism as the following: “Nationalism is the
desire among people who believe that they share a common ancestry and a common destiny to live under their own government on land sacred to their history”.72 This definition is fairly
neutral compared to other more political orientated definitions. Nationalisms of any kind, especially the ethnic sort, are usually fervent in the realms of a state on state duel. Ethnic nationalism is an instrument used on the masses to instigate public support for a certain political cause. Ethnic nationalism, in regard to the rivalling circumstances between Tehran and Riyadh, is a relevant and serious factor in need of scrutiny. It incites both ethnic and patriotic fervour and does indeed augment a population’s animosity toward another country of a different ethnicity. In the aftermath of the execution of Sheikh al-Nimr, angry mobs of Iranians in the capital gathered outside the Saudi embassy to hoist their discontent, encouraged by a nationalist rallying cry from the Iranian government.73 It is due to these factors that it is vital to look at ethnic nationalism as a variable in this thesis.
Regime typology
Time period: 1930s – present day. The 1930s was the decade when the modern state of Saudi Arabia was founded, and it subsequently when the formal alliance between the House of Sa’ud and the Ulama was proclaimed. Because the Saudi and the Iranian regimes are still in power, the measurement of this variable includes events that have taken place as recently as 2016.
In order to further measure the levels of hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we need to take the regime type variable under consideration. Saudi Arabia, as mentioned previously, is an absolute monarchy, while Iran is a theocratic republic, and they are both authoritarian. They are unequivocally opposed to each other’s regime types. Ideologically speaking, Iran advocates revolutionary deposition against the Gulf monarchies, first and foremost towards
71 Foreign Policy 2010, Limbert, John “Why can’t Arabs and Iranians just get along?” available at
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/01/why-cant-arabs-and-iranians-just-get-along-2/ 01/12/2010, retrieved on 14/03/2016.
72 Johnson, Nuala C., Schein, Richard H. & Winders, Jamie (2013). The Wiley-Blackwell companion to Cultural Geography. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Publishers, p. 131.
73 BBC 2016 “Iran: Saudis face divine revenge for execution of al-Nimr” available at
