EU policies towards Ukraine since the Orange Revolution. To what extent did the EU miss an opportunity to prevent the 2013- 2014 Ukrainian crisis?

Student number: 11106077

EU policies towards Ukraine since the Orange Revolution

To what extent did the EU miss an opportunity to prevent the 2013- 2014

Ukrainian crisis?

Aleksandar Malinov 1st of July 2016

Graduate School of Humanities

MA Thesis for East European Studies

Dr. Christian Noack

Second reader: Dr. Sudha Rajagopalan

Word count 17 326

1

Table of Contents

List of abbreviations ... 2

Abstract ... 3

1. Introduction ... 4

2. What does the literature say? ... 5

2.1 EU crisis management and prevention ... 5

2.2 EU enlargement ... 7

3. Background ... 8

4. Research design ... 10

4.1 Methodology ... 11

4.2 Data selection ... 12

5. Findings ... 12

6. The European Union and Ukraine in the context of the EU’s relations with its Eastern

Neighbors ... 13

6.1 European Neighborhood Policy ... 13

6.2 The Eastern Partnership initiative ... 18

7. The Orange Revolution – causes and aftermath ... 22

7.1 The presidential election of 2004 and the Orange Revolution. Internal background ... 22

7.2 Moscow’s attitude towards Ukraine and the EU ... 25

8. EU’s stance towards the Orange Revolution ... 27

8.1 Internal EU dynamics. Old vs New member states ... 27

8.2 Crisis management ... 28

9. From euphoria to disappointment- Ukraine between the Orange Revolution and the

Euromaidan. ... 32

9.1 The period from 2005 to 2010 ... 32

9.2 The period from 2010 to 2014 ... 35

10. Russia’s new assertiveness ... 36

11. The Euromaidan and the EU’s crisis response ... 38

12. Conclusion ... 43

2

List of abbreviations

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy

EaP

Eastern Partnership

ENP

European Neighborhood Policy

ESDP

European Security and Defense Policy

EU

European Union

MP

Member of parliament

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

UK

United Kingdom

3

Abstract

Since the outbreak of the Orange Revolution in 2004, the Ukrainian government and

people have increasingly directed their efforts towards a closer relationship with the European

Union. In the following decade both, the EU and Ukraine have shown determination in

improving the economic, political, and socio-cultural relations between the two entities. This

thesis discusses what measures did the EU take in order improve Ukraine’s European

transition. In addition, the paper aims to understand EU’s crisis prevention measures, imposed

prior to the 2013 Ukrainian crisis. The theoretical framework id based on the concepts of

crisis management and prevention and their use by the EU. Hereby, especially the prevention

and post-crisis management of the 2013 Ukrainian crisis by the EU is identified as a gap in

the literature. Using discourse analysis and applying it to three different types of data pools,

48 sources were discussed in the current analysis. The outcome confirms and expands on

previous findings concerned with EU’s crisis management strategies.

4

1. Introduction

The outbreak of the Euromaidan brought forward the importance of Ukraine as a

border state between the European Union and Russia. Struggling to develop stronger

economic, political, and governmental structures Ukraine appears to be a state divided. The

division became obvious during the Orange Revolution of 2004. The so-called Orange

Revolution was a mass civil protest against alleged corruption and election fraud that

eventually led to a pro-western government being elected in Kiev under the leadership of

Viktor Yushchnenko. The protest wave led to increased civic engagement in politics, as well

as confidence in reforms, improved relations with the West and a potential EU membership.

The Orange Revolution was seen as a pivotal change in the sense of breaking with the

communist past of Ukraine, as well as an end to “managed” and “virtual” democracy.

The

2004 revolution, however, could not erase the historical past of the Russian-Ukrainian

relationship and the state merely progressed towards the process of European integration. The

struggle of division led to a period of stagnation, which then erupted in another, yet similar,

revolution in 2013. The Euromaidan began in November 2013, when president Yanukovich

rejected the signing of the European Association agreement, which unleashed a wave of mass

protests in Kiev and many cities around Ukraine. The situation escalated and in

January-February 2014 more than a hundred people lost their lives when protestors clashed with police

forces. This was followed by a political and security crisis, as Yanukovich fled the country,

followed by the Crimean peninsula being occupied by Russian Special Forces. Despite being

separated by more than a decade the two revolutions hold similar purposes, as well as similar

prime goal of a stronger Ukrainian integration within the EU.

In times of rising EU disintegration issues and the increasing tensions between Russia

and the European Union, the questions concerned with Ukraine’s integration to the

Community appear ever more relevant. In turn, instability within the Ukrainian state creates

an opportunity for Russia to further expand its influence in Ukraine and further harm the

process of EU expansion. This thesis aims to address the above issues and further understand

the practices of crisis management within the EU. The cases of the Orange Revolution and the

Euromaidan will be further discussed in order to better understand EU’s failure to prevent the

1

Nathaniel Copsey, “Ukraine”, in Donnacha Beachain, Abel Polese (eds), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics. Successes and failures, New York 2010 , p. 30

5

latter. Deeper research of the two revolutions will aim to answer the main question of this

thesis of: To what extent did the EU miss an opportunity to prevent the crisis in Ukraine that

unfolded during the Euromaidan? In order to do so, a literature review will look closely at

EU’s frameworks of conflict management, together with conflict prevention. The following

section provides background information on the Ukrainian crises of 2004 and 2013, and

Ukraine’s attempts towards European integration. Following that the research design will

elaborate the methodology consisting of process tracing analysis, explain the sources, and

data selection. Subsequently, the findings will be discussed in a separate section discussing

the results drawn from the data. Finally, a conclusion is going to summarize the results and

will attempt to answer the overarching question: To what extent did the EU miss an

opportunity to prevent the crisis in Ukraine that unfolded during the Euromaidan?

2. What does the literature say?

2.1 EU crisis management and prevention

Since its creation the European Union is involved in a great range of crisis prevention

and post-crisis management strategies.

When discussing crisis management, however, a

theoretical clarification of definitions is needed. The topic of EU crisis management is well

discussed within scholars often addressing different aspects of the “crisis” terminology.

According to Olsson, crisis management can be understood as large-scale incidents, which

come unexpectedly and call for an immediate action in order to protect values of society.

The

author further argues that there is no concrete definition of what events fall in the above

terminology where the EU is responsible for events ranging from earthquakes and terrorist

attacks to unlawful occupation of state’s borders.

There is, nevertheless, a principle

differentiation between the above mentioned cases, separating those between the categories of

disaster management, and military and civilian crisis management. Having its focus on the

latter, the current thesis will look at EU’s military and civilian crisis prevention and

management policies.

2

Crisis Management European Union External Action,

http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/crisis_management/index_en.htm , last accessed 20.05.2016 3

Olsson, Stefan; Crisis Management in the European Union; Oxford, 2009 p. 2 4 _Ibid

6

The roots of EU’s crisis management policies can be traced as far back as the Treaty

of Brussels signed in 1948, which aimed to provide a common security frame for Western

Europe. The current EU crisis management structure, however, is primarily based on the

Lisbon Treaty which came into force in December 2009.

The signing of the Treaty led to the

termination of the Western European Union team and the emergence of the Common Security

and Defense Policy.

According to Gross and Juncos, the reasons behind the creation of the

CSDP institutions can be traced back to the Big Three (France, Germany, and the UK) as key

factors in relation to crisis management.

The authors further argue that the Bosnian and

Kosovo crisis, together with general changes in international structures are additional factors

behind the creation of CSDP. Gross and Juncos see the above dominance of the Big Three as

a drawback in the policy making within the CSDP since “the creation of CSDP institutions is

seen as a purposive act of rational decision-makers and these institutions reflect the interests

of the most powerful EU member states”.

As the thesis will later on discuss such division and

more importantly dominance of power within the EU, play an essential role when acting in

cases of crisis management.

In addition to the inter-organizational drawbacks, the CSDP’s historical ties with

NATO can also be seen as problematic in the execution of crisis management missions.

Previously known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the crisis

management institution is operational since 2003 and had prime goals to first, establish an

independent from NATO crisis management institution, and second to enhance its credibility

as a global security actor. The EU and NATO, however, are organizations closely interrelated

where the topic of autonomy is highly circumstantial. Hunter underlines the “right of first

refusal” policy as an example of the problematic division of power.

According to the policy

the EU may only act if NATO first decides not to. The above is a clear example of the type of

constrains the crisis management institutions are facing despite being noted as independent

from other organizations. Similar drawbacks in communication between institutions can also

be seen in EU’s policies concerned with crisis prevention. According to Hagman, the success

behind EU’s crisis management and prevention begins with “rational cooperation within

Europe, pragmatic cooperation between the EU and NATO and between the EU and US”.

It

5

About CSDP – Overview, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm , last accessed 20.05.2016 6 _Ibid

7

Gross, Eva; Juncos, Ana; EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management; London 2010, p. 253 8

Ibid 9

Hunter, Robert; The European Security and Defense Policy, Pittsburg, PA 2002 , p. xvii 10 _{Hagman, Hans; European crisis management and defence; London 2013 p. 106}

7

is, therefore, important to look at EU’s crisis management policies and analyse to what extent

those are effect in times of crisis. The following section will discuss the European

Neighborhood Policy and the extent to which the policy can be seen as a crisis prevention

matter.

2.2 EU enlargement

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a foreign relations instrument of the

European Union (EU) by which the Union works with its southern and eastern neighbors to

achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic

integration.

The Community cooperates with Ukraine in lines with the ENP in order to bring

the country closer to the EU.

In 2008 the Commission highlighted that the Eastern

Partnership is a response to the “need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the

conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions”.

The connection between the Eastern

Partnership and CSDP is touched upon by the EU Commission discussing the “participation

of partner countries in CSDP missions and exercises”, where the Commission further argues

the partnership aims to achieve “reduced level of internal conflict”.

The above statements

can, therefore, serve as an evidence of EU’s commitment to closer military and security

partnership with its Eastern partners in order to decrease the levels of conflicts. The same

document however, does not give any specific measures on how the above goal should be

achieved and even more so, how conflicts can be avoided on the first place. According to

Lewers and Wolczuk, the ENP “suffered from an essential contradiction, stemming from the

mismatch between its ambitious ‘transformative’ objectives and the lack of overall

commitment by the EU to promote domestic change and bear its costs”.

The above

argument is of great significance since, as shown above, the European Neighborhood

Policy appears important for Ukraine’s integration. Failure of the EU to provide clear goals,

11

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); European Union External Action, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ , last accessed 20.05.2016

12 _{Ukraine, EU neighbourhood policy;}

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine/index_en.htm , last accessed 20.05.2016 13

Gross, Eva Juncos, Ana; EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management; London, 2010, p.142 14

Ibid

8

strategies and support during the process of such integration would inevitably impact the

East-partner countries.

Ukraine’s integration choices are, to high extent, predetermined by the conditions

offered by both Russia and the EU. With the mass protests during the Orange Revolution,

Ukrainian clearly stated their goal of a closer relationship with the EU. Lewers and Wolczuk

state that “Russian strategic planning for the integration of Ukraine was rendered obsolete

with the Orange Revolution in 2004, which changed the regional context”.

The actions of

the Ukrainian state were firm in their intentions of joining the EU, whereas the European

Union appeared unwilling to respond with the same enthusiasm. The authors further argue

that the EU’s lack of commitment is one of the reasons behind Ukraine’s skepticism against

the ENP. On the contrary, Russia’s foreign policy has presented Ukraine with more clear

objectives about the two countries relations. This juxtaposition of a EU versus a Russian

sphere of influence over Ukraine has determined the years of transition between the Orange

Revolution and the Euromaidan. As the thesis will further show there is a closer correlation

between EU’s passive integration strategies towards Ukraine and Russia’s levels of influence

over the country.

3. Background

Since the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the establishment of the European

Coal and Steel Community in 1951 – an organization which would later develop into the

European Union – the integration process on the continent has been constantly evolving. The

1989 collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany in

1990 led most countries of Eastern Europe to seek integration with the Western alliances. This

process established the Fifth Enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, which

included seven former Soviet satellite states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania) and three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

The seventeen members of the organization in 2004 increased to twenty-seven in 2007. In the

context of this ‘big bang’ expansion, EU enlargement was called “the most powerful and

successful tool of EU foreign policy.”

However, the shifting of EU borders eastwards to the

16

Ibid, p.258 17

Vachudova Milada Anna; Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism; New York 2005; p. 260

9

former soviet republics of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine set new conditions towards a

common foreign policy. Until 2004, the actual relationship between the European Union and

Ukraine has been termed as “limited” by scholars.

Both Brussels and Kiev based their

policies towards one-another on different assumptions. For the EU, integration of the former

soviet republic was a gradual process without a clear membership promise. On the contrary,

since it proclaimed its independence from the USSR in 1991, Ukraine has seen its association

with the European Union and the prospect of membership as one of its highest priorities and a

strategic foreign policy goal.

To deal with the large transformation of conditions, after its eastwards enlargement, in

2004 the EU announced the creation of a European Neighborhood Policy. The ENP serves as

an overarching framework for the EU’s policy towards its eastern and southern neighbors,

including Ukraine. The aims of the policy included the strengthening of prosperity, stability

and security in the regions of northern Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe and the

prevention of new dividing lines emerging on the outer EU borders.

2004 was also the year

in which mass protests erupted in Ukraine that came to be known as the “Orange Revolution”.

Although reluctant at first, the EU moved on to support the popular protests and backed up

Ukraine’s EU commitment. Speaking in front of the German Bundestag in March 2015, the

new president Yushchenko stated that “The Ukrainian people defended democracy and opted

for Europe. Our aim is to realize this goal. In the near future, I see Ukraine as a part of the

unified Europe.” This was, however, easier said than done. The optimism for reform quickly

faded away as the ruling coalition embroiled in internal battles for power. The EU failed to

find a way to strongly support the reformists in the government and influence the political

system. In 2010 the man who lost to Yushchenko in 2004 – Moscow-backed Viktor

Yanukovich, won the elections and became president. A year before, in 2009 Poland and

Sweden supported a new EU initiative aimed at re-imagining relations between Brussels and

Kiev. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) intended to guide relations of the EU vis-à-vis Ukraine,

as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. It aimed to create a more

specific approach to the region, but was criticized as being a “technical talking shop” and

compared to the Mediterranean Union as "another EU initiative that still exists in an office

18

Gallina, Nicole; “Beyond the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: The case of Ukraine”. In Hayoz, Niolas, and Andrej N. Lushnycky (eds), Ukraine at Crossroads, Bern 2005; p. 195

19

Gallina, Nicole; “Beyond the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: The case of Ukraine”; p. 200 20 _{Keukeleire Stephan, Delreux Tom; The Foreign Policy of the European Union; New York 2008; p. 250}

10

somewhere, but has had relatively little impact on the ground”.

However, the initiative did

provide a basis for real development of relations in some spheres. The EU was to design

so-called “Association Agreements” with each of the partner countries, adding that “Apart from

the largely symbolic Association Agreements, the Eastern Partnership process envisages legal

"approximation" and joint "institution building," leading to the creation of a new free-trade

zone embracing the 27 EU states and the six partners.”

The path towards the EU-Ukraine

Association Agreement would prove to be a turning point in the former soviet republic’s

internal politics, as well as its relations with the EU. The purpose of this thesis is to

investigate the EU policies towards Ukraine and their weaknesses in the field of crisis

management. It will first explain in detail the mechanisms of common EU foreign policy,

including the ENP and EaP initiatives.

4. Research design

The thesis aims at analyzing to what extent the EU missed an opportunity to prevent

the crisis in Ukraine that unfolded during the Euromaidan. The analysis of official EU

documents, speeches, advisory reports and analytical papers will be used in order to get a

better understanding of EU policies towards Ukraine and the reasons behind the outbreak of

the Ukrainian crisis of 2013. The interest in the subject is spurred by the argument that “while

Ukraine found itself centrestage at the time of the 2004 Orange Revolution (D’Anieri, 2006;

Aslund, 2009) the disillusionment which followed led to reduced interest in Ukraine beyond

the narrow circle of scholars and analyst”.

Therefore, this papers aims to serve as a

complimentary work to the existing studies concerned with the EU-Ukrainian relationship, as

well as to further discuss the issues concerned with the instability of the Ukrainian state. The

principle actors in the following research are the Ukrainian state, the European Union as a

political entity, and separate EU member states.

21

Wilson Andrew; Ukraine Crisis. What it means for the West; London 2014; p. 14 22

Andrew Rettman; Values to form core of EU 'Eastern Partnership'; 18.03.2009,

https://euobserver.com/foreign/27799; last accessed 11.04.2016

11

4.1 Methodology

The basis for this research consists of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis can be

defined as analysis which “examines patterns of language across texts and considers the

relationship between language and the social and cultural context in which is used”.

It is

typically performed on different types of texts where the relationship between what is said

and what is meant is being analyzed. For the purposes of this research political discourse

analysis in particular has been used. Political discourse analysis is a type of discourse analysis

which focuses on political entities, such as speeches, official documents, and debates, and

analyses the strategic use of text for achieving specific political aims.

There has been an on-going debate among scholars of discourse analysis debating the

levels of objectiveness of the technique. Critics on discourse analysis argue “the world is a

‘shifting’ and ‘negotiable’ place that cannot be understood or read, except through language

and that since language is constructive and functional, no one reading can be said to be ‘valid’

or ‘right’.

In addition, political discourse analysis should take into consideration the

producer of the text, the audience targeted, the context in which the text was produced, and

any other sociological factors. The presence of such wide range of factors contributes to the

subjectivity of the produced analysis.

Political discourse analysis, nevertheless, appears to be a vital tool within the course of

political research. The often use of political discourse analysis within the academia can serve

as an evidence for the high importance the methodology has. Being highly informative in its

core, political discourse analysis has been a vital tool in interpreting political discourses,

speeches, policies, and documents.

24

Paltridge, Brian; Discourse Analysis: An Introduction ; New York, 2012 p.11 25

Chilton, Paul and Schaffner, Christina. "Discourse and Politics". In Van Dijk, Teun A.(ed.). Discourse as Social Interaction. London 1997, pp : 206-230 p. 219

12

4.2 Data selection

As outlined above, the type of analyzed data will consist of MP’s speeches, EU policy

documents, think-thanks’ advisory documents and scholars’ researches. All of the above data

was carefully chosen based on several selection criteria.

To start with, all documents revised fall in the same period. The exact period discussed

within the thesis falls between the start of the Orange Revolution in November 2004 and the

aftermath of the Euromaidan in December 2015. In addition, since the focus of the thesis falls

on the Ukrainian state and the EU, all data revised comes from Ukraine, EU member states, or

the EU in its form of a political entity. Despite Russia’s obvious involvement in Ukraine’s

governmental transition no data coming from Russia has been included. The reason for this

can be found in the core of the research question through which the thesis aims to answer to

what extent did the EU miss an opportunity to prevent the crisis in Ukraine that unfolded

during the Euromaidan. The particular focus of the question leaves no space for analysis of

Russian produced data which could, nevertheless, be useful in further researches on the

Ukrainian topic. Moreover, the data analyzed within the current research is produced and

published in English. The specifics of the language show that all documents were intended for

an international public and were not country specific. This is important since it shows that the

documents are targeted primarily at EU member states regardless of their country origin. Last

but not least, all documents are publicly available which enables the replicability of the

research.

5. Findings

According to the above criteria, 13 think-thanks’ advisory documents, 21 scholars’

researches, and 14 EU policy documents were analyzed. The wide range of data provided an

insightful data pool through which a detail analysis of the EU-Ukrainian relations was

performed. The following chapters will discuss in detail all findings acknowledged within the

current thesis.

13

6. The European Union and Ukraine in the context of the EU’s relations

with its Eastern Neighbors

In the following chapter I will explain the nature of the European Union’s approach towards

its neighboring countries to the East, including Ukraine.

The European Union policy framework towards Ukraine has essentially evolved since the

early 2000s, mainly due to the fourth and fifth enlargements. In 2003 an official framework

document issued by the European Commission stressed the importance of the “wider Europe

policy” and stated that “…the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly

neighborhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and

co-operative relations.”

As stated in a 2003 policy advisory paper: “The EU’s vulnerability to

its neighbors, therefore, is the background threat of disorder spilling across its borders; that

should give its member governments a shared self-interest in promoting a mutually beneficial

relationship, rather than one in which minimal concessions are dragged out of both sides. It is

in the EU’s strongest self-interest, therefore, to invest in stability and cooperation around its

borders.”

Before the establishment of the European Neighborhood policy (ENP), the EU’s

policy towards each state in Eastern Europe was based on bilateral agreements and individual

associations, without an overarching policy. In that sense the ENP has been designed as a

coherent EU-wide approach to the Union’s neighboring countries.

According to Sasse,

there were three main concerns expressed by the member-states when implementing the ENP:

a concern for the political stability on the new EU borders, the attempt to counter negative

implications of the Eastern Enlargement that could be felt by the ‘outsiders’ to the East, and

an effort to design a valuable alternative to membership.

6.1 European Neighborhood Policy

The European Neighborhood policy (ENP) was designed in the later stages of the EU’s

eastern enlargement, which included ten would-be member states, comprising the three

27 _{European Commission, “Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and} Southern Neighbors.” Brussels, March 11, 2003, p.4

28

Wallace William, Looking after the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25, Working Paper of Notre Europe, Groupement d’ètudes et de recherché, Policy Papers No 4.; 2003; p.19 29

Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours; in European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System The Road Towards Convergence; Casarini, N., Musu, C. (Eds.) London, 2007 p.163

14

former soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The unique challenges posed by

Ukraine’s membership desires that continued from the 1990s could better explain the very

nature of the ENP.

The ENP did not give answers to basic questions of the EU – how big

should the Union become ? Should all European countries be provided with a clear

membership perspective? Should the enlargement be concerned with norms and standards

only, rather than geopolitics? The initial focus of the ENP to the east was counter-balanced

by the inclusion of the Mediterranean countries. This added focus was seen as a “typical

reflex of intergovernmentalism” – the balancing and matching of national interest in the field

of a common European foreign policy.

EU member states disagreed about which focus of

the policy should be more important – Eastern Europe and the former soviet republics or the

Mediterranean and the countries of northern Africa.

There was a competition between

member states to “tip” the ENP towards an area of their specific economic and foreign policy

interest.

While France and Spain encouraged greater focus to the countries of the

Mediterranean, Germany and Poland supported EU policies to the East.

The inclusion of

north African countries to the ENP further complicated the alternatives to membership that

the EU wished to design for its Eastern neighbors, since the rejection of membership

prospects for a state like Morocco on the basis of geography and “non-Europeanism” clearly

could not be implemented with countries like Moldova and Ukraine. The ENP had a clear

security aspect as well – the concerns of the EU that had to do with illegal migration,

organized crime, ethnic conflicts, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were all

addressed by the ENP, as increased trade and investment in the border areas were in line with

the EU’s key security and economic interests.

A European Commission Strategy Paper

states the added value of the ENP project by emphasizing the reforms in partner countries the

policy will encourage. By converging economic legislation between the EU and third states

and by opening economies to each other, as well as by continued reduction of trade barriers –

the ENP would aimed at facilitating economic growth, reducing unemployment and

31 _{Pentland, Charles C.; Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy in The Boundaries of EU Enlargement} Finding a Place for Neighbours; DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.); London, 2008 p.129

32

Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours; p.166

33

Cadier, David Is the European Neighbourhood Policy a substitute for enlargement?. In The Crisis of EU enlargement, 2013, LSE IDEAS Report,

http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR018/Cadier_D.pdf, last accessed 29.06.2016 34

Ibid 35

Ibid 36

Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours; p.167

15

stimulating investment.

The ENP also offered the neighboring countries close co-operation

within the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense

Policy initiatives to address issues of conflict prevention and crisis management.

The

Commission also stressed the importance of dialogue with partner countries on conflict

prevention , crisis management, exchange of information, cooperation in training and

exercises, as well as the possibility of participation in EU-led crisis management operations.

Further stress was given to the “development of a shared responsibility between the EU and

partners for security and stability in the neighborhood region.”

It was thus, important for the EU’s own security to create a stable and flourishing

neighborhood to its new eastern borders. It has been argued that the creation and

implementation of the ENP was an attempt by the EU to “take up its role as a regional

political force”.

However, the adopted policy strategy also signaled a stage of exhaustion of

the enlargement process on the part of the EU and uncertainty about abut its effects. The lack

of extensive knowledge on Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, the South Caucasus as well as the

awareness of the EU that an economically rising Russia would not wish to see its influence in

the post-Soviet area being rivalled, led to the adopted ENP strategy reflecting “protective

attitudes”.

As noted in an advisory policy paper issued in 2003 by the independent think

tank Notre Europe: “After this enlargement, negotiations within the EU will be preoccupied

with internal readjustment. Member government cannot afford, however, to neglect external

policy. A strategy towards the EU’s immediate neighbors is the basis for any coherent

common foreign policy.”

A working policy paper from 2006 argues for the immense

importance that the economic development of the neighborhood region holds. According to

it, the whole system of relations between the EU and third countries within the ENP is based

37 _{Communication from the Commission - European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper {SEC(2004) 564,} 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}, 12.05.2004 p. 9

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_117717.pdf last accessed 20.06.2016 38_{Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern} Neighbours; p.167

39

Communication from the Commission - European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper {SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}, 12.05.2004 p. 13

40

Casier, Tom The clash of integration processes? The shadow effect of the enlarged EU on its Eastern

neighbours. In: Malfliet, Katlijn and Verpoest, Lien and Vinokurov, Evgeny, eds. The CIS, the EU and Russia. The Challenges of Integration. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe; London 2007 p. 73

41

Koszel, B. Eastern policy of the European Union. In A. Podraza (Ed.). The European Union policy towards Ukraine: Partnership or membership? (20-52).Lublin. 2006 p. 51

42

Wallace William, Looking after the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25, Working Paper of Notre Europe, Groupement d’ètudes et de recherché, Policy Papers No 4.; 2003; p.1

16

on the EU providing economic incentives, but the exact definition of what a “stake in the

internal market” would mean has been neglected.

In its core, the European Neighborhood Policy centers around the so-called Action

Plans – joint ventures between the EU and partner countries. Sasse has argued that this kind of

policy has its negative implications. Those include the conflict with a general overarching

approach policy towards all the neighbors of the EU, as well as the problems of

implementation emerging from the fact that priorities are phrased in general terms and the

time-frame of concrete actions is not clear.

In the early documents of the ENP no

assessment was made of the possible clashes of interest with other regional actors. This was

particularly important for the agreements and action plans towards the former Soviet republics

of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which Russia considered to

be a part of its “sphere of influence”. The role of a resurgent Russia in the internal dynamics

of the EU common foreign policy and in the EU-Ukraine relations will be discussed in more

detail in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, a broader geopolitical frame was obvious in the genesis of the ENP,

when in 2002 a British proposal to give a ‘special status’ to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

was seen as an attempt of drawing the three former Soviet republics “away from Russia and

closer to the EU orbit without promising a membership”.

It was in the EU’s understanding

that after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova would be

increasingly isolated and put in a grey area of post-communist countries without a

EU-membership perspective. Pentland argues that the 2002 proposal was “largely about

Ukraine”, as Belarus was seen as a strong Russian ally with a regime-change seeming a

remote possibility. As for Moldova, the instability projected by the separatist in Transnistria

left the country too weak to be considered a priority.

On the other hand, Ukraine was the

largest country in the region and considered strategically located and potentially prosperous.

Although it had expressed views of desire to join the European Community after it gained

independence in 1991, Ukraine combined that with contradictory foreign and internal policy.

43 _{European University Institute; The European Neighbourhood Policy:A Framework for Modernisation?; 2006;} p. 5

44

Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern

Neighbours; in European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System The Road Towards Convergence; Casarini, N., Musu, C. (Eds.) London, 2007 p.170

45

Pentland, Charles C.; Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy in The Boundaries of EU Enlargement Finding a Place for Neighbours; DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.); London, 2008 p.132

17

This was especially true during president Kuchma’s second term (1999-2004), whose

so-called multi-vectoral policy or the balancing between Russia and the West has been so-called

“little more than a string of confusing and contradictory declarations.”

Ukraine was the first

of the former Soviet republics to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU

in 1994, although the member states ratified it some 4 years later only – in 1998. Ukraine was

also one of the first states to sign a Common Strategy in 1999, following Russia. In 2004 the

European Commission issued a report that would serve as a basis for the EU-Ukraine Action

Plan under the ENP. Along with the Action Plan, the EU added so-called “Ten Points” after

the Orange Revolution of 2004, to serve as a “goodwill gesture” on the part of the EU,

emphasizing its commitment to Ukraine’s reforms, its World Trade Organization membership

and a prospect of a free-trade agreement.

The priorities in the Action Plan included the

further strengthening of Ukraine’s democratic institutions and the rule of law, as well as the

guaranteeing of fair elections, freedom of the press and expression. Added value was given to

the EU-Ukraine cooperation in the spheres of disarmament and crisis management, as well as

the approximation of EU norms and standards within Ukraine’s legislation.

In the context

of the ENP, the European Commission has unofficially stated that the country’s membership

prospect is “is neither open nor closed”.

By not cancelling Ukraine’s membership

perspective nor offering it right away, the EU was creating a room for maneuver. Pentland

outlines two advantages for the EU to put its policy towards Ukraine in a broader integration

context in the form of the ENP. First, the unrealistic expectations Ukraine has for a EU

membership would be contrasted by stronger integration in most ways and a better incentive

structure offering almost everything but a membership. Second, the neighborhood policy

offered by the EU would counterweight (at least in the view of EU policy makers) any

attractiveness that closer relation with Russia would have. The alternative of leaving Ukraine

outside EU’s interests and vulnerable to pressure from Moscow would be in neither Brussels’

nor Kiev’s interest.

It has been argued that rewards and local perception of demands are the most

important variables for the effectiveness of ENP policies in Ukraine. After 2004 the EU

47 _Ibid. 48

Sasse, Gwendolyn; ‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern

Neighbours; in European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System The Road Towards Convergence; Casarini, N., Musu, C. (Eds.) London, 2007 p.172

49 Ibid. 50

Ibid. 51

Pentland, Charles C.; Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy in The Boundaries of EU Enlargement Finding a Place for Neighbours; DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.); London, 2008 p.132

18

support for WTO-membership of Ukraine and the granting of full-fledged market status

arguably helped local business to support the strengthening of democratic institutions. The

study also has shown a gap in the future preferences of the EU and Ukraine, particularly in the

fields of Economics and Justice and Home Affairs.

These asymmetries reflected the

inconsistency of the ENP, which the EU states and especially the new members from Eastern

Europe looked to fix within the Eastern Partnership – an attempt to consolidate the ENP

towards the six ex-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe.

6.2 The Eastern Partnership initiative

Wolczuk has argued that the ENP initiative has led to a significant change within

Ukraine. However, it did not have the same impact as EU policies had in connection to the

former Soviet satellite states that joined the EU.

The same working paper states this is due to

the inability of the ENP to “focus the minds” of the Ukrainian political elites, in contrast to

the Central and Eastern European accession countries.

The EU’s inability to provide a

membership perspective to Ukraine was part of the issue. Wolczuk argues that it was indeed

membership perspective that gave the EU “the power to motivate” rather than the access to a

shared market that was in place with the ENP.

An important internal factor for the lack of

impact the ENP had on Ukraine was the political instability and the competition between

political elites that succeeded the Orange Revolution and the presidential elections in 2005.

The dynamics of the Orange Revolution protests and their relation to Ukraine’s European

integration will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The EU did not open the

“membership question” after popular protests seen largely seen as pro-European. On the other

hand, the perception of the EU within Ukraine was largely shaped by president Kuchma’s

legacy.

In 2008, Poland and Sweden were the architects of a new EU emphasis for the Eastern

neighbors of Union under the scope of the ENP. The project was named the Eastern

Partnership and was seen by many EU members as a “as a continuation of their prior

52

Gawrich, Andrea/Melnykovska, Inna/Schweickert, Rainer 2009: Neighbourhood Europeanization Through ENP: The Case of Ukraine, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 3, August 2009, p.20

53 _{Wolczuk Kataryna, ‘Adjectival Europeanisation? The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under} the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Research Working Paper 18; 2007; p.5

54 Ibid. 55

Ibid, p.20 56 _{Ibid p .11}

19

endeavors to strengthen the ENP in its Eastern dimension, as well as a new opening in the

EU’s relations with the countries to which it is addressed.”

What the Eastern Partnership

aimed at bringing to the ENP was a “necessary eastern dimension of the ENP framework,

aiming at substantially upgrading engagement with the six eastern neighbors.”

The EaP is a

project involving the then 27 member states of the EU and the six former soviet republics of

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. It is a strategic plan of the EU

aimed at the consolidation of the six eastern European countries within the ENP.

The draft

for the EaP initiative was first presented in 2008 by Sweden and Poland – the two EU

members opting to “strengthen the EU’s ties with its eastern neighbors”.

The proposal did

not “undermine but rather enhance existing EU policies” and was described by Polish Foreign

Minister Radoslaw Sikorski as a ""practical and ideological enhancement of the ENP which

would complement the 'Union for the Mediterranean' and in no way foil the EU's strategy”.

A year later, on May 7

2009, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague, Czech Republic

provided detailed steps in the application of the project.

A Joint Declaration of the Eastern

Partnership Summit was adopted – the founding and most important document of the

initiative.

Although each of the six former Soviet republics has unique foreign policy objectives,

all of them seek to profit from EU’s financial and political support. The Eastern Partnership

is therefore the EU’s answer to demands from its neighbors to the east for increased

integration. On Europe’s side, the starting of the initiative was an attempt to reaffirm the EU

contribution to stability, rule of law, effective governance, and support for the economic

development of Eastern Europe.

Naturally, as was the case with the ENP, the specifics of

each of the six countries in question made it difficult for the EU to make identical offers to all

57 _{Wojna Beata, Gniazdowski Mateusz (eds.) Eastern Partnership: The Opening Report, THE POLISH INSTITUTE} OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Warsaw, April 2009, p.5

58

Costea Simion; EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential; European Foreign Affairs Review 16: 259–276, 2011. p. 275 59

Ibid, p. 259 60

‘Poland, Sweden defend ‘Eastern initiative’, 26.05.2008, EurActiv.com,

http://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/news/poland-sweden-defend-eastern-initiative/ last accessed 29.05.2016

61 Ibid

62 _{Eastern Partnership MEMO/09/217, 05 May 2009, Europa.eu,}

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/217&format= HTML&aged=0&language=FR&guiLanguage=fr; last accessed 29 May 2016

63 _{Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009, consilium.europa.eu,}

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf last accessed 29 May 2016

64

Costea Simion; EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential; European Foreign Affairs Review 16: 259–276, 2011. p. 260

20

of them. Brussels instead facilitated the implementation of new Association Agreements

between the Union and partner states.

Therefore, the further development of relations

between the EU and each country depended on the progress in internal reforms.

The issues

that had to be dealt with in the region included the existence of authoritarian regimes in

Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the short 2008 war between Georgia and Russia

and the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009.

Of the six countries addressed in

the Eastern Partnership initiative, Ukraine is the most important one from the EU’s point of

view. It is strategically located, has a potentially prosperous economy and produces 58 per

cent of the region’s GDP. Ukraine also has the largest population of all EaP states, which

comprises 60 per cent of the total number.

However, for Ukraine the evolution of the

European Neighborhood Policy and the following focus of the Eastern Partnership was not an

optimistic development. Kiev initially met the start of the ENP in 2004 with “coolness and

distrust”.

The EaP was firstly seen as a positive development, largely because the EU

singled out its “European neighbors of the EU” in contrast to the Mediterranean countries.

It

was, however, later criticized by Ukrainian politicians because it brought too little progress in

the former Soviet republic’s bid for EU membership. An EU's proposal to announce a more

liberal visa regime rather than granting a visa-free system to Ukraine brought concerns from

the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in 2009.

The world financial crisis of 2008 which led the

way to the EU debt crisis of 2009, made Ukraine’s EU perspective even thinner. According to

Korduban, the issue lies in the richer European states having very different views of their

neighbor to the East. For the leading EU member states, the EaP was more of a forum for

discussing visa agreements, free trade deals and strategic partnership agreements, rather than

a mechanism that would encourage further enlargement of the Union.

Borys Tarasyuk, the

then-foreign minister of Ukraine stated that the Eastern Partnership initiative “would have

little practical meaning if the EU did not revise its approach”.

As early as 2010, academics

saw the need for a re-evaluation of the EaP on the side of the EU. Andrew Wilson stated in an

65

Values to form core of EU 'Eastern Partnership', 18.03.2009, https://euobserver.com/foreign/27799 , last accessed 20.06.2016

66

Costea, EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership, p.260 67

Ibid, 261

68 _{Wojna Beata, Gniazdowski Mateusz (eds.) Eastern Partnership: The Opening Report, THE POLISH INSTITUTE} OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Warsaw, April 2009, p. 67

69 Ibid 70 _Ibid 71

Korduban Pavel, European Union's Eastern Partnership Plan Disappoints Ukraine, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 64, April 3, 2009

72 Ibid 73 _Ibid

21

interview that “some kind of ‘Partnership Plus’ revival, a relaunch, extra momentum – it’s

certainly needed.”

It is important to note Poland’s leading role within the implementation of the EaP.

Since its accession to the EU in 2004 along with six other former Soviet satellites, Warsaw

has been eager to draw its eastern neighbors closer to the European institutions. A 2014 Polish

Foreign Ministry report, which reviews Poland’s first decade of EU membership, states that

the launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2009 is Warsaw’s “biggest institutional success of the

past decade”, followed by the self-assessment of Poland being “one of the most active EU

Member States in the field of Eastern affairs”

The report goes on to say that the initiative

has been an instrument for building support inside the EU for a European perspective for

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

While for politicians in Kiev the agreements under the ENP

and EaP, including a free-trade area and a liberalized visa regime, were seen as small

concessions by the EU long way from the desired EU membership of Ukraine – for Poland

those steps were a success in the EU legal integration of countries that have been part of the

Soviet Union for decades.

The 2010 victory of Viktor Yanukovich in the Ukrainian presidential election and the

nature of his political rule seemed to prove that the EU initiatives had not been very

successful in implementing the rule of law and democratizing the political processes in

Ukraine. Scholars have argued that “Yanukovych consistently consolidates his power by

restricting political pluralism”, thereby moving Ukraine towards a Russian “model” of

governance, contrary to Western expectations.

Illustrations of that power consolidation are

the arrest of one of Yanukovich’s political opponents in the face of former Prime Minister

Yuliya Tymoshenko, political pressure over NGOs, media and universities, as well as election

fraud.

A key issue for the EU is that the ENP and EaP initiatives have been focused on

74

After Just One Year, Are The Wheels Coming Off The EU's Eastern Partnership?, May 07, 2010, www.rferl.org http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_After_Just_One_Year_Are_The_Wheels_Coming_Off_The_EUs_Easter n_Partnership/2035235.html, last accessed 05.06.2016

75

Małgorzata Kałużyńska, Paweł Karbownik, Wojciech Burkiewicz, Karolina Janiak, Marcin Jatczak; Poland’s 10 years in the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw 2014, p.45

76 Ibid 77

Longhurst Kerry Wojna Beata, ‘Asserting the EU’s Mission in the Neighbourhood: Ten Recommendations for an Effective Eastern Partnership’, Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2011, p. 12.

22

working with local political elites and central governments. However, in the case of Ukraine it

was exactly those elites that blocked of political, legislative and economic changes.

7. The Orange Revolution – causes and aftermath

The events of the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine had an immense impact not just on the internal political development of the former Soviet republic, but also on the broader international scene. The Orange Revolution has been called a “catalyst” for change, since it triggered a re-evaluation of Russian attitudes towards the ENP and more general towards the EU’s international activity.80 The protests and the following shifts in Ukrainian foreign policy demonstrated the weakness of a “Russian model of integration” and forced Moscow to opt for an open struggle with the EU in the post-Soviet space.81 The following section of the thesis will analyze the causes and reasons behind the popular Orange Revolution, as well as Moscow’s involvement in Ukrainian affairs. The chapter will continue with an overview of EU mediation of the crisis, explaining the perceptions and motivations of different players

7.1 The presidential election of 2004 and the Orange Revolution. Internal

background

Andrew Wilson suggested that the Orange Revolution should be understood as a drama with three acts. 82 Act One involves the massive outpouring of people into the streets of Kiev and other cities of Ukraine. Those protesters become a political actor, to be reckoned with by both sides of the political spectrum. Act Two saw an “agreed settlement” between political elites. In act Three the newly-elected president Yushchenko decided to avoid “revolutionary justice” against the supposed election fraud perpetrators. 83

In April 2004 the ruling Kuchma regime imposed a single candidate for the coming presidential elections – the then prime minister Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich represented the

79

Ibid, p.14 80

Gretskiy Igor, Treshchenkov Evgeny, Golubev Konstantin; Russia's perceptions and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership; Communist and Post-Communist Studies Volume 47, Issues 3–4, September–December 2014, Pages 375–383, p. 377

81

Ibid. p. 378 82

Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009; p. 322 83 _Ibid

23 “strongest regional clan” in Ukraine – the Donetsk-based Party of Regions.84 The group rose to power during the 1990s, helped by their steel exports from the resource-rich Donbass. The main opponent of Yanukovich in the presidential elections would be Viktor Yushchenko – the leader of “Our Ukraine” party, which won the 2002 parliamentary elections with almost 24 per cent of the vote.85 The Yanukovich campaign received endorsement from the Russian president Vladimir Putin in the form of a “populist Russophile operation”.86 _{That included promises of pensions raising, updating the status}

of the Russian language and verbal attacks against US and NATO influence. Yanukovich held anti-NATO positions as a way to appeal to pro-Russian voters and described Ukrainian membership of the EU as “unrealistic”, stating it could be only achieved after the country had been integrated within the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States’ economic zone.87 The maneuver garnered support for the Party of Regions` candidate in the East of Ukraine, but combined with political intimidation and manipulation averted voters elsewhere.88 Another mechanism used by the Yanukovich camp in the run-up to the elections was the so-called political technology, a term described as a “highly developed industry of political manipulation“.89 That included fake candidates designed to blacken Yushchenko’s profile or play the role of “locomotives” – mobilizing voters in the first round in order to pass the votes to Yanukovich in the second round. 90 In September Yushchenko was allegedly poisoned with dioxin and was rushed for medical treatment to Austria. The fact that the candidate for president fell ill after dinner with the heads of the Ukrainian security apparatus appeared to confirm the poisoning theory.91 The fact that Yushchenko’s life was in danger, followed by his dramatic return to Ukraine led to increased support from the public.92 The election fixes from 1999 and 2002 made the regime forces underestimate the situation in 2004 and calculate that they would just need more fraud to gain an election win.93 The ballot counting after the first round of the elections on October 31st was suspended two times because of Election Commission supposed manipulation of the books – however, Yushchenko still topped the vote with 39.9 per cent, followed

84

Ibid, p.318

85 _{Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 31 March 2002 Final Report, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and} Human Rights; Warsaw 27 May 2002

86

Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.317

87 _{Kuzio Taras, From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution,} Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 2, March/April 2005, pp. 29–44, p.39

88 Ibid

89 _{"Political technology": why is it alive and flourishing in the former USSR?; www.opendemocracy.net; 17 June} 2011 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/political-technology-why-is-it-alive-and-flourishing-in-former-ussr last accessed 10.06.2016

90 _{Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.317} 91

Yushchenko and the poison theory; http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 11 December, 2004

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4041321.stm last accessed 10.06.2016 92

Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.318 93 _Ibid

24 closely by Yanukovich with 39.3 per cent.94 A second round of the presidential elections was to be held three weeks later, on November 20th. The authorities decided to cut the ballot counting procedure to just 10 hours, compared to 10 days in the first round.95 In Donetsk, a million votes were added overnight, raising the voter turnout from 78 per cent to 97 per cent - leading to the Election Commission declaring Yanukovich the winner by 49.5 per cent to 46.6 per cent for Yushchenko.96 _{However, a 15 000-strong exit poll did show a Yushchenko victory with 53.7 per cent}

to 43.3 per cent.97 The announcement of the results from the second round catalyzed the mass protests known as the“Orange Revolution”. By the morning of November 22nd, 200,000 to 300,000 Yushchenko supporters were protesting in Kiev against the alleged election fraud.98 The sudden eruption of mass protests was an evidence of the gap between politicians and citizens – a Soviet Union legacy that live on in independent Ukraine. Kuzio described this dynamic as a “yawning gulf between the ruling elite and the population, with the authorities living in a separate world, and the youth, who constituted most of the participants in the Orange Revolution, playing a crucial part in the elections”.99 Wilson argues that it was exactly the enormous number of people who went out into the streets that took the authorities by surprise and made them consider “radical repressive measures” a whole week after the first protest.100 A violent dispersal of the crowds was briefly considered, but turned down at the end.101 Therefore, the regime tried to counter-act in another way - on November 28th pro-Yanukovich politicians and officials asked for an independence referendum that would declare a “South-East Republic” with the city of Kharkov as its capital.102 Big rallies in cities around eastern and southern Ukraine followed – those both supported Yanukovich and called for regional autonomy.103 The mayor of Donetsk, Oleksandr Lukianchenko, called the Kiev opposition a "nationalist junta", while regional governor Anatoly Blizniuk branded the opposition as “extremists” and called for autonomy from Kiev.104

The Supreme Court of Ukraine began reviewing the alleged election fraud on 29 November and on 3 December condemned the second round and ordered a third round of elections to be held 94 _Ibid 95 Ibid 96 Ibid 97 _Ibid 98

Copsey Nathaniel; Ukraine; in Ó Beacháin, Polese (eds) The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures , New York 2010 p.41

99 _{Kuzio Taras, Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution, in Aslund McFaul (eds) Revolution in Orange?} The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough, Washington 2006 p. 5

100

Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.319 101 _Ibid

102

East Ukraine threatens autonomy; David Crouch; www.theguardian.com 29 November 2004;

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/29/ukraine, last accessed 11.06.2016 103

Ibid 104 _Ibid

25 on 26 December. 105 The decision was followed by Yushchenko accepting “constitutional reform” of 2006 which would limit the president’s power – to critics it seemed that he was “giving away the fruits of victory” from a position of strength.106 As a results of the changes to the constitution, Ukraine became a parliamentary-presidential republic, with the president keeping control over the foreign policy, national defense and security, as well as a continued veto right over the legislative branch.107 _{However, the appointment of the government would be in the hands of the legislature.}108

The “Orange” camp reluctantly accepted these changes, hoping to have enough time until 2006 to use the powers of the presidency for reforms.109 “Yushchenko allegedly made even more promises in private, including an “immunity” for Kuchma and the regime once the opposition took power. In the end, the third round of the elections proved the exit-polls from the second round to be correct – Yushchenko won with 51.2 per cent, leaving Yanukovich second with 44.2 per cent.110

7.2 Moscow’s attitude towards Ukraine and the EU

For Putin’s Russia, the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004 were of strategic and geopolitical importance.111 For Moscow, it was an episode of the struggle to regain Russia’s superpower status in the post-Soviet period. In order to achieve that, political control over Ukraine was significant. As Brzezinski argues, the very existence of an independent Ukrainian state means that Russia ceased to be a Eurasian empire.112 On the other hand, if Ukraine, with its big population and major recourses falls back under Moscow’s control, Russia would “automatically” regain the ability to become a powerful state in both Asia and Europe.113 Therefore Ukraine can be seen as a stepping stone for Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet space and a test for Moscow’s capacity to influence developments in its “near abroad”.114 Sherr argues that in the early 2000s, Moscow was inflicting its control over Ukraine by both economic and deeply-rooted “culture of power”

105 _{Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.320} 106

Ibid 107

Karatnycky Adrian, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005,

http://www.global.wisc.edu/peace/readings/supplemental-johnson-orange.pdf last accessed 29.06.2016 108

Ibid 109

Ibid

110 _{Wilson Andrew; The Ukrainians. Unexpected nation; London 2009, p.320} 111

Copsey Nathaniel; Ukraine; in Ó Beacháin, Polese (eds) The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures , New York 2010 p.36

112 _{Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York} 1997. P. 46

113

Ibid, p. 47 114

Copsey Nathaniel; Ukraine; in Ó Beacháin, Polese (eds) The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures , New York 2010 p.36