Starting and running a media business in Iran

Starting and running a media business in Iran

Three case studies of start-ups that challenge the mass media

in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Master thesis Journalism and Media University of Amsterdam

Master in Media studies To: prof. dr. M.J.P. Deuze

Author: Luuk Ex Student number: 6172474 June 10, 2016, Amsterdam

Introduction 5

Theory 7

Chapter 1: Start-up trends worldwide and in Iran 7

Why Iran? 7

The concept of a ‘start-up’ and how to define ‘media’ 10

Rise of SMEs in the media industry 12

Journalism start-ups as ‘entrepreneurial journalism’ 14

Start-ups in Iran 16

Chapter 2: Iranian journalism in Reese’s hierarchy of influences model 19 Introduction of Reese’s hierarchy of influences model 19

Individual journalist 20 News routines 21 Organisation 22 Extra-media 24 Ideological 26 Method 28

Chapter 3: Three case studies 28

3.1 Multiple case study approach 28

Literature analyses 28

Case selection 29

Informants 31

3.2 Questionnaire topics 31

People involved 31 Location 32 Revenue model 32 Motives 32 Goals 32 Start-up ecosystem 32 Interviews 33

3.3 Set-up of the interviews 33

Context of the interview with Jaaar 33

Start-up Jaaar 34

Start-up Peivast 34

Start-up Aparat 35

Results and analyses 35

Chapter 4: Case Studies, Jaaar, Aparat and Peivast 35

North, near Valiasr Street 35

Technology-driven start-ups 36

Fix inefficiencies, copy successful businesses, and find independency 37

What is their product? 42

When your core business is not your main revenue stream 44

Within and without the state’s policies 46

Conclusion 50

Discussion 52

References 54

Figures 66

Appendix B: Map of Tehran with locations of the start-ups 71

Appendix C: List of respondents 72

Introduction

While observations of fast innovation and radical change in the media of Western coun-tries have been made (Franklin, 2010), it is a topic that has not yet been thoroughly re-searched in other parts of the world.

Western traditional print and broadcast media are challenged as readers and ad-vertisers are moving to freely available online platforms (Castells, 2012; Grueskin, 2011; McChesney & Nichols, 2010; Meyer, 2009). This has resulted in a rise of ‘entrepreneuri-al journ‘entrepreneuri-alism’ seeking to retain the practice of journ‘entrepreneuri-alism by starting innovative business ventures, so-called ‘journalism start-ups’ (Briggs, 2012, DVorkin, 2013).

Whereas some declare the crumbling of the traditional news business (Currah, 2009; C. Lewis, 2008), others observe the introduction of new possibilities (Briggs, 2012, DVorkin, 2013). For example the so-called ‘multiple journalism’ observed by Bregtje Van der Haak, Michael Parks & Manuel Castells (2014) in their study on the impact of new technologies on journalism:

New technology provides new ways to produce better research, reporting and storytelling . . . we believe that the Multiple Journalism of the digital age is not a threat to the independence and quality of professional journalism, but a liberation from strict corporate control. (Van der Haak, 2014).

The observation of a rise of new technologies which would produce better practices and liberation from strict corporate control is mainly an observation focused on journalism in Western countries.

Similar observations have been made about entrepreneurship in the Middle East. Research about entrepreneurship in this region was the subject of the book Startup rising:

The entrepreneurial revolution remaking the Middle East by Christopher Schroeder – an

entrepreneur and start-up researcher based in the area. After a visit to Iran in 2014, Schroeder noticed the ascent of a new generation of entrepreneurs. He suggested that a new generation has access to the “best . . . global technology” and “unprecedented access to information” (2014). This generation of young entrepreneurs “[is] building innovative businesses on their own and creating an ‘entrepreneurial revolution’ in the region of the

this thesis researches a different context and examines the assumptions of entrepreneurial journalism and multiple journalism in a non-Western, Iranian context. The main question addressed is “what does it generally take to start and run a news and journalism start-up in Iran?”

In this thesis I take existing observations about entrepreneurial and Multiple Journalism one step further, researching emerging initiatives in the Iranian media industry. During a two-week visit to Tehran I held intensive semi-structured interviews with start-up found-ers. Via a snowball method – I asked two journalists if they could bring me in contact with an Iranian start-up and other college’s or acquaintances who might know – I got in touch with thirteen journalists who are or have been active in the Iranian media industry, as well as two entrepreneur coaches who work for the Iran Entrepreneurship Association. The lack of factual information remained problematic for the research. Therefore, this thesis must remain an explorative study. The goal is to present and analyse typical exam-ples of the media start-up scene in Iran.

The researched start-ups have been chosen because of the variety of their back-grounds. The first is Jaaar.com, an online kiosk for all Iranian newspapers. Customers can download entire newspapers from the website. Jaaar is innovating the delivery of news by challenging classic mail delivery services. Jaaar is part of a larger company called Pouya Rasaneh, which means “dynamic media.” Pouya Rasaneh’s LinkedIn page indicates that they think of themselves as “pioneers in innovative IT solutions in news/ media monitoring/ delivery services in Iran” (Pouya Rasaneh, n.d.). They specialise in “content aggregation, content analysis and content delivery systems” (Pouya Rasaneh, n.d.). The company also claims to have the first and only news analysis system in Iran. Jaaar is the first multiplatform electronic newsstand in Iran, and has under contract over 186 publications, including most major newspapers and magazines [see figure 1].

Peivast, a classical monthly magazine about Information and communication technology

(ICT), is the second start-up examined in this paper. Peivast was initiated by three jour-nalists tries to grow by selling intensively researched articles that are longer than an aver-age magazine piece; the publication is sold in paperback print. The third case study start-up is the video-sharing website Aparat, which, according to World Start-start-up Report (S,

2014), is the largest recently launched media company in Iran. Aparat can be seen as the Iranian alternative for YouTube, which is absent in Iran due to Internet filtering by the state.

The three cases in this study vary in their employees’ backgrounds, strategic de-velopment, and business models. Each is situated at a different stage of media production in Iran: in news distribution, as content provider, and in social media. But all three start-ups similarly challenge a fundamental part of the mass-media in Iran. Jaaar challenges the classic infrastructure of mass media consumption and focuses on a new revenue model using new online techniques. Peivast is pushed by individual ambitions seeking ‘inde-pendency and accountable journalism’ (Peivast interview, February, 23, 2014). And Apa-rat was born out of the relatively new social media, which, as we also experience in the West, challenges classic broadcasting and has the potential to give individuals more pow-er to express themselves. By exploring start-ups active in these subsequent stages, this thesis aims to provide encompassing insights on what it takes to start and run a news and journalism start-up in Iran.

Chapter 1 provides context about entrepreneurship in the West and in Iran. It ad-dresses the emergence of start-ups worldwide, including Iran. An analysis of Iranian me-dia according to Reese’s hierarchy of influences model is provided in chapter 2. This context is needed to understand in which conditions the researched start-ups operate. In chapter 3, the method of qualitative research via semi-structured interviews and the case study method are explained. Chapter 4 discusses the three start-ups – Jaaar, Peivast and Aparat. Finally, this thesis ends with a conclusion and discussion.

Theory

Chapter 1: Start-up trends worldwide and in Iran

According to James Curran and Myung-Jin Park, universalistic observations about media have been derived from a tiny hand full of Western countries. In the introduction of

De-long dominated media studies in the West. As a classic example of Western-centric think-ing, they review the textbook Four Theories of the Press (Siebert et al. 1956), whose au-thors divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal democracies, the soviet communists, and authoritarian societies. This study served as a landmark for academics for the next forty years (Curran and Park, p. 3). It posited that developing countries would ultimately imitate the Western models of a democratic and open society, with the ideal of a press independent from the state promoting a democratic system. However, modernisa-tion did not occur in such a way for many of these countries. Moreover, the media system in Western countries was often directed toward maintaining control rather than educating for democracy (Curran and Park, p. 3). Curran and Park explain that a lack of local knowledge was one of the reasons why this Westernizing view came into fashion.

Gholam Khiabany also argues against a Western-centric view. In his book Iran:

The Paradox of Modernity (2010) he states that the main problem of Four Theories is

caused by “the focus … on new technologies, deterritorialization, and the decline of the nation state” (2010, p. 11). In relation to Iran, Khiabany points out that the nation state has remained to play a major role: “The boundaries of the media, its goals and aims, its limits and content, is regulated and determined by the nation state and various state insti-tutions” (2010, p. 12). State power and its role should be the focus of attention, argues Khiabany. This study aims to contribute to media studies by gaining local knowledge. In line with Khiabany it also asserts the state as a major player in media.

The decision to take Iran as a site for researching entrepreneurial journalism and multiple journalism is mainly motivated by recent technological, economical, and politi-cal events. To start with the first two — in Iran, as in the rest of the global South, capital-ism and the recent technological ICT-revolution are increasingly reshaping the state and society. New media crossing national frontiers are giving people access to information authorities have difficulty suppressing. The Islamic Republic’s own image and the values it has generated (the good/revolutionary as well as the bad/exploitative) are rapidly be-coming more diffuse. Marginalisation of large-scale production and feudal relations, in-creasing urbanisation and literacy, and the rapid spread of technological changes have all contributed to a new dynamic in the country. At the same time, new media are used by authorities to widen state influence on public communication and debates. As researcher

Gholam Khiabany states, Iran “provides a window to examine global trends of the opera-tion of capital, the transformaopera-tion of the state, the increased privatizaopera-tion of public re-sources, and the divide between the have and have-nots” (Khiabany, 2010, p. 18).

At the time of this research, politics in Iran are experiencing a transitional period in internal and external affairs. In 2013, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran; his election was hailed by reformists and Western countries as a reformist breath of fresh air. Rouhani announced changes in three fields: to restore diplomatic ties with the West-ern countries (George, 2015), to implement a high speed mobile IntWest-ernet, and to give the Iranian people access to all information globally by loosening restrictions online (Erd-brink, 2014). The following quote from an interview with CNN in 2013 illustrates Rou-hani’s intentions shortly after his election: “We cannot shut the gates of the world to our young generation” (Amanpour, 2014).

Changing external affairs can be seen as recently as the agreements on January 16, 2016 to lift sanctions between Iran and the U.S.A. and European Union (EU). Lifting of the sanctions could mark the end of the politics of isolation of Iran from the Western world. The sanctions originated in 1979 and were implemented as a reaction to the Islam-ic Revolution, with the U.S.A. forbidding trade with the governmental oil, gas, and petrol industries. In 1995, the sanctions were expanded with restrictions on banking and insur-ance transactions, shipping goods, and web-hosting services, and since 2006 were also imposed by countries of the European Union. In 2006, the United Nations Security Council (U.N.) imposed sanctions after Iran refused to suspend its uranium enrichment program (Axworthy, 2013). Over the years, all of these sanctions have taken a serious toll on Iran’s people and economy.

The promises for the future stand in sharp contrast to the isolation policy of the administration of preceding president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), who did not want to negotiate about the sanctions. Current president Rouhani (since 2013) held on to some of his reformative promises by allowing the two mobile Internet distributors of the country to widen their bandwidth. With this action, millions of Iranians obtained access to high speed Internet using smartphones. Filtering policies have not been changed since Rouhani’s election; thus, the promise to give Iranians access to “all information globally” and the allowance of new technologies has not yet been honoured.

This internal politics of restriction has curbed much of development of Iranian media. According to Freedom House (Freedom House, 2015), Reporters Without Borders (RWB, 2015) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2015), Iran is still among the most oppressive countries worldwide when it comes to freedom of the press. By the end of 2013 Iran continued to be one of world’s top ranking countries for the imprison-ment of media professionals, with fifty people held in custody (RWB, 2014). Current president Rouhani has not started to release these prisoners. Additionally, the government restricts Internet use of its inhabitants by throttling down Internet speed and filtering websites (Deibert, 2009). Over 50 percent of the top 100 most frequently visited web-sites, for example YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon and E-bay, are not available via Iranian networks today.

In the last year, hopes of reform have faded and been replaced with scepticism. Carolien Roelants, a journalist whose column focuses on the Middle East, describes the development as waking up from a happy dream about a more free Iran: “The reality is that all idealistic hawks have the constitutional possibilities – for example via department of justice – to block any progress towards a more freely society” (Roelants, 2016).

What does the context of economic sanctions and recession, suppression of the press, and at the same time political change out of isolation and disruptions of govern-ment suppression from ICT developgovern-ments mean for entrepreneurial journalism enterpris-es and multiple journalism in Iran? To answer this quenterpris-estion I first outline the concept of ‘start-up enterprise’ in the West and Middle East, followed by an elaboration on the defi-nition of media.

The concept of a ‘start-up’ and how to define ‘media’

Popular research literature mentions three main attributes to define a ‘start-up’. A start-up is a company “designed to grow fast”1 (Graham, 2012) and is “an organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model” (Blank, 2010). According to Blank, a start-up business searches for ‘unknown products’ in any type of business, which, once

1 _{For example cited}

http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/technology/startup-weekend-begins-definition-startup-varies and here

discovered, can be sold. Adam Kramer from the Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Com-merce adds that a start-up is “an innovative company that’s trying to fix an inefficiency or a problem” (Totten, 2013). Media scholars Naldi & Picard are in line with Kramer’s definition and mention that most journalism start-ups focus on the Internet to build new product and business models (Naldi & Picard, 2014).

In summary, according to these definitions a start-up is: (1) a recently started, temporary, or enduring company that is planning to grow rapidly by selling a product or service that (2) offers solutions for inefficiencies or problems occurring in any market.

Start-up companies tend to be small; scholars have considered them as small- to medium-sized enterprises (SME) – i.e., “businesses with less than 250 employees” (Po-well & Ennis, 2007, p. 376). In recent literature, scholars stress a growth of the number SMEs worldwide. Since 1970, after a period of Fordism – the growth of large companies with more than 250 employees responsible for most job opportunities – SMEs are re-emerging in North America and Europe. This development occurred not just in one or a few of the developed countries, but in virtually every single leading industrial country (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001). SMEs have emerged as an engine of economic and social development throughout the world (Audretsch & Thurik, 2004; GEDI, 2014); a shift oc-curring with an outlook on labour markets that face a labour force surplus in the coming 30 to 40 years. Although in Western countries the growth of the population is slowing, the 1980s and 1990s were years of exceptionally strong population growth with an incre-asing number of job seekers. Seekers in this larger population are therefore more likely to find a job in SMEs. This fundamental change has activated scholars to research whether this shift to SMEs is desirable and whether it should be promoted or avoided (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001). The same accounts for the media industry, which also is experiencing an advancement of start-up companies.

To define ‘media’ and ‘media industry’ I follow the concept of Hoag & Sangho. “[T]he ‘media’ refers to traditional mass communication and content genres as well as other technologies for mediated human speech” (Hoag & Sangho, 2005, p. 3). Media include traditional print publishing (newspapers, periodicals, and books), traditional elec-tronic media (radio and television), advertising and public relations, and new media

(YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)2. Since this study is exploratory, this more general con-cept of media is chosen; enterprises in the media industry can be seen as the thesis’ field of research.

When comparing Western start-ups and start-ups in the Global South, this theses follows Reese (2001, p. 185) and does not take our national context for granted as a static and universal feature. As Deuze (2005) asserts, any static definition of journalism as a profession is “naive and one-dimensional” (Deuze, 2005, p. 442). Deuze argues that uni-versal values of journalism as a profession were “challenged or changed in the context of current cultural and technological developments” (Deuze, 2005, p. 442).

Iranian journalism has often viewed relative to the concept of a free press reflec-ted by annual reports about press freedom worldwide. Historically, the nation’s scores are at the bottom of all major rankings (Freedom House, 2015; RWB, 2015; CPJ, 2015). As a consequence, Iran is described as a society with an unfree press, possessing no real jour-nalism and only state propaganda. This thesis studies start-up media enterprises that at first glance do not meet our (Western) idea of a free press. In the second chapter, which focuses on what is understood as news and journalism in Iran, the profession is discussed in greater detail. Below, I define the concept of a journalism start-up enterprise, tracing its manifestation in the context of what many scholars see as a a global crisis in journa-lism.

Rise of SMEs in the media industry

Much of the literature about news and journalism businesses focuses on the progress of ICT. Developments in ICT are seen by some as the main cause for a crisis in traditional news organisations (newspapers, public affairs magazines, and broadcasting). This crisis manifests in the drying up of the industry’s revenue streams, as well as a decline of the quality of news and journalism products. Digital information, news, and entertainment became freely and publicly available with the expansion of the Internet, which caused audiences to desert newspapers for the new online environment. Advertisers followed

2 _{New media are not included in Hoag and Sangho’s study (2005), because at the time of}

their publication, most of the now popular social media did not have the number of users they have today.

quickly by switching to cheaper and more targeted online advertisements. This created competition for newspapers and broadcasters. The business model of market-oriented news businesses, which had worked in the 20th century, collapsed. Due to the vanishing business model and rise of the Internet, the content of existing news businesses came under financial pressure and were forces to adapt.

As a reaction to plunging advertisement revenues and decreasing sales, the media industry reacted with cost-cutting reorganisations, such as cutbacks on editorial staff, reduction of investigative reporting, and cuts in international and provincial reporting. With the growth of online news platforms, journalists have to publish more stories in less time to stay in competition.

Analyses of the British press in 2008 showed that this crisis has influenced the content of mainstream news businesses (Lewis, Williams, Franklin, Thomas, & Mosdell, 2008). One empirical study of British newspapers and broadcasting between 1985 and 2005 revealed that editorial cutbacks have resulted in a homogenisation of news stories, with many journalists are recycling stories from other newspapers or news wires instead of producing their own (Davies, 2008; Lewis, et al., 2008). Since 2008, the global finan-cial crisis intensified these problems. With loans being more expensive, media companies have struggled with weakening liquidity bases, which led to even more cost cutting (Fen-ton, 2012; Ekmekcioglu, 2012).

Some researchers pose the erosion of the news industry as an alarming event, suggesting that the contribution of news to public debate and its relationship to a healthy democracy are in danger (Nee, 2013, p. 327). One of these alarming changes is that a greater amount of news research is done by journalists working on temporary bases and external parties such as freelancers. This affects the established professional status, roles, and practices of journalism previously existing on the editorial floor, which removes pro-fessional control from a propro-fessional editorial staff (Nygren & Witschge, 2009).

In the face of the shrinking news industry, several journalists have started small- to medium-sized enterprises – start-ups – to fill the gaps in reporting about public affairs. These burgeoning SMEs are reorienting the market for news and journalism; a growing number of them are looking at online possibilities. Such an emergence of journalists

looking for new ways to earn money is described as the rise of ‘entrepreneurial journal-ism’3 (Briggs, 2012; DVorkin, 2013).

Journalism start-ups as ‘entrepreneurial journalism’

Product innovation is a common result of the way SMEs orient themselves in the market (Salavou, Baltas & Lioukas, 2004). Journalism companies seek new ways to sell their product — recent trends can be seen in focussing on niche subjects (Politico, Follow the Money, FiveThirtyEight), charging for an Internet only magazine (Mediapart, De Corres-pondent), publishing news in a digital form (Vox), covering the most shared stories of news and entertainment (Buzzfeed), crowdsourcing (Bellingcat), crowdfunding (De Cor-respondent), and renewing the sales model (Blendle). Journalistic start-up companies mainly focus on possibilities online (Naldi and Picard, 2012).

Researchers and policy makers are confronted with three issues regarding start-up journalism: (1) start-ups try out new business models (Naldi & Picard, 2012), (2) go-vernments are forced to think about whether they have to make budget plans for subsidi-sing new SMEs or leave them to the market (Nee, 2013), and (3) start-ups rethink traditi-onal values of journalism (Fenton, 2012; Nygren & Witsche, 2009). When discussed mo-re closely, these thmo-ree issues mo-reveal the como-re of operating an entmo-repmo-reneurial journalism start-up.

Naldi and Picard note that start-ups require a flexible business model and have to rely on more than one income stream. Advertising, e-commerce, subscriptions, member-ships, and donations are all options that can provide revenue. Small companies have ad-vantages in the reduction on bureaucracy, gaining public support, and attracting venture capital. To eventually make a media start-up successful, new enterprises need aggressive communication to a community of readers and engaged leaders. But despite these advan-tages, most media start-ups have poor business plans, limited access to capital, and

3 _{Not to be confused with ‘journalists as entrepreneurs’, also widely researched (Das,}

2007; D’Amours & Legault, 2013), referring to journalists working as freelancers for news organisations, This is a different outcome of the crisis in the media branch and is not addressed in this thesis.

mately fail (Naldi & Picard, 2012). Journalism start-ups spend most of their time working on the editorial aspect of the enterprise and not enough on the business aspect; thus, they fail to build a sustainable revenue model. This results in framing their success not in mo-netary form but in services to the community and public. If such start-ups want to stay alive they need to attend to their revenue model and (partially) rely on private funding and subsidies from the state.

The concept of funded journalism brings an older dilemma to the table: should the government help start-ups or leave them to the market? Considering the prevalence of failing business models in the traditional news industry, some scholars and policymakers see start-ups as a potential solution for the crisis and suggest greater government inter-vention to help ensure the survival of journalism (Nee, 2014). With support via adverti-sements, tax regulations, and direct subsidies, the government can assist start-ups. Not only are policymakers forced to deliberate on this choice, but start-ups also need to deci-de if they want a business modeci-del heavily relying on government support. Although high degrees of sustainability can be insured, state funding is viewed suspiciously by journa-lism companies because of the control the government is granted in such an arrangement (Nee, 2014). Most start-ups researched by Nee favour a nonprofit status and try to find revenue out of advertisements, subsidies, and contracts for services.

The researcher Natalie Fenton mainly sees mainly sees new journalism in light of the Internet, which brought about new ways of researching, networking with audiences, presentation, and delivery. On the one hand, Fenton posits the Internet can “reinvigorate democracy though plurality, accessibility, and participation”. But as the Internet is just a tool, its possibilities must also play out in “the same social, political and economic struc-tures of democracy as the old journalism and traditional news media” (Fenton, 2012, p. 121).

Contrary to the concept of multiple journalism, scholars are mainly focussed on the state and state institutions when analysing the factors of starting and running a journa-listic start-up company. Fenton and Khiabany see state interference as more dominant than technological innovation in determining the boundaries of media. Nee and Witsche also point in this direction by examining state subsidies and describing start-up compa-nies as entities with which the state needs to interact — either by subsidising, regulating,

or letting them operate in the market. Naldi and Picard point out that start-ups usually fail to build a sustainable business model because of a poor business plan. What results is a move towards a non-profit model relying on subsidies. This thesis therefor focusses on the relation between the state and media start-ups. Especially because the state plays a major role in the economy in Iran, as is shown in the following paragraphs. Below, I ela-borate more on the social and political context of the country. Similar to the analyses provided above, I start with entrepreneurship in Iran before focussing on the media.

Start-ups in Iran

Similar to start-ups worldwide, news and journalism start-ups in Iran are SMEs. Two notable observations about SMEs in the Middle East have been made in recent literature: First, the number of SME entrepreneurs in these countries is rising, and due to govern-ment regulations and (new) technological possibilities, workers in SMEs have more free-dom and success in starting their businesses than before (Jafari, 2013; Schroeder, 2014; GEDI, 2014). Second, scholars suggest that only the ruling class is profiting from this new wave of entrepreneurs (Jafari 2013, Schroeder, 2014 and GEDI, 2014).

The Global Entrepreneur and Development Institute (GEDI) provides a general overview stressing both the new possibilities and the ruling elite’s power in SMEs around the world. In their annual report, GEDI ranks the efficiency of national start-up ecosys-tems “through analysis of 34 essential individual and institutional variables” (2014, p. ix). Iran is listed at the very bottom of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. The common feature of this bottom group is that they are “fairly illiberal and controlled economies in which market access is monopolized by ruling business elite” (GEDI, 2014, p. 36). GEDI ranks Iran in the bottom of its Global Entrepreneurial Index because of problems in internationalisation due to external sanctions, and product innovation due to software restrictions; additionally, “bureaucracy and multiple tax burdens threaten sus-tainable business activities” (GEDI, 2014, Introduction page for Iran). However, the re-port also notes Iran as the country with the largest ranking gain in one year. It concludes Iran “exceeds the average of its neighbours in the Asian and Oceania region” and

evalu-ates Iran's physical infrastructure as “increasingly positive in recent years” (GEDI, 2014, Introduction page for Iran).

This progression in Iran is also a result of technology. Due to the Internet, a new generation of the nation’s entrepreneurs is more connected with markets, capital, and entrepreneurs elsewhere, unanticipated until only five years ago (Schroeder, 2014). Ac-cording to software business analyst Jacques Van Niekerk (2014) the start-up entrepre-neurs he met during his trip in Iran were “world class in software development” (Van Niekerk, 2015). However, top-end, open-source software provided by North American companies such as Amazon are (still) illegal to use because of restrictions (Van Niekerk, 2015).

When it comes to entrepreneurs in Iran, it is important to understand the private sector’s small portion in the economy. The state owns 70 to 80 percent of the economy; since 2009, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) became an important player in the remaining 20 percent: “They are among the country’s most important economic actors, controlling an estimated ten percent of the economy, directly and through various subsidiaries” (Hen-Tov & Gonzalez, 2011).

The IRGC are usually described as a semi-private or pseudo-private organisation that has risen as a power since it helped secure the Islamic Revolution. In the recent de-cade of privatisation, the IRGC has gained major influence in all economic sectors such as construction, university laboratories, weapons manufacturing, infrastructure, and oil and gas (Bruno, Bajoria, & Masters, 2013). Analyses about the degree of influence and what ideals this group hold are somewhat varied. Mehdi Khalalji sees the organisation as “the backbone of the political structure” (Khalaji, 2007), i.e., a guarding corps working under direct authority of leader Ali Khamenei. Ali Alfoneh sees the expansion of an or-ganisation that can challenge the clerical establishment. (Bruno, Bajoria, & Masters, 2013). Akbar Ganji sees the IRGC as a fractioned organisation comprised of conservati-ve, pragmatist, and reformist groups (Ganji, 2013). He argues that the ideals of the orga-nisation are shaped by possibilities of making profit.

The influence of the IRGC can also be seen in the media industry. In 2009, this former paramilitary organisation bought 51 percent of Iran’s biggest telecommunication operator from the state. Gaining influence in telecommunication could be related to the

organisation’s large and capable intelligence agency, the "Unit of Reservation of Infor-mation”. This unit exists in parallel with and is quite influential within the Ministry of Intelligence (Khalaji, 2007). Critics have warned the deal exposes ordinary people, espe-cially political activists, to intensified spying and electronic surveillance (Tait, 2009).

Since the IRGC has strong ties with the government, there are resultant conse-quences that more than 80 percent of the economy is directly or indirectly related to go-vernmental institutions. The situation illustrates how involved the state’s operation is in comparison with Western economies. Both the state and the IRGC politically favour cer-tain entrepreneurs to become contractors, suppliers, and recipients of low-interest rate loans and licenses (Jafari, 2013). This reality, of a country in which the economy is large-ly owned by the state and semi-state organisations, puts Iranian entrepreneurs in a contra-dictory position:

On one hand, many entrepreneurs find themselves in an oppositional relationship with economic monopolies tied to the state and the semi-private sector. Hence they have an interest in political reform that undercuts the authoritarian structures that privilege the monopolies. At the same time, however, they have a high level of state dependency. While challenging networks of patronage is one option to conquer a bigger economic space, becoming part of those networks remains an attractive alternative that meets less resistance from the state. (Jafari, 2013, p. 18) If one considers independency as an important value in starting a businesses, this di-chotomy in Iran shows it is hardly possible to operate independent from the state.

When applying Naldi and Picard’s arguments about a successful start-up ecosys-tem to the Iranian context, a few observations can be made. Start-ups need to be flexible in revenue streams, but start-ups in Iran mostly rely on the government as a capital source (Naldi & Picard, 2012). Naldi and Picard also argue that start-ups are best helped with less bureaucracy. But, as mentioned above, the main concern of reports about Iran is the complex bureaucratic system and multiple tax burdens that threaten start-ups. The afore-mentioned observations apply to entrepreneurship in Iran, and not specifically to news and journalism entrepreneurs. The next chapter of this thesis will zoom into the Iranian media industry to get a better understanding of the specific ‘environment’ in which Irani-an news Irani-and journalism start-ups are trying to run their businesses.

Chapter 2: Iranian journalism in Reese’s hierarchy of influences model

This thesis is part of a transnational comparative study about starting news and journa-lism enterprises around the world. As Reese has stressed in Understanding the Global

Journalist (2001), comparing professional journalism in different countries and cultures

is a delicate issue to study, requiring structured guidance. Reese proposes “the hierarchy of influences model” (Reese, 2001) as a framework for comparative research in a “socio-logy-of-media level”. In this model, he stresses research should not only be done on the individual level of a journalist, but also on the larger structure in which a journalist func-tions — i.e., a web of organisational and contextual constraints. Before I analyse the me-dia in Iran with Reese’s model, a short introduction of the model is given below.

To sort out how news and journalism operate simultaneously across the globe, and are impacted at different levels of strength, the model uses a “multi-perspectival ap-proach” (Reese 2001, p. 174). The different perspectives are respectively categorised as follows: “the individual journalist, news routines, organizational, extra-media , and ideo-logical” (Reese, 2001, p. 178). I show these categories in Figure 2; ordered hierarchically, the most influential levels are at the top of the structure. As is shown in this figure, the higher levels of influence have impact on the lower individual level. The shape of the figure is my own interpretation of this hierarchy.

As Reese states, routines can shape the final content more than the individual journalist’s ideologies. Reese’s model helps in sorting out the crucial concept of the level of analyses and identifying connections between levels of influence. For example, in Iran, the extra-media level can have large impact on individual journalism practices. By analy-sing journalism in Iran per level, the impact of these higher levels are clearly revealed.

Compared with the case studies, these analyses show a clear struggle between the ideals of start-ups and the reality of their working environment. Similarly stated by Jafari in chapter 2 — start-up enterprises are interested in reform and working independent from the monopolistic state-owned media, but to get a market share, they have to take advanta-ge of their network with ruling elites. This contradiction is also formulated by Khiabani about the state vs. media dichotomy. Oppositions such as ‘public’ and ‘pri-vate’,‘restricted’ and ‘free’, ‘state’ and ‘market’, have formed some of the most contro-versial pairings in modern liberal societies, often valued in their terms’ degree of separa-tion. “In case of the press (media) in particular, separation from the ‘state’ remains an

ideal” (Khiabani, 2013, p. 9).

Below, I analyse the media industry by discussing it within the hierarchy of influ-ences framework. This analysis provides more insight on the direct and indirect contexts in which media start-ups are working, making more discernible the relation between state and start-up.

Individual journalist

There are few scholarly publications about the profile of individual journalists in Iran. In available literature the concept of professionalism is viewed from different perspectives: historically, compared to Western journalism, or how new techniques of mass communi-cation affected the profession. However, as I will argue at the higher levels of influence, much of the work of individual journalists is much more affected by forces at the meso- and macro-levels. Only those influences that root directly in the individual journalist’s background and behaviour are analysed at the individual level below.

New York Times correspondent Thomas Erdbrink argues that the occupation of journalist in Iran is mainly a partisan job. He sees “a vague line between journalists and the government” (Erdbrink, 2005), and defines this occupation as that of “journopoliti-cians”. Members of the government are journalists and journalists are politicians. This is confirmed by Hossein Shahidi in his book Journalism in Iran (2007). He writes that managers or senior editors receive daily telephone calls from the Ministry of Information about what they should or should not publish (Shahidi, 2007). Both Shahidi and Erdbrink argue that agendas of newspapers are set by politicians who are neither objective nor

in-dependent, but who are heads of staff. They both portray the Iranian journalists of having tight relationships with either the government or other powerful elites.

Besides these political links, their low income makes Iranian journalists depen-dent on commercial parties (Shahidi, 2007). An anonymous journalist from Iran describes in the Nieman Reports Iran - can its stories be told (Anonymous, 2009) that the income of a good journalist is so meagre that they are forced to compromise on their professiona-lism. He remembers many times that his coworkers planted favourable reporting in their pieces about businesses or goods to get extra money (Anonymous, 2009, p. 8).

With the dissemination of the Internet in Iran, a new way of mass media commu-nication arrived and thus a new public entered the political arena. The Internet became immensely popular among individuals who started their own gazette or weblog. This new, easily accessible mass communication technique gave a new group access to the information field. Since the arrival of the Internet “individuals and organisations can un-dermine the state’s claims to power and assertions of legitimacy as soon as they are made, using the same technologies and often in the same virtual locations” (Akhavan, 2013, p. 112).

Seen at the level of individual journalists, journalism in Iran appears to be a high-ly dependent profession in three ways: (i) Iranian journalists have historicalhigh-ly been parti-san. They are affiliated with either the ruling elite or its opposition. (ii) Political propa-ganda seems to be the first purpose of journalism. However it is not easy to divide the journalists in clear groups of authorities and dissidents. The oppositional groups are “no-toriously factionalized, and shifts occur regularly but unpredictably” (Akhavan, 2013). (iii) Besides dependency on the state, journalists write for business partners to generate more income.

News routines

The same anonymous journalist in the Nieman Reports of 2009 writes about the routines of his colleagues. Unpartisan publication is possible at this level of influences, argues the source. Despite being servant to the highest ruling elites – “Whatever is written should prove that you are a strong believer in the ruling establishment and you see eye to eye with the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei” (Anonymous, 2009) – journalists who

consider their work ‘pluralistic’ and ‘independent’ can be found. This can be best descri-bed as a political authoritarian state with pockets of pluralism (Milani & McFaul, 2015). In these pockets, according to the anonymous journalist, a ‘neutral’ press can emerge: “by taking advantage of the dichotomy of so-called reformist and conservative camps” one can act as a journalist with impartiality (Anonymous, 2009, p. 8). While being recog-nised as a sympathiser of the supreme leader Khamenei you can also “criticize the in-cumbent government” (Anonymous, 2009, p. 8).

The anonymous journalist defines a good journalist as: “a person who can say what he means in a way that the friends (audience) can get the point and the enemies (censors and pressure groups) miss the point” (Anonymous, 2009, p. 8). But without gi-ving any examples, it is not very clear what the source means. This broadcasting or prin-ting messages ‘between the lines’ may be undermining an authority, but this does not need to make journalism into an unpartisan occupation.

Ultimately, journalism can be independent in news routines by producing pluralis-tic stories. This means letting opposing sides speak at the same time without taking sides.

Organisation

Deeply rooted in the Iranian society is the concept of press as state gazette. Journalism in Iran started as a print with news about and from state officials. The mission of news and journalism organisations was to counter “lies” of rival foreign states and domestic ene-mies (Amin, 2015, p. 271). According to scholars, this political partisan goal of the press has not changed after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. After the monarchy was over-thrown, the Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini preserved the national radio and televi-sion station and renamed it Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). In the Islamic Republic Constitution of 1979, the Revolutionary Leaders decided that the IRIB should be in line with Revolutionary Ideals and promote Islamic culture, avoiding anti-Islamic threads. In 1983, the IRIB was given monopoly and anyone who started their own televi-sion or radio station would be prosecuted (Shahidi, 2010, p. 95).

Other state officials who wish to work with, influence, or own media have to re-sort to the written press. Newspapers are therefor often used to promote specific econo-mic, political, and cultural agendas of various factions (Khiabany, 2010, p. 135). At the

organisational level it becomes visible that news and journalism are an expansion of the political arena. As stated by Shahidi (2010) and Erdbrink (2005): politicians sit on top of the newspapers and decide their agendas.

At this level of analyses it also becomes understandable what the disruption of ICT can do. Recent development of the Internet worldwide gave many an opportunity to enter into public debate online. With less dependency on government subsidies and per-mits, online publications can be created by individuals in every corner of the country. They do not have to own expensive machines and invest in a distributing channel. And at the same time they have virtually endless space, able to deliver their product right into the public’s mobile devices.

But what is seen by optimists like Schroeder or proponents of multiple journa-lism as “liberation technology” others argue has not delivered its promises. Both perspec-tives have merit. Liberation technology is “any form of information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and economic freedom” (Diamond, 2010, p. 70). This includes the computer, the Internet, mobile phones and their countless innovative applications including new social media. It is a decentralised technology that has the ability to connect a large number of people very quickly. In sharp contrast with radio and television, this new technology is a multi-form method of communication and is well suited for grassroots organisations. It has the potential for individual users to speak to thousands of people at the same time, and thus challenge authorities. However, the Iranian government has strict control over all liberation technologies. It has acquired impressive technological capabilities to filter and control the Internet, and to identify and punish dissidents (Diamond, 2010). Such media can only exist legally if accepted by the state.

The information published outside Iran develops very much like former technolo-gical innovations did. It is mainly used by dissidents and oppositional parties of the state. Erdbrink explains that it is naive to think of Iranian journalists or news platforms working outside the country as neutral or independent. These initiatives are “political debates out-side the Iranian political arena”. Sources inout-side Iran do not dare to talk about opinions opposing the state.

To summarise the first three levels of hierarchy — the state is present in many aspects of journalism. It is indirectly involved in the press being historically partisan and institutionalised; journalists can find freedom of speech in a pluralistic approach but find their limits when writing about subjects like the Islamic Revolution and its leaders. At an organisational level, the broadcasting companies and some newspapers openly belong to the state and are under direct influence of the leading elite. At this level the state influen-ce is directly visible, owning the broadcasting institutions on television and radio and holding a tight grip on newspapers and online media. This becomes even more explicit at the extra-media level of analyses.

Extra-media

All of the Iranian state’s power is clustered at the highest level of the ruling elite — na-mely, the Supreme Leader, nowadays Ali Khamenei. To enforce his power a legitimisati-on is anchored in the Clegitimisati-onstitutilegitimisati-on. The Supreme Leader ‘allows’ and recognises political participation, but “he keeps an ultimate veto for the ruling clergy on the basis that the sovereignty belongs not to the people but to God, and in reality to representatives [such as the Supreme leader] and the guardians of his will” (Khiabany, 2010, p. 157). In the state’s interest is the propagation of a certain type of Islam defined as a national ‘culture,’ which the ruling elite has actively subscribed to since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

The country’s freedom of the press is arranged similarly to the freedom of politi-cal participation. In general, it can be said that in Iran there is freedom of publication un-til it harms the ideologies of the Islamic Republic. As is written in The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979): “the freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts in the Radio and Television of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be guaranteed in keeping with the Islamic criteria and the best interests of the country” (Khiabany, 2010, p. 141). Because the Revolutionary Islamic criteria is guarded by the ruling clergy, the press has some external responsibility to the electorate but their responsibility ulti-mately is to the Supreme Leader.

Personal intervention of the supreme leader, the ultimate power in Iran, has not by any means been rare (Khiabany, 2010). Governmental institutions do so not only by

cen-soring the media, but also expanding, regulating, and subsidising, as well as owning its infrastructure. Because of this system, the press in Iran cannot be seen as the ‘fourth esta-te’ or a ‘watchdog’ as in Europe's ideal press; rather, the media is part of the political structure and power in which it is placed.

Besides legal power, the state also has economic advantages. Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has directly owned and operated hundreds of state-owned enterprises. Since ’79, the state has nationalised many companies, including those within mass communication. The state, therefor, is the only media mogul in Iran.

Khiabany states that future perspectives are not towards a press independent from the state. First of all, the risk of producing a newspaper in a country with little to no his-tory in democracy and open access to information is not an attractive prospect for the private sector. Second, newspaper entrepreneurs not only have to acquire expensive ma-chines for printing, but also lack proper distribution networks such as rail, roads, and on-line infrastructure. Third, it is difficult to publish viable and credible newspapers in a country with no political and social accountability and transparency (Khiabany 2010, p. 88).

In contrast, all of these difficulties are no major concern for the state, which has access to institutions and governmental departments. Press linked with governmental institutions has economic, technical, and infrastructural benefits. For example, Hamshahri, — owned by the Tehran Mayor’s Office and therefore closely linked to the highest ruling elites — and The Islamic Republic News Agency — the state’s official news agency — get 60 percent of the subsidies out of foreign exchange facilities. Kayan and Ettela’at, two state newspapers under supervision of the Supreme Leader, have their own modern printing press. Hamshahri holds the only license for full colour advertising — a unique selling point, as most newspapers are sold precisely because of Hamshari’s colourful advertisement pages (Anonymous, 2013, p. 8; Shahidi, 2006, p. 3; and “Why finding a flat in Tehran is as hard as in London and NYC”, 2015).

Besides the advertisement revenue, a major source of income for these enterprises is sales at kiosks. This source is also dominated by the State. Governmental newspapers keep their price as low as possible, which makes for difficult competition. Other players could compete by choosing the most controversial and sensitive political subjects, or

pu-blishing sensational and popular entertainment, in order to keep the numbers of sales high. But both areas are sensitive and may lead to forced closure for a lack of political or moral sense. Therefore, according to Khiabany, there are no viable alternatives for priva-te prinpriva-ted newspapers to compepriva-te with government-relapriva-ted newspapers at the kiosks (Khiabany, 2010, p. 89).

Ideological

The meaning of ideology in Iranian journalism can be traced by some historical debates in the newspaper industry. First is the ideal of a state gazette:

“Newspaper” means attracting the special attention of the government. And “journalist” means the protector of the government’s affairs. “Newspaper” means the government’s voice. And “journalist” means the trusted servant and keeper of the government’s secrets. (Kermani (1877) in: Amin 2015, p. 274)

With this statement, literary critic Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani defined journalists in 1877 as state servants. He belonged to the first generation of journalists working in the Persian monarchy. Starting with this quote, Amin sketches a history of the media (between 1870 and 1940) with a highly partisan press and broadcasting. The ruling monarchy used the mass media for propaganda and forbade dissidents to publish or broadcast. People with oppositional opinions were forced to move outside the country where they founded newspapers and broadcasting agencies to compete with the ruling elite in Iran. Thus, from the beginning of mass media in Iran, the media became a tool to spread interests of politicians. This can still be seen today. All television and radio stations are in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and under control of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. According to the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, these media must be used as a tool to “serve the diffusion of Islamic culture” and must “strictly refrain from diffusion and propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic practices” (Khiabani, 2010: 138). Similar to the radio and television, this makes working as a servant of the state’s propaganda an ideal of the press.

This press as state propaganda is not the only ideal expressed in Iran. Another ideal is similar to the Western ideal of the press: journalism as independent from the sta-te. Shahidi gives an example of an expression of this ideal in the now closed newspaper

Ayandegan. This daily was forced to close because it put itself on the wrong side of the ruling elite: the paper published an interview in which Khomeini had expressed his desire to remain a member of the clergy and to keep his distance from politics. With this messa-ge, the newspaper tapped into a discussion about the role of the clergy in the system. The ruling elite reacted by labelling the paper as Zionist and Communist. The paper respon-ded with the publication of a symbolic newspaper. Four pages, three of which were emp-ty, whose last page contained a text that said:

It is the duty of a journalist to put the people in the picture and keep them informed of what is going on, not to sweeten everything or present it as divine guidance, so that no one knows exactly what and how bad the probable ills of the people are. (Khiabani, 2010, p. 157)

Ayandegan was the first of hundreds of newspapers that had to close because the regime labelled them as dangerous for the Islamic Republic. This trend reveals a certain consci-ence of the occupation of journalism as an independent informer for the Iranian public. But as is shown by the closing down of Ayandegan and many other newspapers since then, this ideal has little reality in Iran’s media industry.

Shahidi argues that despite the suppression of the press, the profession has matu-red and, after more than a century of toil, trouble, and struggle, is now successfully in-forming the public. What it means to be a journalist in Iran, Shahidi writes, is “to inform the public with the information that they need to find their own answers” (Shahidi, 2006, p. 27). This is also stated by the aforementioned anonymous source: what is meant can be found between the lines. Shahidi concludes that this information service offered by the press is the true task journalists see as their mission.

Method

Chapter 3: Three case studies

3.1 Multiple case study approach

There is more than one reason why a case study approach has been chosen as the method of research. First, the main question of this study is descriptive. Methodologists have suggested that these ‘what is’ or ‘what has happened?’ questions are best answered by studying one or more cases (Yin, 2012, p. 5). This would be so because answering such questions cannot be done from existing data. For instance, when learning about Iranian journalism start-ups, readers want to learn about what motivation drives entrepreneurs, in what conditions they work, and in what way enterprises are supported or restricted by regulations from the government. To address these subjects, the participants themselves and their direct day-to-day context have to be researched. Second, (English-language) literature about Iranian journalism start-ups is missing. Thus, this gap has to be filled in by primary fieldwork. Third, the case study research method is defined by Robert K. Yin as an empirical inquiry that investigates “a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a ‘case’), set within its real-world context - especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2012, p. 4). This description fits start-ups in Iran rather well. As shown in the first two chapters, ups worldwide and journalism start-ups in Iran in particular are a contemporary development. Also, the relationship between start-ups and their context is not clear. For example, Iran’s external sanctions and the internal filtering of the Internet have various impacts on the running of start-ups. Case studies can explore these larger influences in ‘local’ circumstances. The aim of these case studies are to connect the macro-level with the micro-levels of analysis, thus gaining a better understanding from both perspectives.

Literature analyses

In this thesis, the literature about SMEs worldwide and journalism in Iran has been ana-lysed in two steps. Firstly before the period of collecting data, and secondly after that

period. For example, Christopher Schroeder’s book about entrepreneurs in the Middle East helped in defining the topics of the questionnaires used for open-ended interviews. Also, the geographical and cultural difference of Iran and my own Dutch background demands adopting some theoretical perspectives before the fieldwork. Nonetheless, in the second phase, after the visit to Iran, the theory has been rewritten and expanded. This is done with the aim of providing a deeper understanding of Iranian society.

Case selection

This paper’s research started with finding suitable cases to study. A suitable case was defined as a starting SME in the media sector, not older than five years. As discussed in the first chapter, a case did not have to be specifically a news or journalism start-up. The concept of media I follow is from Hoag & Seo (2005) who accept new (social) media as part of this sector. Revivals or renewals of a major organization was treated as suitable cases, as well as start-ups that discovered a new way of distributing media content or were starting a whole new outlet. To locate these cases, I researched via e-mail with a snowball method. I first e-mailed acquaintances in Iran whom I had met during a summer holiday there in 2014, asking if they knew journalists in Iran who could help in finding “entrepreneurial journalism and/ or media start-ups in Iran”. In the e-mails, I referred to Schroeder’s article about the entrepreneurial boom in Iran (Schroeder, 2014), as well as the Multiple Journalism website to show some examples from around the world. I corre-sponded with thirteen Iranian journalists and professionals working in the media industry in total, and with two Iranians working with entrepreneurs. Interestingly, two persons claimed there are no journalism or news start-ups in Iran. One wrote:

Unfortunately, I don't know any promising start ups in the field of media in Iran. Actually, I think it is so hard to expect that under a totallitarian [sic] regime, media can do their globally-defined job. (e-mail, 12 August, 2014)

This answer corresponds with Deuze’s analysis that researchers often write about journal-ism as if it is a consensually defined job. However, Deuze argues, there is a lack of inter-national consensus about the key theory and methods of the profession. The “globally-defined job” the respondent was writing about is an occupational ideology. The corre-spondent concludes that, in the totalitarian regime of Iran, this ideology does not have a

reality. Weaver’s study concludes that most journalists in elective democracies speak of shared values (Deuze, 2005). This respondent, currently living in Norway, clearly be-longs to this group.

Other contacts who live in Iran proposed several companies working in the media sector. They mentioned: a blog about technology and health (1pezeshk4), an online kiosk for newspapers (Jaaar5), a news analysis service (Newshub6), news aggregation services (Hypermedia7, DAKKE8), a news application builder, and a video streaming website called Aparat9_{. One more suggestion sent via Twitter to professor Deuze was the}

Finan-cial Tribune,10 _{a financial daily newspaper publishing in English. The last start-up}

ad-vised as a case for this research was Peivast, a recently started monthly magazine.11 _This

recommendation came from a speaker at the Iran Web & Mobile Conference during the 15th and 16th of June, 2015, in Tehran.

Out of all these suggestions I chose three cases, each active in different fields of the Iranian media industry and representing three different perspectives on media and journalism innovation in Iran. First is Jaaar, an online newspaper kiosk working in the infrastructure of news delivering. Second, Peivast, a classic monthly magazine about news in ICT. Aparat is the third case — a streaming website that is not strictly working in news and journalism, but as a platform for publicly generated video like YouTube. Ob-serving different types of start-ups allows me to track developments in organisations whose founders have varying backgrounds, strategies, and tactics. These perspectives taken together give a representation of what is involved with starting and running a jour-nalism start-up in Iran. As evidence, this thesis uses a textual database with the transcrip-tions of semi-structured interviews.

4_{http://1pezeshk.com/} 5_{http://www.jaaar.com} 6_{http://newshub.ir/} 7_{http://www.hypermedia.ir/} 8_{https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/dkh/id844095531?mt=8} 9 http://www.aparat.com/ 10_{http://financialtribune.com/} 11 _{http://peivast.com/}

Informants

All three start-ups were reached by e-mail. In the first contact, I asked for interviews with the staff and if it was possible to visit the companies for some days. This was accompa-nied by a letter signed by professor Mark Deuze [[see: Appendix D Project Iran Journal-ism start-ups]. All start-ups declined my request for an extensive research period with multiple visits, interviews with all staff members, and document research. Therefor, I chose to research more than one case by doing extensive interviews. Jaaar agreed to meet for an interview in a restaurant with three members of their staff. At my request, the CEO and head of the software department accompanied the PR-chief. Peivast invited me to their office for two interview sessions, both with one of the founders who is now editor-in-chief. Aparat agreed to have an interview at their office with their PR-chief.

3.2 Questionnaire topics

The semi-structured interviews were held with a topic list set up prior to the dialogue. The topic list was provided by Mark Deuze with the aim of collecting comparative data on journalism start-ups worldwide. Topics of discussion were: (1) genesis of the start-up, (2) people involved, (3) revenue model, (4) motives, (5) goals, and (6) start-up ecosys-tem.

Genesis of the start-up

Addressing the genesis of start-ups provides knowledge about the context and ideologies in which the businesses began. Original goals might have changed and prior assumptions have been tested.

People involved

To understand what occupational groups are forming in journalism start-ups and the na-ture of their mutual relations, people involved in the start-ups are addressed. The back-ground, loans, and tasks of employees are explored.

Location

Where are the start-ups situated? The locations of a company reveals information about its goals, networks, and need of physical representation in the city. When founders decid-ed where their office would be, they may take factors into account such as the rent or mortgage, the neighbours, the neighbourhood, or the visibility and accessibility.

Revenue model

Start-ups need to establish a durable income to pay for their costs and invest in growth. Establishing a business model can require a variety of financial approaches. This subject gives insight into the different revenue streams of start-ups and the economic resources with which they build their enterprise.

Motives

Overall motives of the start-ups, articulated by PR-managers or CEOs, can differ from individual motives. For comparison with Western ideas, I asked the respondents to elabo-rate on similarities and differences of motivations to begin start-ups in Iran compared to Western countries.

Goals

I asked respondents to evaluate their original goals addressed in the genesis of the start-up. Did the start-ups meet their goals, why (not), and how did they reach these goals?

Start-up ecosystem

To define ‘ecosystem’ I use Moore’s definition of an ‘economic ecosystem’: “an eco-nomic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and individuals – the organisms of the business world” (Moore, 1996, p. 26). Several organisations are directly or indirectly involved with the start-ups. Directly involved are investors, legal juridical advisors, start-up coaches, start-up accelerators and events, and governmental organisations. Indirectly involved are environmental conditions such as Internet compa-nies and money transfer networks. With this subject I try to understand how different organisations interact within a start-up ecosystem.

Interviews

All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed with a topic list. The second interview with Peivast was recorded on camera and used for a publication on the website Multiple Journalism. This interview was also transcribed and can be found in the appen-dix, together with the transcriptions of the other interviews.

3.3 Set-up of the interviews

Prior to the interview with Jaaar, I asked twice if we could have a meeting at the compa-ny’s office. This would serve the purpose of allowing me to study the working environ-ment. However, their PR-chief rejected this proposal via e-mail. He wrote that the office was too busy at the moment to have a meeting: “Frankly it's our busy season now and on top of that we're doing some maintenance in our offices so I think it's better to have our meeting in a coffee shop or somewhere. (Paravarpishe, Pedram. “Re: Research project on entrepreneurial media/journalism.” Message to author. 10 February, 2014. E-mail.)

My first meeting with Jaaar was on the first day of the Startup Conference in Teh-ran, on February 15th, 2015. The PR-chief texted me and asked to meet in front of the building, during a break. There I met the PR-chief and the CEO of Jaaar, who were visit-ing the conference because their company was selected for an award for most promisvisit-ing media start-up. And eventually, Jaaar won.

Outside the main entrance, I found both of them standing in the sun. The PR-chief started introducing himself and said Jaaar was honoured to be the subject of research. He said they would do everything to help with the study. I asked why they did not want to meet at the office and explained it was in my interest to see in what conditions the com-pany and its employees were working. As soon as I asked this, the PR-chief lowered his eyes and turned his head left and right to look behind him. I realised then I might have crossed a red line, unbeknownst to me, regarding which subjects I could openly discuss and which I should not mention in public. He looked again at me, smiled and said, “We will see what we can do”. We shook hands and they promised to arrange a meeting.