“Their Battle”
A Study on the United Nations’ Work During and After the Bosnian-Herzegovinian War.
Name: Roos Hélène Bergers
Student number: 5881013
Supervisor: Dr. Uğur Üngör Second reader:
Submission date: 2 June 2014
Table of Contents
Acknowledgement 3
Introduction 4
Current state of research The United Nations System
Conflict forecasting and resolution
6 9 12
1. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 19
1.1. Historical background of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 20 1.2. The presence of UNPROFOR in war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 -
1995
28 1.3. Assessment of the Security Council and UNPROFOR 1992 – 1995 38
2. Dutchbat and Srebrenica 40
2.1. Background of Srebrenica 40
2.2. The presence of Dutchbat in Srebrenica 46
2.3. The fall of Srebrenica 50
2.4. Assessment of Dutchbat in Srebrenica 57
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Background, cases and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population
61 3.1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 62
3.2. The case of Slobodan Miloševic 69
3.3. The case of Naser Oric 75
3.4. The ICTY and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population 80
Conclusion 86
Bibliography 90
Acknowledgement
This thesis would have not come into being without the support and input of the following people:
I would like to express my very great appreciation and offer my special thanks to my supervisor Dr. Uğur Üngör. I am grateful for the insightful and inspiring
conversations, the encouragement and patience.
I would like to offer my thanks to the NIOD teaching staff for their interesting and inspiring lectures that sparked my interest in the topic and made the Master Holocaust and Genocide Studies a very successful academic experience.
I would like to thank H.E. Ms. Mirsada Čolakovic, ambassador of the permanent mission of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations, for providing me with insightful answers during the interview.
I would like to thank my friends for listening to me talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina on and on and I would like to give my special thanks to Franzi, Tess, Lukas and Lenette for their support and help while writing this thesis.
Finally, last but not least, I would like to thank my parents and sisters who always listened, supported and motivated me throughout my academic journey.
Introduction
In his An Agenda for Peace, the former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced that the United Nations would play a significant role in conflict resolution all over the globe. He was full of optimism due to the end of the Cold war and the successes in the Gulf War of 1990 – 1991.1 In 1992, when war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations agreed to send troops to the Sarajevo area and airport. From that moment on, the United Nations became increasingly involved in the war.
Unfortunately, the optimism of the United Nations was misplaced as the war escalated through the years. The Blue Helmets faced a mandate that continuously changed, but never gave them enough liberty to properly intervene in atrocities taking place. Moreover, they were ordered to remain neutral, which thoroughly complicated matters. Meanwhile, the international community was shocked due to the ongoing atrocities. The media, scholars and the Bosnian population have criticized the performance of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mothers of Srebrenica have sued both the Dutch government and former Dutchbat commander Thom Karremans multiple times; even nine years after the end of the war.2 They seek justice for the great injustice they had faced. This thesis is a contribution to the debate on the role of the United Nations during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The key points addressed are the work of the Security Council, UNPROFOR and the ICTY. Despite the involvement of many other United Nations departments during the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war, the emphasis is on these three agencies because of their comprehensive involvement. Moreover, the Security Council’s policies for UNPROFOR often mismatched and are therefore a rather interesting subject of research. The emphasis on the ICTY is due to its role in trying war criminals and its effect on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population.
This thesis is comprised of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The section below entails a foundation for the following chapters, by explaining the historiography of the topic, the organization of the United Nations and defining 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (New York, 1992) http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
2 Mirjam Remie, Nederlandse staat vandaag voor de rechter voor Srebrenica. [Today, Dutch state to court because of Srebrenica.] NRC. 7 April 2014
conflict, indicators, accelerators and the differences between the several types of peacekeeping. The indicators and accelerators of conflict serve as a tool in explaining what went wrong during the years of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war. The first chapter provides an assessment of the historical background that led to the wars in the countries of Former Yugoslavia and thus Bosnia-Herzegovina. A brief background on Former Yugoslavia is presented, as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be properly understood without it. Furthermore, it analyzes the role of UNPROFOR and the Security Council from 1992 – 1995. In doing so, the ever-changing involvement of the United Nations can be explored, the similarities and differences in the peacekeeping mission can be pinpointed and the work of UNPROFOR and the Security Council can be evaluated.
The second chapter elaborates on the security situation and presence of Canbat and Dutchbat in Srebrenica. However, the focus will mostly be on Dutchbat. Because the fall of Srebrenica is the most widely known critized atrocity of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must be included in this thesis. The chapter analyzes the security situation in Srebrenica, before and during the time the enclave was a safe area. This will allow drawing a conclusion whether the safe area policy was indeed effective, and if it relieved people’s suffering. Moreover, the events that led to the fall of Srebrenica are analyzed, to enhance the understanding of how it could happen and what Dutchbat’s role was. Furthermore, the work of Dutchbat will be analyzed.
The third chapter highlights the work of the ICTY while providing a background of the organization, evaluating the cases of Slobodan Miloševic and Naser Oric and reviewing the potential effects of the ICTY on the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The cases of Miloševic and Oric are analyzed because it will contribute to a deeper look inside the work of the ICTY. Furthermore, Miloševic and Oric differ in background, which makes it a more varied comparison. Finally, the potential effects of the ICTY on the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina are considered. The aim of analyzing the effects are to present an as complete as possible image of the role of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the beginning of the war up to the present.
The final part of the study entails a conclusion in which the findings lead to the answering of the key question: “How is the performance of the Security Council,
Dutchbat and the ICTY during and after the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war to be evaluated?” The research is conducted in a qualitative manner as it draws its
conclusion from the data.3 Moreover, it implies that the outcome of the situation is
rather due to interactions between people than that it is an outcome of something separate.4 In other words, the war was rather an outcome of processes and interactions
of individuals within Former Yugoslavia, than that it merely erupted out of thin air. The design of the thesis is a case study, as the involvement of three departments of one organization during one event are analyzed.5 Although the ICTY effectively came
into operation after the war, it can not be seen separate from one event: the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The answers are deducted by analyzing existing literature on the several topics while combining this data with primary sources such as resolutions of the Security Council, reports of the United Nations, newspaper articles, pictures, videoclips and the survey of the Dutch parliament.
Current State of Research
This section explores the historiography of the themes in this thesis (the wars in former Yugoslavia 1992 - 1995, the narrative and role of the United Nations in Srebrenica and the functioning of the ICTY in the aftermath). In doing so, it is easier to determine in which scholarly debate this thesis belongs. The literature on the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war is ever growing as its history is still relatively young and continuing research is conducted on this topic. The large media coverage, the journals, the investigations of the ICTY, the work of scholars all over the globe and other sources provide a large amount of information on this period in time.
The course of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia are inter alia described in “Yugoslavia and its demise”6, “Handbook former Yugoslavia”7,“Balkan babel, The Desintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević”8 and “Thinking about Yugoslavia: scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the 3 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 366. 4 Ibid., 366.
5 Ibid., 52.
6 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia, a history of its demise. (New York: Routledge, 1999)
7 Direction Operation Royal Land Forces, Handbook Former Yugoslavia, (The Hague: KL Crisisstaf, Ochtendblad, 1994)
8 Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel, The Desintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002)
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo”.9 These books mostly describe the events that followed from the end of the 1980s onwards, and pinpoint several roots that may have caused the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A few examples of what triggered the disintegration are the rise of ethnic-nationalist leadership, the desire to carve a greater Serbia out of the disintegrated states, and other states like Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina competed for self-determination.
A far more important debate for this thesis is the one about the action and inaction of the international community during the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war. The debate is mostly on whether the international community should have taken more and/or other actions to end the war much sooner and consequently prevent many of the atrocities committed. This debate is important, because the United Nations operated as part of the international community. Especially the debate on the prevention of the genocide in Srebrenica has been elaborated on in the literature. The United Nations have reviewed their performance during this war in several publications. In “The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping10” the United Nations mostly describe the resolutions that were passed and which actions were taken. A more critical review comes from authors such as Rosalyn Higgins, whom criticizes the inconsistent and weak mandate that resulted in troubles for the peacekeeping forces.11
Considering the literature on Srebrenica, the United Nations asses in the “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica12” their role, and show a more critical point of view while also defending their actions. It is perhaps not surprising that an actual survivor of the Srebrenica genocide wrote an entirely different book: Hasan Nuhanovic, a interpreter for Dutchbat and survivor of the Srebrenica genocide, criticizes the work of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in his book: “Under the UN flag, the
9 Sabrina Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 305. 10 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. (New York: United Nations publication, 1996)
11Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia." International Affairs 69:3 (1993)
international community and the Srebrenica genocide”13 He is not cautious in his negative assessment of the performance of Dutchbat.
The extensive report of the NIOD “Hoofdrapport: Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area”14 is a very important addition. They pinpoint several failures of the United Nations, with a clear context that gives a better understanding of the situation. For example, the report states that the troops of Dutchbat were not able to stop the Serbian troops inter alia due to the Dutch being poorly equipped and trained. It does not justify the situation per se, however it does give a better understanding of how it could happen. This report is extensively used in the second chapter, due to its unmatched quality and quantity of content.
Moreover, books like “The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia. Limits to Diplomacy and Force”15 and “Srebrenica, record of a war crime”16 provide the narrative on what happened in Srebrenica and give a concise timeframe for the events. The Security Council resolutions compliment the narratives by offering insightful analysis, because it allows to compare the factual situation on the ground and the decisions of the Security Council. Furthermore, it provides possibilities to illuminate miscommunications, misunderstandings, misinterpretations or just downright mismatches between the headquarters and the experiences of the workers in the field.
The resolutions remain a key element throughout this thesis, as the resolutions that concern the ICTY are important as well. The question that arises in connection to the ICTY comes down to the functioning of the institution and the effect it has on the society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, does it a play a role in reconciliation? When looking at the first element and connecting it to the trial of Milošević, the
13 Hasan Nuhanovic, Under the UN flag: the international community and the Srebrenica genocide. (DES, 2007)
14 J. C. H. Blom, eds., Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area. [Srebrenica: A 'safe' area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a Safe Area.] (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Boom Uitgevers, 2002), 43.
15 Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia. (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994)
16 J.W. Honig & N. Both, Srebrenica, record of a war crime. (New York: Penguin books, 1996) 165.
books The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy17 and Madame Prosecutor18 reveal difficulties during the trial and the anti-climax outcome due to the death of Miloševic. The behavior and attitude of Miloševic posed a great problem, which Waters concluded as well.19 The functioning of the ICTY was put to the test by this trial.
However, some articles do consider the relative successes of the ICTY, such as the captures of Mladic and Karadžic. In this thesis the various aspects of the ICTY are considered, such as the captures but also the content and processes of the trials with a focus on the trials of Slobodan Miloševic and Naser Oric. Furthermore, the second element, reconsilliation, is considered. Articles like "Justice and peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal affects societal peace in Bosnia"20 and “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Developments towards a More Integrated State?”21 reveal that the trust in the ICTY is relatively low and in spite of the positive effects (such as removing perpetrators from a society to a court) has not promoted reconciliation sufficiently. To summarize, in this thesis, the various aspects of the complex war and mass atrocities will be considered in forming a conclusion on the work of the United Nations with an emphasis on the Security Council, UNPROFOR and the ICTY. The United Nations System
This part provides a broad overview of the United Nations and explains the main bodies and committees. This explanation is provided to reach a better understanding of the organization and why and how the different bodies and committees were involved in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and why their efforts could not avail.
The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 after the Second World War. To prevent a Third World War, fifty-one countries are committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among 17 Timothy William Waters, eds., The Milosevic Trial: An Autopsy. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013)
18 Carla del Ponte, Mevrouw de aanklager. [Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with humanity’s worst criminals and the culture of impunity.] (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2008) 19Waters, eds., The Milosevic Trial, 430.
20 James Meernik, "Justice and peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal affects societal peace in Bosnia," Journal of Peace Research 42, 3 (2005)
21 Florian Bieber, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Developments towards a More Integrated State?”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 22, 1 (2002)
nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights.22 The organization grows almost annually, nowadays a 193 countries are member of the United Nations.23 The UN is comprised of many bodies and committees of which the main bodies are the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Tusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.
The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative organ of the UN. Decisions on important questions require a two-third majority. These questions are, for example, on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters. Other questions only need a simple majority. Moreover, each country is allowed to give one vote. There are a number of councils, panels, and working groups, committees, boards, and commissions within the General Assembly.
The Security Council is formally equal to other principal bodies of the UN and is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.24 The Security Council has four main functions:
1. Investigating disputes or situations that (might) lead to international conflict 2. Recommending terms and methods of settlement
3. Recommending actions against aggression or threats
4. Recommending who should be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations25
The Security Council evolved into the most powerful forum.26 The decisions of the Security Council are binding to all member states and to a degree on other states as well. The Security Council has five permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States. Next to these permanent members they have ten non-permanent members. States that are not in the Security Council may participate in debates when the topic affects this particular state, but they are not eligible to vote. During the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war, the elected non-permanent members of the Security Council were:
22 United Nations, “About the UN” http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml 23 United Nations, “Member States” http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml
24 Thomas G. Weiss & and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 117.
25 United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations at a Glance. (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 2012), 27.
1991 -1992 1992 – 1993 1993 – 1994 1994 - 1995
Austria Cabo Verde Brazil Czech
Republic
Belgium Hungary Djibouti Nigeria
Ecuador Japan New Zealand Oman
India Morocco Pakistan Rwanda
Zimbabwe Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Spain Argentina
27
The Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) is concerned with the economic, social and environmental challenges of the world. This council was established in 1946 and since then, issues alike are discussed and debated in the council. Their task is to provide policy recommendations on the above issues. They have broad responsibility for some seventy percent of the human and financial recourses of the United Nations system (including fourteen agencies, nine functional commissions and five regional commissions).28
It is interesting that the United Nations still perceives the trusteeship council as one of their main bodies, because it has suspended its operations as of 1 November 1994. They have not operated since then, because the last trust territory – Palau – became independent on 1 October 1994. They do not meet annually anymore.29 The Trusteeship Council was closely linked to the Security Council, Weiss even calls them overlapping.30 The main goals of the Council were to promote the advancement of the citizens of Trust Territory and their development towards self-government and/or independence.31
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the judicial body of the United Nations. It was established right after the Second World War in 1945, by the Charter of the United Nations and began operating in 1946. It is the only main body that is not located in New York but in The Hague. The role of the Court is to settle legal disputes in accordance with international law and provide advice on legal questions. The Court 27 United Nations, “Elected non-permanent members of the Security Council.” 21 May 2014 http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp
28 United Nations, “About the UN” http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/index.shtml 29 United Nations, “Trusteeship Council” http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/ 30 Thomas G. Weiss & and Sam Daws, eds. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 117.
has 15 judges whom are elected for terms of nine years by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The ICJ is the only international court with general subject matter jurisdiction, therefore it has an important symbolic value.32 However, states often refuse to submit to its jurisdiction or comply with the court’s judgments.
At last, the Secretariat keeps itself occupied with day-to-day work of the whole organization. It services all of the other principal bodies of the UN and administers the programs and policies laid down by them.33 A clear chart of the United Nations system is included in the appendix.
Conflict forecasting and resolution
This section provides a short and tentative analysis of how conflict can be forecasted and thus potentially be prevented before catastrophe strikes. However, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the past, therefore in this thesis we analyze conflict to pinpoint what went wrong. Intertwined are the different types of peacekeeping and an explanation of what types should be put into practice in times of pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. This framework will be of assistance in the following chapter, as to determine whether there were early signals of conflict and whether the unfolding mass violence that subsequently erupted could have been identified sooner. Of course, in hindsight one cannot determine with certainty whether such conflict could have been prevented, because different courses of actions lead to different (re)actions which could be better, worse, or about the same as the events that actually happened. In spite of this fact, it is still worthwhile to analyze, because it does provide a better understanding of what went wrong.
Conflict is defined by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups.34 The conditions of a conflict escalating in a full scale war are identified by Suganami as being: the capacity of human beings to kill members of their species, a sufficient prevalence of the belief among a number of societies, particular the states, that there are circumstances under which it is their function to resort to arms against one another and in doing so demand the cooperation 32 Eric Posner, “The Decline of the International Court of Justice.” John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 233 (2004), 1.
33 United Nations, “Secretariat” http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/secretariat/
34 Hugh Miall & Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., Contemporary conflict resolution. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 26.
of society members and the absence from the international system of a perfectly effective anti-war device.35
Although these conditions are not sufficient, they do play a role in a variety of conflict situations and thus reveal resemblance. Moreover, due to the unpredictable human decision-making process a system of foresight is not likely to grant fixed results.36 However, in theory there is enough knowledge on conflict situations to justify an early and appropriate response to the unfolding situation.
This knowledge has been gathered throughout the years; the concept is not a new idea. Even in 1815 it was a prominent theme during the Congress of Vienna, which lay the first foundation for peaceful measures during times of conflict. Since then, many researchers, academics and organizations have kept themselves occupied with analyzing and developing conflict prevention mechanisms. The United Nations is involved in the matter as well, Chapter VI and VII authorizes the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and the Security Council to settle and prevent conflict.37 The importance of conflict prevention is noticeable in other international policies too, inter alia the World Bank, The European Union, developmental agencies, other non-governmental organizations are engaged in conflict prediction and prevention. Due to the relevance of conflict prevention, this section will explain key elements of forecasting (potential) conflict and the policies of the United Nations related to conflict prevention and resolution.
When aiming to prevent a conflict, it is important to understand what factors should be taken into consideration when forecasting the potential outbreak of a conflict. After all, one needs to forecast a conflict in order to prevent it. The factors that indicate potential conflict can be analyzed through structural and events data.38 Structural data entails information that is slowly changing and provides a background on elements such as the expansion of the military, human rights, the financial situation and so on.39 Events data entails the information of specific events that reveal the stability of a country such as the outbreak of violence. The monitoring of political interactions is key to this type of data. 40 Within these types of data we can find 35 H. Suganami, On the causes of war. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 62.
36 Miall, & Ramsbotham, eds., Contemporary conflict resolution. 114. 37 United Nations, “Charter.” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
38 John L. Davies & Ted Robert Gurr, Preventive measures building Risk assessment and Crisis Early Warning System. (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1998) 47. 39 Ibid., 83.
indicators, which refers to measurements that describe the state and structure of a region. Indicators can be found in many ways, as for example in ideological and religious literature.41 It is important to identify indicators timely, as there is no use in seeking them when violence has already broken out. The indicators that Davies & Harff define as catalyst indicators are as followed:
1. Individuals and/or organizations criticize and/or attack another group and emphasize the seperateness of that group in terms of their language, religion or culture
2. Individuals and/or organizations gain support for claims of territory and/or recourses that belongs to another group
3. Individuals and/or organizations announce that another group “overwhelms” them
4. An event and/or date approaches that draws attention to the inequality and/or history
5. The group that raises the charges towards another group controls the police and military etcetera
6. The discipline and coherence of the military 7. The size of the military
8. The increase in purchase of weapons and the formation of irregular armed forces42
This type of indicator is especially relevant for this thesis, as violence did break out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by seeking catalyst indicators we can conclude whether the international community could have been aware of the atrocities unfolding. However, indicators are not static and can differ according to the situation.
Moreover, accelerators can be identified as well, these are events that occur in the pre-conflict stage and worsen situations.43 Accelerating events often occur a few weeks or days before the situation moves into an open conflict. Triggers however, are 41 John. G. Heidenrich, How to prevent genocide, a guide for policymakers, scholars and the concerned citizen. (Westport: Praeger Published, 2001), 75.
42 John L. Davies & Ted Robert Gurr, Preventive measures building. Risk assessment and Crisis Early Warning System.126.
43 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies.” Journal of Peace Research 35 (1998): 562.
those events that directly move the situation into an open conflict. Hence, the latter is difficult to predict as it directly leads to conflict. Thus, in forecasting a conflict we inter alia need to analyze data and look for indicators and accelerators that prove the formation of a conflict. This can help us answer the question: “Can the international community prevent this war?” as well as “Could the international community have prevented this war?” However, it is important to keep in mind that analyzing indicators and accelerators not necessarily lead to a correct conclusion in a hundred percent of the cases.
Of course, it is a complex process to acquire solid information on a country’s situation and when one retrieves the information, there is a large bulk of data to be analyzed and to be translated into warnings of potential conflict. To bring some order in this process, scholars, policy makers and organizations have developed early warning models in which they try to predict humanitarian disasters such as (violent) conflicts. Within the United Nations, inter alia the Department of Political Affairs keeps itself occupied with conflict prevention: “DPA monitors and assesses global political developments with an eye to detecting potential crises before they escalate, and devising effective responses.” 44
This department analyses information that they primarily retrieve from the work of their regional divisions. The monitors of their department provide the Secretary-General reports on “the status of UN Peacemaking efforts, activities of the political missions in the field and on global political development.”45 In other words, they gather information on the developments of a region and recommend proper steps to the Secretary-General. Of course when we look at the whole process of a conflict, from its origin to the resolution, many departments of the United Nations are occupied with the matter. The formulation of the mission, mandate and course of action depend on the stage and magnitude of the conflict.
The characteristics of the conflict dictate which course of action should be taken. The options are: prevention, peacemaking, peace keeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. There are two types of prevention: operational and structural. The first “aims to prevent situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict.”46 This type has been called “light” prevention as well. The 44 United Nations, “About the UN”
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview
45 Ibid., http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/overview 46 Miall & Ramsbotham, eds., Contemporary conflict resolution, 108.
measures of this type of prevention include diplomatic intervention, private mediating efforts and long-term missions. The second type, also called “deep” prevention, “aims to address the root causes, including underlying conflicts of interest and relationships.”47 Within societies this means engaging with several issues such as developmental, political and community relations.
Peacemaking means “moving towards a settlement of armed conflict, where conflict parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily, for example as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ (Article 33)”48 This part of Chapter IV explains that the disputing parties should first seek a peaceful solution through negotiation, conciliation and other means.49 When necessary, the Security Council plays a role in reaching an agreement by calling upon the parties to settle their dispute. Peacemaking is a stage in conflict that could still be settled by preventive diplomacy.
This term was first used in a report of former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960. Back then it referred to keeping conflicts localized.50 Later former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, who referred to the term as a policy that aims to prevent conflicts and escalations, redefined it. Boutros Ghali emphasized five measures, “confidence building, fact-finding missions, early warning networks, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones.” 51 Former UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan refined the practice and idea even more. His aim was to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.52
The stage of peacekeeping has been defined by the United Nations as “the use of multinational military forces, under United Nations command, to help control and resolve conflict between countries. Peacekeeping operations fulfill the role of a neutral third party that helps create and maintain ceasefires and form a buffer zone between warring groups.”53 Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse’s broaden this 47 Ibid., 108-109.
48 Ibid., 30.
49 United Nations, “Charter, Chapter 6”
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml
50 Alice Ackermann, "The idea and practice of conflict prevention." Journal of Peace Research, 40.3 (2003): 340.
51 Ibid., 340
52 Kofi Annan, “Plan to prevent genocide”
http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlantoPreventGenocide7 Apr2004.htm
definition and include policing, monitoring and supporting humanitarian intervention.54 Peacekeepers are in charge of maintaining order on the ground while mediators meet with leaders from the parties that are in conflict, to reach a (peaceful) solution. Peacekeeping includes both peacekeeping forces and observer missions. The latter is a non-armed mission while peacekeeping forces are allowed to carry light weaponry, which may be used in situations that require self-defense.55
Peacekeepers are expected to be neutral. A challenge with remaining neutral in a war zone is that the forces on the ground are subject to manipulation.56 All parties involved benefit from the delivery of goods and thus want to to be on the receiving end. Furthermore, actions taken by outsiders affect the balance of power, for example; relief goods are delivered to the group that is on the losing side of the conflict , which can lead to a violent reaction in the winning party, as they might feel angered, jealous, or simply undermined in their more successful war campaign again their enemy. Hence, impartiality is a difficult endeavor in times of violent conflict.
Peace enforcement involves, other than in the previous stages of conflict, intervention and the utilization of a variety of coercive measures. This includes the use of military force, which must be authorized by the Security Council.57 The term has been taken from former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali who wrote about it in an Agenda for Peace.58 The term peace enforcement has filled the gray area between full-scale enforcement and traditional peacekeeping. Although the former Secretary-General’s proposal entailed the enforcement of ceasefires, the term has come to be a definition for the operations of the UN that involve full-scale enforcement. The aim of peace enforcement is to make sure the situation is conform to the mandate of the Security Council or comply to the agreement that was signed by the parties involved.
Although peace enforcement requires an impartial attitude, the operation does not require consent of the involved disputing parties, which differs from peacekeeping operations.59 Peacebuilding is the final step, and means the assistance of countries and 54 Miall, & Ramsbotham, eds., Contemporary conflict resolution, 30.
55 United Nations, Department of Public Information, United Nations at a Glance, 98. 56 Harvey J. Langholtz eds., The psychology of peacekeeping. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 104.
57 United Nations, “Peacekeeping operations”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml
58 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An agenda for peace” http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439
59 Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 2 - 3
regions in the transition from war to peace.60 The process begins with a peace agreement. The United Nations attempts to negotiate the transition process to prevent armed violence. Key to peace-building is building a state that manages disputes peacefully, protects its citizens, and adheres to the compliance of human rights.61
In summary; when indicators tell us that a conflict is forming, this should be prevented, when accelerators transform the conflict, peacemaking is a necessary step, when certain triggers have resulted in the conflict to become violent, there should be peacekeeping or peace enforcement and when social change occurs and the conflict ends, the international community helps with peacebuilding.62
Chapter 1. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
This chapter starts with a brief overview on the period before the wars in Former Yugoslavia, in order to get a better understanding of the historical background. This is 60 United Nations, Department of Public Information. United Nations at a Glance. 98.
61 Ibid., 98
followed by an assessment of the build up- and course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that aims to illuminate how the conflict came to be. Thereafter, the presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is described while examining their mandate and actions from 1992 – 1995. Finally, an assessment of UNPROFOR’s performance is provided, in combination with an evaluation of the Security Council’s resolutions. These key points will lead to the answering of the question: “How is the performance of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be evaluated?”
Image 1. The countries of Former Yugoslavia.63
2.1 Historical background of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
In order to understand the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, knowledge of the Former Yugoslavia and its demise is essential. Yugoslavia means Southern-Slavs and include the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Bosniacs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. These people 63 Nationmaster, “Map of Former Yugoslavia”
had their own republic in the Former Yugoslavia.64 The ethnic demography reveals that the different groups are spread out, mostly through Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s division was 40 % Muslim, 30 % Serb and 20 % Croat and is the most heterogeneous republic.65 However, the people did not identify themselves as minorities and fully belonged to the nation.66
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918. Croatia and Slovenia were long ruled by Austria and Hungary and the Ottoman Empire ruled Serbia and Bosnia until the nineteenth century. The Slavs living in the Ottoman Empire were likely to convert to Islam.67 When one converted to Islam they consequently became Muslim, and could not remain to be called Serb. Moreover, Serbs that converted to Catholicism would be called Croats.68 However, in the nineteenth century, they revolted against Ottoman rule with the help of Russia.69 The Balkan wars (1912 – 1914) ended all influence of the former ruler in the Balkan which resulted in the significant growth of Serb and Greek territory. This generated the idea of a Great Serbia: a fusion of all Southern-Slav states under Serbian rule. This strife in combination with the murder of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 caused the Austrians to declare war on Serbia and hence, the First World War began.
The Former Yugoslavia faced another war when in 1941 the German forces entered Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, the country was divided between Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina became one independent state. Hitler installed a “puppet” government which contained fascist Croats (Ustaša movement).70 They were responsible for the murders of hundreds of thousands of Serbs and tens of thousands of Muslims. The Communist Partisans, organized by Josip Broz also known as Tito, resisted this regime. They eventually won the guerilla war against the rulers and due to this success, Tito became popular throughout the area. Therefore in 1945, Tito became president of the independent communist republic; the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From 1946 onwards, Yugoslavia comprised of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-64 Direction Operation Royal Land Forces, Handbook Former Yugoslavia, 1.1.
65 Ibid., 1.1.
66 Meier, Yugoslavia and its demise, 189.
67 Direction Operation Royal Land Forces, Handbook Former Yugoslavia, 1.3. 68 J. C. H. Blom, eds., Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied, 43.
69 Ibid., 44.
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In 1971, Tito introduced a system of collective leadership with regular rotation of staff.71 In 1974, Tito granted the several republics more autonomous power. The federal government was solely responsible for national defense, the national market and foreign policy. In 1979, this principle of rotating leadership extended to the LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia). After the death of Tito in 1980, his responsibilities passed to the collective presidency and the LCY.72
Due to the death of Tito there was no longer a central leader, which resulted in an accumulation of problems. The years that followed were marked by economic and political crises, tensions within the countries and inter-ethnic unrest.73 In 1987, Slobodan Miloševic rose to power and he demanded that Serbia received more authority within the federation. In 1991, strong political disagreements arose between the republics, due to the desire of being independent. Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent in June, and consequently Serbia fiercely opposed this. In June 1991, The federal army (JNA) violently tried to keep Croatia and Slovenia within the republic. Eventually they accepted the independence of Slovenia but not of Croatia. With the sovereignty of Slovenia, Miloševic realised he could not control Yugoslavia as one entity anymore. Therefore he decided to carve out a new entitity; an extended Serbian territory which would be his alone.74
A year before the independence of Croatia (July 1991), Miloševic already carved up territory and justified his actions by claiming that the Serbs in Croatia were threatened by the previously described “Ustaša” regime. Miloševic’ strategy relied on three elements, which was the blueprint for what occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina later.75 The first element of his strategy was to radicalize the Serb population by the means of the media and local politicians by describing all the acts of the Franjo Tudjman’s government as an act of “Ustaša” terror.76 This allegation is a clear example of a catalyst indicator as described in the introduction and marks a prelude to the conflict. Secondly, he used the technique of “compromising the villages”, which involves staging an incident and giving false information on who caused the incident. 71 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, 487.
72 Ibid., 487. 73 Ibid., 487.
74 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia a short history. (London: Macmillian, 1994), 215. 75 Ibid.,217.
The third element is related and entailed the creation of violent incidents and then let the army intervene as an impartial arbiter, although it was clear the army was loyal to Miloševic and the Serbs.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miloševic could not make the claim of a “Ustaša regime” plausible, therefore he claimed that the Bosnian Serbs were threatened by “Islamic fundamentalists”.77 Malcom points out that speaking of a fundamentalist Muslim population was highly inaccurate, because they were overall secularized Muslims.78 However, the Bosnian Muslim government had invited extremist Muslim fighters (Mujahideen) to help them, which was a reason for Miloševic to justify his claim.79 The propaganda can be regarded as a catalyst indicator, as Miloševic indicates that the different groups (Croats and Muslims) “overhwelm” him in regard to their suggested political preferences.
Moreover, The Bosnian Muslims were threatened by Croatia as well, Tudjman stated that the Bosnian Muslims were of Croatian origin and therefore belonged to Croatia. These nationalistic parties had become intimidating presences with barely concealed ambitions.Due to these threatening ideas, Bosnian officials expressed their concern on Serbia’s and Croatia’s plans to redraw the map.80 Although voices from within the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) announced that they were against alterations to the borders, because it was likely that Croatia would be the first to loose territory.81
The propaganda from Belgrade, on the endangerment of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulted in the bonding of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims together on one side, and Bosnian Serbs on the other. The Croat Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina announced that the borders of Bosnia-Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain the same. However, the Serb party (SDS), which had the same name of the party which was rooting for autonomy in the Croatian Krajina, was soon in open revolt. The main Muslim party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), responded in two different ways: they strengthened their own Muslim nationalism by giving greater emphasis to the most distinctive thing about it, which is its religious component, and they 77 Alastair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-99. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004) 40.
78 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 221.
79 Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-99, 39-40. 80 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 217.
emphasized their stand on the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unique character as a multi-national, multi-religious republic.82 The party’s leader was Alija Izetbegovic, who had served time in prison for the distribution of the Islamic Declaration. This publication entailed a description of a united Islamic community.83 Izetbegovic was released in 1988, after a ‘trial of the decade’. He was the first non-communist head of a government/Muslim party.
The election of 1990 resulted in seats for 99 Muslims, 85 Serbs, 49 Croats and 7 Yugoslavs. These proportions are 41 % Muslim, 35 % Serbs, 20 % Croat, which roughly matched the population as a whole (44, 31 and 17 %).84 Izetbegovic formed a government of national unity, constructed out of a formal coalition between all three major parties with shared government posts. The political tension in Yugoslavia was increasing when Izetbegovic took office and the position of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government was difficult.85 During debates about changing the federal structure into a “looser” confederation, Bosnia-Herzegovina sided with Croatia and Slovenia, since Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to reduce the domination of Yugoslavia by Belgrade. But on the other hand, Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians could not side completely with Croatia and Slovenia in these arguments, because they needed Croatia and Slovenia to stay in the Republic of Yugoslavia in order to form a strong front against the Serbs.86
Miloševic and his accomplices openly challenged the future of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Izetbegovic still tried to balance the situation. The Autonomous region of the Krajina formed by the SDS in Croatia, received weapons from the Serbs and were therefore in the position to lay out more demands. In May 1991, the SDS demanded the separation of large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina (West and North), which would join the Croatian Krajina and form a new republic. Three areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina were declared to be Serb Autonomous Regions by the SDS. Not long after these declarations, the Extreme Natiolists Party of Rights (HSP) in Croatia insisted on the annexation with the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.87 82 Ibid., 219.
83Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. (New York: M.E. Shapre, 1999), 67.
84 Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-99, 16.
85 Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel, The Desintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević. (Westview Press, 2002), 49.
86 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 224. 87 Ibid,, 224.
By July 1991, it came to light that Miloševic, Milhalj Kertes and the Bosnian SDS leader Radovan Karadžic provided arms to the Bosnian Serbs. 88 Moreover, the last federal prime minister Ante Markovic, released a recording of a conversation between Miloševic and Karadžic, wherein Miloševic informed Karadžic about a next delivery of arms by the federal army commander in Banja Luka; general Nikola Uzelac.89 It was not long until a full-scale war broke out in Former Yugoslavia. The breaking point for Slovenia and Croatia was Serbia’s refusal to accept the Croatian Stjepan "Stipe" Mesic, whom would be next in line for the federal presidency.90
Due to this event, the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovia followed. The impact of their declaration is noticeable in the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, they requested protection, but in reality they needed the troops to establish the borders of the Serb Autonomous Region of Herzegovina.91 In other words, the declaration of independence resulted in Bosnian Serbs to speed up their plans to carve out more territory. It can be perceived as the accelerator that led to the war, as these events immediately resulted in a full-scale war.92
This situation became agonizing for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government. President Izetbegovic declared Bosnia-Herzegovina neutral between Serbia and Croatia. He had claimed before, that when Slovenia and Croatia would leave Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina would too.93 However, Karadžic denounced this declaration and perceived it as an anti-Serb act. The debate on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina that followed, did not lead to any peaceful solutions.94 On 14 and 15 October 1991, during an extended parliament session, Karadžic and his party members left the debate before it reached the end, because they did not want to accept the resolution on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.95 After they left, the Bosnian Muslim SDA and the Bosnian Croat HDZ took the Bosnian Serb seats, and thus were able to cast extra votes on the matter. Consequently, the majority supported 88 Ibid., 225.
89Josip Glaurdic, "Inside the Serbian War Machine The Miloševic Telephone Intercepts, 1991-1992." East European Politics & Societies 23:1 (2009): 95.
90 Meier, Yugoslavia and its demise, 166. 91 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 227.
92 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies.” Journal of Peace Research 35 (1998), 562.
93 Burg & Shoup, The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 70 94 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 228.
95 Robert M. Hayde, Blueprints for a housedivided : the constitutionallogic of the Yugoslav conflicts. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 94.
the resolution on the realization of self-determination.96 This is clearly a catalyst indicator, as the parties claim territory in the resolution.
A few months later, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population was allowed to vote on the independence question. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted this event and Karadžic warned that any Serb that take part would be perceived as a traitor. On 3 March 1992, Izetbegovic declared Bosnia-Herzegovina independent, and a month later, on 6 April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was internationally acknowledged to be an independent state.97 As a response to this declaration, Karadžic declared the independent Serbian Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, the Serbian
government in Belgrade decided to attack Bosnia-Herzegovina and launched a bombing campaign. The claim on territory had indicated and eventually triggered the tense situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina into a full-scale war in mid-April 1992.
There is no consensus on the essence of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where some emphasize the declaration of independence, others write that the essence of the war lies somewhere between ’86 and ’91, or even in 1918 when Yugoslavia was founded.98 The causes of the conflicts in the former Republic of Yugoslavia are just as complex and debated. To some scholars, the war is due to Serb aggression and their efforts to carve a greater Serbia. Others point out the states’ disintegration and the rise of ethnic-nationalist leadership in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia.99 The role of the West has been analyzed too, especially the cultural, economic, political and financial influences that may have accelerated the pace of the fragmentation. However, most scholars do agree on one point: the self-determination of the Yugoslav states and the competition that arose is a crucial point in the essence of the wars.100 Truth can be found in all the views on the essence of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that in former Yugoslavia several republics were formed, created the notion of territory that belonged to a certain group of people. Therefore, when Yugoslavia disintegrated, the sense of ownership wass likely to increase. Furthermore, the conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina were problematic in a political, economic and cultural sense. When times are rough societies have a tendency to 96 Ibid., 97.
97 Malcolm, Bosnia a short history, 234.
98 Sabrina Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia, 305.
99 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 7
100 William J. Durch, UN peacekeeping Americanpolitics, and the uncivilwars of the 1990s. (New York: St. Martin Press, 1997), 194.
pinpoint a “scapegoat”, which in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina were the Bosnian Muslims, as the campaign against them was intense.101 Furthermore, when Tito died and a central leader was needed, it paved a way for nationalistic figures to stand up and win over the votes by appealing to people’s unease in light of the radicalizing situation. In conclusion, the essence of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can indeed be traced back early on, with accelerating factors through the years and as an important factor the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the claim for self-determination by the Yugoslav states.
When the war had reached Bosnia-Herzegovina, they had little to defend themselves with due to the embargo on weaponry as imposed by the Security Council. Hence, just a few months after the start of the war, the Bosnian Serbs won 70 percent of the land. They were supported by the Serbian government and the JNA, of whom they received weapons. Initially the war was fought between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other. However, due to the different aim in terms of territory division, the Bosnian- Croats and Muslims, seperated their forces.102 This ultimately led to fights between the two groups in 1993 and lasted until 1994. When this conflict was resolved, they worked together again, against their mutual enemy, the Bosnian Serbs.
The war soon revealed to be about much more than just territory. The Serbs and Bosnian Serbs engaged themselves in an ethnic cleansing program. The term was used in the media to describe the forcible movement and killing of populations who were different on the grounds of their religion, language and ethnicity. Nowadays, it has become a more broad term, which covers different forms of ethnically inspired violence such as murder, rape, torture and forced movement of populations.103 Besides this horrific program, Ratko Mladic established prisoner of war/death camps on 22 May 1992.104 Roy Gutman of Newsday revealed the existence of these war camps.105 The awareness of the camps increased emotions in the debate on Bosnia-101Amanda Rohloff, "Extending the concept of moral panic: Elias, climate change and civilization." Sociology 45.4 (2011): 638
102Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-99, 40.
103 Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkan, Nationalism and the destruction of tradition. (Londen & New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-2
104 Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), promoted to the rank of colonel general in June 1994.
http://icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf
105 Dale C. Tatum, Genocide at the dawn of twenty first century. Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Darfur. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2010), 81.
Herzegovina but the reaction of the international community was reticent at first. 106 Diplomats sought a peaceful agreement and a financial embargo was imposed, but no military pressure was used to end the conflict. The most known attempt for a peace agreement was the Vance-Owen plan of the former American minister of Foreign Affairs Cyrus Vance and former British minister of Foreign Affairs Lord David Owen. In this plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided in 10 provinces for Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The Serbs did not agree and refused to sign it, or any other plan, as it was not in their interest to give up conquered territory. After the failed efforts of diplomats to seek peaceful solutions, the United Nations became involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 8 June 1992. The mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia was extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina.107 There was no separate force created for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their presence and mandate consisted mostly of providing humanitarian assistance and demilitarizing the United Nations’ protected areas. Even in 1992, scholars feared that a solution would not come into being if the forces had little enforcement measures.108
The Security Council did not allow UNPROFOR to use enforcement measures as it believed that it would endanger the troops. A second reason was that the war was perceived to be a civil war, which meant the international community should not intervene at all. This argument is somewhat arbitrary because the United Nations was present, so if it truly was regarded as a civil war, the forces would have not been present at any moment.109 A third possible reason is that it was thought that not enough Member States would carry the burden of taking enforcement mesaures.110 In hindsight, this proved to be true. Finally, the budget for UNPROFORs mission did not fit the mandate.111 To properly implement a mission, sufficient goods and facilities are necessary, thus the financing must be satisfactory. The execution of this policy will be elaborated on in the following section.
2.2 The presence of UNPROFOR in war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 - 1995 106 Blom, eds., Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied, 478.
107 Resolution 758, 8 June 1992
108Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War." Ind. lJ 67 (1991): 911
109 Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia," 470. 110 Ibid., 471.
1992
In January 1992, president Izetbegovic called upon the United Nations as the political atmosphere was tense in Bosnia-Herzegovina.112 It was just a few months before the outbreak of the full-scale war. Although Izetbegovic’s call did not get a response, the United Nations would eventually be highly present during the years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In February 1992, the United Nations founded UNPROFOR to control the situation in Croatia.113 Initially it was founded for a period of 12 months in order to meet the conditions of peace and security within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia held by the European community.114 The Conference was established in order to resolve differences between, not officialy defined, relevant authorities.115
However, due to the deteriorating situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR military observers were deployed from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite diplomatic efforts, the conflict intensified and already by May two-thirds of UNPROFOR headquarters personnel were already redeployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina.116 On 15 May, the Security Council stressed the need of a cease-fire to all parties:
Demands that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, respect immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992 and cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about urgently a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change of borders by force is not acceptable […] Also demands that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the Yugoslav People’s Army, as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s neighbours take swift action end such interference and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.117
112 Meier, Yugoslavia and its demise, 201. 113 Resolution 743, 21 February 1992
114 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, 488.
115 Peter Radan, "The Badinter arbitration commission and the partition of Yugoslavia." Nationalities Papers 25.3 (1997): 537
116 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, 522. 117 Resolution 752, 15 may 1992
Several resolutions that followed demanded a cease-fire, but without results. Therefore, on 30 May 1992, acting under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed sanctions on the Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations prevented import and export of commodities or products that originated from the Republic of Yugoslavia (medical supplies and food excluded).118 On 16 November 1992, the Security Council deployed observers to the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina to ensure the embargo. Their task was to monitor the delivery of weapons to Yugoslavia, and to cease interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina (including the JNA and the Croatian Army).119 The embargo and its implantation led to a scarcity of products, which Miloševic propagated to be proof of an international conspiracy against the Serbian people.120
Furthermore, Resolution 757 prohibited any flights from and to Bosnia-Herzegovina without approval of the United Nations. In light of this, UNPROFOR negotiated an agreement of a cease-fire for 1800 hours starting 1 June, and the take-over of the Sarajevo airport. The reopening of the airport had solely humanitarian purposes.121 The United Nations perceived the reopening as the first the step to a security zone.122 From July 1992 to January 1993, UNPROFOR protected and enabled the arrival of 2,476 airplanes carrying medicine and other products.123
However, despite the growing presence of the United Nations, the situation in Sarajevo did not improve. Hence, the United Nations imposed a new resolution, which stated that all measures necessary should be taken, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and to the other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.124 UNPROFOR received the task of ensuring the arrival of humanitarian assistance and once again there mandate was expanded. Furthermore, UNPROFOR was now responsible for helping the UNHCR delivering humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and to provide protection when UNHCR requested.125 In addition, UNPROFOR could be asked to protect convoys of released detainees if the 118 Resolution 757, 30 May 1992
119 Resolution, 787, 16 november 1992
120 Blom, eds., Srebrenica: een ‘veilig’ gebied, 571. 121 Security Council, Document 24075
122 Resolution 758, 8 June 1992
123 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, 524. 124 Resolution 770, 13 August 1992
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) requested.126 UNPROFOR’s presence increased in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the number of infantry battalion groups and civilian staff grew rapidly.
On 9 October 1992, the Security Council additionally banned all military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for those approved by the United Nations in order to ensure humanitarian assistance and safety in Bosnia-Herzegovina.127 To successfully maintain the ban on military flights, the Security Council authorized the expansion of UNPROFOR by adding monitoring personnel. On 21 December 1992, the Secretary-General proposed to add about 10,000 troops to ensure observation around the clock and to enable search operations at the crossing points on the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that the mandate had been enlarged multiple times in 1992. During that year many troops and tasks were added. This would continue for the years to come.
1993
On 22 February 1993, the United Nations decided that an international tribunal should be established, which would indict and convict the persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.128 The ongoing rapes, massacres and ethnic cleansing were cause to establish such a tribunal. Therefore, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded. The aim of the establishment was to put a stop to crimes, contribute, maintain and restore peace and to bring justice. On 21 October Mr. Ramon Escovar Salom was appointed to be the Prosecutor of the ICTY.129 The first trial of the ICTY would take place in 1996.130
As the next step, on 16 April 1993, the Security Council demanded that all parties regarded Srebrenica as a “safe area.”131 This concept was long debated by the international community. Several reservations were expressed because a safe area could potentially be a concentrated target with disastrous conquences. Furthermore, 126 Resolution 776, 14 September 1992
127 Resolution 781, 9 October 1992 128 Resolution 808, 22 February 1993 129 Resolution 877, 21 October 1993
130 ICTY, “Judgement List” http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/JudgementList#1996 131 Resolution 819, 16 April 1993
