Patrons, clients, and friends : the role of Bosnian ulama in the rebuilding of trust and coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cetin, O.
Citation
Cetin, O. (2011, September 21). Patrons, clients, and friends : the role of Bosnian ulama in the rebuilding of trust and coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Retrieved from
https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17852
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203 CONCLUSION
In much of its history, Bosnia has been ruled by multicultural states- Ottomans and Austro-Hungarians and Yugoslavia, each of which left its mark on Bosnia. This gave Bosnian society an identity of peaceful coexistence among its peoples. On the other hand, this also resulted in a history characterized by cultural, demographic and political frictions and conflicts. In the second half of the 20th century, there was a breakdown in the peace prevailing in inter-communal life. Bosnia had been a microcosm of the Titoist ideal of brotherhood and unity among ethno-religious communities. However, politicized ethno- religious identities became instrumental in ethnic-cleansing campaigns following the declaration of independence in 1992.
While secularized identities were fundamental to the Yugoslav ideal, division of political power along ethnic lines in the 1990s led a two-fold development. While it strengthened a sense of religious belonging as well as the role of religious elites, the divisions crystallized and mobilized by extreme nationalisms widened the scale of inter-ethnic violence during the 1992-95 war to include everyday life in neighborhoods. This primarily created the question of rebuilding broken inter-communal relations by situating the idea of trust as a crucial component in post-war period. Secondly, it increased the role of religious elites in shaping the course of inter-communal relations as they had been among the key actors on the construction of particular ethno-religious identities as well as potential peacebuilding actors by transforming the root causes of the conflict.
The objective of this study has been to investigate the role of the Muslim ulama in Bosnia in instigating an ideal of co-existence through the cultivation of trust between Bosniaks and non-Muslim Bosnians. In my study, I have presented two fundamental arguments central to understanding the role of Bosnian ulama on rebuilding of trust among the Bosnian communities. My first argument is that even though trust has been considered a crucial resource for a sustainable peace, it has had a limited a role when not accompanied by alternative mechanisms. In these terms, I secondly argue that the Bosnian ulama, as well as Bosnian religious communities in general, can contribute to peacebuilding in post-war Bosnia with their common-value generating role. In particular, they can transform the
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conflict by targeting its root causes and promoting reconciliation by restoring the dignity of the self and the other.
I primarily discuss the contemporary literature on trust. In particular, I consider whether contemporary studies of trust provide a solution that can be used as well in such complex situations as the Bosnian case. These studies are mainly based on an idea of trust that is to be rebuilt either as the result of strategic calculation regarding the motives of the other, a shared history and familiarity of the parties, or simply taking a leap of faith and trusting the other. This has not been the case for Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslims perceived themselves to be betrayed by their former neighbors and friends. For my interviewees among the Bosnian ulama, the experiences of the 1992-1995 war questioned fundamental values governing their inter-communal social life. Therefore, I argue that the idea of familiarity or a sufficient degree of past experience or knowledge to predict the motives of the other is unlikely to explain the current situation. It has been precisely this familiarity which created bewilderment in the survivors. Familiarity has not helped to overcome unpleasant memories of the past. On the other hand, the idea of an encapsulated interest, namely, perceived self- interest to sustain a social relationship itself, undervalues the idea of trust situated at the heart of a social relationship. Furthermore, what makes the situation more problematic is the reluctance of the perceived perpetrator to apologize. Today, the Bosnian Serb political leadership continues to manifest ethno-religious exclusiveness with occasional warnings regarding a declaration of independence. Therefore, I state that these approaches cannot help to redress the broken inter-communal relationships.
Moreover, I draw attention to the failure in the initial impetus of post-war period, as well as the current political structure drawn by Dayton agreement, which has served to sustain ethnic cleavages. These developments have left little room for an overarching identity. In a recent survey, for example, it was revealed that a civic and state identity of Bosnianhood is adopted less by non-Muslim Bosnians than Bosniaks.305
305 In The UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 Early Warning Annual Report, 91.9% of Bosniaks were reported to be proud of being a Bosnian citizen where the same response was given by 66.3%
of Croats and 43.8% of Serbs of Bosnia where they hold the majority. See, Zaimovid and Maurer (2008a, p. 43).
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In line with Reychler's (1998) two-fold differentiation of post-war initiatives, Dayton’s Bosnia can be analyzed in a two-fold framework. To redress problems in terms of reconciliation, I state that cooperation, trust and reconciliation can be approached independently.306 I argue that while the notion of trust encourages people to enter into cooperative relations, overemphasis on it may have disadvantages, especially in cases of social trauma. By focusing on these three processes independently, however, sustainable socio-political conditions can be established under the guarantee of legal mechanisms and function as grounds for collaboration. Trust may eventually be achieved as the result of these cooperative initiatives rather than a prerequisite. Nevertheless, for such initiatives to be successful, they need to consider the socio-psychological dimension of inter-group relations.
Thus, inspired by a social-psychological approach to trust, I argue that religious actors might corporate as constructive actors at the relational and symbolic levels. In particular, I outline various mechanisms which the Bosnian ulama have practiced.
First, the Bosnian ulama resisted exclusive nationalism by re-contextualizing the Bosnian experience of inter-communal coexistence. Bosnia was a model of Titoist Yugoslavia in line with the policy of brotherhood and unity. The Ulama questioned and rejected this political pragmatism. They rather discursively constructed the identity of Bosnia as a common house with a historical heritage of coexistence best revealed in spiritual principles. This meant a process of re-contextualizing the idea of coexistence from the political realm to everyday life.
In particular, the houses of worship and the Bosnian tradition of neighborhood were presented as the representations of moral values attached to that everyday life of peaceful coexistence. Here, a person’s adopted status of Bosnianhood is more important than his/her ethnic affiliation. Bosnian non-Muslims are integrated into that construct of Bosnianhood on condition that they feel attachment to Bosnia as their homeland and respect the statehood of Bosnia. The religious other, on the other hand, was occasionally emphasized as a legitimizing component in their vision of multi-cultural Bosnia.
Second, the ulama clarified fundamental values attached to post-war inter-communal relations by revisiting religious teachings. They principally rejected the idea of revenge by
306 Baron (2008) differentiates these three processes by emphasizing that “cooperation involves pragmatics... trust is driven by social rule and value, reconciliation involves a different aspect of we- ness, where coming together is healing” (p. 278).
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promoting the concept of a spiritual reward for those who abstained from it. However, forgiveness was rejected despite its presentation as one of the key instruments of reconciliation in contemporary conflict resolution literature. Instead, truth and justice were fundamentally attached to the ulama’s vision of post-war Bosnia. Truth has been presented as a form of social catharsis to leave the burden of the past behind. For the ulama, this has been expressed in a context with references both to the victim and the perceived aggressor.
Similarly, justice has repeatedly been stressed as the basis for a lasting reconciliation by eliminating the idea of collective guilt. By emphasizing truth and justice together as values obliged by their faith, the ulama have presented faith in such a way that it serves to maintain the inter-communal coexistence that trust is supposed to provide. In particular, faith has been seen as supporting the dignity and integrity of the victims vis-à-vis the perceived injustices of contemporary legal and political institutions. It has even functioned to legitimize the sufferings through references to the metaphors in the Holy Books. His esteem being restored, the victim can now surpass the psychological threshold to entering into a relationship. This could not generally be possible through a strategy based on the construction of his perception of the other, which is usually shadowed by the memories of the past.
As their third strategy, the Bosnian ulama particularly used Srebrenica to demonstrate the Bosniaks’ determination to seek justice and request international community to fulfill its commitments and obligations. In addition to clarifying the conceptual background of post- war peacebuilding, Srebrenica has also been used as a platform for religious and psychological guidance for Muslim Bosniaks and for the families of the victims.
Nevertheless, the strategies of the ulama have not only been restricted to the idea of coexistence and praising values that are to facilitate it. As their fourth strategy, they reconstructed Muslim Bosniak identity by using several instruments. In particular, the ulama used fatwas, religio-national commemorations and religious instruction to deconstruct Bosniak self-identity by integrating national and religious identity. They mainly adopted a dismantling strategy to deconstruct the core of the Muslim Bosniak identity by reiterating previous bans on mixed marriages or opposing the use of non-Muslim names. The former was one of the key policies shaping the Bosnian Muslim identity under occasionally repressive secularization policy of Titoist Yugoslavia. Ulama, now strictly drew inter-religious borders to maintain the distinctive the religio-national identity of Muslim Bosniaks. First and
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foremost, they emphasized Muslimhood as the core of their identity perception. Religious commemorations, and particularly Ajvatovica, emerged as the representation of the nationalization of religion and the consecration of nationhood. Nevertheless, the idea of harmonious inter-communal relations at the level of everyday life was common to these three instruments.
My interviews with members of the Bosnian ulama, as well as a discourse analysis of their main texts, also revealed the internal strengths and external opportunities which allowed the ulama to take initiative as an active post-war actor. The historical account shows that the ulama adopted a loyal position towards the Yugoslav civic religion of brotherhood and unity.
This political loyalty also meant a passivism during the development of Muslim Bosniak national identity in the political realm during the Yugoslav period. The democratization process of early 1990s, on the other hand, allowed the ulama to take a more active and independent position. The idea of re-Islamization, facilitated by war-related social- psychology of Bosnian Muslims, emerged as the primary tool in deconstructing Muslim identity into a Muslim Bosniak religio-national identity. They fundamentally interpreted and presented Islam as the fundamental distinctive element of Muslim Bosniak identity. This allowed them to define not only the religious but also the national identity of their recipients.
Besides the role of the historical identification of the religious and national belonging and the IZ’s organizational effectiveness throughout Bosnia, the existing political structure contributed to a strengthening of the ulama’s role as well as their political power. They further legitimized themselves as the spokespersons for the rights and interests of the Muslim Bosniak nation through deliberate strategies. By adopting a delegitimizing strategy, the ulama accused local politicians of being unprincipled. Reisu-l-Ulema Cerid occasionally claimed that the international community was prejudiced towards the Bosniaks. These two factors allowed the ulama to reinforce their aforementioned image as the oldest, most authentic Bosniak national organization, particularly following the end of Izetbegovid‘s leadership. The lack of a relatively strong, unifying leader allowed Cerid to play the role of a Bosniak national leader in addition to a religious one.
However, I argue that the ulama’s role should not be exaggerated. Harsh criticisms targeted at the top-leadership are demonstrative of the critical stance towards their perceived intervention into the political realm. This is even visible among the ulama that are
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critical with of the political actions of Cerid. Moreover, a considerable number of Bosniaks would adopt the cultural practices of Muslimhood centered on fundamental moral and local values, rather than official religiosity preached by the ulama.
In addition to these internal weaknesses, the nature of many post-war conflicts in terms of post-war reconstruction requires the political actors to take the lead, as in the case of the resolution of the issue of divided schools. In such problems, religious figures can play the role of facilitators. Both international and local politicians should rather take the lead and act as mediators in the resolution of such conflicts. Moreover, the representatives of the international community, who are the de jure rulers of Bosnia, should work toward the elimination of the structures rewarding exclusivist ethno-politics and take an active position against messages promoting intolerance. Despite 15 years of post-conflict reconstruction, the resolution of many conflicts still requires a well-structured moderation of the international community with a strong political will.
Unfortunately, a recent crisis erupted between the newly appointed High Representative Valentin Inzko and the leadership of the Serb Republic resulting from the latter’s decision to withdraw the power transferred to the central authority. This has been an example of the failure of the international community to prevent such efforts at destabilization, which has resulted in further loss of prestige of the international community. These initiatives often result in a deadlock between the leaders representing particular Bosnian ethno-religious communities due to mechanisms drawn by Dayton agreement. Therefore, the idea of local ownership for the future of Bosnia is not meaningful without a strong international political will and revised political structures. The opposite means a no-win strategy in practice.
Today, in opposition to current model drawn on Lijphart's (1977) model of consociational democracy, an integrative model (Horowitz, 1985, 1991) could create room for moderate approaches and fluidity of identities as well as a more active participation of “Bosnian”
citizens in political processes. While this requires an active role particularly by the EU to lead the RS leadership towards a more moderate approach for constitutional changes, introduction of new policies such as a preferential electoral system or federalism based on
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heterogeneous units would contribute to overcome ethnic cleavages and foster inter-ethnic cooperation.307
Despite the powerful tools held and used by the ulama, it is difficult to talk about trust in today’s Bosnia mainly due to the aforementioned internal and external weaknesses. I argue that this requires creating suitable platforms for active cooperation as the basis to generating inter-communal trust. In addition to the steps politicians need to take, the ulama in particular can adopt a deliberate strategy accompanying their discursive instruments and strategies realized at the top-level in the Inter-Religious Council (MRV).
These strategies can foster their peace-building capacity, ranging from conflict prevention to reconciliation. A recently initiated project of monitoring violations of religious freedom already highlights the organizational capacity of religious communities practicing throughout Bosnia. Their organizational effectiveness at the grass-roots level indicates the potential of religious communities in the construction of an early warning system. However, their potential can best be realized in the transformation of the situation from one of conflict to one of reconciliation. In its draft initiative for the construction of the platform for inter-faith dialogue, the Islamic community recognized that there have been cases either in the name of Islam or Muslims, where crimes and unlawful acts have been committed (e.g., specific cases of Kazan, Grabovica and the partial construction of a mosque in Bradina on the private land of a Serb). Such messages contribute to the unfolding of the truth. Nevertheless, past initiatives such as the 1941 Resolutions of the ulama association of El-Hidaje show those religious leaders can maintain their messages of reconciliation only by condemning in-group members who engage in violence. In particular, such initiatives should incorporate the grass- roots. While messages exchanged merely at the top-level would undoubtedly emerge as superordinate goals, exchange messages and visits of imams and priests would facilitate to transforming the attitudes of ordinary citizens towards each other. In that regard, I argue that religious leaders should also remind their communities that peace is a common ideal shared by other religions. Such messages would facilitate the required psychological contact among the communities on the way to social restoration. Nevertheless, these processes might be difficult to realize where everyday memories of violence are kept alive due to lack
307 For analyses of Lijphart's model of consociational democracy and integrative models in the Bosnian context, see, Caspersen (2004), and Bieber (2002, 2005).
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of the acknowledgement of past wrongdoings or the offering of apologies. Participation in the commemorative practices of other communities, for instance, can assist in showing respect to the other’s losses as well as promoting inter-communal understanding.
The constructive use of these strategies could assist the structural peacebuilding initiatives of the international community. If properly used, it would alter the burden of collective guilt and break the potential cycle of violence in the decades to come.
Nevertheless, this requires a proper answer to the question of how religious actors are categorized by international peacebuilders. As has occurred in the recent conflict regarding religious instruction between an OSCE representative and Cerid, delegitimizing the portrayal of religious actors resulted in the failure of a neutral religious course. This experience highlights that excluding the religious communities cannot aid in the development of solutions to inter-communal conflicts. On the contrary, it creates additional problems as the international initiatives would be regarded as biased attempts to delegitimize the influence of religious actors.
In summary, the ulama, as well as religious communities in general, have the potential to develop psychical and psychological platforms of collaboration. The instruments and processes, which I have discussed, can help to transform the way members of particular ethno-religious communities perceive themselves and the other in relation to an understanding of the past and a vision of the future. It is hoped that these common platforms of cooperation would create a greater understanding of respect, even if not trust.
However, my study shows that the notion of trust is unlikely to be achieved in the absence of such social-psychological transformations.
