Peacebuilding in East Timor
Organizational learning and success in peacebuilding
Job van der Eerden 10573275 13-06-2018 Under supervision of dr. Jana Krause Second reader: dr. Nel Vandekerckhove Peacebuilding and International Relations jobvandereerden@gmail.com 7913 words
Contents
Introduction ... 1
Organizational learning and peacebuilding ... 3
Methods for measuring organizational learning ... 7
Peacebuilding in East Timor ... 8
Background ... 9
UNAMET ... 10
UNTAET ... 11
UNMISET and UNOTIL ... 14
UNMIT ... 16
Introduction
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, has a unique place in the history of United Nations peacebuilding. It is the first state built from the ground up under supervision of the UN, which even acted as interim
government for some time during the process. Furthermore, roughly four years after the initial mission was claimed a success, violence broke out in the country again, and a second mission was issued by the UN councel. Whether or not the first mission was a success is still debated. On the other hand, the case of East Timor can be called ordinary as well, relative to other peacebuilding missions. What is similar is that they are all unique.
Every conflict, every environment, is different. For this reason it is essential that peacebuilding missions can adapt their approach to the environment they work in and changes that occur in that environment, which is called ‘conflict sensitivity’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 20). A pivotal process that influences the extent to which this adaptation is possible is called organizational learning. This means that in order to adapt to their environment, peacebuilding missions need to learn not only the ins and outs of the environment they operate in, but how their actions and goals influence that environment as well.
Organizational learning can be divided in first- and second-level organizational learning, in short: learning during a mission and learning between missions. First-level organizational learning is important because every case is different and in order to adapt to the circumstances and changes in it, increasing the ability to learn how to engage with the environment in multi-dimensional
peacekeeping is crucial. Second-level organizational learning is rare, partly because “the results of cognitive change are only understood to be learning if they enable the organization to engage better with its environment” (Howard, 2007, p. 15), and if every case is different, only general lessons should be taken into consideration for future reference. ‘Incremental adaptation’, the transferring of a program to another case regardless of context, should be avoided (Howard, 2007, p. 20). Mission personnel on the ground learns from everyday interactions and events, but only if that experience is aggregated, and if it improves engagement with the organization’s environment, can it be called organizational learning. This requires a certain amount of double-loop learning, which means that missions critically evaluate the assumptions on which their mandates, approaches and goals are built (Campbell, 2008). Organizational learning thus contributes to a peacebuilding mission’s success. This paper examines the importance of organizational learning for the success of peacebuilding missions by looking at the case of East Timor. The main research question is: how has organizational learning influenced the UN peacebuilding missions in East Timor and their outcomes?
The two missions in East Timor are interesting cases to study when researching organizational learning in peacebuilding missions because of multiple reasons. First of all, the outcome of the first mission is debatable, since the peace that was established lasted but four years. Howard labelled it a success, claiming it is unreasonable to “expect that peacekeeping operations would be able to resolve civil crises beyond the standards set by the peace accords or the Security Council resolutions” (2007, p. 7). There is a lot of debate on this topic, and many scholars have disagreed with Howard’s verdict (Chopra, 2002; Bowles & Chopra, 2008; Call & Wyeth, 2008).
Chopra already warned for new outbreaks of violence in 2002, criticizing the mission on several points. His article implicitly disagrees with Howard’s findings of first-level organizational learning during the first mission. Instead, he points out moments in time when the implementation of the mandates was inspired by experiences in previous missions, resulting in an example of a failed attempt at second-level organizational learning, ‘incremental adaption’. Howard acknowledges this, but claims that after a period of “significant organizational dysfunction”, the mission “gradually moved into a learning mode” (2007, p. 296). Has first-level organizational learning been a positive influence in the first mission in East Timor, as Howard claims? Furthermore, the short time period between the two missions and the similarities in context (a lot of factors remained the same, as the time span between the missions was only a couple of years, and the UN has been a constant presence as observant during that period) make comparing the two missions interesting for
researching second-level organizational learning, which is a rare chance. In addition to that, there has been little research done on the second mission in East Timor either.
The overarching argument made in this article is to stress the importance of organizational learning for peacebuilding practices by showing how organizational learning has positively influenced the peacebuilding process in East Timor, and when there have been obstacles for organizational learning that have led to an overall decrease in the missions’ ability to engage with their environment. This argument is thus twofold.
On one hand, there have been a lot of obstacles for organizational learning during the peacebuilding process in East Timor. Especially during the early stages, the tendency for organizations to fall back to routines have led to multiple instances of incremental adaptation, amongst other decisions that in hindsight can be classified as mistakes. Underlying were the contextual difficulties, which made it hard to assess the impact mission have had. This in turn makes it less likely for peacebuilding missions to reflect on the assumptions on which their routines are based. Furthermore, most missions were focusing so hard on completing their own tasks, they neglected to integrate other aspects of peacebuilding that were needed in order to pave the way for a sustainable, positive peace. This is most relevant in the case of UNTAET, where the mission’s target was to build a state and hand
it over to a local government, which almost resulted in a failed state. The mission was perceived as successful, because it succeeded in constituting a state and handing it over to a Timorese
government, thereby fulfilling their mandate. But conflict within the state arose, bringing the young country close to collapse. The mission had not resulted in a sustainable peace.
On the other hand, there have been a lot of signs pointing to double-loop learning and improvement in the ability to engage with the East Timorese in the last UN peacebuilding mission in East Timor, UNMIT. Though the mission resembles its predecessors, it focuses more on economic and social development in East Timor, involving and cooperating with the local population in the process. The next part of this paper will explain about the workings and importance of organizational learning when building peace, based on literature by Howard (2007) and Campbell (2008). After that, the case of East Timor will be introduced, starting with a short summary of the conflict that led to the first UN mission. Then, using a process tracing method, the first and second mission will be analyzed to assess if and how organizational learning has had an influence on the approach of the mission personnel after key events and the outcomes of that approach. To determine these key events, literature describing the events during the missions from Howard (2007), Chopra (2002), and Kingsbury (2009) will be compared to each other. In the section on the second mission, second-level organizational learning will be examined by looking at improvement in the preconditions for first-level
organizational learning.
Organizational learning is a term coined by Howard (2007, pp. 14-20), which she uses to describe the preferred learning process UN Secretariat operations should go through while implementing the mandates during missions. She makes the distinction between first-level organizational learning on one hand, which is defined as increasing ability to engage in multi-dimensional peacekeeping (2007, p. 15). This means that peacebuilding operatives learn from their experiences in the field, and that knowledge can then be aggregated to change the way mandates are implemented. The knowledge and experience gained in this learning process allows the UN to adapt to the constantly changing context the mission takes place in. The four indicators of first-level organizational learning Howard
defines are the way which information, coordination, organizational engagement with environment, and leadership are organized and processed. Each category is divided in ‘preconditions indicating possible learning’ and ‘indicators of learning’ (Howard, 2007, p. 17). Howard’s indicators are presented in the table below (Table 1).
Table 1 Indicators of first-level organizational learning (Howard, 2007, p. 17)
Second-level organizational learning, on the other hand, entails learning between missions. It is defined as “change in the organization’s overall means, structures, and goals, in response to new understandings of problems and their causes”(Howard, 2007, p. 19). An important indicator of second-level learning is improvement in the preconditions for first-level learning (Howard, 2007, p. 19).
Campbell has added to these two levels of organizational learning the important concept of double-loop learning, which refers to an organization’s ability to openly and honestly look at their own
assumptions and behaviours concerning the causes of peace and their outcomes (2008). Every peacebuilding operation is built on assumptions about the causes of peace, and accordingly adapts a theory of change that they believe will lead to sustainable peace. These assumptions, however, ought to be under continuous questioning by the organization and its operatives in order to achieve the most adequate pathways to sustainable peace. The dangers of inadequate double-loop learning are numerous. Often, the assumptions supporting theories of change are unexamined and deeply rooted in organizational mandates instead of ‘best practices’ founded on empirical analysis (Barnett et al., 2007, p. 53). Related to this, long-term outcomes of peacebuilding missions are in danger of getting overlooked when a mission appears to be successful initially. Furthermore, theories of change may reflect a liberal peace agenda that focuses on replicating modern state institutions: rule of law, markets and liberal democracy (Campbell, 2008, p. 23). While installing these institutions in order to bring peace to a country is not inherently wrong, implementing them can have unintended negative effects on the peacebuilding process, and even lead to new conflicts.
Double-loop learning is important for both first-level learning and second-level learning. During a mission, knowledge and experience can be accumulated and translated into adjustments in the methods used to achieve peace, all conforming to the dominant theory of change. But without regular and careful reflection on this theory, the assumptions that go with it, and its results, the risk of mistakes and unwanted outcomes rises. That is, if the intended outcome is sustainable peace. The same goes for knowledge transferred between missions. Careful selection and implementation of knowledge is essential to make it fit in a new context, but considering the underlying assumptions about the causes of peace and the theory of change is just as important in order to be as effective as possible. This logic can be applied from the highest decision making level at United Nations
headquarters all the way down to everyday decision making by UN mission personnel.
Campbell presents three additional arguments to underline the importance of organizational learning as a likely factor of ‘determining the success of peacebuilding efforts’ (2008, pp. 27-28). Firstly, the ability to cooperate effectively with other organizations, be it local, national or international, requires a high amount of first-level organizational learning. Secondly, peacebuilding is a fairly young practice that often requires missions to fulfil new tasks and mandates. East Timor is a good example, as it was the first time the UN took part in state building. These missions do not have any previous experience to build on, which makes it even more important they learn in the field and pass on that knowledge as second-level learning. Thirdly, in order to improve impact assessment, a certain level of
organizational learning is necessary, and vice versa. Organizations can only improve their assessment of the impact of their actions if they improve their understanding of the environment they acted in and how they influenced that environment, and are able to look back on the assumptions that were
the foundation for those actions. The other way around, improving organizational learning, second-level learning in particular, requires improving the assessments of the impact of peacebuilding missions.
Because peacebuilding usually takes place in highly unstable, chaotic contexts, assessment of the impact missions have is very difficult. Causal relations are hard to prove, and the outcomes of peacebuilding missions do not necessarily reflect the organization’s ability to learn. Besides that, self-reflection and flexibility are difficult enough for individuals, let alone for organizations. Campbell identifies two possible obstacles for organizational learning (2008, pp. 28-29). The first obstacle is a tendency towards routines. Learning in organizations is commonly guided by organizational routines that are constructed based on past experiences (Campbell, 2008, p. 28). Routines are: “The rules, procedures, technologies, beliefs, and cultures that are conserved through systems of socialization and control. Actions in organisations therefore involves matching procedures to situations more than it does calculating choices” (Campbell, 2008, p. 28). Routines form a framework through which peacebuilding missions view an environment and the tools and methods that are at their disposal in order to solve conflict and achieve peace. These routines are primarily the result of past experiences and interpretations, which does not have to be a bad thing. Second-level learning is in fact doing just that, but learning the right lessons without making mistakes translating them to a new context is extremely difficult. Individuals, looking at a situation through their own particular lens, make “numerous mistakes in their attempts to interpret and draw lessons from history, leading to systematic biases in interpretation” (Campbell, 2008, p. 28). As these systematic biases affects routines on a aggregated decision making level, the structures that are partly the result of these mistakes in interpretation simultaneously affect decision making on the individual level. The
complexity of the situations peacebuilding missions operate in makes it important to be flexible, and a tendency towards routines can clash with this need. On top of that, the many variables influencing outcomes make it difficult to assess the impact missions have, which downplays the need for change in routines.
The second obstacle for organizational learning that Campbell identifies is that organizations learn in relation to targets: “Organisational behaviour depends on the relation between the outcomes they observe and the aspirations, or targets, they have for those outcomes. An organisation therefore learns what it defines and measures as successful” (Campbell, 2008, p. 29). Targets are mostly restricted to implementing mandates, disregarding the complexity of the context and the influence of the effects of actions of peacebuilding missions on a longer term. Double-loop learning is
necessary in overcoming these hurdles. In questioning the assumptions that are the foundations of the routines and goals of peacebuilding missions, their theories of change, peacebuilding missions can adapt them to the context. The question should not be what works in general, or how can this
mission succeed, but how can we (peacebuilders and population together) create a sustainable peace. This requires a massive amount of context sensitivity and organizational learning, which makes it hard, but it should nonetheless be the aim of peacebuilding.
All that is described above points on one hand to the importance of organizational learning for peacebuilding, while on the other hand it shows the complexity of the cases peacebuilding missions try to solve, and how difficult it is to determine whether the lessons learned actually improve the ability of an organization to engage with their environment, or rather conform with their biased theories of change to justify certain courses of action and overlook better alternatives.
Methods for measuring organizational learning
This article looks at the process of organizational learning and how it affects the outcomes of peacebuilding missions. It adds to the literature on organizational learning in peacebuilding by examining the case of East Timor in an attempt to unravel how organizational learning has affected the missions and their outcomes. To do this, first of all the context before the peacebuilding
operations in East Timor will be explained, and an overview of all the missions and key events will be illustrated with a timeline. This article’s main focus is on the final mission, UNMIT, that started in 2006 and ended in 2012. However, in order to determine if and how second-level learning has influenced the way UNMIT was set up, organizational learning and the hurdles that it encountered in the previous missions need to be discussed first. This will be done through a comparison between the works of Howard (2007) and Chopra (2002), who both evaluate the first major peacekeeping mission, UNTAET, with opposite conclusions. Howard sees the mission as a success, because the goals of the mission were fulfilled, which she sees as the highest achievable result. Chopra classifies the mission as a failure, as it did not succeed in building a capable state and a sustainable peace. Here, Campbell’s theories on possible obstacles for organizational learning will be used to explain the importance of one’s standing in the debate concerning the question when peacebuilding is successful when measuring organizational learning. Second-level organizational learning in UNMIT will be measured by looking at improvements in the preconditions for first-level learning, and the
application of lessons learned in the previous mission. First-level organizational learning in UNMIT will be measured by using Howard’s list of indicators for organizational learning complimented by Campbells work on the obstacles for organizational learning (2007). Howard’s indicators are presented above in table 1. Process tracing will be used to examine key points in the mission where organizational learning could (or should) have occurred, and assess why and how organizational learning took place, or did not.
Process tracing is a useful method because it can be used to distil causal mechanisms (Beach, 2017), and organizational learning is an essential part of the causal mechanism that explains why
peacebuilding missions are successful or not. On top of that, as organizational learning only counts as learning if it betters an organization’s ability to engage with the environment, it is in itself a causal mechanism between changes in the mission’s approach and improvement in this ability. Behind this are the assumptions and routines Campbell points out, which influence what is considered
improvement and what is considered dysfunction.
The measurement of the transfer of knowledge and the linkages between actors can help in understanding the impact of peacebuilding activities:
“Potential linkages can be determined by evaluating how each organisation’s capacity, theories of change and working assumptions fit with those of other actors and with the needs and perceptions of the society emerging from conflict. During planning and implementation, these potential linkages can be seen as windows of opportunity.
Transfer measures the impact of each linkage and indicates the momentum created toward the causes of peace. Transfer can be measured by outlining the hypothesised causal chain of the theory of change, after it has been tested against the context and assessing the degree to which the impact is transferred according to the predicted causal chain, as well as the degree to which it aligns with new opportunities that were not predicted.” (Campbell, 2008, pp. 27-28)
Peacebuilding in East Timor
Background
East Timor has a long history of conflict and foreign invasion, which is illustrated in table 2. The territory was officially declared a colony by Portugal in 1702, while the other part of the Island, West Timor, had been under Dutch domination since 1613. When in 1974 a new Portuguese government came in power, supporting gradual decolonization of East Timor, this resulted in a power struggle over control of the territory. Indonesia filled this gap by invading East Timor in December 1975, claiming to liberate it from its colonial suppressor. The international community did not act; they were afraid that East Timor could fall under communistic influence, and on top of that were reluctant to hurt relations with Indonesia. During the 24 years Indonesia ruled East Timor, one quarter of its original population has died (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 17). This connected the people of East Timor, who were separated by linguistic and geographical boundaries before the introduction of Baha Indonesia (the Indonesian language), and were not aware or interested in the concept of nation-states or nationalism (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 14).
The people of East Timor are historically and spiritually deeply tied to the land. Owning land meant having a livelihood and social status, and animistic beliefs that are still being practiced by East Timorese up to date formed a spiritual connection with the land. But the mountainous terrain separated communities, each community with their own language and culture as a result. The introduction of a common language by the Indonesians made it possible for the East Timorese to communicate with one another. The many deaths and hardships during the Indonesian rule in combination with the newfound ability to communicate across communities caused East-Timorese from different communities to bond, paving the way for nation wide resistance against the
Indonesian regime. Catholicism played a central role in this resistance. As a result of the work of Portuguese missionaries, it was the only formal religion on the half island. The Indonesian regime required the East Timorese to adhere to an official religion, and the Catholic church became an institute where East Timorese could organize themselves and where an East Timorese common language was spread: Tetum Praca (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 15).
That’s how a the idea of nation grew in the minds of the East Timorese; under pressure of a common enemy, within the borders of a territory determined by colonial powers, but with that alien concept of nation-state as their only hope for salvation. The resistance had placed their hopes on the United Nations, which never acknowledged the Indonesian invasion. In order to become independent, East Timor needed the international community to acknowledge them as a country. The best they could could do was lobbying and resisting peacefully, accentuating their role as victims in a one sided onslaught. And then a chance appeared. A new government came in power in Indonesia in 1999, and
choose for themselves whether they wanted independency or autonomy within Indonesia (Howard, 2007, p. 264). This resulted in the idea of a national ballot under UN supervision on the issue of independence or autonomy.
UNAMET
The ballot was a result of tripartite talks between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN (Howard, 2007, p. 264). East Timor was not represented, while the major political parties in East Timor had united under the flag of the National Council of Timorese Resistance as possible political representative, which is illustrative for the lack of influence the East Timorese had, especially during the early stages of UN intervention (Chopra, 2002; Howard, 2007, p.264). UNAMET became the first UN mission in East Timor, mandated to organize and oversee the ballot. Indonesian military was tasked to maintain peace and security and to “insure the integrity of the consultation and the security of international staff and observers” (un.org, 1999). The integrity of the consultation was not upheld by the
Indonesians, on the contrary, “massive government funds and resources were channelled to pro-autonomy groups, and indeed the militia” (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, p. 128). The fact that observers on the ground repeatedly reported that the conditions for a free and fair ballot did not exist should have been a red flag for the UN concerning Indonesia’s interests and corresponding courses of action in East Timor. But the stakes were too high at this point, and the ballot continued. Leaving security solely to Indonesia would prove a fatal mistake. The international community and the East Timorese were unprepared for the “scorched earth” campaign that was unleashed after the ballot ended in a landslide victory in favour of independence. The exact reasons why the
pro-Indonesian militias wrecked havoc are unknown, but as the decision for independence had irreversibly been made, the most logical explanation would be retribution (Howard, 2007, p.266). The result of the “scorched earth” campaign was devastating. Approximately 70 percent of the infrastructure was destroyed, nearly all homes, and about the same percentage of the East Timorese population was displaced. All administrative services collapsed. Around 1,500 East Timorese and nine UN members were killed (Howard, 2007, p. 266). Eventually, Australia led an international military force, INTERFET, to restore order.
That the East Timorese were not consulted and involved in decision making, and that possible outbreaks of violence were not predicted, can both be seen as missed chances for organizational learning. But the situational conditions were harsh, and the mission was political of nature, not meant for peacekeeping. The East Timorese wanted the vote to proceed, in fear of losing the momentum: “As one East Timorese man explained, “They’ve been killing us for twenty-four years. They’ll kill us whether we vote or not. This is the only chance we will have to show the world that
East Timor wants independence, and we must use it.”” (Howard, 2007, pp. 265-266). From above, the UN Secretary-General issued a commission to investigate whether East Timor was ready for the ballot, which decided the conditions were as good as they would get and prolongation of the process would be a risk for the conducting of the vote (Howard, 2007, p. 266).
UNTAET
In the aftermath of the “scorched earth” campaign and INTERFRET intervention, there was no effective national government in the country. The Indonesians that ran the country before had fled, and the East Timorese were not educated in governing, and still young as a nation. The ballot ended in favour of independence, but how could the East Timorese govern themselves? In order to prepare East Timor for independence, the UN embarked on the momentous task of state building in a mission called UNTAET. Several assumptions were made starting the mission that greatly affected the route the mission and organizational learning within it took. The first was that the UN saw the country as a “state-centric terra nullius”, where the state had to be built from the ground up (Chopra, 2002, p. 981). In this process, the pre-existing political structures were not taken in account, nor were the local population’s points of view. The second assumption was that the ultimate goal of the peacekeeping mission was independence. While it is true that independence was the goal of the mission, achieving this goal is only worthwhile if the independent East Timor is able to effectively govern itself and the outcome of the mission is sustainable peace. This relates to the debate on success in peacebuilding.
Success in peacebuilding can be defined either broadly or narrowly. A narrow definition of success in peacebuilding takes in account the situational difficulties peacebuilding missions tend to encounter by limiting the agency of the missions to the mandates and peace agreements. Howard is a supporter of a narrow definition of success in peacebuilding, claiming it is unreasonable to “expect that
peacekeeping operations would be able to resolve crises beyond the standards set by the peace accords or the Security Council resolutions” (2007, p. 7). Mistakes will always be made in peacebuilding, exactly because the context is usually highly complex, and it would be unfair to demand UN missions to always do the right thing. However, focusing too much on fulfilling mandates as purpose of a mission can lead to blind spots to potential factors undermining the higher purpose of creating an environment in which a sustainable positive peace is assured. The UNTAET mission in East Timor is an example of a case in which that happened. A broader definition of success in peacebuilding means that the superior goal of peacebuilding is achieving such peace. Although this means setting the bar real high, it prevents peacebuilding missions to lose track of the bigger picture. Success is a word that might be good for morale, but should be used with caution on complex
missions like this. It is more useful to look at successes and failures within a mission when assessing the impact a mission has had. Which definition of success one uses influences how one evaluates organizational learning within and between missions. When defining success narrowly, lessons learned during a mission might not lead to a sustainable peace but rather primarily to fulfilment of the mandate, which is then at least not classifiable as optimal learning.
Under Howard’s definition of success, UNTAET is seen as a success. An important side note here is that her book on organizational learning and peacekeeping success was written before the new conflict arose. This makes it the more interesting to look at the reasons why peace was not sustained. If the transition of power seemed to have progressed as successfully as she claims, how could the state built by the UN almost fall apart soon after? Just as other authors on the subject, she finds a lot of organizational dysfunction in the early stages of the mission. Tensions between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs caused rivalry within the UN, undermining the ability to effectively transfer information between the departments. This proved a barrier for organizational learning when DPKO became in charge of the mission, and modelled the mission after the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Their plan was to incorporate the early decrees and mandates of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in a simple and fully integrated structure that would become the body of the mission
(Howard, 2008, p. 274). Another failed attempt at second-level learning was the exclusion of locals from the early state building process, which was based on experiences in Cambodia (Howard, 2008, p. 274). The idea was that it was best to build the state first, and afterwards transition the power to a “newly minted state machine and its head and its officials” (Chopra, 2002, p. 981). This was a tough call for the East Timorese who had hoped for the opportunity to determine their own future. They felt betrayed by the United Nations. The Department of Political Affairs had a better relationship with the local leaders, but they were bypassed. Another mistake that caused a loss of potential
organizational learning was the small amount of staff from UNAMET that was hired for UNTAET. By not hiring them, individually held knowledge about the dynamics of the situation and the
environment was discarded (Howard, 2008, p. 275).
The preconditions for first-level learning were poor, but Howard determines there was improvement in the main pillar of the mission that led to better engagement with the environment. The first pillar of the mission, governance and public administration, was the most comprehensive, including executive and legislative duties, as well as the civilian police and judicial affairs division (Howard, 2008, p. 277). A lot of things went wrong, as described above, but according to Howard, “most of the staff and the leadership of UNTAET also eventually recognized the need for change” (2007, p. 277). She argues that this need for change was driven by efforts from East Timorese and the resignation of
the head of the District Administration, Jarat Chopra, whose articles about the need for decentralization of power in UNTAET caused the East Timorese leadership to threaten with resignation. In June 2000, the National Council (or ‘Second Transitional Administration”) was
installed, along with a Cabinet of Transitional Government in East Timor (Howard, 2008, p. 280). Half of the Cabinet and the entire National Council consisted of East Timorese, which seems to have lessened tensions between East Timorese and UNTAET. Howards concludes that: “In sum, while the most important pillar of the operation began in a dysfunctional organizational mode, over time, with pressure from the East Timorese and from its own members, the pillar began to change the way it interacted with the East Timorese, and it was able to fulfil many of the tasks it set out to accomplish” (2007, p. 281).
Chopra disagrees with these statements. He argues that the transitional government did not function properly, never achieving much of a presence below the district level, where a majority of the
population lives (Chopra, 2002, p. 993). Power was not distributed, but kept central. Locals were systematically kept from national decision making, for instance illustrated by the language barrier during meetings. The meetings were held in English, but as most East Timorese did not understand English, they had rather have had Portuguese as main language. The UN had not succeeded in creating any kind of local government, as power structures reverted to their former village level, where they were manipulated out of sight from international observers (Chopra, 2002, p. 933). Howard claims the elections for the Constituent Assembly were won fair and square by Fretilin, the biggest party in the CNRT. But according to Chopra, the elections were not fair at all, and resulted in a division of loyalties, with on one side the politicized armed forces who were in allegiance with the President, and on the other a Prime Minister who effectively controlled the political system and was probably complicit in the rise of independent security forces (Chopra, 2002, p. 982). Furthermore, the elections were used as an exit strategy by UNTAET, although they were not part of the original mandate. Free, peaceful elections, was the argument, is proof of the mission’s success in transferring power to an independent East Timor. The UN’s claim of mission success was challenged in a letter sent by Lucas da Costa, Rector of the Higher Institute for Economics and Management in East Timor. He called for a reliably accountable international assessment of the gap between the original mandate and the hardly functioning nation that was a result of it (Chopra, 2002, p. 994). There have been more accounts of failed attempts of organizational learning in UNTAET than successful ones. Useful knowledge of former UNAMET personnel was disregarded, internal strife disrupted cooperation and knowledge transfer between two UN departments, and most importantly, the East Timorese were not properly included in the state building process. Their exclusion originated from routines of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who made this decision based on
results from previous peacebuilding missions. As organizations learn what they define and measure as successful, one can argue like Howard that in fulfilling their task of making East Timor
independent, UNTAET has increased its ability to engage with the East Timorese and hand power over to them. But if what Chopra states about the failure of state building and including East Timorese is true, which the near collapse of the state in 2006 and other situational and historic factors seem to point to, then the mission was not successful in creating a properly working state that could be the foundation for a sustainable peace. Nowadays, even the United Nations
acknowledge the mission had ended too early. For future reference, it would be wise not to focus too much on finishing the goal of the mandate when peacebuilding, but constantly re-evaluating how mandates and peace agreements serve the ultimate goal of sustainable peace, and what else might be important to maximize the chance to achieve this.
UNMISET and UNOTIL
UNMISET was the follow up peacekeeping mission for UNTAET, mandated to support the newly founded government and effectively transfer all operational responsibilities to the East Timorese government. This time, key staff and knowledge were handed down from UNTAET to UNMISET, while UNTAET’s vast amount of recourses were mainly channelled to the new government. The mission included three primary programs in its mandate: assistance of the East Timorese government, the provision of interim law enforcement and development of an effective national police force, and support for the maintenance of the external and internal security (Howard, 2007, p. 291). This focus on security meant the mission consisted largely of military personnel, rather resembling a cease-fire mission instead of a peacekeeping mission (Howard, 2007, p. 291). The local communities were much more involved in the mission, mainly through contact and cooperation with the military who were training the locals. Major problems still persisted, especially in the police and justice departments. Corruption in the police force was still high, a legacy of centuries of colonialism and invasion. East Timor therefore requested a large quantity of international civilian police advisors to remain after UNMISET (Howard, 2008, p. 293). The mandate was due in one year, but got prolongated to three. All of this points to a certain degree of organizational learning. The mission had learned from early mistakes of UNTAET by taking the knowledge of their staff in account and improving their
relationship with the local population in order to transfer knowledge to them. This is partly due to the differences in goals set by UNMISET in comparison to UNTAET. UNMISET was mandated to assist the local government, which implies cooperation, while UNTAET was much more authoritarian of nature. The habit to separate development from other peacebuilding components has proved hurtful throughout the mission (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 82).
There was still a external security problem in East Timor. Indonesia was not planning an overt invasion, but the presence of around 30 pro-integration militia groups in the country still caused a security issue (Howard, 2007, p. 293). Another prolongation of mainly the military component of the mission was for that reason requested by East Timor and Secretary-General Koffi Annan, but was rejected by the United States. Instead, a unanimous vote in the Security Council led to the foundation of the United Nation Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). This is an example of an external barrier for organizational learning, posed by the power of the Security Council. It negated the lessons learned from the field that pointed to a need for long-term security in East Timor.
UNOTIL was a lot smaller than UNMISET, comprised of merely forty-five civilian advisors, seventy-five police advisors and ten human rights officers (and no military personnel) (Howard, 2007, p. 293). This small amount of staff was feared to not have the ability to hold the progress made in East Timor (Howard, 2007, p. 294), and rightly so. The power of Fretilin, which has a Leninist organizational structure, in the national government was so dominant and uncontested, it started to resemble more and more an authoritarian one-party system (Chopra, 2002; Kingsbury, 2009, p. 108). Although the intentions of the UN were to install a democracy, as part of the liberal peacebuilding mantra, the foundations for a democracy were brittle. Democracy as the highest possible form of political system has become a self-evident truth, another important assumption and target influencing organizational learning. But as said before, the nation of East Timor has a limited history of nationalism or
democratic values. Fretilin had been the dominant political party since the start of the independence, and had identified itself directly to the state of East Timor, equalling criticizing them to criticizing the state. The abuse of state sovereignty by Fretilin led to resistance of the state and tensions between the army, Falintil-Timor-Leste Defence Force, and the government. Rumours arose that the military would assume political authority in case of state failure, posing a threat to the state itself (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 111). The obligation of civil disobedience became a question of debate. Since the state was not providing security to all civilians and state institutions were not functioning properly, the feeling of obligation of listening to the government faded. Development issues were for a large part
accountable for the growing frustration amongst the East Timorese. Unemployment and illiteracy were still at respectively 43.5 and 54.2 percent of the local population in 2004 (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 113). These factors were reinforced by the young age of the population, with 40 percent being less than fifteen years old, and the highest fertility rate in the world, with an average of 7.8 children per woman in 2008 (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 113). The judicial system and police were two of the weakest links in the government, which was already a problem in UNTAET (Howard, 2007). Nepotism and police brutality were common, reminiscent of the colonial power structures and fuelled by
the police grew, the police being loyal to Rogerio Lobato of Fratilin and the military. This cleavage, already observed by Chopra in 2002, became identified along geographic lines of east and west (inside East Timor, not East and West Timor). This eventually led to the conflict between the East Timorese police and military in 2006, which became the end of UNOTIL and introduced a new wave of violence displacing a majority of East Timorese from their homes yet again (Kingsbury, 2009).
UNMIT
The failure of state functions that became apparent to the world when violence broke out again in East Timor due to incompetency within the government, mainly the police force, the judiciary system and the army, forced the UN to recognize their accountability of the failure. The withdrawal of UNTAET and UNMISET had been too early, and it had not put enough emphasis on economic and social development (UNMIT, 2012). By explicitly recognizing this after the conflict in a report to the Security Council on the eighth of August, 2006, the Secretary-General pointed out that nation-building and peacenation-building are long-term tasks.
This points to a form of double-loop learning, in
which the assumptions at the foundation of UNTAET and UNMISET were questioned: “The
Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a United Nations multidimensional,
integrated mission, with the mandate to support the Government of Timor-Leste and to
assist it in its
efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation; to support the country in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process; to ensure, through thepresence of United Nations police with an executive policing mandate, the restoration and
maintenance of public security; to assist in liaising with the Indonesian military through the impartial presence of United Nations Military Liaison Officers; and to assist in further strengthening the national capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights” (UNMIT, 2012). Though these mandates resemble the tasks of UNTAET and UNMISET, the focus of the mission was more on social and economic development as a means of strengthening the state than the other way around. This should have been the aim of previous missions, but nonetheless helped in overcoming the obstacle for organizational learning of missions thinking in terms of separate targets of
peacebuilding elements, and looking at an overall sustainable peace as desired outcome. In 2008, the former Military Police Commander Alfredo Reinado attempted a coup d’etat by launching attacks on the in 2007 elected President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, was prevented. Ramos-Horta was almost killed in the attack. The crisis was handled well by the East Timorese political parties and the population, which showed that their faith in the government had improved. The mission itself proceeded relatively smoothly from this point, aiding the government and the East Timorese in becoming capable of self-governance. The policing mission
succesfully transitioned their responsibilities to the national police in 2011, life expectancy from birth had increased by more than two years, the educational system improved and primary school
enrolement increased from 63 percent in 2006 to 90 percent in 2012, and illiteracy was on the path to being eradicated (UNMIT, 2012). East Timor became a participating member in the international community, contributing to UN missions in other parts of the world, assuming a leader position in the g7+, and contributing to the New Deal for aid effectiveness. Though the mandates of UNMIT were completed in 2012, the economic, social, and security situation in East Timor is still fragile. Therefore, the UN is still an active pressence in East Timor, having established a “innovative working relationship of cooperation for the post-UNMIT phase focusing on institutional strengthening and development” (UNMIT, 2012).
The table below (Table 3) provides an overview of the obstacles for organizational learning and occasions where organizational learning did occur during the peacebuiling missions in East Timor.
Table 3 Organizational learning and its obstacles in UN peacebuilding in East Timor
In sum, there are signs of a progressive trend in organizational learning in East Timor. Sadly, this learning process was characterised by trial and error, with the outbreak of violence as essential catalyst for improvement in double-loop learning. Hopefully the overall second-level learning that might be distiled for use in future mission will take the errors and assumptions made throughout the peacebuilding experiences in East Timor in full account.
Conclusion
Peacebuilding is an extremely complicated practice, of which the difficulty is greatly determined by the situational factors in place. Expecting peacebuilding missions to achieve a sustainable, positive peace is unrealistic, but in order to maximize the effectivity of the process the bar on mission success must be set high. Going back to the research question, how organizational learning has influenced peacebuilding missions in East Timor and their outcomes, the answer has multiple facets. On one hand the UN has learned from their experiences in East Timor, by focusing on development in order to create an environment in which the East Timorese can govern themselves and maintain and stimulate positive peace. On the other hand, there have been many missed chances for improvement in organizational learning throughout the missions, caused by the routines the missions were stuck in, and the focus on finishing the goals the missions were mandated to. In East Timor, multiple organizational misconducts negatively impacted the preconditions for organizational learning, drawn from experiences from previous peacebuilding missions. The idea that involvement of the local population would lessen the effectivity of the state-building process, has persisted throughout UNTAET, resulting in a failed state. By appointing separate end goals to each mission, like building an independent state for UNTAET and supporting the government for UNMASIT, the actual goal of achieving a sustainable peace in the country was disregarded. This led to obstacles for organizational learning, and eventually the clash between the national police and army in 2006. This event
highlighted the need for UN support in developing not only the government and its institute, but also economic and social conditions for the whole population. UNMIT can be seen as the accumulation of experiences and knowledge from previous mission that are a result of actual organizational learning. Lessons from previous missions were taken in account, and the focus was increasingly on closing cleavages within the population in order to achieve a sustainable peace. This is an example of second-level organizational learning, for they used double-loop learning to look at the assumptions they had made in previous missions and why they had not succeeded in achieving lasting peace, and applied this to a new approach in UNMIT.
Organizational learning is by definition important for peacebuilding when supporting a broad definition of success in peacebuilding. To improve the ability to engage with the environment, and take lessons learned from other missions and apply them to new cases while aware of the sensitivity of the conflict and the context, means improving the ability to achieve sustainable, positive peace. In the case of East Timor, this importance become apparent. With a higher level of organizational
learning, a lot bloodshed and distress could have been prevented, while at the same time organizational learning led to improvement of the conditions for most East Timorese.
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