The formation of the European Battlegroups
A study on the foundation of the European Battlegroups through the lens of
Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Master thesis
Written by: Stefan Levels Student number: S1946285 Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management Thesis supervisor: Dr. Jaap Reijling Word count: 26.989
“One can go to war alone, but you can't build peace alone”
Jacques Chirac
These words by former French president Jacques Chirac indicate the sentiment that underlies the topic of this thesis. This study has attempted to research whether the cooperation between European armed forces in the form of the European Battlegroups can be explained by the Liberal Intergovernmentalism framework for international cooperation.
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all those who have assisted me in making this thesis possible. I am specifically grateful for the help that Hans van Santen, Dick Zandee, Patrick Bolder, and Eric Wilms provided me with in this study. Without their input this study would not have been possible.
Additional and special gratitude goes out to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Jaap Reijling for his assistance and guidance throughout the process of writing this thesis.
Abstract
This study focuses on the application of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) framework on the formation of the European Battlegroups (EUBG). The LI framework attempts to explain European integration and consists out of three stages in which states: define their preferences, bargain to reach a common agreement, and finally create - or reform - institutions to secure the results of these negotiations. The goal of this study is to assess whether the LI framework has the explanatory potential to shed light on the formation of the EUBG. With use of the framework the case of the EUBG will be analysed through the determination of national policy preferences, the bargaining that led to an agreement, and finally the choice for an institutional form. The three steps of the mentioned LI framework will be assessed with use of both document analysis and interviews conducted with policy experts. One of the main
findings of this study indicates that a strive for positive geopolitical externalities and an ability to act autonomously were the main national policy preferences leading towards the eventual creation of the EUBG. However, this study found that the formation of the EUBG cannot be fully explained by the framework of LI. The LI framework seems to fail in explaining the formation of this ‘high politics’ regarded form of cooperation. Therefore, this study advises future research to use the LI framework in assessing the formation of other security and defence related forms of cooperation, that are considered ‘high politics’, this includes, among others, PESCO, EUROPOL, and the European Defence Agency. Furthermore, this study argues that the common interest that the United Kingdom and Europe hold with regard to security and defence will outlive the UK exiting the European Union. The UK and Europe will continue to share threats such as cyberterrorism, non-state actor violence, and terrorism. As both sides do not benefit from weakening the other, this study recommends to not stick to the zero-sum nature of security and defence with regard to future Brexit negotiations as both sides have a lot to lose from this approach.
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 1
1.1 Academic & societal relevance ... 4
2. Theoretical framework ... 5
2.1 National preferences ... 9
2.1.1 Geopolitical interest ... 10
2.2.2 Economic interest ... 11
2.2 Interstate bargaining ... 12
2.2.1 Supranational bargaining theory ... 13
2.2.2 Intergovernmental bargaining theory ... 15
2.3 Institutional choice ... 16 2.3.1 Federalist ideology ... 17 2.3.2 Technocratic governance ... 18 2.3.3 Credible commitments ... 19 2.4 Analytical framework ... 20 3. Research Design ... 25 3.1 Method ... 25 3.2 Data collection ... 25 3.3 Data Analysis ... 27 3.3.1 Operationalization ... 28
3.4 Reliability & Validity ... 29
4. Analysis ... 31
4.1 The dependent variable ... 31
4.2 State policy preferences ... 33
4.2.1 Document Analysis ... 34 4.2.2 Interviews ... 37 4.3 Distribution of benefits ... 40 4.3.1 Document analysis ... 41 4.3.2 Interviews ... 48 4.4 Institutional choice ... 50 4.4.1 Interviews ... 51 4.5 Results ... 55
4.5.1 Document analysis results ... 55
4.5.2 Interview results ... 57 5. Conclusion ... 61 5.1 Research question ... 61 5.2 Reflection ... 63 5.3 Recommendations ... 64 Bibliography ... 66
Appendix A Sources National Preferences ... 69
Appendix B Coded national preference ... 79
Appendix C Saint Malo Agreement ... 80
Appendix D Battlegroups concept ... 82
1. Introduction
Cooperation between - and integration of - armed forces within the European continent has been a relevant topic since the post-war period when there was an attempt to implement the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. The EDC had the goal of creating a European defence force that should function as an alternative solution to the accession of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, it had the goal of utilizing West Germany’s military potential in case there would be a serious conflict with the Soviet Union (EEAS, 2016). The exact history on the eventual failure of the EDC is a complicated one due to the different perspectives of the nations involved. However, the fact that the community would entail German rearmament made the EDC highly controversial on both a political and a societal level, particularly for those who only shortly before had suffered the trauma of German military occupation. Due to these controversies and a fear of losing sovereignty, the EDC led to political crises, amendments to constitutions, deep divisions which crossed party political boundaries; and, eventually, to failure of the concept as a whole (Fursdon, 1980). More recently, there has been progress in the creation of a common
European defence. This progress started with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The treaty declared that the “Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy” (Council of the European Communities, 1992).
After the treaty was formed, the formulation of a European defence policy was something that was worked on vigorously and ten years later this led to a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This policy is known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (EEAS, 2016). The CSDP which is implemented in the Treaty of the European Union, can be seen as the ultimate attempt to create a common European defence, and several explanations for the emergence of it, all driven by theoretical assumptions, are offered. These explanations vary from arguing that it is Europe’s wish to balance the United States, (Posen, 2006) to the EU’s failure to rise to the challenge of the Balkan wars (Wallace, 2005). Although there are studies into the emergence of the CSDP, the policy is considered undertheorized (Kurowska, 2012). Nevertheless, at their meeting in Cologne in 1999, the European Council agreed that:
“We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence” (European Council,
With this statement the Council indicated that the EU had ambitions on the international stage. In addition, during the European Council meeting in Helsinki, also in 1999, member states formulated the Headline Goal, which was a target to develop a European military capability. It stated a requirement that the EU should be capable of deploying 60,000 troops, within two months from notice that should be sustainable for a year (Lindstrom, 2004). A few years later, when the EU Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted in December 2003, a new target was set which became known as the Headline Goal 2010. This new goal built on the initial Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999, and states:
“…Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond
with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.” (European Council, 2004).
Although the goals set are considered very ambitious and the establishment of a
deployable military force of 60,000 troops is far out of sight at the moment, the line of thought about rapid response and the wish to act autonomous led to the formation of EU Battlegroups (EUBG). These battlegroups have been fully operational since 2007 and are military units, usually composed out of 1500 personnel of multiple nations, whom can be deployed within 15 days. Two EUBGs are on standby for a period of half a year, on a rotational basis. (EASS, 2017). One of these battlegroups was led by the Netherlands during the first half of 2018. This battlegroup had a core that consisted out of forces from the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg, with Austrian participation. During this first half of 2018 the Dutch contribution included headquarter elements of the 13 Light Armoured Brigade and two infantry companies with combat and logistics support. In the second half of 2018 the Netherlands also
contributed. This time with one infantry company in a German led battlegroup (Dutch MoD, 2017). In the past, issues which related to political willingness, usability, and the financing of operations have prevented the EUBG from being deployed. However, there is hope within the European Union that the battlegroups will be deployed in the future (EEAS, 2016). The European Battlegroups concept will be researched as a case in this current study due to the fact that on the one hand it is a unique form of European cooperation in the field of security and defence and on the other hand the battlegroups concept is often criticized for not functioning properly and the fact that it has never been deployed. Additionally, the battlegroups in their current shape and form diverge largely from the ambitions that the European Union had and still has when it comes to building a common defence.
This current study into the case of the European Battlegroups will be conducted through the theoretical lens of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). Credit for the reformation of Liberal IR theory in a non-utopian way must be given to Andrew Moravcsik. His
framework of international cooperation - that will form foundation for this research - was set out in numerous articles that were published in the 1990’s. The LI framework marries
Neoliberal Institutionalism (NI) and bargaining theory and creates a more complete picture of institutional formation (Richter, 2016). Moravcsik’s framework consists out of three stages in which states: define their preferences, bargain to reach a common agreement, and finally create - or reform - institutions to secure results of the negotiations. Each stage of the framework is independent, and is explained by a specific theory, this being the theories of preferences, bargaining, and institutionalization (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009).
Diverging from other liberal theories, Moravcsik (1998) defines LI as a general approach used to study interstate cooperation in world politics. And different from Neoliberal
Institutionalism - in which the EU is mainly the result of shared economic interests - LI promises to explain why and in what way security and defence cooperation was put on the European agenda (Richter, 2016). Although in the past the framework developed by
Moravcsik was mainly used to explain ‘low politics’ phenomena as economic integration; this current study will attempt to explain security cooperation and integration in the European Union, which is considered to be ‘high politics’, with the Liberal Intergovernmentalism framework.
This current research will assess if Liberal Intergovernmentalism can indeed explain the formation of European Battlegroups. This has led to the following research question:
RQ: Does the Liberal Intergovernmentalism framework of international cooperation have the explanatory power to explain the multi-causal steps that led to the formation of the European Battlegroups (EUBG), and if not, why not?
An elaboration on the academic and societal relevance of the research topic will follow in the next paragraph. In the second chapter the theoretical framework that shall provide the guidelines along which this research be conducted will be laid out. The methodology for this study will be described in the third chapter of this proposal. The fourth chapter of this thesis will focus on analysing the case and in the fifth and final chapter, conclusions, reflections on the result of the study and recommendations for future study will be presented.
1.1 Academic & societal relevance
In recent years there has been little research into the implementation of the CSDP and the formation of EU Battlegroups (EUBG). Most research into cooperation between European armed forces dates back to the period following the treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and the formation of the ESDP in 2002 (e.g. Hill, 1993; Taylor, 1994; Whitman, 2004 and Posen, 2006). This study will try to examine whether the formation of the EUBG can be explained by Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Additionally, as Hofmann (2012) puts it, the research that has been conducted into the CSDP is inspired substantively from a realist perspective and
contributions from a Liberal approach are still rather sparse. This will be done by looking into the formation of the European Battlegroups along the lines of the Liberal
Intergovernmentalism framework. By using the Liberal Intergovernmentalism approach, this current research will fill a gap within in the academic literature on European defence
cooperation.
From a societal point of view, the relevance of this study can be found in the fact that the integration of European armed forces is a hot topic in media reports and domestic politics. It was only in November of last year that French president Macron stated that “we will not protect the Europeans unless we decide to have a true European army.” (Mexler, 2018). In the past research has been conducted to measure support amongst the public for the integration of European policy in the field of defence by Richard Eichenberg (2003). Eichenberg’s study shows that in most of the European countries there is “a strong majority that considers a European defence organization to be necessary”. The societal support for this cooperation that was already there when the ESDP was first implemented has been boosted by political support in the past years due to events within Europe as a result of Brexit, the migration crisis and the stance that U.S. president Donald Trump holds towards NATO. These recent developments seem to have led to different attitude with regard to defence within the European Commission and is labelled by some as a ‘game-changer’ or a ‘breakthrough’ (Zandee, 2018). Recent developments in the international political arena, combined with the fact that there is little research into the EUBG from a Liberal Intergovernmentalism perspective and the strong societal and political support for European defence cooperation will make this study a relevant addition to the academic literature on the EUBG.
2. Theoretical framework
Several theoretical traditions within International Relations (IR) can be categorized under the heading of Intergovernmentalism: Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism (NI) and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). Reasoning of scholars within these traditions is based on the assumption that a state is a unitary actor on the stage of international politics. This entails that Intergovernmentalism refers to the cooperation between states that are unitary and sovereign. Within this system, states formulate and bargain over preferences with international
counterparts and decisions that are taken on an international level are implemented on the national level without many discrepancies. Although the state is considered to be unitary and sovereign, international organisations are seen as facilitators of cooperation. The constituent part of these international organisations, the states, will keep them as long as they fulfil this function (Hofmann, 2012). This current study will be conducted through the lens of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, as this theoretic framework is developed in order to better understand European integration, and therefore potentially explains the formation of the European Battlegroups (Moravcsik, 1998).
The period from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s is often considered as ‘the doldrums’ era for Europe, this entails both the European integration process as the academic writings on the subject of this integration. During this period a dedicated core of scholars continued the empirical study of the EU, but much of this work either refrained from grand theoretical claims about integration or accepted - with minor modifications - the Neo-functionalist/Intergovernmentalist debate. However, when the integration process was
reinvigorated in 1980s, this led to an explode in the scholarship on the EU and the theoretical debate was revived. One of the theories that originated due to this ‘relaunch’ of the integration process was Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). LI originated in the early- 1990s when
Andrew Moravcsik argued that the steps forward in the European integration process could be accounted for by a revised intergovernmental model that puts emphasis on national
preferences and relative power of EU member states (Pollack, 2005). The framework that Moravcsik (1998) developed puts emphasis on the reasoning of European governments to surrender sovereignty to an international institution and to coordinate policies with other European governments. The central claim that Moravcsik (1998) makes for European integration since 1955, is that it reflects three factors. These factors being: economic gains, important governments having a relative strong bargaining position, and the stimulus to improve the legitimacy of commitments between states. Moravcsik argues that the most important of these factors is commercial interest. He argues that European integration is the result of a series of choices made by national leaders who are in the pursuit of economic gain.
Whenever there was convergence between these interests, integration within Europe advanced (Moravcsik, 1998).
However, the European Community (EC) was shaped by more than just convergence of national preferences on an economic level. There were also important conflicts among the different states. These conflicts were resolved through hard interstate bargaining, in which serious threats for the vetoing of certain proposals, financial repercussions, and to form alternative alliances that would exclude certain governments were daily practice (Moravcsik, 1998). The results of these conflicts reflect the relative power that certain states have over others. This difference in relative power leads to asymmetrical interdependence, which entails that nations that have the most to gain from integration will be willing to compromise the most to realize it, while those who have the least to gain or for whom the costs of adaption are the highest are in position to impose conditions. Finally, to secure the substantive bargains that were made, the involved governments delegate and pool sovereignty in international institutions with the goal of pressuring other governments to commit (Moravcsik, 1998). This led to a framework in which states first define their preferences, then bargain to reach a common agreement, and finally create - or reform - institutions to secure results of the negotiations. In this framework each stage is separate, and backed by a separate theory, these being the theories of preferences, bargaining, and institutionalization (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2009).
These theories together form the framework for international cooperation that is Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This framework works under the precondition that a series of choices, made by national leaders will lead to further European integration. Moravcsik uses the term framework to designate a set of assumptions that makes it possible to separate a phenomenon that needs explanation - such as rounds of international negotiations - into elements which can be treated separately. Additionally, more focussed theories - each consistent with assumptions of the overall LI framework - are employed to explain each separate element. The elements are subsequently aggregated to create a multi-causal
explanation of a complex phenomenon as a major multilateral agreement (Moravcsik, 1998). Moravscik (1998) argues that governments first formulate a consistent set of preferences that could emerge from the negotiations. In this, “preferences are not simply a particular set of policy goals but a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular
international negotiation” (Moravcsik, 1998). The second stage concerns the development of strategies by states and working towards substantive agreements through bargaining. Finally, the third stage refers to the process in which states choose if they want delegate and pool a certain level of sovereignty in international institutions that will formalize the substantive
agreements they have made (Moravscik, 1998). Within the framework the choice for
international institutions would be theoretically unintelligible without first understanding the specific of bargains that a certain government is trying to secure. The three stage LI
framework developed by Moravcsik (1998) allows this current study to disaggregate the big puzzle of choosing for international institutionalization into theoretically more tractable questions. The questions that Moravcsik (1998) formulated are: What were the fundamental determinants of national preferences? Given those preferences, what factors best explain agreements on substance? Given agreements on substance, what factors best explain choices to construct particular international institutions? The contribution of each stage in the causal sequence is explained by a particular theory (or theories) and although in the past it was mainly used to explain economic integration, which can be considered ‘low politics’; this current study will apply it to defence cooperation, which is regarded to be ‘high politics’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011). This framework, is summarized in table 1 and will be elaborated on in the following paragraphs.
Table 1. International cooperation: The Liberal Intergovernmentalism framework
Stages of
Negotiation National preference formation
Interstate
Bargaining Institutional Choice Alternative
independent variables underlying each stage
What is the source of underlying national preferences?
Given national preferences, what explains the efficiency and
distributional outcomes of interstate bargaining?
Given substantive agreement, what explains the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions? Economic interests or Geopolitical interests? Intergovernmental bargaining or Supranational bargaining? Federalist Ideology or Centralized technocratic management or More credible commitment? Observed outcomes at each stage Underlying national preferences Agreements
on substance Choice to delegate or pool decision-making in international institutions
Throughout this study there will be a central position for different camps that
historically have represented the European member states. These being the ‘Atlanticist’ camp and the ‘Europeanist’ camp. The Atlanticist camp consists out of European member states who traditionally argued that security and defence is the domain of NATO and not the EU, and that security is best assured through transatlantic cooperation and a strong bond with the United States (Howarth, 2014). The Atlanticist camp includes several leading members of the EU, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Portugal. Alternatively, the
Europeanists camp consists out of nations that traditionally held the perspective that European integration and developing an independent European security capability would best serve the interest of individual European states. France is traditionally seen as the boaster and bearer of the Europeanist tradition and strongly argues that the European Union should work on
developing an independent defence capability that could respond quickly and effectively to regional security related challenges (Bensahel, 1999).
2.1 National preferences
The first stage of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) framework with regard to the
formation of intergovernmental organizations has to do with national preferences. Moravcsik (1998) defines these national preferences as “an ordered and weighed set of values placed on future substantive outcomes, often termed ‘states of the world’, that might result from
international political interaction”. Preferences can be seen as a reflection of the goals of domestic groups that influence the state. However, LI treats the state as an unitary actor, despite the considerable influence of domestic actors involved in the formation of preferences and foreign policy. It does this because the theory works under the assumption that “domestic political bargaining, representation, and diplomacy generate a consistent preference function” (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). From a liberal perspective, the preferences and goals that states have are neither established nor homogenous. These goals change over time and issues, among states, but also within states, this happens according to issue-specific societal interdependence and domestic institutions (Morvacsik, 2008).
Important in understanding international negotiations is the extent to which state preferences are compatible or conflictual. Moravcsik (1998) argues that the academic division on the level of state preferences between compatibility and conflict is incorrect. Most
academics will argue that state preferences are either a balance of common gains or
distributional trade-offs between countries. Moravcsik disagrees with regard to this positive- and zero-sum distinction and argues that the most fundamental proposition of bargaining theory assumes that absolute and relative power do not just coexist, but even interact. Therefore, an explanation of the preferences of European governments should not explain whether preferences are positive - or zero-sum but they should explain the mix of positive- and zero-sum elements in these preferences (Moravcsik, 1998).
Furthermore, there is a level of agreement between commentators and scholars that there are two types of motivations that define national preferences building within European integration. These are the geopolitical and economic interests that nations have. Geopolitical interest refers to a state’s perception of threats to national or territorial integrity. While, on the other hand the economic interests refers to the imperatives that are the result of mutual
dependence, and mostly the possibility for an increase in profits through trade among nations and the movement of capital. These competing explanations for national preferences rest on distinctive general theories widely used to explain international cooperation. A geopolitical explanation of international cooperation assumes that security issues are at the top of a hierarchy of foreign policy concerns. On the other hand, the economic explanation, which, according to Moravcsik has been the most important explanation for European integration in
the past, assumes that national preferences are a reflection of issue-specific interests (Moravcsik, 1998). The two following paragraphs will focus on the further elaboration of geopolitical and economic interest.
2.1.1 Geopolitical interest
The basis for arguing that geopolitical interest is the fundamental national preference in cooperation can be found in the connections between economic policies and politico-military goals that underlie these policies (Moravcsik, 1998). Within these national preferences the focus is on indirect consequences of integration, also referred to as ‘security externalities’ (Gowa, 1995). In this, integration is considered a manner of influencing ‘high politics’. Within these high politics there might be specific objective goals, like the countering of clear military threats to a nations territory and sovereignty, but the goals can also be subjective, as the threat to national identity. This leads to the argument that there is a larger chance of cooperation between states when the goals of other states align with a state’s own goals (Moravcsik, 1998). Additionally, Moravcsik (1998) argues that this seems plausible due to the believe that the international system is anarchic and therefore potentially dangerous. This leads to security threats being among the top priorities in state motives. The position of this approach is that when integration will result in positive geopolitical externalities, governments will favour integration. Alternatively, when this integration will lead to negative geopolitical externalities, governments are more likely to oppose it.
The geopolitical explanation for European integration falls in four categories of theorization. Each of these explanations puts emphasis on the importance of response to a perceived geopolitical threat. The first explanation - one that is essentially neo-Realist – focusses on the ‘balance of power’. In this view, integration is a means of strengthening an alliance against a common threat. For example, in Cold War Europe, the threat stemmed from the Soviet Union and domestic Communist parties that aligned with it. During the start of the Cold War, West Germany was worried about abandonment and other European countries were concerned about the possibility that West Germany would turn unilateralist or neutralist. This eventually led to the inclusion of West Germany into NATO (Moravcsik, 1998). A second explanation, stresses a different superpower balancing strategy. From this perspective, integration has the goal of improving Europe’s power and autonomy dominated by hegemons (Moravcsik, 1998). More recently, Barry Posen (2006) has argued that the EU is currently working towards a position in which it will be better capable of managing its security
problems in the direct vicinity of the union in an autonomous manner. The Union is doing this because they do not longer operate under the assumption that the United States will be there to
assist them at all times, and because Europeans are not fond of the manner in which the U.S. address certain issues. They realize they need an alternative option and see the creation of a credible military capability as essential in having such an option (Posen, 2006). The third explanation, sees integration as a regional arrangement aimed at the prevention of conflict among its members. The theoretical backing for this argument lies in the belief that integration nurtures shared economic interests, creates shared ideological norms, bolsters information flows, and imposes institutional control over critical state activities (Moravcsik, 1998). The last explanation that Moravcsik (1998) offers is based on ‘Ideational Liberal’ or ‘Liberal Constructivist’ theories and puts emphasis on Europeanism and nationalism amongst a nation’s population and elites. This relative legitimacy of nationalist and European federalist thinking differs for every country and determines the willingness of politicians and the general public to accept cooperation within federal European institutions. In his framework,
Moravcsik (1998) uses these four arguments as variants of a single explanation. Evidence favouring any of these explanations will count as support for the role of geopolitics. This is done from the perspective that bundling geopolitical explanations makes it easier to find evidence for the importance of geopolitical factors.
2.2.2 Economic interest
Where the geopolitical theory of national preferences focusses on the indirect consequences of integration, the economic variant stresses the immediate results of integration. Moravcsik (1998) argues that “theories of political economy explain international cooperation as an effort to arrange mutually beneficial policy coordination among countries whose domestic policies have an impact on one another.” From his perspective, cooperating with other
governments is a way for national governments to influence the economic policy externalities to their mutual benefit. These externalities are not simply a reflection of policy that is chosen by countries but also indicate their relative position in the markets. When markets render preferred policies to be incompatible or allow a policy to be to adjusted without costs to achieve a certain goal, a zero-sum situation with little incentive for cooperation is plausible (Moravcsik, 1998). While on the other hand, reciprocal policy adjustments can get rid of policy externalities that are considered negative, or develop positive alternatives more efficiently, this creates incentives for governments to coordinate their activities. High tariffs, detailed regulations and currency depreciation, can damage foreign export and create potential for cooperation. (Moravcsik, 1998).
Moravcsik (1998) argues that it is important to note that this is not solely an economic explanation. He argues that “the political economic explanation differs from a purely
economic explanation in that that it focusses on the distributional as well as the efficiency consequences of policy coordination”. Most important in this policy coordination are the producers, as there is a systematic bias in favour of producer groups that already exist, and against the consumer, the taxpayer, and potential future producers. Producers influence policy by exerting direct instrumental pressure on politicians. Moravcsik assumes that this is this influence of domestic producers comes solely from the peak organizations which represent three economic sectors: industry, agriculture and services. Although important, pressures from producers alone do not explain government policy. Governments will promote producer interests, aligned with restrictions by demand for regulatory protection, the efficiency of economics, and fiscal responsibilities (Becker, 1983). The four core policies for European integration in the past are the liberalization of agricultural trade, industrial trade, the removal of regulatory trade barriers, and the stabilization of exchange-rates (Moravcsik, 1998).
2.2 Interstate bargaining
Having elaborated on the competing explanations for national preference building, which is the first stage in the LI framework, further elaboration on the second stage - the interstate bargaining - will be provided in this paragraph. This paragraph will elaborate on the substantive bargains which governments agree upon, based on the framework provided by Moravcsik (1998). In the second stage of his framework, Moravcsik treats negotiations over treaties as a bargaining process over the exact form of cooperation that is beneficial for both parties. The bargaining model that Moravcsik refers to is developed by Ariel Rubinstein (1982), in his paper Rubinstein talks about the bargaining problem, and with this he refers to the following issue:
“Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements. Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are not entirely identical. What "will be" the agreed contract, assuming that both parties behave rationally?”
(Rubinstein, 1982)
While Rubinstein developed his theory from the perspective of economics and his model is often used within the context of business deals, bargaining theory has a lot of potential to explain negotiations within International Relations (IR). Within IR, the configuration of certain national preferences determines a certain ‘bargaining space’ of
potential agreements. Generally speaking, there is a legion of potential agreements, which can been seen across a Pareto frontier of bargains, in which, the exploitation of shared gains has been maximized (Moravcsik, 1998). The Pareto frontier, named after the Italian engineer and
economist Vilfredo Pareto refers to “a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off” (Osborne, 1997). The studying of bargaining requires a metric to measure the results of the bargain. Moravcsik (1998) makes the distinction between two dimensions of bargaining outcomes that are of particular interest: efficiency and the distribution of gains. These two dimensions refer to the two types of analytic questions that are most often asked during international
negotiations. The first of these questions refers to the interstate efficiency: Did governments exploit all potential gains left on the table? Or, were the negotiations Pareto-efficient? With regard to the interstate distribution, the question is as follows: how were the benefits of cooperation divided among parties? Or, who won and who lost the negotiations? The LI framework elaborates on two bargaining theories that have the potential of explaining the results of negotiations. These theories are termed supranational bargaining theory and intergovernmental bargaining theory. The supranational bargaining theory is drawn from a strand of neo-functionalism and puts emphasis on the role of supranational officials as political entrepreneurs in overcoming inefficient bargaining and influencing distributional outcomes. On the contrary, the intergovernmental bargaining theory - which according to Moravcsik has been dominant in explaining European integration in the past - claims that the strong urge within nations for cooperation leads to and influences negotiations. Furthermore, it argues that efficiency is not an issue, as governments are capable of being their own political entrepreneurs. Within intergovernmental bargaining theory, negotiators put emphasize the importance of how benefits are distributed, which in turn, are formed by a governments relative power (Moravcsik, 1998). The two following paragraphs will focus on the elaboration of both supranational bargaining theory and intergovernmental bargaining theory.
2.2.1 Supranational bargaining theory
From the perspective of supranational bargaining theory, interstate bargaining is not the result of intentional choices on the part of governments but from the unforeseen consequences of large, complex negotiations among issues that are referred to as package deals. A
supranational organisation such as the European Commission is necessary to make sure that an agreement emerges. In this line of argumentation, Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman (1989) go furthest when they argue that supranational entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for integration and that without leadership the demand for cooperation will remain latent.
These supranational entrepreneurs can exercise leadership in three ways according to Moravcsik (1998). Firstly, they can initiate negotiations by advancing proposals that have an emphasis on common problems and potential solutions that can serve as the background for negotiation. Additionally, these entrepreneurs can mediate among governments by working together with these governments on the development of compromise proposals. Finally, these supranational entrepreneurs can mobilize domestic politicians, officials, interest groups, and partisan or public opinion in favour of certain policies through the selective circulation of ideas and information. The assumptions that underlie these techniques to exercise leadership are widely accepted, but rarely made explicit. Therefore, Moravcsik (1998) argues that to test the theory, more precision is required. According to Moravcsik, this precision be traced back to in the extensive literature on the analysis of negotiation, international regime theory, international law, and American politics devoted to the role of third-party entrepreneurs as agenda-setters, mediators and mobilizers in international negotiations. What brings the literature on these topics together is that they have three common assumptions. These assumptions are: (1) bargaining power in international negotiations stems largely from the manipulation and generation of information and ideas, (2) information and ideas that are necessary to reach specific negotiated outcomes are costly and scarce for governments, and (3) centralized supranational authorities enjoy a level of privileged access to ideas and information (Moravcsik, 1998). Therefore, Moravcsik claims that a theory of supranational entrepreneurship must have a core that explains why supranational entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage over states in the dissemination and generation of ideas and critical information. Arguments for this can be divided into three categories, these categories being: creativity, trust, and communication. The first category, that of creativity sees supranational actors as ingenious, imaginative, flexible, and skilful. Arguments that stress trust argue that governments and domestic interest groups have reasons to withhold important information. This leaves individual governments without full knowledge about the pattern of preferences, and therefore, about potential compromises. In this case supranational entrepreneurs can act as effective mediators, helping actors to overcome this issue of preference revelation. And finally, arguments that stress communication argue that information is costly to coordinate and exchange among a large number of actors and therefore, can be more efficiently provided by a single, centralized source. If these arguments hold, a combination of these factors create reason to assume that supranational entrepreneurs have bargaining power in
intergovernmental negotiations. If these arguments do not hold, the supranational model is empirically disconfirmed and theoretically inappropriate (Moravcsik, 1998).
2.2.2 Intergovernmental bargaining theory
Differing largely from supranational bargaining theory, intergovernmental bargaining theory does not focus information being available or intervention by supranational entrepreneurs but on the distribution of bargaining power. This distribution will in turn reflect the nature of state preferences (Moravcsik, 1998). The theory of intergovernmental bargaining rests on three assumptions.
First, it assumes that treaty amending negotiations are conducted through unanimous voting in a system that is non-coercive. In this system governments can reject certain
agreements that would leave them off worse. Additionally, each government can support agreements, opt out, veto them, or seek alternative coalitions with a subset of governments. Also, it is assumed that within European democracies, military coercion, punitive economic sanctions, and non-credible threats of withdrawal are not cost-effective negotiation tactics. As coercion is limited and rational governments will veto outcomes that that make them worse off, it is assumed that negotiations will leave governments better off compared to unilateral or coalitional alternatives. Since negotiations take place, it can be assumed that joint gains exist and that governments are concerned to avoid failure of negotiations by external causes, as this would leave them all worse off (Moravcsik, 1998). Second, the theory of intergovernmental bargaining argues that the cost of generating information is relatively inexpensive compared to the benefits of interstate cooperation. According to Moravcsik (1998) the range of potential agreements, national preferences, and institutional options can be assumed to be common knowledge among the participating governments. Given their common interests and the absence of military threats, these governments have a strong incentive to show their actual preferential outcome in the form of a proposal or a demand. Third, and finally, the distribution of benefits is a reflection of a state’s relative bargaining power, which is shaped by mutual policy dependence. There is a balance between a state’s power and the relative worth of certain agreement to this government compared to the result of its best alternative. In the language of IR, this relationship between preference intensities is referred to as asymmetrical interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 2011). When Keohane and Nye (2011) refer to
asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power, they think of power as control over resources, or the affect to outcomes it potentially has. In this context, a less dependent actor will often have a significant political resource, because certain changes in the relationship will be less costly to this actor than to its partners.
Moravcsik argues that if these three assumptions at the core of the theory hold, the negotiated outcome will reflect three specific factors. These factors being: “the value of unilateral policy alternatives relative to the status quo, which underlies the threats to veto; the
value of alternative coalitions, which underlies credible threats to exclude; and the
opportunities for issue linkage or side-payments, which underlie package deals” (Moravcsik, 1998). First, with regard to the first factor - that of unilateral alternatives - Moravcsik assumes that a necessary condition for agreement between governments is that each will prefer this cooperation to its best alternative. In this context, the threat of vetoing or exiting an existing agreement is the ultimate form of bargaining power. However, this threat is only credible if a superior alternative exists. The second factor refers to when an alternative coalition is an option, in this case a government must analyse the value of the agreement that is on the table not just with unilateral action but with two other factors. These factors being: the value of alternative coalitions and the consequences of alternative coalitions that other might join. The existence of attractive alternative opportunities will lead to an increase in bargaining power of potential coalition members. The third and final factor is that of issue linkages. One can speak of issue linkages when governments have a variation in their preference intensities over a number of issues, where small gains in certain areas are of bigger importance to some than to others. Therefore, it can work in the advantage of both parties to exchange concessions over these issues. Linkages are expected in three circumstances: within areas where gains and losses are internalized to the same groups; where the benefits are concentrated and costs are imposed only on groups that are relatively diffuse, unorganized and unrepresented; and where decisions on the exact details of implementation of a policy are postponed, rendering
uncertainty on the domestic distribution of costs.
2.3 Institutional choice
The third analytical stage of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism framework is that of institutional choice. Central to institutional choice is the dilemma of when and why governments choose to institutionalize their decision-making power in autonomous
international institutions. Why do these governments not retain the prerogative to make future unilateral decisions? Moravcsik (1998) argues that this questioning, which is central to
theories of international cooperation is of particular significance within the European context due to the rich set of institutions that have already been developed. This institutions within the European Community consist out of four major branches: the Council of Ministers, an
intergovernmental decision-making body that legislates by qualified majority vote; the Parliament, which forms the legislative branch along with the Council which is an elected body that has responsibilities with regard to legislation, supervision, and budgetary related issues; the Commission, which is a technocratic secretariat that has formal agenda-setting powers; and the Court of Justice, which is a constitutional court that makes sure that European
laws are applied and interpreted in an identical manner in every EU country, and that these countries and EU institutions abide by EU law (European Union, 2018). These institutions affect national sovereignty and therefore transcend the coordinating rules and administrative secretariats that can be found in most international organizations.
The constraining of sovereignty of national governments can happen in two ways, respectively the pooling, and the delegating of the decision-making process. The first option, the pooling of the decision-making process refers to a situation in which governments agree that they will decide on future issues through voting procedures instead of unanimity. Within the European Community this voting primarily is conducted through a qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. The latter option, the delegation of sovereignty, refers to a scenario where autonomous decisions are delegated to a supranational actor, without the intervention of interstate voting or the potential for vetoing (Moravcsik, 1998). Moravcsik argues that there are three potential explanations for the delegation and pooling of sovereignty within the context of the European Community. These three explanations stress, respectively, the belief in federalist ideology, the need for centralized technocratic coordination and
planning, and the desire for credible commitment. Moravscik (1998) argues that the desire for credible commitment has been essential in explaining European integration in the past. The following paragraphs will elaborate on these different explanations.
2.3.1 Federalist ideology
The first explanation for the delegation and pooling of sovereignty suggests that the level of willingness within governments to pool or delegate control over policy stems from the
prevailing beliefs about national sovereignty. Some of the national publics, elites and political entities are more federalist, while others are more nationalist (Moravcsik, 1998). The position of nations regarding institutional form will reflect these beliefs. Throughout Europe there have been distinctive different stances among nations. Germany, along with the Benelux and Italy can be considered as the most federalist nations within Europe. While France has this
federalism - historically speaking - in a lesser sense and balances between nationalism and federalism. The United Kingdom has always been the least federalist nation and the ongoing process of the Brexit emphasizes this nationalist tendency. Over the three dimensions of institutional choice, Moravcsik argues the following.
With regard to the delegation and pooling across issues and countries, the first dimension of institutional choice, the ideological explanation, predicts that there will be systematic variation across countries rather than across issues. This will lead to governments that can be considered federalist to favour consistently delegation and pooling, while
governments that can be considered nationalist should oppose this, independent of the substantive consequences of cooperation. The second dimension, that of domestic cleavages and discourse predicts divisions on a domestic level along the lines of public and partisan views regarding state sovereignty, rather than economic or regulatory interests. This will lead to pro-European groups to favour delegation and pooling independent of substance, while nationalist groups will oppose this delegation and pooling. Whether favourable or opposed, ideologically motivated leaders, governments, and societal groups will focus their attention and rhetoric mainly on those issues that most connected to sovereignty transfers, such as the power of the European Parliament compared to national parliaments. The third and final dimension refers to the identity of and institutional controls on those holding delegated or pooled powers. This dimension explains that European Community institutions will be designed to enhance legitimacy by empowering democratically elected officials and neutral judges. This will make policy processes transparent, salient and subject to direct democratic oversight (Moravcsik, 1998).
2.3.2 Technocratic governance
The second explanation for the pooling and delegation of sovereignty focusses on the need for centralized experts to manage complex, modern, transnational economies. This makes modern economic planning a highly complex activity that requires a considerable amount of technical and legal information. This information is most efficiently provided by a single centralized authority. This explanation assumes that the one of the main issues for governments is that of coordinating the production of information, which is in line with the elements of the
supranational explanation of interstate bargaining. Centralized authorities are in the best position to exploit informational economies of scale and overcome coordination problems of national mistrust and this will lead to the generation and dissemination of information that is required for efficient decision-making (Moravcsik, 1998).
In line with the supranational explanation of substantive bargains, the technocratic explanation of institutional choice argues that there is a need for centralized expertise by arguing that modern economies require extensive intervention by the state and planning by knowledgeable, neutral experts. Rational decisions are best made by centralized technocrats and the transfer of sovereignty establishes a planning capacity. This technical competence is often argued to be the reason for the influence of the European Commission, as it ensures that its proposals command the serious attention of the member governments. However, it is unclear, how in the technocratic view, delegation or pooling is required. A study by Donald Chisholm (1989) found that when there are no arrangements in an organization, or when there
arrangements do not suffice or are inappropriate in providing needed coordination, this will lead to informal adaptions develop that can be efficient and relatively stable. In some cases even more so than within formal hierarchical arrangements. Additionally, informal
organizations permit, with the eye on mutual dependence, the existence of autonomous organizations, and can lead to a higher reliability, flexibility and representativeness compared to formal arrangements.
One explanation for the added value of pooling and delegation from the technocratic view is that expert information will require a considerable amount of time, money and expertise to generate but can be disseminated relatively easily. This makes this information, public good within an international organization but underprovided by individual
governments. This is due to the fact that the costs of provisions are relatively high compared to the benefits. It is unlikely though that the Commission will have more time, money, or expertise than a major European government. A more plausible explanation is that
Commission officials have a privileged position at the centre of an institutionalized network of knowledge. The technocratic explanation operates under three assumptions. First, it predicts that institutional choice will vary more by issue than by country. This makes
delegation likely where issues are technically complex. Delegation is expected when conflict of interest is low and governments are concerned more with efficiency of policy-making than the distribution of gains. The technocratic explanation expects a low level of conflict and therefore the chance for pooling is low compared to the delegation of sovereignty. Second, technocratic elites should play an important role in domestic debates. These domestic discussions should be concerned more with the efficiency of policy-making than with the distributional outcomes. Third, and finally, the technocratic explanation predicts institutions designed to empower technocratic elites. Therefore, little democratic, legal, or political oversight will be needed due to the lack of conflicting interests in areas where there is expert consensus (Moravcsik, 1998).
2.3.3 Credible commitments
Of the two previous mentioned explanations for the pooling and delegation of sovereignty the federalist explanation is considered to be ideological, and the technocratic explanation
informational. Moravcsik (1998) argues that an explanation based on the need for credible commitment can be seen as political. By pooling and delegating the right to legislate, interpret, propose, and enforce agreements, the cost for non-compliance and non-decision is raised. This will in turn encourage future cooperation and helps in the pre-commitment with regard to future decisions. The explanation continues by arguing that governments will
probably accept to pool and delegate decision-making to ensure the acceptation of legislation and the enforcement of this legislation by other governments, to show that they are credible, or to ensure that future decisions go through when there is opposition on a domestic level (Moravcsik, 1998). Furthermore, this explanation argues that a level of uncertainty about the future can explain why sovereignty is pooled or delegated in the context of credible
commitments. This refers to the problem of incomplete contracting, which is the result of a situation in which governments share certain goals but the legislation and enforcement of all future contingencies with regard to these goals is considered too costly or technically
impossible. In the situation of this incomplete contracting, the pooling and delegation of sovereignty is seen a possible solution. Therefore, these governments require efficient means of pre-committing to a series of small, uncertain decisions, of which some are likely to be inconvenient but which as a whole they will benefit the respective governments (Moravcsik, 1998).
In the international realm, where there is no state with a monopoly of legitimate force, subtler mechanisms must suffice in the bolstering of the credibility of pooling and delegation of international commitments. Once the sovereignty has been pooled or delegated, attempts to re-establish unilateral control will pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the particular
institution as a whole and can potentially lead to costly and risky renegotiation of institutions by the involved governments. Additionally, international institutions often enjoy broad ideological support, which automatically mobilizes more groups in favour of any single decision. Finally, international institutions will help in the establishment of reputations for member governments, reputations that can be easily damaged by noncompliance. For this purpose, international institutions are likely to be useful when there is no domestic equivalent available. The eventual decision to pre-commit in the form of pooling and delegation shows a willingness of accepting the risk of being overruled or outvoted with regard to individual decisions. Therefore, the level of this pooling and delegation will depend on a cost-benefit analysis on both ends: governments will shy away from unilateral options to make sure that all parties will have to set up their behaviour in a certain way (Moravcsik, 1998).
2.4 Analytical framework
In this chapter the theoretical framework that lies at the foundation of this study has been discussed. This current paragraph will focus on the analytical framework that can be derived from the theoretical framework that Moravcsik (1998) developed. Three hypotheses will be developed on state preferences, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice to properly answer the central research question of this thesis. However, in order to analyse and test these
individual hypotheses they ought to be formulated in a way that is not as abstract. This will be done for each theoretical hypothesis individually.
The first stage of the framework developed by Moravcsik (1998) is the formation of national policy preferences. Moravcsik (1998) argues that the results of international
negotiations partly have to do with national preferences. Moravcsik elaborates on the process of developing national preferences by arguing that these preferences are either the result of geopolitical or economic interests of nations. The geopolitical reasoning has security threats among the top priorities in state motives, as it assumes that the international system is anarchic and potentially dangerous. The position within the geopolitical argument for
integration is that governments will favour integration when it is assumed that this will lead to positive geopolitical externalities (Moravcsik, 1998). This is contrary to the view that
Moravcsik holds with regard to the broad lines of European integration, as he argues that patterns of commercial advantage is most fundamental factor in European integration since 1955. However, this study argues that in the formation of the European Battlegroups, it was not economic advantages but the geopolitical reasoning that was dominant. The relation between geopolitical externalities and policy preferences of the state have led to the following hypothesis:
Theoretical hypothesis 1: Integration in international institutions is the outcome of a multi-level process, in which, at the first level, a state’s policy preferences are the result of a strive to generate positive geopolitical externalities.
The French-Anglo declaration of St. Malo is considered to be an essential milestone in the history of the European Battlegroups. During this meeting between prime-minister Tony Blair and president Jacques Chirac it was agreed upon by both nations that the EU needed to “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force” (MoD UK, 1998). This agreement was later endorsed by all member states and is seen as one of the first steps in the eventual formation of the European Battlegroups. From this line of thought the following concrete hypothesis has been derived:
Concrete hypothesis 1: The formation of the European Battlegroups is the outcome of a multi-level process, in which, at the first level, the policy preferences of France and the United Kingdom are the result of a strive to generate positive geopolitical
The second stage of the framework that Moravcsik (1998) developed, is the step in which states enter the bargaining process. This study’s theoretical framework elaborated on two bargaining theories that have the goal of explaining the outcome of negotiations. These two theories are termed as supranational bargaining theory and intergovernmental bargaining theory. The supranational bargaining theory assumes that leading supranational officials and political entrepreneurs have a decisive role in efficient bargaining and influencing
distributional outcomes. Intergovernmental bargaining, on the other hand, argues that the demand for cooperation imposes a binding constraint on negotiations. Within
intergovernmental bargaining theory, the relative power of national governments decisively shapes the distribution of benefits. Moravcsik has argued that within European integration, the intergovernmental bargaining explanation has been dominant, as this stresses that states and their preferences matter most. This thesis follows this line of argumentation and expects that intergovernmental bargaining had a dominant position in the negotiations leading to the EUBG. The relation between intergovernmental bargaining and the outcome of interstate bargaining has led to the following hypothesis:
Theoretical hypothesis 2: Integration in international institutions is the outcome of a
multi-level process, in which, at the second level, the distribution of benefits is shaped by the relative power of national governments.
In this study the distribution of benefits can also be seen as the influence of a national government on the outcome of the negotiations. Historically, the French have opted for integration of European armed forces on numerous occasions. These initiatives received a high level of resistance and ultimately failed. The first of these proposals came from the French Prime Minster Pleven and is therefore referred to as the ‘Pleven Plan’. Pleven promoted the establishment of an European army, which would be part of the European Defence Community (EDC), an initiative that ultimately failed. (Kunz, 1953). According to some scholars, all initiatives up to St. Malo agreement failed due to contradictions between the positions of France and the UK (Howarth, 2014). The eventual cooperation from the United Kingdom to work together with the French, on a declaration that should and would lead to European cooperation on a security level can be considered game-changing. Can the veto or approval of the United Kingdom be seen as pivotal in the establishment of the EUBG? The second concrete hypothesis in this current thesis works under the assumption that the relative power of the United Kingdom was larger than France’s and other European
governments and therefore led to a distribution of benefits that favoured the United Kingdom. This has led to the following concrete hypothesis:
Concrete hypothesis 2: The formation of the European Battlegroups is the outcome of
a multi-level process, in which, at the second level, the distribution of benefits within the institution is shaped by the larger relative power of the United Kingdom opposed to other European governments.
The third and final stage of Moravcsik’s (1998) framework is that of institutional choice. Within the framework of Liberal Intergovernmentalism the dilemma of why governments choose for the delegation and pooling of decision-making in international institutions dominates the debate. Moravcsik continues by arguing that there are three potential explanations for this delegation. These being, respectively, the belief in federalist ideology, the need for centralized technocratic coordination and planning, and the desire for more credible commitment. The first explanation, the belief in the federalist ideology, refers to the willingness within governments to pool or delegate control over policy. The second explanation, that of centralized technocratic coordination and planning, argues that there is a need for centralized experts to manage complex, modern, transnational economies. The third explanation, based on credible commitment, argues that the delegation of the right to legislate, interpret, propose, and enforce agreements will lead to the rise of cost for non-compliance and non-decision. This will encourage future cooperation and helps in the pre-commitment with regard to future decisions. This last explanation has been dominant in explaining cooperation and integration within Europe according to Moravcsik. This thesis also argues this third explanation had a dominant position in the negotiations leading up to the EUBG. The relation between the cost of non-compliance and non-decision as a result of credible commitments on an international level has led to the following hypothesis:
Theoretical Hypothesis 3: Integration in international institutions is the outcome of a multi-level process, in which, at the final level, the choice for the institutional form is shaped by the cost and risks of non-compliance and non-decision.
With the pooling and delegation of a certain level of sovereignty within a
supranational institution, governments restructure future incentives, and therefore encourage future cooperation due to a rise in the cost of noncompliance. In the case of the formation of the European Battlegroups the distinction between two historically opposing camps will have
a central position. These two groups are the previously mentioned ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’. The first of these groups, the Atlanticist camp, includes several leading members of the EU, like the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. These nations had long argued that security and defence cooperation was the domain of NATO and not the EU and that security is best assured through transatlantic cooperation and a strong bond with the United States (Howarth, 2014). They argued that the EU was a completely different actor compared to NATO, and that the trans-Atlantic alliance’s monopoly with regard to policies in the field of security and defence should not be challenged. On the other side there are the Europeanists, who hold the perspective that European integration and developing an European security capability that is independent best serve the interest of individual European states. France is traditionally seen as the single boaster of the Europeanist tradition and strongly argues that the European Union should work on developing an independent defence capability that could respond quickly and effectively to regional security related challenges (Bensahel, 1999). This thesis argues that the change in stance of Atlanticist nations with regard to European security and defence cooperation was driven by the potential cost of
non-compliance and non-decision that these Atlanticist nations were facing. This has led to the following hypothesis:
Concrete hypothesis 3: The formation of the European Battlegroups is the outcome of a multi-level process, in which, at the final level, the choice for the institutional form was shaped by the cost and risks of non-compliance and non-decision that ‘Atlanticist’ nations faced.
This current chapter has put emphasis how Moravcsik’s (1998) Liberal
Intergovernmentalism framework attempts to explain international cooperation. In the next chapter, elaboration on the research methods and sources used in this thesis will be provided. This will be followed by the operationalization of the above mentioned hypotheses and afterwards the reliability and validity of this study will be discussed.
3. Research Design
In this chapter, first the methods that were used in conducting this research will be presented. In the following paragraph the data collection methods that were used for this study are elaborated on. The third paragraph of this research design will focus on the data analysis and includes the operationalization of hypotheses that were used in this current study. The fourth and final paragraph of this chapter will elaborate on the reliability and validity of this current study.
3.1 Method
The methodology that guided this current study in answering the central research question is the framework developed by Andrew Moravcsik. In his studies, Moravcsik has attempted to prove his Liberal Intergovernmentalism through the analysis of five case studies on European integration. These cases ranged from the treaties of Rome (1955-1958) all the way through to the negotiating of the Maastricht treaty (1988-1991). For these case studies he developed a series of hypotheses based on LI and tested these hypotheses with the use of empirical evidence. In his method, Moravcsik tests hypotheses with the use of multiple competing explanations for different aspects of state behaviour. These explanations are drawn from generalizable theories of national preferences, international regimes and bargaining. The goal of his study was not simply to create ‘narrative reconstructions’ of the process of integration but to also “assess the importance of causal processes of international cooperation and institution-building which can be applied to a wide range of decisions in the EC and in world politics more generally” (Moravcsik, 1998). This current research operated along the same guidelines and for that reason it can be considered an exploratory case study of the process of negotiation within the European Union that led to the EUBG, based on the framework of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. With the use of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, hypotheses have been developed. These hypotheses will attempt to explain whether the formation of the EUBG can be explained by the LI framework.
3.2 Data collection
The collection of data in this current study was done with use of a variety of sources and will build up two types of sources as described by Yin (2003). First, documents that have been studied in this research include official announcements and statements by EU bodies and national governments, official letters, speeches by government officials, and reports by interest groups and news media outlets. According to Yin (2003), the use of documents in a study has certain advantages, being that they are stable, unobtrusive, broad, and exact in
