Wouter Welling (1484788)
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL DREAM
The Distinctive European Vision on Social Policy
Dr. C.M. Megens (1st supervisor, University of Groningen)
Dr. H. Zapf (2nd supervisor, Georg-August Universität Göttingen)
Contact:
W.Q.Welling@student.rug.nl
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Declaration
I, Wouter Quirinus Welling, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “The European Social Dream: The Distinctive European Vision on Social Policy”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Euroculture Programme, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Signed:
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Contents
Declaration ... 2
Preface ... 4
Introduction ... 5
1. The idea of the European social dream ... 11
1.1 The European social dream as an element of the European identity... 12
1.2 The European social model ... 19
1.3 Two levels ... 26
2. The European reality ... 34
2.1 What is social policy? ... 36
2.2 Internal level: The current status of European shared social policy... 38
2.3 Internal level: The differences in Europe ... 47
2.4 External level: The same underlying idea in a globalizing world ... 59
2.5 External level: Not universal but cosmopolitan ... 67
3. The distinctive European social dream ... 71
3.1 Bridging differences with common beliefs and aspirations ... 72
3.2 Common beliefs and aspirations: a list ... 76
3.3 Models of the European social dream ... 81
Conclusion ... 85
Appendix 1: OECD Social Policy Expenditure as % of GDP since 1980 ... 87
Appendix 2: OECD Social Policy Spending Areas 2007 ... 88
Appendix 3: OECD Social Justice (relative) in 2011 ... 89
Bibliography: ... 90
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Preface
5
Introduction
In my academic life I have been confronted with numerous formulations of the European identity, the shared European ideals, Europeanness, Europeanism, and the idea of Europe. This confrontation made me realize two things. First of all, that there is an interesting on-going discussion on these topics and secondly, that a social element is mentioned persistently in the discussion on what Europe stands for. The European welfare system is often regarded as the jewel in the crown or as the most important feature of Europe that gives the European societies their special quality.1 Since I started the Euroculture master program I have been interested in the validity of these assumptions. This thesis will be my contribution to this discussion.
Throughout my study I learned that academic research should be about challenging old assumptions and providing new perspectives.2 In European studies and its literature there are a lot of assumptions and discussions going on about the ‘idea’ of Europe. There appears to be a consensus that one of the most important tasks for Europe in the twentieth century has been the formulation of the ‘idea’ of Europe.3 Within this discussion I observed a missing element in academic research that formulates the shared European aspirations concerning social policy. This created an incentive to do research on this topic and hopefully provide a new perspective.
The question I attempted to answer to create a new perspective in the academic discourse is if there is a distinctive European vision on social policy, despite of the national differences? Answering this question gave way to the formulation of a new concept to advance the understanding of what Europe stands for. I will argue that the European social dream, which is about the underlying aspirations of social policy-making in Europe, is a useful concept to understand what Europe stands for. This concept became the working ideal type in the investigation on the shared European aspirations on social policy. Following Max Weber, I will consider an ideal type to be a an analytical construct from the elements of a given phenomenon that serves to ascertain similarities and deviations.4 Within this construct it
1 Anthony Giddens, "The World does Not Owe Us a Living! The Future of the European Social Model." Progressive Politics 4, no. 3 (2005) 6.
2 John McCormick, Europeanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) vi.
3 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) 9. 4
6 is not important whether or not Europeans are living completely up to the dream. What matters is displaying and proving the existence of a shared vision throughout Europe.5
The need for the operationalization of the European social dream lies in the missing element in academic research that indicates the European shared aspirations concerning social policy. This could be a hard boundary to overcome, but I have considered it the most important call for a work on this topic. Many scholars have written on elements that define Europe. In his work Europeanism McCormick concludes that there is a distinctive set of values and preferences that drive political and public choices in Europe.6 When accepting that there is a distinctive set of shared values and preferences in Europe leading towards decisions, shared aspirations are also likely to be present to guide these decisions. The aspirations are not only a matter of preferences, but more of an intention to move towards a goal that is built upon shared values and ideals.
Another factor justifying this research is that, according to many scholars, one of the shortcomings of studies on Europe is that Europeans have more in common than is often acknowledged in academics, politics and the whole of society.7 I´ve been struck, together with many scholars, by the degree to which the European society is unaware of its common features.8 This thesis will focus on one aspect of what Europeans are sharing with each other.
There are of course already many works on European identity and what it would consist of. The critics of these works often focus on the argument that a shared European identity is an elite idea that does not describe the whole of Europe. The common identity exists in the minds of politicians and academics, but is completely absent in the minds of common European citizens. Because of this elitist critique it is essential, when trying to make a point about a society-wide shared European dream, that this idea is tested in a way that covers the reality of the whole of Europe. If this is done properly, the proposed idea and its model can withstand the critique of being an elite idea.
With the shared European features in mind and while trying to avoid another elitist point of view, I have attempted to withstand the temptation of writing a political manifesto. When writing about shared aspirations there is often the temptation to write about how, in your humble opinion, a situation should be. This is not what a scholar on politics or society should do. A political scientist or historian is concerned with what is and was, not with what
5 Essence of the European Dream is formulated by: Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (New York: Penguin, 2004) 15.
6 McCormick, Europeanism, 215. 7 Ibidem, 3-6.
8
7 ought to be.9 This study will analyse the historical process that has come to a certain situation without demonstrating any intentions towards the spread of political ideals. The danger of speaking in predictions is very high when posing the perspective of the European social dream. I will suggest a division between, on the one hand, the shared social policy that Europe has had and what its aspirations are. On the other hand, there are predictive ideas about what Europe’s vision should be. I will make no normative claims of how it should be, but will only assess the distinctive European vision on social policy as it has been and is at present.
The Scope
To correctly perform this research I have set a clear temporal scope and made several clear conceptual choices. The European social dream is considered to be representing the shared European vision on social policy since 1989. Since that point the European social dream can be observed all over Europe, although it must be noted that the rise of this shared vision was a gradual process and not an instant creation. The postwar Western European welfarism cannot be considered a Europe-wide dream, because at first it was restricted to a small number of states. Only since 1989 there is a distinctive pan-European accepted social dream.
Another matter is how to handle ‘Europe’ and what it consist of. When writing about the European identity, the European ´idea´ or a shared vision it must be clear what ´Europe´ means in this case. For the concept of the European social dream it will not be the European Union specifically. It is related to the EU, because in this politically integrated body, shared visions are most clearly displayed by common policy. However, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland are sometimes more ‘European’ concerning some matters than some EU Member States. In the case of the concept of the European social dream it does not matter that they are not part of the EU. They are definitely part of the larger European society and carry a lot of its values, accomplishments and aspirations just like EU member states. The European society seems to share a great deal of beliefs, customs and goals that are not restricted to the EU. According to McCormick, European values have a longer history then is often recognized.10 This is not only the case in the European Union, but in all the states in the so called ´Eurosphere´. This term is introduced by Robert Cooper and Mark Leonard uses it to depict
9 Bernard Susser, “The Behavioral Ideology: A Review and a Retrospect” in: Bernard Susser, ed, Approaches to the study of Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1991) 79.
8 the growing sphere of influence of Europe.11 The term is useful to understand that Europe and its values are not only influential in the EU or reserved for EU countries.
Many countries all over the world have adopted values and standards of the European core countries. Mostly because they are adoptable for each nation. In some areas of society Europe has become a goal in itself that symbolizes something that is not present in its purest form in any country specifically. It has become more than a geographical connotation and more of a dream. I will argue that the European social dream is in essence a dream and therefore not real. It is probably never fully observable because it is an ideal type. The dream is chosen as analogy, because there is not one European reality observable that completely matches the dream. It is an ideal type that is distinctive for Europe.
The concepts that are defining the scope of my research are the social model and social policy. I will consider a social model to be a model of how a state organises its social policy. Social policies are the actions that a state takes to directly protect and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. This includes the state policy areas that are broadly consisting of labour policy, social security and social welfare.12 These definitions and distinctions will be used throughout
this research and explained further in the reality analysis in chapter 2.
Working Structure and method
In the research on the distinctive European social policy vision I will use a working structure consisting of two levels. First, there is the internal level of the European national differences. Second, there is the external level of the rest of the world. When researching a European vision on social policy it must be demonstrated how this vision is overstretching and shared by Europe. Besides this, it must become clear that this idea is distinctive for Europe in comparison with the rest of the world. Combined with the external level comes the danger of formulating the pan-European idea on a social policy as a too broad worldwide idea, a more universal vision. On the external level my research will therefore question the distinctiveness of Europe’s social policy vision.
A reasonable question on the method would be why the European social dream should be accepted as a concept. A new concept is only as plausible as the evidence and methods
11
Word Eurosphere: Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2004) or: Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century (London: Fourth Estate, 2005) 53-55.
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9 employed to support its existence and functioning.13 Therefore the methods of this research should be reasonable, methodologically acceptable and academically clear. Scientific communication requires a special language comprised of concepts that “can be used to construct meaningful statements about the world.”14
With this in mind I have set my goal to explain and uncover regularities in the European social policy aspirations.
In writing about concepts it is important to note that concepts are never discovered as a reality in nature.15 They are always invented and therefore changeable and discussable. The European social dream’s status or usefulness relies on its acceptance and ability to describe reality in a meaningful way. It will be suggested as a linguistic construct best functioning when there is a consensus about its meaning. Discussion about it can bring better understanding about its meaning and sometimes even stretch the concept by changing the consensus about it. Following Gibbons, I will consider concepts to be ‘inherently vague and ambiguous’. The difficulty of conceptualization in non-natural sciences lies in its everlasting search for the usefulness of concepts.16 In this vagueness and ambiguity about concepts I will start the discussion on the usefulness of the European social dream in a positive way. The goal is to make it comprehensible as an ideal type concept that helps to create understanding of what Europe stands for.
To form the groundwork for the European social dream, the first chapter will form the basis of how this concept is extracted from the current discourse on the European idea and the European identity. The discussions on the European identity and the European social model will be visited. I will argue that both are signifying that there is ground for the acceptance of a shared European vision on social policy. In the discussions on the European social model I will suggest a new distinction between three elements, which will function as a working model throughout the rest of my research.
The third quarter of the twentieth century is sometimes called the ‘golden age of Europe.’17 From then on there was, according most literature, a rise of the European mentality, even though it was at first only visible in politics and therefore sometimes depicted
13
Based on Andrew Moravcsiks way of explaining why methodology is so important to him. André Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) 10-11.
14 James Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005) 4-6.
15
Ibidem, 155.
16 Michael Gibbons, “Hermeneutics, Political Inquiry and Practical Reason: An Evolving Challenge to Political Science” American Political Science Review 100 nr. 4 (2006) 563-571.
17
10 as an elitist idea. The academic consensus seems to be that the public acceptance of a shared European identity has been growing since this period. The question for my research was to what extent this growing European identity contained a social element.
In the second chapter the European reality regarding social policy is investigated. To operationalize the concept of the European social dream it must cover phenomena that can actually be observed. The search for a distinctive European vision on social policy logically brings the question of the level of distinctiveness. This will be researched on the internal European level by looking at the European policy integration and at the European differences in social policy making. In this way the distinctiveness of a shared vision will be tested in reality. On the external level Europe will be compared in its social policy with the rest of the developed world to find out to what extent it is distinctive on a worldwide level. In this I will not review all worldwide social policies. I will use certain examples to demonstrate Europe’s distinctiveness. Besides this, the European social dream’s external level will be tested to the critique of indistinctiveness. In this I will argue that Europe is distinctive, but not unique and that it does not have the intention to be unique.18
To come back to my statement that academic research is about formulating new perspectives and challenging assumptions the third chapter formulates the distinctive European social dream. It explains its limitations and produces a comprehensive list of its features. To make this conceivable I produced a model which can help to understand the European social dream ideal type. With this model supporting the concept of the European social dream I am not claiming to portray the complete reality in all its diversity, but I am producing a useful tool to understand the shared European vision. In the last chapter I developed a conceptualization, which can be used to assess if the European states are closer or further away from the ideal European social dream.
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1. The idea of the European social dream
“Europe is not just about material results, it is about spirit. Europe is a state of mind” (Jacques Delors, President European Commission 1985-1995)19
The European social dream is a term unfamiliar to many. A simple Google search reveals that the concept is not often used. There is only one serious article written on this specific concept and the term is elsewhere only mentioned in a few forums posts and blog comments.20 The lack of scholarly literature on the concept could be an indication for its minor usefulness or its originality and great opportunities. My conviction that the latter is true rose all through my research. The idea, origin, and dimensions of the European social dream will be the subject of this first chapter.
The idea of the European social dream will first be formulated as an element of the European identity. This shows the relevance of the social element in the European identity. Many works have discussed the European shared identity and what it consists of. The factors mentioned as constructing the European identity lead towards the idea that there are shared aspirations concerning social policy existing in Europe. The European social dream is about the aspirations and the underlying intentions of social policy making. They are not about specific policies that do perhaps not support the dream, but about the bigger picture. To understand this bigger picture it is relevant to formulate how the European social model is described. In this discourse I will suggest a working model that makes a distinction between three parts of the European social model.
The last sections of this chapter will form two levels which can help to understand the European social dream. These levels help to signify the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the European social dream. A distinction is made between the European social dream as shared by the different cultures of Europe and as distinctive for Europe as part of the world. Understanding European features is easier when comparing Europe to other parts of the world. When looking from the inside to Europe, the differences are always more visible than its shared features. I will argue that the European social dream is a useful concept because it has distinctive aspects on both of these levels.
19
Jacques Delors in: The Independent, London , May 19, 1994, in: Bill Swainson, Encarta Book of Quotations (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000) 260.
12 1.1 The European social dream as an element of the European identity
There has been a long and extensive debate in the academic world about what the European identity is, what Europe represents and what European values are. One of the most discussed matters is the existence of a common European identity. Using Andersons definition, I consider identity to be the common factors, mostly imagined, that make a group of people identify with an entity and feel solidarity amongst themselves.21 Like many political scholars, I do not use the general Oxford dictionary definition, but a more political group identity.22 This identity deals with questions about what binds Europeans together and what is European about this?23
During the last twenty years, many scholars tried to define what it is that Europeans have in common. I will not look at the European identity discussion as a whole, but at the elements that are said to be defining the European identity. Within these elements I continuously found formulations of a social element or a vision on how social policy should be. In the following I will extract a tendency towards shared European aspirations about social policies from academic discourses on the European identity.
Because of the impossibility to review all works on what Europeans have in common, I have taken a few of the most respected works. Determining which works to use was mostly done on the basis of remarks by other scholars. The most prominent works were selected. I have selected seven works published throughout the last twenty years. The literature is diverse as coming from scholars in sociology, history and political science. The comment could be made that this is not the complete European identity discussion, but the crucial point is to show that all of these works formulate similar elements, although they have the tendency to formulate their description of the common European elements as completely original. Within these social elements I do not yet make a distinction between different nations or inner European differences. The aim is to give an overview of my findings on the European identity and its crucial elements within the current academic debate.
21 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1991) 4-5.
22 Oxford English Dictionary definition of identity: “the quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties or in particular qualities under consideration”. Criticism by political scientists in: Roger Smith, “Identities, Interests and the Future of Political Science”, Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 4, 2 (2006) 343-351.
13 The European Identity
One of the first and most cited works about the idea of Europe and European identity is
Inventing Europe by Gerard Delanty.24 Delanty argues that Europe is a reality, but perhaps even more an idea with worldwide implications throughout history. One of Delanty’s remarks about Europe is that it has always had the ‘mystique of civilisation’ around it.25
This mystique signifies the highest form of human and social standards, that could be observed as being part of the idea of Europe. He argues that the European identity, like the older national identities, was mostly formed by othering and conflict with what was not European.26 The idea of Europe is an interesting concept for the European social dream, because in this work it hints towards a social element within the idea of Europe.
Although Delanty´s book is mostly about the question of whether Europe can have a collective identity at all, he does state that ‘social Europe’ has become one of the most important aspects of the idea of Europe. He states that since 1989 Europe’s idea can be compatible with most of the social democratic goals, even with neo-liberal governments in power.27 This is clearly formulated in what Delanty sees as coming up in Europe in 1995: The acceptance of the ‘third liberty’, the right to welfare. This involves the idea that the role of the state is to ‘serve society and to be the basis of the social welfare state.’28
In 2003 after the Europe-wide demonstrations against the war in Iraq, two of Europe’s most respected intellectuals, Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, wrote an article in which they claimed that Europe had formed its own European public sphere and that the protests were a sign of this.29 In the article they claim that Europe has found a unique way of solving two major problems. The first solution is a supranational government to secure a long-lasting peace. The second solution was the European social welfare system, that has, according to Habermas and Derrida, become a role model for the rest of the world.30 This second European solution was not the main point of their article, but the impact that this article has had on
24 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. 25
Ibidem, 8. 26 Ibidem, 2-15.
27 1989 is a critical year in the idea of Europe because since then the whole of Europe, meaning also eastern Europe, was part of the greater European idea. Before that year the one could only speak of the ‘Western European Idea’. See: Delanty, Inventing Europe, 144.
28
Ibidem, 160.
29 Habermas and Derrida, "February 15, Or what Binds Europe Together…”. About Habermas and Derrida as most respected Intellectuals. See for example:
14 academic writing makes this statement a good signifier that there is a social element in what binds Europeans together.
Europe’s identity is, according to Habermas and Derrida, based on how Europe and the rest of the world see Europeans. The mentality that Europeans share is what forms this. This mentality is based on six elements that are to more or lesser extend shared all through Europe. These elements are: 31
Secularization
A high trust in the state and scepticism about market achievements Realistic expectations about technological progress
Preferring the welfare state and regulations on the basis of solidarity, A low threshold of tolerance for the use of force
Multilateralism based on global policy.
This classification of the European mentality includes the elements of a high trust in the state and scepticism about market achievements and an overall preference for the welfare state and regulations based on solidarity. This description of the European mentality gives a clear insight in the importance of a social element in the European identity.
The next work, as I must honestly admit, is the source of my title. In his book The
European Dream Jeremy Rifkin tries to describe what constructs the common European
vision about how a society ought to be, mostly based on European values. According to Rifkin some values are uniquely European and better suited for the twenty-first century compared to the values he ascribes to the American dream.32 In Rifkins work the European dream is defined as being constructed by many factors. Not all of these factors contain elements pointing at a social element in the European dream. In this analysis only the elements that can be linked to a social element in the European identity will be taken into account.
The themes that Rifkin describes are rather abstract and are the basis of his ideas about common European sentiments and convictions on social matters. The separate elements can of course also be observed in other parts of the world than Europe, but the combination forms the full European dream, which is distinctive for Europe. Rifkin states that there is a common
31 Ibidem, 295.
32 Chapter 1, “The slow death of the American Dream”. In: Rifkin, The European Dream, 11-36.
15 European acceptance that community relationships are more important than individual autonomy. In this the comparison to the American dream is apparent, because the American dream places individual autonomy above community relations and thereby embodies the exact opposite.33 The second aspect is also describing a more overstretching moral conviction. Overall quality of life is more important than the goal of the accumulation of wealth in Europe. Amassing wealth is not the highest observable human priority. To achieve the goal of a better quality of life Rifkin stipulates the European acceptance of a collective responsibility for this overall rise in the quality of life.34 The last element of Rifkin’s idea of the European Dream is that he states that it places universal human rights and rights of nature over property rights. Universal human rights are an important concept for the European social dream when stipulating that they are placed above property rights. The European mentality places certain unalienable human rights above other rights and accepts no economic or ownership rights as going above these basic human rights. In some instances the overwhelmingly positive attitude of Rifkin towards European values should be noted, but the main elements of what he sees as the European dream are widely accepted.35 Rifkin characterizes the social element in Europe as the belief that society has a responsibility to ‘balance the sometimes ruthless Darwinism of the marketplace by providing social support to the less fortunate, so that no one falls behind.’36
One of the most distinguished historians of the last decades, Tony Judt, published his magnum opus in 2005. It was a history of Europe in the postwar era.37 According to Judt, Europe formed itself against its postwar demons. Among them were unemployment and revolution. These demons created the European tendencies towards the welfare state and cooperation. ‘What binds Europeans together… is what has become conventional to call – in distinctive contrast with the American way of life – the European Social Model.’38 Born out of the mix of Social Democratic and Christian Democratic legacies, there rose a European way of regulating social matters. Europe has become a beacon and example for aspirant EU members and the world alike. From a geographical expression, Europe became a role-model. Europe became a way of life that criticised the ‘depredations of the unrestricted capitalist
33 Rifkin, The European Dream, 14. 34 Ibidem, 8.
35 Community relations, quality of life, collective responsibility and human rights are mentioned by all the other works I use on the European identity and its values. The reviews and reactions on the European Dream praise the formulation of social values he notes. See for example: Brendan Driscoll, “The European Dream” The Booklist vol. 101 (2004) 30-33. and Stanley Hoffman, “European Dream” Foreign Affairs, Book reviews (2004). 36 Rifkin, European Dream, 56.
37
16 market.’39
All over Europe it became the tendency to accept higher taxes and in return for this get nearly free medical care, early retirement and broad social services. Judt states that Europeans paid a high price, but there was a common acceptance of this price because it came with job security, progressive taxes and large social transfer payments. In his final chapter on what Europeans share with each other Judt states that Europe shares among many other things ‘a sense of the balance of social rights, civic solidarity and collective responsibility that was appropriate and possible for the modern age.’40
According to Judt, these elements of a shared identity are only to be found in Europe.
The sociologist Neil Fligstein wrote a book on European identity in 2007 called
Euroclash.41 The word ‘clash’ refers to the clash between the beneficiaries and proponents of
the European integration project and the non-beneficiaries and opponents of this project. The author regards this as the clash at the heart of European political and societal debates. To understand this matter the author tries to give an impression of what the European identity is in a quantitative sociological way. By looking at many surveys, censuses, and other comparable statistical data he answers the question of how European the lives of Europeans are.
Fligstein states that after the second World War, Europe turned into a set of societies that tried to implement systems of social justice and peaceful trade. Europe has had commitment on the part of its citizens, governments, and economic elites to work together. The desire to work together on a regional, national, and international level is an essential element of the postwar European identity. Europeans are, according to Fligstein, relying more on their governments for protection from the negative effects of market competition than any other people in the world. Europeans have a desire to assure as much equality as possible through their relatively well-trusted governments. Europeans have structured their political economies to attempt to promote growth, but also to maintain social justice.42 Most of the European societies formed labour market and social welfare regimes to mediate employer and employee relations independent of one another. Fligstein concludes that because this was done in all European countries, with the support of ideologically widely separated political parties, it must be an essential element of the European identity.
39 Ibidem, 785.
40 Judt, Postwar, 7-8 & 777-787. 41
17 The international relations professors Checkel and Katzenstein have published an edited bundle in 2009 that investigates the European identity in all its diversity.43 In their introduction they make an interesting point that although it is hard to see the European identity as unique, because of the forces of internationalization and globalisation, it is definitely a distinctive identity.44 This distinctive identity, they hold, should not only be seen as an elite identity that is promoted top-down, but it should include the whole of European citizenry. With this in mind the European distinctive identity contains a bipartisan support, among the left and right, for the welfare state.45 This is according to them rooted in the Christian democratic history that is observable all throughout Europe.
During the last decades of EU political integration the EU increased the promotion of European shared values.46 In the bundle the success of this is disputed.47 One of the contributors of European Identity, the German historian Hartmut Kaelble, states that the identification with the European way of life grew while the identification with its politics did not.48 Kaelble uses the term of the Europe vécu, the unconscious and implicit identification with common norms in Europe that has a trend towards European social convergence and similar social welfare programs.49 This ‘vécu’ is an interesting term for the conceptualization of the European social dream and I will come back to this.
The last work on the elements of the European identity is by the political science professor John McCormick. He wrote the work Europeanism in which he argues that the construction of a European view on government, economy, social values, and international relations is existing and growing.50 Europeanism defines what Europe means and what Europeans have in common. This exists among other factors of communitarianism, a collective society, welfarism, and belief that one works to live and not vice versa.51 Disregarding what these features precisely consist of, the point is that many elements that form McCormick’s Europeanism, are related to Europe´s ideals about social policy. McCormick focuses on the shared beliefs, customs and goals of all Europeans. In comparison
43 Checkel and Katzenstein ed. European Identity.
44 Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, “The Politicization of European Identities” in: Checkel and Katzenstein ed. European Identity , 3-4.
45 Ibidem, 15.
46 More on the reality behind the European Social Dream in chapter 2. 47 Ibidem, 13-14.
48 Hartmut Kaelble, “Identification with Europe and Politicization of the EU since the 1980s” in: Checkel and Katzenstein ed. European Identity, 193-213.
49 French term Europe vécu (Experiencing Europe, own translation) from: Hartmut Kealble, Sozialgeschichte Europas 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 2007).
50
18 to the rest of the world, the common beliefs on social matters in Europe consist more of a willingness to share risks, containing social inequalities, protecting the most vulnerable, and a willingness to share.52
The social element
The investigation into the European identity and its elements shows that most authors agree that there is a relevant social element within the European identity. It is described in different ways, but one can extract the social elements from the broader definitions of the European identity. The idea of the European social dream can be found in the elements that are considered to be constructing the European identity. All authors agree upon certain shared European identity elements that can be formulated as shared European beliefs about social policy. Not all beliefs are mentioned by all authors, but all are ascribed to by several authors. The following beliefs can be extracted from the social elements in the European identity discourse:
Universal human rights, which are more important than property rights
High solidarity: the belief that protecting the most vulnerable is a community responsibility
A relatively important role of the state in the wellbeing of its people
A relatively high trust in the state and scepticism towards pure market achievements A collective responsibility for the overall rise in quality of life
Community relations, which are more important than individual autonomy
The ideal that one works to live: the quality of life is more important than pure accumulation of wealth
52
19 1.2 The European social model
The previous section dealt with the European identity discussion. The social elements within the studies on the European identity are evident. Some works describe the European social model (ESM) as an essential part of the European identity.53 The concept of the ESM is, unlike the European social dream, widely researched.54 For the European social dream the ESM appears to be a workable model, because it deals with how Europe handles social matters and tries to make this comprehensible in a model. The model displays European ideas about social policy and how states organize their policy. An important difference between the idea of the European social dream and the ESM is that the latter is about the complete European social policy experiences and the first more about underlying aspirations. When working on this point, the complete ESM must be analysed. In this research I will use the ESM, but in the existing models I suggest an important distinction. In this section I will first elaborate on what the ESM is and then explain the three elements that I suggest to distinguish.
The European social model: Hard to define
The essence of the ESM is to describe the European experience in trying to promote sustainable economic growth and social cohesion through well-elaborated social policy.55 The consensus in the academic discourses about the features of the ESM is what I consider to be the best concept to use in this, although this consensus is hard to find. Several definitions of the ESM have been formulated. Most authors agree that at the time of the end of the ideological partition of Europe in 1989 the model was still based on the postwar principles of fighting unemployment and avoiding revolution or public unrest.56 Even though it was based on these principles, in 1989 it contained much more than these two unspecified goals.
In 1994 the European Commission issued the White Paper on Social Policy.57 The White Paper defines the ESM and defines certain values which form the basis of the ESM.
53 See for example: “What binds Europeans together… is the European social model” in: Judt, Postwar, 9. 54 A simple comparison: The term “European Social Model” gives 561000 Google hits and 8000 articles in Google Scholar. The term “European Social Dream” gives 2400 Google hits and 0 articles in Google Scholar. 55
Michael Knogler and Fidelis Lankes, “Social Models in the Enlarged European Union: Policy Dimensions and Country Classification” Publication by: Europa-Institut Regensburg (2011) 3.
56 Ibidem, 5-6. 57
20 Most important in Europe, according to the document, is that competitiveness and solidarity go hand in hand. The ESM is defined by:
Democracy Individual rights
Free collective bargaining The market economy Equal opportunities for all Adequate social welfare
Solidarity in society towards the weaker
Since this White Paper the European social model has become a very popular topic in studies on what Europeans share. A hard issue with this model is that it has been used in very different contexts and because of being defined differently many times, the consensus seems to be lost.
The European social model is by some considered to be the embodiment of a political ‘third way’.58
A compromise between the left and right wing political ways. This is mainly done by political actors in the UK affiliated with the Blair administration.59 It is a model of how Europe has resolved the everlasting ideological discussion between socialism and capitalism with a settlement. This contained the free market capitalistic production and a social system based on collective interest. This idea of the ESM is useful, but according to some too politically and ideologically based and not pointing at the European reality.60
The European Commissioner of Employment and Social Affairs, Diamantopoulou, formulated the European social model as containing welfare, pensions, employment policies, worker trainings, labour market policy, and equality rules.61 She said that the ESM is, when it comes to the EU, ‘a pragmatic, down-to-earth, joint attempt to establish sensible minimum standards.’62
Interesting to note is that ten years after the White Paper had defined the ESM, the European Commissioner on these matters has a different idea about this model. The elements of welfare, employment policies, and worker trainings cannot be found on the above list of what the White Paper formulated as the ESM. Diamantopoulou’s ideas are all very broad, but nevertheless generally ascribed to by most of the writings on the ESM.
58 Not to be mistaken by Mussolini’s Third Way in the 1930s. See: Judt, Postwar, 794.
59 Tony Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century (London: Fabian Society, 1999). 60
Maria Jepsen and Amparo Pascual, “The European Social Model: an exercise in deconstruction” Journal of European Social Policy 15, no. 3 (2005) 231-245.
61 Anna Diamantopoulou, “The European Social Model – Myth or Reality”, address at fringe meeting European Commission UK, 29 september 2003.
21 As in the descriptions of the White Paper and Diamantopolou, the ESM is mostly formulated in a non-practical way in very broad ideological terms. An attempt to a more practical and observable ESM is made by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens. He regards the ESM as one of the fundamental parts of what Europe stands for. He attempts to define the ESM in a clear way, while agreeing that it is hard to formulate a distinctively European model, because in some instances the model is better applicable to non-European states than to European states.63 Besides this he notes the indistinctness in the numerous definitions and states that for him a state must have five characteristics to be ascribing to the ESM. These terms form clear and useful features: 64
A developed and interventionist state, as measured in terms of level of GDP taken up by taxation.
A robust welfare system, that provides effective social protection, to some considerable degree for all citizens, but especially for those most in need.
The limitation, or containment, of economic and other forms of inequality.
A key role in sustaining the institutions is played by the social partners, the unions and other agencies promoting workers’ rights
Expanding overall economic prosperity and job creation.65
One of the most recent studies by Knogler and Lankes on the ESM deals with the Eastern European states, their accession to the EU, and what this could mean for the ESM.66 The study claims that not all Gidden’s features can be observed in the Eastern European countries and that a good ESM should comprise the whole of Europe and not only Western Europe. With this in mind this study concludes that there are three characteristics that are applicable to nearly all European states. These are:
Extensive basic social security protection for all citizens
A high degree of interest organization and coordinated bargaining
Equal wage and income distribution compared to most other parts of the world
To these three points I would like to add the first point that Giddens mentions: the interventionist state with a relatively high level of taxation. This is essential for the functioning of the three features mentioned above. With this in mind I will use the
63 If for example ‘limiting inequality’ is an important element of the ESM, Australia and Canada are better fitting than Portugal or Greece. (See 1.3, external level).
64
Giddens, "The World does Not Owe Us a Living!”, 7.
65 Interesting to note is that in Europeanism, McCormick used the exact characterization of Giddens (2005) but left out the fifth element of expanding economic prosperity and job creation. See: McCormick, Europeanism, 142.
22 characteristics of these last two formulations of the ESM to look at the European reality in chapter 2. After adding a useful nuance for the working method, the ESM forms a useful model that helps to understand the shared European aspirations on social policy
Working with three elements
The discourse about what the ESM comprises is still running and perhaps the unfinished discussion on this calls for a better conceptualization of its elements and contributors.67 For the idea of the European social dream it could be that the missing clarity about the ESM is another reason for a clear formulation of what the underlying aspirations of the ESM are. In this on-going discussion I found use in the formulation of a working model in which the European social dream will serve as a new concept operationalized as the underlying aspirations in the complete ESM.
When speaking about the European social model it is essential to define what kind of social model it is. Describing it as the complete European experience on social policy does not seem to be clear enough to say what the ESM is about, because experience is a very broad term. An important question to ask is what the model describes about the European experiences with regard to social policy. Confusing is that the ESM can be an ideal model, or it can be about shared or similar policies in Europe.68 In this way a concept becomes less useful for a constructive academic discussion, because the arguments deal with different matters.
Anthony Giddens made the suggestion that the European social model is not a ‘unitary concept’ and that within the model there should be a distinction between the values, aspirations and accomplishments of Europe’s social policy.69
The questions to ask are if the ESM is describing the values on which Europe’s social policy is based, the aspirations of the social policy, or the accomplishments that social policy has made? The ESM can include all these three elements of social policy and is therefore best seen as a hybrid and overstretching model.
The distinction between values, aspirations, and accomplishments seems useful to make, because the three can be completely different. For example the values on which social policy is based can include the previously formulated European beliefs of social solidarity and
67 On the ambiguity in the use of the ESM: Maria Jepsen and Amparo Pascual, “The European Social Model: an exercise in deconstruction” Journal of European Social Policy 15, no. 3 (2005) 231-245.
68
Ibidem, 18-19.
23 a relatively high trust in the state (see list in 1.1). In two different states these values can be present and appreciated, but the accomplishments of the policy, like for example a certain level of social equality, can be completely different. This can be because of different aspirations within the policy (social equality could be an aspiration in one, but not in the other), but the policy can also be completely the same and the accomplishments can be different because of external factors (an external factor could be an economic crisis). Simplifying this would give that the aspirations in social policy can be compatible to its underlying values and accomplishments or differ very much from these. In both of these situations they are in the current idea of the ESM described by one term: the European social model. My working model will propose a distinction between these three elements.
The proposed distinction between values, aspirations, and accomplishments is justified by many forms of elaborations and criticisms on the ESM. In elaborations on the alleged non-functioning of the European social model the three elements are often mixed. A good example is André Sapirs analysis of his four European social models in which he rejects two of them and criticises the whole social model of Europe because of its recent accomplishments.70 Sapir measures the accomplishments in social inequality and national GDP. Measuring only these temporary accomplishments is an incomplete method when criticising the whole ESM. The ESM is of course describing its experiences in social policy making, but the problem is that the critique on the GDP or social inequality does not justify a rejection of all the underlying aspirations of social policy making. This would be rejecting all intentions simply by a result that could have been influenced by many factors.
Another example of criticism that justifies distinguishing between these three elements is ironically an article by the creator of the distinction between values, aspirations, and accomplishments, Anthony Giddens. He formulates critique on the ESM because of its economical accomplishments in the form of Europe’s average GDP and the unemployment rates throughout Europe. Besides this, he uses the current demographic problems to formulate critique on Europe’s social model.71
This is, as was the case with Sapir, criticising the accomplishments and taking along aspirations and underlying values in this critique. For this reason I think it is important to set these three apart.
For the operationalization of the European social dream it is important to be aware of Europe’s aspirations that construct the dream and the accomplishments that can be far
70 André Sapir, "Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models." Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 2 (2006) 269-390.
24 removed from these aspirations. This is why I am using a working method in which I distinguish between these three elements.
A good example of how aspirations and values differ from accomplishments is shown in the way that McCormick looks at the qualities of Europe’s social beliefs and their commonalities by looking at the way Europe has handled four different problems.72 He examines Europe’s measures against its demographic problems, its changing definition of the family, its working ethic that contains a preference for leisure, and its response to crime. In this way McCormick tries to form the bigger picture of Europe’s shared beliefs. He does not only look at political policies and their outcomes (accomplishments). This contributes to the idea that there should be a distinction between separate elements of the ESM. Taking these three elements of the ESM as my working model does not state that the ESM is not a useful analytical model. It suggests that the aspirations which form the ground for the European social dream, could very well be separated from the values and the accomplishments. The idea of the European social dream is to conceptualise the aspirations that are rooted in the experiences described by the ESM.
The way scholars and politicians describe Europe’s social policy experience and try to make a model with the ESM is useful for this research. First, it helps to understand what kind of underlying values and aspirations there are in European social policy making. In this I would suggest that the ESM is not considered to be a static model, but a more hybrid model.73 This means that no state sticks completely to the common model and no state sticks completely to its own ideas on social policy. Important is that there is a shared model, to which all of the countries comply to a certain extent. This speaks for my idea that there are common denominators which together create one ideal type European social policy vision.
Second, the latter showed the opportunity for the social dream conceptualization, because there seems to be a missing element in academic research as in the formulations of the European common aspirations concerning social policy. I will work with the distinction between three elements that together form the ESM. This helps to solve the downside of the ESM being its broadness and focus on accomplishments and thereby overshadowing its underlying values and aspirations. The working model of the division between the three elements seems to make the whole ESM more comprehensible. I am not claiming that the distinction between aspirations, values and accomplishments is academically accepted or
72
McCormick, Europeanism, chapter 6: “Society: Quality Over Quantity”, 141-166.
26 1.3 Two levels
The third aspect of the idea of the European social dream has to do with making it comprehensible as a concept that helps to understand what Europe stands for. It makes a huge difference which viewpoint one takes, when trying to define what Europe stands for. I will argue that it is important to be aware of this, but that the European social dream can and should be a unitary concept.
Most works on the European identity, the idea of Europe, and also the European social model are looking either at Europe as a whole in comparison to the rest of the world, or looking at Europe from within as trying to formulate what it is that the separate states are sharing with one another. For the idea of the European social dream it is important to make a difference between these two ways of looking at Europe. The point is that an entity is understood differently from within than from the outside. The analogy of the traveller makes sense in this case. When a European person tries to identity him or herself travelling to another European country it is easy to focus on the differences and affirm your national or regional identity. However, when a European person travels outside of Europe, his or her Europeanism will seem much more apparent. With this in mind it is easier to understand that the European social dream has to function as a concept on two different levels and can even have two slightly different meanings. There is a European social dream for Europeans and for non-Europeans, although I will argue that its features are the same, but that only the awareness and acceptance will proceed in a different way. The European social dream is a useful concept on both levels, but for a good understanding the difference has to be made. I will first deal with the internal level and then come to the external level.
Internal level: The importance of a shared European idea
27 problems that are in need of the conceptualization of the European social dream on an internal level. Finally, I will also elaborate on a few matters that already point towards a shared social dream. This will display the idea of the European social dream and the necessity of its internal level.
Since the French and Dutch ‘no’ in their respective referendums on the European Constitution in 2005 and especially since the debt crisis in several European Union countries since 2008, the faith in Europe as a unity that has shared features has dropped tremendously. The formulation of a single social dream is a chance to improve understanding of what it is that Europe stands for, but its acceptance has not been helped by the mostly negative national attitudes towards Europe. In situations of crisis the European internal differences are becoming more apparent and easier to turn to, while shared features, methods, and aspirations are mostly becoming visible after a crisis.
Two important factors that make it hard to define Europe’s shared features are two deficits that have been defining Europe in the last twenty years. Next to a strong and often described European democratic deficit Europe deals with an identity deficit.74 This is its crisis in the field of the appeal it internally has towards its citizens. In many European states there are right wing parties rising that focus on the national identity and dismiss any acceptance of a shared European identity with shared European features.75 This identity deficit is mostly related to the European Union institutions that lack legitimization in the field of public recognition or identification with its objectives. It seems hard for European citizens to identify with this intergovernmental and more and more supranational organization. The lack of recognition of the shared identity is mostly recognized by the academic discourse in this field. An interesting point here is made by Kaelble with the term of the European vécu, which is the unconscious and implicit identification with Europe.76 This unconscious identification is also present in the shared European aspirations on social policy. There seems to be a lack of recognized identification with Europe among its citizens, even though the shared aspirations on social policy seem to be present, they are not always acknowledged. It can perhaps be called a European social vécu: the unconscious identification with the same vision on social policy in Europe.
74
On the identity deficit: Chris Rumford, The European Union: A Political Sociology (Malden: Blackwell, 2002) 209-210.
28 The second European deficit is the knowledge deficit. Most Europeans have a very vague idea of what Europe means to them. There is a lack of clarity and knowledge, observed by many authors, on what Europe is and what it symbolizes.77 One of the most important things missing is the common understanding of Europe is and what it stands for. This is not only present in a lack of understanding of the European Union institutions, it is also present when it comes to shared European features. Europe is predominantly considered to be an elite project and this obstructs the acceptance of existing shared features and dreams. Scholars and politicians know what to think of Europe and discuss it, but it is not in common citizens thoughts, while the shared values and aspirations are supposed to be on a citizen-wide level and not only on an elite level.78 The European social policy vision is not much discussed or considered by ordinary Europeans, who are generally unaware of its existence, but this does not make the existence of it less true.79 The dream is an analogy that represents something that is not completely observable in reality, but is alive as something to strive for. This could be part of the previously mentioned European social vécu. It is mostly an indication of the identity and the knowledge deficit, which can be helped by a clear conceptualization of the European social dream. Without stating that it should, the spread of this concept would make Europe more visible for everyone and could perhaps even restore a small amount of belief in Europe as an ideal. Weidenholzer and Aspalter state that ‘a social vision is needed to make Europe more visible and to restore the faith of its citizens.’80
On the internal level the European social dream is problematized by several political tendencies in Europe. There is currently a European trend towards more deregulation and competition. This can be formulated as an opposite of the core European values of equality and solidarity. The policy of the Services Directive of the EU signals, according to some, even the triumph of a market-based Europe over a social-Europe.81 It can also be stated that when scholars claim that there is a trend towards more deregulation and away from equality and solidarity, that the latter must have been defining Europe previously. Otherwise a turn away from equality and solidarity would not be possible. Notifying the change towards a more market-based European social policy, already states that Europe was based predominantly on solidarity and a welfare state. The presumed change towards a more
77 McCormick, Europeanism, 140.
78 Neil Fligstein makes a rather polarizing point about the comment that Europe is an elite project. He
distinguishes between Euro-winners and Euro-losers. The people who benefitted from the European integration, and those who were disadvantaged by it. This is the Euroclash. In: Fligstein, Euroclash, 123-164.
79 McCormick, Europeanism, 142. 80
29 liberalized Europe accepts the idea of a more social welfare orientated Europe in the past. Some would suggest that this move even asks for a redefinition of the importance of a common European idea on a social policy.82
Another point of critique on Europe’s social policies also contributes to the idea that there is already a wide acceptance of Europe’s shared aspirations concerning social policy on an internal level. The criticism of several academics on social policy in Europe is that their labour market policies are too much based on the postwar economic environment of the 1950s and 1960s and have not changed enough afterwards.83 In this critique lies the commonness of European social policy ideals. I do not want to challenge this critique, but similar to the identity criticism, the critique on shared values or aspirations accepts that they are present and have been present in Europe. The postwar situation and the reaction on the postwar conditions have been comparable in most European states and are therefore the starting grounds for shared European values and aspirations on a social policy. Europe started internally by forming itself against its postwar demons of unemployment and division.84 These demons were shared and since that moment social policy has been formed internally in a distinctively European way.
By showing the main problems that the acceptance of shared European features has, the importance of an internal level becomes clear. To formulate a European social dream the acceptance of this on an internal level will have to deal with the difficulties that the identity and knowledge deficits create. Besides this, in publications as well as recent European politics, the trend has been to stipulate the differences in Europe and not focus on the shared features. For these reasons it is important to look at Europe’s distinctive ideas on social policy on the internal level separate from the external level. All these political tendencies and deficits are not relevant on the external level. Because the acceptance of the European social dream has to deal with different matters on the internal level, one has to distinguish between the two. The reality of the internal level will be dealt with in the next chapter.
External level: Distinctiveness in the world
The concept of the European social dream has the same meaning on the external level, but because of the different implications and different way of explaining the concept, this level
82 This vision is formulated by: Weidenholzer and Aspalter, “The American and the European Social Dream”, 10.
83
30 must be separated from the internal level. The external level is how the European social dream is distinctive for Europe and different from all other worldwide shared aspirations on social policy. Unlike the internal level that deals with overcoming the European tendency to focus on its differences, the study of the European social dream on the external level shows that the differences in comparison to the rest of the world are much larger than at the internal level. The European social dream is best conceptualized by bridging the differences internally and showing the distinct ‘others’ externally. By showing its others, the features of the shared European ideas on a social model can be recognized better as a unique feature.
As with the internal level, the external level is well understood by looking at several forms of criticism on Europe. The critics do not have the goal of making a case for a European social dream, but in a lot of criticisms on Europe as a whole, there is an underlying acknowledgement of Europe’s shared features. A good example of this is the modern use of the term ‘Eurosclerosis’.85
The concept was introduced to describe the stagnating European integration of the 1970s, but more recently it is used to describe Europe’s economic stagnation because of inflexible labour policies, anti-entrepreneurial biases, high taxation, and burdensome welfare programs.86 Leaving aside the validity of this criticism, the concept does assign special features to the whole of Europe. This forms the term ‘Euro’-sclerosis and not German or British -sclerosis. The critics of the social policies that Europe has had, are perhaps unsatisfied with these social policy ideals, but they do acknowledge Europe’s distinctiveness in the world on this field.
Another useful critique comes from the mostly American neoliberal scholars who characterize Europe’s social policy aspirations as ‘patronizing’, ‘opposed to performance’ or ‘restraining the individuals liberty’.87
Again leaving aside the validity of these claims, these neoliberal critics on Europe do criticise Europe as a whole. Not the EU or certain special parts of Europe, but the whole of Europe is criticised for its shared features. This contributes to the idea that on the external level Europe is indeed very unique in the world.
When looking at non-Eurosceptic studies, the social dimension is likewise accepted as typical for Europe. Some authors state that it is the social dimension of Europe that makes
85 Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi, “Beyond Eurosclerosis”, Economic Policy 24, no. 59 (2009) 409-461. 86 On the modern use of ‘Eurosclerosis’: Michelle Riboud, Carolina Sánchez-Páramo, Carlos Silva Jáuregui, Does Eurosclerosis Matter?: Institutional Reform and Labor Market Performance in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical Paper no. 519 (Washington: World Bank , 2002) 1-3.
