Do They Have a Say?

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–

NGO Influence in EU-Level Decision-Making:

A Qualitative Case Study of the Policy Process Leading

up to the Communication of the European Commission

– An Open and Secure Europe: Making It Happen?

Thesis | M.Sc. Public Administration

Capstone European Integration in the 21st Century

David Jonathan Scharpf MSc Public Administration -

International and European Governance Academic Year 2019-2020

Student Number: s2413728 d.j.scharpf@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Dr. Rik de Ruiter Institute of Public Administration Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

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Abstract

Purpose – This research project analyzes the influence of non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) in European political decision-making. While NGOs are becoming increasingly relevant political actors and significant stakeholders in global and European governance, findings on how they participate and influence decision-making procedures are rather scarce. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to answer two essential questions: First, how - through which

causal mechanism - did NGOs influence the decision-making process on the Communication

of the European Commission (EC) – An open and secure Europe: Making it happen? And second, what was the level of influence NGOs had in the decision-making process in the case of the EC Communication?

Design/ Methodology/ Approach – In order to answer the research questions adequately, this

project predominantly relies on qualitative document analysis of primary sources. The overall methodological approach is process tracing. The analysis will furthermore be structured through the application of an analytical framework (Betsill and Corell, 2008b), which provides indicators for the systematic assessment of NGO influence in public decision-making. The in-depth document analysis is carried out according to Mayring’s qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000; 2014) with the help of MAXQDA (VERBI Software, 2018).

Findings – Concerning the first research question, the results of the analysis show that NGOs

were able to influence the decision-making process through several channels. NGOs were able to attain their preferences through strategically providing information to decision-makers by using and taking advantage of the available access points to the decision-making process, in particular the consultation procedure, the hearings and the stakeholder conferences. NGOs were especially successful at influencing the negotiations through using framing and agenda setting techniques. Concerning the second research question, the analytical indicators show that NGOs were able to achieve a high level of influence during the decision-making process of this case.

Implications – These findings underscore the theoretical expectations that the behavior of

NGOs and the EC can be conceptualized as a resource-access exchange relationship. Specifically, the expectation that both actors are dependent on external resources, which they try to compensate through rational-strategic behavior, are reflected by the empirical results. The findings furthermore show that NGOs - as representatives of civil society and minority interests - play a significant role in EU-level decision-making and therefore are able to contribute to a democratization of the EU.

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Table of Figures

Figure 1: Timeline of European Treaties and multi-annual Programmes for Justice and Home Affairs ... 9

Figure 2: Resource-exchange model ... 23

Figure 3: Theoretical model of NGO influence ... 26

Figure 4: NGO Influence - Participation and Goal Attainment ... 42

Figure 5: Indicators of NGO influence ... 44

Figure 6: Uncovering the causal mechanism in process tracing through the analytical framework by Betsill and Corell (2008b) ... 54

Figure 7: Step model of inductive category development (Mayring, 2000) ... 55

Figure 8: Strategies for gathering and analyzing data by Betsill and Corell (2008b, p. 28).... 86

Figure 9: Indicators of NGO influence by Betsill and Corell (2008b, p, 34-35) ... 87

Figure 10: Determining levels of NGO influence by Betsill and Corell (2008b, p. 38) ... 88

Figure 11: Code-Relations Model - NGO Preferences ... 89

Figure 12: Single-Case Model – EC Communication - An Open and Secure Europe: Making it happen ... 90

Figure 13: Two-Case-Model: NGO Contributions - 'An Open and Secure Europe - Making it happen' ... 91

Figure 14: Codesystem including number of Codings per Code ... 94

Table of Tables Table 1: Features of political organizations ... 15

Table 2: Indicators of NGO influence – Results according to analytical framework of Betsill and Corell (2008b) ... 74

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List of Abbreviations

ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework

DG Home DG for Migration and Home Affairs

DG Justice DG for Justice and Consumer

EC European Commission

ECPAT End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography & Trafficking of Children

for Sexual Purposes

ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles

ENAR European Network Against Racism

EOS European Organization for Security

EPAM European NGO Platform on Asylum and Migration

EU European Union

FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

GCM Global Coalition on Migration

GMPA Global Migration Policy Associates

H Hypothesis

ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

IO International Organization

MSF Multiple-Streams Framework

MSF Multiple Streams Framework

NGO Non-governmental Organization

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

PICUM Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants

RQ Research Question

TDHIF Terre des Hommes International Federation

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1 Introduction

It is undeniable that non-governmental organizations have become increasingly relevant actors and valuable political stakeholders within the global political arena. NGOs do not only fulfill decisively important tasks that nation states and international organizations (IOs) are unable or unwilling to do – such as emergency aid and rescue missions, monitoring of human rights violations and the implementation of policies on the ground. Their technical expertise and representation of civil society interests have also become significant aspects to consider for political decision-makers. This assumption is underscored by the number of existing NGOs, which grew from 1000 in the 1950s, to 4.000 in 1980, to about 51.000 in 2004 (Union of International Organizations, cited in Seifer 2009, p. 22). Another indicator for the growing relevance of international NGOs is the development of available resources, which increased from USD 875.5 million in 1970 to USD 7.3 billion in the field of development cooperation (Scharnagel 2002, cited in Seifer, 2009, p. 22). A look at official funding of NGOs within the European Union reveals that between 2014 and 2017, the EC “committed an estimated EUR 11.3 billion for implementation by NGOs in many different EU policy areas” (European Court of Auditors, 2018, p.8). Finally, their significance is further illustrated in the Nobel Peace Prize, which has been awarded to the International Committee of the Red Cross (1963), Amnesty International (1977), Médecins Sans Frontières (1999), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (2013) and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (2015), just to name a few.

While their relevance within the field of global governance is quite indisputable, less is known about how they actually participate and influence global and European policy making. This is problematic, since even though NGOs increasingly take over a significant role in European governance, scientific findings on how NGOs participate and influence public decision making remain rather scarce (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Dür, 2008a). Thus, considering their relevance both with regard to public policy making as well as their function as a representative of civil society, it is essential to understand if and how they have an impact on European decision-making. Therefore, this research project presents a qualitative single case analysis of the decision-making process leading up to the Communication of the European Commission - An open and secure Europe: Making it happen (European Commission, 2014a) with the aim of answering two overarching research questions: First, how - through which

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causal mechanism1 - did NGOs influence the decision-making process on the Communication

of the European Commission – An open and secure Europe: Making it happen? And second, what was the level of influence NGOs had in the decision-making process in the case of the EC Communication?

These questions will be answered qualitatively through document analysis of primary sources. The core methodological approach will be process tracing. Furthermore, I will apply an analytical framework, which has been specifically developed as a systematic toolkit for the assessment of NGO influence in public decision-making (Betsill and Corell, 2008b). The text analysis will be carried out through MAXQDA (VERBI Software, 2018) according to Mayring’s qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000; 2014).

The remaining part of the research project proceeds as follows. After giving an introduction to the case (2) and clearly specifying the research questions (3), I will develop a detailed theoretical framework (4). Chapter four provides both a discussion of the conceptual as well as the empirical literature on NGO influence and beyond that outlines the analytical framework which will be used. In chapter five I will discuss the methodological approach (5), draw together the key findings and address each of the research questions in turn (6). In the discussion section (7), I will provide a reflection of the results with regard to causality, compare them to previous findings, identify potential conditioning factors and point out the limitations of this study. In the conclusion (8), I will summarize how my findings relate to my research questions, provide recommendations for future research and consider the contributions of this thesis from a broader perspective.

1 According to the process-tracing literature, a causal mechanism is a causal chain of events, linking an event A

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2 Case Introduction – The Multi-annual Programmes for Justice and

Home Affairs

Before discussing the literature on NGO influence in policy-making, I will briefly introduce the case which will be the object of analysis in this research project. Furthermore, I will provide reasons for its academic as well as social relevance.

The EU policy area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) has undergone some major changes and developments in the past 20 years. The Treaty of Amsterdam first initiated the concept of an area of freedom, security and justice through stating in Article 1 (5) that the EU has the objective “to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime” (European Union, 1997). In this context, the first multi-annual programme was the Tampere Programme which was adopted in 1999 and “highlights the priorities that would define the action at the European level” in the area of justice and home-affairs for the timeframe between 2000 and 2004 (European Commission, 2002). The multi-annual programme was generally intended to respond to the objectives put forth in the Treaty of Amsterdam and provided strategic guidelines for future justice and home-affairs policies in the EU.

Following the Treaty of Nice in 2003 and the largest expansion of the EU in 2004, the

Tampere Programme was succeeded by a multi-annual programme adopted in The Hague in

2004 (The Hague Programme), which set guidelines for the AFSJ between 2005 and 2010. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, “establishes that the European Union must constitute an area of freedom, security and justice, where fundamental rights are fully respected. To achieve this, it tasks the European Council with defining the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within that area. The guidelines cover aspects such as border control, migration and asylum policy, and police and judicial cooperation.” (European Council, 2018). In detail, Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) determines that the “European Council shall define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice” (European Union, 2007). Thus, in 2009, the European Council adopted the Stockholm Programme, a multiannual framework which establishes guidelines for the EU

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on migration, asylum, security and citizenship for the timeframe between 2010 and 2014 (European Council, 2010).

The Stockholm Programme expired in 2014 and was followed by the strategic

guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice, adopted by the European Council meeting in Ypres on 26-27 June 2014 (European

Council, 2014). The 2014 strategic guidelines are a particularly interesting case as they differ significantly from the previous programmes on justice and home-affairs. As Léonard and Kaunert mention, “it had been widely expected that the agenda succeeding the Stockholm programme would be known as the ‘Rome programme’, as it was thought that it would be adopted during the Italian Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2014.” (Léonard and Kaunert, 2016, p. 144). However, the Stockholm Programme was not succeeded by a similar programme, “but rather guidelines focusing on the objective of transposing, implementing and consolidating the existing legal instruments and measures.” (European Parliament, 2019). Léonard and Kaunert argue that there are several reasons why the Council adopted guidelines instead of a comprehensive programme, the most important one being that previous programmes were criticized to be overly detailed, providing too many and too specific aims, making it increasingly difficult for implementation (for a detailed discussion see Léonard and Kaunert, 2016 and the Q&A by the European Commission, 2014b).

What is relevant for this research project is that in March 2014, prior to the adoption of the 2014 strategic guidelines by the Council, the European Commission published a Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions with the title ‘An open and secure Europe: making it happen’ (European Commission, 2014a). A Communication is a particular policy measure of the European Commission which needs to be internally agreed on and that serves the purpose of proposing a specific action plan, recommendations or explicit proposals for legislation. A Communication is a unique policy document that is based on Article 288 TFEU (EU, 2019). This Communication of the European Commission is intended to “set out its vision on the future agenda for the AFSJ” and to deliver its objectives to the Council (European Parliament, 2019). This Communication and its process of formation will be the object of analysis for this research project.

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Figure 1: Timeline of European Treaties and multi-annual Programmes for Justice and Home Affairs2

The Communication from the European Commission from March 2014 is a particularly interesting and relevant case with regard to NGO influence, as the document is the result of an extensive consultation process, implemented by the European Commission prior to the preparation of the Communication. Consultations were majorly organized through two conferences: The Open and Safe Europe: What’s next? stakeholders conference between 29 and 30 January 2014, organized by the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) (European Commission, 2013b) and the Assises de la Justice – Shaping Justice

policies in Europe for the years to come conference, organized by the Directorate-General for

Justice and Consumers (DG Justice) (European Commission, 2013a). Besides conferences, stakeholders and civil society groups were able to submit recommendations and ideas through a public consultation on the website of DG Home (European Commission, 2013b).

In sum, the 2014 strategic guidelines are a particularly interesting case of analysis as they differ significantly from the previous programmes on justice and home affairs issues. Furthermore, the Communication of the European Commission is a relevant object of analysis, as it is the result of an extensive consultation process with stakeholders and civil society groups. Therefore, the formation process of the Communication of the European Commission leading up to the 2014 strategic guidelines will be a relevant and legitimate case to study NGO influence in European policy-making.

2 Source: Own representation.

May 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam Oct 1999 Tampere Programme Treaty of Nice Feb 2003 The Hague Programme Nov 2004 Stockholm Programme Dec 2009 Treaty of Lisbon Dec 2009 2014 Strategic Guidelines July 2014 Oct 2013 -Jan 2014 Consultations EC Communication Mar 2014

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3 Research Question

This research project addresses the question of influence of non-state actors in European policy making with regard to the field of migration. In detail, I will focus on the question of

how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were able to participate and influence the

decision-making process of the European Commission with regard to the Communication of the EC concerning the June 2014 strategic guidelines for the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), called An open and secure Europe: making it happen. In particular, I will attempt to establish causality through tracing a chain of links that connect NGO participation during the consultation stage of the policy process with their influence in the policy process and outcome. The two main research questions will be formulated in accordance with the research framework on NGO influence by Betsill and Corell (2008b), which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.3.

Research Question (RQ)

1) How – through which causal mechanism – did NGOs influence the decision-making process on the Communication of the European Commission – An open and secure Europe:

Making it happen (European Commission, 2014a)? 3

a) How did NGOs participate in the decision-making process?

b) Through which strategies, techniques and resources were NGOs able to influence the decision-making process?

c) What are the underlying causal mechanisms that enabled NGO influence?

d) How did NGOs attain their goals in the decision-making process with regard to the policy outcome as well as the policy process?

2) What was the level of influence NGOs had in the decision-making process in the case of the EC Communication (low, moderate, high)?

3.1 Academic and Societal Relevance

The focus of this research project is relevant both with regard to academic as well as societal concerns. First, there is a significant lack of qualitative findings on how non-governmental organizations participate and influence European decision-making processes

3 The research questions explicitly refer to the analytical framework of Betsill and Corell (2008b), which will be

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(discussed in detail in 4.2). Thus, there is a particular need for comprehensive approaches that not only measure individual factors that affect the likelihood of NGO influence quantitatively, but that specifically analyze how NGOs were involved in one specific case through qualitative analysis. This is particularly relevant in order to uncover the mechanisms and strategies through which non-governmental organizations are able to influence political decision-making processes. Furthermore, the study is academically relevant with regard to achieving a deeper understand of the underlying mechanisms of interest group influence and civil society participation in EU-level policy making. In particular, this research project will provide further empirical insights into the assumptions of Rational Choice approach and the resource-access

exchange relationship between non-state private and public actors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;

Bouwen, 2002 Klüver, 2013; Tallberg et al., 2015). Specifically, the theoretical assumptions of resource-dependence and rational behavior (as discussed in detail in 4.1), will be examined from an empirical perspective. Another reason for the academic relevance of this project is the application of the analytical framework of Betsill and Corell (2008b), a prominent and widely used set of indicators in the field of NGO influence, which will provide further findings regarding its efficiency and analytical strength.

Besides being relevant for academic reasons, this research project also provides important findings from a societal perspective. Considering that non-governmental organizations not only represent citizen interests but are also advocates of political minorities and vulnerable groups, it is highly relevant to understand if and how their concerns are heard and picked up by policy makers and whether their demands essentially transpire into public policies. Furthermore, against the backdrop of the much-discussed democratic deficit of the European Commission (Greenwood, 2007), it is essential to generate further findings on the ability of organized civil society to have a say in public decision-making and thus “to what extend NGOs are able to contribute to the democratization of the European Union” (Furtak, 2005).

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4 Theoretical Framework

This chapter will be structured into three main parts. First, I will provide a discussion of the main theoretical concepts and the most relevant conceptual literature concerning the research question. Second, I will review the essential empirical literature in the field of interest group and NGO influence. These first two sections have the purpose to establish an overview of the most relevant academic approaches to study NGO influence as well as to provide insights on how to answer the research question of this thesis appropriately. In a third section, I will describe the analytical framework that will be applied empirically to answer the research questions of this thesis.

4.1 Conceptual Literature

This chapter will be split into two parts: First, I will discuss the core concepts that will be applied in the empirical analysis and clarify the terminology used during this thesis. Second, I will provide a theoretical account of the role of NGOs in policy-making and explain why NGOs are able to exert influence in public decision-making in general. The overall aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model that explains NGO influence in European policy making.

4.1.1 Discussion of key terms and concepts: NGOs and Influence

In order to clarify the essential concepts of this research project I will first discuss how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are defined for the scope of this project and how they can be differentiated from other political actors. Second, I will address the concept of influence.

4.1.1.1 Non-governmental Organizations

In order to analyze the influence of NGOs on policy outcomes, it is first necessary to establish a clear analytical terminology that clarifies how non-governmental organizations are defined in this research project. In the scholarly literature on non-governmental actors, there is a lively debate about what exactly NGOs are and how to differentiate NGOs form other conceptions of non-state actors, such as interest groups, civil society organizations (CSOs), advocacy coalitions, non-profit organizations or social movements (Furtak, 2005; Seifer, 2009, Klüver, 2013). Thus, it is necessary to develop an applicable definition that entails specific selection criteria which are neither too narrow nor too broad, in order to be able to precisely

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distinguish the object of analysis from other non-state actors, that are not considered in this analysis.

The term non-governmental organization (NGO) was first introduced in 1946 in Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations4 (Götz, 2008). Until then, scholars as well as political institutions and international organizations have developed different definitions of NGOs and have debated about how NGOs can be distinguished from other political organizations (see Salamon and Anheier, 1997 for an overview). For this research project, I will synthesize definitions from different authors, in order to establish a clear description of the object of analysis that is adequate for this case study. As a conceptual base I will draw on a characterization of NGOs by the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, one of the largest comparative studies on third sector organizations (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). According to Salamon and Anheier (1997, p. 35 ff.), non-governmental organizations are characterized by five criteria:

a. organized; b. private;

c. not-profit oriented; d. independent; e. voluntary input.

According to Salamon and Anheier, NGOs are organized in terms of having a permanent institutionalized organizational structure. This criterion is useful in distinguishing NGOs form other less permanently organized groups, such as social movements or protest groups. NGOs are furthermore defined as private entities, which means that they are structurally independent from any governmental body. Thus, NGOs can be differentiated from other political organizations that are either (partially) controlled by national authorities or dependent on governmental input. The criterion of being not-profit oriented is applied in order to differentiate NGOs from other private, profit-oriented organizations or business-related interest groups and lobby groups. NGOs are independent in that they are – besides being autonomous from national authorities – also independent of other political or private organizations, such as parties, businesses or other interest groups. Voluntary input means that

4 “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.“ (UN, n.d.).

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both membership as well as support of the NGO through e.g. resources is based on voluntary principle, which differs in some professional or trade organizations (Salamon and Anheier, 1997).

While these five criteria provide a useful baseline definition, the term of NGOs still remains quite broad. Therefore, I will complement Salamon and Anheier’s analytical criteria with definitions by Furtak (2005) and Seifer (2009). Drawing on Furtak (2005), I would like to add the criterion of having objectives that benefit the general public interest (Furtak, 2005, p. 62). Even though this is a rather vague criterion, it is necessary to distinguish NGOs from other political organizations that mainly represent the interests of their members or specific individual interests. As a last criterion I would like to refer to Seifer (2009) who notes that NGOs are characterized by political interest (Seifer, 2009, p. 36). This means that their activities are specifically intended to result in policy change or at least the attempt to have influence on political decision-making, either through influencing the public discourse or through influencing policy makers directly (ibid.).

To conclude, for the scope of this research project, the definition of NGOs is a synthesis of five criteria by Salamon and Anheier (1997) and two additional criteria by Seifer (2009) and Furtak (2005). Making no claim to be exhaustive, table 1 provides a classification scheme of the most relevant types of political organizations and their different characteristics.

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Table 1: Features of political organizations56

4.1.1.2 Influence

The second core concept is influence. Considering the literature on influence, it is necessary to also shortly discuss the concept of power, as both concepts seem to be closely related within the academic debate (Betsill and Corell, 2008). One of the most prevalent definitions of power referred to in the literature is that of Max Weber, who frames power as the ability to exercise one’s will over others (Weber, 1922). Weber’s definition addresses “social relationships” and characterizes power mainly as the ability to enforce one’s own will on others, despite possible resistant forces (ibid.). Drawing on Hart (1976), Dür considers power to be both an ability of an actor as well as a “causal concept” (Dür, 2008b). A particularly useful conception of power with regard to this research project are the three faces of power, which were developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Dür, 2008b). The first face or dimension of power originates from Dahl (1961), who argues that power can be framed as a matter of who

5 Source: Own representation, based on Klüver (2013, p. 5), extended through Salamon and Anheier (1997), Seifer

(2009) and Furtak (2005).

6 The purpose of this table is to give a systematic overview of the most relevant political organizations. It does

not claim to be exhaustive.

Organiz ed Private Non-profit Indepen dent Voluntary input Public interest Political interest Political parties x x (x) (x) x x Social movements x x x x (x) x Leisure associations x x x x x Interest groups x x x x x

Political think tanks x x x (x) x x

Trade unions (some) x x x x (x) x Non-governmental organizations x x x x x x x

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wins or loses on a certain collectively binding issue on public policy. The second dimension, which was developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) addresses a more subtle form of power. It describes an actor’s ability to set the agenda on an issue or to be able to keep specific undesired objectives off the political agenda. The third dimension of power was established by Lukes (1974) who considers power as the ability to manipulate other actors’ preferences or preventing other actors from attaining their preferences through influencing or manipulating the overall public opinion.

The evaluation of the relationship between power and influence is difficult. Holsti (1988) argues that influence is an inherent part of power and rather conceptualizes influence as a tool to exert and achieve and maintain power. Cox and Jacobson (1973) loosely define power as “the aggregate of political resources available to an actor”, while they frame influence as the “modification of one actor’s behavior by that of another.” (Cox and Jacobson. 1973: 3-4, as cited in Betsill and Corell, 2008). Referreing to Cox and Jacobson (1973), Betsill and Corell conclude that “power may or may not be converted to influence in any given political process. The key is to understand the conditions under which an actor’s capabilities result in influence.” (Betsill and Corell, 2008, p. 22). In short, it is assumed that influence is a varying component of a relationship between actors (ibid.). Whether power can be transformed into influence depends on different circumstances that may change from one case to another. A definition of influence that is widely used in the field of interest group influence in policy making derives from Nagel (1975), who argues that influence can be characterized as the ability of an actor “to shape a decision in line with her preferences” (Nagel, 1975, as cited in Dür, 2008b, p. 561). This definition of influence is based on Dahl’s (1961) first face of power, by simply stating that influence occurs when an actor wins on a collectively binding decision, or as Klüver puts it, “influence is the coincidence of the policy preferences of an actor with the output of the political decision-making process” (Klüver, 2013, p. 7). I consider this definition of influence too narrow for the scope of this research project, as it merely focuses on policy outcomes and thus black-boxes the decision-making process. This is problematic, as the focus policy outcomes might miss certain types of influence. One particular problem with the focus on policy outcomes is that even if there is an empirical convergence of policy preferences in the policy outcome, it does not automatically mean that the NGO was influential. As Klüver (2013) points out, convergence of policy preferences is (if at all) a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition for influence. Another problem with an output-oriented definition of influence is what Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) call counteractive lobbying: “Even if an

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interest group does not manage to move an outcome into a preferred direction, this does not necessarily mean that the group lacked influence.” (Dür, 2008b, p. 561 referring to Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994). In other words, NGOs may still have had an impact on the decision-making process, despite not having achieved their preferences in the policy output. Furthermore, it is often difficult to determine whether NGOs have achieved their goals, since a common lobbying strategy is based on formulating policy recommendations that are intentionally exaggerated from the actor’s actual preferences, in order to have a more significant impact or push decision-makers in a particular direction (Bestill and Corell, 2008). In short, defining influence merely in terms of convergence of policy preferences regarding the policy outcome ignores specific types of influence that NGOs may have on the policy process (ibid.).

Due to these considerations, I will work with the definition put forth by Betsill and Corell who argue that “influence occurs when one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s behavior from what would have occurred otherwise.” (Betsill and Corell, 2008b, p. 24). Conceptualizing NGO influence through the broad term of

communication is a deliberate decision by the authors, as it “better captures the range of

resources that NGOs use to influence international negotiations. Whether that communication occurs […] in the form of technical information, claims of legitimacy, or threats, is for us to determine in each of the cases” (Betsill and Corell, 2008b, p. 24)

This definition essentially entails two dimensions of influence: “(1) how NGO diplomats communicate with other actors during a negotiating process, and (2) alterations in the behavior of those actors in response to that communication.” (Betsill and Corell, 2008b, p. 26-27). This definition is important as it is an extension of the above-mentioned definition of influence by Nagel (1975) that solely focuses on the policy outcome. Betsill and Corell’s two-dimensional definition of influence specifically takes both NGO participation as well as NGO

goal attainment into account and is therefore a more appropriate conceptualization for the

purpose of this research project (Betsill and Corell, 2008b, p. 28). 4.1.2 The Role of NGOs in Political Decision-making

After having defined the core concepts of non-governmental organizations and influence in the previous chapter, this section addresses the question of how NGOs influence decision-making processes and policy outcomes from a theoretical perspective. The question of how non-governmental organizations influence political decision-making processes is

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essentially embedded in a larger puzzle on how political decision-making can be described and modeled in theory. Therefore, in the following section I will discuss and compare the most relevant explanatory models of political decision-making with regard to their applicability to this case.

This is relevant in order to position the theoretical framework applied to the case of this thesis within a broader context of related models and frameworks. And above all, it is necessary to make a sound decision which theoretical framework is most suitable to analyze and explain NGO influence in EU policy-making with regard to the case of this research project.

4.1.2.1 Models of Political Decision-Making

The academic literature provides a vast range of different explanatory models on political decision-making. Drawing on Otten (2016) I will present a short overview of the most relevant analytical approaches with regard to this case, which can be categorized into (1) Rational Choice models, (2) Institutionalist models, (3) Multiple-Streams models and (4) models based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework.7

Rational Choice models are essentially based on the assumption that individual actors

have fixed preferences and make decisions according to rational cost-benefit considerations (Shepsle, 2006). Rational Choice approaches characterize the behavior of actors as driven by the effort to maximize their individual self-interest, while minimizing potential negative consequences (ibid.). Models commonly referred to in the literature are Collective Action

Problems (Olson, 1965/2009), the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Kreps et al., 1982) or Tit-for-Tat

models (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). A particular sub-category of rational choice models of political decision-making are exchange models. Theoretical exchange models are also based on the assumption that actors behave according to self-interest and rational utility-maximization (Olson 1965/2009; Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998). Furthermore, political actors are thought to have limited resources, which is why they are required to cooperate with other actors in order to receive external input (Bouwen, 2002). In this context, actors engage in exchange relationships with other political actors in order to balance out their resource limitations in order to maximize their interests. Applied to the case of political decision making

7 This categorization makes no claim to be exhaustive, as its intention is merely to provide an overview of the

most relevant explanatory approaches in the field of interest group influence and to position the model chosen for this research project in relation to other theoretical frameworks. It must also be noted that the proposed categories are not exclusive, as they inherently overlap with one another in many areas.

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within the European Union, exchange models seem to provide useful tools to analyze the strategic behavior between interest groups and European institutions. Modeling NGO interaction in EU decision-making as an exchange-relationship appear to be productive, as NGOs haven been proven to be valuable to EU institutions for their expertise and legitimacy (Bouwen, 2002; Mahoney 2004; Klüver, 2013).

Institutionalist models are based on the assumption that political institutions

significantly shape and determine the behavior of actors in political decision-making processes (March and Olsen, 1989; Scharpf, 2000). According to Scharpf, institutions are systems of rules that structure the behavior of a group of actors (Scharpf, 2000). Institutions determine the course of action of both collective and individual actors through shaping their perceptions and interpretation of problems, their preferences and abilities to influence the decision-making process (ibid.). Prominent institutionalist models in the scholarly literature are March and Olsen’s New Institutionalism (1989), Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development

Framework (Ostrom, 1990) and Mayntz and Scharpf’s Actor-centered Institutionalism (Maytz

and Scharpf, 1995). Thus, institutionalist models analyze how interest groups are able to influence a particular policy outcome in relation to the institutional context, in which the decision-making process is embedded. The analytical focus of institutional models is on how institutions determine actors the behavior of political actors.

Another relevant framework for the analysis of political decision-making is Kingdon’s (1984) Multiple-Streams Framework (MSF), which since then has been further developed by several scholars (Howlett et al., 2015). The MSF differs from the previous decision-making models, as it particularly takes the relationship between policy issues and the broader policy environment into account. Essentially, the multiple-streams framework by Kingdon is an adaption of the garbage can model developed by Cohen et al. (1972), which describes political decision-making as a form of organized anarchy: Political decision are the result of a disorganized interaction between four independent and disconnected streams of problems,

solutions, decision-makers and choice opportunities, which flow in and out of a garbage can,

which symbolizes the decision/choice arena (Cohen et al., 1972). Similar to the garbage can model, Kingon’s multiple-streams framework identifies three independent streams, problems,

policies and politics, which are conceptualized as central determining factors in the

decision-making processes (Kingdon, 1984). The problem stream can be characterized as policy issues that require political attention because actors interpret and judge the issue as problematic (ibid.). The policy stream symbolizes available solutions to a policy issue that are technically

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feasible and ideologically acceptable to policy makers. The politics stream is determined by the national mood, campaigns and legislative turnover (Kingdon, 1984). Consequently, the convergence of the three streams creates a policy window, which is described as the potential for political decision-making (ibid.). A relevant analytical component of the MSF are policy

entrepreneurs, which are defined as political actors who take advantage of windows of

opportunity to influence policy outcomes according to their preferences (ibid.). Whether a policy entrepreneur is successful depends on several criteria, such as expertise, network or negotiation skills (Kingdon, 1984, p. 189 ff.). In conclusion, multiple-streams frameworks are useful models for the evaluation of NGO influence in European policymaking, as they not only focus on individual actors but also accounts for the complexity of a shifting policy environment.

Another widely applied theoretical model for the explanation of interest group influence in political decision-making is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), mainly developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). The ACF is an actor-centered approach, which provides a comprehensive framework for the analysis of policy-making through the role of coalitions. Since its creation, the ACF has been applied and further development by a substantial number of scholars (e.g. Schlager, 1995; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Cairney, 2015). The framework is highly ambitious as it focuses on the entire policy process and attempts to deliver a very general theory of political decision-making (Cairney, 2015). Sabatier and Weible argue that “the policy subsystem is the primary unit of analysis for understanding policy processes (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 189). The central assumption of the ACF is that individuals coordinate their actions through advocacy coalitions through which they “interact and compete to dominate policy subsystems” (Cairney, 2015, p. 2). Advocacy

coalitions consist of “people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest

group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system—i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time.” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). Policy change can be initiated through

internal or external shocks to subsystems, which may change advocacy coalitions or the power

balance between them (Cairney, 2015). In sum, advocacy coalitions are able to increase their influence in policy-making if they exercise their power effectively within a policy subsystem. Applied to the case of NGO influence in EU policy-making, the Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a useful model to analyze the complexity of the entire policy-making process, as it not only focuses on the behavior of individual actors and groups, but also accounts

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for changing relationships within advocacy coalitions and long term external events, such as socioeconomic shifts or changes in government (Sabatier, 1988).

In conclusion, the discussion of these four theoretical frameworks has highlighted the core assumptions of the most relevant explanatory models to describe and explain interest group influence in EU and international policy-making. A comparative evaluation of the discussed approaches shows that although all models provide useful insights, they each focus on different conceptual elements. While Rational Choice Approaches mainly focus on the behavior of individual actors, Institutionalist models emphasize the relevance and process-shaping elements of the institutional setting for the political decision-making process. Models based on the Advocacy Coalitions Framework also assume that actors behave according to self-interest. However, the political goals of actors are predominantly determined through values and belief systems. Opposed to the assumption of rationalistic behavior in political decision-making, Multiple-Streams approaches conceptualize decisions as the result of a form of organized anarchy and analyze political entrepreneurs as the key analytical entity with the ability to influence policy outcomes.

Consequently, this comparative evaluation of different theoretical models shows that a

Rational Choice approach seems to be an adequate conceptualization of the relationship

between non-governmental actors and the European Commission in the case of the EC Communication leading up to the June 2014 strategic guidelines. Especially the assumptions of the above-introduced approach of modeling the interaction between NGOs and EU institutions as an exchange relationship seems suitable, as the purpose of the consultation phase for the Debate on the future of Home Affairs policies is particularly framed as an exchange of information (European Commission, 2013). Furthermore, the assumption that both non-governmental organizations and EU institutions are rational actors that attempt to maximize their self-interest seems plausible, as both types of actors can be associated with clear preferences and intentions, which they would like to achieve during the decision-making process. Additionally, the decision to apply an exchange model to the analysis of the EC

Communication appears to be productive, as similar studies in the field of NGO influence in

EU and international policy-making have proven its explanatory value (Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998; Bouwen, 2002; Klüver, 2013; Tallberg et al., 2015).

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4.1.2.2 NGO Influence as an Exchange Relationship

Building on the findings from the comparison in the previous sections, I argue that the influence of non-governmental organizations in EU policy-making can be best described as a reciprocal relationship between two interdependent types of actors – NGOs and the European institutions. In accordance with the existing literature, I will therefore develop a theoretical exchange model in order to explain NGO influence in this case of analysis. I will first describe the theoretical foundation from which the model originates from. Second, I will demonstrate the assumed causal mechanism of the model. Finally, I will discuss the two core theoretical assumptions that are relevant to explain the causal mechanism.

Theoretical Foundation

The logic of the resource-exchange model originates from sociological conceptualizations of inter-organizational relationships, which were developed predominantly by Blau (1964) and Levine and White (1961). These authors conceptualize the relationship between state and non-state actors as a series of inter-organizational exchanges. According to Levine and White, “organizational exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives” (Levine and White, 1961, p. 588). The reason for the inherent exchange relationship is that both types of actors are characterized as having a lack of organizational self-sufficiency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Consequently, Pfeffer ad Salancik assume that both, private and public actors strongly depend on external resources in order to reach their political goals (1978). This in turn creates an organizationally interdependent relationship between political decision-makers and private non-state actors (ibid.). The conceptualization of the inter-organizational relationship between public and private actors derived from Levine and White (1961) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) constitutes the basic theoretical structure for the exchange model applied to the case of this research project.

Causal Mechanism

Building on comparable approaches in the field of interest group influence (Bouwen, 2002; Klüver, 2013; Tallberg et al., 2015), I argue that NGO influence in EU policy-making can be theoretically captured as a resource-access exchange relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Bouwen, 2002). In this context, influence of non-state actors is not considered as unidirectional, but rather as a mutually engaging exchange relationship in which both public

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as well as private actors actively seek to participate. The baseline assumption of the resource-exchange model is a lack of organizational self-sufficiency and the need for specific resources, in order to be able to reach their political goals (Bouwen, 2002). On one side, decision-makers lack specific information about certain implications of potential decisions. Therefore, political institutions rely on outside information in order to overcome their deficit in information (Tallberg et al., 2015). Private non-state actors are highly valuable to decision-makers in this regard as they provide expert knowledge, which is necessary as many policy issues are highly complex in nature and EU institutions generally rely on outside expertise during the decision-making process (Van Schendelen, 1994; Pappi and Henning, 1999). Furthermore, private actors possess information on the interests of civil society as well as issue specific information, such as focusing events, salience or the degree of conflict, which is relevant with regard to maintaining political legitimacy (Tallberg et al., 2015.). On the other side of the exchange model are non-state actors, which lack access to the decision-making process, which is a necessary resource for them to reach their political goals, namely influencing public policies (ibid.). The fact that both state and non-state actors are in need of a specific resource that is in possession of the other actor results in an interdependent relationship, which is based on the need to exchange, so both actors are able to reach their goals. In other words, both sides possess resources that the other side values.

8

This results in a “mutually beneficial exchange, [in which] decision makers grant interest groups access to the policy process, while interest groups in return provide information that is useful to decision makers” (Tallberg et al, 2015, p. 215). Consequently, this causal

8 Source: Own representation, in accordance with the resource-exchange model by Klüver (2013).

Eur ope a n I nst it ut ions N on -st a te A c tor s Resources Influence

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mechanism provides the possibility for non-state actors to influence the political

decision-making process.

Theoretical Assumptions – Resource Dependence and Rational Behavior

The resource-exchange model is based on two core assumptions: Rational behavior of actors and resource dependence. In the following section, I will discuss why both public and private actors are assumed to be dependent on external resources and behave according to rational considerations.

The first core assumption of the resource-exchange model is that all involved actors behave according to rational considerations. As already mentioned earlier (3.2.1), exchange models are a particular form of rational choice approaches which are essentially based on

economic paradigms of cost-benefit calculations (Lohmann, 2008). Transferred to the context

of political decision-making, actors are assumed to have clear-cut and fixed preferences and behave rational. This means that actors are assumed to make decision according to a cost-benefit analysis. In other words, actors are trying to maximize their net cost-benefit, which means the maximum benefit minus potential and actual costs of any action. Applied to the political context, collectively binding decisions are based on the same cost-benefit calculation as in individual actors (Esser, 1991). In this context, political institutions such as governmental bodies or parties are assumed to behave according to rational considerations with regard to gain and maintain power, while keeping potential and actual costs at a minimum level (Klüver, 2013; Otten, 2016). Applied to the case of political decision making within the European Union, it is assumed that both non-governmental organizations as well as the EC have specific and rather fixed preferences. In detail, it can be expected that the European Commission has a very clear interest in making legitimate decisions that both reflect responsiveness to civil society interests as well as to create policy solutions that are based on technical expertise and expert knowledge. The reason for this is to maximize the chance of policy proposals to successfully pass the legislative process (Klüver, 2013). NGOs on the other hand have a clear interest to maximize their preference attainment in policy outputs. Therefore, they aim to translate their political preferences and goals into political decisions through influencing the public policy-making. Furthermore, it can be assumed that NGOs attempt to use the provision of information as a strategic tool to maximize their impact on policy making. This assumption is in line with Tallberg et al. (2015) who notes that the exchange-relationship between non-state actors and decision-makers is “not innocent. Both parties recognize that interest groups

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have a strategic incentive to present specialized information in such a way that it benefits their cause” (Tallberg et al., 2015, p. 215). Therefore, it can be assumed that NGOs try to use this exchange-relationship strategically to provide information with the intention to specifically convince decision-makers of their preferences on the issue. In sum, both types of actors, NGOs and the EC are assumed to be driven by self-interest and rational behavior directed at maximizing their interests while keeping possible negative consequences at a minimum.

The second assumption of the resource-exchange model is that both political decision-makers as well as private non-governmental organizations are inherently dependent on resources from other actors and therefore rely on external inputs. The assumption that NGOs are dependent on external resources is rather obvious, as the main goal of most NGOs is to lobby for a particular political cause in order to achieve policy change in line with their preferences. The most relevant resource in order to achieve these political goals is influence in political decision-making, as this is the most effective and direct channels to achieve their goals (Tallberg et al., 2015).

On the other hand, the assumption that public decision-makers are dependent on external resources is less obvious and therefore requires further discussion. Applied to the context of the EU, it is assumed that the European Commission is particularly dependent on legitimacy as an external resource. A comprehensive discussion of the value of legitimacy for European decision-making and the highly contested debate on the EC’s democratic deficit would go beyond the scope of this research project. Therefore, I will carefully consider both the value of legitimacy as well as the EC’s need for legitimacy due to the democratic deficit as given, with reference to the pertinent debate in the literature (Scharpf, 1999; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007; Schmidt, 2013). What’s relevant from this debate is the distinction between

input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). According to Scharpf (1999), input legitimacy at

the level of the EU refers to the level of participatory elements in decision-making and the responsiveness to, and involvement of citizens and civil society interests. Output legitimacy describes the effectiveness of policy outcomes in dealing with a particular issue (Scharpf, 1999). Coming back to the assumption of resource dependence, the two forms of legitimacy exemplify the specific types of resources the EC is dependent on from external stakeholders and in particular from non-governmental organizations. I argue that the EC attempts to meet their demand for input legitimacy through the involvement of non-governmental organizations. The consultation of NGOs, which essentially represent organized interests of particular civil society groups, is a means to increase responsiveness to citizens. On the other hand, the demand

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for output legitimacy is met through the consideration and implementation of expertise and technical knowledge, which is delivered through the consultation of non-governmental organizations on a specific complex issue: It provides the EU institutions with the necessary expertise to deal with their problems in an efficient way and thereby increases output legitimacy” (Bouwen, 2002, p. 371). In summary, both public and private actors are dependent on resources from external stakeholders. Bouwen (2002) describes these particular resources, which are demanded in exchange for access of NGOs to the decision-making process as access

goods: “Access goods are goods provided by private actors to the EU institutions in order to

gain access. Each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is important in the EU decision-making process.” (Bouwen, 2002, p. 370).

Routes of NGO Influence

Betsill and Corell (2008b) identify two core tactics or routes of NGOs to exercise their influence: persuasion and coercion. Persuasion refers to the ability of an NGO to alter the preference of another political actor (Allan and Hadden, 2017). Allan and Hadden argue that persuasion through NGOs is more likely to occur when they function as specific providers of

services to political institutions (Allan and Hadden, 2017, p. 602). Coercion on the other hand

is defined as the ability of an NGO “to change the behavior of another actor, without the actor first altering its preferences (Allan and Hadden, 2017, p. 602). NGOs are able to coerce other actors either through ideational or material means (ibid.) A widely discussed strategy to coerce other actors is naming and shaming, which is used to draw public attention to a specific issue in order to force an actor to change its behavior or a specific regulation.

Conclusion – Theoretical Model of NGO Influence

All in all, the theoretical discussion on the influence of non-governmental organizations in political decision-making can be conceptualized as a three-stage model (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Theoretical model of NGO influence9

9 Source: Own representation, based on discussed literature as well as model by Allan and Hadden (2017).

Resource-exchange relationship Persuasion -Coercion Strategic use/communication of information of NGOs Influence

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The above-described resource-exchange model serves as a theoretical foundation which explains the role of NGOs in political decision-making and provides an understanding of the theoretical mechanism behind NGO influence. The theoretical assumptions on rationality and resource dependence lead NGOs to provide information strategically to maximize their individual preference attainment in the policy process. The two major routes through which NGOs are able to eventually influence decision-makers are persuasion and coercion.

4.2 Empirical Literature

The previous chapter has provided a discussion of the most relevant conceptual approaches to study NGO influence and as a result established a theoretical model to explain NGO influence in European policy-making. This chapter is intended to highlight, synthesize and structure the most relevant empirical findings on NGO influence10 on policy outcomes. The central question guiding this literature review is how NGO influence in the EU can be explained empirically. In particular, I will review the literature with regard to identifying empirical determinants of NGO influence on policy outcomes, with a special focus on the policy-making process of the European Commission.

This chapter follows a four-step review process: First, I will do a “second tier”-review of the broader scope of literature that addresses interest representation and influence of non-state actors in general (Knopf, 2006). This step serves the purpose of establishing a comprehensive overview and understanding of the scholarly debate and furthermore locates the focus of this research project amidst the most relevant themes of academic research. In a second step, I will narrow down the focus to the “first tier” of literature, which directly addresses the research question of this thesis. Through structuring the literature thematically into three levels of research approaches, I will review the most relevant empirical findings on NGO influence in political decision-making with regard to my research question. Third, I will discuss the most relevant gaps and shortcomings in the literature in order to justify my research question. A fourth step will briefly outline the contributions of this research project with regard to the state of the art of the research field of EU interest group research.

10 Although the focus of this research project is on the influence of NGOs, this chapter will also review literature

that works with a broader conceptualization of non-state actors. The reason for this is that even though many studies focus on interest group influence, which includes both profit as well as non-profit organizations, they can nonetheless provide important insights into determinants of NGO influence in policy-making. Beyers et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the terminology and definition of interest groups.

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4.2.1 Second Tier Review

There is a vast amount of literature that provides an important but rather foundational discussion about interest group representation and stakeholder influence within the governance-framework of the European Union (Van Schendelen, 1993; Mazey and Richardson, 1992; Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998; Greenwood, 1997, Eising and Kohler-Koch, 2005). This broad theme can be further subdivided into literature that focuses theoretically on the role of NGOs with regard to knowledge and expertise (Furtak, 2005; Saurugger, 2002; Tallberg et al., 2018), legitimacy (Kohler-Koch, 2007, Dür and De Bièvre, 2007b; Greenwood, 2007) and the democratic deficit of the European Union (Warleigh, 2001, Steffek and Nanz, 2007). Another broad strand of literature deals with the classification of the EU interest group system into pluralist, corporatist, statist or network-type forms and its implications on the relationship between NGOs and the European institutions (Kohler‐Koch and Eising 1999; Eising, 2007a; 2009, as cited in Klüver 2013). Besides the focus on the structural form of the interest group system, a significant theme in the literature discusses the changing role and influence of interest groups in connection to European integration and the increasing Europeanization of different policy sectors (Richardson, 2000; Göksel and Güneş, 2005; Beyers et al., 2008).

These vast themes of literature are relevant with regard to providing a foundational theoretical account of the influence of non-state actors and interest representation in the EU, the conceptual role of NGOs in European policy-making and their relationship with the European institutions. Nevertheless, a first interim conclusion of studying the aforementioned themes of academic scholarship reveals two significant shortfalls in the literature. First, while most of the articles discuss the role and thus also the influence of non-governmental actors on decision-making procedures and policy outputs, they do not specifically address the question of how and under which circumstances these actors are influential and which factors may contribute to their lobbying success. Second, there is a vast discrepancy between studies addressing the issue of NGO influence theoretically and studies analyzing specific cases and empirical data, as most of the reviewed literature remains on a theoretical level. This assumption is underpinned by Klüver, who - drawing on Dür and De Bièvre (2007) and Dür 2008a - concludes that “only very few scholars have empirically dealt with interest group influence on European policy‐making and empirical tests of these hypotheses for the case of the European Union are therefore scarce” (Klüver, 2013, p. 10).

Do They Have a Say? – NGO Influence in EU-Level Decision-Making: A Qualitative Case Study of the Policy Process Leading up to the Communication of the European Commission – An Open and Secure Europe