The Kurdish Diaspora in
the Netherlands
Transnational involvement and inter-ethnic
tensions in the host society
Name: Josie Joanna Kolsteren
Student ID: 10608893
Supervisor: dr. A.J. van Heelsum
Second reader: dr. P.E. Pallister-Wilkins
University: University of Amsterdam
Program: MSc Conflict Resolution and Governance
Word count: 23,934
3
Table of content
List of abbreviations ... 5 Acknowledgements ... 6 1. Introduction ... 7 2. Theoretical framework ... 92.1 The concept of diaspora ... 9
2.2 Diasporas and transnationalism ... 10
2.3 Transnational identity ... 11
2.4 Cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities ... 13
2.5 The role of diasporas in conflict ... 15
2.6 Determinants of transnational involvement ... 16
2.7 Research themes ... 18
3. The Kurdish diaspora ... 19
3.1 Kurdish identity and history ... 19
3.2 The Kurds in Turkey ... 20
3.3 The Kurds in Iraq ... 21
3.4 The Kurds in Iran ... 23
3.5 The Kurds in Syria ... 24
3.6 Kurdish migration into Europe ... 25
3.7 The Kurdish diaspora in Europe ... 26
4. Methodology ... 29 4.1 Research design ... 29 4.2 Operationalization ... 30 4.3 Respondents ... 31 4.4 Methodological limitations ... 32 4.5 Ethical considerations ... 32
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5. Results ... 34
5.1 Kurdish transnational identity... 34
5.2 Transnational activities... 40
5.2.1 Cultural transnational activities ... 40
5.2.2 Social transnational activities... 42
5.2.3 Economic transnational activities ... 45
5.2.4 Political transnational activities ... 47
5.3 Inter-ethnic tensions in the host society ... 55
6. Conclusion ... 60
6.1 Outcomes ... 60
6.2 Reflections on theory ... 61
6.3 Limitations and further research ... 62
7. Bibliography ... 64
8. Appendix ... 71
5
List of abbreviations
KDPI Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KJAK Kurdistan Free Life Party KNC Kurdish National Council
KSVN Koerdische Studenten Vereniging Nederland PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PVV Partij Voor de Vrijheid PYD Democratic Union Party YPG People’s Protection Units YPJ Women’s Protection Units
6
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank dr. Anja van Heelsum for the structured guidance and support that she gave me throughout the process of writing this thesis, and for giving me constructive feedback on my work. I greatly appreciate the effort that Anja spend on continuously reviewing my work and the time that she took to discussing possible points of improvements with me.
Furthermore I would like to thank dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins for taking the time and effort to review this thesis as a second reader.
Last not but least, I would like to express my gratitude to all my respondents, as without their contributions I would not have been able to write this thesis. I would like to thank all inspiring Kurdish respondents for telling me their personal stories, for opening up and being vulnerable, for being so welcoming, for sharing their traditional food with me, and for inspiring me with their hopes and dreams for a peaceful future for the Kurds.
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1. Introduction
The role of diasporas in conflict resolution has been explored by several studies in the past decades (Antwi-boateng 2011; Fagen & Bump 2006; Lyons 2007; Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009; Sheffer 2003; Shain 2002; Smith & Stares 2007). Diasporas have been characterized as both ‘peace-wreckers’ and ‘peace-makers’ (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009; Smith & Stares 2007). The extent to which diasporas engage in homeland conflict today, either positively or negatively, is largely influenced by the increasing speed of globalization and channels of communication. Migrants are now more than ever able to retain close socio-cultural, economic and political ties with their homelands. Along with the growing concerns around the migration influx of refugees in the European Union today it remains uncertain what the effects of such processes of transnationalism are. The huge flows of migration have raised many controversial debates and pose challenges to policymakers across Europe.
Whereas much research has focused on how transnational communities affect politics in their homeland, the existing literature attributes relatively little attention to questioning how migrants import homeland conflicts and accordingly maintain inter-ethnic tensions in the country of settlement. Apart from existing theories around transnational activities and identity, rarely social scientists have focused on the link between transnational (political) involvement and inter-ethnic relations among different migrant communities in the host country (Brown 2004: 6). With the continuation of globalization processes and conflict-related migration flows, it is likely that host governments in Europe will have to deal with the issue of inter-ethnic conflict in the diaspora context increasingly. It is therefore essential to examine what factors and characteristics define transnational involvement of diaspora communities and what shapes potential inter-ethnic tensions and conflict in the host country context.
A relatively recent example of the described issue is the politically active Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, France and other countries in Europe have been following political developments and conflict in their homelands closely, particularly with respect to recent events in Turkey. As a result, the politics of the homeland play out in Europe through conflict and tensions between the Kurdish and Turkish community. To illustrate, many instances of violence during Kurdish demonstrations have been reported in Germany and the Netherlands. Besides, political cleavages between the two communities are articulated in (sometimes tacit) expressions of antipathy and discrimination in everyday activities.
In an attempt to narrow the research gap, this thesis examines to what extent ‘the Kurdish question’ is transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands. This study contributes to
8 the existing knowledge on the development of diaspora identities, particularly those who are stateless and generated by conflict. Moreover this thesis adds to the understanding of how inter-ethnic tensions in the host country reinforce a common diaspora identity and increase active political transnational involvement.
By taking a comprehensive approach, this research involves stories of Kurdish diaspora members from Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and shows the united identity and political activism among Kurds from different regions. As previous studies in the Netherlands have solely focused on Turkish Kurds (Bruinessen 1998) this approach presents a significant addition to the existing literature regarding the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.
In order to create a framework through which the research question can be analyzed, this thesis first explores the existing literature around the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism, the role of diasporas in conflict, and determinants of transnational involvement in chapter two. On that basis, the case of the Kurdish diaspora is examined by looking at the historical roots of the Kurds in different regions in chapter three. Chapter four covers the methodology section and describes and justifies the use of qualitative semi-structured interviews in this study. The results of the obtained data will be discussed in chapter five, including an analysis of transnational identity, transnational activities, and inter-ethnic tensions in the case of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. Finally, chapter six presents the conclusions and outcomes of this study and gives recommendations for further research.
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2. Theoretical framework
This chapter provides the theoretical basis for the study of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands by laying out essential arguments and concepts. The first sections (2.1 and 2.2) explore the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism as well as their connection. Following, the characteristics of transnational involvement are examined through the notions of transnational identification (2.3) and transnational activities (2.4). Consecutively, theories around the role of diasporas in conflict are discussed (2.5) in order to provide a basis for understanding the conflict-related nature of the Kurdish diaspora. Additionally, factors that determine transnational involvement (2.6) are considered and provide several indicators to differentiate between diaspora members. Finally, this chapter ends with the operationalization of the theoretical framework into sub themes (2.7) that are instrumental in answering the main research question.
2.1 The concept of diaspora
The ‘diaspora’ concept was historically linked to the experience of particular groups such as Jews, Greek, and Armenians (Cohen 2008; Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003; Vertovec 1997). The meaning of the term diaspora therefore was negatively associated with traumatic exile and victimization (Safran 1991; Vertovec 1997). From the 1980s onwards the term has been used more broadly in both theory and practice. Expatriates, political refugees, ethnic and racial minorities started to be categorized as diasporas. The broad and varied use of the concept was criticized from the mid-1990s onwards by social constructivism, which led to the idea that diasporas are inherently connected to a particular ethnic identity in the ‘homeland’ (Cohen 2008). As the concept lacked analytical strength and specificity, Brubaker referred to the “diaspora’ diaspora”, a “dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space” (2005: 1). Correspondingly the diaspora concept becomes useless if we would allow it to apply to an ever-broadening set of cases, such as language communities, labor migrants, national movements and religious communities (Brubaker 2005: 3).
The remaining question relates to what essential criteria characterizes diasporas and based on what definition-in-use this study will analyze this concept. Three elements are key to the definition of diaspora, when referring to it as a social form (Vertovec 1997).
Firstly, diasporas are characterized by a dispersion in space from their ‘original homeland’, related to causes of migration, such as forced migration or labor migration. Usually diasporas are dispersed from a specific original center to two or more peripheral regions (Safran 1991: 83).
10 Secondly, the idea of a ‘homeland’ constitutes an essential element in the experience of diasporas. Diasporas will always be engaged in cross-border experiences related to their homeland. Often times the return to the homeland functions as a basis for solidarity and a common identity. Yet many diaspora members never return as a result of continuous violence in their homelands, or it simply does not (or no longer) constitute “a welcoming place with which they can identify politically, ideologically, or socially; or because it would be too inconvenient and disruptive, if not traumatic, to leave the diaspora” (Safran 1991: 91). Continuous contact with the original home country through social relationships, political and economic linkages are also connected to this characteristic (Vertovec 1997: 3-4).
Thirdly, diasporas are characterized by distinguished identities in their host country. The collective memory within the diaspora shapes identity formation in the host country. These preserved distinctive identities maintain boundaries with the host-society. Discrimination, social exclusion or alienation are factors that determine and are influenced by the extent to which groups integrate in society, and which in turn provide the basis for the creation of ethno-national diaspora organizations (Brubaker 2005: 6; Clifford 1994: 311; Cohen 2008: 165-166; Safran 1991: 96; Sheffer 2003: 83). All in all, the described defining characteristics are shaped by a triadic relationship between the self-identified ethnic groups that constitute the diaspora, the homeland country and context, and the host society where the diaspora resides (Vertovec 1997: 5).
2.2 Diasporas and transnationalism
The activities that are undertaken by diaspora members are linked to theories of transnationalism. Both concepts relate to cross-border processes, yet transnationalism is used in the more narrow sense of the durable ties and networks that migrants uphold in the host country (Faist 2010: 9). Transnational activities involve the everyday activities that diasporas or migrant groups engage in. ‘Transmigrants’ in this sense “develop and maintain multiple relations- familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders […] and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously” (Schiller et al. 1992: 2). While the diaspora concept refers to particular communities or groups, transnationalism is an abstract term that encompasses processes that transcend borders (Faist 2010: 13). Diaspora theories focus to a larger extent on collective identity and the multi-generation pattern that has been established through transnational practices, whereas transnationalism evolves around contemporary migration flows (Faist 2010: 22).
11 Having established the difference between diasporas and transnationalism, it remains the question whether transnationalism constitutes a ‘new’ term along with notions as globalization, deterritorialization and post-nationalism (Brubaker 2005: 8). Since the term emerged in the latter half of the 20th century it has been perceived as a new notion within the field of migration, focusing
on patterns of activities that relate to both home and host societies (Schiller et al. 1992: 1). Although the concept might have been relevant in the past as well, the politicization of transnational communities is rather new. Moreover, recent developments in the field of modern transport technologies as well as the current speed of communication and global media have significantly changed the position of migrants and transnational communities (Clifford 1994: 309; Demmers 2002: 86; Sheffer 2003: 96; Van Amersfoort 2001: 51). Globalization has increased opportunities to engage in transnational activities as the distance between different places in the world is reduced by airplanes, internet and a mobile job market (Clifford 1994: 304). This has allowed transnational communities to evolve in a manner and scope that was previously impossible (Snel et al. 2006).
Additionally, recent large refugee flows have changed the context of transnationalism. In 2015 the largest number of war refugees and displaced people worldwide since the Second World War was reached, including 65.3 million individuals (UNHCR 2016). The large share of civilian casualties and displaced people is related to the relative increase of intrastate conflicts, which characterizes ‘new wars’ as described by Kaldor (2006). These trends, related to globalization and increasing flows of conflict-related migration, explain why transnationalism is useful as a concept today.
2.3 Transnational identity
The concept of transnationalism in practice encompasses the concept of transnational involvement, which includes transnational identification and transnational activities (Snel et al. 2006). Transnational identification relates to the extent to which migrants identify themselves with a certain ethnic identity outside of the host country, and therefore maintain an identity that crosses borders.
The concept of transnational identification is based on the idea that identities are socially constructed and that people define themselves in relation to their social environment (Snel et al. 2006: 290). The notion of identifying yourself in relation to a social category or group forms the basis of social identity theory. Social identities are constructed on the basis of self-categorization and social comparisons (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). Self-categories involve certain labels that are based on rules of membership and on sets of characteristics or behaviors that define who belongs to
12 the in-group (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). Accordingly social categorization involves emphasizing similarities with other in-group members and accentuating differences with out-group members (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). The social comparison process involves the positive evaluation of in-group characteristics and members, and correspondingly the negative assessment of the out-in-group. This has also been referred to as “identity politics” (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848).
Ethnic identity is a form of social identity that is characterized by behaviors or rules related to religion, language, customs and common myths (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 848). Ethnic identity concerns “the extent to which people feel related to a particular ethnic group and orient themselves towards the norms and values of that group” (Snel et al. 2006: 290). Ethnic identity is commonly defined by political and cultural discourses (Verkuyten 2005).
When ethnic groups cross borders, and migrants sustain a feeling of belonging to their homelands and continue to identify with compatriots abroad, ethnic identity becomes transnational. Transnational social categories involve behaviors and rules that are linked to more than one physical place and community. Experiences in multiple environments or communities “compromise people’s cultural repertoires, which in turn influence the construction of identity – or indeed multiple identities” (Vertovec 2001: 578). The ‘translocality’ (Appadurai 1990) that is created by these multiple contexts affects the construction of a transnational identity on the basis of a perceived feeling of belonging (Vertovec 2001: 578).
For diasporas, the feeling of belonging relates to physical spaces or social relations that are connected to the homeland. The connection to the homeland is based on a kind of awareness or consciousness of a national identity that exists in the minds of each (Anderson 1983). In the case of diasporas, this concept of imagined communities constitutes a kind of long-distance nationalism. Identities of diasporas are produced by the very fact that they live outside of their homeland, and thus national identity is in fact an imagination (Appadurai 1990).
National consciousness in the diaspora develops on the basis of positive and negative experiences. Diaspora identity is produced through common histories, shared myths, traditions and culture which are influenced by the distance between the home and host country (Clifford 1994; Shain 2002). In the case of conflict-generated diasporas, homeland conflicts play a large role in the formation of diaspora identities (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009). In these cases collective identities develop on the basis of exclusion and discrimination produced by homeland regimes of inequality or political domination. This resembles the concept of ‘resistance identity’, referring to identity-building produced by collective resistance against oppression, possibly on the basis of ethnicity (Castells 2010: 9). Besides the connection with conflict in the homeland, diaspora identity that is
13 constructed on the basis of exclusion can also result from alienation in the host society. As a consequence of social exclusion or marginalization, migrants develop more radical identities and engage in transnational activities on a larger scale (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The less positive an immigrant perceives the host-country context, the larger the probability of engagement in transnational involvement (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 772).
In sum, the existence of diaspora communities relies on the willingness of migrant populations to engage in transnational activities and accordingly maintain their ethno-national identities. Collective identity forms the basis for social movements and mobilization, such as through transnational activities.
2.4 Cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities
Transnational activities involve a variety of cross-border activities that affect multiple nation-states (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 767; Snel et al. 2006: 289). Often such activities are initiated from below (by migrants, social movements or nongovernmental organizations) but sometimes they commence in a top-down manner. States often maintain a continuous connection with their diaspora populations in order to maintain their expatriates’ loyalty, resulting in valuable remittances for the homeland (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1214).
Transnational activities are either focused on the country of origin or involve practices among the diaspora in the host country. They can take place at the individual and familial level, or through (international) community institutions (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2007). The array of activities are not mutually exclusive as participation and motives for social action vary (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Yet for the purpose of analyzing transnational involvement, this study employs the categorization of transnational activities into cultural, social economic and political activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Levitt & Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2007).
Cultural transnational activities relate to sustaining certain ideas and behaviors connected to the homeland. Engagement in cultural events and rituals that are linked to the homeland, contribute to the feeling of belonging of migrants (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Such activities can be developed in and mediated by the host country context. Cultural traits and traditions in the case of diasporas become a mix between the modern reality of the country of residence and the original practices from the homeland (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007: 139). Examples of cultural transnational activities include language, in some cases religion, musical events, national holidays, celebrations and performing arts. Also events to promote culture through education, such as
14 weekend schools for children, belong to the dimension of cultural transnational activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 625).
Social transnational activities involve “the recreation of a sense of community that encompasses migrants and people in the place of origin” (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002: 768) . Social and cultural transnational activities are usually more common than political and economic activities (Snel et al. 2006: 294). Social and cultural activities are also more symbolic and less instrumental or rational (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 769). Social transnational practices are very much related to cultural activities in the sense that often times, social transnational gatherings involve cultural practices and the other way around. Social transnational activities involve processes of sociability, social obligations and mutual help (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768). Social practices focused on the home country involve social remittances, visiting friends and family and maintaining social contacts. Social practices among the diaspora in the host country involve the membership of social diaspora clubs and gatherings, links with organizations and online connections among diaspora members (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619).
Economic transnational activities are less common than social and cultural activities as they are very much dependent on the income of migrants. Economic transnational activities can be professional or private activities (Snel et al. 2006). Private activities that relate to the homeland mostly involve sending money or goods (such as medicine and clothes) to family members (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619; Snel et al. 2006: 291; Van Amersfoort 2001: 30). It also encompasses donations to the homeland, either directly or as community remittances through charity organizations. Moreover paying taxes in the country of origin also constitutes an economic transnational activity (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619). Host-country focused private economic transnational activities involve financial support to homeland-related organizations in the host country. Professional economic activities, which are usually uncommon, concern business-related remittances, trips and investments (Snel et al. 2006: 291). Although economic transnational activities are often perceived as uncommon, Vertovec (1997) refers to the economic strength of transnational groups in the area of international finance. Many others have suggested that remittances from diaspora communities provide financial sustainability to parties in the homeland context or can contribute to economic development (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fagen & Bump 2006; Lyons 2007; Newland & Patrick 2004).
Political transnational activities are defined by Østergaard-Nielsen as “direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees[…] as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country or international organizations” (2003: 762). Through the faster flows of news, opinions and images, diaspora
15 communities transfer political beliefs from their homeland to the host society. Political struggles therefore are no longer tied to territorial borders (Demmers 2002). Political activities that are concentrated in the homeland involve direct participation in elections or referenda, membership of political parties in the homeland, reading the news and keeping up-to-date with the politics of the homeland (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619; Snel et al. 2006: 292). Activities that take place in the host country involve lobbying, participation in rallies and demonstrations and membership of political organizations in the host country (Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 619). Generally speaking, the involvement of diaspora members in political activism is in many cases perceived to be relatively small (Guarnizo et al. 2003).
2.5 The role of diasporas in conflict
Transnational activities and identification develop differently when undertaken by a conflict-generated diaspora, or in case of conflict in the homeland. The construction of diaspora identity is affected by homeland conflict to a large extent, particularly in the case of oppressive policies and discrimination in the homeland. In case of conflict-generated diasporas, collective identity is shaped by traumatic memories resulting from forced migration, violence or repression. The desire to maintain a certain identity in this case revolves around the homeland’s survival in conflict, or around the survival of a particular ethnic group. Conflict-generated diasporas continue to emphasize the cause of their original displacement and their related grievances (Lyons 2007: 532). This serves as a basis for activism, the creation of institutions and the raising of funds (Shain 2002: 129).
With declining support from foreign governments in civil wars, the role of diasporas in conflict has become increasingly important (Shain & Barth 2003). Particularly political and economic transnational practices can have large impact on peace processes, in both positive and negative ways. Regarding economic influences, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argued countries with large diaspora populations are more likely to experience recurrences of violence in civil war, due to the financing of rebels by diasporas. When one however perceives diasporas as development actors, economic remittances can also have positive effects (Turner 2008: 174-77). Through providing many families with a basic income, diaspora remittances have a positive impact on poverty and potentially on conflict resolution. Such money flows nonetheless create larger inequality in the homeland and do not constitute long-term productive investments (Turner 2008: 167-77).
With regard to political practices, diasporas can exert influence on conflict dynamics in the homeland through supporting certain political parties or by lobbying in the home or host society. Shain & Barth (2003) have argued that diasporas have the ability to build bridges or act as mediators by transferring democratic values of their host society. Moreover, diasporas sometimes
16 have the capacity to influence foreign policies concerning the homeland conflict (Shain 2002: 120). Diasporas can thus function both as external and internal supporters of peace.
It remains questionable whether such involvement is justified, considering the fact that diasporas are not surrounded by the same societal context. Shain (2002: 116) argues that diasporas generally have an independent stance on the homeland conflict because of their remoteness. Demmers (2002: 95) in contrast argues that diasporas hold more extreme views as they only experience conflict from a certain distance and do not suffer directly, which makes up for different realities. This ‘hate from a distance’ can translate into negative influences on peacebuilding in conflict settings, through spoiling peace processes or supporting certain parties in the conflict (Antwi-boateng 2011; Turner 2008).
The political views and the distinct identity that diaspora members pursue as a form of belonging do not only have consequences for conflict dynamics in the homeland, but also create challenges for stability in the host state. Diasporas are affected by the way they are perceived by the host society, because of the homeland conflict, or through physical threats by those who are engaged in the conflict (Shain 2002: 125). Collective action and transnational political activities can result in conflict and tensions with the host government, the host society or between different diaspora groups. Cleavages between migrants groups can be related to previous tensions in the homeland or can be developed in the new context (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009: 26). Conflict and collective action in that case spread from the homeland to the diaspora context and are diffused across borders (Tarrow 1994: 253). Tarrow refers to the concept of relational diffusion: “the transfer of information along established lines of interaction through networks of trust or formed around mutual advantage” (1994: 253). As such ethnic conflict is no longer bound to the internal dynamics of the territorial state but has the potential to spread across the world along with forces of globalization (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 926). As a result, western European countries can transform into settings in which homeland conflicts plays out between different ethnic migrant groups. Conflict resolution as well as host country policies therefore should address the needs and concerns of diaspora communities, besides simply looking at the conflict within the territorial boundaries of the state (Shain 2002).
2.6 Determinants of transnational involvement
An examination of the connections between homeland conflict and transnational involvement of diasporas requires differentiating between different types of involvement. Determinants of transnational involvement help explain why certain diaspora members are more transnationally
17 involved than others. Although transnational involvement is dependent on a very wide scope of determinants, this section will discuss a selection of factors that are particularly relevant in the case of diasporas and that are further explored in the results section.
First of all, transnational involvement is dependent on whether and how much migrants connect and relate to social, economic and political processes in their homelands. The stronger diaspora members are emotionally attached to maintaining their identity and ties with their homeland, the more they are inclined to participate in transnational activities (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 772). This emotional connection is often considered to be particularly present among the first generation (Rumbaut 2002). Second generations are however naturally influenced by the cultural background of their parents on a daily basis even if they have never returned to their parents’ homeland themselves (Portes 2001; Schiller & Levitt 2004). This generational experience is therefore not necessarily bound to territory (Schiller & Levitt 2004: 1017). As a result of the physical distance to the homeland of their parents, second generation migrants can even be less willing to compromise. Second generation migrants are sometimes perceived as more actively involved in transnational politics than their parents (Bruinessen (1997).
Besides generational differences it is often found that gender influences the extent to which transnational activities are undertaken. Generally, men experience downward occupational mobility after immigrating and therefore are more likely to engage in transnational activities. Women on the other hand experience an opposite effect and usually become employed in the host context whereas they would not have participated in the labor market before (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1216). Particularly with regard to political transnational activities, men are more likely to engage extensively in homeland politics and to maintain a strong political opinion. This has been perceived as related to the loss of status in the host country context (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1216).
The extent to which diasporas engage and commit to transnational practices also depends on their level of organization (Shain 2002: 132). In the beginning, diaspora institutions are usually quite informal and related to personal networks of family members and friends. Such social networks can sustain diaspora identity and activities, even in case of scarce economic resources. Yet more formal and professional organizations are necessary in order to establish long-term diaspora communities and official ties to the homeland (van Amersfoort & van Heelsum 2007: 241). The wider these networks are, the larger the possibilities for strong and extensive political transnational action (Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1218). Sheffer describes the example of the Kurdish and Palestinian case: “With every wave of Palestinians and Kurds who were driven out of their homelands or who left voluntarily for political, social, and economic reasons and settled in various host countries, their
18 international trans-state networks became more extensive […] those resources either have been transferred to their homelands or have been used in host countries to promote their causes” (2003: 107). The way in which these networks are set up and diaspora communities are organized, differs between state-less and state-linked communities. Particularly with regard to conflict settings, stateless diasporas are more likely to provoke violence and mobilize themselves in order to help the armed struggle back home, such as through campaigning for independence or recognition (Cohen 2005: 180).
2.7 Research themes
In the theoretical framework several issues have been discussed including the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism, transnational identity, the variety of transnational activities, the connections between diasporas and homeland conflict and several determinants of transnational involvement. This discussion of relevant theories and concepts helps to establish a framework through which the main research question of this study can be answered, namely, to what extent ‘the Kurdish question’ is transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands.
As transnational involvement in the theoretical framework has been divided into transnational identification and transnational activities, both the Kurdish transnational identity and the range of social, cultural, economic and political transnational activities of the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands will be examined. Considering the theoretical discussion of the role of diasporas in conflict, and the possibility of the continuation of homeland conflict in the diaspora context, inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands will be examined from the perspective of Kurdish diaspora members. As transnational identity in the case of conflict-generated diasporas is often shaped by experiences of discrimination, the connections between the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions in the host country and diaspora identity formation will be explored lastly. This leads to the examination of the following sub questions:
1. What characterizes the Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands?
2. What social, cultural, economic and political transnational activities do members of the Kurdish diaspora community in the Netherlands undertake?
3. To what extent do inter-ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks shape and reinforce Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands?
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3. The Kurdish diaspora
Before examining the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands, this chapter provides background information that is key in understanding the Kurdish question, the position of Kurds across different regions and the origins of Kurdish migration. This will be helpful in interpreting the perceptions and behaviors of Kurdish diaspora members in the Netherlands. This chapter starts by describing the historical roots of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish identity (3.1). Following, an overview is provided of the historical position of the Kurds in Turkey (3.2), Iraq (3.3), Iran (3.4) and Syria (3.5) including the characteristics of Kurdish identity and activism in these countries. Finally, flows of Kurdish migration will be discussed (3.6) as well as the features and position of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (3.7).
3.1 Kurdish identity and history
The early history of the Kurds can be traced back to the migration of Indo-European tribes into Iran around 2000 B.C. One of these tribes, the Medes, probably comprises a large part of the ancestry of the Kurds. Yet it remains difficult to trace the origins of the Kurdish people and identity as it is likely that the Kurds have mixed ancestry. Today still, the Kurds are a highly heterogeneous population considering the different states that they live in and the variety of religions and languages (Khayati 2008: 66). The majority of Kurds today is Sunni Muslim, along with many Shiite, Yezidis, Alevites, Yârsâns, Jewish and Christian Kurds (Acker 2004).
Despite the mixed ancestry, a strong Kurdish ethnic identity has developed on the basis of tribal structures and familial ties throughout history. McDowall (1996) argues that the distinct Kurdish nationalist community emerged in the 20th century. The Kurdish people have been divided
across the Ottoman and Persian empires from the 16th century onwards, but the end of the First
World War constitutes the start of their spread across the Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed by Britain and France to further their colonial interests in the Middle East, resulting in the division of control over the different regions in the old Ottoman empire among the Allied Powers (Muir 2016). As a consequence, national borders were drawn without much consideration for ethnic, tribal, religious or linguistic differentiation in the region (Muir 2016). The Sykes-Picot agreement was further finalized in 1923 when the Lausanne Treaty was signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers. This treaty involved the final formation of the borders of the Republic of Turkey and the permanent jurisdiction of the Kurds under Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (Khayati 2008: 67). The following sections will discuss the position of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria respectively. Although this study does not focus on Iranian Kurds, the position of
20 Kurds across all regions should be discussed in order to create a comprehensive overview of Kurdish history.
3.2 The Kurds in Turkey
The Kurdish minority in Turkey today makes up for between fifteen and twenty percent of the Turkish population (BBC 2017b). Deep hostilities have continuously existed between the Turkish state and the Kurdish population throughout history. Despite nationalist policies designed by Turkey around 1920, the Kurds proved to be a difficult population to integrate (Bruinessen 1998). All forms of Kurdish expression were banned at this time, including schools, associations and the use of the Kurdish language in public (Başer 2011: 6; Griffiths 2002: 80).
These assimilation policies generally proved successful until the 1960s, when new Kurdish social movements arose in Turkey (Bruinessen 1997: 3). Kurdish left-oriented organizations increasingly demanded political, cultural and linguistic rights (Başer 2011: 6). The revived activism was a combined result of the military coup in 1960 and the increasing Kurdish middle class (Griffiths 2002: 84). The protests and revolts of the 50s and 60s organized by this new movement were however crushed quickly and many Kurdish leaders were killed or imprisoned (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 930).
A new national movement arose during the 1980s with the foundation of the Kurdistan Working Party (PKK) in 1978 (Griffiths 2002: 85; Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 935; McDowall 2004: 421). The PKK, led by Abdullah Öcalan, was a Kurdish national liberation movement based on Marxist thought. What started as a small group became increasingly popular, particularly among the poor (Griffiths 2002: 86; McDowall 2004: 420). Many people living in eastern Turkey, though not of Kurdish decent, started to identify ethnically as Kurds in relation to extensive state oppression and their low socio-economic position (McDowall 2004: 4).
From 1984 onwards the PKK started to launching strikes against government forces, landlords and villagers who were armed by the state (McDowall 2004: 420-23). The insurgency led by the PKK resulted in more than 37,000 deaths up until the beginning of 2000 (Gunter 2008: 6). Due to policies of large state oppression and widespread poverty in Turkey, the PKK nonetheless continued to have mass support.
Around 1990 the Kurdish quest for a state and the insurgency by the PKK had become an internationalized issue. Öcalan at the same time was ready to leave the armed struggle, and announced a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993, followed by the start of peace talks (McDowall 2004: 437). The Turkish state however continued to defeat the PKK and diminished the position of
21 the group at the negotiation table. This eventually led to the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 and the withdrawal of the PKK (Ünal 2016: 101). In the following years the PKK focused on legitimizing themselves as an official political organization for Kurds, both in Turkey as well as internationally. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Turkish state has been working towards EU membership since 2005 and subsequently has started to recognize the Kurdish question to a limited extent. The PKK has violated ceasefires frequently, aiming to coerce Turkey to compromise (Ünal 2016: 103). The ceasefire that was announced in 2013 by Öcalan broke down again in 2015, followed by an escalation of violence from 2016 onwards (Human Rights Watch 2016).
Since 2015, Turkish military forces have officially been involved in the fight against Islamic State in Syria (Gunter 2016: 82). The involvement of the Turkish military in Syria escalated with the military operation in the Kurdish region of Afrin from January 2018 onwards (The Economist 2018b). In March 2018, after a two-month offensive, the Turkish military took control over Afrin, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and more than 1,500 Kurdish fighters dead (The Economist 2018a). Turkish officials later have stated to continue their fight against Kurdish militias in other regions of Syria as well as in Iraq (The Economist 2018a). This regional involvement shows the importance of the perceived threat of Kurdish independence or autonomy against all four states, and the willingness of the Turkish state to oppose this.
3.3 The Kurds in Iraq
The Kurdish population in Iraq today compromises between fifteen and twenty percent of the population (BBC 2017b). The Kurdish movement in Iraq originated with the beginning of the existence of the state of Iraq after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Kurds in Iraq have mostly populated oil production and reserve areas. Along with the fact that Iraq was already divided religiously between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, this made the Kurdish population more inclined to revolt (Gunter 2008: 12). Possibly as a result the Kurds in Iraq have experienced relatively much autonomy and national rights (Katzman 2010). Yet the Iraqi government has continuously perceived the Kurdish question and possible secession as security threats to the state (Yesiltas 2014).
Around 1931 the Kurdish fight for autonomy started when Mulla Mustafa Barzani emerged as the new leader for the Kurds in Iraq. Barzani formed the foundation for the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 and finally passed on his leadership to his son Masoud Barzani (Katzman 2010: 1).
22 After a long military struggle with the Iraqi army, the KDP finally negotiated more autonomy for the Kurdish region under the Baathists government in March 1970. This agreement however was not fully implemented in practice, leading to increasing levels of violence and friction up until 1974 (Yesiltas 2014: 42). The KDP faced many internal difficulties at that time as another Kurdish front was formed by the Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 (Gunter 2008: 13). The PUK was led by Jalal Talabani. The KDP generally is more dominant in the northern Kurdish areas, close to Turkey, while the PUK is supported largely in the south of Kurdistan at the borders with Iran (Katzman 2010: 1).
Between 1970 and 1974 the Iraqi government enlarged their Arabization policies by moving Arab families to Kurdish regions, giving Arab names to public institutions and streets, and transferring Kurdish officials to other regions.
In relation to the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdish revolt was supported by Iran. The increasing influence that the Kurdish movement accomplished was feared by the Iraqi government (led by Saddam Hussein from 1979 onwards). In response, the government initiated the Al-Anfal campaign, which forcibly replaced and killed hundreds of thousands civilians in the Kurdish region, involving the use of chemical weapons (Yesiltas 2014: 123). Part of this campaign was also the chemical attack on Halabja in 1988.
The involvement of the United States army in Iraq from the 1990s onwards in response to the Gulf War provided a basis for Kurdish autonomy, as the U.S. and its allies established a no-fly zone above the Kurdish region. This provided the Kurds with the opportunity to establish their own administration and hold elections in 1992, resulting in the joint rule of the KDP and PUK (Katzman 2010: 2). The coalition between Barzani and Talabani however broke down between 1994 and 1998 (Gunter 2008: 14). The U.S. however finally negotiated a cease-fire agreement between the two parties, leading to the return of stability in the region. The unified parliament in 2002 declared the federal state of Iraqi Kurdistan (Gunter 2008: 14).
The U.S. launched the Iraq War and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. The provisional government led by the U.S. established the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, which held the right to differentiate from national legislation and reestablish their Kurdish militias, also known as the Peshmerga (Katzman 2010: 3). Jalal Talabani held office as the president of Iraq between 2006 and 2014. In the 2009 Kurdistan elections, Barzani was reelected as president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Katzman 2010: 4).
Barzani decided to organize an independence referendum in 2017, despite objections from the region, the Iraqi government and the U.S. While 92% of the Kurdistan Region voted in favor of
23 the referendum, the Iraqi government deployed its troops in the region of Kirkuk (BBC 2017a). This disputed region had been reclaimed by the Peshmerga when the Iraqi army was defeated by Islamic State in 2014 (BBC 2017a). As a result of the unacknowledged referendum and the defeat of Kurds in Kirkuk, the political situation and autonomy of the Kurdish region in Iraq has deteriorated since (Cockburn 2017).
3.4 The Kurds in Iran
The Kurds in Iran are estimated to constitute around ten percent of the population in Iran, and mostly populate the border regions with Turkey and Iraq in the northwest of the country (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018). Over all, the Iranian government has been successful in their approach to the Kurdish movement as a result of their strong regimes and the close relationship between Persians and Kurds (Gunter 2008).
The first Kurdish revolts in Iran were initiated in the 1920s, when Iran emerged as a modern state under the Pahlavi Dynasty. The Iranian regime took control over the Kurdish regions during the 1930s and established assimilation policies in order to promote the Iranian identity, language and culture (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6). These policies were less extensive and violent than the policies implemented by the Turkish state.
During and after the Second World War the Kurdish movement gained more support and established the Kurdistan Democratic Party for Iran (KDPI) in 1945 (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6; Stansfield 2014: 71). In 1946 the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan was established, signifying the first autonomous state of Kurdish rule. The republic promoted Kurdish language and culture and accordingly formed the basis for a distinct Kurdish identity in Iran (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 6).
After one year however the Mahabad Republic collapsed. With the beginning of Islamic rule in Iran, the Kurdish movement was divided into several splinter groups, leading to much internal conflict and disputes (Stansfield 2014: 73). Nonetheless Kurdish militias continued fighting during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and were supported by the KDP in Iraq. During the early 1990s Kurdish activism in Iran remained relatively calm as a result of the assassination of several leaders of the KDPI (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 7).
More freedom and rights were established for Kurds in Iran following the election of Muhammad Khatami as president in 1997 (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 7). Khatami’s policies allowed more autonomy for Kurds and created more cultural and political freedom (Stansfield 2014: 76). The larger autonomy that Kurds in Iraq received led them to increase their nationalist demands. Their position however became subject to the Iranian regime again with the new government from
24 2005 onwards. The assassination of a young Kurdish leader in 2005 resulted in protests of thousands of Iranian Kurds, which the government in turn responded to with force (Gunter 2008: 134).
During the same period the newly established Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) started to launch attacks against the Iranian regime. The PJAK was based in the mountains of northern Kurdistan in Iraq and was supported by both the PKK and the U.S. government (Gunter 2008: 134). The Iranian regime responded with increasing levels of violence and repression, shown by their assassinations of many Kurdish political leaders and activists from 2007 onwards up until today (Asadzade & Tezcür 2018: 9). Thousands of Kurds in Iran launched demonstrations in support of the vote for Kurdish independence in Iraq in September 2017 (Cunningham 2017). Although the KDPI only advocates Kurdish autonomy under the democratic regime of Iran, Kurdish nationalism continues to be perceived as a security threat to the state.
3.5 The Kurds in Syria
The Kurds in Syria today compromise between seven and ten percent of the Syrian population, being the largest non-Arab minority in the country (BBC 2017b). Particularly the north and northeast of the country are populated by Kurds, including the Jazeera, Efrin, and Ain-Al Arab regions (Ziadeh 2009: 2). Similar to Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Kurds in Syria have been denied basic rights and have been oppressed by the Syrian state ever since Syria became independent.
The tensions that already existed between the Kurdish regions and the government under the French rule continued after Syria gained independence in April 1946 (Zisser 2014: 198). During the initiation of Arab nationalism throughout the 1950s and 1960s the first policies against non-Arab ethnic minorities were implemented and political activists were arrested (Zisser 2014: 210; Ziadeh 2009: 2). Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were denied Syrian citizenship in 1962 as the government stated they had crossed the border with Turkey illegally (Zisser 2014: 200). Until 1970 various regimes in Syria established extremist and radical policies, including the exemption of Kurds from political representation and bans on expressions of Kurdish identity (Ziadeh 2009: 2).
From 1970 onwards Syrian state policies towards Kurds softened slightly as a result of the new government led by Hafiz al-Asad (Zisser 2014: 203). Nonetheless, Arabization policies continued, forcing Kurdish families to leave their home and banning Kurdish names as well as Kurdish language in schools (Zisser 2014: 204). At the same time the Syrian regime was pressuring Turkey and Iraq by establishing relations with Kurdish parties abroad, such as the KDP, PUK and PKK (Zisser 2014: 204).
25 From 2000 onwards, under the new rule of Bashar Al-Asad, repressive measures against the Kurds continued. This led amongst other things to the Kurdish Intifada in 2004, where many Kurds were killed and hundreds wounded after they had set a government building on fire (Zisser 2014: 195).
The Arab Spring in Syria that broke out in 2011 was supported by the Kurdish movement. In order to mitigate the protests, the position of Kurds in Syria suddenly improved significantly as Asad granted more than 100,000 Kurds Syrian citizenship (Zisser 2014: 208). At the same time, Kurdish parties in Syria established the Kurdish National Council (KNC) with the support of Barzani. Another Kurdish front was formed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The PYD later formed a military branch including the People’s Protection Forces (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), both supported by the PKK (Schøtt 2017: 15). The YPG took power over the Kurdish areas in Syria after government forces withdrew in 2012 (Schøtt 2017: 15). During 2014 and 2015 the YPG accomplished to recapture the Kobane region from Islamic State, supported by the U.S.-led coalition. As Turkey has been very concerned with the increasing power of the PYD in Syria, the Turkish military has been involved in the war in Syria since 2015 by attacking not only Islamic State but also the PKK, YPG and YPJ (Schøtt 2017: 17).
The war has led to increasing international attention to the Kurdish question in Syria. The position of Kurds has particularly been highlighted as a result of the Turkish military operation in Afrin (The Economist 2018b). The complex involvement of various regional and international actors in Afrin, but also in Syria more generally, continues to hinder a united Kurdish struggle for self-determination in Syria (Schøtt 2017: 19).
3.6 Kurdish migration into Europe
A large part of Kurdish migration to Europe can be attributed to the regimes of oppression in the Kurdish regions in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. The rise of Arab nationalism in these countries caused the forced displacement or political migration of hundreds of thousands Kurdish communities from 1980 onwards (McDowall 2004: 457). More recently there has been a large influx of Syrian refugees in Europe amongst which many Kurds.
Before the period of predominant political migration, Kurds mostly migrated for economic reasons (Başer 2013: 7). Around the 1960s many young Kurds emigrated to pursue their education in European countries. The first Kurdish student organizations and political parties in Europe were established at that time (McDowall 2004: 457). Together with the first generation of Kurdish students, the nationalist sentiment in the diaspora increased from that moment onwards.
26 Particularly the second generation was inclined to be interested in their parents’ origins during the 1980s and 1990s (McDowall 2004: 457).
The 1970s were particularly characterized by labor migration, often concerning Turkish Kurds. As a result of the bilateral agreements between European countries and Turkey in particular, this period was characterized by large influxes of migrant workers initially from the western and central parts of Turkey, and later on also from eastern Turkey (Başer 2011; McDowall 2004: 456; Van Bruinessen 1999). Kurdish migrants were motivated by the prospect of extensive employment opportunities in Europe yet also by increased repression in eastern Turkey (McDowall 2004).
The Kurdish diaspora today in Europe is particularly spread out over France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Norway (Başer 2011: 8). Estimates of the amount of Kurdish migrants in Europe lies between 850,000 to one million Kurds in western Europe, of which the majority lives in Germany. Others have estimated the Kurdish population of Europe to be double of that amount (Başer 2011: 8). These ambiguous statistics are due to the large amounts of undocumented migrants in Europe and the fact that Kurds hold Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian or Iranian citizenship.
3.7 The Kurdish diaspora in Europe
The Kurdish migrant community is seen as one of the most politically active diasporas in Europe (Başer 2011; Sheffer 2003). When Kurdish migrants came to Europe, the barriers to Kurdish cultural and political expressions were finally lifted. In the context of the host country there were plenty of opportunities to explore Kurdish identity, language and culture, which enabled the development of the Kurdish diaspora community (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 933).
Most of the initial (labor) migrants in the 70s mainly identified as Turkish when they came to Europe, even if they would have identified differently in Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1999: 9). Europeans additionally regarded all incoming labor migrants from Turkey as Turkish citizens, as Kurds were not registered separately. As a result, labor migrants and their descendants are less politically active in the host society compared to refugees who entered Europe after 1980 (Başer 2011: 9; Van Bruinessen 1999: 10). Though many Kurdish cultural organizations were established by students and labor migrants in the years before, the political Kurdish question only became part of the European debate from 1980 onwards (Başer 2013: 10).
The distinct Kurdish identity in the diaspora was particularly emphasized and reinvented as a result of the political events in Turkey with the 1980 coup and the escalating events that led to the start of the civil war in 1984. Political refugees that arrived during this period were responsible for
27 building the Kurdish movement in Europe and gaining broad support (Başer 2011: 9). In contrast to earlier migrants, these refugees had usually been politically active in their homelands and were often traumatized as they had been arrested before or had experienced violence (Başer, 2013). The political mobilization of Kurds initiated by this group of immigrants also adhered to labor migrants. The latter group only started to become more aware of their ‘Kurdishness’ in the host country, in response to the development of a distinct politicized ethnic identity (Başer, 2013: 11).
Bringing both migration flows together, the Kurdish diaspora grew and developed itself in connection to political oppression and deprivation in the homeland. As a result of both these nationalist discourses on belonging and instances of marginalization in the host society, a strong Kurdish diaspora identity emerged (Alinia & Eliassi 2014: 73). The Kurdish common diaspora identity advanced and became a significant source of political mobilization (Khayati 2008: 65). The Kurdish question became a European matter instead of only a struggle in the homeland countries (Başer 2011). The Kurdish nationalist movement in Europe established a variety of cultural, linguistic and political organizations. These associations over the years have played an essential role in forming the Kurdish diaspora identity, through major gatherings, celebrations, Kurdish festivals and by fostering the use of one of the dialects of the Kurdish language (Adamson 2005: 40; Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 114; Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 934). The Kurdish Institute in Paris, established in 1983 by Kurdish intellectuals, organizes all kinds of activities to promote Kurdish language and culture (Başer 2011: 16). Many Kurdish publishing houses have been set up in order to gain support for the Kurdish question through journals and magazines, and subsequently mobilize Kurds in Europe. Radio and TV broadcasts have also been used by the PKK to catalyze nationalist awareness among the diaspora (Başer 2011: 15). Additionally the Kurds in Europe became increasingly connected with their homeland through internet, which made it easier to maintain transnational ties (Wahlbeck 1998: 7).
Kurdish political organizations and bodies were established in Europe during the 1980s. Many of these political initiatives were linked to the PKK, which aimed at mobilizing the Kurds for their cause in Europe. The PKK particularly aimed at engaging young second-generation Kurdish migrants to get involved in the Kurdish struggle, adhering to their feelings of alienation and marginalization in the host society (Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 114; McDowall 2004: 457). According to Başer (2011: 11), second generation Kurds in Europe engage in transnational activities to a larger extent in case their parents have experienced maltreatment and discrimination in the homeland.
An important objective of the PKK in Europe was to actively recruit guerilla fighters, activists and technicians among Kurds for the struggle in the homeland (Başer 2013: 21). The PKK
28 moreover was largely financially supported by donations from the Kurdish diaspora (Adamson 2005: 40). Through all these activities in Europe, the PKK established a second front on which their battle was fought (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 928).
The transnational political network established by the PKK across Europe was headquartered by the Kurdistan Regional Government in Brussels, along with national offices in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK, Switzerland, Italy and Scandinavia (Adamson 2005: 39; Khayati 2008: 90). The PKK established the Kurdish National Congress in 1995, which later became known as the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. With the aim to create a political center for Kurdish activism in Europe, this institution organized all kinds of conventions and gatherings. Kurdish institutions at the supranational level initiated the Kurdish lobby for political and cultural rights at different political and legal EU institutions (Başer 2013). Whereas these institutions were perceived as legitimate by European authorities, the PKK itself has been recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU since 2002 (Başer 2013: 20; Casier 2010: 393).
Today pro-Kurdish demonstrations are held almost monthly in Europe. This often causes spillovers of the conflict in the homeland to Europe, revealing itself in violence during protests between Turkish and Kurdish groups. An example of such spillovers was the immense response of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe to the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 (Sheffer 2003: 110). Also more recently there have been many Kurdish outbursts, demonstrations and instances of violence in response to political events and developments in Turkey and Syria. This leaves challenges for internal policies in European states considering its Kurdish and Turkish population and foreign relations (Lyon & Uçarer 2001).
29
4. Methodology
This chapter provides an overview of the research methods that have been employed in order to examine the research question “To what extent is ‘the Kurdish question’ transferred to Dutch society through transnational involvement by the Kurdish diaspora and inter-ethnic tensions with the Turkish community in the Netherlands?”. The first section of this methodology chapter (4.1) explains and justifies the qualitative research design of this study. The second part (4.2) elaborates on the operationalization of the themes discussed in the theoretical framework into the three research sub questions. The third section (4.3) describes the group of respondents that participated in this study. Finally ethical challenges and limitations to this research design are considered in the last paragraph (4.4).
4.1 Research design
The qualitative research design of this study involves the use of semi-structured interviews for the purpose of collecting data. Semi-structured interviews focus on the application of respondents’ subjective theories in daily activities, including implicit and explicit assumptions (Flick 2009: 156). It provides the respondent with the opportunity to talk about concrete descriptions of events or things they are engaged in or have witnessed (Weiss 1994).
Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to develop questions that guide the respondent towards the topics that are related to the research topic. At the same time, semi-structured interviews provide flexibility by allowing respondents to express their own views and stories as they are given the space to discuss topics that might not be covered by the guiding questions. This provides the opportunity to discover new relevant topics as they come up during the collection of data. More specifically, this study has employed the method of descriptive/interpretive semi-structured interviewing. Descriptive/interpretive semi-structured interviews involve the exploration of the perspectives and experiences of the respondents within certain established themes (McIntosh & Morse 2015: 4).
The research design of this study provides the opportunity to gain an understanding of the position of the Kurdish diaspora in The Netherlands, their backgrounds, their (political) views, their feelings and behavior. This approach furthermore caters the understanding of the construction of Kurdish identity, and provides insights into why respondents take part in a variety of transnational activities, how they perceive their participation in these activities, and how they relate personally to the homeland. The narratives of respondents are moreover helpful in understanding how members
30 of the Kurdish diaspora view and describe their relations with the Turkish community in the Netherlands.
In using the method of semi-structured interviewing, in some cases an ‘empathetic turn’ of the interview has been employed. Through this technique, the interviewer shifts from an objective stance to being involved personally. As Fontana and Frey (2008: 696) state: “empathetic interviewing takes an ethical stance in favor of the individual or group being studied. The interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee”. Considering the political sensitiveness of certain topics that have been discussed during interviews, this contributed to the willingness of the respondent to discuss all aspects of their views and experiences.
4.2 Operationalization
The main research question of this study has been analyzed according to the three sub questions that followed from the theoretical framework. These research themes, in support to the main research question, formed the starting point for the use of semi-structured interviews and the guiding questions. In the following section, the operationalization of research themes into guiding interview questions will be discussed. A complete guide of questions can be found in the appendix.
The first sub question of this study examines the origins, meaning and characteristics of Kurdish diaspora identity in the Netherlands. This part explores to what extent respondents identify as Kurdish, what ‘being Kurdish’ means to them, and is therefore also related to the migration cause, language, culture and the feeling of ‘home’.
The second sub question examines the cultural, social, economic and political transnational activities that are undertaken by the Kurdish diaspora in the Netherlands. This firstly involves questions relating to cultural practices including language, religion, traditional food, clothing and holidays. Secondly this covers questions related to social transnational activities, including topics such as homeland return, family connections and social gatherings organized by Kurdish associations in the Netherlands. Thirdly economic transnational practices are operationalized through questions related to economic remittances and support to family members, as well as to political parties. Fourthly, questions related to political transnational activities include topics such as watching the news, discussing political preferences and opinions, political party support in the home and host country and political activism.
The third sub question examines the connection between transnational involvement and the potential for inter-ethnic tensions between Kurdish and Turkish communities in the Netherlands.
31 Interview questions that relate to this topic focused on tensions and conflict in the Netherlands, related to developments in Turkey, such as violent clashes during demonstrations. This part in the interview also covered the less expressive tensions that might be present or felt by the Kurdish community. Interview questions in this section were related to the extent in which respondents expressed their identity openly in the Netherlands. Additionally this part covered questions regarding respondents’ perceptions of the Turkish community and Turkish state.
The described questions and research themes provided the foundation for the process of collecting data as well as for the categorization and analysis of results. After the recording and transcribing of interviews, transcriptions have been categorized and analyzed by relating them to the sub questions that followed from the theoretical framework, through coding. The use of (open) coding provides the possibility of analytically breaking down the data in order to compare similar experiences or events (Corbin & Strauss 1990: 12).
4.3 Respondents
In total, interviews were conducted with eighteen (first and second generation) respondents of Kurdish origin from Syria, Iraq and Turkey. No respondents from Iran were found. The first respondents were found through my personal network. On the basis of these first contacts, many other respondents were consecutively found through snowball sampling.
Interviews were conducted with fifteen female and three male respondents between the ages of 19 and 48 years. Six respondents were (originally) from Syria, six from Iraq and six from Turkey.
Ten respondents were not born in the Netherlands, yet seven of them were below four years old when they migrated to the Netherlands and therefore their memories remain limited. Eight respondents were born in the Netherlands. This study differentiates between first generation migrants (foreign-born) and second generation migrants (born in the Netherlands). Yet, first generation migrants that have migrated before the age of four will be discussed separately in the analysis of results. This provides a distinction between first generation migrants who have a conscious memory of their experiences in the homeland and those who can barely remember that period of their life.
The majority of the respondents’ original migration cause was connected to political reasons. The remaining five respondents (or their parents) emigrated from Turkey to the Netherlands within the context of labor migration.
