FACULTY OF GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS - MASTER IN CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT
THE WORD’S BATTLEFIELD:
TO WHAT EXTEND ARE THE TARGETED KILLINGS FROM 2014 TO 2016 IMPACTING THE NARRATIVES OF THE ISLAMIC STATE?
SUPERVISOR:WIETSE VAN DEN BERGE SECOND READER:DR.JOERY MATTHYS DIANE ZUNE – S1782657
I would like to dedicate this thesis to all the victims of terrorism, and especially the ones who died under the bombs of the El Bakraoui brothers in Brussels the 22th of March 2016.
I would also like to thank my supervisor, Wietse van den Berge, without whose advices and wisdom, the writing of this dissertation would not have been possible. My second reader, Dr. Joery Matthys, for the time spent on the reviewing of this dissertation. And, finally, all the people who supported me through this final step towards my degree, Jennifer Dowling, Lara Douvartzidis, Elena Preziosa, Veronica Masera, Olivier Thiry and Pauline Trouveroy.
TABLE OF CONTENT
INTRODUCTION 5 MAIN QUESTION 7 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE 9 SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE 11
OUTLOOK OF THE STUDY 12
PART 1. SETTING THE SCENE 14
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15
I.TARGETED KILLINGS: NEW TECHNIQUE, OLD PRACTICE 15
A.SHORT HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 15
B.USE OF THE TECHNOLOGY 17
C.DEBATES 18
C.1.WHEN IS A TARGETED KILLING EFFECTIVE ? 18
C.2.THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLINGS 20
II.WORDS AS A WEAPON 21
A.SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 22
A.1.COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 22
A.2.RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 24
A.3.POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 25
A.4.FRAMING THEORY 25
B.COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES 25
B.1.MASTER FRAMES 26
B.2.CORE TASKS FRAMING 27
B.2.1THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAME 27
B.2.2.THE PROGNOSIS FRAME 28
B.2.3.THE ACTION FRAME 29
METHODOLOGY 30
I.THE COLLECTION OF DATA AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS 30
A.RAW DATA 31
B.INTERVIEWS 32
C.PREVIOUS RESEARCH 32
D.VALIDITY 35
II.OPERATIONALIZATION:FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 36
A.THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE OCCURRENCES OF THE STRIKES
B.THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE FRAMES 39 B.1.THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAME 40
B.2.THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE PROGNOSIS FRAME 40
B.3.THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MOTIVATIONAL FRAME 41
PART 2. THE POWER OF WORDS 42
THE ISLAMIC STATE 43
I.THE RISE OD THE NEW FACE OF SALAFI-JIHADISM 43
A.THE ORIGINS OF THE GROUP 44
A.1.ZARQAWI’S IDEOLOGY 45
B.IRAQI FREEDOM AND IT’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 46
B.1.AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ 47
B.2.ZARQAWI’S DEATH 48
C.THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 48
D.THE CALIPHATE 49
D.1.THE ‘ARAB SPRINGS’ 50
D.2.THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND THE CALIPHATE 51
II.THE GLOBAL JIHADI MOVEMENT 52
A.SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATION 52
B.DESCRIPTION OF THE MOVEMENT 54
B.1.THE ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENT 55
B.2.THE PURISTS 57
B.3.THE POLITICOS 57
B.4.THE JIHADIS 58
C.THE NEW FACE OF SALAFI JIHADISM 59
ANALYSIS 61
I.THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TARGETED KILLINGS AND IS’ NARRATIVES 62
A.THE IMPACT OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON IS’ NARRATIVES 62
A.1.TABLE 1–COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DRONE STRIKES AND IS’ NARRATIVES 62
A.2.THE IMPACT OF THE PERCEIVED THREAT 73
B.TOP LEADERS 74
II.THE ISLAMIC STATE NARRATIVES 76
A.THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAME: YOU’RE EITHER WITH US OR AGAINST US 76
A.1.THE MANICHEAN WORLD 77
A.1.1.TARGETED KILLINGS AS A SUBMISSIVE STRATEGY 78
A.1.2.THE UMMAH IS UNDER ATTACK 78
A.2.IT IS FAIR GAME 79
A.2.1.COLLATERAL DAMAGE 80
B.THE PROGNOSIS FRAME: ONE MAN’S TERRORIST IS ANOTHER MAN’S FREEDOM FIGHTER 81
B.1.THE KILLINGS OF INNOCENTS 81
B.2.THE INEFFECTIVE AIRSTRIKES 83
B.2.1.IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY 83
B.2.2.REMAINING AND EXPANDING 84
C.1.THE SENSE OF GUILT 86
C.2REVENGE FOR OUR DEAD 87
C.3.JIHAD AND MARTYRDOM 88
C.3.A.THE LIFESTORIES 89
PART 3. THE FINAL STAGE 90
CONCLUSION 91
RECOMMENDATIONS 95
APPENDICES 96
APPENDIX 1:INTERVIEW OF THOMAS RENARD 97
APPENDIX 2:WRITTEN-INTERVIEW OF HARORO INGRAM 108
REFERENCES 112
I
NTRODUCTIONSometimes blood must be spilled for one’s country. Military force may be a necessary response to terrorism, at times requiring . . . assaults on terrorist training camps. The death of a terrorist leader during an attack causes no qualms. There is still a crucial difference between . . . military operation and assassination—the cold-blooded selection and murder of a specific individual. Assassination is a slogan, not a solution (…) however, being at war... would make a difference.1
Salafi-jihadism, or the Global Jihadi Movement, and its new hero, the organisation known nowadays as the Islamic State (IS)2, made a thunderous comeback with the Paris attacks on the 13th of November 2015. Nine years after the first declaration of the ‘Islamic State’, by the group known nowadays as IS, the self-labelled Islamic State hit the West with an attack that was qualified by the press as the French 9/11.3 The arrival on the media scene of the group led to questioning the successfulness of the Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ operation and its aftermath. The Operation was launched in 2003 because of the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein and his – alleged again – support of extremist Islamism and,
1 Quote of Jenkins, “Assassination: Should We Stay the Good Guys?” Los Angeles Times, 16 November 1986 in Alex S. Wilner (2010) Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 309-310 2 The group is also referred as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Daesh (for Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al Sham)
3 Courrier International (2015) Vu d’Allemagne. Le 11 Septembre de la France, Courrier International-Paris, the 14th of November 2015, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/vu-dallemagne-le-11-septembre-de-la-france
more specifically, his ties with Al Qaeda.4 As it will be presented in the second part of this dissertation, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Iraqi insurgency that followed the invasion helped the group, known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) since 2004, to define itself in time as the Islamic State.5 Indeed, the group known as Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (JTWJ) in 2003, that became Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)6 in 2004, seceded from the former hegemon of the Global Jihadi Movement, Al Qaeda, to become the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2011 and then in 2014, when it proclaimed the Caliphate on Syrian and Iraqi territories, the Islamic State (IS).7 For many scholars and practitioners the invasion of Iraq in 2003 left Iraq in a disastrous position, which paved the way for the rise of IS.8 Even President Obama recognized that “ISIL is a direct outgrowth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences. Which is why we should generally aim before we shoot.”9 Not only the consequences of the US-invasion of Iraq were, and still are, scrutinized by state officials and academics, but also the current tools used by the U.S. led coalition to confront the spread of the organisation to other territories. A particular measure is claimed to be ineffective by some and effective by others: the drone strikes.
I.
M
AINQ
UESTIONThis thesis will focus on the terrorist group IS, and more specifically the use of specific narratives in regards to targeted killings to enrol more people to their cause. The idea is to highlight whether or not the targeted killings are used against their own purpose, which is to
4 Fawaz A. Gerges (2016) ISIS. A history, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, p. 51
5 Charles Lister (2014) Profiling the Islamic State, Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar, Analysis Paper, No 13, November 2014, pp. 6-14
6 Charles Lister (2014) Profiling the Islamic State, Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar, Analysis Paper, No 13, November 2014, pp. 6-8
7 Idem, pp. 6-14
8 Dilly Hussain (2015) ISIS: The “unintended consequences” of the US-led war on Iraq, Foreign Policy Journal, the United Sates of America, the 23th of March 2015, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/03/23/isis-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-us-led-war-on-iraq/
9 Quote of President Barack Obama in Fawaz A. Gerges (2016) ISIS. A history, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, p. 51
counter the spread of the Islamic State. The central question that leads this research is: to what extent are the targeted killings from 2014 until 2016 impacting the narratives of the Islamic State?
The idea of this research is to assess the use of targeted killings by IS in its narratives. In order to assess this, the use of the framing theory as analytical lens seems obvious. The framing theory focuses on the use of certain narratives by a Social Movement Organisation (SMO) to frame what it assesses as a problem. More specifically, the framing theory can be divided in two parts, the core tasks framing and the master frames. For this case it is the core task framings, which consist of three steps (diagnostic, prognosis and action or motivational frame) to mobilize adherents of the Movement that have been preferred for the analysis. These three core task framings consist in, firstly, the identification of a problem thanks to the diagnostic frame, in this case the targeted killings by drone strikes. Secondly, the prognosis frame, which can be defined as the strategy to deal with what an organisation identifies as an issue by the first core task framing. Thirdly, based on the two previous framings, the action frame is constructed to motivate adherents – or potential recruits – to take action. This approach has been chosen because it will permit an analysis on three steps to evaluate whether or not targeted killings are impacting IS narratives, and if it is the case, how they do so. Of course, the choice could have been about the master frames (i.e. the discursive processes from which emerge the collective action frames).10 But it would not have been appropriate, since the master frames are more related to a Movement than a specific Organisation. The master frames are the rhetorical arguments that are used by the organisations belonging to a certain movement, and from which specific frames are drawn.11 For instance, in this case a master frame would be the one dividing the world between the Ummah (dreamed community of Muslims) and the Crusaders. 12 Even though it is useful to spot the master frames that the IS refers to when they talk about the drone strikes, it does not show the extent of the impact of targeted killings on the narratives, which is precisely the goal of the dissertation. Finally, some clarification in regard to the question has to be presented. The time frame 2014-2016 has been chosen because IS’ magazine, ‘Dabiq’, was first issued in 2014. And since the
10 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 191
11 Ibid.
12 Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006) Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol 29, issue 3, pp. 207-239
focus of the thesis will be on narratives used by the Islamic State in regards to targeted killings, the time frame is set on that basis. Indeed, in order to achieve the goal of this thesis, the unit of analysis that has been chosen is the English-written propaganda journal of IS: ‘Dabiq’. Moreover, it is during that time frame – 2014-2016 – that IS erupted on the media scene with its seizing of territories in Iraq and Syria13, then started to lose territory over the coalition forces, and attacked civilian in Europe and around the world (Australia, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, the United States, etc.). Even though Europe and the other Continents had been attacked by terrorist groups and individuals before, 2014 was the first time a deadly attack was claimed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham.14
II.
S
OCIALR
ELEVANCEBesides its very own existence on a seized territory claimed as a Caliphate, the magnetism that IS has on people all around the world15 is a greater concern for the International Community. Indeed, as Thomas Renard explains in his interview, Europe could simply not accept a group like IS to control such a vast territory, vast resources, at its doorstep.16 Moreover, the spectrum of foreign fighters continuing to leave their countries to join the cause of IS became, since 2012,17 a preoccupation for governments worldwide. Indeed, the attacks in Tunis the 18th of March 2015, in Paris the 13th of November 2015, in Brussels the 22th of March 2016, in Nice the 14th of July 2016, the 19th of December 2016 in Berlin, just to mention the ones that caught more the attention in Europe, were the result of French, Belgians, Tunisians attacking their own countries.
13 Gérard Chaliand (2015) Le jihadisme à l’heure de Daech in Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (2015) Histoire du terrorisme de l’Antiquité à Daech, Fayard, France, September 2015, p. 645
14 Edwin Bakker and Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015) Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Western Europe: A Low-probability, High-impact Threat, the ICCT, The Hague, October 2015, p. 5 15 The Soufan Group (2015). Foreign Fighters. An updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, TSG, New York, p. 5
16 Interview of Thomas Renard, the 14th of November 2016, Brussels, see Appendix 1.
17 The year is marked by an increase of deaths from terrorism as showed in the Institute of Economics and Peace (2015) Global Terrorism Index 2015. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism, The Institute of Economics and Peace, Figure 1., p. 14
In the case of the Berlin terror attack, the fact that the perpetrator could flee across Europe without detection raised voices against Europe and its values of freedom of movement. These attacks spread the fear of homegrown terrorism, led to the questioning of countries’ security management but also questioned the values on which the European Union was built on.18 Not only does the existence of IS on a seized territory in a volatile region poses a security threat to Western states, but even their own citizens can disrupt countries’ security in the name of the terror group, which jolts the foundation of the European Union. How to counter it? Besides the diverse assaults that are handled in Iraq and Syria by the allies of the U.S. led coalition, the Operation Inherent Resolve, targeted killings have an (long) American history of use to fight against terror groups like al Qaeda19 and IS. Therefore the utilization of the Western countries’ counterterrorist measures against them is becoming a greater concern. Journalists like Jeremy Scahill20 in his book ‘Dirty Wars’ and academics such as Audrey Kurth Cronin in her article ‘Why Drones Fail’21, Michael J. Boyle in his article ‘The cost and consequences of drone warfare’22, Daniel Byman in his article ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’23 and many more24, are challenging the governmental use of some counter-terrorist measures such as the use of military
18 Interview of Thomas Renard, the 14th of November 2016, Brussels, see Appendix 1.
19 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, the United States of America, pp. 14-33
20 Jeremy Scahill (2013) Dirty Wars. The World is a Battlefield, Lux, New-York, 764 pages
21 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2013) Why Drones Fail: When the Tactics Drive Strategy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, pp. 44-54
22 Michael J. Boyle (2013) The costs and consequences of drone warfare, International Affairs, Vol. 89, issue 1, pp. 1-29
23 Daniel Byman (2006) Do Targeted Killings Work?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 95-111
24 Adam Roberts (2015) Terrorism Research: Past, Present, and Future, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 38, No.1, pp. 62-74
Dennis Jett (2012) Losing the War on Terror: Who we help are hurting, Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 135-141
Ionut C. Popescu (2009) Strategic Theory and Practice: A Critical Analysis of the Planning Process for the Long War on Terror, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 100-124
John Gray (2016) The age of hyper-terrorism, the New Statesman, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.newstateman.com/politics/uk/2016/04/age-hyper-terrorism
Joseba Zulaika (2014) Drones and fantaisy in US counterterrorism, Journal for Cultural Research, Vol. 18, No.2, pp. 171-187
Kyle Grayson (2012) Six Theses on Targeted Killing, Politics, Special Section – Politics and War: Ethics, Opinion and Logics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 120-128
Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro (2012) Who takes the blame? The strategic effects of collateral damage, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 167-187
force or targeted killings to counter the spread of terrorist groups because of the civilian casualties and the capacity of terror groups to use these casualties at their benefit.25 Furthermore, understanding the impact that Western acts can have on IS’ propaganda can be useful to disrupt the terror group and its powerful attraction for citizens that leave their countries to join their ranks.26 The use of counterterrorist measures such as the use of drones is oppugned. More specifically, the role played by them in creating terrorism, or at least paving its way.
III.
S
CIENTIFICR
ELEVANCEOn the matter of measures to counter terrorist groups, IS included, one has been observed and analysed increasingly by the academic community over the past few years, because of its extended use by the Americans under the Obama administration: targeted killings.27 The intensifying use of targeted killings to counter terrorism led to an expansive debate in the academic community. Some experts, like Alex S. Wilner28, are advocating in favour of the targeted killings and other counterterrorist strategies, arguing that such measures are effective because of their effects on the groups’ organisation and structure. Others, such as Lisa Hajjar and Laleh Khalili or the war reporter Jeremy Scahill, disagree saying that the measures are not effective since a lot of civilians are killed in the process, which reinforces the anti-American feeling across populations against which targeted killings are used, such as Iraqis, Yemenis, Afghanis, and Pakistanis.29 The matter in this debate is that the pros and cons of such measures
25 Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh (2013) Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence of Propaganda Output, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 311-327
26 Haroro J. Ingram (2016) An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, pp 1-2
27 Uri Friedman (2012) Anthropology of an Idea: Targeted Killings, Foreign Policy, September/October 2012, issue 195, pp. 32-33
28 Alex S. Wilner (2010) Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 307-329 29 See: Jeremy Scahill (2013) Dirty Wars, documentary, Big Noise Films and Civic Bakery, The United States, 1h 27 minutes, available on the Internet. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TN4Sn5u_pK0 Laleh Khalili (2012) Fighting over Drones, Middle East Report, Vol. 42, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/fighting-over-drones
Lisa Hajjar (2012) Anatomy of the U.S. Targeted Killings Policy, Middle East Report, Vol. 42, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/fighting-over-drones
are not looking at the same unit of analysis to assess the (in)effectiveness of targeted killings. The first ones are focusing on the impact on the structure of terrorists groups and the other ones are focusing on the civilian population killed in the process. Nonetheless, it seems that no one focused on the impact of targeted killings on the narratives used by terror groups, or more specifically IS. Even though authors such as Audrey Cronin30 have already pinpointed the use, by terrorists groups like al Qaeda, of certain narratives to frame the targeted killings. For the author, the targeted killings framed by such groups are used to legitimize their actions against their ‘enemies’.31 But it seems that no one in the academic community has already zoomed in on the particular impact that targeted killings have on the narratives used by the Islamic State. IS spreads its narratives through different platforms: beheadings videos, tweets, Facebook posts, propaganda videos, propaganda magazines such as ‘Dabiq’ for the English speakers, ‘Dar al-Islam’ for the French speakers, and more recently ‘Rumiyah’. Recent history abounds of examples of double-edged wars. As during the two World Wars, there were the battlefields on the ground and in the words. Defeating the enemy was not only a military question; pamphlets were dropped from the skies within the enemy territory to ‘inform’ the population of the wrongdoings of its defenders. Nowadays, there is no need to drop information from the skies, but the practice is still the same: battling on the ground and informing the population through to the Internet. Far from the idea of reinventing the wheel, this thesis will be a contribution to the body of scientific knowledge about the Islamic State, the understanding of consequences of Western actions to counter the spread of the group and the academic sub-community focusing on the analysis of IS’ propaganda magazines.
IV.
O
UTLOOK OF THE STUDYThe thesis will be divided in three major parts. The first one will focus on the prerequisites of writing the analysis, meaning the theoretical framework and the methodology. In the part where the scene will be set, the concepts and theory on which the analysis relies on will be developed.
30 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, the United States of America, pp. 14-33
31 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, the United States of America, pp. 14-33
The targeted killings, and the framing theory are the concepts that need further explanations and definitions. Then the second part will present IS and its history, its nature as a Social Movement Organisation part of the Global Jihadi Movement. Moreover, the second chapter of this part will be dedicated to the analysis of the content of the propaganda magazine ‘Dabiq’. This analysis will be made by confronting the reports on targeted killings, that are available thanks to airwars.org, with the narratives developed by the group in the issues of ‘Dabiq’. Cities on which drone strikes are massively used, the number of civilians victims who died as collateral damage by the hands of the U.S. led coalition, top leaders taken down by the Americans or the UK, all kinds of available information on drone strikes will be compared with the narratives of IS to assess the extent of the impact that the first one has on the other. The observation will also be completed by the interviews of counterterrorism experts as well as press articles. Moreover, the analysis part will be divided in three sub-parts corresponding to the three core task framings that will be explained under the banner of the framing theory. Finally the third stage will conclude with the deductions extracted from the analysis and recommendations for further research on IS and its narratives.
P
ART1.
T
HEORETICALF
RAMEWORKThe word God has no meaning for me but I restore it to the mystery, not to the void. – René Magritte. 32
Before the analysis, the concept of targeted killings, and the theory that will be used to look at IS’ narratives need to be presented and defined. This chapter will be twofold. First, the use of targeted killings, as a counter terrorist measure will be developed. Second, the social movement theory is will be described, and in particular, one of its perspectives: the framing theory.
I.
T
ARGETED KILLINGS:
N
EW TECHNIQUE,
OLD PRACTICEAs seen before, the targeted killings are nourishing a vast debate in the academic community and between the community and the practitioners. To understand the essence of this debate, it is imperative to understand what targeted killings are. The chapter will provide a short historical perspective of the practice, then develop its use in today’s policies, and finish on the debates that arose from it.
A. SHORT HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The practice of targeted killings, or targeted assassinations, has been used for centuries by governments or organisations to get rid of persons of interest. History is stacked with examples of
32 Quotes of René Magritte in Charly Hescovici (2016) René Magritte: Écrits Complets, Flammarion, France, the 21th of September 2016, 768 pages
political plots to assassinate kings, archdukes or political leaders to prove a point or to end wars. Some are more famous than others, such as the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, which sparked the First World War, or more recently the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, which was seen as ‘disturbing’ for the international balance of power.33 But the recurrent use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) to get rid of presumed terrorists or terrorist leaders that was introduced by Israel34 is a novelty in the history of coups. The Israeli government uses targeted killings in the name of national security to deal with suspected terrorists while minimizing collateral civilian victims, as they claim. This is precisely where the novelty lies: the use of drones to target and kill suspected or proven terrorists is known to the public and claimed by governments. A famous example of that shift was the assassination of the number one enemy of the United States of America, Osama bin Laden.35 Even though the governments ‘kill lists’ using targeted killings by drone strikes are not known, it is common practice for the countries to recognize when they took down someone from that list.36 Thus, as Ahmed Buckley defines the practice, the targeted killings “are the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals ... with explicit governmental approval.”37 Americans have been using drone strikes since the George W. Bush administration, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the start of the War on Terror (the first recorded drone strike carried out against human targets outside the set of war was the 5th of November 2002)38, but it is President Barack Obama who made it a recurrent choice to deal with terrorist organisations.39 As former President George W. Bush had a preference for capturing supposed terrorists, President Barack Obama opted for targeted killings. Both methods have their pros and cons. During the second Bush
33 Uri Friedman (2012) Anthropology of an Idea: Targeted Killings, Foreign Policy, September/October 2012, issue 195, pp. 32-33
34 Frederico Sperotto (2008) Targeted Killings in Response to Security Threat: Warfare and Humanitarian Issues, Global Jurist, Vol. 8, No. 3, Article 10, pp. 3-11
35 Jonathan Masters (2013) Targeted Killings, Council on Foreign Relations, CFR Backgrounders, 23th of May 2013, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627 36 For example, the killing of ‘Jihadi John’ was acknowledge and disscussed by Joint Committee in the UK. See, Joint Committee on Human Rights (2016) The Government’s Policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, Second Report of Session 2015-16, The House of Lords and House of Commons, London, 10th of May 2016, 108 pages
37 Ahmed Buckley (2012) Smiting Spell: The Legality of Targeted Killings in the War against Terrorism, Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, November 2012, p. 440
38 Thomas Michael McDonnell (2012) Sow what you reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to carry out assassinations or targeted killings of suspected Islamic terrorists, The George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 247
Administration, there were scandals around detention centers of Abu Graib and Guantanamo Bay and the conditions in which prisoners were interrogated. During the Obama Administration, there was the scandal of the killings of American citizens by drones, Anwar Awlaki, and his 16-year-old son.40 Moreover, both methods led to further debates on their legality and ethical validity. Nonetheless, as Daniel Byman advocates in his article ‘Why Drones Work? The Case for Washington Weapons of Choice’, there is no real alternative that “does not involve boots on the ground and gets the work done for a relatively cheap price.”41 The weaponry is essentially used “to carry out lethal strikes against suspected terrorist”42 and is more likely to stay Washington’s weapon of choice, because the technology tends to expand to other countries and for the same reasons invoked previously, to use the words of Daniel Byman, “there are no alternatives as effective and cheap as drone strikes.”43
B. USE OF THE TECHNOLOGY
Usually targeted killings conducted by the Americans are understood as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) raids and drone strikes.44 But this work will only focus on the drone strikes launched by the U.S. and to a smaller extent the UK. The JSOC was used way before the War on Terror, and served as covert operations for lethal operations, but not only that.45 The Joint Special Operations Command is an elite corps inside the US military that was and still is deployed for specific targeted operations, for the War on Terror.46 The American Administration calls targeted killings conducted by drone strikes ‘signature strikes’. They are usually covert operations, about which getting information is difficult. Nevertheless, drone strikes are now used in military theatres such as the wars in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, since they are
40 Jeremy Scahill (2013) Dirty Wars. The World is a Battlefield, Lux, New York, pp. 53-70 and 93-102 41 Daniel Byman (2013) Why Drones Work? The Case for Washington Weapon of Choice, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 4, July/ August 2013, pp. 32-43
42 Megan Braun and Daniel R. Brunsletter (2013) Rethinking the criterion for assessing CIA-targeted killings: Drones, Proportionality and Jus Ad Vim, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 12, No 4, p. 304
43 Daniel Byman (2013) Why Drones Work? The Case for Washington Weapon of Choice, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 4, July/ August 2013, pp. 32-43
44 Jeremy Scahill (2013) Dirty Wars. The World is a Battlefield, Lux, New York, pp. 48-60 45 Ibid.
more extensively used for direct actions47, it is possible to track them down, as the London Bureau of Investigation, its partner airwars.org and dronewars.net do in countries such as Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc. Hence, some information on drone strikes is available, whereas very little to no information at all exists on the JSOC. But even though there is some data that the public can access in regards to drones, it does not imply which ones were bombings against IS and which other were actual killings carried out by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. With that in mind, the data will have to be used cautiously, since there is no way to differentiate the essence of the strike. Only the assassinations of the top leaders of IS are leaked to the press, therefore, they are the only ones that can be traced.
C. DEBATES
The recourse of such weaponry has led to two major debates: the first one tore the academic community around the question of the effectiveness of targeted killings; the second debate arose from the legality of such a measure.
C.1.WHEN IS A TARGETED KILLING EFFECTIVE?
As introduced, there are two major camps that battle against each other on the effectiveness of targeted killings. The authors that are arguing in favour of the measure are doing so by demonstrating how such killings impact the structure and the planning of attacks of terrorist organisations. Authors, like Alex S. Wilner, in his article “Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency” demonstrate that targeted killings are effective by analysing the type of attacks carried out by the Taliban before and after targeted killings.48 Daniel Byman also argues that the measure is effective since terrorist organisations are based around charismatic leaders and thus, carrying attacks against
47 Chris Cole (2014) Drones in Iraq and Syria, what we know and what we don’t, Drone Wars UK, the 7th of November 2014, available on the Internet. URL: https://dronewars.net/2014/11/07/drones-in-iraq-and-syria-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/
48 Alex S. Wilner (2010) Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33n No. 4, pp. 307-329
them helps diminishing a terror organisation.49 Others, like Thomas Michael McDonnell, highlight that, thanks to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, there are no safe havens for terrorists anymore, since the vehicles can reach zones that troops cannot.50 On the other side of the battlefront, authors refute the utility of targeted killings. They usually invoke the same rhetoric, arguing that these measures are killing civilians, which creates a thirst of revenge within the population hit by the bombings.51 Moreover, academics like Laleh Khalili and Lisa Hajjar demonstrate in their articles that the measures undertaken by Western societies to fight terrorism have opposite effects since the counterterrorism tools are hitting civilians. This creates martyrdom and gives local populations (primarily not attracted by the terrorist cause) ground to join such organisations to seek revenge.52 Even the argument that targeted killings kill more civilians than terrorists is subject to debate. Audrey Kurth Cronin explains, in her article “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy”, that, under the Obama Administration, drone strikes avoided civilians in 86% of the strikes.53 Nevertheless, the author also explains, in her book “How terrorism ends: understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns”, that the decapitation measure (i.e. targeted killings or capture of a leader) can have a significant effect on a terror group and how it is perceived.54 Alex P. Schmidt and Rashimi Singh also mention the importance of narratives and propaganda in the struggle against terrorism.
The successful framing of reality and the conflict in such culturally resonant terms has resulted in the fact that today, a sizeable group of Muslims – and even the majority of Muslims in several countries including the United States – tend to believe that the War
49 Daniel Byman (2006) Do Targeted Killings work? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 95-111
50 Thomas Michael McDonnell (2012) Sow what you reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to carry out assassinations or targeted killings of suspected Islamic terrorists, The George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 27
51 Jeremy Scahill (2013) Dirty Wars. The World is a Battlefield, Lux, New York, pp. 48-60
52 Lisa Hajjar (2012) Anatomy of the U.S. Targeted Killings Policy, Middle East Report, Vol. 42, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/fighting-over-drones
53 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2013) Why Drones Fail : When Tactics Drive Strategy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, pp. 44-54
54 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, the United States of America, pp. 14-34
on Terror is in fact a war on Islam.55
This would tend to prove that the use of targeted killings to counter the spread of terrorist groups is not as effective as expected. Indeed, the narratives used to frame the War on Terror, and the use of specific counter terrorism measures, tend to depict them as a war against Muslims, which could pave the way for further enrolments of members in terrorist groups such as IS. Thus, a counter terrorist measure used to counter the spread of a terrorist group can be used against its purpose by framing the reality in different terms.
C.2.THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLINGS
Another source of debate in regards to the targeted killings is the legality of the measure. The debate has formed around the legality of the ‘signature strikes’—whether or not it is legal to kill alleged terrorists instead of capturing them—and around the question of the sovereignty of states in which the targeted killings are conducted.56 The targeted killing measure is conditioned (for the United States) by the Presidential Policy Guidance, which describes the circumstances when targeted killings can be conducted.57 Five conditions are established when it comes to such a measure: “the near certainty that the terrorist target is present; the near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; the assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation; the assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; the assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.”58 The question of labelling presumed terrorists as ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful’ combatants divides the academic community. The matter of labelling terrorists with a term or its opposite may seem irrelevant but has its importance. Indeed, the use of targeted killings will be seen as legal in the eyes of the international law if terrorists are recognized as ‘lawful combatants’, whereas, if they
55 Alex P. Schmidt and Rashmi Singh (2009) Measuring success and failures in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 55 in Alex P. Schmidt and Garry F. Hindle (2009). After the War on Terror: Regional and Multilateral perspectives on counter-terrorism strategy, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London, 151 pages.
56 Lynn E. Davis, Michael McNerney and Michael D. Greenberg (2016) Clarifying the Rules for Targeted Killings, RAND Corporation, Research Report, the 8th of September 2016, pp. 1-9
57 Ibid., p. 12 58 Ibid.
are not recognized as such, the use of such measure is outside of the law.59 The risk of ‘collateral damage’ among civilians is also scrutinized by the academic community and leads to the debate previously presented with respects to the effectiveness of the measure. The debates around the legality of targeted killings and their conformity with the international law used up a lot of ink and had to be at least presented even though it appears that such restrictions do not apply to the current use of targeted killings in Syria and Iraq, since the measure is used within the scope of direct actions in areas of active hostilities.60
II.
W
ORDS AS A WEAPONWar is not just a question of the biggest guns or bombs, words have their impact too, and IS understands that very clearly.61 Indeed, the organisation is not only fighting the coalition on the grounds of Syria and Iraq, but it is also continuously trying to recruit by recurring to its narratives.62 “They’re wielding a narrative with the power to frame random act of senseless violence as heroic deeds of epic significance.”63 It is not the truth that matters, but rather the meaning that is given to it. In the group’s narratives, ‘a random act of senseless violence’, such as setting a Jordanian pilot on fire, is depicted as a ‘heroic deed’ to avenge the children and women that died because of the U.S. led coalition. In the narratives, instead of being cruel, the group is the avenger of the Ummah64, which is persecuted by the rest of the world. The
narratives, or propaganda apparatus, used by IS are recognized as being one of the most effective
59 Ahmed Buckley (2012) Smiting Spell: The Legality of Targeted Killings in the War against Terrorism, Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, November 2012, p. 439-454
60 Chris Cole (2014) Drones in Iraq and Syria, what we kno wand what we don’t, Drone Wars UK, the 7th of November 2014, available on the Internet. URL: https://dronewars.net/2014/11/07/drones-in-iraq-and-syria-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/
61 Interview of Haroro Ingram, the 18h of January 2017, The Hague, see Appendix 2. 62 Ibid.
63 Tamin Ansary (2016) Islamic State: The Menace is Its Narratives, The World Post, Berggruen Institute, the 11th of December 2016, available on the Internet. URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tamim-ansary/islamic-state-the-menace-_b_8788644.html
tools of the group.65 The narratives are not only used to recruit fighters, they are also used to motivate lone wolves to carry out attacks.66
A. THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
The understanding of the Islamic State organisation as a part of the Global Jihadi Movement (GJM)67 is crucial for the theory that will be used as the spectacles through which the analysis will be made and can be developed. Because the research question is focused on the impact of targeted killings on IS’s narratives, and the unit of analysis chosen to answer it is the issues of ‘Dabiq’, a theory focusing on the construction of narratives is needed. The theory chosen to act as the theoretical lens is the framing theory. This theory is focused on frames, defined as “the manner in which a choice problem is presented”68. It analyses how a certain event is identified as an issue then dealt with, in terms of narratives, and then used to recruit adherents69. This is precisely what this dissertation is about: assessing the impact of the targeted killings on IS’s narratives.
The framing theory is part of the social-constructivist perspective in international relations and more specifically, the social movement theory (SMT). The SMT emerged in the early 1960’s when scholars needed a new pair of theory glasses to analyse new social movements appearing on the political stage such as the civil right’s movement in the United States.70 The theory conceptualizes social movements as being structured around claims from isolated sections of
65 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr and Bridget Moreng (2016) The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy, ICCT Research Paper, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, March 2016, p.8
66 Aaron Y. Zelin (2016) Filtering meta-narratives: From Global to Local in: The Carter Center (2016) Countering Daesh propaganda: Action-oriented research for practical policy outcomes, the Carter Center, Atlanta, February 2016, pp. 20-23
67 See Part 2, Chapter 1, section III
68 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 190
69 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 191
70 Doug McAdam and W. Richard Scott (2005) Organisations and Movements, in Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald (2005) Social Movements and Organisation Theory, Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2005, pp. 4-6
society. Social Movements (SMs) are conceptualized as broad banners in society that rally several organisations, the Social Movement Organisations (SMO’s). These SMO’s form social movements since they share the same claims and thus gather together to make their demands heard. For example, within society, there is the GJM – a Social Movement – that is the jihadi movement rallying different jihadi groups – the SMO’s – that share the same claims (the establishment of Islamic States, the defence of the Ummah, etc.).
What is labelled ‘Social Movement Theory’ is in fact divided in sub-approaches: the collective identity approach, the resource mobilization perspective, the political opportunity model, and the framing theory.71 In the early days of the theory, only three broad factors (that are corresponding to three ‘sub-approaches’) were considered important to understand the emergence, development and sometimes decline, of a Social Movement: the mobilizing structure, the political opportunities and the framing processes. 72 It is the combination of the approaches, corresponding to the aforementioned factors, that allows the researcher to “capture important aspects of reality that influence social movement.”73 A collective identity has to be formed for the organisation to exist. Once there is a collective identity, resources have to be mobilized for the group to become an organisation. The mobilization of resources will be used when there is an opening thanks to the political opportunity. Finally the framing will continue to develop the collective identity, since it provides spectacles to read the world around individuals by framing what the group considers as problematic and what actions need to be taken.74 Karl-Dieter Opp describes, in his book ‘Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis’75 the pre-cited approaches as the major theoretical perspectives in the
71 Jörg Balsiger (2007) Social Movement Theory in: Mark Bevir (2007) Encyclopedia of Governance, Sage Publications, California, 2007, vol-I. 889-892
72 Doug McAdam and W. Richard Scott (2005) Organisations and Movements, in Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald (2005) Social Movements and Organisation Theory, Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2005, pp. 4-6
73 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 21
74 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, pp. 758-761
75 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 103
Social Movement field.76
A.1.COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The collective identity approach is the last ‘sub-approach’ that has been developed within the social movement theory. Melucci theorized the perspective in 1988.77 Its elaboration resulted from the inadequacy of the three other approaches to cope with the question: ‘why do groups form around an issue?’78 Indeed, according to Melucci, the other perspectives dismiss a vital aspect with respects to the SMOs, the actor itself.79 This perspective consists in apprehending the formation of a collective identity being defined as “an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.”80 Based on that sense of membership this approach looks at how it is used by Social Movement Organisations to mobilize its adherents.
A.2.RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
John D. McCarty and Mayer N. Zald have developed this perspective in their article ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.’81 It is, according to Opp, the oldest sociological approach to Social Movements.82 As its name indicates, the resource mobilization theory asserts that Social Movements need to mobilize resources such as money, adherents, times, etc., if they want to be
76 To explore and study the dynamics between the four approaches and the Social Movement Theory see: Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, 403 pages
77 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 204
78 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper (2001) Collective Identity and Social Movements, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 27, p. 284
79 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 204
80 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper (2001) Collective Identity and Social Movements, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 27, p. 285
81 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 127
successful.83 This theory focuses on the success of a Social Movement thanks to the role of internal resources and the mobilization efforts developed around them.84 Resource mobilization can be defined as ‘the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action.’85 The sub-approach looks at how an SMO pulls its resources together to manage the claims formulated by its adherents.
A.3.POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
Eisinger, first theorized this perspective in 1973, to understand why there were some riots in certain cities, whereas there were none in other.86 The explanation relied on whether or not the political system was open to public claims. The rise of individual’s expectations that deciders take their opinions into account would depend on the opening of an opportunity structure. This rising of expectation would lead people to gather and form of social movements (SM).87 Thus, the theory looks at the role of political structures in shaping the potential opportunities for the SM to achieve their objectives.88 The political opportunity was then defined by the author as ‘the likelihood that changes in the political environment raise the ‘chances of the success of citizen political activities.’ 89
83 Nahed Eltantawy and Julie B. Wiest (2011) Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory, International Journal of Communication, issue 5, University of Southern Carolina, p. 1209
84 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 758
85 Definition of Resource Mobilization given by Jenkins in Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 139
86 David S Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff (2004) Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, The Univeristy of North Carolina Press, The United States, Social Forces, June 2004, Vol. 82, No. 4, p. 1459
87 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 201
88 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 758
89 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 31
A.4.FRAMING THEORY
Frames are defined as ‘an interpretative schemata that signifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one’s present or past environment.’90 They matter since the way of framing an issue or a story will affect a movement’s (or an organisation’s) ability to recruit adherents and demobilized antagonists.91 Therefore the framing theory studies how the reality is framed by Social Movement Organisations to recruit adherents, to explain the ‘world out there’ to its members and motivate them to act.92 This perspective is developed further in the next section since it will be used for the dissertation.
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
David A. Snow developed the framing theory in the 1980’s with the goal of explaining how frames are constructed for a mobilizing purpose. According to Benford and Snow, Social Movement Organisations (SMO’s) are using frames to “render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action.”93 According to the authors, collective action frames are divided in “two sets of characteristic features”94: the core tasks framing used by Social Movement Organisation to mobilize its auditorium and the discursive processes from which emerge the collective action frames, the master frames.95
90 Snow and Benford’s definition of Frames in Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 761
91 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 188
92 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 761
93 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An overview and assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, pp. 613-614
94 Idem, p. 615
95 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 761
B.1.MASTER FRAMES
The master frames were described as the discursive processes from which the collective action frames emerge.96 They (the master frames) can be seen as ‘bigger framings’ that are shared by organisations of a same movement. These master frames are therefore acting on a larger scale because of their generic nature.97 They are also used to frame reality and issues that are faced by the movement, and not the organisations. It can bee seen as a giant bag put at the disposal of the SMO’s by the Social Movement to which they belong, and from which the organisation can develop more specific arguments.98 For instance, in the case of the Global Jihadi Movement, the Social Movement to which the Islamic State belongs to, the master frames would be the unity of God (tawhid) and the fight against the Crusaders to protect the Ummah.99 Indeed both of these
master frames are commonly used by the Salafi organisations and more precisely the Jihadi’s ones. Hence, even though they echo in IS’ narratives, they are too broad to assess the particular problems of targeted killings for the group. Because IS is understood as a SMO, part of the Global Jihadi Movement, collective action frames already emerged thanks to political opportunity like the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Indeed, it allowed the master frame dividing the world between ‘the Crusaders and the Ummah’ to re-emerge from the one previously crafted during the war that opposed the USSR and the Taliban.100 At that time frames such as the
Ummah against the rest of the world emerged to attract more fighters to join the cause and push
back the invaders personify by the USSR. During the U.S. led invasion of Ira in 2003, the frame of the Ummah facing invaders emerged again, but this time the intruders were not the Soviet Union but the Westerners led by the Americans. The frame that emerged during the war of 1979, re-emerged in 2003, thanks to an opportunity given by Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’.
96 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 188
97 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 246
98 Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarec (2013) Social Movement Theory, Collective Action Frames and Union Theory: A Critique and Extension, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 51, Issue 4, December 2013, p. 762
99 Ummah designated the imagined (by the Salafis – the extreme branch of Sunnis of which Jihadis are a part) community of – Sunni – Muslims that has to be protected from the West.
100 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 124-126
B.2.CORE TASKS FRAMINGS
As operationalized in the next chapter, the analysis will be using the core tasks framings (CTFs), which are acting on three levels: diagnosis, prognosis and motivation. Therefore they are labelled diagnostic frame, prognostic frame and motivational frame. These core tasks framing are crafted to use what is identified as an issue to mobilize the adherents of an organisation to act. “Collective action frames may serve an interpretive function by focusing, articulating, and expending meanings to activate adherents, transform bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize antagonists (…).”101 It is a process.
B.2.1.THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAME
First an organisation will diagnose an event as a problem and frame it as such (the diagnostic frame). In doing so, the organisation will attribute the blame or responsibility to a designated source by two sub-framings: the adversarial framing and the boundary framing.102 The first one consists in constructing the antagonists and protagonists of the movement, whereas the second one is focused on blurring the boundary between good and evil.103 Therefore, the first core task framing will provide answers to “what is wrong?” and “who/what is to blame?”104. However, there might be some divergences between SMO’s of a same Social Movement in regard of who or what is the source of the problem.105 For example: in the Global Jihadi Movement, the differences of opinions between al-Qaeda and IS are crystalized around the ‘far enemy’ and the ‘near enemy’. Al Qaeda, would direct the blame for the Muslim World’s decline to the Americans, its European allies (the far enemy), and the Middle Eastern governments they
101 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 124
102 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An overview and assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, p. 615
103 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An overview and assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, p. 616
104 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 124
105 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 124
support, whereas IS would direct the responsibility to the ‘near enemy’, the Shia community.106
B.2.2.THE PROGNOSTIC FRAME
Once the problem is defined and a Manichean world is created in regard of the narratives, the organisation will provide a way to deal with the problem (the prognostic frame), this task consists essentially by using counterframes. These imply a ‘reverse’ use of the adversary framings. The idea is to use the arguments of the source of the problem against itself. 107 For example, the countries using targeted killings would say that it is efficient whereas the other part will frame the targeted killings by refuting their efficacy and say that it kills innocent people. It is all about how to frame it. The prognostic frame also consists in the elaboration of solutions to deal with the problem and in the identification of strategies, targets and tactics. It is a sort of road map to tackle the issue the organisation is facing.108 Thanks to the second core task framing, the question “what is to be done” will be answered.109
B.2.3.THE ACTION FRAME
Finally, the third core task framing activates people to act (the motivational or action frame). The idea is that, once the problem has been diagnosed and countered, adherents need “a rationale for action.”110 It is a “call to arms.”111 This framing acts as an inspiration for people to take actions,
106 Fawaz A. Gerges (2016) ISIS. A history, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, pp. 242-249
107 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An overview and assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, p. 617
108 Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis, Routledge, Oxon, the United Kingdom, p. 258
109 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 127
110 R David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 128
111 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho (2006) Frames and their consequences, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, the United Kingdom, March 2006, p. 188
thanks to a certain type of vocabulary: the “vocabularies of motive.”112 The idea here is to overcome the fear of risks that come with the collective action. For this case and within the jihadi movement, the motivational frame could be drawn from the idea of Jihad and holy war that therefore grants you the access to paradise.113
112 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, And Islamic Terrorist Movements, International Quarterly Review, Vol 12, No 1, p. 128
M
ETHODOLOGYIn order to answer the research question – to what extent are the targeted killing from 2014 until 2016 impacting IS’narratives? – an analysis of the English-written magazines of IS will be conducted. The analysis will focus on how does the group frame the targeted killings in its narratives. To do so, a search for particular frames within the magazines will be conducted. The three frames that will be searched for are the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame and the motivational frame. The idea is to assess whether or not IS uses narratives related to targeted killings to motivate its members to take actions and to encourage its potential recruits to migrate to the territories under IS’ control. In order to assess whether or not drone strikes are impacting IS’ narratives, a two-levels analysis will be conducted. First, number of drone strikes targeting IS will be confronted to the occurrence of narratives used to frame them. Then, each frame’s appearance and their narratives will be catalogued. To conduct this analysis, data are a primary need. Thus the first section of this chapter will present the gathering of data as well as the validity of the research. The second section will develop the operationalization of the framing theory into concepts and indicators. This section will also present how frames will be searched for in the issues of ‘Dabiq’ and how a potential link between the targeted killings and the narratives of the group can be drawn. In other words, how the research will be conducted.
I.
T
HE COLLECTION OFD
ATA AND ANALYTICAL TOOLSIn order to conduct research, material is needed. Both primary and secondary sources will be used to gather information and process it. To assure as much objectivity as possible and to override some issues that could be faced, a triangulation of methods had been chosen. Thanks to a diversified pool of information, the data will be crossed to ensure transparency and objectivity. The data will be gathered by looking at reports published on the actions taken by the U.S. led
